CONTENTS

Here and Now

Editorial
Full Employment & Total Management
Debate on Managerialism
Kurdistan as a Permanent Refugee Camp
The Urge to Destroy
A Soviet Autopsy
The Myth of Professionalism
Teaching Johnny to Grieve
Orcadian Abuse
Stonehenge and the Travellers
Seriality Kills

Reviews
Assaults on Economic Reason
The Leadership Secrets of Atilla the Hun
Transport

Letters

Short Story
Whatever happened to Wreckless Eric?

Listings

Cover Design by Pete Coleman
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No. 12

Frank Dexter
John Quail & Mike Peters
Jim McFarlane
John Barrett
Colin Webster
D.K.
Alex Richards
Kevin Hetherington
Frank Dexter
Steve Bushell
Mike Peters
Alex Richards
Terry Delaney

1992

3
5
7
11
13
15
17
21
22
25
29
33
37
39
40
41
43
EWAILING THE BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL ORDER IS A SURE WAY TO
gain a hearing for repressive recipes. Predictably both Roger Scruton in the latest
Salisbury Review, and Beatrix Campbell in the latest (and mercifully the last) issue
of Marxism Today, have worked up a lather of indignation about the demoralisation
of society by, respectively, "hearts softened by pleasure and indulgence" and a "disaffected,
dangerous masculinity" undermining the "discipline of communal culture". These
complementary diagnoses of the most recent forms of social 'disorder' in British cities display both their
authors' obsessions and the strategic interests of the strata they are speaking for. For Scruton only a
religious revival (coupled with harsh policing and sentencing) can keep the mob at heel, for Campbell (a
'communist' who loathes at least 50% of the proletariat) only a more intensive management of everyday life
can unbind the springs of this aggression. Both confirm the reigning orthodoxy: without constant inspection
and instruction (however disguised) by the properly qualified authorities (the police and social workers) the
riff raff will go wild in an orgy of rape and pillage.

This issue is devoted to probing the proliferating agencies of control; agencies which have apparently
flourished under a period when 'rolling back the frontiers of the State' constituted the apotheosis of government
rhetoric and ideology.

In the opening article Frank Dexter attempts to provide an overview of developments in the management
of production, and this is followed by a discussion between John Quail and Mike Peters as to the merits of the
new strategy of managerialisation (whereby workers are encouraged to manage themselves - akin to the
poison of guilt and self-punishment or an opportunity to displace the administrative class?). The spread of
managerialism from its origins as a mechanism for the control of wage labour, into the territory of everyday
life, the emotions and the unconscious itself is documented in articles charting its progress in the professions,
by Colin Webster, into grief, by D.K., and into the culture industry in the exploitation of 'horror' by Frank Dexter.

Despite managerialism's self-professed claim to reconstruct community, be it in the workplace, nation, or
beyond, it is itself dependent upon (and instrumental in creating) a widespread desocialisation - a process
nurtured by the spread of distrust, the destruction of existing solidarities, and the perpetual defamation of
convivial ways of living as 'traditional', 'outdated' or 'conservative' as Steve Bushell reveals. Indeed it is the
real horror of the experiences of human beings in Kurdistan and Yugoslavia which shows that the modern
tradition of nationalism cannot sustain the test of establishing a better society or community, although as
the letter from a Saudi P.O.W. camp indicates there are less illusions about this in Middle Eastern Kurdistan
than in European Yugoslavia.

Far from conforming to a model of central control, or a myth of total administration, the 'fragmentarian'
rather than totalitarian strategy prevails. The fate of the Soviet Bloc as described by John Barrett confirms
that fragmentation is where the real convergence of East and West is heading. Previously particularities
had been able to survive precisely because the ruling power's claim to universality necessitated ignoring
these peculiarities. No more so. By relinquishing claim to the universal the particular is all the better
policed. The abandonment by the radical professional (amongst others) of claims to Truth has buttressed
their role as arbitrators (potentially as powerful a role as any in this state), although this has not prevented
such claims being made by some in the pursuit of special causes as Alex Richards discloses.

However this new role sends fissures into the depths of professionalism. Colin Webster uncovers the tensions
which have produced the atmosphere of constant crisis under which most professionals labour - a point John
Quail also makes to explain the plethora of different managerial strategies.

The current role of the manager whose job began with the destruction of 'archaic' work practices the better
to unleash a devastating industrialisation, and continues with the most intimate penetration of the corners of
daily life, calls into question the practice of those radicals who still find mileage in 'demystification' as an
oppositional strategy, although Kevin Hetherington reveals that such a process is far from complete.
The present stage of capitalism is one in which it is possible to say that the central imperative of capital is nothing less than the transformation of people. This makes ‘management’ as such into the aim and not just a means to an end, at the same time as it makes all ‘labour’ increasingly into a process of ‘management’ of the body, of appearance, of desire, of self as much as of the behaviours of others.

This undercuts the possibility of any meaning to a struggle within the terms of capital: “Human Resources of All Lands Unite - You have nothing to lose but the capital invested in your training?!” It also underlines the importance of recognising capital’s need for ‘making both ends meet’ politically. For this constitution of a new social order needs the Left for its constant deconstructive demonstration of the horrors of leaving people unregulated (or ‘excluded’ as it would say), as much as the Left needs the Right in order to delude itself that its ‘radicality’ has some other ends than those of capital.

Socialism wasn’t ‘stolen’ by capital, nor can the radical intelligentsia be accused of joyriding a ‘marxism’ whose brake linings they have grossly abused. The history of socialism teaches us differently, which is why ‘history’ is now a source of unease for intellectuals whose chief aim in maintaining their control of the schooling system is to ensure that not a whisper of the real past shall be divulged to the next generation, a past that does not fit the neat little dichotomies of progressivism/reaction which these pundits trade in.

Those who have accepted their role as the managers of everyday life have only one hope of redeeming themselves, and that is to fail. A residue of conscience would dictate some deliberateness to this outcome, the sooner the better. To those who cannot grasp this what can be said? Beware your goals lest you attain them.

Readers Meeting September 1991 (Leeds)

W HAT WAS INTENDED TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY to explore the role of ‘progressive’ ‘liberatory’ management in present times came somewhat unstuck when Sadie Plant, author of ‘The Most Radical Gesture - The S.I. in a Post-Modern Age’, took this as an opportunity to launch an auto-critique of her book. Somewhat knocked off balance by this Alex Richards, whose intention had been to locate the S.I. as the last of the vanguards and not necessarily the most interesting, instead elaborated on his view that the metropolis held an overly favoured position in the concerns of revolutionaries, to the detriment of suburbia and the countryside.

With the chair floundering around trying to find a theme to link these disparate concerns, others soon chimed in with their own particular and peculiar obsessions. From a discussion about the importance of space over time to the disturbing assertion that the struggle against alienation conceals a death-wish, a lot of interesting insights succeeded in being said without notice being taken of any of them.

We will be trying this again sometime, and planning it better, I hope. Those wishing to volunteer their services as speakers, please forward your address to Here and Now.

The Chair

Here and Now Meeting in Poly Occupation

W E WERE INVITED BY MIDDLESEX POLY students to give a talk in their occupation in December. Partly they wanted information on the role of the Situationists in Paris ’68, partly they wanted a criticism of vanguards. We called the talk ‘the Situationists and Beyond’.

Starting from the pamphlet ‘Of Student Poverty’, the social moment in today’s Polys was described as a commodification of education, a further Tayloring of learning to the needs of the economy leading to unrest.

Hilarity ensued when the summing up of the Strasbourg judge was read out from the preface of ‘Of Student Poverty’ - his condemnation of the Strasbourg students was expressed in much the same way as the vanguards had been slaggling off students in the occupation who wouldn’t follow their line.

A critique of the left was made which highlighted its role (in its everyday tactics) of shoring up the State, by presenting it with demands that required State action. Legislative, judicial or procedural action is privileged by the left over other forms of solving problems, thereby exposing its function as a handy mechanic for the State machine. We suggested that the century-long crisis of the left lay precisely in this sort of statist which at best ignored, at worst destroyed, the many actions, experiments and tendencies which defended and advanced vernacular ways of living in the here and now.

Unfortunately automatism in the form of the Socialist Workers Party seeped into the meeting, and managed to infect ourselves as well. There’s something depressing about finding yourself reciting familiar (and long-won) arguments about Kronstadt with Leninists. The real danger of zombies is that they turn everyone else into one.

However afterwards we were able to see for ourselves how the occupation had been organised with food available, for a self-determined donation, a library open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (considerably more than the Poly authorities had managed during the period of normality) and non-commodity Pool. We attended a meeting where tactics were discussed for maintaining the occupation. Some spoke of opening the Poly up to squatters and the homeless over Xmas, but we’ve since heard that the wave of occupations of the Polys in London is over . . . for now. One criticism to be made of some of the student’s propaganda is the ‘Students . . . we are the future’ type-stuff which seems to be appealing to Capital to take good care of its future managers. Always a temptation in any struggle to ally oneself with the perpetual rationalising tendency of Capital, such a tactic replaces the awkward, different, combative and convivial aspects of the struggle with a media-driven rationalisation that at its most effective can only provide Capital with the necessary negativity for reforming itself.
'SELF-EMPLOYED' IS ONE OF THOSE STUPID expressions which gloss the oxymoronic with the patina of 'common sense'. How does one use oneself? It is like the quaint notion of 'self-abuse', which could only be imagined by the sort of deformed minds who propagated this term, hoping to achieve this effect, or their current descendants who aspire to convince their victims they are suffering from equally absurd defects in their selfhoods. To be employed is a necessary condition for survival under an economic system which attempts to create a society on the basis of universal desocialization (and tries to attach 'selves' to its various functions). It is a regrettable misfortune, nonetheless, which everyone at least semi-consciously recognises. To be 'self-employed' is a ridiculous bureaucratic misnomer: a social security category which is currently held out as a personalised utopia for those suffering from 'overemployment'. Absurd as the term 'self-employment' is, if taken literally, by virtue of this role as chimera (translating the desire for emancipation into the language of self-oppression) it is important to examine it.

'Unemployed' is an equally ridiculous term. Each age has its dominant mental disorder. Ours is the Metonymic Mentality - whereby things are called by the names of some contingent attribute or of something arbitrarily contiguous to them. 'Unskilled worker' for example, for (probably quite skillful) people who happen to be in more than averagely stupid jobs). Likewise, being 'unemployed' which denotes a circumstance (as officially designated) is used as if it named a special class of people. What about the not-yet-unemployed, or, for that matter the 'misemployed' (a universal class if ever there was one) . . . or, a case in point, the 'overemployed'? A suitable term for those aware of being used up more quickly than most. This self-defining class grew quite large some time ago, and a lot of the recent progressivist strategies of employers are a response to the consequences of this rise in consciousness.

Once one begins to think in terms of 'being employed' as being consumed, a lot of things can be seen the right way round. Not only do the 'employers' become recognised as the real consumers of the worker, but their 'profits' as the wages their workers pay them in order to keep them in work. Why not? Socialists already talk about wages as the price for keeping people out of unemployment. And socialists are those on whom capitalism may be dependent for its long-term salvation.

What was called the revolt against work has called forth a counter-revolution which was actually being prepared long before it; it amounts to nothing less than the abolition of the working class. One aspect of this strategy is the deconstruction of the concept of the 'job'.

Capitalism, whatever its ideology proclaims, still needs work. But jobs are a very inconvenient and inflexible way of getting people to work: unemployment being a thing capital does to people, rather than a climatic condition, there ought to be a transitive verb 'to unemploy'.

Paradoxical as it might seem, unemploying people is a good way of getting us all to work harder. It's a strategy that 'works', so to speak. And the 'unemployed' include some of capital's best workers.

There are other aspects of the strategy that deserve note, hidden behind the morbid spectacle of underclasses and superexploited and marginalised and others hired to perform abjectness pour encourager les autres. Two things in particular need more attention: one is this rise of 'self-employment', whereby a certain fraction of yesterday's proletariat are re-enlisted under the colours of the petty bourgeoisie, and the other is managerialisation: a process in which the remainder are transformed by sociological alchemy into professionals and managers. These are complementary processes. Both have a long prehistory (in the rhetoric of 'property-owning democracy' and 'paternalism' respectively), but each has a new inflexion and a novel recuperative twist: basically the first is the favoured strategy of the capitalist Right, and the latter is the strategy of the Left Capitalists.

In its ideal utopian form, self-employment as a generalised policy inverts the old line of ideological legitimisation of capital. In the epoch of industrial society, the line was 'everyone is a worker' (sc. even the boss); today the line would be 'everyone is a capitalist': self-employment is the attempt to realise this vision.

For many of those newly 'self-employed' during the last decade, this status has been largely a way of being employed directly by capital-in-general (which thus far can only take the form of money as such, administered by banks), rather than having this employment mediated by managerial and bureaucratic servitude to particular capitals.

It does make very important differences - just as performing 'outwork' for the merchant capitalist was a different status from working in a factory for industrial capital, after the 'revolution' in the forms of technology and social control at the beginning of the 19th century.
There is, as Marx was at pains to insist, nothing eternal about social forms, and the wage-labour relation is no exception. Marxists have, not untypically, been overtaken by capital's practical dialectic being superior yet again to the theoretical conservatism of 'political economy'.

In the seventies some sociologists indulged the hypothesis of a proletarianization of managers, speculating on their fate as components of a 'new working class'. Capital in the eighties has taken exactly the opposite course in managerializing large sectors of the working class: making many of them carry the responsibility of administering capital's own functions - even calculating their own rate of exploitation - under the grand title of self-management appropriated from the new radicalism itself.

Much of the 'self-employment' into which previously employed (or, as one should say, directly managed) workers have escaped or been redeployed, of course involves an 'autonomy' just as spurious as that enjoyed by those who remain legally under the tutelage of corporations while now having the inverse regime of 'self-management' inflicted upon them.

It is, in both cases, the very meaning of 'autonomy' that has been restructured and drastically reduced, as much as the conditions of life that have been rearranged.

In the case of the new self-employed, it is money-capital administered by the bank manager which takes on the function of discipline and surveillance, while the workers have to become themselves capitalist functionaries: 'being one's own boss' meaning doing one's own accounts, doing one's own bureaucracy etc. and in general working much harder than when one was a mere wage-slave.

In the case of the new corporate worker with delegated semi-autonomy, one has to incorporate the function of discipline and surveillance into one's own self-identity (especially when one's title becomes literally 'managerial' - and it is not inconceivable for all such employees to become managers in this sense).

They too have to work twice as hard and at different things, but in a different way from the former category. They have to internalize their corporation and not just love big brother, but become him.

While self-employment means confronting capital directly in the form of the market (the customers who pay your wages infinitely less reliably than the boss ever did) and the bank loan (which becomes a quasi-feudal rent with the sword of Damocles suspended by a credit-line), self-management means taking all the mediations and contradictions of the 'organisation' into one's very soul. Or at least that is what the corporation must now attempt to do.

The old days when all the company wanted from you was your 'work' and was content to leave your unconscious to your dreams and the TV have gone. The 'working day' whose notional quantitative components Marx was interested in, in order to discover where the 'difference' of the surplus came from, must now be examined from its qualitative side: the labour-process is not just what the worker does for capital, but what capital does to the worker.

And capital has finally come to realise the full importance of exploring the infinite scope of what uses can be made of the social and psychic territory over which it has command for those hours. 'Training' workshops, seminars, brainwashing and morale-boosting exercises can be as important as any other kind of 'labour' expected of the worker in the age of the Totally Managed Life.

Robert Owen already saw the potential of the factory as a school and a seminary for moulding the moral and sexual materials embodied in proletarian bodies. And Fourier explored, as kind of surrealistic bureaucrat, the outer-limits of what could be conceived in the way of harmonising human desires with social functions. Today all corporations are moral industries and all managers aspire to be Fourierists.
DEBATE

Managerialism - Life and crisis in the sea of dreams.

John Quail and Mike Peters debate the meaning of the new management.

'Scientific Management' as developed by F. W. Taylor was an ideology that required and justified the organisation of work around the maximisation of labour effort. Taylor was a crank. What amounted to - despite his followers' protestations - the maximum possible exploitation and control of labour, offered only to the employer under the full Taylor system a zero sum. The extra surplus that the employer extracted had to be ploughed back into the maintenance of the system that extracted it. Labour got sod all. The only apparent beneficiaries were the administrators of the system.

This crankishness was obscured by a subsequent massive increase in productivity stemming from the kind of efficient planning of machine production pioneered by Henry Ford. This is now seen as the epitome of scientific management. Under this system, too, large bureaucracies have been erected but they could graze on the lush surpluses created and still raise wages and lower prices to the consumer. Ford himself was an utter bastard who only paid the higher wages because he had to. Interestingly enough he bulldozed offices his son had had built at the Detroit works on one occasion and torched the entire stock of requisition forms on another. He hated bureaucracy.

It was however inescapable that large complex organisations had to be run by bureaucracies. Ford could play the rugged pioneer all he liked but his company had to bureaucratisse if it was to move beyond the mass production of one unchanging model. And bureaucratisse it did.

The economics of bureaucracy were straightforward then and are straightforward now: it has to be paid for. And either it is paid for by the surpluses its special organisational skills generate or it is paid for by chiselling the pay and conditions of the workforce or - as in the Eastern bloc the pay and conditions of a whole society. In either case the system is vulnerable to other firms - or other societies - which can produce more surplus with less bureaucracy.

We live in interesting times. The bureaucracies of the East have clearly entered a period of deep and public crisis. But the bureaucracies of the West (or at least the UK and USA) have also entered a period of crisis if less severe and less publicised. The cranky ghost of F. W. Taylor has come back to haunt the system. The addition of managerial hierarchies to organisations is coming out as a zero - and in some cases a negative sum. It had come to be assumed that because certain managerial structures could with spectacular success at certain times in certain areas of production raise the return on capital, raise wages and lower costs to customers in one great big bumper bundle that it followed that managerial structures were ipso facto in consequence a GOOD THING and the guarantor of the optimal allocation of resources in all circumstances. This is becoming open to increasing doubt.

It is at its most dubious in sectors of public services in the UK which have been assailed by pernicious managerialism. Health Services and the Polys shine out particularly. Cash limited by Government dictat and continually pressed to do more with less the internal struggle over the allocation of resources is acute. On the one hand we have a new, well-paid, well-staffed, well-accommodated high status and largely incompetent management. On the other the specialist professional work-forces have seen their status, pay and conditions deteriorate and their workload steadily rise. Leaving aside external factors (important though they are) it is hard not to see the increasing misery of the workforce as the consequence of the increasing well-being of the management. Management's major claim to legitimacy - the rational distribution of resources for the greatest good of the greatest number - disappears as they feather their nests while all around the squalor deepens.

In the wider scheme of things these may be special cases. It may be that the managerial misery and incompetence is the consequence of the conflict between professional and managerial ideologies with the managers in a state of 'new to it' confusion. In order to assert its will management has to resort to Stalinist authoritarianism. When the managers have learned their job a bit, the government stumps up a bit more cash and managerial ideals have been internalised (and the medical personnel will know what that means) then the whole thing will become a seamless unified culture. Won't it?

Well maybe. The public sector in the UK is just the most obvious bit of managerial dysfunction hanging over from the Thatcher era. In British industry generally over the 1980's management structures have become increasingly Fordist (authoritarian, undemocratic, non-consulting, strictly hierarchical). Workforces are seen as plug in plug out units, a periphery to the essential core of the management structure itself. In its essentials it is a movement to remove any countervailing force to the managerial hierarchy within the enterprise.
But this process may have to unravel itself. If current US management theorists are to be believed the loss of employee involvement as a result of managerial machismo may be catastrophic. The Thatcherite cure of the 'English disease' may leave UK industry incapable of adapting to the new way of doing things which is just around the corner. This new stuff emanates from people like Tom Peters and Peter Drucker. It is the consequence of their observations on the way that the status of the US as an economic power has tumbled since, say, the end of the Vietnam War and the rise of Japan. This is seen as a critique in its most concrete form of corporate America's way of doing things - the way of doing things that Thatcherite Britain was busily trying to emulate. The heavy hands-on, kick ass multi-layered corporate hierarchy is seen as being just too unresponsive in a world which requires fast and flexible adjustments to take new opportunities and meet new competition which is global and growing ever more intense.

But it is no response, the theorists say, to simply unbundle conglomerate organisations and return to the market structures of the Nineteenth Century. Organisations have to have the flexibility of small organisations with the marketing and R and D clout of a large one to survive. So corporations have to be transformed so that the bits of it that deal with customers can adjust their goods and services to deliver what the customer wants at an appropriate price and quality. And in order to do that you have to have individuals with qualities of commitment to quality and performance, creativity and initiative at the base that are the very opposite of the have-a-nice-day zombie or the time serving jobsbworth who is the typical lower denizon of a large bureaucracy.

The thought counts more than the money when searching for skills

Debate

Richard Minns

M a t t e r s o f a s o c i a l i s t b u r e a u c r a c y?

The Guardian

(They are zombies or jobsbworths for very good reasons. As anyone knows who has worked in large organisations, except within narrow limits which are themselves full of nasty traps, the last thing anyone wants from an underling is high qualities of commitment to creativity and initiative etc etc. For a start it makes their superiors look like complete prats. And as the Japanese proverb has it 'the nail that stands higher is hammered down'.)

So there is a paradox at the heart of this new management stuff. Conformity machines are going to have to breed artists. Hierarchies that reward people for moving as far away from the customer as possible are going to have to reward people for staying near them. And, say the experts, the people that run bureaucracies ten layers deep, that sweated and plotted and knifed their way up the hierarchy are going to have to cut it away. Drucker suggests that in future no more than three layers of bureaucracy will be necessary. Three! (Think about that in terms of your workplace comrade.) But you can see the dream they are peddling: a flat hierarchy with all the corporate effort in the field units up-front, getting sensual with the customer.

Now what this means to me is that something is going on which isn’t necessarily what it says it is. All these slogans which are beginning to appear about getting close to the customer, sweeping away bureaucracy and empowering the worker must be assumed to be shock full of the standard issue corporate bullshit. I would suggest that no matter how virtuous and crystalline the vision of the management thinkers, the ease they will be put to is to justify carrying on the systematic sacking of blue collar workers in the name of increasing productivity in the alternative guise of sacking white collar workers to get closer to the customer. Attempts are under way to try and restore organisations which were once pyramids then (as blue collar workers were sacked) became more pear-shaped back to being more pointed pyramids. Perhaps a layer or two will go (they already have in some firms). And meanwhile it will be prattle about the customer this and the customer that. (There’s even stuff about where the police, and I think also the Prison Service, talk about service to the customer: what does that mean?)

But as any good manager will tell you it is important to be proactive rather than passive in the face of difficulties. (Bold words and phrases should be treated as vocabulary building.) But before you can act on your Mission Statement as amplified by your Corporate Strategy and Action Plan you have to do a Status Review involving a SWOT Analysis (that’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). And if managers can be pro-active I don’t see why the pro-situt proletariat or indeed the considerably radical revolutionary can’t be pro-active too. There is enough in the new management thinkers which can be put to good account by the people in the lower echelons who wouldn’t mind at all being an empowered worker (or even worker’s power - remember that?). Those were the days.) The notion of a large degree of autonomy, the right to move as circumstances dictate and as your creativity dictates as well, all that sounds like a pleasant way to work. It allows active units with professional or craft ideologies to not only question management orders but to question managements’ right to exist. In other words the new management thinking seems eminently adaptable to a form of space seizing syndicalism.

Remember: there is no instrument of another’s will which, if appropriated by us, cannot be used against them.
Perchance to wake up?

Critical Response to John Quail by Mike Peters

THINK JOHN'S STYLE HAS BEEN INFECTED BY reading too many of those pop-up management books. I'm not saying he's swallowed their slogans whole as if they were real ideas, but he does seem to have been bitten by the sound-bites, and the bugs can be fatal.

Starting at the end, what on earth can it mean to say that management speak "can be put to good account by the people in the lower echelons"? The notion that this specific lexicon is a merely neutral 'instrument' that can be used for contrary purposes by those against whose interests it is directed is an old idea and it is a lethally disabling one. The whole point of the current evangelism is to get people to use these words. They have no other 'function' than to enforce a certain regime of communication/control.

This language is an integral component in the practices by which they are deployed: the phrases aren't just lying around in the books, they are 'scribed' in exercises, training workshops, monitoring procedures, and all the rest of it. Above all, they are an 'accounting' procedure, independently of whatever 'semantic content' they may be thought to have. And, as every cynical manager knows, they 'mean' bugger all. The words themselves change constantly anyway; the power being exercised through them comes not from what they (may be made to) mean but from the way they are implemented. To imagine otherwise would be like imagining that measuring costs and benefits in monetary terms is just a neutral 'technicality'.

To try to use the strategy of classical 'ideology-critique' - exposing the contradictions between the proclaimed ideals and the prevailing practices (which is more or less what he's suggesting) is to miss the point. This kind of critique never worked except as a means by which marxism claimed to be able to realise a better form of capitalism than the bourgeoisie. Those who lived off this kind of historicism have deservedly died by it. Their beloved 'History' didn't need them.

But to hope to fulfil the ideals of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' is a bit different, to say the least, from looking for radical potential in buzzwords like Total Quality, Corporate Identity, Self-Funding and Performance Appraisal.

How does John arrive at this barrel-scraping pseudo-optimism? My guess is that he isn't ready to acknowledge that the current management linguistic offensive is genuinely radical. It is already a recuperation (to coin a phrase) of the rhetoric of yesteryear's radicality: self-management, anti-bureaucracy, etc.

I don't think you can 'reappropriate' stolen weapons which have been deliberately sabotaged ('customised') precisely to blow up in your face. I'm not talking a priori theory here; I'm talking from what it is like to be told that I have to spend more and more of my 'working time' submitting my 'work' to a kind of reflexive cost-benefit analysis from the standpoint of my bosses. SWOT analysis is all about redefining what you do in terms designed to ensure you are doing something completely different from what you ought to be doing. If John has some nifty ideas for how this 'stuff' as he calls it can be 'used against them' please let us all know. And while he's at it he could tell black people that racist language is similarly just an instrument that when used by real radicals can be turned against racism. This isn't cheap rhetoric; I really am saying that the new managerial discourse is itself all about translating the radical impulse towards autonomy into a 'manageable' form of social control.

The rot sets in in John's essay at the point where he describes Taylorism, Fordism and bureaucracy in capitalist language. He deploys capital's own critique of what from capital's point of view is 'wasteful'. The invocation of 'competition' and the crap about being "unresponsive to a world which requires fast and flexible adjustments to take new opportunities and meet new competition which is global and growing ever more intense" is either loaded with a heavy irony which I missed entirely or else is written on automatic pilot. Trance-like sentences like this are generated by anyone dumb enough to go thorn in the face of Japanese juggernauts and other bogeys like "our foreign competitors". These incantations are a big part of the ideological softening up which has been going on for ten years now to panic everyone into submitting to new historical imperatives, the substance of which is never allowed to be debated: what 'work' should be being done for whom and how should its 'value' be measured? These questions cannot be asked as long as competitiveness, efficiency and so on (and their meaty-mouthed siblings 'creativity', 'flexibility' and 'quality') are allowed to be shibboleths. Surely John isn't accepting capital's right to define value after a lifetime of struggling against management's right to manage. Surely he doesn't believe all this. It is just a provocation, isn't it?

Unapologetic response to Mike Peters

MIKE WRITES THAT MY STYLE HAS BEEN infected by reading 'too many of those pop-up management books'. My style (literary or political) has not been infected by reading but by participant observation of the uses to which off-the-peg ideological consumables are put in large bureaucracies. These bureaucracies are uneasy places. Their preferred mode is an 'everybody wins' acceptance of the status quo: those that are restless and dissatisfied can climb the greasy pole while everyone else finds comfortable niches. But this doesn't happen very often or for all that long. The community of interest between organisation and individual constantly threatens to dissolve into the war of each against all with everyone but the highest or the lowest operating as rivals, victimised order-takers and victimising order-givers. Mike would appear to be middle of such a squalid mess by the sound of it and he has my profound sympathy. I fail to see, however, why the people responsible for this dysfunctional crapola can't be beaten over the head with it as failure by them in their own terms. (See for example Patrick Heron on Arts Schools in the Guardian, 7.11.91). I don't care whether this is a strategy of classical ideology-criticism or not.
I fear Mike sees management ideas too monolithically. The threatened dissolution into strife and dysfunction is closer to the surface of the management psyche even in the best functioning bureaucracies than Mike would appear to allow. The ‘management project’ as represented in the writings of the management gurus is to a great degree the business of finding ways to motivate the workforce in order to stop this dissolution. These should not be read as texts of dominance but as texts of unease and vulnerability.

I refuse therefore to treat managerialist rhetoric as the kind of incantations of absolute evil that Mike seems to think I should. I will not cross two candle-sticks or wear a string of garlic round my neck. If a managerial guru says that failure to motivate staff or (worse still) conflict between workforce and management is a sign of bad management our stance should be that that makes our discontent management’s fault. They should make us happy. If management gurus say that only three layers of bureaucracy are necessary, I say that any economy drive by management can be thrown back in their faces as a case for their own decimation. If the rhetoric of customer satisfaction can mobilise the rage of students or parents then use it. The New Jerusalem it isn’t. But it is a piece of tactical ideological jujitsu that will have to do until the real thing comes along. I think this ‘barrel-scraping pseudo-optimism’ does allow for some creative forms of resistance. I view them as having the potential, say, of the Lucas Aerospace initiatives which didn’t bring about a single alternative product but did stave off redundancies for some considerable time effectively by seizing the rhetorical advantage over management. Mike’s response appears, on the other hand, to offer only the options of submission, self-immolatory individual defiance or impotent textual deconstruction.

Such responses surely only apply at totalitarian extremes which we have not yet reached. Power must still legitimise itself through rhetoric and while it does both managerial power and managerial rhetoric remain a contested terrain if we wish to make it so. If as Mike suggests, the words mean bugger all and the power is all there is then why continue to produce the reams of management miasms that pour from the presses? Catch 22 doesn’t require so many bloody thousands of words. It isn’t auto-pilot (or auto-suggestion) but managements real view of the world that they are assailed by increasingly difficult markets on one side and deeply unenthusiastic staffs on the other. All those management books are designed to try and deal with their world and its problems.

And, I am saying, in so doing they may (repeat may) be opening a Pandora’s Box because in order to translate ‘the radical impulse towards autonomy into a manageable form of social control’ the Fordist bureaucracy has to encourage the radical impulse towards autonomy first! The managers themselves find this a risky and threatening strategy even if Mike doesn’t. It is a measure of the hole they feel they’re in that they will consider it. And I find it more interesting than I might otherwise do because frankly I haven’t seen much of the radical impulse towards autonomy around recently.

I remain unrepentant on the use of dominant ideologies against themselves - historically, radical ideologies can without difficulty be shown to be mutated versions of dominant ones. (And vice versa.) Even Mike’s reductio ad absurdum of trying to use the language of racism against itself is not as absurd as all that, incidentally.

Certain black radicals (whether or not they are real radicals) I leave to Mike but they are certainly contingently radical as the object of oppression of the racist rhetoric) have ju-jitsu the categories of white racism though at the probable cost of proto-black supremacist. They allege an abstrait psycho-genetic mutation which produced whites as a sport apart from the true running, black stock of mankind. It turns the idea of evolution as progress with whites at the peak on its head and its purpose is clear: to clear some psychic space for a (black) impulse towards autonomy. Everything is usable, seen rightly.

John Quail

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Kurdistan as a Permanent Refugee Camp

Since the end of the Gulf War a veil of silence seems to have been drawn over the whole affair. Few indeed are those prepared to question the facts behind the massacre on the road to Basra, or the crushing of popular revolts against Saddam Hussein. The following article and letter from people caught up in the aftermath of war reveal that nothing has got better, and a lot has got worse for the ordinary people of the region.

IN KURDISTAN SINCE THE WAR AND THE UPRISING there’s an informal, behind the scenes scenario taking place. Basically the coalition, particularly the USA is manipulating and exploiting the situation by, more or less, persuading the rich, especially the landowners, via their influence with the PUK (Kurdistan Patriotic Front) to negotiate with Saddam. It seems the USA is scared of an even bigger explosion from below not only in Kurdistan but throughout Iraq, Iran and Jordan. Thus President Rafsanjani of Iran is refusing to help the somewhat Shia influenced insurgents in the marshlands of southern Iraq because of the increasing tempo of riots and strikes inside Iran.

In a sense, the go between, facilitating liaison between these regimes and the West is King Hussein of Jordan who is a master of two faced diplomacy. He was cast in this role even before the Gulf war. When rioting broke out in Jordan in ’89/’90 over high food prices, Saddam helped Hussein by increasing trade in food and oil which allowed the Jordanian state to ameliorate basic living conditions and make some slight democratic changes to keep a cap on things internally. It was favour to be amply returned!

All the regimes in this area of world capital agree on one thing: the maintenance of the status quo. And for Iraqi Kurdistan that means threatening the Kurdish refugees with Winter all over again.

As a result of the Gulf war the poverty in Iraqi Kurdistan has become terrible. In reality the majority of the Kurdish people here have become a vast army of refugees. The safe haven was not a safe haven. Some 70,000 became refugees in Turkey where they now live in virtually unbearable camps. Some could stand it no longer and returned to Iraq to face disease, no money or work, massive food shortages and things like no education for their kids. Constantly moving on from town to town, they are continually attacked by the Iraqi army and on going back to their old homes they only have time to look around and then leave immediately. Nowhere to run. Nowhere to hide.

Letter from a prisoner. November 3rd 1991

To whom who in the most hopeless time of my life let fall the frost of Kurdish mountains over my inflamed heart and offered to me the most beautiful and perfumed bunch of flowers together with a beautiful letter which brought back life again the bosom of my heart.

My dear . . .
I regard and respect you . . . Regards that are more perfumed than the red buds of Kurdistan - regards and respect for your friends too.

Dear Brother,
From the light of your letter you would like to know news from me. I don’t like to sadden you with this news and blank out from the face of the day.

My friend and I (his name is Saber Aziz and from the people of Penwen*) came to Saudi and gave ourselves up to the US army on January the 21st. We were looked after by the Americans for some time in good conditions. But later on they handed us over to the Saudi army. It was like being transferred from daylight to dark night. That’s why I say it’s right when they say that life is a well of experience. But I don’t know what to say about our lives because those above us are only concerned with protecting their positions and capital would sacrifice thousands of human beings in order to save itself.

Dear Brother,
Believe me, we haven’t seen anything since January except the barbed wire from all four sides. We cannot see anything else; that’s
why our life is the same thing day after day... etc. and this created a situation where many diseases threaten like psychological illnesses (depression and other things such as cutting one's self with razor blades and knives). When we see these things going on around us we feel we're living like animals but that's why people are driven to put their lives through these extra dangers.

For those who are guarding us I don't know if they recognise anyone else as human beings except themselves. No doubt, my brother, they themselves aren't human because they think we've run away from poverty. Consequently, anything we say, they reply: "isn't it food, what else do you want?". But for these lepers life is only about eating. Now I can see the smile on your dry lips! I can see you saying Tah (the present letter writer T.N.) can just talk about food.

I don't know what to talk to you about but thousands of wishes to Kak Fukharden* in the Iraqi prison... With your permission let me talk about the regime that is using 14,000 Iraqi refugees deprived of all human rights like some playing card. Their treatment of us is rather like our treatment of animals in the harsh Kurdistan winter when we put food inside them for the next day... or if there is a problem sometime - meaning a fight - they don't respond, saying it's not God's will to come inside the compound. If there's fighting, then they flash their car lights at us, all the time laughing, just like looking at monkeys in the zoo. If one gets injured with a knife or a stave in the fighting, they merely demand the fighting cease so we can take the injured together to the hospital. They won't let anyone out of the compound until the fight is over.

Sometimes in the other compounds, people from Basra fight those from Nasria. One or two or more will get killed and many are injured. In August and September, there were demonstrations in the compounds we are living in. Each compound is two km square and contains 400 people. The demonstration was organised around the refusal of camp food and the wire fences were pushed over and we got outside. Then just like their Big Brother Saddam they used chemicals on us such as tear gas as well as other gases killing ten people and injuring many. As Kurds say this is only a handful of grain from the sack (meaning like a drop in the ocean TN).

In August ten people were selected to go to see various embassies from throughout the world. One of them responded by saying you are all prisonners of war and no country would accept you. The British Embassy fortunately has been saying - all we can do is help the Iraqi people, especially Kurdish people, that's why I say if you don't consider this as a duty, write a letter in our name to the British Foreign Office requesting that some 200 Kurds want to go back to Kurdistan if possible.

I have received your letter but unfortunately no news about your family. Saber and other friends send regards to you.

Dear Brother,

If you have got an address in Iran please write a letter to take back to Kurdistan with one of the Saber's.

It is true that distance suffocates hope inside a human being but I always remember you; you have lit a candle in the darkness of my life and you have planted new hope in my hopeless heart... Dear Brother, I beg your pardon if this letter isn't sufficient but here we live outside the scale of humanity.

Dear Brother, if you have time please write a letter in may name - via Iran - to my Father with wishes from Saber... Kamil, Rak Aso, Mohammed are in the army hospital... they will phone you.

from T

1. Penjwen: an old town in Iraqi Kurdistan destroyed by the Baathists.

2. Kak: word of respect like Mr.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS IN VICTIMS OF THE GULF CONFLICT

Psychological responses of victims of combat may not be closely related to the severity of physical injury. Other factors which are of importance include the individual's previous character and experiences before combat, and the exact circumstances under which any injuries were acquired.

The normal response usually involves: (in varying degrees):

(i) Sudden preoccupation with what has happened - including dreams and vivid flashbacks in severe cases.
(ii) Avoidance and withdrawal from what has happened - including numbness and seeming indifference.
(iii) Anger or bitterness at what has happened - sometimes expressed as complaining or difficult behaviour.

These responses are very similar to those seen after a civilian accident which has proved to be a major threatening experience. The best way to help the victim is to bear in mind each of these three components and recognize them when and if they occur:

(iv) Feelings of distress should be discussed in an open and accepting way. It may be difficult for macho service personnel to acknowledge strong emotions and there is nothing wrong with introducing the subject:
(v) Avoidance and numbing can look like bravery or coolness but it can be followed by delayed reactions which are slower to recover and may be more disabling in the long run. One useful approach is to discuss the victim's situation openly; the responses are likely to follow when the victim is encouraged to acknowledge his experiences:
(vi) Anger and bitterness can be very trying if they are displayed on staff and poison the working atmosphere. They can be difficult to discuss directly, but it is important to try. Frank (not aggressive) discussion of behaviour is the best defence against getting into unhelpful confrontations with individuals.

Other psychological responses are relatively rare, but may occur more commonly than we are used to in routine NHS work.

1. Severe mental disorders - like schizophrenia or other paranoid states - can occasionally develop even in those with no psychiatric history.
2. Confusional states may be more common than is usual in young people, because of the combination of physical brain damage and severe psychological trauma leading to agitation.
3. Conversion disorders and other central nervous system complaints - psychosomatically-produced paralysis, pseudoseizures, blindness etc.

Any of these problems may be complicated by the co-existence of head injury with brain damage.

Official instructions issued in the NHS during the Gulf War. Counsellor as war profiteer?

A pamphlet describing the uprising in Kurdistan and the poisonous role the Kurdish nationalists played in it has been published by BM Blob & Combustion (London WC1 3XX) price 65p plus postage.

The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan's Nationalist Shop Front and its Negotiations with the Baathist/Fascist Regime describes the operations of the Shora's (worker's councils) during the revolt, their limitations and the practices of the nationalists in undermining a popular rebellion.
THE URGE TO DESTROY

With Slovenia and Croatia caught up in Euromania and 'Greater Serbia' resisting its advances, military escapism is enveloping the Balkans, Jim McFarlane concludes.

Although not replicated in Croatia, even Slovenia had succumbed to the imperatives of a drive towards independence and intended incorporation into a future expanded European Community. The re-election of Milosevic in Serbia and his overcoming of the demonstrations in March 1991 cemented the need to prepare for secession and the creation of the 50,000 strong Slovene Territorial Defence Force. Under the pretext of securing borders with Austria, Hungary and Italy the Yugoslav Peoples Army moved in and found themselves out-maneuvered by the resistance of the Slovenes.

In contrast the balance of forces had changed considerably by the time the Serb-Croat conflict had escaped from the Chetnik (serbian fascist) influenced enclave around Knin. Any pretense of Federal authority over the Army had vanished. Initially the Croats had not prepared for conflict and spent time re-inventing the heraldry of pre-Communist regimes. Faced with the logistics of fighting on 3 fronts in Krajina, Banija and east Slavonia they lost up to 30% of the greater Croatia Tito had created for the republic while it was within the Federation.

CHALLENGE FROM BELOW

Croatian autumn offensives against federal Army Barracks had released quantities of weapons and, although Air and Naval power was unleashed from Slavonia to Dalmatia, a stalemate was emerging with the weakened Federal forces and Serbian Militias consolidating gains and attacking vulnerable areas like Dubrovnik and Pakr. Fascistic militias at the front such as the H.O.S. and Black Legion within the croatian forces had their own agenda of "National Socialism", strangely at odds with the imperatives of Euro incorporation desired by the 'democratic majority' in Croatia.

The Generals at the eastern Croatia front witnessed the mass desertion of reservists from southern Serbian cities such as Kragujevac, the 'crossing over' of Croat commanders at Vukovar and the October military conscription which was largely confined to Serbs and Montenegrins. The memory of the mothers' protests in August in Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo served a reminder of potential civil protests if a combination of economic impoverishment and emboldened anti-militarism was to shake the warmongerings of the ruling elites bent on destruction and sacrificing the 'pawns' on the nationalist chessboard.

WILE OTHER CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN economies are being subjected to the rigours of market forces, the disintegrating Yugoslav economy has hastened a flight to assert political identity through the myth of ethnic nationalist homogeneity.

In 1989, Sonja Licht and Milan Nikolic anticipated that "if nationalism aims at preserving national identity by encapsulating it in a homogeneous society, if it is hostile toward other cultures and nations, if it advocates undemocratic methods in the process of emancipating its own nation, if it subordinates the human and civil rights of individuals to the rights of national collectivities and if it values past tradition higher than future perspectives, it can easily develop a totalitarian dynamic of its own, even in the struggle against an existing totalitarian regime".

NEW POLITICAL POWER

Articles in Iztočinš and elsewhere had highlighted the influence of the new social movements and their hope for "an up-to-date formulation of the original idea of Yugoslavia as a trans-ethnic integration based on the classical tradition of democracy and economic efficiency (...) a guarantee for a solid multi-ethnic state, geared to the standards of contemporary Europe". However, as Thomas Mastnak prophesied in H&N 7/8 the Peoples Army had become the last bastion of a Yugoslav League of Communists, all that was left of socialism was the "authoritarian contents".

By March 1990 the role of the NSMs was past. Leading personalities had graduated to positions of power in Slovenia. "The Movement for Religious Rights transformed itself into the Christian Democratic Party, and its leader became Prime Minister. Peace activist Janez Jansa took the post of defence minister and his friend Igor Bavec, founder of Human Rights Council, was named interior minister".

13
Meanwhile, Serbian Democratic Party enclaves in northern Bosnia and Eastern Hercegovina have declared secession. Clashes between Muslim, Croat and Serbian militias east of Mostar were destined to spread in the tangled ethnic mosaic of the disintegrating republic. In addition to the always present potential of an explosion in the Albanian dominated province of Kosovo, the focus for conflict could switch to Bosnia-Hercegovina, whether EC sponsored peace efforts succeed or not in defusing Serb-Croat hostilities in the north. Disruption of economic activity, whether industrial, agricultural or tourist is severe, especially in Croatia. In Serbia, the Socialist Party leadership, in tandem with the Communist Party military has a programme that subordinates economic reform to conquest and hegemony.

With both Croat and Serb protagonists cloaked in the mantle of past atrocities and mutual fear the supremacy of the irrational is currently ensured. The democratisation/enlightened nationalism/new social movements current has dissipated and is marginalised. Past workers strikes have been unable to supercede national identities. It is ironic that the pamphlet which indicated that the Yugoslav students had views as advanced as their western counterparts in 1968/9 should end with the quotation: “it is not only a conflict between production and creation, but in a larger sense - and here I have in mind the West as well as the East - between routine and adventure”.

1 In Across Frontiers Vol 5 No. 2. PO Box 2382, CA 94702. USA ($20 sub).

2 Reprinted in Edinburgh Review 83

3 from the Tubingen declaration, quoted in (1) above, Jan 1989. This recalls a conversation I had in the office of the former Alliance of Socialist Youth in Ljubljan in autumn 1988 when I suggested that EC membership and nationhood would be pursued by Slovenia.


5 From BM Blob WCIN 3XX. £2.


A SOVIET AUTOPSY

After the August coup attempt John Barrett examines the entrails.

PERESTROIKA HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE BASED on the entirely false assumption that the Soviet system was reformable. The twin palliatives advanced by the 1984 Soviet leadership of restructuring and ‘open-ness’ have not removed Soviet society’s intractable problems. Gorbachev’s past line that modernisation was necessary simply to shake out an obsolete superstructure obscuring an essentially healthy base was either a ploy designed to reassure socialist fundamentalists or a crazy misjudgement of the situation. The fact is that only the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and of some of its past satellites in Europe, will achieve the marketisation Gorbachev purports to favour. And even if that happens the consequences are by no means a foregone conclusion.

Perhaps what characterises most forcefully the poverty of thought about the Soviet Bloc in the 70s was the fact that recognised experts regularly confessed to their surprise in the 80s at the rapidity and depth of the collapse of Communism. Part of the blame for this must lie in the prevalence of the view that these were totalitarian societies which for some reason escaped the dynamics of change and decay which afflicts other systems. Forgivable in persecuted dissidents this analysis was yoked to a cold war idea which counterposed an idealised open ‘Western’ society to a monolithic Soviet opposite. A myth of Communism’s irreversibility was nurtured among certain Rightists, frightening themselves like children at midnight with tales of permanent terror and eternal darkness. The ‘totalitarian’ idea overlooked both the economic realities of the Soviet Bloc and the survival of traditions and customs from before 1917 amongst the people. In fact, totalitarianism is the vanishing point towards which all socio-political systems drive, but never reach. By emphasising the political control of society over the crumbling economic reality adherents of the totalitarian notion both forgot the element of consent necessary for any state’s survival, and over-estimated the power of the centre to change that society.

The fate of actually existing dissidents in the Soviet Bloc was different, although no less unforeseen. By the 70s they had embarked on a strategy of ‘anti-politics’ (variations of which can be read in the works of Konrad, Michnik and Havel - see Here and Now passim) which had some resemblance to the movements in the ‘West’ in the 60s to refuse participation in modern capitalism. The destiny of these movements were very different. East European anti-politics was not co-opted by the existing official oppositions (there were none), nor was it transformed into raw material for a burgeoning entertainments industry, nor was it destroyed - fates all reserved for various ‘Western’ movements. The communist command economy ruled out co-option by the entertainments business, or integration into the checks and balances of a democratic power structure, but it could not annihilate physically the opposition movements because of the unspoken approval they had from significant sectors of the population. In the early 80s at the price of exclusion from power East European oppositionists retained their identity (the best example of this is Poland under martial law).

The integration of the ‘Western’ 60s generation (into academia, entertainments, the local state etc.) in comparison with the attempted repression and eventual survival of E. European oppositionists signalled forcibly that US/European/East Asian capitalism was better able to maintain itself (because it was able to use opposition as an internal control mechanism) than Soviet-style bureaucratic centralism. The US and European strategy of ‘empowering’ allegedly self-constituted constituencies through the elevation of their media boosted stars and leaders, in order to maintain the system’s legitimacy, while avoiding the costly changes necessary to deal with inequality, social disintegration and ecological destruction, has proved more efficient and less de-stabilising than the Soviet strategy. The reason why Soviet-style systems did not attempt to co-opt the opposition is no better illustrated than in Poland where tentative power-sharing led to the political destruction of the old elite, even though ex-communists managed to hang on to economic power by miraculously converting themselves overnight into new entrepreneurs.

Along with ‘anti-politics’ E. European dissidents developed the notion of ‘Civil society’ as a non-political, pluralistic way of life beneath the communist system. Initially viewed as an alternative both to communism and consumer capitalism the idea was suggestive of a parallel public sphere which could operate within either system but nurture and protect its own values and interests against the hegemonic power. To date the appearance of originality which these ideas had is looking badly tarnished. Pluralism is certainly proliferating within the corpses of Soviet-style regimes, but when the hegemonic power finally collapses, what replaces it is decidedly uncivil war (as in Yugoslavia - see ‘The Urge to Destroy’ in this issue) or a rehash of liberal neo-corporatist politics which civil society politics was supposed to be an alternative for (as in Havel’s Czecho-Slovakia).
The fragments that make up this pluralism cannot, however, be put back into the bottle. Far from engaging with society in a 'civil' way, these fragments, where they are not actively resisting the new economic reforms of their new masters (the erstwhile civil society ideologists) are settling scores old and new with other uncivil fragments. A note of caution must be introduced here. In these futurist times the tendency is to lump all traditions into one category and attach adjectives such as 'pre-modern', 'atavistic', 'reactionary', 'nationalist' etc to it. Some of these fragments deserve better than this. On the one hand there is the return of an essentially 'modern' tradition, namely nationalism, product of the strivings of the 19th century intellectuals, the authenticity of which is best judged by the remarkable similarity of 'traditional' peasant dress from Portugal to Poland. On the other hand is the return of genuinely pre-modern customs and community impulses some of whose roots lie in pre-Christian times and which have survived because they remained of genuine use and benefit for people in dark times.

As far as the actual 'civil society' politicians are concerned, they have failed - except in the one area where they ostensibly claimed no brief, namely state power, where they have replaced the old communist power structure.

No doubt in reaction against Marxist-Leninist economism E. European and Soviet dissidents tended to favour the political and cultural over the economic. But in fact, Soviet societies' independence from the global market was largely illusory, and that, together with the increasing difficulty of getting basic goods to people within these countries, took away the last legitimating support for these regimes. In competition with the rest of capitalism Communism was unable to modernise, to change its industry from extensive to intensive development, to pass on skills and inventions forged in the military sector to the consumer sector, or to improve agriculture. While Soviet-style economies could hide their ineffectiveness behind a generalised 'Stakhanovism' which exhorted (and extorted) more work from the working class in the name of 'fighting fascism' or 'building communism', the day of reckoning could be deferred. But with the Brezhnev compromise, and the consequent tuning-down of the political rhetoric to that of economic targets and performance, real reality was no longer camouflaged. Gorbachev's version of stability and economic growth gained no legitimacy when he provided neither, while people's expectation of a better life remain irreversible.

The problem for the Soviet Union in particular, and it applies to other ex-Soviet societies in direct proportion to the extent they have not discarded the old ruling apparatus, is that to implement the market reforms the Soviet leadership believe to be the only solution for the Union, requires austerity, social dislocation, unemployment and greater class division. The old power structure, however bureaucratically enthusiastic, simply did not have the legitimacy to push such painful reforms through. It is considerably doubtful whether the new, post-coup apparatus has that confidence of the people to do so either. The only residues of legitimacy lie with the ethnic, religious and nationalist fragments which are by no means automatically on the side of 'Marketisation'.

In order for there to be successful market penetration of any country or territory there has to be a system of laws and a constitutional framework which will guarantee private property, recognise and enforce binding contracts, safeguard certain civil rights and back up the nation's currency to say nothing of policing the inevitable discontent. Despite the myths of the free market libertarians state intervention has always preceded successful marketisation, both by introducing protectionist measures to nurture fledgling industries, and to accumulate capital in order to finance crucial projects of infrastructure. East Asian capitalism is only the latest example which proves the point. In the Soviet Union both the establishment of a constitutional framework and judicious state intervention would be overseen by corrupt bureaucrats already hopelessly implicated in past debacles.

In fact the Communist Party itself was in much the same position as any ancient regime threatened by rapid market reforms and would have, and still will as individuals, resisted and subverted such changes. The Soviet Union as it stands now, including the 'Party' and the state structures, simply does not have the legitimacy to carry through market reforms successfully. Disintegration of the Union, which is already beginning, is the absolute precondition for successful economic liberalisation.

What sources of legitimisation remain? The most obvious, and the one which global capitalism seems to be putting its money on is nationalism. The 'suppressed' nationalities of the Union and beyond have thrown up leaders apparently untainted by involvement in the Communist apparatus, although this itself is less and less certain (eg: Croatia's Tudjman, Ukraine's Kravchuk). Decentralisation and devolution become the watchwords of resurgent capitalism. The absence of fundamental values enjoying broad political support is likely to speed up the process of the centre's disintegration - the return of 19th century nationalism will provide sufficient popular support to enable states to be formed and markets imposed.

However as I mentioned above, nationalism is not the only 'fragment' enjoying popular support. In fact, what has survived 70 years of Soviet Communism (and less) is neither a civil society of liberal minded individuals practising inter-subjectivity, nor a civil society of enterprising individuals on the brink of participating in contract formation and capital accumulation. What has survived is traditional society. Post-socialist traditional society can trace its roots far beyond the relatively modern phenomenon of nationalism, it has a culture long before anyone attempted to demean it by calling it 'popular', and it involved systems of mutual aid as incompatible with consumer capitalism as with Communism. At the same time other contemporary fragments exist, with no history past the last few years which sustained and maintain opposition without falling for the temptations of power. Then there is a working class with its own inveterate traditions, likely to be the first in line for breaking when marketisation comes. One danger here is that the process of silencing and suppressing this class may push it towards identification with, and alliance to, the old, similarly attacked, Soviet bureaucracy. The potential all these 'fragments' may have in the future has not been lost on the ruling class, new or old. The resurrection of Solidarity in Poland (1989) by the State which had imprisoned and persecuted it was a desperate attempt to reconstruc a unifying force upon an already divided nation (see Here & Now 7/8 'The Economic Movement and The Polish Opposition'). All that in fact was achieved was the demise of the old ruling elite and its replacement by Walesa's mob, shakily perched upon an unravelling society.

So despite bourgeois triumphalism, there is much that is uncertain and risky for those seeking the full integration of the territory of what was the Soviet Bloc into the global market economy. 'The return of arrogantly 'transcended' past traditions together with the memories of the pleasures and adventures of fighting the system (any system!) do not bode a smooth passage for intensive commodification of these territories. And in the process of encountering submerged and marginal ways of living the normal and the familiar come into question, and other forms of social organisation beyond the twin evils of nationalism and Capital begin clamouring to join the game.
The Myth of Professionalism

Colin Webster questions the power of the professional.

'Fish in water. - Since the all-embracing distributive machinery of highly concentrated industry has superseded the sphere of circulation, the latter has begun a strange post-existence. As the professions of the middle-man lose their economic basis, the private lives of countless people are becoming those of agents and go-betweens; indeed the entire private domain is being engulfed by a mysterious activity that bears all the features of commercial life without there being actually any business to transact'.

Theodore Adorno.

PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONALISM HAVE been slagged off from all parts of the political spectrum at various times and from wildly different intellectual traditions. Adorno wrote the above in 1944, even then suggesting that the rise of professional type occupations is predicated on changes in economic organization towards large companies and a decline of small business. The decline of the traditional petit-bourgeoisie coupled with an expansion of the education system in the post-war period feed an inexorable growth of professional occupations. But perhaps most perceptively, Adorno recognized that the proliferation of professional activity increasingly blurs the separation between the public world of work and private world of relief from work, and, that the nature of this professional work increasingly takes the form of intrusions into the private sphere through surveillance and control of behaviour. Here professionals seem unable to distinguish between work and non-work, thus a condition is created whereby their own personal lives are invaded by work imperatives. At the same time much professional work involves the invasion of other's private lives, both the lives of friends and acquaintances and of 'clients' lives. What is often forgotten in this is the extent to which professionals must police their own behaviour as a condition of maintaining credibility. The overall effect is to weaken any will to think independently and critically about social arrangements, instead self-absorption becomes the preferred modus operandi.

Since Adorno's diatribe the thesis of 'the professional conspiracy' has found many adherents, from Illich's 'Disabling Professions', Habermas' notion of 'professional experts colonising everyday life', H&N's critiques, Foucault's delineation of 'knowledge/power', to popularist neo-conservative arguments about professional closed shops and professions being parasitic on wealth-creating sectors. Perhaps the most impressive and sustained study that lends some support to the thesis is Perkin's historical plotting of The Rise of Professional Society-England Since 1880. Perkin who hails from the social democratic centre-left, characterizes post-capitalist/post-industrial England as having become a 'professional society', reconstituted from traditional class society, and sets out to answer "... how did professionalism as an organizing principle (of society) come to supersede class ...". In essence Perkin's argument is that the rise of professional society saw an evolving philosophical, economic and political battle, not between workers and capitalists against professional interests as such, but a rounding of the private sector professionals who ran the large corporations and their academic and journalistic supporters upon the public sector professionals. The former saw the latter as a burden upon the private sector in two senses, as consumers of the wealth which it produced and as controllers and regulators of its managers' freedom of action. This eventually finds its apotheosis in the 1970's and 1980's in a triple backlash against special interest groups, big government and corporatism. Perkin exposes these New Right arguments and concludes that 'professional society' is a good thing but must rid itself of the see-saw of Left and Right and professional rivalries that are counter productive. Despite the obvious inadequacies of Perkin's overall analysis (after all, both public and private sectors are profoundly wedded to a highly commodified, archaically undemocratic society), the historical account is excellent.

More generally, professional work raises the question of the relationship between public and private life, paid and domestic labour, sexual and ethnic divisions of labour, and indeed the nature of work itself. The consequences of these relationships for professionals themselves are particularly marked amongst women. Because of the particular pressures placed upon the caring professions (social work, nursing, school teaching, etc.) to be selfless, putting the needs of others before their own, women find themselves in a constant double-bind in attempting to manage the competing demands of home and work - controlled by externally defined professional standards which take little account of the wider familial and societal demands upon women to fulfil what are often contradictory or incompatible roles.

This experience of professional work by women, is in an intensified way, symptomatic of an overriding orientation amongst 'caring professions' to make work and work hard - imperatives amply supported and imposed by guilt-tripping colleagues. Women also fulfill the role of feminizing the management of social control, making this primary purpose of 'caring professionals' somewhat more acceptable to 'clients'.
Leaving aside the critical commentary I want to now offer something that I hope places 'professionalism' in a more 'realistic' light than detractors and critics allow when they ascribe over-arching, reifying traits to professional work, and implausible analysis of the position of professionals in post-capitalist commodity society sometimes bordering on the paranoia of conspiracy theory. I do not wish to defend 'professionalism' (many critics are in many respects correct), but to brush aside rhetoric in order to look 'inside' it. Professional work is after all still work in the sense of there being influences, controls and pressures on this type of work associated with the wage labour relationship. I want to step into the nature of professional work so as to demonstrate it is not all radical critics make it out to be. To challenge the view that professionals are mostly powerful actors, necessarily peregrinous in their effects. In particular to ask what it is professionals are supposed to know and do that supposedly makes them so powerful and what consequences follow for (professional-professional: professional-client: client-client): (Society) configurations.

What then, are professionals supposed to know and how is this knowledge employed in practice? What is the nature of professional work? What are the effects and consequences of these knowledges and actions upon professionals themselves? The following issues may provide a framework within which to address our questions:

The relationship between professional language/knowledge (expert knowledge) and ordinary everyday language/knowledge is such that the former does not address the common people or common, specialized trades - higher knowledge is still expressed in terms unfamiliar to and impenetrable by the many and discussed by techniques of discourse that are opaque to outsiders. These language games employed by professionals serve to position them in a hierarchy of values and rewards vis-a-vis others. The more complex and opaque, and the longer it takes to learn these special languages, the higher the economic and/or status rewards and privileges that accrue. But this positioning has also to be legitimized culturally to others, especially to those who in relative terms lose out most. Others must be made to believe in the inherent fairness of these processes. Doctors are given high social standing whereas social workers are not, which means social workers have had to work much harder at strategies of legitimation. Here discourse is a form of cultural capital valorized so as to both exclude others, establish distinctions, and enhance/maintain one's exchange value.

On the other hand, what is the relationship then, between those who create, transmit and apply expert or formal knowledge and the actual exercise of power? In what way can it be said accurately that knowledge is power? Can we speak of the 'tyranny of the experts', 'social control', 'hegemony', 'professional dominance', or 'monopoly of discourse' to characterize professionals relationship to knowledge and power? Friedson, a sociologist of the professions poses the issue with admirable clarity:

"What, then, of professional power? As human institutions, professions can manifest different kinds of power. As associations they are interest groups that can exercise economic and political power. As credentialed incumbents in key positions in agencies and organizations they can exercise bureaucratic, even state, powers. But the same can be said of a variety of non-professional occupations. The key question for the professions is whether the exercise of those powers also advances or imposes the formal knowledge by which they distinguish themselves from other occupations. Is professional power the special power of knowledge or merely the ordinary power of vested economic, political, and bureaucratic interest? That is the critical question."

Turning now to how professionals employ the formal knowledge or discipline that they claim to represent, we find that this knowledge is systematically transformed by professionals with differing perspectives created both by the particular demands of the work they do and by the demands of their particular clients. In particular, professional administrators/managers and practitioner's, given their differences in perspective and interest, each transform in different ways formal knowledge produced and advanced by academics and researchers.

Administrators/managers make arbitrary selections from formal knowledge that best fit what they believe to be the practical situation of the organization for which they are responsible and proceed to reduce what they select to an artificially limited and consistent set of rules, guidelines or procedures. Issues of state regulation, income, and client pressure figure in their plan. Formal knowledge is simplified and rationalized, given greater formality than it actually possesses. Here we see the imposition of bureaucratic and procedural rules on individual initiative and the scope of professional work.

In contrast, practitioners accept that portion of the formal knowledge and of guidelines of managers which is useful to them in their variable day-to-day work experience, while rejecting that which is not, in the light of their pragmatic judgement, based on the work situation confronting them. The resistance of clients comprises an important part of that work situation. In other words formal knowledge is applied inconsistently and informally. Professional workers can be as involved in conflict with managerialism and as resistant to managerial strategy as other groups of workers.

In each case there is a different transformation of formal knowledge into working knowledge. That is knowledge comes to be a source of workplace control and resistance used by professionals against both managers and in some cases clients.

Professional administrators/managers, however, must promulgate guidelines designed to influence the way professional work is to be performed or evaluated - they must assert a definite standard. But here again, the evidence on standard setting suggests dilution and compromise - often as not 'community standards' are in operation - that is what is widely accepted and performed by practitioners as custom and practice rather than what is recommended by the theory and research of formal knowledge.

At the level of everyday work, practising professionals have little control of policy-making, little capacity to define general public needs and problems, and little power over the allocation of resources except those immediately at hand. It is the administrator/manager who has the power to allocate those resources to the practitioners as well as specifying what resources the practitioners can dispense to clients and under what circumstances. This fact alone gives the lie to an undifferentiating claim that professionals simply control, dominate or manipulate clients.
Apart from these general differences and conflicts between managers and practitioners, there are specific differences in situations that vary from profession to profession. The most important stems from the nature of the professions clients and relative power they have. A crucial source of power practitioners have over their clients is their capacity to serve as gatekeepers of desired resources—whether educational grades, drugs, financial benefits, or whatever.

Some professions, however, serve clients who are powerful, sophisticated, and well organized, e.g. engineering, architecture, and, increasingly science are typically dependent on clients who possess capital and are therefore powerful. Personal Service professions (teachers, social workers, solicitors) face 'public opinion' constructed and orchestrated by the mass media, which if this were to be representative of a genuine democratic public sphere, would greatly enhance accountability. The reality, however, is a vicarious and uninformed populism about 'restrictive practices' and 'persecution' of alleged child-abusers by social workers (the latter resting in part on a mischievous defence of the sanctity and privacy of the family). Whatever kernel of truth can be found in these onslaughts, the real issue of how moral responsibility should be understood is ignored.

This fluid and complex reality evokes a picture of interaction and negotiation by active human beings which calls into serious question the value of seeing professionals and the professions as all-powerful in contemporary western societies. Or, does it? Having suggested we subject the supposed knowledge claims of the professions to critical scrutiny both in terms of the knowledge itself and what it means in practice, and that professionals themselves are the object of managerial strategy and imposition, we should now ask, what do they actually do?

What then are professionals supposed to do and what are the effects and consequences of these actions both upon the 'client' and professionals themselves? In particular what are the relationships between professional power and organisational settings and the institutionalisation of 'clients'? Through what processes and with what outcomes for clients, are professionals implicated? The essential task of professional work is to classify and categorize people and objects in terms of 'client group needs' and 'services delivery'. Professional power operates on the basis of processes of classification, categorization and definition - the mad, the bad, the evil, the inadequate, the ill and the profitable, marketable and exchangeable. This bread and butter of professional work engenders anomalies and creates the paradox of boundary-blurring, disruption and subversion of boundaries. Yet definitions offered vary and may have remarkable and unforeseen consequences. Becoming a client is not always a progression into dependency, nor in the case of social control professional-client transactions, into badness, madness, evilness or wickedness. The rule-breaker may be coaxed into any one of a number of 'roles'. Those who straddle categories are sometimes awarded non-human or superhuman qualities whilst at the same time all classification systems must engender anomalies because none can be exhaustive. It is intrinsic to organization that it produces the unmanageable cases that subvert it (this is the effect of 'satanic abuse' on social work). Finally, organisational or bureaucratic ideology/ethos determines the ways in which professionals categorise people on the basis of 'need' or 'blame', whilst at the same time, stifling operational autonomy and innovation amongst professionals.

On the other hand professionals and their institutions operate so as to selectively offer relative 'successes' - the redeemed, reformed, deserving, healthy and changed to 'justify' their supposed competence, position and power, whilst surrounding themselves with a sea of 'failure' (presumably to point towards 'the immense task ahead', 'the work to be done' etc.). What this invariably does is to override any substantive justice or concern with/for the 'client'. The central paradox for professionals is they need 'clients' - both those who can be 'cured', 'helped', 'rehabilitated', and those who resist reform and help.

This can be illustrated by reference to Scott's 1960's study of Blind Institutions in the U.S. which proclaimed that the blind are manufactured by the special agencies which 'care' for them. This remarkable conclusion rests on the case that Blind Institutions operate so as to select a few eligible candidates for transformation into the acceptably functioning blind. Apart from these chosen few to be redeemed, made educable and employable, the rest are discarded. Blindness is mostly partial-sightedness and this is the case amongst those discarded, but instead this group are methodically encouraged to play the blind role, relinquishing any use of sight and adopting the methods of the utterly sightless. They are required to learn incapacity - a kind of orderly incompetence. Professionals select categories of blindness and define what these mean and this flows from institutions dependence on the continuous production of conspicuous and sympathetic successes. This, in turn, comes from the need to secure funds and carve out satisfying (?) professional careers and/or ensure survival. Clearly, the malleable and changed provide a mirror image of the intractable and recalitrant, and the equation between them is constructed so as to provide a manipulable ploy or justification for expenditure and effort. A case of the blind leading the blind!

All this raises in my mind the issue of trust. In conditions of postmodernity, especially, how is it possible to trust professionals and professional-client relationships? In particular, transactions associated with supposed expert knowledge? In a different context Anthony Giddens has suggested:

"I trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge)".

If we are moving towards a social system concerned more centrally with information, whilst at the same time there is a plurality of heterogeneous claims to knowledge (as postmodernist theory claims), in which science does not have a privileged place, then this places unusual strains and pressures on professionals work with clients, as well as on the whole legitimacy of the claims made for the basis of these relationships. On the other hand as social relations become increasingly disembodied - lifted out from local, traditional contexts of interaction - then professional work and associated expert systems are increasingly likely to be based on trust, if they are to work.

The Invasion of the Home from D. Pepler 1915

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the expert knowledge which professionals apply - something which clients cannot usually check exhaustively themselves. Trust in expert systems, is an article of 'faith', by the lay person. Expert systems are also disembedding mechanisms because they remove social relations from the immediacies of context, by providing 'guarantees' of expectations across situations at different times and places - providing standards and values which are interdependent, interchangeable and transferable. In both these senses then, trust is disembedded - there is no need to trust someone whose activities were continually visible and thought processes were transparent, or to trust any system whose workings were wholly known and understood. The prime condition of requirements for trust is not only lack of power but lack of full information.

'Trust' is connected to 'risk' which originates with the understanding that unanticipated results may be a consequence of professional - client relationships, activities or decisions. These unintended consequences of professional knowledge and practice may or may not be ameliorated by 'reflexivity' which consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.

Expert systems can be seen as a relatively new type of credentialled symbolic 'universal' exchange, at least amongst those holding cultural capital - they are however, unlikely to supplant monetization, that is the centrality of money as the primary medium of exchange - but are likely to continue to carry considerable value in relatively non-modified spheres. In this sense there is an interest by professionals (in the public sector ?) in ensuring the creation of symbolic tokens which carry ascendancy relative to private capital - this is the real meaning of Perkin's thesis viz. private versus public professionals.

Finally, if we now address our question about professional power the answer surely lies in the powers of association and in particular who is powerful and what is power in the situation. When considering the configuration (Professional-Professional: Professional-Client: Client-Client): (Society), it is useful to bear in mindBruno Latours paradox of power: "...when an actor simply has power nothing happens and s/he is powerless; when on the other hand, an actor exerts power it is others who perform the action." It appears from this that power is not something one can possess - indeed it must be treated as a consequence rather than as a cause of action. On this model power is not the diffusion of commands from a central source, but relies and results from the actions of a chain of agents each of whom 'translates' it in accordance with his/her own projects. Since power is composed here and now by enrolling many actors in a given political and social arrangement, and it is not something that can be stored up and given to the powerful by a pre-existing 'society'. it follows that the nature of society is negotiable, a practical and revisable matter, and not something which can be determined once and for all by the radical critic or social observer who attempts to stand outside it. Accordingly, we should seek to analyze the ways in which people are associated together and their methods of association that offer ways of linking people that may last longer than any given interaction. Professional associations are such a method and cannot simply be seen as having power - in potential - but exerting power - in actum - where the 'clients' themselves are performing the action and not the 'professional'. Clients constitute the power transaction because no matter how much power professionals appear to accumulate, it is always necessary to obtain it from the clients who are doing the acting. The reservoir of professional power is full only so long as clients dutifully fill it. Apart from the implication for those who use professionals that they themselves are implicated in their own 'subordination' and may wish to withhold trust, the actors in the configuration (professionals and client) are themselves bound together to create relationships that may serve to keep us all in place.

D.K.

Contradictions and some advice for Professionals

We can liken the contradictory position of professionals to that of the Brahmin Caste in India, and in particular to the Brahminical sceptical tradition. Maria Douglas, an anthropologist, sought to locate within the social structure the niche in which radical scepticism tends to flourish. The Brahminical sceptical tradition is compared with Western idealist movements in the 19th and 20th centuries and with sceptical trends of today. She describes a social position that combines considerable privilege with lack of influence in an arbitrarily powerful political system which gives rise to moral contradictions and insoluble problems, and goes on to suggest:

"In such a position a denial of the reality of the world indicates a level of thought in which intellectual coherence may be possible. The converse situation, where claiming authority and holding power seem feasible, is more compatible with affirmation of reality than with its negation."

Perhaps radical scepticism best represents the social position of professionals and should be endorsed by them as their best hope in the situation. Also, to hold onto the fact that, after all, professional work is only work not a way of life. Having to be both 'nice' and anxious at the same time leads to neurosis whereas a healthy disrespect for things the way they are may lead to a modicum of self respect and an openness to change, even if that means one commits a kind of social suicide - not identifying with one's job or career.
Teaching Johnny to Grieve

D.K. takes a look at Bereavement Counselling

This is a business I feel very strongly about. Readers will feel perhaps that the matter doesn’t warrant such anger, which even a sympathetic reading might see as disproportionate. But I can’t help it. I regard the current epidemic of Counselling as a social catastrophe; the battalions of ‘Care’ professionals of every kind are to me an object of moral outrage. I have a deep abhorrence for their pretentions, their jargon, their very existence. I’m sure I’m not alone in despising the whole business, and I do owe them an explanation.

The trade now operates on a vast scale. It is like pornography: the more you study it, the less one is able to tolerate its existence as a relatively innocuous response to some rather unfortunate human ‘needs’, and the more it reveals itself as a gigantic and perverse exploitation of real miseries, a racket which adds insult to injury, generating income from the very unhappiness it has in fact no interest at all in alleviating. Like pornography again, its sheer enormity can make any opposition disheartened at its momentum and apparent invulnerability.

The most obscene specialism in this field of emotional colonialism must be Bereavement Counselling. In no other area does the arrogance of the ‘specialist’, their trained inability to perceive the particular reality in front of them, expose its objective cruelty in such starkness. This is because the realities confronted in grief are a universal reality. The petty jargonisations and mealy-mouthed philosophies which designate the absolute as a ‘field’ or an ‘issue’ to be ‘addressed’ (the talk of ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘dealing with denial’ etc) cannot fail to insult the human species itself: asking someone to talk to a grief counsellor is no less irrelevant - impertinent - than asking them to fill in a questionnaire. To call it ridiculous is too generous. Insensitiveness is often forgiven when the motivation is accepted. The motivation of counsellors is always necessarily mercenary (by definition since it is the professional project that has priority over the particular ‘case’ in hand).

One of the leading entrepreneurs in this booming area, Dr Colin Murray Parkes, chairman of Cruse affirms (in the false modest fashion typical of the trendy professionals who are at pains to deny mendaciously that they impose standardised models) that counsellors must beware of imposing their views of what constitutes “good grieving”. This is the dishonesty by which ‘counselling’ eschews the giving of advice thus showing the same flagrant contempt for semantics as their practice shows to the sentiments of their clients when they fail to acknowledge their ‘need’ for the service offered.

It has been noted how the town of Lockerbie had to endure an invasion of ‘helpers’ after suffering the horrors from the skies. Firemen spoke of the ‘contrived empathy’ of these naive ghouls. Yvonne McEwen, reported in The Independent in October this year, put her finger on one of the lynchpins of today’s psychocracy in saying “Many of these counsellors just won’t accept that denial can be healthy, that not everyone wants to talk.” There is indeed a veritable shibboleth about ‘denial’ and a faith in the healing power of talk worthy of an interrogator. ‘Denial’ is now the main weapon by which those peddling their spurious doctrines try to knock holes in their ‘clients’ discourse to gain an inroad. It functions as an accusation of resistance to the truth possessed by the carrier of the so-called care. (Of course they themselves will ‘deny’ that they are claiming any monopolies of truth, but they really do have something worth denying).

Iain Philpott, after the Marchioness disaster, said “we all got sick of being discussed by experts at conferences when no-one has actually come back to us to ask where they went wrong.” The true magnitude of this affront can only be measured by recognising that such professional abuse of survivors is itself a promising subject for PhDs and publications in the trade journals.

Even those who have been helped have grievances. Barry Devonside, after Hillsborough, admits that some people “did feel persecuted by social workers coming in and telling them what was wrong and how to handle it. There were complaints that counsellors were far too forward and personal.”

Like millions of others I have had dreadful bereavements. There will be more. But my acquaintance with these deaths confers no authority to ask of anyone else that they ‘discuss’ their own grief with me. The professional will be assured that I am claiming no homespun amateur remedies to compete with them. But on what grounds are their own ‘qualifications’ based? A course, some ‘training’ workshops, some canonical formulas in a textbook, a dissertation and an exam paper? It is perfectly true that this society’s incompetence at dealing with death disqualifies its claims to be called a ‘society’. But the growth of a new professional expertise which justifies itself by reference to this spiritual impoverishment can only amount to further proof of the moral bankruptcy of the professionalisation of the lifeworld.

In those ‘traditional societies’ which offer the models of ritual and symbolic response to death, trades like undertaker and butcher are shrouded in taboos; they are vicariously ‘unclean’ as is anything contiguous with death. In societies in which professional mourners exist, they are expected to make a good show of their own grieving. If a re-ritualisation of these ultimate matters of life and death is to be undertaken, then the grief workers would be what they should already be treated as - pariahs. Those who wish to make a living off death should put their social status where their salaries come from.
Alex Richards shows how the satanic scandal in the Orkneys exposed the universalistic pretensions of the various state agencies involved.

**THE ORKNEY RITUAL ABUSE AFFAIR PLAYED** out on various levels. Sides were taken around beliefs about social truth (e.g. about prevalent child abuse), about progress towards enlightenment (e.g. that "we are just coming to recognise the scale of such problems"), and about justice and the boundaries of legitimate power.
The relative weightings of these concerns map back onto social position. Appeal to universal values assumed a shared social programme, a set of interests backed up by beliefs.

It may be helpful to look in some detail at one of the most revealing articles published during the affair; that it was probably written at speed and in some anger makes its own agenda visible. The article is Derek Rodger's signed editorial "Hands Together for Life" in the April/May 1991 edition of the magazine Scottish Child.

The caption itself brings the first problem. What does it mean? What life? An appeal to solidarity on whose part? A solidarity rising above all particular interests? "Hands together" but community autonomy has been evacuated in the article: community is merely the scab on a wound, a place of denial: "Our society's ability, sometimes bordering on the desperate, to deny the existence of widespread sexual abuse in ordinary families-next-door is, quite simply, to fly in the face of known facts". Known facts, if denied by "society", therefore remain "real" only by circulating in the discourse of specialists.

So by the beginning of only his second paragraph, Rodger's proposition that child abuse is endemic in society has him veering towards prejudice. Despite protestations of even-handedness, his prose is set in its ways. Presumption of innocence? The media "lap it up, unquestioningly". Specialists, by contrast, "consider the possibility" that the allegations are true. (Presumably, the actions and inactions of the various State agencies involved in the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four cases were informed by a similar logic.)

The five paragraphs devoted to the South Ronaldsay witch-hunt are directed mainly against the Press, accused of wanting to cover-up (and thus consent to) child abuse. But this howl against the media twists and devours itself. Those who live by the media. So ChildLine and soap operas are assigned a place above the media swamp: "EastEnders has noticed - why can't our national press?" This encapsulates the Left's collapse in the 1980s into identity politics: well-meaning television soaps could provide the lint over society's wounds; each identified group would be allocated its role models, all of whom could discuss their ills away around a kitchen table. The zeal for greater realism, better models, more true-life situations cedes the leading role to script-writers (more specialists).

So far from everyone holding hands, the original social unity has already sundered into a trinity: the mass (place of denial), the expert (place of disinterested knowledge), and the media (at worst, an interested group pandering to mass prejudice, at best disinterested purveyors of didactic entertainment).

That establishes the essential purity of the social workers: "the first to get it in the neck". They are deftly amalgamated with the "children", for whose protection, it should be recalled, the whole affair was ostensibly organised: "The social workers in Orkney, and the children's panel members involved, must be defended against tabloid hysteria - but not just for their own sake. For it is children who are really under attack in this press campaign".

So much for Rodger's article.

Missing is any recognition that "therapeutic" agencies have particular interests (although the usual bureaucratic interest in increasing the resources under their control has already been nodded through). The response to criticism claims a legitimacy in their power: that 'society expects us to do its dirty work but complains when our hands get dirty'. This conservative concept of the legitimacy of constituted power supposes a consent never given, a society never unified.

Furthermore, the policing of "agreed" social norms has been supplanted by the formation of a progressive programme: a novelty-based, self-enclosed project of developing "new expertise" and new areas of concern. Agencies don't refer back to the community for legitimacy but seek to lead. They regard child abuse as both exceptional (in that emergency action is needed to deal with it) and the norm (in its ubiquity). This condition of super-legality and self-referentiality lacks coercive mechanisms, so it escalates into continual resource-pleading and collapses into illegality.

Three codes - the legal, the therapeutic and the police - interwove in the Orkney affair. The combination of therapeutic and police interests produced the peculiar flavour of the initial raids: police interest in sudden raids to snatch "evidence"; therapeutic interest in detaining those assumed to be witnesses/victims and interview them in "disclosure sessions" until evidence was forthcoming.

(A fable for those who think the end justifies such means: the victim of a beating goes to a hospital casualty department on a Friday night but claims the injury was self-inflicted. A "greater good" may be served by detaining and interrogating the person over a period of weeks until the assailant is named. But justice goes out the window.)

The mediation of Social Workers' relationship to minors through the Children's Panel system developed as an ostensibly liberal replacement of application of the legal code to children. But like the Staffordshire and Leicester affairs, South Ronaldsay showed conditions where the legal code admits greater safeguards against arbitrary action.

Having entered a situation where an agency was defining its own criteria for intervention, the system's equilibrium could not easily be restored. Sheriff Kelbie was appalled by the extent to which the process (for extracting statements by repeated interrogation over weeks) lay outside norms of justice and ruled the actions invalid at the first opportunity. (At least some Scottish social workers who declined to participate in the original snatch had predicted this.)

The Kelbie judgement left Social Work in disarray. Having been criticised for refusing to allow children to attend their own Children's Panel hearing (or even to know it was happening), Social Work Directors prepared pedantic instructions that, if Kelbie's judgement stood, every new-born child being taken into care would have to be taken from incubator to Panel Hearing. Inability to distinguish between infants and 15 year old children would disqualify people from most jobs, but is apparently no inhibition to a career in social work management, where the Peter principle reigns.

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23
Normal conditions were restored by overturning the grounds of the Kelbie judgement on appeal, while leaving the material outcome unchanged, and a judicial hearing is now taking place in Kirkwall.
At the time of writing, the hard evidence which the Social Work establishment has always claimed existed has failed to emerge: social workers are coronary that one child was insufficiently outraged by being snatched (a blame-the-victim logic akin to blaming Jewish people for insufficient opposition to the Nazis). But some of the social workers involved seem to be admitting to individual doubts, but had felt they couldn’t question the hierarchy.

That last fact points back to problems of agency, problems solved neither by increasing resource allocation nor by appeals to “put our hands together for life”. Problems, including the plight of any child being abused, require solution, but ceding from the family and the local community to external agencies is no more than partially adequate, both from the interests of the individuals involved and for any possibility for social change. Any possibility for radical change starts from elsewhere than propping up existing institutions by appealing to abstract solidarity and the spirit of youth.

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DON’T DELAY. WRITE NOW TO THE POLITICAL CONSUMERS’ ASSOCIATION, Democracy Chambers, Runnymede Road, Cheapskate, London EC1 2XX.
Indeed it is easy to forget that the word utopia, often taken to mean idealized visions of a society of the future (temporal), in fact literally means “no place” - an imaginary place outside time. Early socialism had the idea of land for the people central among its claims and radicals as well as social reformers, such as Robert Owen, Patrick Geddes, and the various communal movements have made place in the here and now central to their ways of trying to change society. The criticism of such approaches has always been with regard to their partiality, particularism or lack of an historical understanding of social relations given the desire for haste in social change in these approaches.

Yet all resistance is spatial in nature as are its opposites such in social control and surveillance. From the panoptical designs of Bentham’s nineteenth century prison designs to remote control cameras in policed spaces, the spatial aspect of maintaining existing power relations has been of great significance. There are however, other more important ways in which space is policed; through attaching particular meanings to place, defining what can take place where and who decides, the construction of place myths.

A significant claim made by feminists, for example, has been that a spatial division of public and private space has taken place through the attachment of particular meanings and legitimation for place specific social attributes. Public means male, rational and discursive, while the private has been associated with female, emotional and the figural realm of desire. Such legitimation, to continue with the feminist example, has led, it is argued, to the subjection of women (and children), to the outcomes of patriarchal power in a place legitimized as a supposedly safe and nurturing space, in other words the place myth of home is used as a means of maintaining patriarchal relations of power.

In what follows, I want to make the case that any radical critique of existing social relations has to take account of the spatial dimensions of social life as well as the temporal ones. This is not an argument in favour of rejecting a general critique of society in favour of a plurality of particular circumstances and for that much abused term difference, but for an integrated critique of the social uses of space. I intend to make my case by considering a recent example where the importance of space for both social control and the resistance has been clearly visible: The festival at Stonehenge and over the lifestyle of the New Age Travellers. It is hoped that the limitations of both the means of control and the resistance will be made clear, leaving open the way for new ways of looking at space.

The Travellers and the Stonehenge Festival.

“Stonehenge on a Victorian public holiday was a busy place. The pilgrim who goes there with his reverent mind full of Druids ... undergoes a series of electric shocks ... He never bargained for vato [various] hoards of upavais [upavais], dressed in all the colours of the rainbow, and in many others of antipodean origin. They come, they crack jokes, they feast, and they sing the latest sweet thing from the music hall repertoire ... while a fusillade of ginger beer adds to the general rudeness” (quoted in Chippendale 1983b: 173).

ON 1ST JUNE 1985 THE CONVOY, TRAVELLING ON ITS WAY TO STONEHENGE WERE FORCED OFF THE ROAD BY THE POLICE AND INTO A BEANFIELD WHERE A BATTLE BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE TRAVELLERS TOOK PLACE. MANY CONVOY VEHICLES WERE DAMAGED AND OVER 500 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED, OTHERS MANAGED TO FLEE INTO THE DEPTHS OF THE SURROUNDINGS OF SAVERNEKE FOREST. THE SO-CALLED "PEACE CONVOY" AS IT HAD BECOME KNOWN AFTER A VISIT TO GREENHAM IN 1982 HAD BECOME THE MOST VISIBLE FEATURE OF AN ANNUAL SUMMER RITUAL FOR MANY PEOPLE TO GO TO AT STONEHENGE, IN ORDER TO ATTEND THE SUMMER SOLSTICE CELEBRATIONS AND PARTICIPATE IN A ROCK FESTIVAL.

Out of the festival scene the travellers had emerged as a diverse set of groups or tribes, although not the original festival organisers, they are people who lived on the road all summer, in old buses, caravans and makeshift dwellings "benders," opting only to park up or return to city squats during the winter. They took the brunt of police hostility in 1985, the year the festival was suppressed. In 1986 the convoy spent May and June being forced from one site to the next by the police, magistrates, landowners and local authorities who refused to allow these people to congregate and hold anything representing a free festival. (NCCL 1986). Farmers blocked their fields with tractors and agricultural machinery and began to brandish their shotguns, vehicles were impounded, arrests made, children taken into care and pets put down.

More recently, things have been quieter, partly due to the four mile exclusion zone around Stonehenge at solstice time, miles of razor wire, road blocks, police dogs, helicopters with searchlights and in some years thousands of police. But especially because of the introduction of the public order act in 1986, which allows for the prohibition of large scale movements and gatherings such as free festivals, not arranged through formal procedures. But the travellers continue to exist, some estimate that there are currently 10,000 "New Age travellers" living on the roads in Britain, there through choice, out of poverty, avoiding the poll tax or because they find the idea of nomadic lifestyle appealing. While the Stonehenge summer solstice festival has not taken place since 1984, travellers have gone instead to other ancient stone circles, or tried to go to Stonehenge for the winter solstice or at the spring/autumn equinox.

The festival was not only a place for large numbers of people to congregate during the summer for rock and folk music and entertainment, but also for the market it provided for the new age travellers, at which they could make some money and meet up with old friends while taking part in the festival. (Hetherington, in Shields, (ed) 1992). The Stonehenge festival was itself part of a "season" of summer free festivals, travellers would move on from one fair to another earning money, selling goods, offering and exchanging services.

Contemporary "free" festivals are out of place in modern society. Festival has always been a particular space associated with inversions of established norms and social statues. (Bakhtin, 1984, Stellybrass and White 1986). They were a good example of a liminal reversal of social constraints, allowing the authorities to be mocked and the world "turned upside down". The contemporary festival lifestyle re-introduces mockery and anti-authoritarianism into the modern life, celebrating disorder, drug taking, hedonism and bizarre costume, all of which are meant as a visible expression of release from imposed social constraints. The festival goes mock, through carnival all those who hold ideals of progress and satisfaction through effort. This is particularly true of many travellers, their often dirty, dishevelled look, rejection of the work ethic and open support of a drug culture, meant they had transgressed the boundary of respectability.

Travellers see their lifestyle not as "dropping out", but as an alternative way of life more naturally suited (sic) to human society - "tribes" of about thirty to forty people who lived together, shared common iconic symbolism and provided the support for family units that emerged. Although this new traveller lifestyle only emerged in Britain in the mid 1970's some like to see what they are doing as following in an "anarchist tradition" with its roots in Winstanley's Digger movement from the time of the English civil war!

There is however more of a resemblance in this traveller lifestyle to that of the German youth movement prior to the first world war, the Wandervogel, in which the attempt to turn nomadism and camping into an heroic rejection of modernity reached its high point.

For example,

"In the late nineties and early nineteen hundreds there were no youth hostels, no well travelled routes, no easily transmissible techniques of roaming. The pattern was that of prolonged truancy or vagrancy, accompanied by a little rowdym... Costumes was highly individualised and sometimes approached the rags and tatters of the quasi-mythical "wandering scholar" of medieval times of the nondescript, dirty garb of the 'raggle-taggle Gypsys, O!" " (Becker 1946: 67)

The month long roam into the forests of Bohemia provided this fusion of a lifestyle in the same way that the Stonehenge and other free festivals do for today's travellers.

"[T]hrough identification with the group, as demonstrated by successful assimilation of the unique experience of the expedition, [convoy] rapidly came to be the way in which initially random conventicles of dissenters were fused into genuine sects of the likeminded and consciously elect. (1946: 83)

An important event in the life of the roaming German youth at the turn of the century was the celebration of the summer solstice! (Mosse, 1964: 174)

Stonehenge: Heritage and Festival.

The travellers therefore have engaged in a particular set of spatial practices associated with nomadism and festival that remain at odds with normal ways of acting in public. Not surprisingly the reaction was hostile from the start! and voiced in terms of "invasion" "despoilment" and "pollution" (Rojek 1989)

"these anarchists are here spoiling a beauty spot and harassing both residents and holidaymakers" (see Rojek 1989: 200)

"the fair face of this unique area is being disfigured and fouled" (1989: 200)

In the words of the chief Constable of Hampshire,

"for over a week there has been a very angry and resentful fear in our community at Stony Cross which has been threatened by the presence of this invasion. The invaders, as elsewhere, have shown a reckless disregard to peace and how anyone can think of that as a convoy of peace defies my imagination" (quoted in Rojek 1989: 201)

The local MP, Robert Key, was reported in the local newspapers to be investigating whether the travellers were a possible source of hepatitis and HIV (Salisbury Journal 22/5/1986).
Stonehenge is a prime example of a place with a multitude of meanings attached to it (see Chippindale 1983a). It is a site with many conflictually produced and contested meanings, but they centre around two fundamental ones: that of heritage and that of festival. This can be seen in the descriptions of Stonehenge as an important archaeological site, a temple, an ancient astronomical instrument, a tourist attraction, a symbol of ancient Briton as culturally and technologically skilled, a Neolithic site of worship, part of England’s cultural heritage, a node in a system of powerful ley lines and the site of an annual rock festival. (Chippindale 1983a, 1983b, Chippindale et al. 1990) It is with the latter and its connection with New Age religious meanings that provide us with the example of Stonehenge as a site of festival embodied in the celebration of the solstice and through forms of popular culture. The other examples, although diverse, provide us with the view of Stonehenge as a site of heritage. As a site overburdened with meaning it has become policed, both literally in the form of thousands of police officers at the time of the now banned festival, with the use of perimeter fencing, admission fees, and symbolically through the way meanings are given to such a space.

Despite its ancient origin, the host of meanings given to Stonehenge are all modern. Even the Druids who hold their own ceremony during the solstice are a modern phenomenon founded at the beginning of the Eighteenth century. Stonehenge is more than just a contested space, the social-spatializations (Shields, 1991) of heritage and festival are an articulation of distinct “place myths”, imaginary meanings attached to places that come to shape the sets of activities considered appropriate in that particular place. Heritage is a social spatialization that legitimates spatial order and of gazing at a place rather than using it. In festival one encounters the ideal of a spontaneous communitas and a carnivalesque spatial practice that detours the association of Stonehenge with heritage.

The ambivalent nature of Stonehenge, a site associated with carnival and markets make it a good example of what has been described as a liminal zone, a margin or boundary, the crossing of which involves ritualised forms of transgression, often association with rites of passage. (Turner, 1974) In describing Stonehenge as a liminal zone one has to recognise that for those living an alternative way of life, it provides a space offering a mythopoetically significant set of practices presumed to have transformative potential: carnivalesque rituals, pagan ceremonies and drug induced states, all of which embodied in the idea of the “free festival”.

Stonehenge then, offers these two groups of antagonists, whose interests are invested in the notions of heritage and festival the possibility of coming into contact and thence conflict. On the one hand a spatialization that represents a sense of continuity and order, while on the other a spatialization that is pagan, expressive, emotive, magical, carnival, ritualised and full of uncertainty.

The source of anxiety and the strength of the reaction by the “locals” is due not to any physical danger (although it may be articulated as such), but is related to uncertainties surrounding the visible persona of the traveller and the strangeness they bring to places that they occupy. As a consequence those who celebrate festival at this space are treated as Other, a source of horror, because they are identified with a persona that gives its expressive form represents the chaotic, disorganised and transient features of modern life that transgresses the routines and familiarities of everyday life.

While these anxieties may be cloaked in expressions of horror in relation to dirt, disease and drug taking, an attempt is made to make visible unseen anxieties, by defining those with a visibly different lifestyle in terms of the source of risk. While it is drug taking, sexual licence and an appearance that seem strange that are often the source of concern, their visibility makes the space in which they occur the source of conflict as much as the practices themselves. The travellers were seen as a direct threat to the routine stability of social life maintained by the locals, because their proximity was a source of ambivalence that upsets the relations between place and trust. In Douglas’s terms the ritual space of “home” another spatialization, similar in many respects to that of heritage, is “polluted” by the nomadism of the travellers. (Douglas 1984) It is notable that the dirtiness of the travellers appearance is singled out and taken as a moral condition. As was also the case with the peace camp at Greenham common, the space which they inhabit is viewed as contaminated, filthy, obscene and contagious.

Resistance and the Aura of Place.

While festivals and the traveller lifestyle embody a critique of society through an opposing set of spatial practices and place myths, they do not fundamentally reveal the nature of power relations embodied in space and place. In looking at the case of travellers and of Stonehenge, the main issue is not one of defending the travellers at all costs because they have been badly treated. The issue, as I suggested at the beginning, is more a requirement to see how space is used, and especially how particular meanings attached to place come to legitimate policing and control. Football grounds and shopping centres are now policed using surveillance cameras. So what. Far more significant and less obtrusive are the pervasive and routine associations of place and spatial practice, that one doesn’t recognise that the real social control takes place at the level of what can be called an “imaginary”. Place becomes place myth. The nation is a good example of a place myth. (Anderson, 1983) but there are many others less easily discernable, Stonehenge is one, the home is another, as are the workplace, office and school. Words like local, community, refuge, public, private are all imaginary place myths too.
something inherently conservative, embodying dominant relations of power as such. It is only by challenging the auristic status of the imaginaries of place that one begins to develop a genuine possibility for resistance, the reason is clear; it is only by exposing the power of place as such, rather than particular place myths, that one becomes capable of transgressing the limitations of the particular and difference.

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DISAFFECTION INDEX NEEDS REFORM, SOCIOLOGISTS SAY

IN A RECENT HIGHLY CRITICAL REPORT ON THE OFFICIAL disaffection figures, Professor Brian Stiltskin of Telly University has claimed that the decline in disaffection, announced by the Home Secretary last week, may be seriously misleading. The way the disaffection rate is measured, says Professor Stiltskin, does not take into account changes in the overall vocabulary supply. The effect of changes in language policy over the last ten years, he argues, may have been to produce an underestimate of the total quantity of disaffection in the economy.

The disaffection index has shown regular improvements over the last five years, which most commentators have claimed to be the result of a 15% increase in the number of young people gaining places on positive-wellbeing courses. According to the findings of Professor Stiltskin’s study, which is based on an analysis of figures provided by the Department of Mental Health and Spiritual Training, the disaffection index itself may need modification.

“When we looked at the raw data from a sample of local training centres, it became apparent that there were significant variations in the number and types of words with which the clients were being equipped. In some areas managers had not provided any negative words at all, and in at least one office we found that clients had developed a subterranean code of their own in which statements like “Yes, I definitely feel that my aspirations are being fulfilled” appeared to mean “I feel really pissed off at being compelled to attend this brainwashing centre every day.” What I am proposing is that there be greater standardisation in language acquisition programmes in schools to eliminate this kind of variation in semantic structures.”

One needs to recognise that space is not something abstract, an empty container for action, but a medium in which social action takes place, and also in turn helps to shape the meanings associated with particular spaces. Physical space does not determine what happens within it. But at the level of the imaginary, the meaning laden level which both determines action and is in turn determined by action, space, often expressed in terms of place, is a means of enforcing conformity. Dominant social relations and interests are represented by dominant place myths. The travellers are one case of a group who have, perhaps unwittingly, revealed this. But that is all that they have done. While they offer a different meaning to a particular place, they do not challenge the ways in which place myths are created and the means to which they are put.

It does not follow that in suggesting that space is an important issue for any radical social critique, we should argue in support of particularities of place; ethnic division, tribal territory and so on. The particularities of difference can often themselves be a source of new place myths and new relations of power, because they use the realm of the imaginary as if it were real and as a consequence are unable to control it when it starts to shape the realm of everyday life.

Instead, what is needed is a critique of the social relations of place; of making visible how space becomes place and how this imaginary realm embodies those with the best resources to colonise it. The Situationists went some way towards doing this by suggesting the deliberate use of space for purposes for which it was not intended, and thereby visibly opposing the social relations embodied in place. But they too had their own place myths, of an “authentic” urban space of resistance, based on the imaginaries of the nineteenth century Bohemian quarter of Paris, and of the Paris Commune. Rather than the S.I, it is perhaps Walter Benjamin, with his concept of aura who offers a better basis for the critique of place (Benjamin, 1971, Savage, 1991).

The city (and also the countryside, beach or wherever) have an aura like the painting which is unique and powerful in that it stands opposed to those who experience it. Rather than maintain the aura of place intact by simply offering alternative place myths, as both the travellers and the Situationists have done in their different ways; the aura of place, what I have called a place myth, should be seen as
Seriosity Kills

Frank Dexter explores one of the latest developments in the management of the unconscious.

"The difference between the local director and those he directs is not great... both live, act and think serially"1

This was the Year of the Serial Killer.

During 1991 you could hardly pick up a newspaper without having to read some review of a serial murder movie, or be told about some new controversy about one. On British TV this summer there were two serial killer films in one night. Earlier in the year the late night After Dark discussion show brought together writers, directors, relatives of victims and even Peter Sutcliffe's father. As I write this, on Halloween, a documentary on horror films, scripted by Mick Farren, has rounded up the usual suspects for interview (from Clive Barker to Brian Yuzna) and rehearsed the usual clichés about perennial fears and our deepest horrors. John Carpenter, dating the genre back to 1977, says "something is going on". But what?

You can't have failed to notice the pattern. Just to name the best known cases: Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer; Silence of the Lambs; Love Crimes; not to mention Brett Easton Ellis's American Psycho. And, for a quasi-feminist balance, Dirty Weekend by Helen Zanavi, being filmed by Michael Winner. True Detective magazine, up-to-the-minute, devoted its September issue to the subject with an erudite crash course on the big stars (complete with three-line summary of de Sade and Nietzsche).

As part of the overkill, there is the sick humour that is now the inevitable accompaniment of such media manias. The apocryphal story about the serial killers convention in the USA is one of those pieces of urban folklore that belong in the Fortean Times, along with the alligators in the sewers and the vanishing hitchhiker.

The history of the media has from its beginnings been the history of crime stories and the requirement for escalating grotesqueness is a product of the competition between the 'fictional' and the 'factual' branches of the business. But serial killers are a specific permutation in the art of atrocity that deserves some decipherment in terms of a more immediate context than the banal pontifications of the producers and directors, who can only make pompous claims about reflecting current preoccupations. Have serial murderers replaced the celebrity killers and the random snipers in some periodic model change?

Celebrity killing, on the other hand, obeys the logic of the fully-fledged spectacle: it is the Aufhebung of fandom. Here being starstruck is raised to the heights of vicarious suicide. One builds into one's imaginary life a figure from the hall of fame, and sacrifices it symbolically. Hinckley and Chapman are the 'famous' cases of this psychosis of intertextuality; they are only extreme versions of what takes place routinely in the minds of millions who in watching soaps and chat shows are already internalising as personalities the electronic hallucinations on the screen. Star-killers are part of the postmodern scene; they break down the boundaries between the real and the representation; they enact the revenge of the crystal, and are at the same time proof of the power of the hyperreal; there is nothing outside the text. Arthur Bremer, who shot and wounded George Wallace in 1972 left a diary in which Hinckley's attempt on Reagan is foreshadowed, and this diary is a blatant fiction whose probable author, according to a literary analysis by Gore Vidal, was E. Howard Hunt, CIA spook and thriller-writer, who himself had a walk-on role on the Grassy Knoll in Dallas 1963 in the first great celebrity-killing of recent times.

Serial killing is the latest structural permutation of fact and fiction, in which not only the now-inseparable 'real' and 'representation' but also the deed and the discourse about it, are synchronised. Just as literary criticism has now displaced altogether the need for literary works, so has media chatter about serial murders now prescribed the acts themselves. Even before they have happened their destiny as subjects of speculation has been pre-ordained. The killers themselves are a mere supporting act to their media commentators. What, then, is the distinctive configuration of this kind of murder?

1. The victims are arbitrary but not random; that is, a principle of selection is at work (unlike shooting into a crowd), but it is an inscrutable, idiosyncratic preference-schedule, analysable into certain broad target categories; mostly young women but with other discriminations according to sexual orientation; children and young single men etc. The patterns displayed in the choice of victims provide the clues for the investigators, whose hunting down of the perpetrators provides the narrative unity: by their choices shall ye know them.

The random sniper fires into crowds, and thus belongs to the age of the crowd defined from the point of view of a self-appointed elite. This genre of massacre is a case of death imitating art, as prescribed by Andre Breton in his famous definition of the quintessentially surreal act as emptying a revolver into a crowd of passers-by. Random snipers, like surrealists, represent a hysteric form of individuality: Michael Ryan in Hungerford, collected guns as obsessively as artists collect pretentions about their creativity, and finally discharged them convulsively. This is the way one proves one's superiority to the mass in the epoch of mass production. Where this happens literally it becomes a metaphor for a wish-fulfilment which exists on a mass scale (at least among those hordes of self-styled 'individualists' who dominate the creative arts).
2. The victims are either despatched on the spot or are taken home for extended sessions of cruelty. In some cases the process is recorded; the details of dismemberment, and even cannibalism are frequently described with all the precision of a D-I-Y manual.

3. The murderers are archetypal solitary males whose behaviour is clearly associated with normal ‘hobbyism’ and collectomania. Serial killers are, we are led to believe, doing abnormal things in a hypernormal manner.

4. Among the various patterns described, the seriality itself is not incidental. Coined by the FBI’s Robert Kessler because the murders reminded him of the film serials he had seen as a child, the very term exhibits the fusion between how cinematic dramas are linked together in sequels (don’t miss next week’s exciting episode) and how life itself has come to be experienced. Murders once used to come in individual units: now they are, like the Elm Street films, in numbered runs. It is as if culture today were consciously modelled on Sartre’s concept of the series; each individual striving to do no more than replicate the actions of others under the internalised negativity of scarcity: “that element by which one is capable of killing or vulnerable to being killed”. As audience we are all elements in the ‘practico-inert’ state of a queue, waiting to be chosen, to be killed/horrified by/in the next Freddy film. The infinite series, as Baudrillard says, is the logic of industrial media: reproducibility precedes and determines production. Viewers (and critics) line up as victims (and killers) as part of the comprehensive programme.

Is it possible to explain the serial killer craze?

There are two clues in the culture: Psychology and Shopping. The serial killer is a synthesis of these two expert systems. Psychologists have created the ‘subject’ of this activity through ‘Psychological Profiling’, while the activity itself replicates the exemplary act of consumption—whether or not the prize is literally eaten.

The Everyday Life of Psychopathology

Let’s consider first the figure of the killer as constructed by psychologists: they are always so ordinary. Robert Bloch, author of Psycho says that the whole thing boils down to the simple formula: “It could be the person standing next to you.” Even True Detective makes this point: they are called “Gary, Frank, Harry, Henry, Jack”. Unless, of course, they are psychologists like Hannibal Lecter, in which case they are geniuses, irreducible to analysis:

Nothing happened to me, Officer Starling. I happened. You can’t reduce me to a set of influences... A census taker once tried to test me. I ate his liver with some fava beans, and a nice Chianti... Go back to school, little Starling.

BIOFEEDBACK

![Functional diagram of the EMG feedback system.](image)

Hannibal even has his own analysis, not surprisingly consonant with the philosophy of the FBI:

All that talk about breaking away from the timid compromises of bourgeois morality, all those grand liberal gestures — all that sex wherever you looked — I am the monstrous result.

Serial killers are meant to stand for individuality and to make it seem that the forensic science of psychopathology still has an object. The second coming of Edgar Lustgarten in a time when the abolition of the individual has stepped forth from the pages of Adorno to become the project of popular culture.

There was a time when the inscrutable workings of the human mind were a territory to be explored: the last frontier where the soul of free will might be discovered. This Eldorado is fully colonised now like a theme environment, and the serial killer is the latest exhibit. Come and see the amazing feats of Homo Homicidius. What makes him tick? Marvel at the achievements of the FBI psychopolice. The audience at this freak show can experience simultaneously all the various pleasures of the wildlife park; the security of knowing that the specimen (‘the individual’) is still at large and being protected; the assurance that it is being thoroughly investigated: the nostalgia that it may finally be extinct. We can even imagine ourselves as this sort of creature, according to the scripted fantasies provided.

Everyone can take consolation at the same time from their own inability to depart from the norms of their social milieu and from the illusion that this is a freely chosen conformity.

There is a kind of grisly sarcasm at work. It is as if the Code is saying: the serial killer is the reductio ad absurdum of the sovereign will. The vivid demonstration of what freedom from social conventions amounts to in the final analysis: a life which is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish but measurable by the performance appraisal of a body count. The obsession with numbers reads like a scorecard. At the close of trading the prices were:

- Leonard Lake - 25 women
- Christopher Wilder - 8 women
- Ted Bundy - 23 women
- Dennis Nilsen - 15 men
- Richard Ramirez - 12 people

Surely it's no accident that the FBI's Behavioural Science Unit (whose work is promoted by The Silence of the Lambs) is based at a place called Quantico.
Serial Killer as Consumer

Old fashioned killing is either highly personal: the murder arising out of an existing relationship, or else it is industrialised. The Nazi exterminations were based on Fordist principles: even the tortures were impersonal, a labour-process like any other. There were some pointers towards the future, however, in the case of Dr. Marcel Petiot, who managed to kill and incinerate over 150 people on a cottage industry basis in his Paris apartment during the war. Petiot, the subject of a sympathetic biography by US intelligence agent John V. Grombach, seems to have been involved in deceiving his victims, luring them with the promise of being smuggled out of France, only to rob them of all their possessions and remove their bodies from the face of the earth. In terms of numbers he still holds the highest score, but in the form of his activity he anticipates the recently fashionable serial mode of killing, even if his motives were merely mercenary.

In serial murder, the victim is obtained off the shelf by some ordinary introduction. Chris Wilder, posing as a photographer, apparently just asked young women if he could take pictures. It is trust which leads to victimhood. It is obvious that the moral message of serial killer culture is that every normal social interaction with strangers is a threat, and this is part of the larger project of desocialization. But, more than this, it is the very commodification which is the official substitute for social interaction which provides the form for the murders themselves. The body of the intended victim is the use-value in the mind of the killer and the preceding interaction which provides the means for its availability. This is the normal form in which wants are to be satisfied, freed of the oppressive complications of reciprocity, obligation, uncalculated generosity and all the other antiquated vestiges of a bygone symbolic order.

Each serially-killed person is both an object of desire and a disposable item. Identical in function, in other words, to a consumer good. It could have been someone else, but it was you who were actually chosen. This is exactly the contingency of the market. The relation between killer and victim has all the arbitrariness of the absolute semiosis: the purest power relation of the kind that characterises no other interaction except that which obtains between shoppers and whatever they do in the privacy of their homes with the things they have purchased. Consumption, as we have been taught, is not a social relation; it is the domain of perfect freedom and sovereignty, when you are paying you expect good service. Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law of supplied demand.

The cult of shopping in the 1980s in fact left a crucial gap - a blindspot in its otherwise exhaustive saturation of everyday life: consumption itself. When we hear about consumption what is really meant is only buying: the act of exchange which gets the stuff off the shelves and the money into the till as rapidly as possible. The problem which stalks the consumer society is what do you do with what you get? Where do you manage to put it all? The spectre of use-value, which is now almost inconceivable, returns in the phantom form of the acid bath in the kitchen, the head in the pressure cooker, the smell which bothers the neighbours.

This is the place where the audience is to locate itself: we (especially women - the selected victims for all such cinematic paranoia) are at risk of becoming the next bargain in the basement of the lonely man next door. The moral as always turns out to be the same as that propagated by every other 'progressive' media blitz: evil lurks on the inside, behind all closed doors. The only safety is the eternal foreplay of the shopfront: as soon as anything or anyone is bought they are as good as dead.

Lecter in Fabula

In an otherwise interesting article Kevin Robins' sketches a fashionable psychoanalysis of the serial killer syndrome in the light of the Gulf War: he assimilates the smart weapons that stalk their targets in the darkness with the psychotic strangers for whom "we too have become a bounty of targets". His moral is that "there is, in our culture now, a kind of collective social mechanism of 'splitting'. The 'spectator-self' is morally disengaged, floating about in an ocean of violent images." By this he seems to mean that "our exposure to violence has been through the mediation of the screen." At the same time "it is through the screen that we disavow or deny our human implication in moral realities." But it is he himself who makes the connection between the Gulf War and the Serial Killers, on the basis that they are both media events. If there is any connection between the Gulf War and the Serial Killers it is exactly the opposite: it is the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime and its professional 'mind hunters' who are the equivalent of the 'smart weapons'. They are the carriers of the sophistication and precision, the surveillance and the targeting. Serial Killers are, at the ideological level of analysis, just the old figure of the terrorist stripped of politics, personalised, banalised, sans everything but an incomprehensible will to harm.

To apply psychoanalysis to the cinema has in any case always been caught in a veritable bindweed of fallacies, not the least of which is the assumption that a contemporary collective unconscious can be thought of as structured in the same terms as the individual unconscious in a pre-media world. Psychoanalytic theory and the Cinema were born at the same historical moment, and the categories of the former cannot be held constant as the medium for disclosing the truth of the latter. If the psychoanalysis of films reveals anything it can only be some clues to the preoccupations of those doing the analysis. These discourses are more like the free associations - the raw material of analysis - than revelations of what is going on.

So, when Robins bemoans the moral dissociation involved in "the act of screen gazing" he forgets to include among the symptoms of this splitting the writing of these kinds of articles. Why should the critics and commentators think their discourse is somehow external to the cultural phenomenon it refers to?

The Next Instalment

Serial Killings, like Ritual Child Abuse, are not to be treated just as isolated symptoms of a pathogenic culture; they are more like stages (or in Hegelian jargon moments) in a process of accelerating desocialization. Seeing these phenomena merely as media spectacles underestimates their effects.
To analyse serial killer movies as if they were some kind of collective dream from which we can learn something about ourselves is to imagine that society is on the couch providing material for us as we sit in the analyst’s chair. But the media aren’t dreaming; and these contrived fantasies take place in full wakefulness. The dream, if that is what it is to be likened to, is one we are all in the middle of. The whole history of media is a single process that can’t be cut and spliced as if each genre or each film could be decoded separately: the serial killers are just one episode in a larger story. These moments are connected together in a narrative chain whose main aim is to keep people watching, to keep them amused, to keep them talking, at all costs. The longer the serial runs the harder it gets to extricate oneself from this all-too-real fantasy. And all the while, the nightmare-like decomposition of the social is really happening. And this is just where the dream-analogy collapses. Dreams don’t have effects: they enact in the protected arena of a sleeping mind the consequences of a repression whose vigilance is circumvented for the duration. At least that’s the psychoanalytic story. It used to be that the cinematic apparatus, according to the Frankfurt School, inverted the Freudian procedure: constructing socially acceptable dreams in order to reinforce the repression by camouflageing it.

Today neither Freud nor the Frankfurt School seem appropriate to a situation where psychic fantasy has been virtually harmonised with economic functioning, and the reality principle is but a brief respite from the media. The unconscious is now a public sphere whose management requires the final extermination of what used to be called ‘social’ values. The fascinatory power of the methodical amateur killer is a cynosure for a culture that has made neurosis into a profession and murder most mundane.

SYNOPSIS OF SILENCE OF THE LAMBS

1. King of Blue Knights sends heroine on quest to slay monster. She must seek help from sorcerer.
2. Heroine meets sorcerer in dungeon, where he is held captive by wicked dwarf. Sorcerer makes bargain with her. She must risk her soul and cast a spell over her and discovers secret of her childhood.
3. Heroine finds magic chrysalis which reveals secret of monster’s lair.
4. Monster captures daughter of White Queen.
5. Dwarf tricks heroine: sends sorcerer to White Queen.
6. Sorcerer tricks White Queen and escapes by disguising himself as Blue Knight, after killing two Blue Knights.
7. Heroine frees princess from dungeon and slays monster.
8. Heroine admitted to Order of Blue Knights. Sorcerer’s spell begins to take effect.

Basically the fairy tale extols the alliance between the Blue Knights (Police/FBI) and the White Queen (Feminism). The magic powers (forensic psychology) and the Sacred Quest (careerism) add the excitement, risk and mystery to what is really a classic American story of professional aspiration. Even the subreptitious Blue King/Father Figure subplot is about social mobility rather than psychological maturation. The sorcerer (Lector) and the monster (Buffalo Bill) only represent the evil force of masculinity insofar as the latter is a sign for the atavistic forces lurking in the social underground and as yet not properly under social control - hence all the cages/chains and the escaping from deep holes etc. As a general rule whatever is represented as ‘psychosexual’ in American cinema is really referring to something socio-political. Everybody can talk till they’re blue in the face about sexual politics/serial murder or cannibalism, but what must never be called into question is the American social system and the culture of success and bargaining (“quid pro quo, Doctor Lector”). At the climax, as the heroine is stalking the monster in his lair, a poster is briefly glimpsed saying “Open you eyes, America”. The clues are all in the film but there is no solution to the riddle.
Assaults on Economic Reason

Using Andre Gorz’s reformist ‘Critique of Economic Reason’ as a starting point Steve Bushell argues that relinquishing faith in progress reveals practical possibilities and strange allies.

The decline in the number of working days lost to strikes, and the shift from the workplace to the streets (and countryside!) in the location of struggles, indicates that whatever the fate of the Totally Managed Society as a whole, the factory, hospital, office and workshop have become control zones of greater intensification than before.

You will find in these pages, both past and present, extensive documentation of the nature of this control, which includes both the soft (job enrichment schemes) and the hard (‘the invasion of exchange’ Here and Now No. 4). One way to make sense of the 80s, in the UK at least, is to see it as a counter-revolution to the revolt against work (see ‘The Eclipse and Re-emergence of the Economic Movement’ Here and Now No. 6).

There have been a number of responses to this counter-reformation. ‘Marxism Today’, true to its marxist/leninist tradition of slavish adherence to the forces of production coupled with a penchant for disguising the ascent of a particular class with the camouflage of universalist rhetoric, has identified a technocratic class capable of manipulating the new technology with some autonomy as the harbingers of New Times which will go some way to establish Marx’s utopia of work within a free market economy. Their class base remains the technocratic stratum which Machajsky warned about in the 1890s. Others more prepared to shed the theology of Marxism find little to celebrate in one class’s good fortune. The elevation of the professional, managerial and technocratic class and an improvement in its working conditions does not a revolution make.

One such is Andre Gorz whose book ‘Critique of Economic Reason’ is in part an attempt to understand the changes of the 80s, and in part an explanation of where the revolt against work has gone, and what it should be doing. For him the devolution of power implicit both in technological developments and managerial strategies to certain select groups in the workforce bodes little good. He subscribes to the idea of the ‘South Africanisation’ of ‘Brazilification’ of the economy - the stratification of the working class into a ‘relatively’ stable core (the overseers of production), a ‘peripheral’ mass of part timers and temporary, and a segment of sub-contracted out-workers, professional or unskilled.

The new managerial strategies of ‘Human Resources’ are in the main directed at the stable core. What Human Resources ideology is relies on capitalism’s own criticism of itself. For too long, according to this idea, has labour been regarded as just another factor in the production process. By specifying and identifying the human factor in production, human resources ideology intends to undermine the revolt against work (motto: ‘the object of work is not to work’) by taking into account desires for self management, work control, and democratisation, together with an intrinsic concern in the non-economic aspirations of the workers leading to flexible working for study or child care, and the setting up of swish leisure facilities. In effect what this means is that perceived non-economic activities become colonised by economic reason. What the Marxists would call ‘reproduction of labour power’ becomes a real cost to the company.

Gorz is unimpressed. Not only is this strategy directed at a minority, but the care and concern behind the ‘democratisation’ of work rests on the same illusions about capitalism which ‘self-managementists’ entertained in the 60s and 70s.

Gorz’s ‘Farewell to the Proletariat’ was not so much an attack on the notion of class struggle as a dismissal of the privileged position the proletariat had as the midwife of freedom. In ‘Critique of Economic Reason’ he states clearly his belief that that the development of the productive forces has ruled out the kind of utopia of work that was once Marx’s and is now the managerial revolutionaries’ dream. This utopia of work is the myth that the individual worker can be master of the totality of productive forces by means of voluntary collaboration. Like Jacques Camatte Gorz sees capital and technology as inseparable, and that industry is indistinguishable from Capital:

... ‘if from the outset, the development of the means of industrial production had been in the hands of ‘associated producers’ in workers’ cooperatives, enterprises might have been managed and controlled by the people working in them, but industrialisation would not have taken
not to people with commitments beyond work. The pay cheque should be made up by the state in a form of basic income scheme, which would include the right to work (for all his criticisms of wage labour, he recognises its impersonal public nature can represent a pleasure in small doses, as well as freeing people from the potential hothouse of personalised relations). With the liberation of time should come the flourishing of other activities, a widespread differentiation of human purposes, which up until now, have all been threatened with being subsumed under the dread category of wage labour.

Gorz sees the differentiation of kinds of work as crucial for re-establishing subjectivity’s place in the economy. Instead of the one-dimensional wisdom of the Left which identifies the evils of capitalism with inequality and exclusion, he argues that the very systematisation crucial to the imposition of wage labour removes from work all the different ways of thinking and feeling about it that an individual could have. He uses examples such as, prostitution, motherhood, housework and ‘autonomous activity’ to show how each of these constitutes a different experience, which demands to be judged, which placing them under the catch-all category of ‘labour’ will obscure. He also takes issue with those ‘futurists’ who see the solution to the decline of employment in commodifying greater areas of life. These ‘service industry’ ideologists put forward housework and personal services as growth areas for employment. Gorz shows how contradictory it is for those Leftists who support this to claim to be against inequality. Paying somebody a wage for doing a personal service you couldn’t be bothered to do yourself can only take place if one hour of your time earns you more than what you will pay your servant to do one hour’s personal service. What Gorz is arguing for is the re-establishment and defence of ‘non-economic’ activities, not because these will remain at the level of ‘privatised’ chores, but because they could provide the basis for setting up genuine networks of mutual aid, which in their turn could help establish a combative public sphere. The reduction in time spent for wage labour will lead to greater free time in which these activities and aims can be nourished.

It is here that Gorz really starts to part company with the traditional Left. Years of training in Marxist dogma have ensured that residues of ‘productive forces ideology’ cling to the sides of the Leftist mind. The idea that development must be going somewhere good seems to have joined forces with an attitude of mind which has simply capitulated to the apparent inevitability of economic reason. The Left may call it ‘socialisation’ but in a capitalist economy it means ‘monetisation’. The campaigns for ‘Wages for Housework’, the socialisation of childcare, the further professionalisation of social assistance, all mean one thing - the extension of wage labour into areas previously free of this curse. Gorz argues for making distinctions between different kinds of human work rather than asserting that in their ‘essence’ they are all ‘labour’ and therefore should be treated as such. Leftists may argue that the removal of the profit motive from the socialisation process and its replacement by a notion of social function somehow constitutes a revolution, but this as we have shown above is on the horizon of present society, and, anyway, the decisions about what constitutes valuable social function will ensure the same direction, control and surveillance as would occur in a profit-oriented society, only worse. What the Left really sees in its socialisation policy is more jobs for professionals, and greater opportunities for regulation, a fact, practically admitted to by Sean Sayers in his review of Gorz’s book for Radical Philosophy. The Left always trusts the State before people.

Unlike Camatte, Gorz does not see the better future in an apocalyptic dismantling of those productive forces. He recognises their harmful effects, has woken from the dream of their self-management which sweetened the sleep of many a revolutionary but argues for the care, control and eventual incarceration of economic reason, rather than its liquidation, as a way out of its evils.

These evils include: the destruction of the notion of the sufficient, the mathematization of social relationships which then disguise real relations and relieve us of any responsibility for them, the need for continual correctives to economic reason in the form of state intervention, the destruction of mutual aid networks, the degradation of work and the shrinkage of free time. One particular target of Gorz’s scorn is economic reason’s notice of ‘efficiency’.

We have already seen how economic reason itself has had to modify its own laws in order to accommodate human resources ideology. Maximisation of production could only be maintained by dragging non-economic considerations into cost/benefit analysis. However it is this very productivity which Gorz questions:

‘Economic rationality saves labour in pursuit of an ever-vanishing end goal which is always out of reach and this end-goal is never the liberation of time itself; that is, the extension of the time we have for living.’

Productivity as an end in itself leads to a new kind of inefficiency. Maximum realisation of the value of Capital demands maximum inefficiency in the satisfaction of needs, and unlimited maximum wastages in consumption, or, in other words, if needs were met there would be no demand. Efficiency which is proclaimed as a great universal, turns out to be very partial in its application, and very particular about where it is deployed.

Gorz argues that economic reason must be reined in, shown its place, and prevented from intruding upon human activities where it has no useful role to play. And where Gorz is superior to other critics of economic reason like Camatte or Ken Smith (see ‘Free is Cheaper’ reviewed in Here and Now No. 10) is that he advances a practical proposal which goes underneath the florid usings to revolt, the faith in ‘One Big General Election’, or the enclaves of pure living outside the economy, without necessarily denying the possibility of any of those ideas. Gorz starts small, but not so small as to rule out an effect or a challenge to the corporations currently running the economy. Continuing the tradition of the revolt against work he argues for a push, by all or any forces, for a systematic and sustained reduction in working hours without loss of pay.

His arguments for this are obvious once stated. The efficiency which guarantees maximisation of production is going nowhere either ecologically or in terms of improving global standards of living.

That efficiency should be used for the liberation of time, because only the freeing of time can solve the problems which were caused by its initial enslavement, for example: the decline of mutual aid, the rise of the professional, the attack on subsistence and vernacular values, the domination of the culture industry etc. Reduction in work time should be without loss of pay in order to prevent the exacerbations of global capitalism’s trend towards an impoverished part-time and temporary proletariat. Reduction in work time should be for managers etc. as well, in order to make these positions available
It has to be said that despite the central thrust of his demand for a reduction in working hours without loss of pay - a demand which unites old-fashioned trades unionism with both ecological and ultra-left aspirations - that there are a number of weaknesses in Gorz's argument. In his latest book 'The New Realities' Peter F. Drucker, the guru of the management gurus, points out that the US worker now works 1800 hours a year compared with 3300 in the early years of the century while the figures for Japan are 2000 and 3500 in 1939 respectively, with German workers doing not a lot more than 1500. Drucker wrote a book called 'The End of Economic Man' in which he saw the rise of Nazism as final proof that the ideals of the economic society had been thoroughly discredited in human beings' eyes. He now sees our period as a 'post-business society' in that the development of the productive forces has led to a greater opportunity for people to participate in 'non-economic' activities. He also sees the development of management, something born in the economic world, as leading the way towards a different kind of society where management becomes autonomous from its business roots and becomes a 'liberal art' in itself and leading force of society. The argument here is that management has economic reasons under its care and control, that the world has moved away from the grand narrative of salvation by society towards the search for specific remedies for specific ills which is management's legitimating ideal. The challenge to Gorz that this presents is firstly, whether he has identified correctly economic reason as still the dominating force in society and secondly, whether the reduction in wage labour does lead to an increase in autonomy.

The 'escape of capital' - its global, transnational and fictive nature, its move away from being individually possessed (towards pension fund type ownership), and its thorough-going colonisation of everyday life (how free is free time?) - does present a difficult problem, but not one which can be wished away with lashings of millenarian rhetoric about the 'reconstitution of the human community'. Despite Drucker's hopes management are not as free from the economic demons as he would like, in fact it is this stratum which is taking quite a hammering in the current recession. Although it is true that Gorz proposes very little to disrupt the culture industry's covetous eye on free time, it does not follow that capital's colonisation of such time is either total or irreversible. Similarly Gorz's failure to identify what Ilich calls 'shadow-work' - that 'unpaid work' created in the shadow of industrialisation which includes housework, shopping and commuting, but which is different from subsistence activities - does not invalidate his claim that 'autonomous' activities do exist, and that economic reason has not penetrated universally. Evidence for this can be found in countries like Indonesia where The Ministry for Language Development has been striving for years to establish one word ('bekerdja') in the minds of the people to mean 'productive jobs'. While journalists and trades union leaders have been happy to oblige, people have carried on using their diverse terms according to whether the work was pleasurable, tiresome or degrading rather than whether it was paid or not, and in Mexico the toiling unwaged consider the term 'deseempleo' to refer to the unoccupied loafer on a well-paid job, rather than to themselves. There are plenty of cracks in the system, the danger of theory is that it can paper over them.

Gorz's strategy of reducing working time is one useful wedge which can help open up some of these cracks. But Gorz also represents part of that crystallisation of anti-capitalist thought which has dispensed with productive forces ideology. The ideology of progress still exerts a powerful, if unacknowledged, hold over radical thinking. Extricating oneself from this progressivist metaphysics means resisting the lure of the new and refusing to endorse the value of 'change'. Progress is a deeply ingrained habit - prevalent as much in the assumption that the random peregrinations of 'art' constitute some kind of 'development' as in the dogma of the academic world that the latest publications somehow amount to an 'advance' in knowledge. To settle accounts with the capitalist/marxist ideology of the 'progressive' would open up a large number of questions which readers of Here and Now may want to take up in future.

One example of someone who resolutely refuses to be fooled by the beneficence of time is Herbert Shove, whose book The Fairy Ring of Commerce condemns industrialism for its effect of dispossessing human beings both materially and spiritually. Identifying agriculture as the basis for any society, Shove holds that it is the method by which the ruling class establishes control over the fruits of agriculture which is the key to understanding any system. Using many of the sources Ken Smith used in Free is Cheaper Shove reveals how changes in property ownership forced through by the State were the pre-condition for the development of a society based on wage labour. By removing the social duties from property ownership, and establishing absolute ownership profitability could be increased. Once self-sufficiency has been compromised commerce can begin to flourish. Once commerce begins to flourish then agriculture itself becomes threatened. Because agriculture is dependent upon the seasons for the realisation of value, industry will always outstrip agriculture as a source of profit, and thereafter will always attract greater investment. Only those farms tied in some way to the industrial system are likely to survive. Industrialism in its very essence is about quickening the process of production, as Shove puts it: 'Speed begets Credit; the greater the speeding up of life, the quicker can profits be made'. The 'fairy ring of commerce' itself describes capitalism's effects spatially:

'... as the fungus of commercialism starts in an economic society, it first concentrates wealth and "fertilises" the
soil for industrial prosperity. Then, when this artificially stimulated prosperity is worked out, the area of its growth is left with ruined agriculture and depleted natural resources, while "capital" successively "develops" the resources of ever more and more distant regions."

Shove goes further than Gorz in that his idea involves the wholesale rejection of industrialism which is not to be replaced by an unknown community but by a return to a society of agriculturalists, where productive property is equitably distributed amongst the members of society. Such a conclusion has a whiff of 'Pol Pottery' about it except that his preferred method of change is through moral persuasion and the actions of a disinterested middle class. However the similarity between Gorz and Shove (and for that matter Smith and Camatte) rests on a rejection of progress that Marxist and managerialist alike would consider regressive and conservative. However if one escapes from the whole rhetoric of 'the progressive' then the notion of 'the conservative' falls away as a meaningful category as well. Certainly the dominant traits of the Left since 1937 have established their apparent cogency on their instinctive opposition to social phenomena and mindsets identified as 'conservative' and it would be no exaggeration to say 'conservatism' itself has only achieved coherence in opposition to perceived radical positions. Ideologies do seem to start from what they are against, and this may be where the fatal errors begin - imputing a mistaken unity to the thing being criticised. At the beginning of the end of Right and Left it is going to be those ambivalent ideas, neither one thing nor the other, political defectors, dissenters trapped in institutions they cannot shake their loyalty for, the paradoxes of right-wing anti-capitalism or left-wing anti-collectivism, which should excite the interest of those looking for a better world wherever, or whenever it might be.

If asked most critics of economic reason would still base their attack on the stifling of potential, the narrowing of horizons that capitalism has imposed on people. A better world is still imagined in terms of uninterrupted procreation, of frenetic insatiability, of endless bustle - a vision based on the quintessentially bourgeois notion that no possibility must be wasted. As a reaction against the austere 'naturalism of needs' which reduces the anti-economy to democratically administered subsistence, the idea of a better world as a blind fury of activity is understandable but unnecessary. It is not wide but narrow horizons which are the most beautiful and interesting.

Books discussed:

**Critique of Economic Reason**: Andre Gorz (1989)

**The Wandering of Humanity**: Jacques Camatte Black and Red (1975)

**The End of Economic Man**: Peter Drucker (1939)

**The New Realities**: Peter Drucker (1989)

**Shadow-Work**: Ivan Illich

**Free is Cheaper**: Ken Smith (1988) John Ball Press


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### TABLE OF INCREASES TO THE WORTH OF ONE PENNY DUE TO 10% COMPOUND INTEREST

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*English measure
**This number of cyphers is actually reached by 1982, but does not add another to make 81 until 2006.

J.R.J.

**Note.** Using the world population figure for 1987 of 5,000 million (source: World Bank/The Hunger Project), the £100 × M141 + reached by 1982 is sufficient to make every man, woman, and child on Earth an unheard of biooctillionaire over 10,000 trillion times - English measure.

Using U.S. measure . . . bi-octillionaire^2 over 10 quadrillion times . . . or bio-octillionaire^2 (without hyphen) over 5 quadrillion times.
Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun
Wess Roberts (Bantam Press) 1989

The US may no longer lead the world in manufacturing things, but it surely heads the league in 'engineering of human souls'. The business world is flooded with self-help books for managers and evangelical crusades are now a normal feature of life in many organisations. Roger Harrison has described - without irony - the process of creating the new organisational culture as "releasing love in the workplace." These days it is not enough that one labour, one must love Big Brother (or Sister) too, and actualise one's human potential into the bargain.

This book, widely promoted as 'essential reading for the aspiring executive' is unfortunately no spoof, but supposedly a serious contribution to management thought. On the know-your-enemy principle alone I thought it would be worth a read, if only to see how far its precepts might catch on in the workplace. You need a strong stomach, though; this is the literary equivalent of fermented mare's milk - an acquired taste.

Two main sides of 'management' training seem to exist at the moment. One puts candidates through some sort of rebirthing experience; the other makes them run through the woods in flak-jackets firing red dye at one another. This book would seem to belong to the latter school (after Assertiveness Training and Total Quality: Rape and Pillage seminars?), but the two sides are not in fact so different. Both sensitivity/communication and aggression/competition share a common preoccupation with the moulding of 'character' and the importance of 'moral'. The present text is not without concern for the current shibboleths of flexibility, autonomy, friendliness and trust. A random sample of the author's words of wisdom:

Never threaten the security or esteem of another Hun unless you are prepared to deal with the consequences

Be approachable; listen to both good and bad news from your Huns. Otherwise you will provide reason for murmurings

A wise chieftain knows he is responsible for the welfare of his Huns and acts accordingly

Chieftains must develop empathy - an appreciation for and an understanding of the values of others, a sensitivity for other cultures, beliefs and traditions

Our leaders must have the essential quality of stewardship, a caretaker quality. They must serve in a manner that encourages confidence, trust and loyalty. Subordinates are not to be abused; they are to be guided, developed and rewarded for their performance . . . etc.

There are hundreds of these handy hints throughout the book, all couched in this platitudinous form. For every 'nice' maxim there are plenty of contrary messages: eg. "Do not neglect the opportunity to deceive your enemy. Make him think of you as a friend. Let him act prematurely. And never tell him anything." This is one of the many precepts that workers, for their part, could well take to heart in their dealings with New Age bosses.

What is to be made of all this? Why does what is really just another 'management skills' primer have to dress itself up in the language of 'Huns' versus 'Romans', 'chiefains' and 'warriors'? The Attila motif is obviously a way of pandering to the self-delusions of male business workers, especially in the USA, who may need to imagine their tawdry commercial tasks as having something warlike and therefore exciting about them, even though they are largely transacted on paper and in front of a VDU and all for the sake of the banks who own KwikFikIx cherry bars or whoever. But then, 'war' itself is conducted this way too.

Did you know that positive thinking is used most often to do something wrong and unlawful?

Cons, thieves, and cheaters!

All those people are using positive thinking methods to get what they want. The 5 dollar book will give you the tools and facts to protect you from danger. In this book you will learn the tools to use for personal, business, and financial success. This book explains in common language the dangers in our daily lives and how to deal with them.

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The Attila metaphor itself undoubtedly belongs to a now-superseded age: the greed-is-good Gekko years. The media have been falling over themselves to report that a new style is now in force, and some of the more prominent villains of the wild west era have been publicly disgraced (Boesky, Millken, Gutfried) as if to mark the advent of a new, more caring capitalism. The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun was certainly a typical eighties tract - even down to its cleverly cultivated cachet as an underground classic (circulating privately in manuscript by no less an authority in entrepreneurial barbarism than H. Ross Perot). It is hardly in harmony with the current vogue for spiritual growth and ethical 'responsibility'. But the very shift in style and values is itself being promulgated by exactly the same means: behind the change in the content it is the same obsession with psychology, the same 'leadership qualities' merchandise.

The genre to which this book belongs shows no signs of slowing up: it is one of the largest segments of the publishing industry. These are all behaviour recipes, and any text which seeks to distinguish itself from the morass must have a catchy conceit: the 'Hun' motif is ultimately little more than that (There is, incidentally, also a Genghis Khan Book of Business). There must already be a Gourmet Guide to Good Management Guides for the connoisseur. It is hard to imagine any promotional gimmick that hasn’t already been tried.

This mania for manuals and self-help panaceas is a true hallmark of the age. From Norman Vincent Peale’s Power of Positive Thinking through to the corporate high-priest Peter Drucker (whose trademark is imprinted on every single ‘idea’ on the market today) there runs the same passion for homilies. Cynical scoffing at managerial psychobable is ubiquitous and easy; it is an indictment of literary theory that it has never subjected this literature to scrutiny. There are clearly identifiable formulas which are rigidly adhered to in all these books: semi-humorous familiarity; flattery of the reader; mnemonic catchphrases; lists (ten steps to successful selling); pseudo-technical acronyms (MBO, SWOT etc); above all there are instructions. Virtually every sentence is in the imperative mood: "Care more for rewarding your Huns than rewarding yourself", which is more important than the semantic value of what is being said. And there is, as almost a taken-for-granted assumption, the assimilation of 'business' and 'life' to the same terms, in which the commercial criteria which govern the former are posited as the ground rules of everyday reality itself, while the business world itself is rendered as homely and familiar as the latter.

Is the managerial class - a class to which everyone is destined to be enrolled (if only in imagination) - so insecure and narcissistic that its members must be continually dependent on this drip-feed of advice? Is it so cognitively impoverished that it will accept subjection to these cliches and commonplaces masquerading as 'knowledge', and 'skills'? Why should those who pretend to be able to 'control' others be so abjectly in thrall to a banal and infantile discourse, to a self-identity on the same level as Victorian Sunday School pablum? How - to end on a more hopeful note - can those of us who find our worklives saturated by these seductions to self-managerialization counteract and creatively subvert this plague of stupidity? Here and Now wants to hear from readers with ideas along these lines. One day we may even hope to collect together the best suggestions and publish a counter-managerial compendium under some such title as The Secrets of Successful Sabotage. This would be a guide you can’t afford to miss. It could change your life.

Mike Peters

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**REVIEWS**

**“TIME TO DECLARE” by Dr. David Owen**

At the time, the new-found unity was presented as an inauguration of the radically new. The new politics would build on the founders’ past experiences but would also utilise ideas from outside traditional politics - but ideas in everyone’s heads. This unity was both inclusive and exclusive: inclusive in the belief that everyone discuss, be involved in what affected them most, and act decisively together; exclusive in the projection of a single organisational line.

Collegial beginnings hid personal conflicts among the leadership, conflicts which were to lay waste to the entire enterprise. The relationship of exclusion-inclusion, the weapons of criticism and the criticism of weapons propelled one figure towards the centre, a man convinced of his destiny. His growing confidence and sense of vision brought an ever more apparent intransigence, which would ultimately seek to preserve the organisation by smashing it.

And after the fall, there remained only a small coterie of supporters, convinced that the fit with the historical moment had vindicated that one man’s vision. What remains? Only to document the moments which had been.

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**“PANEGYRIC” by Guy Debord**

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TRANSPORT

"Freedom To Go: After The Motor Age" by Colin Ward (Freedom Press, £3.50)
"Releve Provisoire de Nos Griefs Contre le Despotisme de la Vitesse" (Alliance Pour L’Opposition A Toutes les Nuisances, BP 188, 75665 Paris Cedex 14, France, 15FF)

TRANSPORTATION POLICY LIES AT THE VANISHING point of command-based politics. The political class’s pretense to represent a “general interest” implodes under pressure from each particular interest (e.g. for or against road and rail development schemes). The cartels and corporations pay scant regard to the planning pretensions of the politicians, and rational behaviour seldom results from the sum of all individuals’ behaviour, bringing unforeseen results (new motorway; my car trip; their traffic jam).

The delusions of administrative politics are therefore evident, and can be opposed with no wider programme than that of a pressure group defending a particular community’s interests. But can the issues be developed in a way which opposes administrative-technical fixes without positing another set? The two present pamphlets, both stand outside command politics, and can be viewed from this perspective.

The French pamphlet appears, at least, to intervene in a particular struggle: opposing the construction of a south-east arterial route for the TGV high-speed train through further communities. However, the pamphlet consists largely of denunciation of the cult of speed and suppression of distance by those whose use of the TGV allows them to enlarge the commuter dormitory belt around the metropolis.

Much of radical theory followed Marx in favouring the city over the countryside. The metropolis was the focal point: its growth had cast everything into flux, initiating new behaviour patterns which were understood to define the public and the private. Some proclaimed a new urbanism which would breach these divisions, but the substance of these proposals should they spread beyond small vanguards (themselves a metropolitan conceit) remained unclear. The current pamphlet plays a familiar tune: quality replaced by quantity, true need by false, a monotonous standardisation of life. Well and good, unless it merely fulfills an obligation to map preconceived ideas onto reality in a way which triggers recognition in a tiny number of people.

Another danger lies in producing well-meaning and sensible proposals without any movement towards their application - the sort of administrative politics without power which can be associated with the Green Party.

Ward’s pamphlet skirts that danger. It provides a handbook synthesising histories of the public and private, the social and personal aspects of various forms of transport. The theme is caught up in State structure and funding, as prestige projects (like the TGV) are pursued to enhance the image of the State, and in the interplay with corporations’ activities. As Ward describes, the “realm of freedom” based around the private automobile resulted from State reluctance to impede the corporations’ dismantling of US city transport systems as well as from the underwriting of motorised freedom by funding road programmes. Like his other writings, however, such conspiratorial origins of the Motor Age are balanced with recognition of the specific activity which people make in their lives.

For example, Ward remarks on the intensive interest in tinkering with cars (reflected in many Custom Car type magazines at the newsagent), despite such activity being far from his or our interest. Such recognition of the creativity involved in hobbies is more open to, for example, the impulse towards “hotting” stolen cars than would be an attention to the banality of the totality which could ignore such activity, act as a parody civil liberties lobby by decrying heavy-handed policing, or celebrate hotting as a crack in the capitalist monolith.

There is certainly an awkwardness in Freedom To Go, one which appears in any attempt to propose positive goals while withholding consent from those in power. Ward highlights the extent to which contemporary palliatives, such as pedestrianisation and traffic calming devices, offended against town planning orthodoxy but have since become a new “good practice”. Not that the adoption of such programmes represents a victory of the convivial over the planners - control is not relinquished, merely remodelled. The highest profile traffic calming programmes are those around army checkpoints in Northern Ireland. Pedestrianisation is predominantly introduced in town shopping streets and the effect rather than restoring the multiple use of space which preceded the domination of motor traffic, is often to dedicate the area to consumption by day and leave it unsafe to walk alone at night.

Ward recalls the campaigns against higher public transport fares in London (and Glasgow) with free transport a worthwhile goal, both in the local transport infrastructure and in potential wider benefits. As well it might be, but the past decade has seen different or even contrary impulses at work. In particular, deregulation of bus services had the ostensible purpose of allowing market mechanisms to provide a better provider-purchaser service. Beyond asserting that the true goal was different, any revised campaign for free mass transport would need to define “public” control on a level other than that of the municipal.

To step back from the security and guarantee against reformism apparently provided by the idea of a banal totality requires recognition of the forces at work, the interests of the administrative strata and their propensity to co-opt, and also of the difficulty of finding a rooted position, outwith the circling rhetorics of anti-social and social oppositions. The developments of mass and individual transportations both formed and weakened our communities, such as they are.

Alex Richards
Dear Here and Now,

I read with interest the article on Softtechnica and it helped put into perspective some of the reasons my job is so crap. I work as a librarian that serves the student elite, a variety of computing-only books - up to date or even ahead of the rest. The changes in computing technology reflect the type of people we see here (or the type of people that have taken over these computer courses). There has been a movement from the 'social' problem areas of system methodologies reflected in the good old (near political) arguments of Mumford and her gang, to Checkland and the clean cut SSAQM gurus. It is generally agreed that SSAQM will conquer all, and so the problem areas have now moved to expert systems and knowledge engineering. This presents a weird situation fired by the fact that all work must be seen as progressive, and so we see the lies about e.s. circumscribed (e.g. prospector e.s. designed to find wealth mineral deposits using topsoil data) has been quoted as having such and such success rate and having found massive deposits in actuality it has never been used).

In truth, the architecture of e.s. has now reached its maximum possible under current ways of thinking, and so research now ploughs into cognitive theory and neural network theory, though improvement/progress via this route is debatable. The current bog-standard e.s. (or e.s. shell) is presented as a reasoning device to either support a decision made or make that decision for you. It is best applied to areas where the subject can be broken down into a vast network of hard and fast rules. Now come the problem areas...

I have studied the problems of knowledge acquisition and it is a little discussed area (we have one pamphlet/book written by a British Telecom employee). I did some work with these people who made kind-of e.s. for use in Citizens Advice Bureaux to offer the client/advisor help benefits calculating/debt work etc. Here the knowledge is from law books though, and all advice workers find the systems useful and a good time-saving asset. The problems arise in the arena of capitalism where either (i) a person may take strength from the fact that his/her work is based on complicated rules and laws and so would obviously feel under danger from e.s. (ii) a person may use 'heuristics' which is their own rule of thumb that help makes decisions in areas where no formal laws exist (e.g. some statistical areas of operations research) and so feel the problems of (i) but also the added problem of some form of intellectual copyright. To apply some Marx's labour theory of value into this unstable concoction is a brave lunge indeed, and I agree that this should address all areas of the debacle, including the masses of people who end up as data inputs (often venting their anger in Processed World).

I find this very difficult ground to tread and feel I can only observe and add comments after the event. All I see are the computer-nerd students who are taught how to analyse and rationalise and shoe-horn in these information systems. The realm of e.s. is only just beginning - at the moment we are still seeing the craze of databases (this is responsible for the mass of data-inputters as a relational database can print out all status/queries/reports etc. - but needs an inputer). What the widespread use of e.s. in industry (if it happens !) will bring in terms of freedom vs. job security etc. is anybody's guess.

Love,

Barney Retriever

*ssadm Structured System Analysis and Design Methodology - i.e. a move from people-centred to information centred planning. SSAQM was practically developed in the civil service/ DHSS which is the prime example of a bureaucratic maze of information and meta-data fascination.
**e.s. - export systems (or IKBS Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems or DDS - Decision Support Systems).
***Prospector is described as working in the abysmal book The Creative Computer Michie and Johnston, Penguin 1984 (page 43). This is false!

Dear Here and Now,

Thank you for reviewing my pamphlet, The Politics of Whim: A Critique Of The Situationalist Version of Marxism, in issue No. 11, although I am disappointed that it wasn't sufficient to prevent your own reviewer from engaging in the same sort of reified jargon employed by the Situationists. Your reviewer is certainly correct in stating that "criticism" of the sort he employs ("Production as a system of forgetting the labour in the commodity; leisure as an integral part of that system") is "foreign" to me. This sort of twaddle, like that of the situationists is simply the false consciousness of coercive intellectuals who just can't accept the fact that the mass of ordinary people

Just when you thought it was safe to go out... Everyone thought it was all over... but they're back! They've still got all the answers and all the same demands as before. This time they've forgotten even more and learnt even less. And more urgent than ever... They want your MONEY and your LABOUR-POWER, and they won't let you go until you've accepted their line.

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MICK HUME as Leninimitator II

"Holds you enthralled for more than five minutes, if you let it" The Spectator

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"I was frozen stiff in my seat with depression" L. Bronsteir

"Splendid to see the old team still going strong. Keep up the good work. felles" G. Bush

NOW SHOWING AT A SHOPPING CENTRE NEAR YOU

40
MARY AND THE CHILDREN WERE ALL IN BED
and Richard had the stereo up as loud as he dared. There
was a bottle of Highland Park on the coffee table and a
stack of old 45's by the turntable. Richard was chasing away
the blues.

His head was nodding to the beat and he sang softly.
"I don't care about this world
I don't care about that girl
I don't care"

The music and the whisky were firing him up. He remembered
when he used to buy records; he remembered when he'd never sink
under the weight of everyday obligations.

Before Mary had gone to bed she'd gotted mad with him again. He
irritated her constantly without meaning to, though he supposed that
was no excuse. What a fate to be chained to me the useless bastard,
he thought.

He'd had his ear up the speaker trying to get the words to the
Ramones' "Commando" - was that "get them ready for Vietnam"
or something else? She'd been talking to him while he was listening
to the record. All he'd done was lift his hand and say "shhh!" but
she'd huffed of course. She wouldn't tell him what she had been
going to say ever when he'd begged her to. She'd said he'd been
rude. Rude, for crying out loud. He wasn't a five year old.

Still he must be an awful sod to live with.

He got up and changed the record to Iggy and the Stooges "I'm Sick
of you". He began to dance - a restrained pogo (mustn't wake the
kids). He bounced gingerly around the floor for a while and sang
along in parts.

"I'm sicka your mom and I'm sicka your dad!"

Finally he collapsed in an armchair. He gulped some whisky
straight from the bottle and relished the great searing sting in his
throat. Feel, he thought, I need to feel.

"feeling high . . . so high!
Skanga! Skanga! Skanga! Skanga!"

That was loud but what was a little breakout now and again? Mary
would have to understand that.

Next record in the pile was Wreckless Eric's 'Whole Wide World'.
He'd seen Wreckless Eric once. It was at the Rock On stall in Soho
Market. He'd been flicking through the soul 45's looking for
Solomon Burke's 'Everybody Needs Somebody to Love' when
he'd become aware of a small man standing beside him. His
appearance was nondescript. An ordinary man, but he'd made this
great record in which he'd pronounced his words peculiarly. You
wouldn't have thought so to look at him.

Wreckless and the stallholder had talked about covers of Jimi Hendrix
tunes, because that was what Wreckless was collecting. Wreckless
had been doing a session for John Peel the previous week and John
had told him he had a tape of Bernard Herman and the N.D.O.
playing Purple Haze. They'd all cracked up at that, Richard and the
stallholder and Wreckless Eric. Then the stallholder had told them
that John had told him that as well.

Richard started to dance again, pogoing and spinning, then lurching
off across the room in ersatz abandon.

"I'd go the whole wide world
I'd go the whole wide world
just to find her."

He crashed into the sideboard and a table lamp slipped to the floor.
The bulb went dead but the lamp didn't break.

"There you go!" hissed Richard.

1977 had been a very good year, he thought. He'd got about a lot,
gone to some gigs, drunk frequently and copiously, smoked some
stuff. Hadn't worried much.

He put Whole Wide World back on when it had finished. He turned
it up very loud, and began dancing again. He shouted out the lines.
He leaped in the air and as he leaped he kicked out karate fashion. A
chair overthrown. The baby began to cry.

Whatever had happened to Wreckless Eric?

Mary was at the living room door, a bawling Kasia in her arms.

"Turn it down! The baby!" She tried to make herself heard above
the din, but although Richard understood he didn't do anything.
Just continued to leap and barge.

There was an enormous banging at the door and Mary went to see
what that noise was about. The record finished and there was a
shock of sudden silence. He could hear an angry voice out in the
hall. He put Whole Wide World on for a third time.

The record ground out of the speakers so loud the sound was distorted.
The living room door opened again and Mary shouted as loud as she
could. Smith, their fat neighbour with psoriasis on his face, the great
greasy pervert, had gone to phone the police. She was taking Kasia
and Johnny to her sisters. Goodbye.

"See ya." He shouted above the roar as the door closed. He kicked
at the sideboard until the wood splintered.

"I'd go the Whole Wide World . . ."
He crashed into the bookshelves, dislodging a few paperbacks. He bent and picked one up - Vanneboim's 'Revolution of Everyday Life'. He tore it page by page as he danced, the pages fluttering to the floor, where his feet mangled them.

In 1977 he'd gone to a Rock Against Racism gig in Hackney Town Hall with a couple of mates. Generation X and the Cimarrons were playing and the place was full of little punks. It had been a good evening, although Generation X were terrible and Billy Idol a particular prat. They'd met this little Glaswegian punk who'd told them all about what a heavy dope user he was and said he might have a little extra if they were interested but they weren't. Then he'd looked a little worried and had asked them if they were DS.

"Do we look like Drug Squad?" they'd asked laughing, and he'd smiled and said, "well yes you do." And they'd looked at each other then at all the little punks and Richard had said, "I suppose we do".

He'd never forgotten that.

Dancing was like running, there was a pain barrier but once you had gone through it you could go on forever. Richard bounced around the room disregarding the crashing ornaments and splintering wood. He shouted at the top of his voice.

"M.P.L.A. . . . . . . . NATTY GOIN' ON A HOLIDAY!"

There was a banging on the door. Richard ignored it. He wondered just how high he could jump. Could he bang his head off the roof? He could have a go. A short rest while pondering a suitable choice of record for Olympic pogoing and then he'd get started. He poured himself a very large whisky.

The banging at the door continued.

He flipped through his records, but what he saw there was disappointing. Good records all, but nothing seemed far enough over the top to drive him to the heights he wished to reach. He settled in the end on Roky Brikson's 'Two-Headed Dog'. He pushed the couch back against the wall, picked up the whisky bottle, put the record on and started leaping. Whisky splashed out of the neck of the bottle with every landing, splattering the wallpaper and upholstery. Serves it right, thought Richard.

A policeman walked into the room.

"Two-headed dawg! Two-headed dawg!
I've been working in the Kremlin with a two-headed dawg!"

The policeman stood watching him, his arms folded. Richard thought he looked very small and very far away.

"Come in!" giggled Richard. "The door's open".

The policeman looked up at him without expression. Richard thought he looked familiar. And very small for a policeman, but that was what everyone said about police, they looked younger as you yourself got older. And smaller?

The regulations about that sort of thing weren't as strict now as he'd heard.

Richard pogoed on. He was going to do it, he was going to hit that roof.

It was Wreckless Eric. The policeman was Wreckless Eric.

"Wreckless!" Richard shouted in dismay.

Another cop walked into the room helmet in his hand. It was Glen Matlock, once of the Sex Pistols.

"You scum, Eric!" shrieked Richard. "You scumbag!"

The policeman looked up at the leaping Richard and curled his lip like Elvis.

"And you're another."

He gobbled at Richard, white froth flecking his legs.

Richard bounced higher and higher.
Listings

Analysis New Marxist quarterly. Winter 1991/2 issue (1,90 Monomark House, 27 Old Gloucester Street, London WC1N 3XX) contains a long article by the editor Susil Gupta 'The Aids Fraud' which painstakingly demolishes the statistical jiggery pokery by which a real tragedy has been worked up into a phoney medical and moral mania. This is an important contribution to the understanding of the politics of panic and to the critique of how pseudo-radical hyperbole is complicit with the 'doctoring' of facts and figures for the purposes of propaganda and public relations. A particularly good section on the 'AIDS Gravy Train' shows how the state now funds an army of pseudo-helpers: "there is around one Aids support organisation for every three Aids sufferers in Britain". This is an excellent piece of research, which does not, unfortunately, inquire into the role of the pharmaceutical industry in this whole atrocious scandal (a strange negligence for a magazine committed to "a revival of the classical Marxist tradition")

Midnight Notes No. 10 (UK sub $13 from Box 204 Jamaica Plain, MA 02130). On the theme of 'The New Enclosures': impressive analysis of the capitalist reorganisation of global/local space with essays on Africa, Debt, the concept of JUBILEE etc. All excellent. Editorial article shows how the historical 'enclosures' were not, as usually understood, a one-off movement inaugurating capitalist developments, but a continuing expropriation of the commons which is still at the heart of capital's recomposition of space. Whether such an insight can be squared with an incipient attachment to the triumphalist progressivism of Marx remains to be seen.

Wildcat No. 15 (BM CAT, London WC1N 3XU UK) Good issue introduced by level-headed editorial. 2 excellent articles on Satanic Abuses and Drugs...plus thought-provoking review of Perlman's 'Against History! Against Leviathan', 'The Hunt for Red October' provides extensive documentation of the role of the Bolsheviks in crushing revolt during the 'Russian Revolution'.

Bulletin of Anarchist Research (BAR, P.O. Box 556, London SE5 ORL UK). No. 24. Goaman on 'Processed World, Mathew Kalman (Ed. 'Open Eye') on 'Transpersonal Psychology', Habermas and Anarchism. No. 25: The Poll Tax deconstructed, interesting article on Thomas Spence and his Agrarian Socialism, details of Anarchist Research group projects.

Green Perspectives No. 24 (P.O. Box 111, Burlington, VT 05402, U.S.A.) Murray Bookchin advances Libertarian Municipalism against the politics of particularism.

Anti-Clockwise No. 18 and 19 (P.O. Box 175, L69 8DX, Liverpool, U.K.) Apparently this journal is winding up. A pity judging from Issue No. 19 which contains excellent examples of how divergent the debate on sexuality has become. From Bob Black's 'Feminism as Fascism' (self-explanatory) to Mr. Social Control's identification of situationism's big problem being 'the fetishisation of sexuality' this debate would be prematurely closed by Anti-Clockwise's demise - perhaps combatants would like to continue in the pages of Here Now.

The Infinite Egress of You (P.O. Box 391733, Mountain View, CA 94039, U.S.A.) "A critique of the New Age": the New Age promotes itself as an antidote to the reign of instrumental reason. But it might be more realistic to see it instead as the price that has to be paid for that hypertrophy.

Open Magazine (P.O. Box 2726, Westfield, NJ 07091, U.S.A.) Pamphlet producing outfit. Well produced polemics around Chomsky-an themes eg: "How Mr. Bush got his war: Deceptions, Double Standards and Disinformation" (featuring an exclusive interview with the King of Jordan?)

Open Eye (£1.20 plus postage. c/o Bookmarks, 265 Seven Sisters Road, Finsbury Park, London) New magazine with para-political themes. "The Lost History of the Falklands War", "The Cancer Business", "Gladio and The European Secret Armies".

Poison Pen (P.O. Box 71, Hastings, East Sussex) "The New World Reich Marches on..." Neolat Manifestos: The Art Strike Papers, Stewart Home et al (AK Press, 3 Balmoral Place, Stirling, Scotland FK8 2RD) Compilation of polemics, poems and leaflets from the art strike, plus criticisms (£2.95 + 60p)

Counter-Productions Catalogue (SAE to P.O. Box 556, London SE5 ORL U.K.) Excellent collection of subterranean tracts and texts from today and yesterday.

Flatland Catalogue (P.O. Box 2420, Fort Bragg, CA, U.S.A.) Includes interview with Tom Yargue, short reviews of many mags; catalog of unusual lore.

Fantasy Island Project (135A Meersbrook Park Road, Heeley, Sheffield U.K.) Contributions invited for new magazine 'mapping out our paths into the information age. As we meet new methods of control and new forms of media hypnosis beyond the mere simplicities of a 'consumer' or 'spectacular' society so we need to develop new strategies for intervention and sabotage, and to further our understanding of the current situation and its built-in capacity to tolerate our anger and revolt.'

Common Ground (from Working Press, 85 St. Agnes Place, Kennington, London SE11 4BB) Large pamphlet exploring capitalism as a process of dispossession. Bringing the land back to the centre of anti-capitalist concern. (Fuller review in next issue).

Morduiss (Summer 1991 20F from BP11, 75622 Paris Cedex 13) In French includes noteworthy article on Aids.

Wildcat Workshop Reader (Nov 1991 10 dm to Wildcat c/o Sisina, Postfach 36 05 27, D-Berlin 100) Collection of discussion papers from exey) Curry project designed to intensify and enlarge knowledge of workers struggles in Europe and beyond. Concerned to describe and analyse the latest work re-organisations as a response to resistance. Includes information of Fiat, Italy, struggles in the service sector, contradictions of the modern factory. Part of a continuing project which anyone prepared to take one step back from their job could participate in. In English.

Love and Rage (P.O. Box 3, Prince St. Station, N.Y., N.Y. 10012, U.S.A.) Revolutionary Anarchist Monthly.

Anarchy No. 30 (C.A.L., POB 1446, Columbia, MO. 65205-1446 U.S.A.) American magazine provides a useful critique of Post-Modernism by John Zerzan 'The Catastrophe of Post-Modernism'. Zerzan’s relentless desire to return to origins does however look like a mirror-image of the progressivism he would like to subvert.

Counter-Information No. 32 (P/H C.I., c/o 11 Forth St, Edinburgh, EH1 U.K.) Information on Tynside Riots, Russian Coup, Poll Tax & U.S. Part Struggles.

Variant Issue No. 10 Autumn 1991 3 (sub. 4 issues) from Freeport, 2/9, 73 Robertson St, Glasgow G2 8BR, U.K. Really good essay by Ed Baxter on Virtual Reality, and interesting article by Alastair Bonnett on The Situationist Legacy suggests there may still be some mileage in psychogeography....

Variant Issue No. 13 (Subs now £14 from as above) Articles on Calypso, US artists burning the flag, reports from conferences.

Lobster No. 22 (£2 from 214 Westbourne Avenue, Hull UK HU5 3JB) Good solid historical articles in this issue: links between MI5 and fascists in the inter-war period; how Willi Brandt was ousted in 1974 (along with Wilson and Australia's Whitlam); several other interesting items. More facts per square inch than any other magazine on the market. Worth reading even if you don't agree with the politics of the editors: Harold Wilson as Britain's JFK? Robin Ramsay and Steve Dorrill's book Smeared? Wilson and the Secret State is available from Lobster at £16.25.

The Bigger Tory Vote by Nick Tocezk (from AK Press, 3 Balmoral Place, Stirling) Investigations into the far right. More names per square inch than any other pamphlet!

Processed World 26/27 Summer 1991 (Non-US sub 4 issues $25 from 41 Sutter St. 1829 San Francisco. Ca 94104 USA). Best magazine of its kind. Much criticised for its entrepreneurialism and even closet Leninism - see Bob Black 'The Abolition of Work' - PW is nevertheless always a good read. This issues theme is the 'good job'. Articles on 'progressive' work, New Age managers, market research etc. Nothing like it in the UK, it reminds us of an anti-work culture which these islands used to be famous for. See also compendium of previous issues published in the UK by Verso - 'Bad Attitude'.

Demolition Derby (from CP1154, SUCC*+B", Montreal, Quebec, Canada HSB 3L2) 3 critiques of feminism from Dominique Fauquet, Claudia, & Annie Lebrun.

Girlfrenzy (BM Senior WC1N 3NX - 90p plus postage Solanas, sexism and sexuality. Comics.

Workers Scud (Box 15, 138 Kingland High Road, E8 2NS) Critique of anti-Gulf war movement, analysis of religion.

Subversion. (Free from Dept. 10, 1 Newton St, Manchester M1 1HW) Soviet coup, critique of ALF, split in Militant.
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