

HERE AND NOW

ISSUE 10
90p

Euromania

The Politics of Panic

Art/Anti-Art Supplement



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Here and Now

No. 10

1990

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	— Abroad	£3.00 inc. p&p
	— Institutions	£5.00 inc. p&p
	Cheques/P.O.s made out to G.P.P. or 'Here & Now' please.	

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New York outlets - A. Distribution, Room 202, 339 Lafayette St. NY, NY 10012.
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*The cover incorporates a map (c.1595) drawn by Sir Walter Raleigh showing Eldorado. (reproduced from Gillian Hill, **Cartographical Curiosities**, the British Library, 1978).*

Editorial

H

ERE & NOW IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF CHEERLEADING OTHER people's struggles. Nor do we try to reprocess current events to find vindication for our analysis. What is most welcome about the conservative revolutions in Eastern Europe is their very conservatism - for that was what was truly revolutionary in them. It will be a long time before Western radicals can re-learn for themselves what makes revolution worth undergoing.

Those who have made real revolutions in Czechoslovakia and Romania don't need cheap wisdom from slogan vendors and armchair terrorists; they will discover soon enough that the democracy that they fought for abolishes neither misery and corruption nor the secret police. It simply targets them more effectively. This is an undeniable improvement - like the ascent from Hell into Purgatory.

All the commentators have nothing better to do than commentate - to tell us what they are telling us to be happening and to emphasise it with exclamation marks. Nobody knows any better than either to applaud what others are doing or to grumble cynically about their rivals. History has overtaken those whose latest idea was to call it a day.

It is already being forgotten that the decade that just ended amid the euphoria of collapsing walls and fraternization had opened with hostile snarls and cold war hysteria. The Western activists who worked themselves into panics about a nuclear holocaust in the eighties (or about Nazi revivals in the seventies) have their own vested interests in the politics of insecurity. They have learnt to operate more diffusely, as the regime of the more integrated spectacle now dictates: AIDS, Child Abuse, 'Crack' are all relentlessly exploited as part of this agenda of anxiety. After the breaking down of the Wall - that concrete icon by which an entire generation has been instructed to visualise the concept of "boundaries" - there appeared in East Berlin, again as if on cue, Nazi graffiti in graveyards, duly exploited by the SED and its security police in their desperate hour of need. Above all our heads, the spectre of global death, the ecological millenium, must however be upheld to underpin the new social strategy: from its beginnings as a radical opposition twenty years ago, the ecology movement is now becoming the official ideology. Capital and its States have given the Green Light to controlled hysteria.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe - real popular revolutions as they have been - were officially authorised by the geopolitical powers-that-be and applauded at almost every stage in the international media. This is but one of the paradoxes which define the new social order which is being constructed behind the backs of the oppositions on both sides.

Radical change and fundamental social transformation are being demanded and enforced as their prime justificatory principle by capital, its managers and its governments whose past legitimacy was derived from myths of tradition and promises of stability. Established radicalisms - socialist or feminist or whatever they style themselves - are not merely complicit in the new social order, they provide the cadres, the cultures and the ideologies as well as the very energies by which this strategy of 'change-ism' is managed and implemented.

Its objective? To continually deconstruct, disaggregate and demobilise the 'social', to churn up and entropize the very things in whose name they purport to be operating.

Freedom and liberation have become the watchwords of those who oversee the steps towards the totally administered society. Existence is shackled to the imperatives of exchange-value by the sweet talk of a life without chains. The psychic household (the last private realm?) of the individual and family has been remodelled into a financial counselling service. In the name of wilderness, nature is domesticated and managed; in the name of conservation, increased consumption is galvanised; in the name of management, an imaginary condition of perpetual crisis is established under cover of which a coherent agenda is implemented. Those apparently furthest away from the logic of full cost accounting, the mystics and the new religions reveal themselves as stockbrokers trading in the new markets of transcendence and spiritual well-being.

Here and Now will continue to disabuse both the radical and the new managers of the comforts of those changes which persist in being an alibi for the continued existence of their class.

Self-Congratulation and Piety in Glasgow

Sadie Plant reports on the 'Self Determination and Power' conference

THE PEARCE INSTITUTE IN GOVAN 'WELCOMES the strangers of the world' in its entrance and warns children to 'say no to drugs and strangers' on its noticeboards. Although a friendly consensus prevailed throughout the two day event, *Self-Determination and Power* was fraught with such contradictions and there were few opportunities to develop them. Events of this sort are rare, and the high demand for places proves the need for discussions and contacts which exceed the usual political agenda. Those who attended were certainly convinced that self-determination and power are good things which people don't have, but there was little discussion and no agreement about what they mean, why they are wanted, and how they can be gained.

In the 'Women and Self-Determination' workshop, for example, the "self" in "self-determination" was taken to be the individual, with questions as to the consistency of personal identity dominating a discussion which, not ten years before, would surely have concerned itself with women in a more social context. Elsewhere, self-determination was more conventionally taken to relate to the rights of nations, peoples and communities, but even here, there was an assumption that "the people" is an homogeneous group rallied against those "against the people" and free from conflict and antagonism. Romanian demands for the death penalty do not arise on a happy continuum with Scottish struggles against the poll tax, and there are contradictions between Polish leanings towards the free market and Green politics. Conflicting interests emerge between all struggles for self-determination, and whilst this doesn't preclude their reconciliation, it is vital that differences, no matter how uncomfortable or disturbing they may be, are not papered over in the rush to declare the existence of a great movement of humanity towards a single, but ill-defined goal.

Noam Chomsky's contributions, two wide-ranging and well-received considerations of the nature of government and the nature of humanity, did little to upset the cosy high tea and cakes feel of the event. Although he shunned the guru role into which he was forced by virtue of being the only Big Name, Chomsky suffered for the want of an opposing voice and there was no challenge to his faith in the existence of a humanitarian impulse or instinct for freedom which cannot and at the very least should not be repressed. Interesting attempts to marry the Scottish intellectual tradition of common sense philosophy with this position were made by both Chomsky and George Davie, but the level of debates in this area was not sustained in the more immediate discussions of self-determination and power.

At the plenary discussions, prefaced and concluded by a mixture of housekeeping arrangements and identifications of splits (variously between the thinkers and the do-ers, the thinkers and do-ers and "the people", and the personal and the political) which seemed to have escaped the attention of the participants, applause greeted every sentiment. Educationalists insisted on the need for unrepulsive schools; women that more women should speak from the floor - perhaps to counter their absence on the platform; nationalists that MPs should be recalled every seven years; anarchists that all power corrupts; the pious that ancient symbols should be invoked; the disciples to know what Chomsky thought about anything and everything. There were discussion groups, to which members were assigned with varying degrees of success, and workshops, including those by Greens, postmoderns, the highly entertaining writers from Leningrad, *Here and Now*, and the Free University. Although both the latter and *Edinburgh Review* were involved in the organisation of the event, the proceedings were dominated by *Scottish Child*, a magazine about "Scotland growing up". And the image of the bonnie

playmate provided the event with its unifying symbol and purpose: its all for the children, for the next generation; the fight is not for us here and now (that involves confronting too many awkward questions) but on behalf of others. For a conference on self-determination, this was a particularly ironic and debilitating theme. Appeals to the innocence of wide-eyed children will always generate enthusiasm amongst those anxious to be on the right side of history, but when they lose the naivety of childhood, those same kids will judge their parents' political efforts and find them wanting unless the Govan consensus is disturbed.

Edinburgh Review

issues 84 and 85

Major features due in these issues include:

James Kelman on Noam Chomsky
Jenny Turner interviewing Christine Brooke-Rose, plus an extract from Brooke-Rose's *Verbivore*
Mark Thompson on William Empson
Tom Leonard's 'The Present Tense'
Robert Song on Alasdair MacIntyre
Martin Chalmers on Hans-Magnus Enzensburger
Poetry from Gael Turnbull
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The Institutionalisation of

Bedford Fenwick relates some thoughts on 'Care in the Community'.

"Speaking for myself, I too believe that humanity will win in the long run; I am only afraid that at the same time the world will have turned into one huge hospital where everyone is everybody else's humane nurse."

Italian Journey: J. W. Goethe (1787).

the Community

1.

LARGE SCALE INCARCERATION OF THE 'UNFIT', those with a mental handicap, epileptics, inebriates, the 'feeble-minded', took place in the U.K. at the beginning of this century. It represented the triumph of a scientific ideology derived from Darwinism (eugenics) and a significant step in the project initiated by the Temperance and Purity movements for the cleaning up of a recalcitrant populace. The Mental Deficiency Act (1914) further refined the administrative classification of society, replacing the inaccurate and often chaotic classifications of the Poor Law and the Lunacy Laws. Here people received a finer grading, and receptacles for 'types' were rationalised so that idiots attended idiot asylums, the 'feeble-minded' feeble-minded colonies, criminals jails, and the poor the workhouses. In an age where science was coming out of the studies and libraries of gentlemen of private means into the corridors of power, power found new legitimacy in the slogans of Social Hygiene and Racial Degeneration. The emerging mass market was creating the conditions for a respectable working class, one that could (however partially) participate in consumption beyond absolute need. The price was the creation of a residual population, excluded from the bonanza, cut off from the means of self-sustenance by their expulsion from the land, who congregated in cities to live off the pickings of respectable society. They had a claim on respectable society through family links, but they also interfered with the social aspirations of their relatives. They became a problem, a constant reminder of the imperfections of capitalism as well as offending the rationalist spirit of the times by refusing to be educated, to settle down, to be assimilated, to behave. The colony, the asylum and the workhouse were an attempt to decontaminate society of its wayward members, both to 'encourage' the others and to provide laboratory conditions for humanity's examination by experts.

2.

Under the conditions of a closed institution the surveillance, inspection, punishment, training, education and reformation of inmates could begin in earnest. The closed institution provided captive material for the theorists of human control, who until then had been engaged almost entirely in speculative and academic enquiries. Where Bentham could merely theorise the conditions of complete control in his idea of the Panopticon at the beginning of the 19th century, Francis Galton was able to study human material directly in the Idiot Asylums of the 1890s. Binet and Simon, joint founders of the still-applied Intelligence Quotient test, experimented on the backward children to whom Simon was physician in a French asylum. Cyril Burt, the influential, although discredited psychologist, cut his teeth as a psychologist in a London County Council Asylum in the early part of the 20th century. Other psychologists such as Rivers, McDougall, Pear, and William Brown obtained their initiation into

the study of functional disorders and the techniques of psychotherapy in the special hospitals for the victims of shell-shock after WW1. Behaviourism, like eugenics another offshoot of Darwinist ideology, emerged in 1913 from academic psychology, thanks to the institutionalisation of animals in laboratories. From a mindlessly mechanical notion of evolution claims could be made about human behaviour from animal experimentation. Its later application in the institution has not stopped it catching up with its psychological rivals as a technique worthy of universal utilization. For it wasn't long before the practice of psychology spilled out of the asylums and colonies, and enlarged its territory from a concern with mental disability or academic disputations on the nature of mind to a comprehensive bid to be an all-embracing science of all human behaviour. From being a test designed to aid the French Ministry of Education to stream its pupils, the Binet-Simon scale rapidly acquired the stamp of authority and found itself applied by industry (for vocational assessment), criminology, and even by the U.S. Army in WW1, which used the test to assess 2 million army recruits. Burt soon found the attractions of examination and manipulation in the outside world more exciting than the grim life inside the closed institution. He joined the National Institute of Industrial Psychology which studied problems of 'staff selection and training, environmental conditions, motion study and methods of work, production planning, management of personnel...' (Hearnshaw, *A Short History of British Psychology*), while McDougall augmented his prospectus to cover global problems in books like *The Character and Conduct of Life* (1927). Indeed government itself began to urge the new psychological scientists to ply their trade outside the realm of mental disability. The National Council for Mental Hygiene in the UK stated after WW1 its aim to be the improvement of 'mental health in the broadest sense throughout the community'. Not that psychologists or psychiatrists required much encouragement. Speaking at the First International Congress of Mental Hygiene William White legitimated a dramatically extended brief:

'Mental Hygiene is on this account alone more important than ever before, and its significance can be seen to be gradually changing from one of simple prevention of mental disease, which is a negative programme, to the positive attitude of finding ways and means for people to live their lives at their best. Medicine has long enough maintained as ideals freedom from disease and the putting off of death. It is time that these were replaced by ideals of living, of actual creative accomplishment. The art of living must replace the avoidance of death as a prime objective, and if it ever does succeed in replacing it in any marked degree, it will be found that it has succeeded better in avoiding death than the old methods that had that particular objective as their principle goal. Health is a positive not a negative concept.' (1932)

Despite the consummation of eugenics in the death-camps of the Nazis, no one thought that such a fate invalidated the whole project of scientific classification and psychological assessment of humanity.


The proliferation of expensive psychotherapy on the couch for the rich and cheap psychology in popular magazines for the poor advanced in the wake of WW2. Freudianism and its derivatives became domesticated; shorn of subversive potential by the capitulation of its practitioners to things as they are, it assisted in the administration of the soul by the rationalisers of modern capital. Today psychology has penetrated vast areas of everyday discourse. Language and thoughts are processed through the prism of psychological prejudice, which has the effect of creating the conditions for further psychological colonisation, while at the same time legitimating that colonisation. This age represents the victory of the mental hygienist movement, not in its dream of people living at their best, but in the prodigality of psychological professionalisms and expertises whose pretensions to 'knowledge' would have been laughed into oblivion in any other period which did not have such a need for 'authority' as this one.

3.

For the incarcerated inmate, the attentions of psychologists and psychiatrists were for a great deal of the century confined to admission procedures, yearly reviews, and, of course, the ubiquitous 'study'. The actual 'care' was conducted by nursing staff of varying degrees of humanity and patience. Life was eked out at the margins of, or underneath the institution, in secret and surreptitious defiance of the eternal regulations which governed residential life. Far from being the victimised object of Foucault's or Illich's imaginings many inmates sustained their humanity and integrity, while it was the staff that most often lost theirs. From the 1930s onwards some of those incarcerated by the 'feeble-minded laws' (Chesteron's happy description of the Mental Deficiency Act) could find themselves out in society working in factories or mills, while many colonies to all intents and purposes functioned like the self-managed model of 'community' so favoured by many present day radicals. There were however countless individuals whose confinement was unjust in the sense that they had no mental deficiency and had simply fallen foul of the highly subjective categorisation of the Mental Deficiency Act, 'Moral Imbecile'. Their cases were brought to light in the agitation of, amongst others, the NCCL in the 1950s, and many were released in the 1960s. It was also around this time, and up into the 1970s that significant steps (hindered by a lack of resources) were made to make life in an institution more humane and less restricting. I mention all this because it undermines the righteousness with which decarceration is proselytised nowadays. There never was such a rigid system that required such a rigid reformation.

4.

The sixties saw a sustained assault on repressive institutions, from prisons to asylums. Anti-custodial solutions to deviance and crime were propounded by anyone from the Socialist Patients Collective to the U.S. Justice Department. It seemed that the closed institution's days were numbered. Looking back on what happened to those hopes is both depressing and instructive. Far from being a replacement for incarceration, non-custodial measures are an *addition* to the state's armoury of punitive options. In the U.S. the celebrated Intermediate Treatment Programme for 'offenders' 'treats' people who under the old system would have walked free. Cohen estimates that 45% of the members of these programmes were subject to no court order, yet they remained entangled within the psycho-judicial net, enmeshed in the web of caring professional restriction. In the U.K. despite the practice of community service orders, probation and suspended sentences the prisons are overcrowded as ever. Meanwhile, the latest solution to the primitive state of British penal institutions has been outlined in 'Punishment in the Community', in which electronic tagging, curfews and parental responsibility and liability is expected to reduce the number of custodial sentences. If the last 20 years are taken as an example, these measures look like only further integrating people into the penal/commercial complex who otherwise might have got away with a fine, while the size of the prison population remains essentially intact.



5.

Similarly in the fields of mental illness and handicap, despite a rhetoric of 'community care' which has come from governments since the 1930s, the asylums and colonies remain, albeit in truncated and half shut-down forms. Despite 20 years of appointments of community social workers and the like, despite a relentless propaganda against the mental institution, the population of mental handicap institutions for example, has been reduced by only 20%, 7,500 of whom now live in private or voluntary residential homes. The 40,000 who remain have to tolerate all limitations of incarceration, together with the neglect that accrues when you are no longer a fashionable career option. Of course, all this slow motion only fuels the engines of the decarcerative lobby further. The very destitution of the institutions, caused by limited shut-downs, proves the point of the community carers. New posts are created, local authority and NHS budgets are stretched to provide the necessary professions in place in the community ready for the next wave of expelled ex-residents, while the actual desires of the people all this activity is supposedly about go ignored, explained away in the jargon of managerial justification. On the pretext of community care new networks of professional superintendence are established in society. The professions which were born and perfected in the institution, can now infiltrate the community. In the sixties and seventies psychological intervention in the lives of residential inmates became more intense. Behaviourism, in particular, flourished as an apparently successful technique in the care and control of the mentally handicapped. With community care came the need for greater control of behaviour, in order to smooth the passage from colony to community. The effectiveness of behavioural psychology has given it a recognised status in the community, and not just for dealing with 'clients' (another laughable euphemism used by the caring professions to summon up the myth of choice for their charges) but also with the staff, who may not be adjusting adequately to the 'process of change'. Behind desks with the title 'Community Psychologist' exist the evangelists of psychological utopianism. Yet beneath their language of liberation and the ritual incantations of anti-institutionalism lies a consolidation and extension of power, for instead of the closed territory of the institution their domain now includes the open fields of society, a domain made more powerful by its refusal to recognise itself as such.

Of course the utopian dreams of the incarcerators of The Mental Deficiency Act were not fulfilled. Society did not behave, and the incarcerated did not reform. Whereas failure in the short-term could be accounted for by a failure of scientific expertise, by an inadequacy of the sample tested, long-term failure has demanded a more radical response. This perhaps is the most reasonable explanation for the State's apparent determination to institute the policy of 'community care'. Incarceration has failed. It neither tamed the inmates nor prevented society from being awkward and unmanageable. While there is truth in the theory which sees 'community care' as a government cost-cutting exercise, it ignores the deeper reasons for incarceration's existence in the first place. Incarceration was first and foremost about social control and only secondarily about the care and treatment of the indigent. In terms of control the State is finding the ideology of the community a far more effective means of maintaining good order than the threat of confinement. In the post-modern world the state is drawing on a pre-modern form. The traditional community represents the most effective Panopticon of all - control through mutual surveillance. Capitalism destroyed this. 'Prisons, workhouses, poorhouses, hospitals, mental asylums, were all by-products of the same powerful thrust to redeem the method of control-through-surveillance once the conditions of its traditional deployment proved increasingly ineffective.' (Baumann *Legislators and Interpreters*). The present age is attempting a resuscitation. Just as the traditional community policed itself because it gave consent to the ruling ideology, because people considered that their own interests were connected to the interests of their masters in a significant and truthful way, so present day power is seeking an imaginary identification with the interests of everybody. Only today that identification is hard to achieve and power must ransack the ideologies and rhetorics of previously popular movements to gain a footing. In microcosm this can be seen in the decarceration of the mentally disabled. The real wrongs of incarceration are exaggerated to the point of caricature. A victimised subject is created, who has no autonomy or independence in the minds of the decarcerator. Liberation becomes synonymous with the policy of the management. The management become the liberators, the whole exercise becomes a lesson in the virtues of the management - society is once again confirmed as being material to be managed, the struggles of the incarcerated to live like human beings in the institution is forgotten amid the praise of the liberators. The same kind of identification with one's rulers can be seen in the notion of the European *Communauté* - a homely word for an entirely undomestic concept.

7.

Without trying to add to the cliché mountain, we can say that communication is crucial to our times. Language is a significant instrument of power. The way language is used reveals the way power is deployed. In the early 20th century, when power was not so desperate to receive legitimacy from *any*, nor so arrogant as to demand it from *all* quarters, the terminology of indigence centred around a kind of scientific brutalism - 'Idiot', 'moral imbecile', 'feeble-minded', 'defective'. No consideration whatsoever was given to the feelings of those so designated. Today however a pedantic sensitivity informs the process of naming, as if the social reality of stigmatisation could be reduced to the kind of words one uses. Instead of brutality we have euphemism. The mentally handicapped are described as 'people with learning difficulties', the disruptive as 'people with challenging behaviours'. This does two things. On the one hand it seeks to confirm the state and its servants as the source of care and concern - a cut above the ordinary humanity of the citizen uninitiated in the arcane patter of the professional. On the other hand it seeks to disarm imagined prejudice by promoting nescience. Anderson in *Telos* 76 says: 'Civil rights only took hold because we accepted moral facts and were willing to declare certain behaviours wrong. Mere tolerance of the kind which arose later in the 60s does not get you that far. It produces passivity. Perhaps we should not say that *any* philosophy of rights necessarily entails dependent


individualism and the bureaucratic state. It may be a problem mainly for versions of the philosophy of rights which takes relativism and ignorance as their starting point, thinking, mistakenly, that only blindness can engender tolerance.' In fact we could go further. The very attempts to restructure language in a benign fashion cuts off a means of understanding a not very benign world. As Adorno said in 'The health unto death': 'Just as the old injustice is not changed by a lavish display of light, air, and hygiene, but is in fact concealed by the gleaming transparency of rationalised big business, the inner health of our time has been secured by blocking flight into illness without in the slightest altering its aetiology'. The State (and its recognised corporate entities in the caring-commercial complex) seeks to monopolise the provision and nature of care. Its assertion of benevolence serves to demoralise society both by denying the unbearable reality of present society, and by undermining society's belief in itself, independent from expertise, as a responsible and reasonable substance. The State not only wants our obedience, but like other contemporary corporations, it demands our love. The ideology of the community is one way it seeks to achieve this.

8.

Our society seems to torment itself with the loss of community. Radical projects define themselves as a discovery of community, like the gay community, or the national community. It is hard to find a word said against it. Community stands for all the warmth, friendliness, comfort and cosiness which we believe to have left our society. It represents something authentic in a world we believe corrupted by institutions, culture and class. We believe in it so much we are prepared to accept the term 'community care' as representing something a million times more natural than institutional care. Yet the reality of community care *must* mean as much care by institutions as care was in institutions. The family, voluntary society or street are also institutions, just as mental handicap institutions could be called communities. The family or the street can be as vicious, repressive, isolating and 'normalising' as any closed institution, yet the laurels of authenticity can be showered upon these institutions and rigidly denied the hospitals and asylums. My point is not to redeem the hospital, which clearly has played an unhappy role in many people's lives, so much as to question the alternative now on offer.

9.

Community care, with its catalogue of professional posts and bureaucratic placements, does not conceal or destroy an authentic community. It simply hides the fact that the true community it caricatures does not exist, has never existed. The spectre of arbitrary power, psychic manipulation and enforced helplessness haunts the community as much as the institution. What is perhaps new is that the practitioners of power deny they are doing any such thing. Instead they cover their tracks with the language of empowerment, sensitivity and advocacy. The kangaroo court of the case conference is upheld as the superior form of decision-taking ('all interests are represented'). In reality their job is to integrate without too much fuss, indigent people into an unjust society. They could just say that, then at least they could acknowledge that they are as compromised as anyone else. But they believe in their own ideology, and worse, demand that everyone else goes along with them.



The community is a codeword covering a multitude of sharp practices. With its ideological commitment to deregulation and the proliferation of 'enterprise' the present faction in power attempts to disguise its bias by equating the community with private agency. Thus care in the community becomes institutionalisation in private residential accommodation. Following its own mythology of Capital and the market as natural givens, the provision of private nursing homes is seen as an authentic reflection of society where state provision is not. In fact the community has had what independence it had planned out of it. Private agency is simply the ideology of money made material. In order to conceal the fact that money is itself a faith like any other enterprise is portrayed as coming from some authentic sphere of demand. Attempts are made to make the community and the market synonymous. Community is an effective camouflage because it responds to a widespread nostalgia. It decorates the utterances of politicians (and prettifies irredeemably ugly activities - the 'Intelligence Community' is an example of this.) It is used to create 'belongingness', but only the belonging of mutual consumption is really envisaged.

11.

Cardboard City, the presence of disturbed people begging, or screaming incoherently at the traffic has inspired widespread revulsion. It is hard to say whether this is the revulsion of the respectable for the disreputable, or the revulsion one human being feels for the immiseration of another. Calls have gone out for the rehabilitation of the asylum. Other calls have gone out for a massive injection of funds into care in the community. Building houses would probably be a more successful solution than either.

The modern community aspires to universal auto-surveillance. Convinced that this is the best of all possible worlds the rulers have no shame about encouraging, informing, sneaking and spying. At the same time campaigns are run to knit individuals together against a common threat - drugs, acid house parties or strangers. By isolating the false category 'feeble-minded' in the 1900s administrators were able to justify the incarceration of a minority. By just treating *everyone* as if they were feeble-minded the state has been able to justify a plethora of control mechanisms and produced exponential growth in the soft professions of social regulation. Punitive methods of discipline are only the last sanction in a full programme of technologies. The aim is towards the preventative/integrative model. As the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards puts it: '... as institutional walls disintegrate, figuratively speaking, the boundaries between the various human service areas will disappear as well - and correctional problems will come to be a range of professionals serving communities.' The job of these professionals will be to include rather than exclude, integrate rather than segregate. 'The new mode of domination distinguishes itself by the substitution of seduction for repression, public relations for policing, advertising for authority, needs creation for norm-imposition' (Bourdieu). We will have all the suffocating care and concern of Goethe's huge hospital, together with announcements declaring the victory of humanity and our arrival in a common democratic home. But we should not forget, it is the brightest rooms which are the secret domain of power.


Found on noticeboard of St. James Hospital, Leeds.

Managing to Deceive

A crash course in Expression-Management

The key to effective dissimulation is simplicity. Never use words that require thought. The changes you want to bring about need to be only half-understood. Remember the formula: Successful implementation depends on incomplete comprehension.

THE SIX KEY COMPONENTS IN SUCCESSFUL MYSTIFICATION



1. Having the confidence to Tell Lies

This involves caring for the illusion needs of your workplace. Not many of us can stand too much truth and a caring organization will provide opportunities for individuals at all levels to satisfy their need for fantasy.

Individuals will accept the need for lies if you can involve them in the process of deception themselves. An organization that encourages flexibility in cognition-management will be an organization in which other kinds of flexibility will be enhanced. It is sometimes happens, certain individuals adopt narrow and rigid strategies towards factuality (see section on 'Coping with 'Truth-Mongers') you will need to elicit supportive networks from relevant peer-groups in order to isolate the danger posed by such members.

A positive attitude towards overcoming fixations with truth-content can be reinforced by offering alternative versions of lies in order to minimize the salience of the truth.

A common strategy for generating a climate of cooperative counter-verification is to set up developmental activities and projects of various kinds which are premised upon false assumptions, and to reward participation in these projects. In this way even the most recalcitrant employees will learn to appreciate the benefits of personal investment in falsification.

2. Avoiding Specificity

The effective manager doesn't just have to cope with a constantly changing environment, but also with a constantly changing identity. It isn't enough to be all things to all people. It is even more important to be nothing in particular to anybody. You must not let yourself be pinned down to any specific propositions or else you will be held responsible for other people's problems. Simply put, if it's not what we know or talk about that counts but what people think we may be talking about. The factor most likely to prevent this kind of thinking is our capacity to get people's attention fixed on comfortable images rather than on abstract concepts or real-world relations in what you are saying. Call your proposals 'packages' or 'bundles' because we all like unwrapping parcels. Use metaphorical language liberally as everyone wants to feel they are moving in some direction or other.

3. Keep Talking

There is no substitute for communication. The fact that you are addressing words to people makes them feel important and shows that you care about them. If it is not necessary to wander around the building having face-to-face interactions without. What matters is that everyone talks about what you have been saying. It is your words that need to circulate not your body. Successful expression management means being in control of the way people talk and the terms they use. Face-to-face interactions can dissipate this control.

4. Maintaining a sense of continual change

Restructurings are a vital part of the everyday life of an Expression-Managed organization. Ideally every member of the organization should be speaking excitedly about the new Structure whose emergence is imminent. To sustain a high level of commitment to change it is necessary to have a variety of change proposals in the pipeline but to keep your options open by preventing any definite plan being decided. Such decisions only produce closure and rigidity as individuals start to have expectations about the future. The watchword as always, must be OPENNESS. A structure where everyone knows where they stand is one in which too many people will know where they are going. By keeping your options open, and encouraging the expression of every possible point of view, you not only find out how everyone is thinking, but you disarm conservative opposition by not providing anything for people to oppose.

5. Flatter your subordinates

Hierarchy is a negative concept. Everyone is against it. The progressive expression-manager must be in the vanguard of this radical denunciation of hierarchical, top-down structures. It is a truism that the life of an organisation is at best understood at its lowest levels. Speak always from the standpoint of the grassroots even when you are in a position of high executive responsibility. You must be prepared to denounce all the things on which your own position is based. It is easier than you think. It is all a matter of commitment and conviction. Use radical slogans for every administrative arrangement being undertaken. Enforcement of regulations, disciplinary sanctions and other actions of authority especially require a radical even populist presentation.

It is on the interpersonal relations front that you can do the most immediate work in undoing the springs of resistance to your power. The best way to get your way is when you can get people to believe they are free to do what they want. The days when people were made to feel alienated from their jobs by rigidly defined roles must be banished forever. Increasingly the organization will need to harness all the hidden potential of its employees' personalities. There is no room in the organization of the future for repressed, unconscious residues. Dynamic expression management must combine the tasks of job-design and psychotherapy. Individuals must be liberated from their alienated attitudes in order to realize their full potential in their work-roles.

Role-playing exercises are a normal and necessary part of the work of an employee today - in many ways these exercises are more important than the work-tasks themselves. As psychologists have shown (eg. Boguslaw's Anarchy of Needs), it is through playing games that people are most effectively socialized into conforming with the needs of organisations.

6. Buzzwords

The skill and sensitivity with which verbal behaviour is managed is the key to the successful outcome of any strategy of decision-management. Never call a spade a spade, but every organizational endeavour you are engaged in may usefully be called spade-work, and the function to call a spade a spade is a suitably empty metaphor that can be deployed in any context. Buzzwords have very precise life-cycles and a rapid turnover. Your position in the pecking order largely depends upon the proficiency with which you can determine the rate of change in organizational vocabularies. Words change frequently but while they are in the ascendancy they must be obeyed unquestioningly. Never be the first to use a particular expression, but always try to be second. Be prepared to take on board new phrases and progress them down the line as an essential part of your learning curve. Your own personal problem-solving strategy should centre around your competence in promoting flexibility. Being a change-agent is the name of the game, but it may not always be so. If and when change ceases to be the watchword, you will be in a whole new ball game and you will not be prepared to respond to new circumstances.

Euromania

As moves towards European unity gather pace, Mike Peters and Steve Bushell examine the 'Europe' on offer, and the capital - political and economic - invested in it.

The Miraculous Europe-trick Exposed

THE PROGRAMME FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION has been one of the most consistent propaganda projects of the last fifty years. One measure of its ideological success is the poverty into which any criticism has been manoeuvred. Such criticism as there has been is confined either to doubt about the immediate feasibility of its goal (which leaves unquestioned the goal itself) or else a conservative nationalism which takes existing states as sacrosanct. Lively debate is, of course, permitted about what kind of united Europe might be possible, but unity and Europe are compulsory shibboleths.

The following reflections will blaspheme against these sacred slogans of unity and pour cold water on the mystifying pretensions of the name Europe itself. Nothing could be further from the truth than to reduce these critical notes to some kind of ulterior vindication of any English or British national orientation. That English nationalism currently expresses itself in a ridiculing of Europeanism doesn't provide sufficient basis for aligning the present argument with those of the *Spectator*, the *Salisbury Review*, or Norman Tebbit, or any other part of Britain's diffuse 'pamyat' tendency. Indeed it should be clear that English (or any other) nation-fetishism is what is being indicted here as an even more despicable real object of which Europeanism is simply a phoney simulacrum: Europeanism in its very phoniness expresses the false essence of all nationalisms. Moreover, it is the very meaning of the word 'Europe' that is being called into question, and the same questions could certainly be applied to any other names, especially 'England' and 'Britain'. When a nation's name is being invoked you can usually be sure that it is the actions of those who comprise its state apparatus, or those political forces aspiring to control it, which are in fact being referred to. And this masquerade is blatant in the case of 'Europe', which, if it refers to anything refers to a particular class of political professionals who staff the byzantine bureaucracy of the 'European Community'.

Many on the Left are aware that a new order is being constructed and that the people of Europe are being led like sheep into a system designed to manage life more thoroughly according to the interests of capital. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger says, the European Parliament is a joke, and "the only people represented in Brussels are the lobbies and the banks on the one hand, and the bureaucrats on the other". Even Chris Piening, head of the secretariat of the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, has to concede the truth of the old adage that, if the European Community itself were to apply to join the European Community, it would not be allowed in, because it is not democratic enough according to its own rules defining democracy as a condition of membership. John Lambert of Agenor, and former Secretary General of the Strasbourg Rainbow Group, sees that "what is emerging around us, bit by semi-clandestine bit, is the outline of tomorrow's Euro-state", but this is a view rarely expressed

in Britain these days, and even he seems to believe it possible to modify those structures which have been designed expressly to prevent non-capitalist forces developing.

First of all: what and where is 'Europe'? This is no innocent geographical expression, and, despite the strange media obsession with maps it is hard to work up a continentalist mystique of land masses. Europe is an Asiatic peninsula and the fact that the Bosphorus is taken as a boundary seems arbitrary: it is much narrower than the strait between Denmark and Sweden and yet what is now Turkey was once 'Asia' itself: Europe's Other. The concept of Europe, however, owes nothing to geography, as the absence of any Eastern boundary shows.

It is 'History' and 'Culture' - those mystifying categories par excellence - which are invoked to define a spiritual community - the "common European homeland", not geography. Geography is too fixed. History and Culture can be manipulated more easily. Turkey is now 'in' Europe in spite of the symbolic role played by the Turks historically in providing the first evil 'Eastern' empire against which a Europe could be defined. Poland and Hungary should not need history lessons in this respect, nor should Bulgarians, whose recent persecution of ethnic Turks shows that this matter is not as dead as the NATO Council would wish.

The concept 'Europe' exists as an ideological category: it inhabits and distorts the imagination of radicals no less than conservatives. In one radical version 'Europe' can provide a locus for the social ills of racism, colonialism and imperialism, summoned up in the buzz-word 'Euro-centric'. How those who equate capitalism with the career of the great white european bogeyman will respond to the coming 'Asian'-dominated epoch in the history of the capitalist world economy is not my concern. When I use the word capitalism, I do not intend any such names as european to be its necessary adjective.

While part of the motivation behind this sudden conversion to 'Europe' on the part of British Socialists (erstwhile proponents of 'Ingsoc') must lie in pure cynicism - conforming to the Europeanist consensus in the political class - there is also the knee-jerk response to the duckspeak fetish of 'Thatcherism': the enemy of my enemy must be my friend, so if she is against it then it must be a good thing. But deeper than this, there is a way in which Europeanism appeals to the pretensions of the British Left to 'internationalism', rooted in the higher-minded imperialism which has never quite got it into its head that 'Britain' is not the centre of the world. English nationalism, in its cruder forms, has always been derided and detested by the socialist fraction of the English political class; indeed the invariable tendency of English socialism to support moral causes in other countries and to champion 'black' against 'white' in England itself is rooted at least as much in this revulsion from the popular culture in which such nationalism thrives as it is in any principled rejection of the injustice and inhumanity of racism itself. This interpretation is at least plausible, given the highly selective nature of the causes espoused and the apparent determination to write off the entirety of 'English' national culture. But this olympian detachment from the mainsprings

of English nationalism is a clue to the class perspective and state-consciousness which lies beneath the surface. Consider the terms in which the issue is always - and I mean always - posed: English nationalism is derided as 'parochial', 'narrow', 'insular', as 'little Englandism'. In what other nation, I wonder, do such terms exist? This contempt for smallness and this yearning for scale is a clue to the power-fetishism so typical of political elites. This is the language with which Edward Heath derides Thatcher as "a narrow little nationalist". It is the language of those in the British state who can only talk about the European Community as "a power to be reckoned with on the world scene".

Europeanism allows expression to the semi-conscious yearning for power and self-aggrandisement, 'national pride' (as it would be called in other contexts) which the educated English have for so long publicly denied themselves.

Europeanism in no way transcends the metaphysical fantasy of national thinking. It is in fact only meaningful because of it. National thinking creates an imaginary world in which reified - and often personified - 'nations' function as subjects. France feels this or that; Germany wants this, etc. The infantile rhetoric of politicians is always at home in this kindergarten role-play world. Media commentators compare 'national' economies for their 'strengths' and 'weaknesses' as if trade relations across frontiers were like sporting encounters between teams, with economists as self-appointed trainers and medical advisers. The way Eastern Europe has been dealt with in the language of the media is a goldmine for dream-interpretations: the solution to the crisis in the east is presented like a glorified 'Community care' policy in which the EC will look after the decarcerated inmate nations and assist in their 'normalization' as the poor souls decant themselves into the real world of multi-party political shopping. Poland will be healed from its sickness and rehabilitated of its 'institutionalization' by medicinal loans from the pharmacies of international finance and behaviour-modification programmes administered on an out-patient basis by the tried and trusted routines of democracy-therapy. One could go on. The 'common European home' is explicitly - and unblushingly - called a family (which makes the Eastern nations into either aged in-laws or prodigal children).

EURO-PHORIA

The political class is currently trying to orchestrate public enthusiasm for this vaguely defined Europeanism with renewed vigour. Over the clamour of national voices the inexorable rise of a new supra-national state takes shape.

We are forced yet again to affirm our virtuous internationalism by responding positively to the stupid loaded question: Are you FOR or AGAINST Europe? It has been made socially impossible to do other than answer YES. Perfect technocratic questionnaire design: the sign 'Europe' has on its side signs like unity and integration, and who is for division and disintegration? To quibble about what sort of social and political order is being constructed under the flag of European unity is to be automatically consigned to the oblivion of reaction, as if the only possible opposition would be an affirmation of bad signs like narrowness, smallness and insularity. This at least is how British brains are washed: since Europe represents the big power, larger stage, greater sphere of influence, its only logical obverse can be the bigoted little nationalism of refusal and prejudice and isolation, ignorance, complacency and so forth. British Europeanists presumably know what they are up against; they know the mentality of English nationalism so well that they can recite its shibboleths for themselves. Indeed one can deduce the main themes of Anglocentrism simply by taking the slogans of Europeanism and working back to the signs of which they are the opposites. That is where they have come from in fact. There is a peculiarly derivative, second-order flavour to the ideas surrounding Europe in the language of the British political class, as if what is attractive about Europe is what it appears to be an alternative to, what it is *not* (it is not-narrow, not-insular, not-little etc) rather than what it concretely refers to in

itself. Anyone not convinced of this should interrogate attentively an ardent Europeanist and note down the key words which keep the discourse going: and then ask oneself whether these are grounded in familiarity with and valuation of a European cultural tradition or whether they are driven by a desire of some other kind. Historically, it is not implausible to see Europhoria as the third of the great political enthusiasms of the British political class in the 20th century for larger unities in which 'Britain' could 'play a part', a big part, exercising 'influence' (even 'leadership') in the modern world. The first was the idea of 'Empire' (later 'Commonwealth') and the second was the Atlantic/Anglo-American special relationship (in which the USA would inherit the mantle of Britannia).



The death of one enthusiasm and its replacement by another underlies much contemporary British political conflict. The division in the British Conservative Party is complex and mysterious, but its clearest visible polarity is between an 'Atlanticist' (or more properly Americanist) ideological perspective on foreign policy and a 'Europeanist' perspective which defines immediate integration of the British state into a European superstate as the most urgent priority. Whilst this latter policy is equally ideological, this addresses the strategic economic and social needs of big multinational capital. The most important thing to note is that this is a political division *within* the ruling class, whilst at the same time it cuts across the current disposition of party alignments. More specifically, the 'Europeanist' perspective is not confined to the Conservative Party, being a long-standing preoccupation of both Liberal and Social Democratic Parties (whose representation within the ruling class is more significant than their membership at large). Recently the Labour Party has been captured by the 'Europeanist' faction, having for years been a battleground between these tendencies.

WHICH EUROPE?

What does Europe really mean? Before I can agree to its 'unity' I want to know what kind of thing it is. Does this name really provide a focus for common identification, or is it another mystifying fetish? Thinking about the use of names - and maps and flags, and all the other signifiers by which people allow themselves to be lined up as extras in other people's political games, one is forced to reflect on the phenomenon of nationalism itself - of which this Euronationalism is clearly a replicant.

I can say that it works well enough on me: I could easily be summoned to the call as a 'European'. What I know of history has given me the means to identify where I must 'belong'. I too can gaze at the map and name all the cities and nations; I can find myself related to places

which I may only have read about. I can agree that Budapest is less 'foreign' to me than Cairo. But so what? Why should I be expected to measure degrees of foreignness geographically or culturally? Muslim culture in England (and this word culture by now surely needs its pretensions exposing) is 'alien' to me, but surely that must belong within Europe now, or are we talking about something more sinister. Why indeed should I be made to think in terms of foreignness at all? To be asked to stand and salute my common European heritage is really to be asked to give allegiance to a separate power. Allegiance always in practice implies authority: let's not confuse it with simple loyalty or belongingness, or any other moral bond which might perfectly well do without institutions and administrative staffs.

If a European civilization - a cultural heritage - already exists, which I wouldn't ordinarily dispute, why should that require a state unless there are some boundaries, some enemies even, against which to rally? Nations themselves have historically been brought into existence by political strategies to build unities on the pretext of shared cultures, against particular enemies. I can think of no other point to nationalism. Against whom is the new European cultural unity being defined? If 'Communism' is no longer the enemy at the gate, is it America? Japan? or Islam again?


The current hegemony of the word Europe draws on a palimpsest of past identifiers (Christianity, 'The West', 'democracy' etc), but its power seems to derive today from the multiplicity of its meanings. A cursory wander through the various interested parties reveals quite a range of conceptions of 'Europe' - all different but seemingly mutually reinforcing. They cannot all be logically consistent and we are entitled to ask which represent hopes, which are self-delusions and which may be downright camouflage.

1. 'Europe' for the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians means 'the West'. It means freedom, democracy, shopping without queues, human rights and no more Russian troops.
2. For the British elite, 'Europe' means a chance to be part of a big power again, and for the British Left it means a vicarious counterweight to the British conservative regime and a refuge from the nastier side of English nationalism.
3. For the Scots, as for the Catalans and other nationalities, 'Europe' means a higher authority through which to realise their own nationalist aspirations against the nations within which they find themselves.
4. Whenever the Russian government talks about 'Europe' it is a code word for accommodation with Germany.
5. The closer the Germans and the Russians get the more the French renew their zeal for 'Europe' (for the French 'Europe' always means 'France' writ large).
6. The closer Germany gets to reunification the more they reassure their neighbours about the subsumption of a united Germany within a greater 'Europe' as a whole.
7. For the Europeanist propagandists, 'Europe' signifies internationalism and the renunciation of war.
8. For cold war propagandists, 'Europe' signifies a bastion of civilization and democracy against Eastern totalitarianism.
9. For racists in all countries, 'Europe' is a code word for white (in the political unconscious of many soi-disant anti-racist European intellectuals no less than in the explicit discourse of the French FN, who draw on a long tradition of racial thinking by no means confined to France. I have heard commitments to 'European' unity in bars in Hungary, Spain and England in identical terms: 'we're all white after all').

10. For big business, Europe means a big market from which to compete with Japanese and American rivals; it means economies of scale, standardisation, integration of operations, free access to customers, rationalization of production and all the rest.

THE REAL EUROPE ON OFFER

Contrary to the ideology that there is a 'natural' progression towards the creation of bigger states absorbing little ones (a concept utterly obsolete in the 'backward' Russian empire) the idea of Europe had to be worked for. The creation of a federal European state was the conscious objective of a determined group of people who wielded their influence for the most part behind the scenes. Foremost among these manipulators have been Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, a Catholic and friend of another Europeanist, Frank Buchman founder of Moral Rearmament (MRA) (a precursor of the evangelical, anti-communist, pro-capitalist brain-tidying outfits that proliferate throughout the world today). Schuman wrote a foreword to the French edition of Buchman's speeches **Remaking the World** (1950). Other prominent members of MRA included Frits Philips vice-president of the secretive and very powerful Philips company. The present chairman of the European Business Round Table (the central committee of the big multinationals) Wisse Dekker is a former chairman of Philips who is open about the fact that the source of the pressure for the single market was the big industrial firms. He congratulates himself with the success of his pressure in making European unity an 'irreversible process' - a hallmark of the methodology of European integration. Even shadier figures include the Polish 'eminence grise' Joseph Retinger (for whom European unity was to secure the future of his own country) whose brainchild, the Bilderberg group provided the forum for the secret deliberations of the powers that be for the last 30 years. Capital too needs its vanguards.



The European integration programme today centres around the concept of the removal of barriers and the so-called 'bonfire of controls' - quintessentially 'radical' slogans for the agenda of economic liberalism. Such is the metaphysical investment of radical and Leftist thought in the idea of 'removal of barriers' that a critique of this programme is inhibited, and only fails back into the grooves of national-statism, reaffirming the need for more controls (which are envisaged as controls over capital and its movements, but which can only take shape as controls over labour and social activity). But at the present juncture the impossibility of such a national strategy only reinforces the statist element in the equation, on an enlarged scale. The enthusiasm of the British Labour Party for a European 'social programme' represents in fact a classic displacement: consolation for exclusion from state power at the national level by a fantasy of participating in a larger state-power, which can only be construed as 'socialist' by its association with the very bureaucratic-centralist mechanisms from which 'socialism' has been trying to disassociate itself. The idea that 'socialism' means simply 'planning' has reappeared

in a paradoxically more 'acceptable' form: state-regulation of society is presumably OK as long as the 'state' doing it is not the old familiar national state, but a new universal leviathan.

The liberal (anti-socialist) strategy is incomparably superior to the pseudo-universalism of supranationalism: instead of seeking to 'plan' and 'direct' economic activity by some apparatus above existing governments, it adopts the quintessentially capitalist method of equalization: the gist of this is that each national state is obliged to recognise every other state's rules. This 'liberalization' does not mean anything like the abolition of 'barriers' or 'controls' in the form imagined if those reifications are taken literally. What it means is a classic form of the way competition is described by Marx rather than the way the market is described by neo-classical economic theory: it is not that 'freedom' is ensured, but simply that a reduction is effected to the level of the capital with the lowest costs of production (costs-of-production here includes protective measures enforced by various national states: 'faux frais' like Health Service provision and the like). In other words by the simple Edenic device of mutual recognition of one another's state-regulations, those capitals based in states with the least controls over capital acquire an automatic competitive advantage over the others and, moreover, the regime of the most 'advanced' capital is generalized to the whole continent. It is a veritable capitalist charter: a solemn accord by which employers agree to allow the cheapest labour to make itself available for exploitation without prejudice against the accidents of birth. And if labour is cheaper to produce in Ireland or Italy then it shall be free to move to Milan or Munich without hindrance from local formalities.

What happens to labour reflects what happens to money. The European Monetary system (EMS) is really a new Deutschmark area. The 'strongest' currency, the D-mark determines the value of the ECU (European Currency Unit) and the other currencies are to have their relative values set by the external (i.e. dollar) value of the D-mark. The national central banks are to be obliged to do their buying and selling to keep these values within a defined band. In other words, while integration of the labour market is achieved by making the *lowest* costs of labour-power the standard, the integration of money is achieved by making the *strongest* national money into the standard.

This 'liberal' Euromarket, favoured by the German bankers (a kind of Cobdenism in which the freedom of trade produces uniformity) is only complemented rather than contradicted by the 'socialist' Euromanifesto favoured by the French, like Delors (the Delorean strategy?), with its corporatist social charter. Either way, the social will be adjusted to the economic.

What seems to be happening in Europe now is an attempt to square the circle: to create a 'supranational' state to whom allegiance is based simultaneously upon a supposedly 'universal', and hence non-nationalist, appeal and, on the contrary, upon an encouragement of various other 'nationalisms' whose position within the structure is predefined: fabricated nationalisms from the top down. 'Sovereignty' is to be fused together, but national differences are to be preserved and polished up. This is all of course nonsensical. The only 'universal' value in Europe is exchange value and if all the nations of Europe are to be standardised in the same way that their flags are all the same shape, and united under a common monetary unit, with all 'boundaries' removed insofar as they constitute barriers to the free movement of capital and industrial rationalization, how can 'national cultures' flourish even with EC cultural-fund subsidies? A purely decorative nationality for which others pay? Nations themselves only ever came into existence as a means for state-creation, and the 'autonomy' of aspiring nations means nothing if not as a claim to state-hood. What does the vapid slogan 'Scotland in Europe' mean? Where else has it been for the last few hundred years? A national autonomy dependent upon an imperial bureaucracy in Brussels is a literally provincial autonomy; the only autonomy enjoyed being in the hands of the local satraps with new offices and salaries. This is the autonomy of the hundreds of principalities in the Holy Roman Empire.

The citizens of Europe are more realistic than their rulers. While the power elites (especially the ones who keep modestly away from the TV cameras) indulge reveries about their imaginary European Supernation, the population at large still fails to show the required enthusiasm for this new simulated patriotism. Public discussion of the nature and purpose of the Europeanist project has been deliberately confined to reiteration of highflown platitudes, lest too much discussion take place about what kind of state is being constructed and what kind of society is being planned. One popular theme - that a united Europe means no more war - has been played for all it is worth for fifty years. This has probably been the main basis of popular support for Europeanism all along. The pooling of sovereignty between state apparatuses does indeed represent an advanced diplomatic solution to the perennial problem of interstate conflict. But it should not be confused with some sort of dismantling of the state itself - or the emancipation of social life from state power as such. Nor should the construction of a supranational European state or a continental economic bloc be imagined to bring into being some fantastic European nation.

The fact that the pursuit of the European idea has been conducted in secrecy and only presented to the public in the most vague and abstractly idealist slogans suggests it has hidden agendas on which debate has been deemed undesirable.

What will this new European State amount to?

1. a state designed expressly for capital, for what Kundera calls "those powers that pretend to be fate": a state whose territory has been put together to ensure a population of the right size and composition to provide for the labour-power needs of the big industrial and commercial concerns and to provide a big enough consumer market.
2. a state so designed that the workings of parliamentary 'democracy' cannot possibly interfere with the operations of business and the police.
3. a state in which cultures can be nurtured in their variety in such a way that they do not give rise to collective subjects with interests at variance with those permanently in power.
4. a state providing for 'peaceful' intercapitalist rivalries and competition that is without the need for dangerous political dependence on non-capitalist forces: the labour unions being able to be rewarded in proportion as they collaborate with the dominant capitalist blocs without posing risks to the system as a whole.



The whole structure of the Europolitical system will be such as to make any questioning or challenge of the structure of social and economic life impossible. Just as in the United States of America where the capitalist market is enshrined as the fundamental constitutive principle of the cosmos, so in the new federal Eurostate, there can be no effective politics outside the carefully designed system which excludes anything other than a capitalist interest.

The Politics of Panic: the Kedichem case

Mass action has often escaped criticism in radical circles. In this story Arjen Mulder and Geert Lovink show how, despite the anti-authoritarian make-up of the participants, manipulation and passivity emerged in a crowd engaged upon an anti-fascist action.

"Immer mehr bin ich davon überzeugt, dass Gesinnungen aus Massenerlebnissen entstehen. Aber sind Menschen an ihren Massenerlebnissen schuld? Geraten sie nicht völlig ungeschützt in sie hinein? Wie muss einer beschaffen sein um sich gegen sie wehren zu können?"

Muss man instände sein, eigene Massen zu bilden, um gegen andere gefeit zu sein?"

Elias Canetti, *Das Geheimherz der Uhr*.

"More and more I am convinced that mentalities spring from mass experiences. But are people responsible for their mass experiences. Don't they end up in them without any protection? With what should one be equipped, to be able to protect oneself against them?"

Should one be able to form one's own crowds to be immune against others?"

Elias Canetti, *The secret heart of the watch*.

DURING TEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING mass actions in the Netherlands practical knowledge has been acquired about the planning of panic, both among those against whom the action is directed and among the activists themselves. But to be able to use this panic effectively in the street, in politics and in the media there has to be a taboo about its actual existence among the activists. No matter how much panic arises during an action, people will always deny that they have been in a panic and later on only the effect of the action will be discussed openly, but never the role of panic during the action. The only situations in which it is discussed are squat-bars, chaotic action-meetings and once in a while the underground media. They will look for two things there: 1) the people who instigated the panic and 2) how it can be avoided in the future. There will be an increasing desire for an organization of mass actions which could preclude panic. But the authoritarian consequences of this will, at least in the Netherlands, never be accepted by the activists who enjoy these actions as long as they are spontaneous, chaotic and without a rigid organisation. Such actions can lead, in the activists' own myth about what the old mass actions were like, to the most bizarre burglaries and attacks without lapsing into terrorism.

A classic example of planned panic is the so-called Kedichem-case. On March 29th, 1986 300 anti-fascist activists disturbed a secret meeting at Kedichem, a village in the middle of Holland, where two ultra-right splinter parties made an attempt at reconciliation. The hotel where they met was destroyed by fire, a number of party members were seriously injured and 72 activists arrested. Since 1982 the 'Centrumparty' (CP) had held one seat in the Dutch Lower House on a programme which declared itself to be anti-fascist and anti-racist, but which made out a case for the 'protection of the Dutch cultural values', a modern form of racism which particularly blames foreign workers in the Netherlands for housing problems, unemployment, pollution and overcrowded roads. Since that time increasingly firm measures were being taken by activists against public assemblies of this party, while at the same time a broad anti-fascist movement developed which was internally strongly divided on the question of banning the CP and measures that should be taken against it. This movement is grounded in the anti-fascist attitude and resistance in World War II. It can be seen as the way in which a new generation reshapes the memory of the horrors of fascism, which is still at the forefront in Dutch education, media and literature. Therefore everyone in Holland is concerned in the new movement, everyone is a 'natural' anti-fascist.

Ten days before 'Kedichem' a 'fascist' was elected as a municipal councillor for the first time since the war in Amsterdam. The swearing in of the new councillor would take place on April 29th and discussions about its prevention were in full swing. Aside from that, on the 26th of May parliamentary elections would be held and it was of vital importance for the CP that the internal disputes, which existed since 1982, should be settled. To this end the meeting in Kedichem was summoned. The violent disturbing of the reconciliation meeting prevented the formation of a reunited ultra-right party and led to the loss of their seat in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament.

For a considerable time there has been a tradition of research into the wheeling and dealing of ultra-right and fascist individuals and groups in Holland. In this way it was found out that the secret negotiations would be on the 29th of March, but the place was kept secret, even in CP-circles. Two days before, a meeting was held between activists in Amsterdam where it was explained to about 150 people the crucial importance of not only disturbing the CP-meeting, but also how to disturb it. A small group of experienced activists assumed the responsibility for the organization. There was no discussion at all about the plan of action, apart from a vague reference to the 'Boekel-model'.

Two years before, the last convention of the CP took place in Boekel, a small town in the South of Holland. Activists from all over the country had entered into a physical confrontation with the 300 party members who were present. The 'Boekel-model' consisted of surrounding the conference room, demanding the fascists leave and, if they ignored this demand, 'smoking out' the conference room with tear gas or smoke bombs. In real terms however, there had been a great difference between on the one hand the non-violent 'demonstrators' who wanted to press charges against the CP in order to mobilize public opinion, and on the other hand the 'heavy' faction who were out for a direct confrontation and actually prepared themselves for this by taking along helmets, leather coats, clubs and smoke bombs. Because the latter faction was the first to arrive at the secret conference room, their strategy was directly put into action: windows were smashed, tear gas was thrown in and outside there was heavy fighting between the fascist thugs, the 'heavies' and the newly arrived 'demonstrators'. Afterwards there was a serious disagreement among the activists, but shortly before Kedichem this all seemed to be forgotten: it was assumed that everybody knew what the 'Boekel-model' meant, it was time to take action now, quarrels were put off until later, a typical feature in Dutch action tradition: act first, talk later.

On Saturday morning the 29th of March about 300 activists gathered at 9.00 a.m. in an old squatted hospital in Utrecht, a city in the centre of Holland. Because it was unknown where the CP-meeting would take place, this seemed to be the best location. It was known that a number of CP members would gather at the soccer stadium of Utrecht. These members were secretly followed by people on motor-bikes who regularly called up the meeting-point to pass on how many fascists were on their way and where they were going. Not until 2.30 p.m. did it become clear that the fascists had gathered in the 'Cosmopolite' hotel in Kedichem.


During the long hours of waiting in Utrecht there hadn't been one joint discussion about what exactly was going to happen. Only the almost magical phrase 'the Boekel-model' flitted through the place. "In the ocean of time and the relatively cosy atmosphere in Utrecht it was explained insufficiently and too hastily what exactly was going to happen" Marie concludes afterwards in the autonomous weekly **Bluff!** "Was it fear of confronting opinions within the group and heated discussions right before the action? Was everyone already occupied with their own fear of violence and the heavy odds of fascists we expected to meet there? Afterwards I could have kicked myself because I too only dozed around there, while in the back of my mind I had the hazy feeling that a lot of things were not completely right". Caspar, asked about it: "In the rumours in Utrecht the fascists became more and more. And we went for more and more beer and drank it, because it all took a very long time. Our nerves went to pieces. For three hours all those people were waiting, drinking and smoking dope. And then we finally got on our way."

Among the waiting crowd in Utrecht there was already a clear distinction between those who were sublimating their fear into a worthy demonstration and the 'heavies' who were cultivating their anger into a frenzy for attack. The fact that the crowd didn't interfere at all with the organization was because it appeared to be very professional. "The organization had a mafia-like, secret-service style", says Caspar. "They were driving motor-bikes throughout the country, people were tailing the fascists, everything was running smoothly, it all looked like a well-oiled machine. Everything was taken care of, you could hand it to them." It was a comforting feeling that the power was delegated: in a subculture which doesn't recognise an organization, the people in charge are those who take up the practical organization beforehand. In case of trouble afterwards the guilt will be pushed across to them: the crowd will always be innocent, for the crowd only the fascination of being with so many counts. Ronald: "When I went for something to eat I saw that the centre of Utrecht was swarming with people in leather jackets. It

was really insane." The certainty of belonging to a crowd gives individuals a possibility to concentrate exclusively on their own emotions.

At 2.30 p.m. it became clear that the fascists had gathered in the Cosmopolite hotel in Kedichem. Because this is a very small hotel, the motor-cyclists thought that the fascists would first gather at this place. Therefore it was decided that the activists would first meet at the station of Leerdam, a town near Kedichem. Finally the waiting crowd was allowed to move: "We burst into a cheer when we heard the word Kedichem. I'm dancing with joy. To the vans. People are shouting. We still have to make some arrangements. Who is the mouth-piece here? Several people appoint themselves. One of them wins. He organizes a car which will drive ahead to check out the situation. He says that a couple of things are still to be arranged, such as 'entering the scanner-frequencies'. No one asks what this means. Neither do I, but I think it will be alright. Then comes a message that there are only 18 CP-members in the hotel. But we don't really listen to this. The message isn't very clear anyway. We'll see when we are in Leerdam."

At this point almost 100 vans and cars left Utrecht. In Leerdam the procession posted itself before the small station. In front was the 'commanding-van' of the leaders which was crammed with scanners to bug the police-radio. Around it the vans of the 'heavies' drew up so that they wouldn't miss a thing. When a police car came along and the scanners indicated that more police were on their way and when a message came from Kedichem that Cosmopolite was indeed the meeting place of the CP, the cars in the front decided to leave immediately. There had hardly been any contact between the separate vans and the geographical situation in Kedichem was unknown to everyone. Geert Burgomaster, who wrote the most controversial criticism in **Bluff!** (from which we also quoted the above passage): "Suddenly we had to leave. Who gave the starting signal? That is not clear. We'll see in Kedichem." In the waiting crowd in Utrecht something like an anxiety for command had formed: the forced apathy of the people could only be broken by the signal that they had to leave, the command of the leaders was felt as a relief.



The road from Leerdam to Kedichem is five miles long. The touristic experience brings about the 'we-sensation' which belongs to such an outing of 'the Movement'. Ronald: "A long row of vans left for Kedichem, we made a mess of the traffic, ignored traffic lights and began to drive through the polder-landscape, a kind of caterpillar on those dykes. It was an incredibly nice route. You drove on a very narrow dyke along the river Linge, where no oncoming traffic could pass. Halfway we came across a police car which was parked on a parking lot and in which two frightened policemen were prattling in their radio-telephone. The road on which we drove wasn't straight but winding, so that you saw the procession ahead of you and behind you all the time". Betsy: "It was a real caravan, a convoy".

Coming from Leerdam the Cosmopolite hotel is situated upon the left side of the dyke, with the village of Kedichem on the right hand side. From the dyke there is a road which leads down into Kedichem. The vans in front were of course the first to arrive at the hotel, they examined the situation and parked their cars so that they would be able to leave quickly in another direction than where they came from. When they got out of their cars the vans at the back were still about a mile from the hotel. When these arrived the long procession parked along the road on the dyke and the people began to walk from there in the direction of the hotel.

The proceedings in front of the hotel took place at a terrific speed. Caspar was part of the group up front who had decided for a direct confrontation with the CP-members: "When we got out we put up our balaclavas. We saw that a lot of cars hadn't arrived yet. We all had sticks and clubs and quite a lot of adrenalin and everyone rushed towards the hotel. We waited for each other so that we would be many. We were about 40. There was a police car in front of the hotel". Ronald: "The police car said that we had to clear the area or 'violence would be used'. We all were in laughing fits, of course: 3-400 people with clubs and helmets and only one police car." The conservative newspaper *De Telegraaf* quoted a party-member: "We hadn't been in hotel Cosmopolite for 10 minutes when two policemen came in. 'We have some nasty information for you', they said, 'about 200 thugs are on their way and we can do nothing to protect you'. The policemen left immediately and at the same moment the first bricks came in through the windows".

The only thing the organisers can be reproached for is that they had knowledge about what crowds actually are and how they function, and that they knew how to use this knowledge.

Caspar: "We started to shout: 'Fascists, fuck off' and 'Fascist pigs!'. Then the hotel-owner showed up and the police said: 'Let's keep quiet'. The owner said that they were not fascists and that we should leave them in peace, he only wanted to make some easy money. But people started to throw stones toward the owner and shouted at him that he was a fascist-collaborator and that he should piss off. The windows were smashed and all kinds of things were thrown in. The police had gone away by then, up the dyke because they couldn't control the situation. More and more people showed up and windows kept on rattling and there was beating with clubs on the windows. From the cafe downstairs ashtrays were thrown at us. We also heard a lot of screaming inside, those people were really frightened." Ronald: "You couldn't see who was inside, the curtains were drawn and the light was switched off. You only saw shadows. Then the smoke bombs went in".

"More and more smoke came out of the front", Caspar continues. "We didn't have a strategy, only to smoke them out. So we thought let's throw in some smoke-bombs, let me do it; but almost everyone wanted to throw in his own bomb. I think there was too much ammunition. And too much adrenalin, because we had had to wait so long, the bottled up aggression. Then one smoke bomb got stuck in the curtains, I saw that too." Ronald: "If there is throwing during a riot everyone does one's bit. The pavement went to pieces at once and also the parking lot on the side of the hotel with those handy cobble stones. One smoke bomb got stuck in the curtains. It probably was an old one which had got wet and which combusts with a flash. Suddenly the white smoke got a little darker and the flames shot out of the building."

ARCADE

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ON THE PLACING OF IMPOSSIBLE TEXTS at the opening of Arcades

'It is not enough to think: one's got to think upon something.'
Jules Renard

The impossible text refuses to become the object of feasibility-studies, marketing analysis of target-groups and segments to be conquered. It stays outside social relevance, science policy and the culture of weekend-specials. The impossible text doesn't seek its readers but has already found its subject.

Being written for the desk-drawer, it finds its ambulatory in the lobbies under the Arcades. In the shadow of the screaming avant-garde it is traded upon in the grey circuit of festering words.

No final destination, no origin: circulation, openness to all sides, but with the back against the wall.

Compact text, flopped magazine out of the reign of digital thinking, crafty writing which follows its own way in the secret planetary networks. The authors did accompany their subjects for a while instead of imposing it their way. Their standpoint was the Dutch language, the Dutch version. No *Helmat* needed. There didn't appear any older-studies, but frontier-blurring essays. Arcades are no forum, but a foyer for salesmen of suspicious character. The discussion will not be monitored, ideas will be given away for the price of solidity, perseverance and the application for more impossible texts.

Therefore the 300 of Arcades are invited. Your treatises, aphorisms, mental experiments, your travelling notes, free translations and summaries find a place, a point of departure, an entrance. They form the Academy for Ambulant Sciences.

Arcades.

Ambulatory (æm'būlātōri), *a.* 1622. [ad. L. *ambulatorius*, *f. ambulator*.] 1. Of or pertaining to a walker, or walking. 2. Adapted for walking 1835. 3. Unfixed in abode; movable 1622. 4. *fig.* Shifting, temporary, mutable. (So in Fr.) 1631.

1. A. exercise 1622, life 1796. 3. Many [schools] are a. 1845. 4. A man's will . . . is a., or alterable, until death 1651. They . . . think virtue and vice a. Alex. Ploetz. var. A. ambulatorial (in senses 1, 2).

Ambulatory, *sb.* 1623. [ad. med. L. *ambulatorium*; see -ORY.] A place (open or esp. covered) for walking in; an arcade, a cloister.

"When we saw that the hotel was burning we went to the back. I said to my buddy: 'Let's look if they can get away, it's getting quite dangerous'. Then we saw that nobody got out, but also that it was impossible to get in, for we still wanted to beat up some fascists. We got scared when we saw that they couldn't leave the hotel. I thought: there is water behind the hotel, they can jump in there of course, but yet . . . Later it turned out that there was another exit. I was really worried. Then I went to the other side of the hotel to see if they got away there. First I only thought: if they get away we can really give them a thrashing. But when we saw those flames coming from the first floor we thought: this isn't going to work, those people are all going to die in there", says Caspar.

Geert Burgomaster saw it like this: "All the windows are smashed out. The room is full of smoke, I look inside and can only see some shadows walking in the back. But the throwing of smoke bombs doesn't stop. Enormous whoppers are thrown in. In the panic - or is it enthusiasm? - everyone wants to get rid of his stuff. I think: this has been enough. But you are part of the stream, you have no say anymore. Your shouting fades away. And then: white smoke turns into black smoke. Suddenly there is the crackling of fire. I tear my helmet off my head, throw away my club and start to run: I don't want to have anything to do with this."

Panic is always fear of murder: the murder that can be committed against you or the murder you commit yourself. The assailants behaved like a classical baiting-crowd. Canetti says about it: "The baiting-crowd forms with reference to a quickly attainable goal. The goal is known and clearly marked, and is also near. The crowd is out for killing and it knows what it wants to kill. One important reason for the rapid growth of the baiting-crowd is that there is no risk involved. There is no risk because the crowd has immense superiority on its side".

The waiting crowd of Utrecht was not out for killing but was preparing itself for a confrontation with shadows. How many, how strong, unknown. But when the front ranks formed themselves on the Lingedyk, they had one goal: "In the van we talked all the time about fascist thugs, whom we expected to meet there. We were all really fucked up and we wanted to hit fascists. Everyone was 'in the mood for killing'. But there was nobody to fight with, nobody showed up" (Caspar). When they came near the hotel (and parked their cars as close to it as possible) and found out that they had a large superiority there was no restraint to prevent the group turning into a baiting-crowd. The people had concentrated on their individual fears of being beaten and on their desire to beat, but not on the collective experience which awaited them. They had protected their bodies with leather coats and helmets, but they were not protected against their own crowd. For the crowd there was no danger, it was definitely superior to its opposition. The real danger lurked in the crowd itself: as individuals they suddenly recoiled from the act which the crowd committed.

First the crowd was innocent: a white crowd. When the smoke turned black this changed: guilt spread itself among the crowd, it turned black. That guilt was the panic. The sense of being responsible for murder turned the crowd into a group of individuals whose only interest was to get away from the scene of the crime. And they succeeded in getting away, because their cars were free and within reach.

Consequently they all escaped, as individuals. Caspar: "We wanted to save our skins, threw away our gloves and balaclavas and went back to the van, without bothering to look back at the other people. We heard a lot of sirens and the police car came again and tried to drive right into us, but then we threw bricks at the vehicle. In the car we took off our black clothes because they would attract too much attention and we switched on the radio. In this way we dashed home. Every time we came to another junction I felt more relieved, because we were incredibly anxious, at least I was, about what might have happened to those people in the building. I thought of babies who would be sleeping on the first floor of the hotel." And Ronald: "Some of us were really panicking to get back to the cars, they left their clubs and helmets behind in the roadside. The dyke was strewn with them when the greater part of us had gone. We were quite relaxed when we drove back through the polder. But afterwards you had this feeling, was this alright, or was it a stupid action by a bunch of stupid people? We were convinced of the fact though, that we could have thrown in less smoke bombs."

For the group that came behind the assailants, the demonstrators, it was all very different. Oliver: "We had lost our way. When we arrived in Kedichem we parked the van in town and began to walk

up the dyke. I was walking in the direction of the hotel. It started to smoke more and more. The nearer you came, the more smoke you saw. From a distance it was a great spectacle. But I had no idea about what was going on there. I thought it would be a kind of siege, that we would go inside and expose those CP-members. In fact we arrived too late for the action. When the flames came from all sides of the building we heard: 'Back to the cars!'. I was still coming closer when the others were already retreating. 'Take it easy, take it easy!', people shouted."

Betsy: "I was halfway along the procession of cars. I had the idea that it was a demo. After a while we stopped and walked towards the hotel. Then I heard the shattering of windows and I saw smoke. But I never reached the building. Suddenly everyone began to run back: clear off! I saw a cop car driving criss-cross through it all, he didn't know what he was doing either. When we were back at the car we first waited for the others to come. The car turned round on the small dyke, it was all very chaotic. All cars were jumbled up, you couldn't get away. It was quite heavy, further away you saw all those clouds of smoke, quite a spectacle. I thought: you will never get away from this dyke, there were no side-roads. I found it stupid to go back, better to go straight on, but almost everybody turned their cars".



The demonstrators who had been waiting all day were initially strongly attracted towards the fire from which the assailants were fleeing. They had not yet, as a crowd, come to a 'discharge': they had not yet reached that stage when each individual who belongs to the crowd feels equal to all others. When they learned that for them the party had come to an untimely end, they had to turn back, but they formed, against all common sense, into a flight-crowd for which by definition the danger comes from behind. Only as a flight-crowd could they come to that desired discharge, to experience that attractive common equality. But forming a flight-crowd was for them the only possibility to avert the panic which they were part of, but which they didn't understand. And they had to deal with that panic (although they didn't know anything about the possible murder): "The incoming wave which threatened to crush the building suddenly turns back. On top of the dyke there is a jumble of vans which try to turn around. People are gesticulating wildly and shouting. Two vans bump into each other. An empty van tells two escapees to find their own van: you don't belong here. Meanwhile some of the townsfolk stop being just onlookers: they head towards us. Some of us get heavy blows but no one does anything: it is every man for himself now" (Geert Burgomaster).

Not only panic determined the behaviour of the fleeing demonstrators, but also their sense of not being guilty. Oliver: *"Our car didn't start, on top of it all. We tried to push start it. Meanwhile we were harassed by locals who were holding their lighters near our gas tanks. They said: 'What have you done! You set the place on fire!' When actually we were the last to arrive there. It was only a wild guess on their part that we did it."* The fact that the flight-crowd didn't feel responsible for the fire for which they fled, proved to be fatal: it resulted in the return of the apathy which characterised the waiting crowd of Utrecht.

After the chaotic reversing the procession drove back to Leerdam. But: *"After a while a cop car came which posted itself right across the road, we all had to stop. Nobody knew what was happening. There were a lot of cars ahead of us. Then we got out of the cars. We were standing there for more than an hour, we were shut in at the front and the back. If you wanted you could still get away through the grassland, but I thought: we are in the middle of nowhere anyway"* (Betsy).

All people from the cars were arrested and transported to Leerdam in a police wagon. There was no resistance. One person who hid himself in the reeds along the river until 9.00 p.m. managed to escape by joining a group of Turkish boys who were playing soccer on the dyke. All the others who managed to reach the Leerdam station were arrested on the directions of the locals from Kedichem. Oliver was already arrested in Kedichem itself: *"We were running behind the car we were pushing. At the moment that the cops were two metres behind us the engine started. We got busted and another one of us was caught by the locals who couldn't keep out of it. It was funny: the car drove away and we were the first to be caught."* The police car in which the three handcuffed detainees were kept blocked the road when the fire department came. The car had to be pushed to the roadside which delayed the fire engine for a couple of minutes. When they arrived at the hotel it was already in a blaze. Over the police radio the detainees heard that the leg of a woman had to be amputated. They didn't hear who the woman was.

The CP-Member of Parliament Janmaat, who arranged the meeting, told **De Telegraaf** about the leg: *"I fled with my secretary, Mrs Corseluis-Schuurman, and some other people upstairs. From the window we could see the flames and the other people getting out 5 metres below us. Within three minutes everything was on fire, including the stairs. We tied sheets together. I was the first to climb down, to test it out. The sheets were too short, I had to jump. My secretary came after me. But hanging on those sheets she swung right through a big window and she crashed to the ground. She was bleeding terribly, I tried to help her, but later her leg had to be amputated. Horrible, a disaster. In this same suit, which is full of bloodstains, I will ask questions in the Lower Chamber: why were our people not protected against this rabble?"*

For those who were arrested, of whom the majority would be detained for 4 days and eventually only a few would be sentenced to three months imprisonment, it was impossible to keep their clothes: after they had thrown away their helmets and caps, the police in Leerdam took all their other clothes for laboratory investigation into gasoline-traces. Oliver wouldn't even get his clothes back, ten days later he ended up in the street in his underpants.

The group of assailants returned unharmed to their home base: *"We drove back with the group to a squat-bar. We didn't see any cops and we ran out of beer too. Back in the bar we learned that no one had been killed, that one woman was injured and we had a good laugh about it. We also heard about the 72 arrests and we found that really shitty"* (Caspar). The assailants soon got over their panic when they were home: the murder had not been committed against people, but against a leg. They expressed their relief in a wave of laughter. Ronald, who went back to another bar: *"We watched the 6 o'clock news and only then heard about the arrests and some*

seriously injured people. This really chilled the party. Anyway, you can talk about if this was or was not a very clever action, but it really is a kick to see a hotel burn down".

At the same time a press release came from the organizers who called themselves 'Radical Anti-Fascists' (RAF) for the occasion. The phrase in this press release that *"The events in Kedichem could be repeated"* was immediately connected by everyone to 'The Leg'. The interpretation was that they would not shrink back from making new serious casualties in their fight against fascism. The shocking implication of this statement was that the organizers did not shrink back from admitting 'murder' and thus indicated that the panic was planned and that when the majority of the activists, once they were at home, exerted themselves to eliminate the panic of the action in themselves by discussing the effect and the strategy. Ronald went directly into politics: first by organizing lawyers for the people who had been arrested, and one day later in a press group which was formed *"Because nobody liked the sound of the RAF press release. After that release we didn't see anyone of the leading organizers again. We tried to make the most of a hopeless situation"*. The first goal of the press group was to distract attention from The Leg, which was leading its own life in the media. *"A news programme on T.V. had an interview with the bitch, lying in bed, without her leg. And that hotel owner also behaved like a madman. Our aim was to explain that it hadn't been our intention that a leg had to be amputated. Besides we wanted to bring forth our own arguments why we did it and subtly incorporate our criticism of how things went."*



They also made a press release, signed with *"The activists of March the 29th"* which said: *"We literally smoked out the fascists. That the Cosmopolite hotel went up in flames was not our intention. We regret if any non-fascists were injured"*. In this way the kick and the panic was written out of the Kedichem story. While the story for the big media was stripped of panic, the underground media explicitly pointed out the culprit of the panic. It was quickly found because the RAF itself had already claimed that they had included the panic in their planning beforehand.

In **Bluff!** Geert Burgomaster wrote about the spokesman of the RAF: *"I think he is an incredible bastard. But I don't think he's the only one who is guilty. After all we are all responsible"*. And he goes on about the RAF: *"It is a very small group of people who decide that Holland is ready for terrorist actions, but they are too spineless to do it themselves"*. And he concludes: *"We have much more important things to think about. We shall have to learn to discuss and organize things together, otherwise the future movement will be ruled by ingenious madmen once again"*.

In the analysis Geert B. makes about the relation between the individual and the crowd, the individual is not to be blamed for the actions of the crowd. He sees the crowds of Utrecht and Kedichem as victims of those who know how crowds react and how to direct them. In order to exclude these evil leaders he suggests to form an 'own', 'good' crowd which will be able, through discussion and democracy, to withstand the devious leaders. The fear of violent anti-fascist actions and the suppression of panic is a result of the fact that an anti-fascist mass movement in Holland basically includes the whole Dutch population. Even the CP admits this. Their comment on Kedichem was: *"They didn't serve the anti-fascist committees well, for there are a lot of good people in these committees"*.

Anyway, Geert B's characterisation "ingenious madmen" also shows respect for these leaders. But he doesn't ask the question why the crowd of Utrecht delegated power to them. Why did they let themselves be enticed into apathy? And why did the group of assailants let themselves be worked up to such an extent that they were prepared to kill? Geert B. circumvents this question by talking directly about "the perspective of the movement", since he is not able to conjure up his 'own' crowd in other than vague terms, he doesn't do anything else but to make the panic a taboo once again.

The very fact that the activists in Kedichem got into panic, proves that they were no fascist horde themselves. There is no panic in fascism. Fascist thugs or bureaucrats never shrink back from murder. The planning of the panic by the leaders was prompted by the assessment that it would enable them to get away quickly. This could gain them the reproach that they have a terrorist tendency, something Geert B. actually reproaches them for. But terrorists do not need a crowd to be able to operate. The only thing the organizers can be reproached for is that they had knowledge about what crowds actually are and how they function, and that they knew how to use this knowledge. All those who, with or without secret amusement, disassociated themselves from the RAF and by doing so stuck to their own myth of mass actions as a spontaneous and chaotic event within an unorganized structure, denied themselves access to this knowledge. They will end up "without any protection" in the next mass experience.

With what should one be equipped, to be able to protect oneself against mass experiences and to cope with them? The refusal of Dutch activists to think about their own mass experiences and the tabooing of panic makes it impossible to find an answer to this question.

Knowledge of books with cunning theories is not necessary, only a thorough digestion of the experiences of the dozens of actions à la Kedichem would be enough.

Afterwards the sons of the owner of hotel Cosmopolite said to a newspaper: "Two years ago we also had a fire in our home furnishing shop in Leerdam. By now it has almost been rebuilt. We have almost finished the job. We thought we could quieten down a little. But now we have this fire in Kedichem again. It was an unexpected blow. For me and my brother it only means a material damage of about a hundred thousand dollars. But for our father it goes much deeper. He feels it as an attack on his life".

This attack happened during Easter weekend, on the 29th of March 1986, but the movement in the Kedichem case came to a standstill two months later: "The 62 year old owner Mr. In den Eng bought, according to the police, a second-hand mechanical shovel to take up the demolition of the hotel Cosmopolite himself. Earlier the facade of the building was pulled down by the local authorities for fear that it would collapse. On this Saturday the owner wanted to remove the remains of his hotel on his own. Because the shovel didn't want to start he had placed a battery on a pair of steps between the right front and rear wheels. He had to connect the battery with wires to the starter inside the machine. As soon as the connection was made the heavy machine unexpectedly set itself in motion. Mr. In den Eng, whose way out was blocked by the pair of steps, couldn't get away and was run over in full length. He died on the spot. The machine crossed the dyke, sweeping away a crush barrier, piercing an iron bar through a window at the other side of the dyke, and, thanks to a security system in the shovel, came to a standstill".



Rushdie Matters

Following on from John Barrett's article 'The Tigers of Wrath' in Here and Now No. 9, C. W. explores the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the British context, while Ali Hussein reveals how the Rushdie Affair has exposed real fissures in the mythical monolith of Islam.

JOHAN BARRETT'S REPORT, 'THE TIGERS OF WRATH' in H & N No. 9 attempted to address the ambivalences found within Left and Radical responses to the 'Rushdie Affair'. This ambivalence isn't found within the New Right or within Neo-fascist groups for quite unexpected reasons. New Right and even Neo-fascist groupings have positively welcomed the forces and tendencies released by the Rushdie Affair in the same terms as those found within the Muslim community itself. All talk of a 'rightwing backlash' misses this point.

Growth of the New Right has been accompanied by development of the New Racism - a racism which finally buries biological claims of racial connotation and inferiority in favour of a celebration of cultural difference. Cultural, religious and ethnic 'diversity' is to be encouraged and enhanced in the notion of *independent but separate development* for ethnic minorities. This can take more or less 'acceptable' forms from the encouragement for 'opted-out' separate Muslim schools at one end of the spectrum to the BNP's and NF's fascination with Gadhafi's and Khomeini's regime. Despite the different political and historical bases for these claims and 'solutions' within the Right (primarily resting upon conflicting views of 'nation' and 'national identity') they do bear an uncanny resemblance to both Islamic fundamentalism and certain aspects of 'moral' anti-racism and multiculturalism found on the Left.

These competing claims and solutions as responses to cultural, religious and ethnic 'diversity' sowed seeds within Muslim communities which enabled restoration of patriarchal localism and Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, a path has been laid for ethnic absolutism or essentialism as a way of life, a self identification for individuals and groups and as a preferred 'solution' to white racism within the Black and Asian working class.

In H & N No. 5 I referred to the dangers inherent in the 'New' social movements of Anti-sexist and Anti-racist struggle. Firstly their easy cooption into a debilitating social democratic or 'socialist' localism wherein public relations exercises and careerism come to replace radical action and change. Secondly, even radical political theory and action can be reduced to a community based 'localism' which eschews wider alliances drawn from a universalistic notion of justice addressed to systemic injustices. Furthermore, because this approach goes along with an 'identity-exclusion' type of politics conferring moral superiority upon 'black' or 'women's' experience a paralysis is induced amongst the actors and their allies. Thus moral anti-racism in attempting to corner the market in oppression induces a paralysis for widening or extending struggles which then becomes a constraining condition for all subsequent parameters of debate and action.

In connecting this argument with the Rushdie Affair I might be accused of conducting an exercise in self-vindication. The opposite is the case - these arguments didn't go far enough because they only anticipated negative outcomes for radical action and social movements.

Furthermore, they left untouched the *internal dynamics* and directional range of the movements. They were unable to penetrate, looking as they were, from the outside, a logic which could lead to surprising, unanticipated and 'positive' outcomes. Islamic Fundamentalism, in Britain, has become such a movement sharing important characteristics with the Anti-Racist movement as well as important differences.

Rushdie's 'Satanic Verses' and later Khomeini's edict were catalysts in bringing Muslim demands for self-determination and self-assertion into the public domain. This took authoritarian forms as moral and religious 'policing' within the Muslim communities (especially of youth), and initiated by local Imams. But also encouraged more or less organised physical and symbolic forays into public space - in city centres and inner city areas - by Asian youth. Space which had hitherto been the preserve of white intimidation.

Cultural, religious and ethnic diversity is to be encouraged and enhanced in the notion of independent but separate development for ethnic minorities.

My argument has not addressed the very real force of ideas and motives generated by Islamic fundamentalism as this found expression in Britain. I am not immediately qualified to discuss these and Ali Hussein operates an 'internal critique' of Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere in this issue. Meanwhile John Barrett's report raises the general issue of how a secularised rationalized society which reduces moral and ethical questions to supposedly 'technical' decisions gives rise to populist authoritarian reaction. According to Barrett, Islamic fundamentalism as a spiritual reaction to meaningless materialism and commodification both reveals denial of access to these materials and commodities for ethnic minorities in Britain, and encourages tyrannical political solutions elsewhere. As both a response to rationalism and as foundation for a Just society, fundamentalist religion is judged profoundly flawed, whilst indicating alienation and disenchantment.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that on the ground there is considerable ignorance within Muslim communities about the intentions, efforts and political frameworks of the Anti-racist movement. For example, one argument having general currency is the British state's inconsistency on censorship policy - 'If Wright why not Rushdie?'. Another is that Rushdie has also insulted the British establishment - 'the Queen, the government and the British way of life.' Indeed he has! Many of these comments are authoritarian and statist and show through their political naivete just how much the world has been perceived through adherence to the tenets of revealed truth - 'ignorance is bliss'.

Looking at Islamic fundamentalism in its own terms I am in broad agreement with Hussein and Barrett. In terms of social and political effects Islamic fundamentalism as a new social movement in Britain is a surprising and unintended consequence of the ways in which the Left and the New Right have responded to and generated discourses around 'race' and 'racisms'.

Specific levels and types of racism in British society were reduced to a general theory of racism in the Anti-racist movement and subsequently this was embraced by large sections of the Left. Whether in its 'soft' (multicultural) or 'hard' (anti-racist) versions there resulted a culturalism or ethnic essentialism never challenged and in an important sense embraced (for strategic reasons) by the Left. Meanwhile this opened the ground for New Right cultural racism - 'separate cultures' - which in however bizarre ways drew support from conservative and


reactionary elements within the muslim communities. If fundamentalist religion is an outcome or expression of this so has been an increased physical and public confidence amongst Asian youth, especially in smaller primarily working class towns, where 'political organisation' amongst Asian youth has been weak.

Whatever the effects of fundamentalism upon the hearts and minds of Britain's Muslim communities the notions attached to all forms of 'cultural', 'ethnic' or 'religious' essentialism should be jettisoned. The equation identity (or 'race') = experience = religion or culture = politics in any absolutist or essential sense is untenable both as a means of struggle towards and realization of a truly democratic and just society. The projection of religious or cultural dispositions into the public realm necessarily undermines political freedoms and material justice. A just society would protect and guarantee cultural and religious freedoms and diversity as private matters in the conduct of life not as claims on or privileged access to power.

A Writer's Freedom to Imagine


DURING THE HECTIC DAYS OF MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST mobilisation in Bradford against *Satanic Verses* a Sudanese friend who had just started reading the book told me that Islam is a proper target of literary enquiry, but literature (*adab* in arabic - which has the additional meaning of gentility of manners) and conduct employing cussing and abuse, is a contradiction in terms. I ought to add that the man is a well known opponent of muslim fundamentalism and spent eight years in jail not least because of it.

It was clear in the months which followed, as reports appeared about muslim writers' attitudes to *Verses*, that he was not alone. Naguib Mahfouz, the Egyptian Nobel laureate, emphatically endorsed the legitimacy of Rushdie's enquiry, adding the reservation: 'but this is not the way to do it'. The man should know: his novel '*Children of Gebelawi*' was banned in the '50s, by a fatwa, for mocking god. With minor variations, scores of others, under pressure from the media to give a verdict echoed the same sentiments. Yes but no. Reading these responses, made thousands of miles away from the consternation and fury which engulfed this country, they sound complacent, even accommodating. The truth is, of course, theirs is a limited literary observation conditioned by a long standing battle raging between modernists and muslim fundamentalist critics over modern arabic letters. They are hardly aware of the twin issue of the affair - the racial dimension which gives muslim fundamentalists' reaction a moral weight and a secular language in a liberal democratic context. In the Middle East the *Verses* affair wouldn't have arisen for obvious political reasons. The novel would never have been published in the first place. On the occasions where a work with a similar theme has been at the centre of a furore, modernists have confined themselves to the literary merits of the work in question. Tactically, it is suicidal to broach publically the political question of freedom of expression. The pervasive religious orthodoxy at the heart of muslim states, aided by a growing fundamentalist mass movement, defines religion as the limit of a writer's freedom. The balance of power in the wider society ensures a writer's pen scrolls are within this boundary.



"You Have the Floor, Explains Yourself." Henry Duncker, 1856.

A similar conflict in a British terrain was bound to produce a naked and unrestrained political contest, and as things stand now, with unaccountable consequences. We are asked by muslim fundamentalists, to set limits to a writer's freedom. A writer's freedom to imagine. I will discount the naive outrage which greeted their demand. Neither is the demand outlandish in the light of others regularly emanating from Right wing forces or government, albeit for reasons of state. Antecedents of this sort of demand and intervention stem directly from a curious brand of moral anti-racism espoused by race relation officers, born-again blacks, over-the-counter activists who seize on the genuine misery and suffering of ordinary black victims of racism, then substitute it for their own in order to hector and guilt-trip the white working class as the source of racism. After successfully dispersing support, the victim is left to their isolation and misery, and they move on to the next. They are the post-Scarman new black middle class. Their intervention has given the language of racial dignity to religious fundamentalism, and in a real sense, it is its most powerful weapon.



Helen Bowling

We can safely qualify the muslim reaction by saying that had Rushdie took on Christianity, the whole thing would have probably ended in court like many others before it. A few articles for and against, T.V. programmes and the newspapers' letters' pages crowded with indignation; not to forget the NCCL AGM obligatory call for the abolition of blasphemy. Offence, wounded vanities and slighted values are never a source of illuminating cultural debate. But to object to a work of art on these grounds is not new in British cultural life. In 1967 the book *Last Exit to Brooklyn* was the subject of an obscenity trial. Sir Basil Blackwell, a publisher no less, said reading the book had darkened his whole life. Bishop Sheperd told of how his reading of the book had marked him, and that the young who might read it are precisely those who would feel that the printed word gave a kind of authority to imitate them. We are entitled to think here: why all the fuss? A reader of levelled judgement would put the book away at the first sight of the inimical words and go about his/her business. But not for what someone had described as the critical school of offence. Cries about affronted values are symbolically about the insecurities of a destabilised social power in lieu of intellectual counter-arguments. Unless religion is seen like race and gender as a mark of identity. As in the case of arguments against pornography or racist literature, one is able to cite the victims' corpses. That is how muslim fundamentalists are proposing to counter Verses.

If anyone had been watching the growing chorus of disapproving voices greeting the works of the small band of black writers, in the years since they gained literary recognition, one had a prior sense of the uproar about Verses. Hanif Kurashi nearly got thumped because the central character in his film *Laundrette* was a homosexual Pakistani. This was construed by his detractor as a comment on the community's male machismo. Farrukh Dhondy, himself a dab chronicler of the excesses of those vulgar positive-image critics, had his T.V. series *King of the Ghetto* withdrawn from re-runs. When first shown on the BBC, the East End's *FBYL* mobilised a picket against it, an action presumably as central to their anti-racist work as combating NF violence.

At the heart of this is a supposedly shared view about black writers' loyalties and their responsibility to deal with that which commends, rather than knocks his/her community in the eyes of others. That a black writer is tempted to explore unsavoury realities in our midst is least acceptable.

Imposing false political precepts on literary creativity is a chip off the crude 'socialist realist' dogma that sent many a writer, especially socialist ones, to their death. There was always a greater threat, the Commissars keep telling writers knowingly, worthy of critical attention than that they chose to deal with. But Rushdie's radical rejection of Islam and his imaginative revisionism is without precedent by an insider, and a highly placed one at that. To ignore this simple fact is to detach the Verses storm from the historical and internal cultural dynamics in which the writer is making his intervention.

These dynamics may be symbolised in popular culture by the images of Iran under the Ayottollahs, or another Middle Eastern Sheikdom, or running street battles in Cairo. But in effect the lines of conflict are drawn up right here inside Britain's Muslim community, and specifically within Bradford where there is the largest muslim presence of all. In these countries it is played on the stage of national power politics but here too there are open cultural and political rifts no less significant."

Cries about affronted values are symbolically about the insecurities of a destabilised social power in lieu of intellectual counter-arguments.

Here the cultural heritage of Islam and the commonality of language that was the basis of the cohesive unity of many earlier successful struggles against racism, is straining to express the demands of a new generation of young men and women. Their attitudes and perspectives draws on social experiences beyond those of their parents. Modern social life being what it is, many of its gestures and attitudes involve a compromise of a religious principle in the eyes of muslim fundamentalists. Then of course there is the issue of women's rights. It is a battle for the reconquest of young minds, whose public arena had been education for girls and now blasphemy. All evidence suggest they are bound to fail. The Verses episode illustrate how they can also succeed. The climate of fear created by Khomeini's Fatwa and felt deeply by dissenting muslims, can impede the search by youth for a new independent direction and alliances beyond the category of colour, ethnicity and religion, challenging the post-Scarman state sponsorship of a black middle class charged with demobilising and pacifying the rebellion of black working class youth.

This new social class and the few among them who attained success and were acclaimed as positive images now were served up by the 'state as proof of 'declining racism' has an equally indispensable coercive function as shown by the call of muslim fundamentalists to ban Verses. Those who fear its tone of rejectionism and high irreverence may give a language to the young men and women who are already, by the example of their social life and attitudes, reassessing Islam to fit their lives, reforming it as they go along.

In the recent past, Islamic orthodoxy has been devouring and banishing its free-thinkers and reformers. Hopefully Verses may prove to be in future the benchmark against which their gentle words are judged. If they don't listen then, many others who read Verses will.

Full-Time, Part-Time, Paid, Unpaid

Patronage is alive and well in local government and higher educational establishments. Using disguises to protect the innocent and guilty alike, Martine Christie reports.

THE THEORY

ONCE UPON A TIME IT USED TO BE SAID: "HE who will not work, neither shall he eat." A modified modern version says: "He who is not paid, neither shall he lead."

Who are the paid and the unpaid? Those who work are paid and those who do not work are unpaid. Conversely: if you are paid, you work, and if you are unpaid, you do not work. This theory acknowledges the existence of some aberrations. It is admitted that some paid workers do less than they ought to. Worse even, there are unpaid voluntary workers who take over jobs which ought to be done by paid professionals.

Those who do the paid work, the professionals, are in charge of policy-making. Not so their clients, because they do not work. It is for professionals to lead and for clients to follow.

THE PRACTICE

The following life portraits may give an idea of how the theory works in practice.

- (i) **Fred the Accomplished Full-Timer.** What does a bright youngish (30-45) male expect from life? What ought life to offer him? Certainly a full-time job in the public sector, safe, tenured, non-manual, preferably managerial, well paid of course. If an academic, also a PhD in preparation. (Originally registered as a full-time student, he is now completing it in his spare time.) A full social life, of course - male company and talk; pub, drink and sex; squash. A rewarding political life. Most of it takes place at the pub, but there are meetings, and they have to be carefully prepared. No caucus, no goals attained. A car, why not? A mortgage, a fulfilling domestic life, a domestic partner, preferably a PhD wife, and 2.2 kids. (A PhD wife is the one you divorce after completion of the PhD. This rate of divorce should be monitored.) Clothes according to status. Baby sitter and meals out.

Youngish bright males do, as a rule, achieve the full life they deserve. Now let's examine their time-table. Nine to five for the full-time job? At their hierarchical level, they should not be subjected to such strictures. The working day is flexible. Good organisation and a network of contacts smooth the operation of various duties. There is always someone to cover for you. Most of the work is done outside in informal conversations, which may look like social life but are constructive, positive steps towards new developments of great value to the community. Further-

more, an allowance should be made for the completion of your PhD, which takes many nights of your life until 6 a.m., so you are obliged to get up late. You can't help very much with the kids, not until the PhD is out of the way. Your PhD wife has accepted a temporary sacrifice to help you out, for which you are so grateful.

She's a bit stuck at home for the time being, and longs for the PhD to be completed so that the bright male finally leaves home. Life would be easier and husbands are so expensive! She sometimes wonders whether it would not be better for him to have a nine-to-five job which would keep him in one place at a time. If he is not there - how does he manage? The secretaries phone frequently, and so does Bert, with all sorts of messages. Oddly enough, his mates do not ring him at home, except for formal invitations to parties with wives. She would like to attend an evening course, but cannot, and some Tuesdays the Labour Party meet, but God, how difficult. And then the typing, not to mention the indexing once the thesis is completed. It will be mentioned in the acknowledgements, though.

- (ii) **John the Full-Time Part-Timer.** Teaching three days a week for the time being, and then who knows. Six hours have been passed on to me by Dave, who has managed to get some timetable relief because of his extra administrative duties. The Tuesday hours are the usual, no change. I got them by chance, because my predecessor died and a student happened to know I was available. Advertise? They occasionally do, but it is all fixed up beforehand. I met Fred at the pub and invested in some pints to make him talk. He was most helpful. Thanks to him I learnt about the situation in his Department and who to and how to apply. He gave me a reference too. So I can't complain. For this year I have enough to get by. And not too uncomfortable. If I get up at half past six I can catch the seven thirty-five. The Metrocard allows me to travel by train so I can take the bicycle for the rest of the journey. Healthy. Yes, I get on with my PhD in the summer hols. Mind you, I forget everything from summer to summer. Labour Party social tonight? Must be joking, two lectures to prepare! I have just inherited this Integrated Programmes course from Stuart who is on sick leave. They want me to do this and some New Partial Cultures later on because the report should show that some work with the Partially Incorporated is being done in the Department. The grant is earmarked. Payment by results. To me? No, not to me. To the Department. The library? No, the library hasn't got any books on this. They are just beginning to be written. It's all conference papers so far. No, not by me. I don't get money to attend conferences. Dave goes. Useful because when he is away part-timers can get some

of his lectures. There is a ceiling to the number of hours you can teach, though. One advantage of this type of work is that it may get published. Yeah, the project team leader's name goes at the top. But still, you can put it on your curriculum vitae. It's something. I can't complain. He does put it on his curriculum vitae too. How much am I paid? It varies enormously. For what I write, nothing. For the teaching at the Department, it's O.K. because there is a national rate. Not so bad for the North. The union is difficult to approach when you have a problem but sometimes they do something. For the Rawtenstall classes, it's different. I know I could join MSF. But I haven't got a clue who the membership secretary might be. Nobody has ever approached me. It's only 35p a week, but is it worth it? Anyway, the pay is determined by the employing body in Manchester. Part-timers have no representatives on it.



- (iii) **Clare the Unpaid Woman.** I know. Only women are Unpaid Women. Men are Professionals and Activists. So you have to slave here typing Their letters, sticking Their envelopes, sending Their newsletters so that They get elected at the next election and They get Council jobs. At the Ambulance they think a bit more highly of me. I could resuscitate even Them. But because the Ambulance is Manned by Unpaid Women - all the admin is - you can't get a representative on a Neighbourhood Forum. No Voluntary Workers admitted. You ask Them who they represent! The reps are mostly men in their thirties and early forties, no housewives, no Citizen's Advice Bureau and no Ambulance Brigade. They have got one or two wheelchairs though, and the odd token black. And of course Women, - a well known Minority. Well, *those* Women are a minority. You ask Them how they recruit Them. If I had time to go to the Flixborough I would meet Them All there. They decide the Fate of the Party. And of the L.E.A. And of the N.H.S. And of the Neighbourhood Forum. And of Their respective Unions, but don't ask me what their initials are, because I've had enough. The latest is that the newsletter has not been delivered in time for the Pre-Selection Meeting because we are all Volunteers. You can't Force a Volunteer to Work, says Fred. As if you could Force Him. Ask the six or seven people - at least - who are carrying Him. Ask Kate. An Administrative Secretary could do all this and much more for two and a half thousand a year, says Ed. John knows of one case. A Professional subcontracted the job. She would have a Contractual Obligation and Work Under Threat of Dismissal. This ensures Efficiency. Does it? Have you ever seen a Principal Lecturer in Charge of Supervision of the Removal Within His Time-Table, i.e. Paid For It, on twenty thousand a year? I have. Never seen anything more useless. And this is just one case. I wonder how much our Councillors get for expenses that they think they qualify as Professionals. Or is it because of the safe Professional, as opposed to Politician's, Council Job they are after? Anybody knows that political parties

should be Manned by Professionals. Plus one full-time job in the Women's Section for one of the girl-friends, of course. What would meetings be for, then? To Pass Resolutions, naturally. This is Democracy, not the Tory Party, says Ben. Now they are All going to Conference. They say Everybody who is Anybody is going to be there. Which means that I won't be there because I am an Unpaid Woman. Unpaid in my spare time, for as a technician I am more professional than Them. And, after all, Descartes wrote philosophy in bed and not when He was Being Paid For Teaching Queen Christina. The meeting will be as usual led by the City Councillors. They must be at the Flixborough now. If I were not stuck here typing the minutes I could drop in and overhear whether They are actually wheeling and dealing with the right wing Councillors. I wonder who starches and irons the Councillors' shirt cuffs? Paid or unpaid work? Their wives never turn up, so you'll never know.

WHAT IS GOING ON

Fred the Accomplished Full-Timer and Clare the Unpaid Woman - while in her working time - have tenured full-time jobs. For them, "work" flows constantly and regularly. Production levels do not alter reward, since reward has been acquired once and for all. Military and academic posts are classical examples of security of employment.

Although recent changes in legislation have taken away the security of some positions in the public sector, Labour City Councils are still seen as providers of safe employment, one reason why the activists depicted by Clare strive for "professional" Council jobs.

But the pyramid of the safely-employed tenured professionals rests on a base of casually-employed part-time workers, paid at best one half and at worst one sixth of the rate for the job for comparable work. They have no security of tenure, no sick benefit (with some exceptions) and no pension rights.

The part-time contract specifies a minimum amount of work to be done and ignores the support work done by the worker him/herself. What John the Full-Time Part-Timer does as a part of a development team does not count as work. Neither does the material he prepares for Dave's conference papers. He gets no secretarial support - this mostly goes to help those better placed on the hierarchial ladder like Fred. A Full-Time Part-Timer works more hours than a full-timer who works full-time like Clare the technician, and many more hours of actual work than an Accomplished Full-Timer like Fred.

Professionals and aspiring professionals agree that work should not be done by an unpaid woman. She may think that, in her extra-curricular activities, she is an activist like them, with a voice and a vote. But her being unpaid prevents her from having a say in the Neighbourhood Forum or for all practical purposes in her Party Ward, which, in the view of those she quotes, should be managed by professionals and administratively run by (low-) paid secretaries.

That low-paid work is partly unpaid work is not recognised. The hours that John the Full-Time Part-Timer spends working for free for the greater glory of Dave and his Department do not turn him into a voluntary worker who, for one half to five-sixths of his time, usurps the jobs of deserving professionals. It does not, because without such unpaid work the managerial pyramid would not stand.

A rebellion of the part-timers is not to be feared. Part-timers - except for the few who are recognised candidates for full-time employment - have no say in policy making or management. Or in the union. Casual workers - again with the exception of those coopted as aspirants - have hardly ever been shown a union membership application form.

Their wages may or may not be negotiated together with those of the full-timers. In one case at least, the wages of workers who should be able to join MSF are not negotiated but unilaterally determined by their employer. This balances the books and allows local topping-ups for the tenured posts.

On the other hand, part-timers cannot complain, because they have to be grateful. Their jobs, seldom advertised, are obtained through the grapevine and through the full-timers. In the present economic circumstances the number of applicants and prospective applicants for part-time work exceeds the number of posts. When a commodity - in this case the jobs - is relatively scarce, it may be allocated in various ways, the simplest of them being patronage. The tenured full-timers like Fred become patron saints of the casually employed Johns - and as such have lighted many candles (or sacrificed many pints). Unlike the unpaid woman, casual workers do not grudge the many hours of their labour which they give the full-time professionals for free. They have to be grateful, because employment has been obtained, tapped, for them, through intercession or manipulation. For this they pay with their unpaid hours and in more personal ways - ranging from drink and sex to sycophancy and political support.

The full-time professionals, while objecting to voluntary work by unpaid workers, quietly benefit from the unpaid work of the casually-employed and the badly-paid in two ways:

1. by being carried by the part-timers, who are exploited by their immediate boss and according to their contract;
2. by being politically supported, fêted, etc., out of gratitude or fear.

What full-timers give in exchange is *employment*. But employment can only be *given* by employers (e.g. a City Council or an educational body). The mediator just intercedes.

The defeat of the ambulance workers should not allow what was truly radical about their action to be forgotten. The idea of the 'social strike' had long been a grail pursued by anarchist theorists. Nowadays such qualitative considerations have been submerged by an obsession with militancy, violence and extremism, or simulations of these.

For a considerable period of time ambulance staff in some areas ran an emergency service for the public outside the control of their managers and without wages. They sustained themselves from the contributions of the public and provided a superior service to that cobbled together by a conspiracy of managers, police and army. The measures some local managements took to break the strikers organised service indicate the threat they felt from it. In Oxfordshire police cars waited outside ambulance stations ready to arrest any crew which took an ambulance out on a call, for the offence of taking a vehicle without the owner's consent. In Leeds health authority management instructed doctors and nurses not to contact ambulance workers directly in order to get a service. This followed an incident in which a nurse arranged with a crew for a baby to be taken to Scarborough. In the end Leeds, like Glamorgan and other areas went to the courts to take out an injunction against ambulance staff using vehicles and equipment. In South Yorkshire, workers used their own cars to run a service. In Lincolnshire ambulance stations had to be occupied to prevent management taking emergency equipment out of the hands of the workers.

The defeat should not allow such exemplary action to be forgotten. The very challenge made to the state and its servants that social service can be delivered outside the remit of managers and professionals perhaps underlined the state's determination not to give way. But as a strategy the free unofficial service provided by strikers should resonate throughout the public sector. From now on strikes do not have to remain within the boundaries set by the recognised authorities of both Capital and Labour.

It takes him - or more rarely her - an hour or two of his time per client per year to plug the grateful client into the system - drinks, references, a couple of phone calls, some forms to pass on.

As a two-way relationship, patronage is a bargain for the full-time tenured professional mediator and a rotten deal for the clientelised casual worker.

Martine Christie.

NOTES:

1. For an analysis of the professional/voluntary position vis-a-vis representation and policy-making, see Usman KHAN, "Islington: Is the Red Flag Flying There?" in **Going Local** (Bristol University), June 1989, and Paul THOMPSON and Mike ALLEN, "Labour and the Local State in Liverpool", in **Capital and Class**, 29 (1986).
2. Composite portraits. Fred, Bert, Kate, John, Dave, Stuart, Sheila, Clare, Ed, Ben, Ron, Tom, Jim, Rawtenstall (railway station), Flixborough and Partially Incorporated are fictional names.
3. For an example of part-timers' working conditions see John Atkins and Jane Stagemen, "Living on the Bread Line", **Trade Union Studies Journal**, Spring 1981.
4. John's support work, for instance, may include planning of courses, preparation of lectures, preparation of students' materials, marking of students' work and drafting of exam papers.

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Letters



**Here and Now, c/o Transmission Gallery, 28 King St., Glasgow G1 5QP.
Here and Now, P.O. Box 109, Leeds LS5 3AA.**

LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE

I am writing in response to the article 'Language, Truth and Violence' by Frank Dexter in (H&N No. 7/8), published (?) at the end of 1988, which appeared to me to go some way in shifting the whole ground of *Here and Now*, in a direction to which I felt myself to be opposed.

Firstly, I was rather mystified by the introductory note. In what way do the *Here and Now* collective believe that 'the time has come' for the issues the article deals with to be 'more openly and honestly debated than they have been up until now'? What precisely has changed - *Here and Now's* perspectives, its readership, or the 'climate of opinion' in general? And has this 'change' taken place between the 'summer' of 1988, when the article, as it says, was received, and the time of publication several months later?

In general, I found that the article, despite its intention as a polemic against a variety of positions such as those evincing the emotional responses of hatred and resentment, itself read with the tone of hatred and resentment against stereotyped identities and positions (eg. pacifism, feminism), against which the writer was reacting for what appeared to be very personal and eccentric reasons.

For brevity I will limit my criticisms to the following points:

1) Dexter's view that pacifists' opposition to violence and war seems to 'come from a utopian, even religious, vision of an end of conflict... Pacifists must believe that everyone except themselves is either weak or spiritually unhealthy insofar as they do not realise the need to purge violence from their souls and persist in the practice of fighting one another' (p. 10) appeared to be subjective, stemming more from Dexter's personal response to pacifists than from any arguments pacifists might make themselves.

2) Dexter attacks pacifists for preferring symbolic gestures (eg. 'thronging around missile sites' or, 'writing letters about toy guns') than concerning themselves with more 'everyday' violence such as (by implication) fights outside the pub. This again is a rather eccentric objection, since pacifism directs itself against a particular form of violence, war and terrorism, institutionalized and

used by the State. And the point of pacifists focussing on symbols of violence is that our culture is permeated with such symbols promoting militarism, domination and technocracy, in a way that most people do not question. Lacan's idea of a phallogocentric society would seem to me to be relevant, (though this is about the only area of Lacan's work with which I am sympathetic).

3) Dexter's polemic against hatred as 'disabling' and purely 'personal' appears to contradict his polemic against pacifism and positions of non-violence. If a society were ever to develop in which 'hatred' was eliminated, then violence would also be eliminated. The two cannot be separated. I agree that conflict is an inevitable (and I would say healthy) part of human society and relations, but I would argue that violence and hatred cannot be separated from, and are extreme forms of, conflict that arise when other channels of negotiation, verbal argument and disagreement have not been used or have broken down.

4) Dexter's polemic against the discourse on aggression, reinforcing the 'psychologisation of violence', takes the form of an attack on feminism which then wanders off to a now commonplace attack on therapies/counselling as a form of management, power and manipulation. While I am not defending therapies and counselling (for many practitioners in these fields set up a relationship in which they manage and control their clients), it is worth pointing out that skills such as co-counselling and assertion training encourage individuals to express themselves verbally in order to avoid provocation, hatred, violence and resentment.

And, in relation to what appears to reveal a personal resentment on the part of Dexter towards feminists and the categories they 'confuse' of male domination (patriarchy) and male violence, I want to make the following point: as much as my own position on feminism is that, as a movement, it tends to promote a closed identity (that of woman), which also ignores the 'male' aspects of women, and the 'female' aspects of men, tending also to promote an 'us and them' relationship, I want to point out that what cannot be ignored in our society is that violence, assault, rape and killing is carried out for the most part by men, not by women. Women

out walking alone are scared not of other women, they are scared of men.

Power cannot be argued to be gender-free, as many thousands of years of patriarchal human society attest. Patriarchy and male violence therefore cannot be separated in the way Dexter claims they can. While there are a few feminists who may entertain an essential view of males as patriarchal and violent, most feminists are aware of the social construction of such characteristics in patriarchal society.

5) The arguments on authoritarianism in part III resort to the kind of crude psychologistic approach so deplored in the article. For example, in the simplistic, psychologistic, stereotyped typologies Dexter sets out, anarchists are lumped into the same crude, meaningless type (that of 'rebel') as storm-troopers and concentration camp guards and torturers.

The arguments are also expressed in the language of management, manipulation and control.

6) What follows on from the whole rambling and disorganized article is a set of conclusions numbered 1-5 which are mere truisms for readers of *Here and Now*. Following on from this is an argument about different forms of power, again a truism to anyone familiar with any kind of anarchist, libertarian, poststructuralist or critical Marxist thought.

The example Dexter uses to illustrate this point at the end of the article is particularly gross and eccentric. He suggests the construction of a 'matriarchal' conception of power which, he says, is 'meant to challenge the ideologically-laden notion of "motherhood" as a wholly positive, wholesome relation... the cliché that mothering is good, fathering is bad'. I haven't heard of the 'cliché' that fathering is 'bad', and, while mothering may at some level be considered 'wholesome' (whatever that implies), mothering is also devalued in our society, considered menial, boring and 'outside' society.

Dexter cites Canetti as illustrating his point that to be 'mothered' is to experience a subordination from which we might need emancipation. I would agree that many mothers, and fathers, in our society dominate, subordinate and 'exercise power over' children, just

as teachers and most other adults do. This however is a pathology of our authoritarian society, a pathology that has long been of concern to the libertarian left, from William Blake through Spanish anarchism to the present day. What is not made clear by Dexter's article and the Canetti quote is that this pathological relationship of domination is not an intrinsic and essential part of 'mothering' (or 'fathering'), but results rather from the internalization and reproduction of complex patterns of domination in our authoritarian and State society.

In summary, I found the article contradictory, disorganized, rambling, unself-reflexive, psychologistic and subjectivist, attacking stereotyped figures and positions and written in a tone that appears to express the hatred and resentment it purports to decry. It seems to raise the question of a hidden agenda, since the tone of humourless contempt sets its statements up as the 'only way', in a traditional Leninist/Trotskyist manner.

While I think *Here and Now* appears to be making an important contribution towards questioning the traditional categories and assumptions of left, right, libertarian and anarchist thought, I think it's important to criticize different radical/oppositional positions from a broader perspective that the level of personal prejudice. An article such as Colin Webster's on New Social Movements (*Here and Now* No. 5, 1987) seemed to me to be more relevant in situating the limitations of single issues, single identity positions, characteristic of new social movements, in a broader critique.

The arguments presented in 'Language, Truth and Violence' might well be applauded by those on the right who seek arguments to legitimate their abhorrence of and their stereotyping of dissent, opposition and difference. The reactionary hyperbole of the article may also alienate readers of an open-ended 'anti-authoritarian' position, who are self-reflexive and self-critical, but who are unwilling to shift ground towards a cynical, anti-libertarian and anti-anti-authoritarian position such as is expounded in this article.

Jessica Badmus.

Because of the relative infrequency of *Here & Now*, we sent Ms Badmus' letter to Frank Dexter who wrote the following reply:

J. Badmus didn't agree with what was being said and so chose to attend only to a 'tone' she heard in the article; from this, an 'attitude' was inferred. Ignoring the arguments of the text (so much for poststructuralism), she presumed this 'attitude' alone could serve as a clue to the thinking of the (evidently nasty) 'person' behind it. This imaginary person's right to express disagreement with truths she holds as self-evident is then denied. I hope this is a caricature. Her version of my article certainly is.

As far as this unexplicated 'attitude' goes, she seems to feel confident enough to make speculative (and arguably offensive) insinuations. Not recognising myself as the person constructed by her text, however, I took no offence, but I don't know how to respond to words like 'personal' and 'subjective' used as *accusations*. I admit to the charge of 'eccentric' if that means, as it seems to in the context, being outside of the 'centre' defined by the very consensus which was being criticised. Eccentric is a relative term, after all. If you dissent from some shared beliefs you can only expect to be treated as deviant.

She and I simply happen to disagree on some rather important matters. There is surely no need for her to hint at treachery or giving comfort to the enemy (saying that my arguments "might well be applauded by those on the right"; I could say that's the intolerant voice of 'authority'). I'll deal with her points in the order she makes them, as well as I can, although I really think the 'replies' are in the original article.

1. On Pacifism.

The criticism of pacifism didn't come from any traumatic personal encounters of the kind suggested. I have only two problems with pacifist ideas. One is the concept of 'violence', the other is the concept of 'peace'. The former seems to be treated (by some pacifists at least) as a kind of unitary metaphysical substance; the latter (which I was only alluding to) has pretty clear theological connotations: as in the Buddhist notion of peace as the cessation of thought. On this view all violence is the result of wrong thinking. A mind at 'peace' will not do violence. Since Buddhist techniques form part of the training of warriors, I don't think this is the sort of 'peace' we're dealing with here.

It seemed to me that to reduce and restrain the kinds of violence that concern most people is the basic problem of *social control*. I don't see how violence can be 'controlled' except by *power*. The central issues are *who* is to control *whose* violence, and above all, *in what ways*. I have found pacifist theories, by and large, not much help in clarifying these issues. But I'm willing to learn. I must have been looking in the wrong places.

2. About symbols

The relation between symbols and what they supposedly symbolise is more complex than Badmus's point about "symbols promoting militarism, domination and technocracy" seems to allow. Apart from the latter triple conflation, which I still think confuses things for the sake of a nice tidy unitary worldview, the way the 'culture' is portrayed is *behaviouristic* (toy guns teach 'militarism') while the 'society' is construed in *psychoanalytic* terms. As far as the latter idea goes, one has to remember that if A is a symbol of B, this does not make B a symbol of A. One is entitled to wonder sometimes *whose* thinking is being revealed by such 'symbolic' equations. The term 'phallocentrism', if it means anything, would seem (literally) to be most applicable as a name for those analysts of literary texts and cinema theorists who go on about it; these are not the sources I would draw on for an understanding of how the international armaments system works. Is one not permitted to reject the Lacanian theory?

3. Hatred

My actual argument against reducing the concept of violence solely to hatred got overlooked.

Simply to assert that "violence and hatred cannot be separated", doesn't refute my suggestion that they ought to be distinguished (rather than elided together in an Orwellian slogan form) in order to examine the ways they actually do relate to each other in reality. I don't see why Badmus can't acknowledge that violence *can* be done in a cold and instrumental fashion, without personal passion. Remember, I defined violence in terms of the damage/suffering involved. It still seems to me such clarification might make it possible to envisage and thus work towards a society with an enormously reduced quantity of violence (something quite practicable), whereas

her hypothetical society "in which 'hatred' was eliminated" seems infinitely less feasible, and an implausibly long route towards the former. A society without hatred seems especially hard to conceive given her extremely large and loose use of the term. She sees even my rambling text as "evinced the emotional responses of hatred and resentment". (I can assure her there was nothing stronger than irritation at work in the author's mind, as I'm sure there was in hers.) We can at least agree that *conflict* is inevitable, which I suppose is something to go on if there were to be a debate.

4. Power

"Power cannot be argued to be gender-free", OK, but only if one is holding to one particular (and maybe tautological) definition of 'power' as being the *only* possible one. Again this doesn't properly disprove my point that other kinds of power exist. Either the word power gets too narrowed or the term gender gets too inflated. I don't think one can have it both ways: if

gender is socially constructed then how come patriarchy functions as both 'subject' and 'product' of this process? An 'essentialist' definition of male and female is... well, 'essential' to this package.

5. Stereotypes

Whereas Badmus refuses to separate things I wanted to distinguish, here she accuses me of 'lumping' different things together. She won't admit the similarities I was suggesting: that certain kinds of 'rebels' might have anything in common with stormtroopers is "crude and meaningless". Readers will make their own minds up according to whatever *real* present-day 'rebels' they happen to know (as against imaginary, stereotypical ones); I can only suggest she may be underestimating the possibility that stormtroopers and concentration camp guards might not be so alien a species from the rest of us. If this is 'psychologistic' it's because I was talking about psychology.

6. Mothering

Here I think she just missed the point (quite understandably since it was heretical and expressed clumsily). But, since she carries on using the term 'authoritarian society' when that notion was precisely what was being questioned, my suspicion that this is a rigid and unreflexive catchphrase is rather confirmed. I don't disagree with anything else said in this paragraph. Part of the devaluation of mothering which she rightly refers to is a tendency to *underestimate* and misconstrue its effects, and particularly the contradictory effects. It would take too long to illustrate this (and I shall refrain from 'stereotypes'), but feminists, as well she knows, have said much the same. Part of the pain of mothering, as it is organised in our society, is the anxiety and complexity of eventually losing *control* over, and fear of no longer being needed and 'valued' by *one's* offspring. I was not 'criticising' motherhood as a real relation but proposing it as a *metaphor* for other kinds of power relations, less comfortably dualistic in form.

7. Hidden agenda.

'Agenda' means 'what is to be done'. I would have thought it was obvious what sort of things I was saying should *not* be done. One of these is acting as if 'we' are the 'goodies' and others are the 'baddies'. Implicitly, I was also saying that adolescent rebelliousness isn't a basis for social revolution, and that exclusive self-congratulatory 'radical' subcultures aren't ideal models of human community. Any other hidden messages weren't spotted.

Incidentally, I don't see what's wrong with hiding things; we all do it. I once lived in a house with people who held to the belief that any kind of hiding was an ideological sin and a psychological sickness: we should all be upfront and open; privacy was a bourgeois vice, etc. They nevertheless hurried to stash their dope when the police came round and generally simply camouflaged their power games from one another and from themselves the same way as most other people.

The self-styled 'radical' milieu and the 'Left' in general contains too much complacent self-satisfaction and confidence in the essential correctness of its present view of the world. Badmus's apparent unwillingness to see anything *problematic* in her assertions about the relations between violence, power and authoritarianism, or about the nature of the society we're living in, seems to exemplify this consensual - 'only way' - of seeing things. When we talk as if the evils we hate in the 'society' and the psychological traits of the Right ('abhorrence of, and... stereotyping of dissent, opposition and difference') have no connection with *our own* thinking and behaviour than we may be deceiving - and thus disempowering - ourselves. Barbara Deming, the eminent American pacifist, puts it well in her paraphrase of the prayer of St. Thomas:

"We have to be frank: Lord, I love my neighbour. Help me to stop wishing him dead."*

One can easily be honest by having simple ideas; I was only trying to be frank.

* On Anger (Peace Pledge Union, 1985) p. 8

Frank Dexter



Letter to *Here and Now*, replying to Frank Dexter's reply to Jessica Badmus's letter.

1 November 1989

The first point made by Frank Dexter in reply to my letter is typical of his style of argument, in picking on one element of an intellectual position and inflating it until the rest of the argument he is criticizing is obscured. The fact that I noticed a particular tone, that reflected an 'attitude' (both emotional and intellectual) does not necessarily imply that I missed the 'arguments' of the text. The arguments are in fact *part* of the evidence for inferring a tone and attitude. If a racist 'argues' for genocide using logic, empirical data etc, I think this might constitute evidence for deducing the presence of a certain attitude.

But even worse is the assumption that a reader of a text should not pay attention to more subtle indications of tone and attitude. Given his contempt for attending to the tone of an argument ('poststructuralist', as he calls it), it seems odd that he plays a kind of poststructuralist game of adopting a pseudo-position behind which to hide, and from which to provoke, often seeming to laugh up his sleeve at those who can't see the 'game' he is playing.

Dexter's response assumes that disagreement with his position implies inattentiveness to the arguments in his article. On the contrary, when analyzed in detail, his arguments prove to be vacuous; for example, see his point 4 where he simply begs the question of whether gender behaviour is socially constructed or not, under cover of Sophist flourishes and pseudo-paradoxes. He also appears to misunderstand my text; (see point 2 of his reply, where my list of several dominant social patterns is taken to constitute automatically a

conflation). In this paragraph he also misunderstands the nature of psycho-analytically perceived 'symbolism' in which symbol and referent are often interchangeable.

Dexter's arguments also frequently show an inattentive perception of reality (hence my use of the word 'eccentric' in my first letter) referring in particular to his perception of the concerns of pacifists, and his essentialist view of mothering). In his reply, Dexter re-emphasizes (point 5) his perception of the similarity between 'stormtroopers' and 'rebels'; this kind of analogy is just possibly useful heuristically to shock leftists etc. out of their complacency, and no one would argue with the by now banal liberal truism that concentration camp guards might not be so alien from the rest of us (*humani nil me alienum puto*, as Terence said c.160 B.C.). But there are also very important differences between the motivation of a rebel (who may rebel through non-violent means or through refusal, and who is challenging authority of some

kind), and that of authoritarian concentration camp guards and stormtroopers who in fascist fashion follow blindly the authority of a leader.

One last point is that I use terms such as 'authoritarian' (and 'anti-authoritarian') with deliberation and conviction. I find these useful terms, and Dexter's texts produce no arguments or evidence that questions the validity of the word 'authoritarian'.

Jessica Badmus

STRAIGHT RECORD

Dear Here and Now,

A word of warning — on page 2 of your magazine (No. 9) you warn readers

of the dubious activities of the Humanist Party — a loony political sect with limitless funds. On page 18 you praise 'the old anarcho-syndicalist CNT' for helping to democratise companies like SEAT by beating the Communist and Socialist unions at the ballot box. Pity you weren't aware that the good old CNT you referred to (now thankfully called the C.C.T.) was entered en masse by the Spanish Humanist Party a couple of years ago. Oops!

The real CNT boycotted the above elections and keeps its distance from sects like the Humanist Party. It's affiliated to the International Workers Association.

I'm sure you'd like to put the record straight.

Leo (c/o Black Flag).

Editorial note: The views referred to in the article were those of the author not Here & Now. Here & Now does not have a party line.

Spooks' Corner

Lobster magazine recently organised Britain's first national conference of spy-watchers and conspiracy-researchers. Mike Peters reports on the prospects of the new science of parapolitics.



IS BRITAIN THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD where a serious interest in political conspiracies, deception and dirty tricks can get you labelled as a crank rather than a realist? The British ruling class has a record second to none in the arts of subterfuge and disinformation. From Guy Fawkes to the Guildford Four, the British state has played to win when dealing with its 'enemies within'. And yet those who have tried to find out what has really been happening behind the carefully cultivated veil of official 'politics' are ignored. Worse, this work is scorned as perverse by a Left which still prefers the comforts of Theory to the untidy realities which appear when the stone is lifted.

Britain's tiny band of radical investigators into state security and intelligence gathered in Bradford last October to compare their findings and coordinate future research. During an intensive weekend of discussions a picture emerged of the awesome scope of dirty tricks perpetrated in British politics since the 1970s. The 'new science' of parapolitics has come of age.

Those attending come from different traditions. Some derive from the academic field of Peace Research, where study of the political

economy of militarism has long recognised the importance of political disinformation, not least in the recent attacks upon Peace Studies itself. Others come from the study of the sharp end of coercive policing and technologies of repression. Others, like **Lobster** magazine itself, from the American-inspired field of research into political conspiracies.

Participants divided roughly between those working within the orbit of the Labour Party, still struggling to make their leaders and representatives aware of the forces they are up against, and those with an anarchist orientation, concerned to educate others than the self-styled 'educators' themselves. Happily, however, there were no arguments of the familiar sort. The nature of the subversive strategies deployed by the American Right and its intelligence accomplices pose more fundamental questions for a radical counter-strategy than can be adequately addressed by stale bickerings along the lines of reformism versus revolution. If divisions were to emerge within this field as it grows, they may not follow the lines predictable from political formations of the individuals involved. Some of those now inside the Labour Party have anarchist backgrounds, and **Lobster's** own Steve Dorril affirms the situationist premise on which his work is based.

Future students of parapolitics may, in becoming experts in the business, aspire to play these games themselves one day. Others may even have the ambition to invent their own games. Who may benefit from them may not be determinable in advance. One thing is for sure, parapolitics is here to stay.

Lobster is available from 214 Westbourne Avenue, Hull HU5 3JB. UK. Subs £4 for 3 issues.

Current issue No. 18 contains: Jeffrey M. Bale 'Right-Wing Terrorists and the Extraparliamentary Left: collusion or manipulation?', David Teacher 'The Pinay Circle and Destabilization in Europe', Gordon Winter replies to critics, more on the Wilson plots.



Money Matters

Review of **Free is Cheaper** by Ken Smith

(The John Ball Press, 1988/£12.95)

THERE IS MORE PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMIC THEORY, social concern and poetry in anti-Capitalist literature than could be read in a lifetime, but comparatively few facts and figures are generally deployed in the attempt to show that free is more efficient. That may be unavoidable and no bad thing in any case, part of me says; but, one realises, says also the hopeless Utopian. Therefore this book promises to be just what one has always wanted, a rigorous 'cost/benefit' analysis of the commodity and (tentative) non-commodity economy.

The title of this book itself contains the kind of contradiction, surely intentional, which aids the meaning of Proudhon's dictum 'property is theft'. As there can be no theft without property, so if everything is free we cannot know if it is cheaper. And much of Ken Smith's book works in a similar way, evoking the vision of another way of doing things without providing all the substances one would wish for. There is much that is useful here for making a strong case on what could be called the anecdotal level, such that even an ex-Thatcher economic adviser, Alan Budd, in his review of **Free is Cheaper**, appears to concede many of Smith's points; and pleads that it would take 'a little too much space' to refute the example given (on the dust jacket) to show that 'the poor are not so much better off as to account for the loss' of purchasing power of an hour's labour.

In this example, Smith asserts that 'Five hundred years ago an English building worker could earn the price of a steak or lamb chop, a housebrick or roof tile in as little or even less time at work than he can today.' (p. 9). The source of this alleged fact is only hinted at obliquely as either Ferdinand Braudel (**Capitalism & Material Life**) or Walter Minchinton (**Fontana Economic History of Europe**), and this sort of reliance on third hand sources and 'facts' of a loosely attributed nature mars the book. This, though, is at the same time part of the appeal of **Free is Cheaper**, a kind of barrack-room irrefutability which definitely has its uses, and an appeal to unlikely authorities, such as H.D.F. Kitto, H.G. Wells, Winston Churchill, Kaiser Wilhelm, Rod Hackney and Milton Friedman.

The first part of the book deals with 'The Problem', and is a discussion of the market economy in history and in general. Smith points to surpluses enjoyed by earlier societies and an apparent decline in the quality of life despite 'progress'. With respect to the great undertakings and achievements by slave societies, he makes the interesting point that the Pyramids and the Great Wall of China were built *despite* the fact that slaves are 'extremely inefficient producers'. Less than ten percent is his estimate of the working population required to produce a sufficiency of all our needs, including entertainment, medical and educational services. The energies of the other ninety percent is uselessly expended in 'The costs of controlling, policing, recording, mediating, and otherwise dealing with the system . . .' (p. 46).

Smith believes that there is an essential kernel of real needs in humanity: 'In short, the capacity to consume is extremely limited, and to believe otherwise is to betray one's poverty, material and spiritual; a beggar's eye view of the world.' (p. 51) It is refreshing, but in some eyes sufficient to condemn, to see the frankness of his appeal 'for a more puritanical outlook' (p. 51).

In Part II various industries are analysed closely. Smith gives figures to show that a 'typical' house cost a man on tradesman's wages the equivalent of just over two years wages in both the Fifteenth Century and the Nineteen-Thirties. However, by the early Nineteen-Eighties a person on £12,500 a year would buy a house costing on average about 3.5 times their annual income (p. 90).

The reader is left dangling at the end of Part II with the question 'but what if all restraints, like inadequate income, are removed, can the world ever supply all the cars that will be demanded?' answered with an implied 'yes'.

Part III is positive and optimistic, attempting partly to show some places in which the new anti-money economy grows within the shell of the old money economy, but also attacking inefficiency again and trying to bounce the usual economist's accusations of Utopianism back at themselves.

In response to a quote from *The Economist* (cited on p. 220), which admits that the theory of free markets rests on assumptions which 'rarely hold in the real world' but asserts that the case 'rests securely on comparisons of the two systems at work (market-based vs. centrally-planned)', Smith unfortunately descends to mere polemic. He appears to ignore the plain meaning of the extract he has chosen when he says of it that 'what we are dealing with here is the hopeless optimism of true believers'. For *The Economist* this is liberal, doubting stuff.



Smith approves of: unmetered water, home-ownership, jogging, permanent education, gardening, jeans, self-build houses and DIY, books, the Black Economy, voluntary societies, blood donors, lifeboats and mountain rescue. He seems to balance Left-wing urban guerrillas (what are they, Daddy?) against the policies of governments which 'kill and maim millions' (p. 245). One cannot help wondering what kind of person Ken Smith is. The sleeve notes mention land developing, Army service, mutiny, gaol and 'businesses'. Certainly, no woolly liberal could say without discernably changing tone that with 'a modest nuclear bomb... not beyond the capability of a hard-working and dedicated group' the 'future of city riots like... Brixton... could be lively.' (p. 245).

Unwisely, on the subject of things better not left to the market, he says that 'Nobody has yet proposed privatising the sewerage services of this country.' 1988 is the date on the flyleaf.

Smith makes a mistake, I feel, in totalling up actually productive work and taking it to be that which is essential to maintain life at a level of ease to which we have become accustomed. Either that or he has not fully appreciated the level to which our standard of living would fall, if all those on the peripheries of production and outside it no longer did their jobs. Without the market putting a brake on production, though, he says that there is nothing we cannot produce to glut. (p. 231-2).

This is the same as saying, surely, that all that is essential to run a factory is the electricity, or the machines, as it is they which really do 'the work'. It is how labour is used and where it is disposed that really makes the difference between subsistence and surplus. All these 'superfluous' people and jobs - the travel agents, poodle trimmers, bank managers etc. - play their part in the complicated system of reward, regulation and punishment which is the Capitalist bureaucracy.

Ken Smith says that the market is built on a raft of unpaid labour. One might equally well say that the unpaid labour is only made possible by the market economy. All those meals-on-wheels volunteers and lifeboat men make a living elsewhere. Would he really like all society's tasks to be carried out with the efficiency of a voluntary organisation? Not all areas are suitable for coming under the market, and Smith makes convincing sense when talking about Health, water and many other things; but that does not invalidate the market in those areas which, at a particular time, are best left under it, no matter how small by some measures.

That which is 10% of labour now might very well, if the other 90% were liberated, soon become 90% itself. Smith cites Gresham's law ('Bad money drives out good') but, strangely enough for a businessman, not Parkinson's ('Work expands to fill the time available').

He sometimes looks like a 'Rainbow Alliance' man, as when he describes the working class marching to a common rallying point with middle-class, protest and interest groups, that common point being the abolition of the wages system (p. 247). Even the National Trust is an expression of this current.

'All of those thousands of voluntary agencies mentioned earlier, all of the informal economy, all of the amateur cricket clubs, dramatic societies, brass bands, all of the myriad forms of collaboration and cooperation that human society has adopted through the ages will become the model for the reorganisation of producing for our needs, but this time from the bottom up, not the top down.'

The answer to the major problems before us lies not in the impossible dreams, the Utopian schemes, of those who tinker with the Market economy in the hope that, after five centuries of failure, it could be made to work. The real answer lies all around us in the attitude of self-help, in the spontaneous groupings of mutual-aid, in the inescapable urges of sociability that have always characterised the human race.' (p. 250).

Ken Smith shows unusual even-handedness, in distributing the blame for the mess that has been created, he says, by the market economy. It is difficult to identify the traditions and the prejudices which underlie the work, and for this reason it has the potential for appealing to a wide cross-section of readers. There is also a welcome degree of humour here, if often of an equally idiosyncratic kind.

It is easy to criticise a book for not being what it does not pretend to be, and I may be guilty of that here, as there is much that seems to be right and worth saying in this well produced volume. If it is treated unfairly then this is only because of a desire to be 'more right' than **Free is Cheaper.**

Although I am no economist, there are some aspects of Ken Smith's argument around which I would like to muddy the waters, and the remainder of my review will thus be limited to the following points:

- (1) **'Falling' living standards.** This is a conflation of the perceived decline in nebulous 'quality of life' measures, from the time when England was green and beer barrels were made by Coopers, and the apparent fall in return for a given labour time for the 'average' working person.
- (2) The 'roof tile and meat' example is difficult to account for, but one can suggest some reasons for these facts, if that is what they are, and offer counter-statistics. Indeed, I can bandy second-hand statistics with the best of them, and note a report in the **Daily Mail** (30.10.89) about a collection of Gallup polls over the last 15 years². The organisation found that the proportion of household expenditure which went on food went down over the period from one-third to less than a quarter.

This was over a duration during which the general level of ownership of goods such as cars, video recorders, bathrooms and washing machines continued its inexorable rise, in the Western, Eastern and industrialised nations at least.

- (3) Some factors which may account for Smith's examples include:
 - (a) Proportionately more beef, pigs and poultry to arable production in the Fifteenth Century than now.
 - (b) Price held down by home production (meat).
 - (c) Exhaustion of cheap and local building materials, eg. wood, red clay, thatch, stone; the increased quality of buildings.
 - (d) The effect of the Black Death on late medieval and middle ages wage rates.

Considering that at this time the most valuable items to be found in an average house were the crockery and linen, and that today these would be some of the least, there is at least a suspicion that part of the argument necessary to show what is intended, is missing.

- (4) **Isolation from market economy.** Smith often cites examples, especially in Part III, of non-commodity activity, which he then generalises into a possible way of organising all human activity. He even makes the startling claim that, including women's unpaid labour, the majority of relationships are outside the cash nexus (p. 233), which presumably means that most of the important 'work' in society is already non-commodity.

This, if true, and if it is possible to measure such things, does put the market in a new perspective, but none of these arguments show that a market could be dispensed with. Neither is his '10% useful labour' argument as strong as it first appears, and for a similar reason.

- (5) **Golden-Ageism.** Smith seems to think that we left the Golden Age by a mistake of the kind Adam made by biting the apple. I would like to see more evidence before I set the controls on the **Tardis**, and I also would have liked to have seen more recognition of changes which had been forced by the environment as well as hard won by human endeavor.
- (6) **Real needs.** The notion that we should 'get back to basics' and establish a general level of comfort which would satisfy all good, honest and decent needs is one which pervades **Free is Cheaper**. Ken Smith seems blissfully unaware of all subsequent debates on this issue, but this lacuna may be a blessing in disguise. With the presence of this complication as a factor of writing the book might never have been written.

Malcolm Stroud.

1 Originally printed in 'Ham & High', newsletter of a British financial firm'. Reprinted in 'Discussion Bulletin' No. 34 of the Discussion Bulletin Committee, P.O. Box 1564, Grand Rapids, MI 49501, USA.

2 'Britain Speaks Out', Gallup 1989. **Daily Mail** 30.10.89.

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Listings

Radical Scotland No. 42, Dec/Jan 1990. This not normally inspiring magazine has an interesting article by Craig Cairns, 'Where are we in history?' commenting on the recent vogue for 'endism' and 'post-isms'. He draws out the underlying images of 'history' on which such ideas depend and identifies the discursive tricks used by current 'post-philosophies': *"first deflect attention from the object of enquiry to the frame in which it is held. Do not ask what a sentence asserts, ask what discourse it belongs to . . . Second, suspend the apparent trajectory of the object so that you can examine its constituents as though they had no relation one to another."* Current orthodoxies paradoxically impose a pre-conceived scheme of historical sequence while pretending to escape from their own deconstructions. But Cairns incriminates the concept of 'history' itself as, following Hayden White, *"the ideology by which Western man has imposed his will upon the world for two hundred years"* and thus perpetuates the very orthodoxy most in need of debunking. Western man seems to have his principal abode in the contemporary radical imagination, where he plays the role of the (negative) subject-of-history. Like Father Christmas, it seems to be necessary to keep reinventing him. Someone should break the news. Craig Cairns' **Out of History** is published by Polygon in June.

Cahiers d'IRIS - Autonomism Italian-Style? In French. (No. 1 pre-print; available from IRIS 47 Rue de Montmorency, 75003 Paris. Tel. (33-1) 48 87 15 34. This is an Italian Autonomist-in-exile magazine, involved in setting up a 'Transnational network for social liberation': *"a first step towards the existence of this network will be to promote a theoretical collective activity, starting by a redefinition of the terminology on the key-points of social movements"*. This publication does seem inordinately preoccupied with terminology: with finding new words in which to express what looks very much like the same old marxist ideas . . . a concern, in other words, with constructing the right image. The mode in which this business of image-making is conducted is interesting: it is identical to the procedures of advertising. The cover page has a picture of an eye overprinted by the word *iris* in a stylish typeface redolent of an ad for cosmetics or maybe a better class of contact lenses.

Anti-Clockwise Situationist bulletin from Liverpool. Includes article on holiday shanties (**The Leisure Tendency**) by Wren and Szezelkun. Write to P.O. Box 175, L69 8DX, Liverpool.

In Bergamo Concerning an attempted robbery and a Democratic Frame-up. Pamphlet about Alfredo M. Bonanno's arrest. BM Elephant. London WC1N 3XX.

Little Free Press Anti-Money newsletter. Provocative article on divorce. Available L.F.P. 2714 1st Avenue S. Minneapolis. MN 55408. USA.

Variant No. 7 Includes review of **Here and Now**. Interview with Stewart Home, Polish Orange Alternative, Erotic Films by Women. Price £2. Subs £6 or £10 if you are an institution from 76, Carlisle Street, Glasgow G21 1EF.

AntiCopyright Distribution and copying service. 30 Piercefield Place, Adamsdown, Cardiff, Wales.

Green Perspectives No. 18 Murray Bookchin on **Radical Politics in an Era of Advanced Capitalism**: *"... capitalism has transformed itself from an economy surrounded by many precapitalist social and political formations into a society that itself has become 'economised'"* From PO Box 111, Burlington, Vermont 05402, Sub \$10 for 10 issues.

The Anarchist Age No. 1 Includes review of early **Here and Now**, article on nurses' strike in Australia, reports on international anarchist movements. From PO Box 20 Parkville 3052. Australia. Price \$2.

Kleintje Muurkrantkollectief 'Metropolitan thoughts from a small provincial town.' Postbus 703, 5201 As Den Bosch. Holland.

Discussion Bulletin Anti-parliamentary communist perspectives on Green Movement in the U.S. Articles on Spanish Dockers. John Zerzan. From Discussion Bulletin, PO Box 1564, Grand Rapids, Michigan. M1 49501. U.S.A.

The Red Menace Article on ambulance dispute. Hull '76 Prisoners Revolt' and a leaflet 'The Struggle against Islamic Fascism begins with the Struggle against Iranian Bolshevism'. From BM Wild, London WC1N 3XX.

Socialist Messenger News and views of Polish self-managementist tendency PPS-RD. Available from International Office of the Polish Socialist Party (Democratic Revolution), The Basement, 92 Ladbrooke Grove, London W11 2HE.

On Gogol Boulevard 151 First Avenue, 62 New York, NY 10003, USA.

Ukraine Today News of nationalist and left-wing movements in the Ukraine. PO Box 1308, London N16 0EE.

Elements of Refusal Collected Works of John Zerzan. From the origin of time, language, numbers, art and agriculture to analysis of the eighties Zerzan asserts that refusal is alive and kicking. Available from Left Bank Books, Box B, 92 Pike St, Seattle, Wa. 98101. USA.

Free Library Appeal Appeal for books, magazines etc. for Polish opposition. Send to PO Box 67, 81-806 SOPOT 6, Poland.

The Wolf Report (Nonconfidential analysis for the anti-investor) by S. Artesian. No. 14, Nov. 1989. From: PO Box 246 Stuyvesant Station, NY 10009. Mildly interesting 5-page summary of terminal capitalism in the terminology of terminal marxism, eg. *"... where profit saw its future in the composition of capital, the rate of profit proclaims its here and now in the decomposition of capital."*

Eastern Europe: A Freedom Workshop Conference 14th-16th April 1990 in Trieste. Contact Gruppo Anarchico GERMINAL, via Mazzini 11, 34121 Trieste, Italy (Tel. (0)40/368096).

Counter-Information, Nos. 24, 25 & 26 Includes E. European coverage SAE to p/h C.Info, 11 Forth St., Edinburgh.

Exchanges 62, including 'Fiat is booming' by David Brown, BM Box 91, London WC1N 3XX (Donation).

Workers Info Rag No. 6 from PM c/o Zamisdat Press, GPO Box 1255, Gracie Station., New York, NY 100028. (Donation).

Independent Voices, SKUC, Kersnikova, 4, 61000, Ljubljana, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (Donation).

Etcetera No 14 Includes analysis of China. Ap. 1363, 08080, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.

Perspectief, Flemish magazine, v.u. Faes, Dracenastraat 21, 9000 Gent.

Conviction, Newsletter of The Martin Foran Defence Campaign. PO Box 522, Sheffield S1 3FF.

Green Perspectives No. 19 Article on West European Greens: Movement or Parliamentary Party? by Janet Biehl. PO Box 111, Burlington, UT 05402. USA.

Radical Bookseller Magazine listing publications and books from 265 Seven Sisters Road, London N4 2DE.

Spanner's a new journal for new thinking Green/Toffleresque half-yearly magazine. Price £1 from BM Spanner, London WC1N 3XX.

'There and Then'

'I HAVE PAID NO POLL-TAX FOR SIX YEARS. I WAS PUT INTO A JAIL once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through, before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand on the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timed as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.'

Henry Thoreau 1849



From the 1986 New Year's card of the Prague samizdat journal 'stredni Europa'.

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Nature of Modern Society
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Kampuchean Communism;
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No. 2 (Summer 1985)

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The Subversive Past;
Critiques of Germaine Greer and Paul Cardan.

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PUBLISHED MARCH 1990 BY WEST YORKSHIRE HERE AND NOW.