

politics

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Edited by Dwight Macdonald

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The Powerless People

by C. Wright Mills

The New Imperialism in Latin America

by Arthur Pincus

Comment

The M.C.F.—A New Third Party?

On March 5 and 6 some 350 delegates from AFL and CIO unions, farm organizations, consumer and white-collar groups, and leftwing parties met in Detroit and took the first steps towards setting up the Michigan Commonwealth Party. The driving force behind the Detroit conference was a group of youngish second-rank union leaders, mostly from the United Automobile Workers: Matthew Hammond, tool and die worker and president of Local 157, UAW; Paul Silvers, president of Local 351, UAW; Tucker P. Smith, secretary of the United Retail Workers' joint board in Detroit and vice-president of the Michigan CIO; Emil Mazey (now in the Army), head of the powerful Briggs Local 212, UAW; Brendan Sexton and Frank Marquart of the UAW; Merrill Case of the American Federation of Teachers (AFL).

The Conference laid plans to launch 260 "Commonwealth Clubs" in Michigan in the next two months, and to hold a convention in July at which the Michigan Commonwealth Federation will be formally established and its basic program determined, and candidates selected for local and state elections this fall. Meanwhile, it adopted certain basic principles, of which the most important are:

"This party shall be open to membership from all the common people of Michigan who work for a living, who are forced to 'watch the pennies' as they live, who renounce

the old-line parties, and who declare themselves ready to band together in a new party to fight for their common good and against their common foes. It shall especially seek to enroll trade unionists, working farmers, consumers, and progressive professional and small business people.

"This party shall work for the establishment of economic democracy to parallel our political democracy. It will fight for the organization of an economy of abundance that will afford full employment and security to all who work for a living in factory, farm and office. It shall especially fight for democratic control over those industries and monopolies where private ownership is threatening democracy, is injuring the common welfare and is blocking the achievement of the highest possible living standards."

Elsewhere in this issue is a first-hand report on the conference by Frank Marquart. To his comments, I should like to add a few of my own. First of all, the vagueness, not to say ambiguity, of the above program—what does "democratic control" mean? where does private ownership not "injure the common welfare"? etc.—shows that the conference was dominated by trade unionists and not political leftists. It will have to define its principles more clearly if it is to develop into more than a left pressure group on the Administration in power. Its model is the Canadian CCF, whose sensational growth has stirred the imaginations of the American left. The keynote speech at the conference was delivered by David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF. It is significant of the trend that, although the conference was called to consider "the promotion of a Farmer-Labor Party", the delegates decided this was too

Marxist and class-conscious a name and voted instead for a *Commonwealth* party. The change seems to me an improvement: American workers and farmers are not very class conscious, and a party which wants to attract them need not alienate them with its very name. Also, the "farmer-labor" label is pretty stale now in American politics, nor is it associated, as the CCF is, with a tradition of contemporary success. The conference also followed the CCF in emphasizing a loose, democratic organizational structure, with a great deal of local autonomy, and in appealing to middleclass as well as workingclass interests—both of them good ideas. The remarkable political backwardness of the American workingclass, however, appears in the refusal of the MCF to follow the lead of the CCF in putting forward a *socialist* program. Such a program is no guarantee of progress, as the evolution of the British Labor Party shows, but it is hard to see how progress can be made without it. The next few years will call for something stronger than a new New Deal if labor and its natural allies are to advance, or even successfully to defend their present positions.

Has It a Future? Far from adopting a socialist program, the conference did not even emancipate itself from Roosevelt. It did not endorse him, but neither did it criticize him. And it adopted a formal plank stating the party would not run a presidential candidate in 1944. Chairman Hammond made his own position clear when he took the floor to say: "As far as I am concerned, the best way of re-electing Roosevelt is the formation of this party. That is the only way he will carry this state. We will bring thousands of voters to the polls. Who do you think they will vote for if not for Roosevelt? Most of us will vote for Roosevelt no matter who runs on the Republican ticket." According to *Labor Action* (March 20), although a large bloc of delegates were opposed to Roosevelt, "Not a single leading member of the committee took the floor to challenge this point of view." I think this was a tactical error; illusions about Roosevelt are very dangerous now that his policies have become so predominantly anti-labor, and the place to begin to educate unionists about the facts of political life today would seem to be such a conference as this. If the MCF fails to meet this issue squarely in its July convention, it will have failed to lay a foundation for its whole future work.

The attitude of the top leaders of the UAW towards the conference was either openly hostile (Thomas, Frankenstein) or non-committal (the Reuthers). Director Scholle of the Michigan branch of Hillman's CIO Political Action Committee denounced the meeting before it took place—although his attitude may be different now that the MCF has tacitly supported Roosevelt's 1944 campaign. But regardless of what the top CIO leadership thinks or does now, some kind of third party, based mostly on labor, seems pretty definitely in the cards in the next two years. The disillusionment of the rank and file with both old parties is becoming acute, and the top leadership is beginning to realize that when Government boards determine wages and working conditions, they need a political as well as a trade union organization to get anywhere.

In Chicago another embryo third party has arisen, on a

more modest scale than the MCF but significant: the American Commonwealth Party, recently formed as "an experimental pattern" by Willard Townsend, president of the Transport Service Employees (CIO), Len Levy, vice-president of the United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Workers (CIO), and Maynard Krueger of the Socialist Party. Other such groups may be expected to sprout here and there in the future. The situation now seems to be like that in the trade union movement in the early thirties. Industrial unionism had become a pressing historical necessity. Leftists had been preaching the gospel for years, without apparently getting anywhere. Then a bloc of top AFL leaders led by Lewis organized the CIO, and in a couple of years industrial unionism was part of the American social pattern. It seems probable that certain of the more progressive CIO top leaders will similarly grasp the opportunity and found a national labor party some time after the 1944 elections. They may find it more difficult to keep it inside the framework of the *status quo*, however, than was the case with the CIO. A political party is a more explosive mechanism than a trade union, and the forties promise to be a more turbulent decade than even the thirties.

Bliven An indication that POLITICS is getting under the skin of those whose skins should be gotten under was the veiled reference to "a new journal, sharply leftist, devoted to politics and economics" in Bruce Bliven's attack on "The Hang-Back Boys" in *The New Republic* of March 6. (All the references were veiled; it was that kind of article.) Bliven says YEA to the Stalin regime, the Roosevelt Administration, and World War III, and he is indignant that a few perverse souls continue to say NAY to some or all of these inspiring phenomena. He has evidently been bottling up his wrath for a long time, and he lets go in one glorious shotgun blast which peppers the target all the way from Wisconsin isolationism to Trotskyism, from Charles A. Beard to Milton Mayer. It must have been a great relief.

It is a little late for a detailed reply to Bliven, and anyway my fellow hang-backers have already retorted at length—at more length than the specific gravity of Bliven's article warranted, perhaps. I should like merely to point

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out that the article is a striking example of "totalitarian liberalism", which makes a fetish of State control of the economy and has no tolerance for criticism of this process from the viewpoint of human freedom. Free criticism itself, in fact, is suspect by this school. Bliven makes little attempt to show that the war and the Stalin and Roosevelt regimes are more deserving of being embraced than hang-back-from; he thinks he has proved his point when he demonstrates the "negativistic", uncooperative attitude of the hang-back boys. I should also like to observe, in John L. Lewis language, that it ill behooves one who himself supped at isolationism's table up to a few months before Pearl Harbor to attack his former associates with such violence. And it ill behooves an editor who changed his paper's policy on the war in the fall of 1941 "to reflect the views of its owner, Mrs. Leonard K. Elmhirst . . . a British citizen" (*Time*, March 20, 1944), to read lectures in political morality to anybody.

Watch the "Avery Gang" Tom Girdler has gone soft, or at least diplomatic, on labor unions, but he has a successor: Sewell Avery, who heads two of the 200 biggest non-banking corporations in the country—Montgomery Ward and U. S. Gypsum. He is also one of the leading gauleiters of the J. P. Morgan industrial empire and, according to *Fortune*, "unquestionably the No. 1 Chicago businessman."

On March 17 the *N. Y. Times* carried a two-inch news item of more significance than anything on the front pages. It was headed "PULLMAN SUES CIO LOCAL" and it told of a \$1,000,000 libel suit the Pullman-Standard Manufacturing Co., which makes cars for its parent, Pullman, Inc., had just filed against the weekly paper, *The Keel*, which the United Steelworkers of America, Local 2928, distributes to its 3500 members in the Pullman plant at Calumet Harbor, Ill. The following day another news report revealed that Pullman-Standard had just announced it would refuse to sign a union contract ordered by the War Labor Board because the contract contained a maintenance-of-membership clause.

These little news items are important because, early this year, Sewell Avery's Montgomery Ward (1) brought a million-dollar libel suit against *The Spotlight*, the weekly union paper of the locals of the United Retail Workers (CIO) in his company's stores and plants; and (2) refused to sign a union contract ordered by the W.L.B. because it contained a maintenance-of-membership clause. (He had also refused to sign for the same reason a year earlier, and it had taken two personal orders from President Roosevelt to get him to comply.) The coincidence of Pullman-Standard's and Ward's actions becomes less mysterious when one finds that Silas Strawn, Chicago's leading corporation lawyer, is both counsel to Pullman-Standard in its libel suit and also chairman of the executive committee of Ward, that Pullman's president D. A. Crawford is also a director of Ward, and that Avery himself is a director of Pullman.

The War Labor Board has so far done nothing to enforce its order requiring Ward to sign a contract, and as this goes to press, the union has gone on strike to force the WLB to take action. Sewell Avery is evidently organizing a conspiracy, backed by enormous corporate assets and the most

expensive legal brains obtainable on the market, to defy the War Labor Board, smash American unionism, and gag freedom of the press by the use of gigantic libel suits.

This last is a particularly serious matter. It is true that Avery's suits are legally absurd—as a Federal judge in Chicago observed recently in dismissing another million dollar libel suit Avery had brought against *Business Week* for its reporting of his difficulties with the union. But, with plenty of legal funds behind them, their nuisance value can be great, especially against less well-heeled opponents. In England, the libel laws have long been perverted into an effective instrument for suppression of free speech. The same may happen here.

The new committee which Time, Inc., is financing to conduct a two-year inquiry into "the status of the freedom of the press in the United States" might well make this libel-suit technique of the Avery Gang one of its first objects of study. The committee, incidentally, is headed by President Hutchins of the University of Chicago. Sewell Avery, incidentally, is a trustee of the University of Chicago, and the University of Chicago, also incidentally, is one of the biggest stockholders of both Ward and U. S. Gypsum. Such are the complications which confront the earnest student of the freedom of the American press.

"Massacre by Bombing" At last some influential Americans have spoken out against what Winston Churchill elegantly calls "beating the life out of Germany" by saturation bombing of her cities. A group of religious leaders, including Harry Emerson Fosdick and John Haynes Holmes, have signed a powerful statement:

"... In our time, as never before, war is showing itself in its logical colors. In the first World War, some shreds of the rules of war were observed to the end. Laws of war are intrinsically paradoxical; but so far as they went, they were witness to the survival of some fragments of a Christian conscience among the combatants. But today these fragments are disappearing . . . Christian people should be moved to examine themselves concerning their participation in this carnival of death—even though they be thousands of miles away . . ."

The reaction against this statement was violent enough to betray a widespread guilty conscience among Americans on this subject. The *N. Y. Times*, which put the statement on page one, reports it received fifty letters against to every one for. Personally, I think the clergymen are right, not only morally but also in military and political terms. It looks increasingly doubtful that bombing will "soften up" Germany to the extent once anticipated. (The current drive to get all able-bodied younger men into the armed forces, regardless of their indispensability to war production indicates that much greater numbers of fighting infantrymen are going to be needed before the war is won than the high command had calculated before all-out bombing had been given a real test.) Politically, indiscriminate area bombing stiffens a people's will to resist rather than cracks it, and also arouses a hatred among the common people of Germany that, in Vera Brittain's words, is "steadily creating the psychological foundations for a Third World War". Finally the exclusive reliance on bombing to damage German war production—and at a time when a large

percentage of it is being turned out by foreign slave labor which hates the very system its products defend—shows the lack of any humanly appealing war aims on the part of the United Nations. The mindless brutal battering of bombs is the only language our war leaders know how to speak to the common people of Germany.

The clergymen's statement appears in the March number of *Fellowship*, organ of A. J. Muste's Fellowship of Reconciliation, as a foreword to Vera Brittain's "Massacre by Bombing". This thoroughly documented, 15-page article first appeared in England, where public protest against the Allied bombing policy has been much more widespread than in this country. Miss Brittain has brought together a great mass of evidence, some of it almost unbearably painful to read. She examines and refutes the main arguments for the present "all out" policy. (*Copies of "Massacre by Bombing" may be obtained at 10 cents each. 12 for \$1, from Fellowship, 2929 Broadway, New York 25, N. Y.*)

Some of her facts:

- Those who have suffered bombing themselves, and know its horrors, are less eager to inflict revenge bombings on the Germans than those who have not had this experience. A Gallup Poll in April, 1941, showed 45% of those living in bombed areas in London in favor of reprisal raids—and 76% of those in unbombed rural districts. (This may also be a factor in the greater public protest against mass bombings in England than in this country.)

- The R.A.F. has developed a technique of "cascade" bombing which has stepped up the "rate of delivery" from 17½ tons a minute on Cologne in May of 1942 to 120 tons a minute in recent raids (or 80 times the intensity of the heaviest attack ever made on London).

- Bombing at this intensity starts fires so huge they actually suck up so much oxygen as to asphyxiate those in nearby shelters. Most of the 20,000 bodies removed from the ruins of Hamburg after one raid last summer had perished thus. Those who stayed in the shelters were suffocated and then cremated. ("The work of salvage is difficult because the temperature in the cellars two weeks after the fire is still such that any introduction of oxygen makes the fire flare up again.") As for those who tried to escape by running outside: "Women and children in light summer clothing who emerged from the cellars into the storm of fire in the street were soon converted into human torches."

- According to German sources, 1,200,000 civilians have been killed or are "missing" in air raids from 1939 through October 1, 1943. (In that period, the number of British civilians killed was 50,000.)

- Brittain quotes a letter to the press written by Bernard Shaw last fall: "The blitzing of the cities has carried war this time to such a climax of infernal atrocity that all recriminations on that score are ridiculous. The Germans will have as big a bill of atrocities against us as we against them if we take them into an impartial international court."

- She also quotes Brendan Bracken, Churchill's Minister of Information: "Our plans are to bomb, burn and ruthlessly destroy in every way available the people responsible for creating this war."

QUERY TO MR. BRACKEN: HOW MANY OF THE 1,200,000 GERMAN CIVILIANS YOUR AIR FORCES HAVE TO DATE BOMBED, BURNED AND RUTHLESSLY DESTROYED WOULD YOU SAY ARE "RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THIS WAR"?

The Powerless People

The Role of the Intellectual in Society

C. Wright Mills

While the United Nations are winning the war, American intellectuals are suffering the tremors of men who face overwhelming defeat. They are worried and distraught, some only half aware of their condition, others so painfully aware of it that they must obscure it by busy-work and self-deception.

Pragmatism was the nerve of progressive American thinking for the first several decades of this century. It took a rather severe beating from the fashionable left-wing of the thirties and since the latter years of that decade it has obviously been losing out in competition with more religious and tragic views of political and personal life. Many who not long ago read John Dewey with apparent satisfaction have become vitally interested in such analysts of personal tragedy as Soren Kierkegaard. Attempts to reinstate pragmatism's emphasis upon the power of man's intelligence to control his destiny have not been taken to heart by American intellectuals. They are obviously spurred by new worries and are after new gods.

Rather than give in to the self-pity and political lament which the collapse of hope invites, Arthur Koestler proposes, in the *New York Times*, a Fraternity of Pessimists" who are to live together in "an oasis." Melvin Lasky, writing in the *New Leader*, responds to Koestler by urging intellectuals "neither to cry nor to laugh but to understand." The president of the American Sociological Society, George Lundberg, ascribes contemporary disasters, and disasters apparently yet to come, to the fact that the social sciences have not developed as rapidly nor along the same lines as physical science. Malcolm Cowley, of the *New Republic*, wonders why the war years have produced so little that may be considered great American literature. As for live political writing, intellectuals from right of center to revolutionary left seem to believe that there just isn't any. In a feeble attempt to fill the gap, Walter Lippmann's *The Good Society*, originally published in 1937, is reprinted and even acclaimed by at least one anxious reviewer. Many writers who are turning out post-war plans to suit every

purse and taste busily divert the attentions of their readers from current political decisions and bolster their hopes by dreams of the future. Stuart Chase and other proponents of a brave new post-war economic world achieve a confident note at the expense of a political realism which worries even John Chamberlain.

Dwight Macdonald has correctly indicated that the failure of nerve is no simple retreat from reason. The ideas current are not merely fads sweeping over insecure intellectuals in a nation at war. Their invention and distribution must be understood as historical phenomena. Yet what is happening is not adequately explained by the political defeat of liberal, labor, and radical parties—from the decision in Spain to the present.

To understand what is happening in American intellectual life we have to consider the social position of its creators, the intellectuals. We have to realize the effect upon them of certain deep-lying trends of modern social organization.

I

We continue to know more and more about modern society, but we find the centers of political initiative less and less accessible. This generates a personal malady that is particularly acute in the intellectual who has labored under the illusion that his thinking makes a difference. In the world of today the more his knowledge of affairs grows, the less effective the impact of his thinking seems to become. Since he grows more frustrated as his knowledge increases, it seems that knowledge leads to powerlessness. He feels helpless in the fundamental sense that he cannot control what he is able to foresee. This is not only true of the consequences of his own attempts to act; it is true of the acts of powerful men whom he observes.

Such frustration arises, of course, only in the man who feels compelled to act. The "detached spectator" does not know his helplessness because he never tries to surmount it. But the political man is always aware that while events are not in his hands he must bear their consequences. He finds it increasingly difficult even to express himself. If he states public issues as he sees them, he cannot take seriously the slogans and confusions used by parties with a chance to win power. He therefore feels politically irrelevant. Yet if he approaches public issues "realistically," that is, in terms of the major parties, he has already so compromised their very statement that he is not able to sustain an enthusiasm for political action and thought.

The political failure of nerve has a personal counterpart in the development of a tragic sense of life. This sense of tragedy may be experienced as a personal discovery and a personal burden, but it is also a reflex of objective circumstances. It arises from the fact that at the centers of public decision there are powerful men who do not themselves suffer the violent results of their own decisions. In a world of big organizations the lines between powerful decisions and grass-root democratic controls become blurred and tenuous, and seemingly irresponsible actions by individuals at the top are encouraged. The need for action prompts them to take decisions into their own hands, while the fact that they act as parts of large corporations or other organizations blurs the identification of personal responsibility. Their public views and political

actions are, in this objective meaning of the word, irresponsible: the social corollary of their irresponsibility is the fact that others are dependent upon them and must suffer the consequences of their ignorance and mistakes, their self-deceptions and their biased motives. The sense of tragedy in the intellectual who watches this scene is a personal reaction to the politics and economics of irresponsibility.

Never before have so few men made such fateful decisions for so many people who themselves are so helpless. Dictatorships are but one manifestation of this fact. Mass armies all over the world are its living embodiment, and the Cairo and Teheran conferences are its most impressive symbols. The soldier may face death yet have no voice in the network of decisions which leads him to recapture Burma or garrison India. Power is an impersonal monster; those who do the taking understand only its technique and not its end.

The networks of military decision may be traced further up the line to the centers of political power. There plans are made by older men who do not face the chance of violent death. This contrast between the elder statesman and the young soldier is not a popular topic to stress during war, but it is nevertheless one foundation for the modern man's urgently tragic sense of life. When the man who fights and dies can also make the decision to fight in the light of his own ideals, wars can be heroic. When this is not the case, they are only tragic.

Contemporary irresponsibility may be collective; no one circle of men may make the most fateful decision, there may, indeed, be no single fateful decision, only a series of steps in a seemingly inevitable chain, but these considerations do not relieve the resulting tragedy. On the contrary, they deepen it.

The centralization of decision and the related growth of dependence are not, however, confined to armies, although that is where they may be seen in their most immediate form. Organized irresponsibility is a leading feature of modern industrial societies everywhere. On every hand, the individual is confronted with seemingly remote organizations and he feels dwarfed and helpless. If the small business man escapes being turned into an employee of a chain or a corporation, one has only to listen to his pleas for help before small business committees to realize his dependence. More and more people are becoming dependent salaried workers who spend the most alert hours of their lives being told what to do. In climactic times like the present, dominated by the need for swift action, the individual feels dangerously lost. As the *London Economist* recently remarked, "The British citizen *should* be an ardent participant in his public affairs; he is little more than a consenting spectator who draws a distinction between 'we' who sit and watch and 'they' who run the state."

Such are the general frustrations of contemporary life. For the intellectual who seeks a public for his thinking—and he must support himself somehow—these general frustrations are made acute by the fact that in a world of organized irresponsibility the difficulty of speaking one's mind has increased for those who do not speak popular pieces.

If the writer is the hired man of an "information industry," his general aims are, of course, set by the decisions of others and not by his own integrity. But the freedom of the so-called free-lance is also minimized when he goes to the market; if he does not go, his freedom is without public value. Between the intellectual and his potential public stand technical, economic, and social structures which are owned and operated by others. The world of pamphleteering offered to a Tom Paine a direct channel to readers that the world of mass circulations supported by advertising cannot usually afford to provide one who does not say already popular things. The craftsmanship which is central to all intellectual and artistic gratification is thwarted for an increasing number of intellectual workers. They find themselves in the predicament of the Hollywood writer: the sense of independent craftsmanship they would put into their work is bent to the ends of a mass appeal to a mass market.

Even the editor of the mass circulation magazine has not escaped the depersonalization of publishing, for he becomes an employee of a business enterprise rather than a personality in his own right. Mass magazines are not so much edited by a personality as regulated by an adroit formula.

Writers have always been more or less hampered by the pleasure and mentality of their readers, but the variations and the level to which the publishing industry has been geared made possible a large amount of freedom. The recent tendency towards mass distribution of books—the 25 cent "pocket books"—may very well require, as do the production and distribution of films, a more cautious and standardized product. It is likely that fewer and fewer publishers will pass on more and more of those manuscripts which reach mass publics through drug stores and other large-scale channels of distribution.

Although, in general, the larger universities are still the freest of places in which to work, the trends which limit the independence of the scholar are not absent there. The professor is, after all, an employee, subject to all that this fact involves. Institutional factors naturally select men for these universities and influence how, when, and upon what they will work and write. Yet the deepest problem of freedom for teachers is not the occasional ousting of a professor, but a vague general fear—sometimes politely known as "discretion", "good taste" or "balanced judgment." It is a fear which leads to self-intimidation and finally becomes so habitual that the scholar is unaware of it. The real restraints are not so much external prohibitions as control of the insurgent by the agreements of academic gentlemen. Such control is naturally furthered by Hatch Acts, by political and business attacks upon "professors," by the restraints necessarily involved in the Army's program for the colleges, and by the setting up of committees by trade associations of subjects, like history, which attempt to standardize the content and effects of teaching. Research in social science is increasingly dependent upon funds from foundations, and foundations are notably averse to scholars who develop unpopular theses, that is, those placed in the category of "unconstructive."

The United States' growing international entanglements have subtle effects upon some American intellectuals: to the young man who teaches and writes on Latin America,

Asia, or Europe and who refrains from deviating from acceptable facts and policies, these entanglements lead to a voluntary censorship. He hopes for opportunities of research, travel, and foundation subsidies.

The means of effective communication are being expropriated from the intellectual worker. The material basis of his initiative and intellectual freedom is no longer in his hands. Some intellectuals feel these processes in their work. They know more than they say and they are powerless and afraid.

In modern society both freedom and security depend upon organized responsibility. By "freedom" and "security", I do not mean independence for each individual; I mean merely that men have effective control over what they are dependent upon. The ethics and politics of democracy center on decisions which vitally affect people who have no voice in them. Today, everywhere, such decisions are central to the lives of more and more people. A politics of organized irresponsibility prevails, and because of it, men in high places must hide the facts of life in order to retain their power.

When irresponsible decisions prevail and values are not proportionately distributed, you will find universal deception practised by and for those who make the decisions and who have the most of what values there are to have. An increasing number of intellectually equipped men and women work *within* powerful bureaucracies and *for* the relatively few who do the deciding. And if the intellectual is not directly hired by such organizations, then by little steps and in many self-deceptive ways he seeks to have his published opinions conform to the limits set by them and by those whom they do directly hire.

II

Any philosophy which is sensitive to the meaning of various societies for personal ways of life will give the idea of responsibility a central place. That is why it is central in the ethics and politics of John Dewey and of the late German sociologist, Max Weber. The intellectual's response to the tragic fact of irresponsibility has a wide range but we can understand it in terms of where the problem is faced. The tragedy of irresponsibility may be confronted introspectively, as a moral or intellectual problem. It may be confronted publicly, as a problem of the political economy.

Along this scale there are (1) simple evaluations of our selves; (2) objective considerations of events; (3) estimates of our personal position in relation to the objective distribution of power and decision. An adequate philosophy uses each of these three styles of reflection in thinking through any position that is taken.

(1) If ethical and political problems are defined solely in terms of the way they affect the individual, he may enrich his experience, expand his sensitivities, and perhaps adjust to his own suffering. But he will not solve the problems he is up against. He is not confronting them at their deeper sources.

(2) If only the objective trends of society are considered, personal biases and passions, inevitably involved in observation and thought of any consequence, are overlooked. Objectivity need not be an academic cult of the narrowed attention; it may be more ample and include meaning as

well as "fact". What many consider to be "objective" is only an unimaginative use of already plotted routines of research. This may satisfy those who are not interested in politics; it is inadequate as a full orientation. It is more like a specialized form of retreat than the intellectual orientation of a man.

(3) The shaping of the society we shall live in and the manner in which we shall live in it are increasingly political. And this society includes the realms of intellect and of personal morals. If we demand that these realms be geared to our activities which make a public difference, then personal morals and political interests become closely related; any philosophy that is not a personal escape involves taking a political stand. If this is true, it places great responsibility upon our political thinking. Because of the expanded reach of politics, it is our own personal style of life and reflection we are thinking about when we think about politics.

The independent artist and intellectual are among the few remaining personalities equipped to resist and to fight the stereotyping and consequent death of genuinely lively things. Fresh perception now involves the capacity continually to unmask and to smash the stereotypes of vision and intellect with which modern communications swamp us. These worlds of mass-art and mass-thought are increasingly geared to the demands of politics. That is why it is in politics that intellectual solidarity and effort must be centered. If the thinker does not relate himself to the value of truth in political struggle, he cannot responsibly cope with the whole of live experience.

III

If he is to think politically in a realistic way, the intellectual must constantly know his own social position. This is necessary in order that he may be aware of the sphere of strategy that is really open to his influence. If he forgets this, his thinking may exceed his sphere of strategy so far as to make impossible any translation of his thought into action, his own or that of others. His thought may thus become fantastic. If he remembers his powerlessness too well, assumes that his sphere of strategy is restricted to the point of impotence, then his thought may easily become politically trivial. In either case, fantasy and powerlessness may well be the lot of his mind. One apparent way to escape both of these fates is to make one's goal simply that of understanding.

Simply to understand is an inadequate alternative to giving in to a personal sense of tragedy. It is not even a true alternative; increased understanding may only deepen the sense of tragedy. Simply to understand is perhaps an ideal of those who are alienated but by no means disinherited—i.e., those who have jobs but don't believe in the work they are doing. Since "the job" is a pervasive political sanction and censorship of most middle class intellectuals, the political psychology of the scared employee becomes relevant. Simply understanding is an ideal of the man who has a capacity to know truth but not the chance, the skill, or the guts, as the case may be, to communicate them with political effectiveness.

Knowledge that is not communicated has a way of turning the mind sour, of being obscured, and finally of being forgotten. For the sake of the integrity of the discoverer,

his discovery must be effectively communicated. Such communication is also a necessary element in the very search for clear understanding, including the understanding of one's self. For only through the social confirmation of others whom we believe adequately equipped do we earn the right of feeling secure in our knowledge. The basis of our integrity can be gained or renewed only by activity, including communication, in which we may give ourselves with a minimum of repression. It cannot be gained nor retained by selling what we believe to be our selves. When you sell the lies of others you are also selling yourself. To sell yourself is to turn yourself into a commodity. A commodity does not control the market; its nominal worth is determined by what the market will offer. And it isn't enough.

We insist upon clarity and understanding in order to govern our decisions by their consequences. Clear understanding of the political world and of our place within it is also indispensable if we are to keep an appropriate distance from ourselves. Without this distance men collapse into self-pity and political lament. We must constantly shuttle between the understanding which is made possible by detachment and the longing and working for a politics of truth in a society that is responsible. The problems which make a difference, both personally and politically, arise in the active search for these goals. The solutions which may be truthful and adequate require episodes of detachment from political morality and from considerations of self.

The phase of detachment may be isolated from its political context and in the division of labor become an end in itself. Those who restrict themselves to work only such segments of intellectual endeavor may attempt to generalize them, making them the basis for political and personal orientation. Then the key problem is held to arise from the fact that social science lags behind physical science and technology, and political and social problems are a result of this deficiency and lag. Such a position is inadequate.

Alienation must be used in the pursuit of truths, but there is no reason to make a political fetish out of it. Much less may it serve as a personal excuse. Certainly more secure knowledge is needed, but we already have a great deal of knowledge that is politically and economically relevant. Big businessmen prove this by their readiness to pay out cash to social scientists who will use their knowledge for the ends of business. Many top economic brains are now hired by big business committees; and a good social scientist is often fired from government, under business pressure, only to be hired by business or by one of its front organizations.

The political man does not need to wait upon more knowledge in order to act responsibly now. To blame his inaction upon insufficient knowledge serves as a cheap escape from the taking of a political stand and acting upon it as best he can. If one-half of the relevant knowledge which we now possess was really put into the service of the ideals which leaders mouth, these ideals could be realized in short order. The view that all that is needed is knowledge ignores the nub of the problem as the social scientist confronts it: he has little or no power to act

politically and his chance to communicate in a politically effective manner is very limited.

There are many illusions which uphold authority and which are known to be illusions by many social scientists. Tacitly by their affiliations and silence, or explicitly in their work, the social scientist often sanctions these, rather than speak out the truth against them. They censor themselves either by carefully selecting safe problems in the name of pure science, or by selling such prestige as their scholarship may have for ends other than their own.

IV

The above acceptances of the *status quo* proceed directly. The present may also be accepted—and made spuriously palatable—by unanchored expectations of the future. This method is now being used in the production and publicity of hundreds of “post-war plans.”

The big business man sets the technological trap by dangling his baubles before the public without telling precisely how they may be widely distributed. In a similar manner, the political writer may focus attention away from the present and into the several models of the future. The more the antagonisms of the actual present must be suffered, the more the future is drawn upon as a source of pseudo-unity and synthetic morale. Intellectuals and publicists have produced such a range of “plans” that there is now one to satisfy every one. Most of these commodities are not plans with any real chance to be realized. They are baits for various strata, and sometimes for quite vested groups, to support contemporary irresponsibilities. Post-war “planning” is the “new propaganda.”

Discussions of the future which accept the present basis for it serve either as diversions from immediate realities or as tacit intellectual sanctions of future disasters. The post-war world is already rather clearly scheduled by authoritative decisions. Apparently, it is to be a balance of power within the collective domination of three great powers. We move from individual to collective domination, as the nations which have shown themselves mightiest in organizing world violence take on the leadership of the peaceful world. Such collective dominance may lead either to counter-alliances and bigger wars, or to decisions not effectively responsible to the man who is born in India or on an island of the Caribbean.

There is very little serious public discussion of these facts and prospects, or of the causes of the current war. Yet the way to avoid war is to recognize its causes within each nation and then remove them. Writers simply accept war as given, refer to December 7 when it all began, and then talk of the warless future. Nobody goes further in the scholarly directions of the inter-war investigations of the causes of modern wars. All that is forgotten, hidden beneath the rather meaningless shield, “Isolationist”. It is easier to discuss an anchorless future, where there are as yet no facts, than to face up to the troublesome questions of the present and recent past.

In the covenants of power the future is being planned, even if later it must be laid down in blood with a sword. The powerless intellectual as planner may set up contrary expectations; he will later see the actual function of his “planning”. He is leading a prayer and such prayer is a mass indirection.

Discussion of world affairs that does not proceed in terms of the struggle for power within each nation is interesting only in the political uses now made of it by those in power. Internal power struggles are the only determinants of international affairs which we may influence. The effective way to plan the world's future is to criticize the decisions of the present. Unless it is at every point so anchored, “planning” disguises the world that is actually in the works; it is therefore a dangerous disguise which permits a spurious escape from the anxieties surrounding the decisions and happenings of the present.

V

The writer tends to believe that problems are *really* going to be solved in *his* medium, that of the word. Thus he often underplays the threat of violence, the coercive power always present in decisive political questions. This keeps the writer's mind and energies in general channels, where he can talk safely of justice and freedom. Since the model of his type of controversy is rational argumentation, rather than skilled violence or stupid rhetoric, it keeps him from seeing these other and historically more decisive types of controversy. These results of the writer's position, his work and its effects, are quite convenient for the working politician, for they generally serve to cover the nature of his struggles and decisions with ethically elaborated disguises. As the channels of communication become more and more monopolized and party machines and economic pressures, based on vested shams, continue to monopolize the chances of effective political organization, his opportunities to act and to communicate politically are minimized. The political intellectual is, increasingly, an employee living off the communicational machineries which are based on the very opposite of what he would like to stand for. He would like to stand for a politics of truth in a democratically responsible society. But such efforts as he has made in behalf of freedom for his function have been defeated.

The defeat is not at the hands of an enemy that is clearly defined. Even given the power, no one could easily work his will with our situation, nor succeed in destroying its effects with one blow. It is always easier to locate an external enemy than grapple with an internal condition. Our impersonal defeat has spun a tragic plot and many are betrayed by what is false within them.

FUNNY THING

At Malvern College, Laborite Home Secretary Herbert Morrison told an audience of upper-crust British boys that more socialism has been accomplished in Britain by the Conservative Party, which opposes socialism, than by the Labor Party, which espouses it. Added Mr. Morrison: “This is the funny thing about British politics, which only an Englishman understands, and not many of them understand it, but this is how we get along.”

—“Time”, Feb. 21, 1944

O BRAVE NEW WORLD!

In his new book, *What Is Hypnosis?*, Andrew Salter offers a breathtaking project: teaching autohypnosis to soldiers. Says he: “Simple mass procedure applied to soldiers could quickly filter out one of five or at worst one of eight who can quickly be taught to make themselves immune to such sounds and pains as they wish. It is not impossible to imagine battalions of self-anesthetized soldiers going into battle.”

—“Time”, March 6, 1944

The Cause that Refreshes

Four Delicious Freedoms

Some of my friends in, around and under the Government tell me that I do not take this war seriously enough. Others tell me I take it too seriously. In an effort to clear up things, I have formulated a slightly revised edition of the Four Freedoms. Of course, my edition does not alter the philosophical purity of the original concept: it only shifts the emphasis to a new type of freedom: the freedom from order. It is my hope that the following suggestions will be as constructive as the bombings with which the Allied air forces are now preparing the peoples of Europe for a new era of everlasting peace.

The changes I propose are very slight. By simply shifting a few prepositions—harmless, modest little words—we get the most valuable results. Specifically:

Freedom of Speech should become *Freedom from Speech*

Freedom of Worship should become *Freedom from Worship*

Freedom from Want should become *Freedom of Want*

Freedom from Fear should become *Freedom of Fear*

Let me explain.

I. FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

This includes all speeches, from the lascivious allurements of advertising, which bring man, via the long detour of his sexual instincts, to satisfy his thirst with liquids that taste like sleeping feet, to the speeches of Churchill, Roosevelt, Wallace and others. It goes without saying that Hitler's and Mussolini's speeches are also on the list, under the heading of "political advertising".

Many will object to the inclusion of the inspiring speeches by our war leaders, but they are even more dangerous than the others. Take for example Churchill's speech in which he said: "*This is not a war of dynasties, chieftains or kings, it is a war of causes and ideals.*" Or the Wallace Common-Man speech, or Roosevelt's appeals to revolt in Italy. Many Italians who received copies of those speeches dropped from Allied airplanes, and kept them in their pockets at the risk of their lives, are now exhibiting them at Allied Headquarters and saying: "Here are your promises, why don't you keep them?" This is what happens when communications are slow and badly organized. Those poor devils have not yet been freed from the spell of the above speeches, which was not meant to last that long and to create such strong illusions of good faith. Had they also received a copy of Churchill's last speech in which he says "This is *no time* for ideological preferences," or of Roosevelt's declaration of July 1943 that he would not stand for anarchy and disorder, no such misunderstandings would have arisen. It is useless to reproach the O.W.I. for failing to send copies of those later "corrections" to Italy; the people in Nazi-occupied Italy would have refused to give up their illusions. The only answer therefore is: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH.

II. FREEDOM FROM WORSHIP

This includes not only the worship of Kings, Fuehrers and Duces, but also the True Faith, which must be discovered in a state of complete freedom. The Italians remember how long it took to persuade the Pope that the sun stood still and the earth danced around it. Only a few centuries ago this view was regarded as highly libelous and communistic, and the local F.B.I. made things very hot for those who insisted on thus slandering the Astronomic Supremacy of our Planet. They recall for example that Galileo's discovery of the pendulum was also regarded as "untimely", to say the least, and when he began blabbing about confidential goings on in the heavens, he was made to sign a declaration promising to mind his business and stop staying out late at night to look at the Pope's sky. The Italians remember these and other things, and so do the Spaniards. But today it is the great Protestant powers that place them again under the rule of the priests, in accordance with their ignorant belief that the Italians "belong" to the Church. Public schools are once more placed under Catholic authority, and thus the progress of a whole century of struggle for independence is annulled in the very name of Liberty. The answer therefore is: FREEDOM FROM WORSHIP.

III. FREEDOM OF WANT

Let me illustrate this kind of freedom. Once, on a hot day in August, I offered one lira to a Neapolitan beggar who was sleeping in the sunshine. I wanted him to carry my suitcases. "No." "Two lira." "No. I've had my lunch." "But you will want your dinner." At this, he sprang to his feet, not to carry my suitcases as I thought for a second, but to shout: "Mind your own business! My hunger belongs to me!" This proud kind of want should be protected by the Third Freedom against the slanderous attacks of those barbarians who can never relax and who therefore claim that moneymaking is a nobler activity than sleeping in the sunshine.

Other forms of want should also remain free: the hunger for independence which in many people accompanies the hunger for food. Some time ago, Badoglio told the Allies that if they would only place him in charge of the distribution of food, he could use it to crush all political opposition, because hunger was greater than anger in the Italian people. Up to now, I am glad to say, Amgot has refused to follow this reactionary advice. It has scrupulously observed the Third Freedom, as here amended. The Italian people have been allowed to keep their hunger—600 calories a day as against the hospital standard of 2200 (see *N. Y. Times*, March 19, p. 14). Excellent! But Allied propagandists seem to be ignorant of this enlightened policy of their generals. They keep urging the Italians to work like Trojans and fight like lions in the great cause of democracy—on a diet of 600 calories a day. Badoglio would feed the people so as to control their thoughts. Amgot starves them and leaves them their thoughts. But at once to starve them and control their thoughts, in fact to expect idealistic enthusiasm from them—this is something only an American advertising man could dream up.

It is useless now to reproach the Allies for behaving badly. They have a right to be cynical, dishonest, stupid, anything they may choose to be; but if their presence does not bring about the expected liberation, and only adds to the sufferings of the Italian people, the Italian people have a right to retain their hunger, without having to see these ominous liberators in their midst all the time. The answer therefore is: FREEDOM OF WANT.

IV. FREEDOM OF FEAR

This should include not only the freedom to fear Mussolini and Hitler, who by now can no longer impress the European peoples, but also to fear the Allies themselves and their invertebrate faith in democracy. Why not be afraid of the new Governor of Sicily, a former policeman of the combined Ovra and Gestapo organizations, now a civil servant of the liberators? Yet anyone who expresses such healthy fears is called a defeatist. And why not fear the United Nations, fear that the peace may be even worse than the war, after one has seen that even the sugary nonsense of the Atlantic Charter proves too great an impediment to the dishonest plans of Mr. Churchill? But such fears are not licensed under the present rationing system. It is useless now to teach the Great Defenders of Democracy that fear should be withdrawn from corpses and extended

to a few more living people, but if the people choose not to smile at their orgy of innocence, and to be afraid of everybody, of the dark nationalist beasts like Senator Reynolds, Lindbergh and Gerald Smith, and also of the only existing alternatives to these frightening forces, well let them be free to tremble in every limb of their body, for they are always the first to get hurt, either on the giving or the receiving end of the constructive bombing; they are obliged to believe, to smile, to be enthusiastic; the big boys are exempt from ideologies unless the Nazis are too damn close to England; the big boys can afford to liberate the people from their King, or the King from his angry victims, if they so choose to do; and before the big boys get hurt it takes a hell of a long time. Badoglio doesn't have to eat out of a garbage-can, and still, he is less innocent than the Neapolitan people who *are* eating out of garbage cans. Petain, King George, King Victor Emanuel, King Peter, Franco, Salazar, Mannerheim, and a few others, just change from a discredited German currency to the good old American greenbacks, that's all. Why should we not be free to fear the governments of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin which leave to such architects the building of considerable areas of the World of the Four Freedoms?

We must, therefore, demand: FREEDOM OF FEAR FOR EVERYBODY ON EARTH.

NICCOLO TUCCI

Twenty and ONE

The New Imperialism in Latin America

Arthur Pincus

SOMETHING has happened to imperialism. One finds repeated recognition of this fact in current writings. Current American imperialism, we are told, is "different;" we are also told that it is not imperialism at all, but a progressive force that will use "cooperative international planning" to achieve a post-war economy of abundance.

This type of logomachy is not new, nor, in the light of all they now subscribe to, is it surprising that it has caught up so many of the old intellectual leaders of liberals and the left. Yet I submit that it is an illuminating sidelight on the confusion of our times that it is precisely at the moment that imperialism has become most centralized, persuasive and all-pervading in our national life that many liberals and left wing leaders are hailing its demise.

The reason for this attitude is not far to seek. And to understand it fully, it would be useful to clear our minds once and for all of conventional patterns and what some one has called the "old single-track dogmas" concerning imperialism.

It is true that in recent years old-fashioned imperialism has been disintegrating, or failing that has become softened and much modified for the better. The Latin American countries have achieved formal political and (a measure of) economic independence, Ireland has finally gotten independence, the dominions of the British Empire are self-

governing, the freedom of India is actually a distinct possibility. From these unquestionable facts, many liberals deduce (1) that the disintegration has been evolutionary, in response to democratic pressure, and connected somehow with "progress," "reform" and "gradualism"; and (2) that after victory in the war the disintegration will have been completed and the way paved for greater democracy, freedom and economic security for all the weaker nations and subject areas of the world. But the crucial questions are: one, *why* has the old imperialism been disintegrating? and two, *what* has taken its place?

It is obvious that the actual disappearance of imperialism would imply a fundamental change in the economic, political and social organization of our society. At last glance this had not taken place. Hence to answer the first question we must trace the degeneration of monopoly capitalism (of which the old imperialism is an organic part) during the period between the two wars of our generation. To answer the second question, we must understand that on the ruins of the old capitalism has arisen a new structure that, for want of a better name, we shall call "State capitalism," in which, in varying degree both at home and abroad, economic and political control has become centralized in the State apparatus.

In other words, we have this: *monopoly capitalism has*

revealed a progressive atrophy of many of its essential functions, imperialism being one of these functions; hence, as control of the imperialist process has slipped from the hands of private finance capital, imperialism per se has not disappeared; what has happened is that the function has been taken over more and more by the State.

To find out what this new State-controlled imperialism is like requires a quick glance backward at the past history of our imperialist relations with the other Americas.

Imperialism, Old Style (1916-1929)

The old pattern of imperialism in Latin America is familiar enough; the starvation, misery, chaos and violence it brought have been catalogued repeatedly. Briefly, the bankers, industrialists and merchants of the various nations struggled among themselves for oil, mining and agricultural investments, for exploitation of the labor of depressed-standard-of-living natives, for a free and high hand in making loans, for a market for manufactured goods.

At a certain point of impasse in the economic struggle, the State power was called in to run interference through diplomatic and foreign office channels and through the use of its battleships and armies. Sometimes this power was used against the natives of the weak but recalcitrant colonial or independent state, sometimes against the nationals of a rival power. The naked power pressure used on the eight Caribbean states in 1923 to sign treaties foregoing the "right of revolution" (later put forward as justification for the landing of marines in Nicaragua) is an example of the first type; the last war is an explosive example of the second.

The important thing to bear in mind is that at every point in this sequence it was the private capitalist who held the initiative, sought the overseas market, initiated loans, made foreign investments, summoned the State power to his aid when the economic struggle no longer sufficed, reaped the profits if his side emerged the victor.

The imperialist drive of the United States among the ten independent countries of South America did not actually get under way until 1916-1918. Up to that time the great preponderance of our imperial interests had been in the Caribbean and Central American countries and in Mexico, where something over two billion dollars in direct investments had been made.

The outbreak of World War 1, however, permitted us to move in on lands farther south, previously dominated chiefly by England and coveted since the turn of the century by imperial Germany. In 1913 the investments of U. S. banks and corporations in South America were estimated at only about \$175 million; at the close of 1930 these investments had swelled to well over three billion.

The trade curve also rose. In 1914 United States exports to South America were \$88 million, in 1918 \$294.5 million, in 1920 \$613 million and in 1929 \$537 million. *The 1929 figure represented about 29 percent of that continent's total imports for the year, the 1920 figure about 33 percent, and the 1918 figure about 25 percent. In 1914 the percentage had been 12.5!*

If this proved that imperialism, old style, could still reap profits from war by exploiting new foreign markets,

a glimpse behind the figures will show (1) that after the last war finance capital emerged as the dominant factor in the imperialist process; and (2) that the same process that piled up profits was piling up grief for the Latin Americans and also piling up insoluble contradictions among the three types of American capitalist imperialist expansion in Hispanic-America, namely, trade, loans and capital investment.

The post-1918 period was a period of glut for both manufactured goods and raw materials. World prices collapsed; the result was the heavy losses of the 1920 deflation. For the United States this was a period of comparatively orderly readjustment; for most Latin American countries less well cushioned against such shocks, it was a plunge into chronic economic invalidism from which several did not recover until the very outbreak of this war.

Cuba is a good, if spectacular, example. Cuba saw the price of sugar nose-dive from 22½ cents on May 19, 1920, to 3¾ cents on December 13, 1920. *Colonos and centrales* could not pay off American bank loans, and from this time on, the story of American imperialism in Cuba became a bankers' story.

The economies of the other Hispanic-American countries were not as directly tied to the United States banking system as was the Cuban. Nevertheless, the story of American imperialism in these countries during the decade 1920-1930 was also substantially a bankers' story. For while American loans were financing reconstruction in Europe, thus creating a new demand for Latin American raw materials, they were also enhancing the buying power of the Latin American countries, whose purchases of consumer goods were held down by the low prices of primary products as compared with manufactured goods.

This artificial closing of the gap was a double outrage on the Latin Americans, penalized first by the spread between the labor value of raw materials and the labor value of manufactured goods, sharply imposed by the industrial world; and then further impoverished by the necessity of paying high interest on bankers' loans; loans, moreover, made to dictators who in many cases spent the proceeds unwisely, passing on only the debts to the people.

The American capitalist whose interest in Latin America was selling goods was also caught in the noose of this contradiction. And here we see a classic example of the rivalry within the national framework of the three types of capitalist imperialism. Thus, in Latin America loans began as the hand-maiden but ended as the strangler of trade. During the bond-selling orgy of South American securities between 1920 and 1929, American investment bankers distributed South American government bonds aggregating a face value of \$1,600,000,000.* The bankers'

* If only to recall the atmosphere of those frenzied days, let us examine one of these bond issues—by no means the worst. Between 1921 and 1927, Dillon, Read and Co. floated long-term Brazilian issues with a face value of \$176.5 million. Dillon, Read paid from 84 to 91, except for one small issue which cost 94.5. The spread on the small issue was 2 points; on the rest it ranged from 4.5 to 8. One \$25 million issue was earmarked for the electrification of a railway; to this date the road is not electrified. Dillon, Read's profits were so fat that a dummy corporation, the Eastern Trading Company, was set up to reduce income taxes. (See J. Fred Rippey's excellent *South America and Hemisphere Defense*, Louisiana State University Press, 1941. Also, W. Feuerlein and E. Hannan's *Dollars in Latin America: An Old Problem in a New Setting*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1941.)

spread averaged about 5 points, or about \$320 million; incidental expenses such as bribes to Latin American officials, agents' fees, etc. amounted, at a conservative estimate, to another \$5 million; funding operations and consolidations of debt which provided another bankers' feast took roughly about \$200 million; so that the total proceeds for the South American countries on more than a billion and a half indebtedness was a little more than one billion dollars.

Fed by this, American trading companies did very well at first; Latin American imports from the United States nearly doubled between 1922 and 1929. However, initial profit was followed by collapse. Most of the issues went sour (approximately 68 percent of the South American bonds are still in partial or total default). And from 1930 to 1936, the piled-up obligations, on which Washington and the bankers demanded payment, prevented the resumption of anything resembling normal trade. The bankers loaded most of the loss on the individual American investors. *But the real loss was taken by the trading companies, who with vast accumulations of surplus products in the United States all through the post-1929 years, paid the cost of the loans many times over in the form of goods they were prevented from selling.*

Capital investment added its own set of contradictions. Argentine railways, Mexican copper, Bolivian tin, Colombian petroleum, Costa Rican bananas, Cuban sugar, Chilean nitrate, and Brazilian light and power all illustrate the point. Necessarily placing the emphasis not on social and economic progress essential for an expansion of the market for manufactured goods but rather on security of property and a cheap labor supply, capital investment aided the continuance in power of brutal feudal dictatorships. Siphoning out of the country enormous profits that should have been used to build schools, roads and health programs, capital investment kept the countries of Latin America chained to their one-crop economies.

The Rise of Economic Nationalism

When the 1929 depression struck, the entire structure of American capitalist imperialism was shaken. Between 1929 and 1932, total United States trade with Latin America slid from \$911.5 million to \$198.5 million.

In other words, American capitalists lost every vestige of the commercial advantage gained during the World War. But this was not all. The more advanced Latin American countries seized the opportunity to break out of the one-way street which is the one-crop raw material system. Industrialization had already begun toward the close of the last war; beginning in the 1930's, economic nationalism and encouragement of native industry became rampant.

To consider only the industrialization among the four principal ABCP powers:

ARGENTINE in 1930 had only five spinning mills employing 4,000 persons; in 1937 there were 4,727 mills employing 77,000 workers. *The total number of industrial establishments in the country today is nearly 50,000, employing more than half a million workers out of a total population of 13,000,000. Argentine manufactures about one-third of its consumption of cotton goods, three-fifths of its linen,*

all of its shoes and woolen goods and most of its cement and tires. Motor vehicles, radios, refrigerators and similar products are largely assembled in branch factories of American and British ownership which are part of an industrial "migration" that took place after 1936. On the other hand, the Argentine government, through its National Meat Board, has entered into direct competition with foreign-owned packing plants such as Swift, Armour, etc., and has greatly encouraged the processing of native foodstuffs (flour, sugar, etc.).

BRAZIL in 1920 had 13,300 industrial establishments, employing 275,000 workers; in 1935 she had over 58,000 industrial establishments, employing more than two million workers out of a total population of 48,000,000. Brazil now has some 600 textile mills, whose production of cloth rose from 760 million yards in 1927 to nearly two billion yards in 1940. Most of its industrial power is electric of hydraulic origin. In São Paulo, which has grown from a city of a few hundred thousand to one of over a million, it has one of the most highly industrialized cities of the world. Brazil today supplies the needs of its people in paints, cotton and woolen goods, nuts, bolts, screws, buttons and matches, and has growing industries in jute, cement, iron and steel and chemicals. As of 1941, the value of Brazil's industrial production surpassed that of agriculture by more than 20 percent (and Brazilian agriculture—although only 3 percent of the arable land is cultivated—produces the world's largest crop of coffee, second largest of cocoa, third largest of corn, fifth largest of cotton, fifth largest of sugar, seventh largest of meat and ninth largest of rice).

CHILE officially placed its industry at 100 for the 1927-1929 period; in 1936 the index stood at 146, and is probably much higher today. More than 30 per cent of the country's gainfully employed are now in industrial activities. A broad program of State participation in export industries and public utilities was instituted in 1940. Chile is now supplying all of its domestic needs for woolen textiles, pharmaceutical and allied products, shoes and tannery products, cement, glassware, tobacco and products of wood. Her textile and jute mills are among the most modern in the world, and her industrial chemical and iron and steel industries are expanding rapidly, aided by the only considerable supply of coal in South America.

PERU, though less advanced along the road of industrialization than the countries mentioned above, nevertheless has clothing, shoe, cement, paint, aluminum ware, meat packing and furniture industries that supply a large proportion of domestic needs.

Hand in hand with industrialization has come the deliberate fostering of economic nationalism, whereby a whole series of entangling laws, codes and restrictions have for the first time put teeth into such nationalist slogans as "Mexico for the Mexicans" and "Brazil for the Brazilians." Tariffs, exchange controls, capital export taxes, import licenses, managed currencies, government encouragement of labor unions to harass foreign capital, differential freight rates, direct trade subsidies and special anti-foreign regulations limiting the transfer of profits out of the countries where they are amassed soon had the American investor and trader caught like flies on fly paper.

The Nazis Show the Way

As is well known, Nazi Germany was the first to trim its sails to the new wind in Latin America. This was done by breaking all the rules; that is, by discarding all the traditional methods of conducting international trade and exchange. The Nazi government, as a State, went directly into business. From this proceeded double money, *aski*-marks and all the other blocked currencies, State subsidized exporters, and direct State negotiated agreements with South American countries which resulted in their diverting purchases to Germany from countries they had ordinarily bought in.

Apparently even the pursuit of profit, which is what had made capitalist imperialism tick, was summarily set aside. Between 1936 and 1939, Germany was quoting prices for her goods averaging 20 percent less than those offered by American manufacturers and buying, albeit in restricted marks, valuable stock-piles of raw materials at higher than world market prices.

In 1936, 1937 and 1938 Germany forged ahead of Great Britain in exports to every South American country except Argentine and Uruguay; shoved the United States out of first place in exports to Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay; and was giving hot chase to the United States for first place in Chile. The spearhead of Germany's trade advance was pointed mainly at five countries: Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay. The German imports of these countries made up the bulk of the more than 15 percent of Latin America's total imports supplied by Germany in 1937 and the more than 17 percent supplied in 1938. For the same years England's figures were 12 and 11 and those for the United States 33 and 34.

In all, covering the five-year period 1932-1937, it has been estimated that German export trade to Latin America as a whole increased 178 percent. In Central America—our own particular backyard—German export trade increased 500 percent.

But figures alone cannot possibly give the full measure of this trade rivalry—the most ruthless the world has ever known. If it was difficult for the Nazis to break the Anglo-American monopoly on mine and oil industries, the Nazis ran ahead of the British and Americans in transportation, steamship and particularly air lines, and in supplying machinery, tooling and engineering for new manufacturing industries.

Under the Germans, too, instruments of propaganda were used to play an important role in imperialist rivalry for the first time. The government-controlled German News Agency furnished a low-cost radio teletype service throughout Latin America with which neither AP, UP, Reuters nor Havas could compete for cheapness and rapidity of distribution. Transocean Radio, also Nazi government-controlled, was on the air throughout Latin America with excellent programs from 7 in the morning to midnight. And in addition to scores of German language newspapers published in Brazil, Chile, Argentine and other countries, heavy advertising in the native press served either wholly to stifle criticism or else to buy warm journalistic friends; in many other instances there was strong ground for belief that the native press was secretly owned or subsidized by the Nazis.

The individual American businessman, no matter how powerful, was helpless before this closely coordinated drive of trade, communications, and propaganda. This was not trade war in the old sense. It was War; the sneak punch, Pearl Harbor and the blitz all rolled in one. Moreover, the side that was waging the war did not have to wait, in accordance with the classic rules of capitalist imperialist war, for a formal declaration to effect that shift of control from private capitalism to the State which mobilizes total national resources. The Nazi State, having taken over private trade and finance, was using economic as once only military weapons had been used.

Enter the State

Against this background, the counter-use of the American State power in conducting the imperialist struggle takes on perspective. Beginning in 1936, the cultivation of the Latin Americans became a major assignment not only of the State Department but also of the Treasury, Labor, War, Navy, Agriculture and Commerce Departments, and of virtually every other government agency and bureau (including the Indian Bureau) whose acts or decisions were capable of affecting any phase of inter-American relations. The State Department, in addition, has also established a special Division of Cultural Relations with Latin America, which has a tidy budget all its own. Hovering over all, as a kind of traffic manager, is the Nelson A. Rockefeller Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs whose \$3 million budget in August 1940 has expanded to some \$130 million.

Obviously the Latin Americans felt no compelling urge to bring good-will to us; the blandishments were all on our side. As a matter of fact, the military and upper class circles of South America were very much at home with the social ideas exported by the Nazis along with their binoculars and aspirin. Besides, Latin America's interests are best served when the great powers of the world compete for its products, rather than when a single great power such as the United States monopolizes exports and is the sole source of imports. But since South America is a "reflex continent," dependent on what happens in Europe and North America, the Latin Americans dutifully attended the conferences—the special Buenos Aires Peace Conference in 1936, the regular but much-augmented Pan-American Conference at Lima in 1938, and the special consultative meetings of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 1939 and Havana in 1940—but just as dutifully left the initiative, drive and control (and most of the rhetoric) to the United States.

That rhetoric was, and is, of two kinds. The first is addressed to the masses of Latin America over the heads of their dictators; the masses who supported Republican Spain against Franco and who are truly anti-fascist. The second is addressed to the dictators, the military and the Catholic Church, who are termed democracy's best allies in the Western World.

Carleton Beals has pointed out that no more dangerous words for the peace of Latin America were ever spoken than those uttered by President Roosevelt in Buenos Aires in 1936. Taken literally, his ardent championing of demo-

cratic and constitutional government in both Americas was a call for bloody revolution in most of the twenty countries south of us. His winged words were spoken to one of the worst gatherings of official murderers, political gangsters and anti-democrats ever assembled in any one place at any one time in the world's history. Had it not been that the peoples of Latin America, while admirers of rhetoric, do not necessarily act upon it, his words might well have been a clarion call to mount barricades and strike for freedom.

This has been the official atmosphere of the various conferences promoting "Hemisphere Solidarity." But the conferences, like the many scores of plans and projects that flowed from them, have been mere window-dressing for far more practical matters, namely, the winning away of the Latin American governments from German influence and the consequent taking over by the United States government of an imperialist function that the private businessman, by his fumbling and contradictory methods, had proved incapable of fulfilling.

In early 1940, the chief need of the Latin American countries was for loans to carry their unmarketable surpluses, to stabilize their exchanges and to finance purchases from the United States. But the money was not forthcoming from American bankers. Indeed, private investment bankers in the United States had quite openly lost their nerve, refusing to chance export capital because (1) profit opportunities were less attractive, and (2) the bold moves of Mexico and Bolivia in expropriating foreign oil holdings had given them an unholy scare.

In late 1940, 1941 and 1942 the shoe was pinching the other foot: the United States was in desperate need of help from Latin American countries. The threat and then the actual cutting off of Far Eastern sources of vital war materials demanded immediate substitute development of these strategic supplies in the Western Hemisphere. But in this case, too, normal capitalist imperialist trade and investment channels were of little help.

Throughout Latin America the memory was still lively of the abuses perpetrated by American financiers in the 1920's. A native industrialist or banker in a country like Mexico, Brazil or Chile sounds like a third-period Stalinist in his denunciation of imperialist greed and exploitation; he wants to reserve the privilege of exploiting native labor and agriculture for himself. Economic nationalism backed him up; and new American private capital was either wholly prevented from entering Latin America, or else it was hedged in by so many restrictions and anti-foreign taxes that very little of it would take the risk.

Therefore, since 1940 all loans to Latin America for such projects as armaments, naval bases, new industries, adaptation and expansion of old ones, new agricultural ventures, improvements of roads and other means of transportation—once the sacred precincts for exploitation by private capital!—have been made with government capital through the Export-Import Bank and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; which is to say, they have been made by the State power itself.

For the first time in the history of American imperialism, the debtor-creditor connection has thus been taken out of Wall Street and brought into the sphere of inter-govern-

mental relationships, with the twenty Hispanic-American countries twenty debtor countries—as *States*, and the United States the one creditor nation—as a *State*. All of which goes the Nazis one better; throughout their trade drive they were unable to tie any of the Latin American countries to themselves through loans—their tight economy, preparing for war, permitted itself no such luxuries.

According to official published figures, the Export-Import Bank has authorized the loan of nearly \$779 million in Latin America, of which the bulk has been made since 1940. A specific Export-Import Bank project, though not necessarily typical since conditions, loans and purposes of loans vary from country to country, is the new Brazilian steel plant at Volta Redona. The Brazilian government retains a 50 percent interest in the project, and the rest of the stock has been distributed among native capitalists. The Export-Import Bank loan of \$45 million is guaranteed by Banco de Brazil; the money is drawn against credits established in United States banks. The equipment and materials are all specified as American manufactured, the engineering is in American hands, and the technical management and direction when the plant goes into operation will lean heavily on Americans.

In the development of new sources of supply in Latin America for raw materials vital for the American war machine, we again find that the United States government has almost completely replaced the private capitalist *entrepreneur*. More than a year before Pearl Harbor, the United States government organized the Metals Reserve Company, the Rubber Reserve Company and the Rubber Development Corporation. Since that time there have been organized the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Defense Plant Corporation and the United States Commercial Company. The total expended in Latin America by all these subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (up to November 1943) was well over one billion dollars. And in addition, there is the Foreign Economic Administration with its United States Purchasing Commission, concerned with purchases of a politico-economic nature.

And After the War?

This is not to say that the whole structure of private capitalist imperialism is threatened with liquidation. Far from it; private property relations still exist; surely profits have not been eliminated; and it is still as true today as it was before the war that in almost no other great section of the world are natural resources, trade and commerce so completely in the control of foreigners as in Latin America. No; the emphasis is not on liquidation but on the trend which has a new State-directed imperialism co-existing with the old imperialism.

But is direct State intervention in the imperialist process merely a temporary phase of the war economy or has it more permanent features? The answer is not easy.

There are at least two examples of government projects which very likely will revert to private ownership after the war. One is in Cuba and the other in Peru; in both instances, private American capitalists have been nervous over the possibility that the government plans to hand these properties to the two countries in question after the war,

and have conducted a campaign among interested United States Senators to forestall any such likelihood.

The Cuban project is a nickel mine on which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has spent nearly \$33 million for the construction of production facilities, and which the R.F.C.'s Defense Plant Corporation has leased for operation to the Nicaro Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Freeport Sulphur Company, for 10 years. Ownership is clearly in the name of the Defense Plant Corporation. The same is true of the vanadium mine project in Peru on which \$4,000,000 of government funds have been spent and which is leased to the Vanadium Corporation of America.

Further evidence of the intention of private business to step into government's big shoes in Latin America is to be seen in the volume of advertising placed by American firms in Latin America. Most of these companies are on war orders today and cannot fill Latin American orders in any quantity; yet their expenditures for institutional and prestige advertising in 1943 totaled \$16 million.

On the other hand, the case for the carry-over of the new State imperialism—at least for a considerable period after the close of the war—is much the stronger. As matters now stand, the American State holds a financial and military control over Latin America that can quite easily, with intelligent administration, dictate the future of the continent. Today the great areas of the world are rapidly being assembled into a few vast inter-continental empires, each to be dominated by a single great heavy industry power. In such a world the process of domination may be "rationalized" to a point where for military-security reasons the old imperialism of seeking greater profit may weigh less heavily in the scale than the *new imperialism of guaranteeing raw materials*. In this set-up Latin America would be, as it is, invaluable.

As has already been indicated in passing, nearly everything that was once produced in the African and Oriental empires of the British, French, Belgian and Dutch, or an acceptable substitute for it, is now being produced in tropical and sub-tropical Latin America. Neither the quality nor the quantity of some of the products may be all that is desired, but both factors are subject to correction through time, technical skill, agricultural improvements—and above all, a planned economy.

The potentialities of this war-produced transfer of United States purchases from Africa and Asia to Latin America are enormous. Manganese that once came from India, South Africa and the Gold Coast now comes from Brazil, Mexico, Cuba and Chile. Manila hemp and other hard fibers that once came from the Philippines, the East Indies and the South Seas now comes from tropical Brazil and some of the West Indies. The Latin American countries are now the only source of sisal, flax, castor oil and rapeseed oil, furnish us all our imported supply of tung oil, 10 percent of our requirements of certain oils used for soaps, glycerins and plasticizers, and large quantities of balsa wood and mahogany required in the naval and aviation programs.

It is estimated that over a period of about 10 years a considerable portion of the rubber and all of the quinine needs of the United States could be developed in Brazil, Bolivia and the Central American countries, freeing us of dependence on British and Dutch colonies. In Haiti alone,

for example, the Rubber Development Corporation has spent nearly \$5 million planting cryptostegia, a rubber-bearing vine.

Obviously if there is substance to the proposals that are being made by leading industrialists and Army officials to place the war economy on a permanent footing, then Washington's long-term plans for Latin America must inevitably include retaining a hold over raw material sources through the present system of State-dominated imperialism. A return to old-style exploitation would be risky, even if possible. The Latin Americans are already much too sophisticated, and the United States will not wish to see a revival of widespread anti-American feeling. State control, plus the system of Pan-American conferences, apparently keeps this down to a minimum.

The Missionary Yields to the Doctor

I think it is significant that the classic symbol of 19th century imperialism was the missionary who, in all-too-unconscious innocence, paved the way for glass beads, trade gin and Maxim guns with theology and hymn books; and that the equally unconscious forerunner of the more subtle and persuasive form of imperialist enterprise in our time should be the doctor.

This doctor, as is well known, works out of Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. It is his job—and he is doing very well at it—to bring health and sanitation to those areas in Hispanic-America from which the flow of war-strategic materials is impeded by the low state of health of the workers. He is today as disinterestedly absorbed in saving bodies as his counterpart was once absorbed in saving souls.*

Along with the doctor there goes the industrial technician and engineer, the radio script writer, the public relations expert, the artist, the poet and the movie actor—all of whom are part of the Coordinator's Office or secured through it. Indeed so many Americans of these and related professions have appeared in Brazil that the Brazilians have taken to referring to their coming as "an invasion of friendly paratroopers," with an ironic inflection on the word, "friendly."

A million words or more a month of canned news and feature stories, describing the might of American arms and industry, flow from the Coordinator's Office to Latin Americans newspapers. A flock of short-wave radio programs and documentary films hammer away at the same point. Eighty thousand copies of a huge, expensively-printed, slick-paper magazine called *En Guardia*, its format patterned on *Life*, are distributed monthly among Latin American government officials.

When this magazine is not backing up the job of the

* The parallel goes further. Half a century ago the missionary turned a deaf ear to the outcry of Far Eastern peoples that "religious invasions of Oriental countries are tantamount to filibustering expeditions." (Quoted in Mark Twain's impassioned outburst against imperialism in his piece, *To the Person Sitting in Darkness*.) Today the United States medical emissary does not hear the outcry of Manuel Ugarte, the so-called *Yanquiphobe* of Argentine, who once wrote to President Wilson: "We desire that measures of sanitation shall not serve to diminish the sovereignty of the nations of the Pacific . . . that the star-spangled banner cease to be a symbol of oppression in the New World."

radio, film and news services, it publishes articles lauding notorious Latin American dictators as zealous defenders of liberty, freedom and the good life. What matter if these dictators maintain the only concentration camp in the Western Hemisphere in which a country interns its own nationals (Paraguay); torture and murder political opponents (Peru, Brazil, many others); stifle the press and free assembly (practically every Latin American "republic")? The dictators are flattered into cooperation and invariably reprint the articles in their controlled press; their benumbed populations cannot fail to see the point when they read such articles side by side with those expounding the power of American tanks, planes, guns; quite clearly democratic American might is on the side of those who trample on democracy at home.

Twenty and ONE

The control of the imperialist process has thus slipped from the hands of private finance capital to the State. In one sense it is more enlightened than the old kinds of imperialism, as it is certainly more centrally directed and planned. Its new superstructural form has made possible plans and projects that were beyond the scope of the old apparatus. An obvious example is Lend-Lease to Latin American countries. Another is the long-term loan for projects such as roads, irrigation and drainage which will be a long time, if ever, in returning direct income. A third example is purchases made entirely because of political considerations. The United States government has bought, for instance, Chile's output of gold, which does not rate shipping space to New York; the cotton crops of Peru, Nicaragua and Haiti, which surely have no market here and hence are staying right in their respective countries; and has put \$1 million into Brazilian nuts, which Leo T. Crowley, administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, admits represent a 75 percent loss. All these obviously uneconomic transactions are defended by the State on the grounds of higher political interest, which means simply that economic unrest in any one of these countries might upset the whole Pan-American appletart.

Thus pursuit of greater profit may, for the moment, not be the primary driving force of the new imperialism. Actually it is responsive to other drives, particularly the pursuit of political-military-monopoly control over raw material sources, which may better serve the national interest.

Its larger pattern of control makes possible not only a greater degree of economic control than we have known heretofore; its orderliness and reasonableness imply a more easily maintained degree of political control. The buying of dictators is a relatively simple job. It must be admitted that scores of men and parties of integrity in Latin America have been bought with another kind of coin—their belief that the United States in fighting Nazi reaction will not use her victory to impose her own brand of reaction on the weak countries of the New World.

Practically every telling voice against *Yanqui* imperialism in Latin America has been stilled, including of course the Stalinists who are today the most fervent drum-beaters

for Good Neighbor collaboration and trust in the United States' good intentions. More important than the Stalinists are men like Haya de la Torre and Manuel Seoane, leaders of the Aprista movement; Américo Ghioldi, outstanding figure among the younger Argentine Socialists; and the scores of liberal, Socialist and trade union leaders in Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba and Mexico. They have led their followers to believe, as indeed so many liberal and left leaders of our own country believe, that the power of the One can be offset by the power of the twenty at the open inter-American conferences—which decide nothing; overlooking the closed session in the Latin American office of the State Department—which decide everything.

A Letter on the Michigan Third Party Conference

Dear Macdonald:

I chaired the panel on "policy and program" and can report a few first hand facts and views about the third party conference. Despite the fact that a few days before the conference, R. J. Thomas spoke over the radio reminding UAW Locals of CIO policy and trying to discourage attendance, about 350 delegates and no less than 150 visitors attended. I do not have a breakdown of the representation but I know that most delegates were from CIO unions, and the rest came from AFL unions, farm organizations and a few spoke for obscure "money bug" outfits.

What surprised and pleased me was the manner in which the boys got down to cases in the discussion groups. While the discussion on program was often terribly confused, it nevertheless showed clearly that the delegates have little faith in the ability of the Democrats and the Republicans to deliver the country from unemployment and its accompanying evils. After four hours of talking, arguing, clarifying and formulating, our panel came out with a program, a copy of which I am sending you.

This program was considered too "socialistic" by some of the third party leaders, who thought it might scare away farmers and middle-class elements. So the program was considerably watered down when reported out at the Sunday afternoon session. This made the delegates who participated in the panel sore as hell and they served warning that, to quote one of them, "No UAW brass hats are going to take this party over in order to slow it up!"

I'd say that the attitude of the delegates was positively refreshing. They seemed convinced that the new party is needed and appeared determined to put it over "from the bottom up and not from the top down". Undoubtedly much sound educational work can be carried on in the neighborhood recruiting clubs which the movement will sponsor. When you can get 57 people to hold together in a room for four hours, eagerly talking about how to get public ownership without allowing bureaucrats to take over—that's something you can no longer do in the unions. And as far as I'm concerned the chief value of the movement for a long time to come will be that it offers an opportunity to do just such an educational job.

It may interest you to know that the Trotskyites (of the Cannon group) argued vehemently in favor of omitting

all reference to public ownership and limiting the demands to immediate issues. In this they were far to the right of what one of them called the "scissor-bill delegates". Later when the conference voted to name their party the Michigan Commonwealth Federation and to include other socially useful groups, the Trotskyites said they would pull out because "This is not going to be a farmer-labor party, but just another popular front". Later they changed their minds, and I got it straight from their people here that they will string along.

The Commies of course are doing everything possible to discredit the movement and to besmirch those active in it, accusing them of violating CIO policy, deliberately attempting to defeat the commander-in-chief, etc., etc. Unfortunately in this as in other things they exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numbers.

While the Conference did not endorse FDR, it certainly did not come out against him. It voted definitely *not* to

run a presidential candidate this year. To my knowledge, no surveys have been taken to find out how auto workers felt about FDR, but judging from what the boys say when the subject comes up, they more or less still think he is the next thing to God.

Next move will be a constitutional convention, which will be held sometime in July. There is no doubt that the party will run at least a few state and local candidates, otherwise it will not even make the papers any more. No one can say with any authority how many will be run nor who they will be.

It *seems* to me that the militants will have to guard against the attempt of the union big shots to jump in and harness the tide when they see that they will not be able to stem it. Many rank and filers are fully alert to this danger too.

Sincerely,

DETROIT, MICH.

FRANK MARQUART

The Soviet Union: A New Class Society

Peter Meyer

(This is the second part of Mr. Meyer's Article. The first part appeared in the March issue.—ED.)

Main and Intermediate Classes

There are two main classes in Soviet society. The "place in production" and the "relation to the means of production" of one class consists in its absolute lack of individual or collective power over the means of production. It has no voice as to what is to be produced, and how and where; how production is to be organized, its products distributed, and their prices fixed.* Its members cannot participate in the determination of their conditions of work and their pay. They must work, obey, and live in poverty. Far from being masters of the means of production, they are their appendages in a far more literal sense than are their fellows in the bourgeois democracies. Their incomes are confined to the most essential and elementary articles of subsistence, and often amount to less than that, even though they support the whole of society by their labor. They are the exploited.

There is another class of people, who control the means of production. They decide what is to be produced, and how and where; what prices, wages, bonuses, and rewards are to be paid, and how social products are to be distributed. Their power of command over the means and processes of production and their power to dispose of its prod-

ucts is unlimited from below, but subordinated to every higher authority in their own class. Under this collective, hierarchical organization they control the means of production monopolistically—i.e. to the exclusion of all other, non-privileged strata of society. They thereby decide as to the distribution of the national income and arrogate the lion's share to themselves. They are the exploiters.

We know now why the marshals, the Party secretaries, and the "Red executives" "live better and more happily": they belong to the class that controls the means of production. The servants and workers live in poverty because they belong to a class that has absolutely no power over the means of production. The differences in "the sphere of consumption" are the results of differences of position in the processes of production. Political power belongs to the same class to which economic power belongs: both are only the different sides of a single fundamental social relation, that of exploitation and oppression.

The relations between the two classes are those of commanding and obeying, of exploiting and being exploited. To that degree they resemble those of all other class societies, including the capitalist.* The differences begin further on. The capitalists control the means of production by right of private property; the Russian ruling class by right of social administration. Each of the bourgeoisie

* "It is self-evident that the workers themselves have no voice in the decision how accumulated capital shall be invested, this has from the very first been a function only of the Government." (Hubbard, *Soviet Trade*, pp. 321-322) "In actual fact the *kolchozniki* have little voice in the organization of their own farm. Not only are the main activities of the farm, the crops to be planted, the livestock to be raised, the technical method to be employed, laid down by the Plan, but the scale of remuneration and the form in which the remuneration is paid is governed by law . . . Once allotted to brigade the *kolchoznik* has to obey the orders of his *zvenovod*, who is under the brigadier, who is responsible directly to the president." (Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, pp. 165-166) "The president of a *kolchoz* is usually a Party functionary and not a farmer, and in fact, very few presidents are local men, or men of local origin . . . Professional presidents . . . to-day rule most of the 240,000 *kolchozy*." (Ibid. p. 162)

* "The basic classes of a given society are two in number: on the one hand, the class which commands, monopolizing the instruments of production; on the other hand, the executing class, with no means of production, which works for the former. The specific form of this relation of economic exploitation and servitude determines the forms of the given class society. For example: if the relation between the commanding and the executing class is reproduced by the purchase of labor power in the market, we have capitalism. If it is reproduced by purchase of persons, by plunder or otherwise, but not by the purchase of labor power alone, and if the commanding class gains control of not only the labor power but also of the body and soul of the exploited person, we have a slaveholding system." (Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, English edition, New York, 1926, p. 282).

—at least under classical capitalism— controls “his” means of production individually; the Russian ruling class commands the means of production collectively, through a hierarchical organization. In a capitalist society the worker can choose which capitalist to sell his labor power to—but he has to sell it to one or another, otherwise he cannot live. In Russia the labor power of all workers belongs, to start with, to the collectivity of the exploiters. Under the capitalist system the worker sells his labor power temporarily and on the social average is paid its value, while the capitalist appropriates its surplus value: the line between value and surplus value being determined on the free labor market by automatically effective economic laws. In the Soviet Union labor power belongs to the state without being purchased by it: the line between the worker’s share and the surplus product is not determined by laws of value. It is pressed down from above by the exploitative appetites of the bureaucracy, which are practically unlimited, and is kept up from below—very unevenly—by the danger of the working class’s extinction.*

It will be objected perhaps that we have simplified the picture. There are not just ruling bureaucrats and workers. Certainly we have simplified; it was a question first of all of the *fundamental* and *new relationships* which are typical of this society.

After one hundred and fifty years of existence, no capitalist society can be found anywhere that consists just of capitalists and proletariat. Besides these fundamental classes there are intermediate classes peculiar to capitalism and large remnants of pre-capitalist classes.

There are similar phenomena in the Soviet Union. The independent peasants and craftsmen belong pre-eminently to the remnants of pre-Soviet classes. They are close to the type of “simple producers of goods” in capitalist society, but their control of their means of production and of their products is much more limited.† Their number is relatively small and their role in the whole of the processes of production insignificant. The collective-farm peasants, who form the overwhelming majority of the agricultural population, are a mixed type. In so far as they work for “wages” in the “socialized” sector of the collective farm and have to deliver their products to the state, they belong to the “proletariat” of Soviet society and their situation is analogous to that of the industrial worker; in so far as they work their individual parcels of land and sell their products on the open collective-farm market, they are “simple producers of goods.” They can be termed partly “Soviet proletariat” and partly simple producers of goods.

In addition there are middle strata which belong organically to Soviet society and play approximately the same social role within it as do the petty bourgeoisie and the “new middle class” in capitalist society. These are the workers aristocracy (Stakhanovtsi) and the middling technicians and officials. They receive larger incomes than

the workers but much smaller ones than the high bureaucrats. They function as pushers and speed-up men in the processes of production, as social props of the bureaucracy and as a reservoir from which the ruling class renews itself.

The Closing of Class Frontiers

The favorite rejoinder of Stalinists and their willing and unwilling friends to the theory of class rule in the Soviet Union is to point out that there are “unlimited opportunities to advance oneself” there. The American fable is that “every boy can become president,” and by the same logic every Soviet soldier carries a marshal’s baton in his knapsack.

There is a certain amount of truth in this, or rather, there *was* in the initial stages of Soviet society. But even then it was no proof that classes did not exist. In this country, too, bootblacks have become millionaires but no reasonable person has ever thought to deny that it is a class society.

And class frontiers in Soviet society, which were at first relatively open and elastic, have closed themselves with bewildering speed. There are still many workers’ and peasants’ sons in the contemporary generation of bureaucrats, for this ruling class came into being by differentiation of the working and peasant classes. But the bureaucrats of tomorrow will be preponderantly the children of bureaucrats, and the whole policy of the ruling class is slanted in this direction. It is becoming the rule more and more that the son of a worker becomes a worker, while the son of a bureaucrat, or, at most, of some one belonging to the middle stratum, becomes a bureaucrat.

There are three ways in which privileges are handed down: by inheritance, by the monopoly of education, and by patronage. Inheritance is the least important. To be sure, the right to inheritance has been restored, and the USSR is the only country today in which the right to the unrestricted disposal of property through a last testament is guaranteed by the constitution itself. But you can only will away what you own: furniture, works of art, summer villas, cash, bank deposits, government bonds—all of which have an enormous value amidst the general poverty—but you cannot hand down factories and shares of stock.

The privileged person, however, can have his children educated. And he *alone* can do that. “As far as students are concerned,” writes Yvon, “the economic factor is often the most important of all, and the son of a rich father has a great advantage over those whose means are always very limited.”⁴⁹

Since this was written there have been many more developments in the same direction. In 1935 the Soviet press recorded with great jubilation the fact that more than 50% of the students were having their way paid by their parents—whereas just after the Revolution the majority of them had been supported by various public institutions. In many places there are special schools for the children of bureaucrats, beginning with the *crèches*. In 1940 tuition fees for the last three years of secondary school and for all universities and colleges were re-introduced;⁵⁰ the example was soon followed by all technical, normal, agricultural, medical, and other secondary schools.⁵¹ The tui-

* It is self-evident that in any class society the oppressed classes must be nourished somehow and be able to reproduce itself; and that the ruling class receives the surplus product above the subsistence level. The specific method, however, by which the surplus product is appropriated differentiates the various class societies.

† The “simple producer” of goods is, in Marxist terms, a producer who owns his instruments of production, works for the open market, and hires no one’s else labor.

tion at secondary schools amounts to 150 to 200 rubles, at colleges to 300 to 500 rubles. Scholarships are granted only for the highest marks—two thirds “excellent,” the remainder “good.” Tuition fees for the first semester after the introduction of this law had to be paid within four weeks; those who were unable to provide the money were expelled. Thus 600,000 students had to leave school.

The establishment of the Suvorov military academies with preferential openings for officers’ sons is another step in the same direction. All that is lacking is the introduction in the Kremlin Court of a corps of pages on the Czarist model. . . .

As regards the third way of handing privileges on, Yvon tells us: “Diplomas are indispensable but they are not the whole story. The jobs for which they qualify one vary in desirability, and it is becoming more and more difficult to succeed without connections. A man in a position of authority can then be of immeasurable help to his son. He does not start him off in his own department but in a colleague’s, because that attracts less notice. Once one has a foot in the stirrup, a few good hand-holds will gain succession to a place worth as much as the inheritance of money from a capitalist.”⁵²

These facts take the wind out of another favorite argument. The bureaucracy, some say, consumes indeed a disproportionate share of the fruits of production, and at the expense of the workers, but in the final analysis the greatest part of new production is consumed neither by workers nor bureaucrats, but is accumulated. And whom do the newly built factories, roads—and guns—serve if not the people? Of course, the people are exploited, but the accumulation is for the good of the whole. But under capitalism the product of new factories and the use of new means of transportation contribute *in the same way* to the good of the “whole people.” The capitalists do not eat up all the margarine and all the spaghetti that comes from the new factories, and they do not ride all by themselves in the new subways; nor do they shoot each other up with the guns, but use them for defense against the external enemies of their countries and the internal enemies of their social order. The accumulation consists in the building of new factories so that the capitalists and their children can continue to exploit workers. And the Russian ruling classes also proceed with accumulation by building new plants in which they and their descendants can go on exploiting workers. If Russia were to belong to a *single* great capitalist corporation, she would do just the same.

Contradictions and Disproportions

But perhaps Soviet society—despite differences in income—can develop harmoniously? Let us picture to ourselves that the productivity of labor will grow, and with it the quantity of products, workers will receive better wages, the bureaucrats higher salaries; enough will remain, however, for purposes of accumulation, and new factories will increase productivity even further—everything will be for the best in this best of all possible worlds.

Unfortunately this picture does not correspond to the facts, as we have seen. Why?

In a totalitarian society in which the workers have no

rights, the path of least resistance is to depress their standard of living and place on their shoulders the burden of supporting the upper class and providing for accumulation. The position of every member of the ruling class, his prestige, his advancement, his salary, his job, and sometimes even his life depend on whether he fulfils and overfulfils the Plan and on whether he attains and exceeds the prescribed yield of profit. Buying and selling prices are dictated from above, but he can lower wages and increase working hours and tempo. The whole social system is conducive to the wasteful exploitation of labor—as it is, for that matter, wherever labor is not free. Hubbard writes reproachfully that the death of millions of people in the famine of 1932 “must be regarded as a loss of capital to the nation.”⁵³ But the bureaucracy cannot help itself. The over-accumulation and the relative over-consumption of the upper ten thousand are complemented by the undernourishment of the broad masses, which makes for a lower productivity of labor; which in turn diminishes the quantity of social products to be disposed of. This sharpens the struggle over the distribution of products. The crisis is solved by the bureaucracy in the usual way: in order to maintain and increase the tempo of accumulation so that the incomes of the rulers will not suffer, the masses’ standard of living is simply depressed further—after all, they cannot defend themselves. And so the vicious circle begins anew.

The underconsumption of the masses is one source of contradictions. But there is no lack of other disproportions. Errors of planning are inevitable. In every modern society there exists some method of regulating the apportioning of the means of production and labor power among the various branches and processes of productive activity. Under capitalism this is taken care of—for better or worse—by the mechanism of prices and profits, and mistakes are corrected in the end by economic crises and losses. The mechanical laws of economy express themselves by economic catastrophes; they function, as Marx has strikingly observed, the way the laws of gravity do when a house collapses on your head. In a socialist society this blind control would be replaced by the conscious democratic supervision of the masses in conjunction with a completely public rendering of accounts. But under the exploitative rule of the bureaucrats the old methods of regulation lose their effectiveness, and new and democratic methods are inconceivable, for they would expose exploitation. *Therefore* the most elementary economic facts are kept secret. But not only that: regulation and criticism “only from above” are no substitute for public control. If orders from above may not be criticized even when they are senseless and impossible to carry out, then their carrying out has to be faked. The despotic system forces everybody to lie. Not a single figure or fact is reliable. At a conference of the Communist Party in February, 1941, Malenkov, a secretary of the central committee, told how four different reports as to the supply of raw material in a factory were given simultaneously: one by the head of the supply department, one by the chief accountant, one by the director of the plant and one by a committee of inspection.⁵⁴ Four different totals resulted and they differed by several hundred per cent. And yet the inventory of raw material in a plant is the easiest statistical

task of all. What happens when prices too are taken into reckoning and when there is a rather unstable monetary standard to be manipulated? Malenkov mentioned this case as a typical one, and we begin to understand how even in a census the bureaucracy can make errors involving figures that run into millions.

Errors of planning are inevitable even with the best statistics. But under conditions such as these they become the rule. Once a mistake has been made under this system it grows into something enormous. Yvon writes: "The possible scale of error is one of the most negative phenomena in the life of the country . . . The possession of almost unlimited power over society lends itself most easily to senseless decisions, which are carried out nevertheless."⁵⁵

Anyone acquainted with the numerous examples of erroneous investments and senseless planning decisions reported in the Soviet press or by foreigners has to admit that the expenses of bureaucratic mis-economy are in no way less than those of capitalist competition.

But besides that, there is also direct parasitism. The unproductive administrative and oppressive apparatus of contemporary Soviet society is one of the costliest in the world in relation to national income.

Now and then some crass examples of this parasitism come to light. In the spring of 1941 it was officially ascertained that there were 50,000 persons in the administrative apparatus of the collective farms of the Rostov district alone who, even by the standards of the bureaucratic State executive, were altogether superfluous. Simultaneously it was discovered that there were several hundred special executives' aides in the factories of Moscow whose sole task in life was to hire new workers. And it was estimated that each aide hired on the average only one new worker a day. The above-mentioned Malenkov told the Party conference of the following case: the Ural state copper works sold the state trust for non-ferrous metals some worn-out equipment for 100,000 rubles; unaware of this, another director of the same copper works bought the equipment back from the trust for 111,000 rubles—and both directors received bonuses, one for a good sale, and the other for a cheap purchase. These are no isolated cases, for a special law was promulgated forbidding such dealings in worn-out equipment.⁵⁶ Further examples can be piled up *ad infinitum*.

Thus the bureaucracy can maintain itself only at great social expense. Disorganization, disproportions, and parasitism restrict the development of productive forces and lower the living standards of the masses. Yet a planned economy has one great advantage: in an emergency, all available resources and manpower can be concentrated on one job, disregarding all others.

Here we have the clue to the effective resistance Soviet Russia has been able to offer to Nazi invasion. For it is in war that such concentration of effort is most essential. No private property interests, no legitimate rights of labor are permitted to interfere with the war effort in the Soviet Union. Branches of production that are unproductive and unprofitable according to peacetime norms can be maintained almost indefinitely, their losses spread out over the whole national economy. Entire industrial areas can be shifted about, regardless of cost, for reasons of military strategy. New inventions, technical and social experi-

ments can be tested and introduced on a big scale. Manpower can be sent wherever it is most needed, and forced to work under terrible conditions; sacrifices can be imposed on the population such as the Rickenbackers of America dare not even dream of.*

But this concentration of all power and all resources in a single group of rulers explains not only the Russian successes in war. It also suggests how the bureaucracy in peacetime, despite all internal disproportions, mismanagement and social conflicts, was able to maintain its power. Whatever the losses, all the resources of a colossal empire have been at the disposal of the bureaucracy to cover them up, tide the system over the crisis.

State and Economy

Having sketched the social stratification of Soviet society and its contradictions, we wish to deal for a moment with the relation between the State and economy.

The Marxists always used to take pride in revealing the actual social relations behind legal fictions and ideological wrappings. Therefore it is all the more remarkable that many writers who have been through the Marxist school should believe that the means of production in Russia belong to "all" or to the "working class," because it says so in the statute books. The means of production in Russia belong, not to everybody, but to the State. According to Marxist doctrine, the State is the ruling classes' organization of the forcible oppression of the oppressed classes, and its existence and constantly increasing strength should alone have been enough to warn Marxists that a class society was involved. Trotsky once wrote that the means of production in Russia belonged to the State and the State belonged to the bureaucracy. There is more wisdom in this sentence—which Trotsky himself later dismissed unfortunately as a mere *bon mot*—than in all the Trotskyite literature about a "degenerated workers' State."[†]

Several authors have already pointed out that in a Statified economy everything depends upon whose hands

* It might be added here that the inequalities we have seen in Soviet civilian life are to be found also in the much-advertised "people's" Red Army, and on an even greater scale. A Red Army private gets 10 rubles a month, a lieutenant 1,000 and a colonel 2,400. American army pay is positively equalitarian in comparison: \$50 for a private, \$150 for a lieutenant, \$333 for a colonel. (See *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 23, 1943)

† The whole Trotskyite argument that Russia is a workers' state stands and falls on the thesis that the statification of the means of production means *eo ipso* a workers' state, no further investigation being necessary. This flies in the face of reality no less than of the entire Marxist tradition. Engels had already made fun of the notion by saying that the first socialist institution must have been the regimental tailor, if it was true that every state enterprise had something socialist about it. The Russian state is a workers' state essentially, say the Trotskyites, because it retains the economic foundation of socialism. This foundation is the statification of the means of production. If one were to object modestly that statification in itself is not a socialist measure, since an exploiters' state can statify too, the Trotskyists will answer that statification by a workers' state is necessarily a socialist measure. Thus it is revealed that Russia is a workers' state because it retains a socialist foundation, but that this foundation is socialist only because Russia is a workers' state. Or to put it more briefly: Russia is a workers' state because it is a workers' state. Either you believe that or else you are a philistine, petty bourgeois, and renegade. . . .

the State power rests in.† If in the hands of the broad, democratically organized masses of the producers, then the means of production are also in their hands and we have socialism or are well on the way to it. But if the State power is found in the hands exclusively of a privileged special stratum, then the latter rules over the means of production too and we have a class society.

The conclusion is that socialism is impossible and inconceivable without democracy. Democracy is not an accidental and superfluous ornament on the structure of the socialist economic order, but its effective basis, its essence.

But it would not be correct to claim that once the means of production have been statified, economic laws are no longer effective, that politics have replaced economics, and so forth. Political oppression is only the reverse side of economic exploitation. And the State defends the class relations existing in the economy.

The despotic dictatorship of the bureaucracy is not an accidental superstructure or excrescence on a socialist economy. It is the adequate and legitimate political expression of the economic fact that the bureaucracy exploits the broad masses. One can say indeed that the bureaucracy rules the factory because it rules the State, but one can turn the statement around with equal justice. Two sides of one fundamental class relationship are involved. It would be correct to say that nothing is lacking to socialism in Russia except the introduction of producers' democracy; but far from meaning simply a "purely political" overturn of the "superstructure," its introduction would mean at the same time a *social* revolution. A revolution could not overthrow the bureaucracy politically without depriving it of its economic power. It could not introduce democracy without replacing the production relationships of obedience and exploitation by those of freedom and equality, of voluntary cooperation. It would have to transfer the social means of production from the hierarchical collective ownership of the bureaucracy to the democratic collective ownership of the producers. Without that socialism cannot be attained in Russia.

†Max Shachtman has done this particularly well in various numbers of the *New International*.

49. Yvon, page 171.
50. Decree of October 3, 1940.
51. Decree of October 12, 1940.
52. Yvon, page 171.
53. Hubbard, *supra*, page 180.
54. Report in *Pravda*, February 20, 1941.
55. Yvon, page 22. There are many examples of this.
56. Decree of February 10, 1941.

ACADEMIC HONORS—THEORY vs. PRACTICE

The college presidents were asked what services or achievements they felt should be recognized in conferring honorary degrees. While 41% of those responding indicated that "achievement in business" should be recognized, 43% urged recognition of "achievement in the effective leadership of labor", and 44% thought "achievement in agricultural leadership" worthy of recognition. Yet the same college presidents reported that the institutions over which they presided gave 250 honorary degrees to business leaders, seven to farm leaders, and two to labor leaders.

—"Honorary Degrees, a Study of their Use and Abuse" (p. 132) by Stephen Edward Epler (Am. Council on Public Affairs, 1943).

A Brief Introduction to the History of Culture

Such was the natural course of decay . . . Tasso bowed before the mutilation; indeed, professed his readiness to make every change demanded. . . .

"And if the name of 'Mage' offends these gentlemen, It shall be 'Sage' instead. I've cut that queer enchanted wand,

Those cold blue foaming waters opening,
Although no bright Jerusalem was there.
My characters instead go underground through caves.
Let odors of black art float up from other manuscripts,
Not mine.

"And I have cut the resurrection of the buried man,
The metamorphosis of warriors into creatures of the sea.
(Two Marys guide me to the Eucharist.)
The ship was marvelous, but it will have to go
As well; I multiply the orthodox. Those stanzas that conclude

A canto near the end—although examined, tolerated,
Almost, one might say, approved,
By the Inquisitor, I've doctored anyway.

"—Of course, the marvels must come out,
The kisses-stanza, and the parrot, too—
It seems a shame. Impediments at Rome,
Monsignor Silvio. I look toward Venice furtively.
Have I been over-theological?"

WELDON KEES

Free and Equal

On the Conduct of the Lynn Case

THE February issue of *POLITICS* contained Conrad Lynn's original brief in the Winfred Lynn case, which involves racial discrimination in selecting draftees for the Army. As the case is now nearing the Supreme Court, I would like to make some criticisms, which have been on my mind some time, of the way the case is being handled by Conrad Lynn's successor, Arthur Garfield Hays. These criticisms raise a much broader issue than the Lynn case itself: the conflict between legal expediency and social purpose that often arises in cases of this kind, especially in wartime.

There are two big social questions to which many of us had hoped the Lynn case would give some answer:

- (1) Is segregation in itself discrimination?
- (2) Is a racially segregated Army a violation of Section 4(a) of the 1940 Draft Act which provides that "in the

selection and training of men under this Act . . . there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color”?

It is because the Lynn case seemed to raise those issues—and because Conrad Lynn’s original brief did raise them—that I have been interested in it, and that most others have been too, I dare say. But the form the case has taken since Mr. Hays, acting for the American Civil Liberties Union, took it up to the Circuit Court of Appeals is turning out to be something quite different. If the original brief was in the tradition of the Brandeis “social brief”, the Hays brief contrasts most markedly with it, both in spirit and contents. It is in the narrowest legalistic tradition and avoids raising precisely those basic questions to test which the Lynn brothers originally brought their suit.

As to (1) the question of segregation: the Supreme Court has been ruling for generations that segregation is not discrimination *if equal facilities are offered to both races*. In that case, the reasoning goes, segregation is equitable to both races since if Negroes cannot sit in the white day coach, neither can the whites sit in the colored coach. This reasoning is specious, as Justice Harlan pointed out long ago in his great Plessy dissent (which will shortly be reprinted in this department), since the whites do not want to sit in the colored coach, while the Negroes do want, if not to sit in the white coach, at least not to be herded off by themselves. They well realize, even if the whites are careful not to, that segregation is not a mutual agreement, but is unilaterally imposed in a humiliating way by the stronger party on the weaker. It is furthermore a pleasant legal fiction that conditions ever could be equal, since this would weaken the disciplinary force of segregation. And even if they were, segregation would still be undemocratic and unjust so long as it is imposed by the stronger on the weaker. It could only be justified if it were something mutually agreed-on by equals, in which case there would be no point to it.

It will be seen that there is much to be said against the theory of segregation being not in itself discriminatory, and the Lynn case seems to offer a specially good opportunity to say it because it involves an action of an agency of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court has evolved its reactionary doctrine on the basis of cases involving local regulations by one or another of the Southern states—and reluctance to interfere with states’ rights has been a factor, as well as the realization that only a social earthquake could shatter Jimcrow custom in the South. But here is a case involving the Federal Government itself. It is true that a Federal statute of 1866 set up separate Negro regiments, and that this precedent has not hitherto been challenged. But it is one thing to have racial segregation in a few Regular Army units, and quite another to impose it on millions of civilian draftees drawn from all sections of the country.

The broad point that segregation is discrimination was, therefore, prominent in Conrad Lynn’s original brief. But as Mr. Hays has chosen to conduct the case, it has been stripped of relevance to this issue and reduced to a Mandarin-like legalistic quibbling over whether if it can be shown that a draftee was called in a different order number, under a separate quota, than he would have had under a consolidated quota, he is the victim of discrimination *without*

taking anything else into account. So thoroughly has Mr. Hays expunged all general social considerations from his consciousness that he scarcely seems interested in the fact that Winfred Lynn’s segregated quota had something to do with the color of his skin. Possibly Mr. Hays believes that he can better induce the Supreme Court to hear the case, even to render a favorable verdict, by this line of argument. Possibly he is right. But as a simple layman, I must ask: is the object of the Lynn case to win a legal victory, or to test certain principles? For there may, unfortunately, be a conflict between these two aims.

If the object is simply to win, then one would assume that Corporal Winfred Lynn brought his case primarily because he wanted to be released from the Army—as he will be if he gets his writ of habeas corpus. His motive, in that case, would not be so different from that of the usual “draft dodger”. But the fact is that Lynn from the beginning was anxious to protest against the whole Jimcrow system in the Army, as his letter to his draft board two years ago shows. He was even willing to go to jail, and did so, rather than give up his protest. When it appeared that he could better test the law by entering the Army, he at once did so. I think we may safely assume that Corporal Lynn wants his case conducted along the lines that his brother, Conrad, laid down, as a real challenge to Army Jimcrow and a real test of the whole principle involved; and that he would prefer this approach even if it meant greatly increasing the risks of an unfavorable verdict by the Supreme Court—or even an outright refusal of the Court to hear his case.

The second big issue raised by the Lynn case, the interpretation of Section 4(a) of the 1940 Draft Act, is even more important. And—again speaking only as a humble layman—it seems to me that Mr. Hays has gone even farther afield in his handling of this issue, or rather his avoidance of it. One must understand, to begin with, that the Lynn case raises directly only the question of discrimination in selection, since Lynn began his suit before he entered the Army and hence before he suffered any discrimination in training. The two questions would seem to be closely associated, however, since the only reason for Jimcrow draft quotas is to provide draftees for Jimcrow training. Conrad Lynn’s original brief, therefore, makes no sharp distinction between the two forms of segregation but rather discusses the broad question: is segregation, of any kind, discrimination and thus prohibited by the 1940 Draft Act?

Mr. Hays, however, goes out of his way to dissociate the two, arguing that selection is a *civilian* affair, training a *military* affair. In his oral argument, he went so far as to admit that perhaps racial segregation in the Army can be justified on grounds of military necessity though he himself, he stated, personally deplored it—and on page 13 of his brief, he concedes: “The Army is in a sense a law unto itself.” In selection, he insists that the law be enforced, since this is in the civilian sphere. In training, however, he admits that perhaps the Army has the right to adopt such regulations as it pleases, under color of “military necessity”.

Mr. Hays’ reasoning seems to me defective (1) as law, (2) as an interpretation of the actual situation, and (3) as liberal doctrine.

this country since the Fourteenth Amendment. The 1940 Draft Act was passed a few weeks before the fall elections by a Congress which needed colored votes, and was signed by a President who also had some faint interest in the Negro vote. It would be, I repeat, extremely educational to force the Supreme Court to decide just what this Act means, if anything, so far as the Negroes are concerned. But it is precisely this kind of education that liberals like Arthur Garfield Hays are anxious not to promote. It is getting harder all the time, in this total-war period, to combine a patriotic belief in American democracy with the championship of civil liberties.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

REJOINDER BY MR. HAYS

Dear Mr. Macdonald:

I have read your article "The Conduct of the Lynn Case" with considerable interest. Your point seems to be that I have "chosen" to conduct this case on a narrow legalistic ground because I have failed to raise the question of segregation.

It seems to me that there is a distinction between discrimination and segregation. It seems to me that regardless of segregation there is definite discrimination in *selecting* men for service.

Of course, the question of segregation presents a much larger issue. Much as I deplore it, the Supreme Court has time and again held that segregation is lawful so long as accommodations are equal. Your proposal is that I should argue the Lynn case as a segregation case because that is more important and this even though such a case would at this time, in my judgment, be summarily thrown out of court. You fail to realize that if I took this position I should lose the opportunity of trying to establish a principle which also is important, to wit, that there should be no discrimination where civilian authorities administer the law in the *selection* of men for the Army. You also fail to realize that the law moves step by step and that if we can get the decision we contend for, it will be a step toward a future case to be brought in peace time which will directly raise the question of segregation. The dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in the Circuit Court is in itself a landmark of hope for the future and it is out of expressions like this that we may hope to make progress.

You as well as a great many other people feel that I should argue a broader question where there is no chance of success and give up an opportunity of making a step in the right direction even though it may not take us directly to our goal.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS

EXTRA! SCIENCE ABOLISHES RACE PROBLEM!

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 9: A new chemical that turns skin of any color white was described yesterday before the annual session of the Medical Society of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Louis C. Schwartz, medical director of the U. S. Public Health Service, said that the discovery was made during a study of a skin disorder among Negroes employed in a leather plant.

The hands of workers wearing gloves treated with monobenzenyl ether of hydroquinone became white, Dr. Schwartz related.

—N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1944.

Popular Culture

Bert Brecht, Minstrel of the GPU

RUSSIAN propaganda is very active on the "cultural front." You can buy very cheaply at least thirty different items in the latest style in the German language, here in New York, but "made in Moscow" and showing proudly their trade-mark: "The Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow."

You can read here in New York in German and in English: Erich Weinert, the chairman of the Moscow "Free Germans," specially trained in Spain, where he was attached to the International Brigade; Johannes R. Becher, who played the harp in honor of the GPU, building with forced labor of ten thousands of their unfortunate victims the "great" canal from the Baltic to the White Sea; Willi Bredel, Friedrich Wolf, Theodor Plivier (he has known a better past) and a terrible petty-bourgeois sentimentalist, coming from Vienna, Klara Blum, who has years of training in the adoration for "Father Stalin" behind her, all her products printed in the "Internationale Literatur," published very regularly in Moscow, since 1933. Literature is the opium of Stalinism.

The "line" is, of course, prostration before Stalin and the Red Army. It is a very monotonous theme indeed and only sometimes a little more stirring through a "Free-German-Nationalistic" tune. There is not the slightest trace of ideas, neither liberalistic nor socialistic; in this world of lost souls there blinks no other light than that of the victorious Red Army. Becher sings:

*You are the grand hope. The world
is looking up to you, fortress of freedom.
The destinies of the peoples are under your shield.
You are the Good, you are the Very Best.*

It would not do to put Bert Brecht in the same class with these poetasters. Undoubtedly, he has more talent, a more original technique than Weinert, Becher and *tutti quanti*. He has voted with his feet against Stalin's Russia, preferring capitalist America to his chosen "socialist fatherland." Brecht is not an unknown in the USA; his dramatization of Gorki's *Mother* was produced on Broadway in 1935, his *Beggar's Opera* songs are well known, his anti-Hitler poems (now sentimental and democratic and not totalitarian at all) are popular among the German emigration. Brecht is one of the most ardent admirers of the "Great Stalin," sincere in his admiration, for he is absolutely unable to understand socialist ideas and socialist theory. He is one of the new types, so frequent in the German emigration, who follows the myth of the total state, the total terror and the iron disciplined party. In this sense, he is typical of many Germans of the twenties, a driving leaf in the hurricane, driving in the direction of Stalinism as the only possible alternative, for him, to Nazism. So the Nazis will drive back to Stalinism in post-Hitler Germany—in methods of thinking and of organizing so near each other, twin-brothers of the European counter-revolution.

Brecht came to Stalinism at a time when the degeneration was almost perfect, the Russian anti-Stalinist opposition defeated and the coordination between the Russian apparatus and the German communist organization completed. He is of good "bourgeois" origin and habits of life; his

relationship to the Revolution is primarily a literary one. Entering political life at the time of the defeat of the Chinese revolution and of the enforced collectivization, he adapted himself to the new times with amazing ability, feeling with the sensibility of an artistic temper the new trends in his bones, earlier than many politicians and bureaucrats. In 1931, he dramatized not only the GPU methods as holy and respected institutions of the Communist Party, but approved and glorified the trials before they were conceived in their perfect form in Stalin's brain, pushing forward to its logical end the party-line of the day. This piece of "art" should be studied and analyzed by all those who are discussing the question: "What to do with Germany?"

The piece is called a "didactic" poem; its title is inadequately translated as: "The Punishment" (*Die Massnahme*). It was accompanied by the very modern music of Hanns Eisler and presented first in one of the best concert halls in Berlin, then in different workingclass meeting places and finally in the *Grosses Schauspielhaus*, one of the biggest theatres, which holds five thousand people. It made a deep impression, especially on the young. I spoke at that time with sweet young girls, very ladylike in behavior and looking like the females of the prophet, who should not be beaten, even with a flower, who just swooned with enthusiasm for Brecht, proving again that women as well as men are products of their environment.

The synopsis of this *Lehrstueck* will make their behavior more instructive. The heroes are four agitators. They report about their work before the "control-body" and in argument and counter-argument, in songs and chorus the story is told. The control-body greets the four agitators and thanks them for their good work for the revolution; but the agitators answer: "Stop, before you go on with your praise, we have to announce the death of one of our comrades and to ask for your judgment."

Who has killed him?

We killed him, we shot him and threw him in the lime-pit.

What had he done?

He was a danger to the movement.

The young comrade had joined the four men, sent from Moscow, as an organizer of the last local group before they crossed the frontier to Mukden. They all went over the hills in masks, under other names, effaced as individuals, bound to live for the cause, in the chains of the strictest discipline, warned not to fall into the trap of "pity for the wretched and starving." But the young comrade falls frequently into the trap of "pity"; he sees the tortured coolies and incites them to ask for shoes for their naked feet. He is recognized by the police and has to flee. That is his first failure. His next task is the distribution of leaflets . . . but he begins to fight against an aggressive cop, himself attacking the attacker. That is his second failure—he should have run away and not have interfered in the conflict between the workers and the police.

But these two scenes are only an introduction to the kernel of the piece. The third task is the real one: the winning over of a rich businessman for arming the coolies against the British. The businessmen are in conflict with the British over tariffs and should be brought to a joint action with the coolies' union against the British. The assignment of the young comrade is to forget absolutely his class-feelings, thinking only of the conclusion of the alliance with "big business."

*What art thou? May you sink in the dirt,
embrace the butcher, but change the world.*

Again the young comrade fails; he "can not eat with the Big Man" (not adapt himself to the alliance with Big Business against the British in the Germany of 1931!) And here the drama reaches its climax; the "High Treason" of the young comrade. . . . Because he wants an open fight against the oppressor—for the workers can no longer endure their unbearable hardships and the hunger of their families—he exposes the secret plan and its planners. He does not cease "to cry out on the open street" and therefore

*we knocked him out
and carried his unconscious body
out of the town.*

Outside the town, the agitators decide that the young comrade has to disappear "totally." And here the poet, with a wonderful divination of his master's secret wishes and dreams, composes the following scene:

First Agitator: *We will ask him if he agrees with us,
for he was a brave fighter.*

Second Agitator: *But even if he does not agree with
us, he must disappear—totally.**

The Three Agitators: *So we ask thee: dost thou agree?*

The Young Comrade: *Yes, I see that I have always
acted incorrectly.*

The Three Agitators: *Wilt thou do it alone?*

The Young Comrade: *Help me.*

The Three Agitators: *Lean thy head against our arm,
close thine eyes.*

The Young Comrade: *For communism. . . .*

The Three Agitators: *Then we shot him and threw him
into the lime-pit, and when the lime had ab-
sorbed him, we returned to our work.*

The Control-Body: *You did well. You have propagated
the science of the great classical teachers, the
ABC of Communism. . . . And there too the
revolution is on the march, and there too the
ranks of the fighters are marshalled. We are
in agreement.*

Brecht, it is true, asks through the "control-body," if there was no other way out than this "measure." But that is only a rhetorical question. For the whole plot of the piece is constructed solely and with a quite original technique in order to make the "punishment" inevitable and inescapable. But it is in the background of Brecht's *measure* that the real originality of the composition appears. The agitators are bound not to a central committee and not even to a leader; they are under the discipline of the "control-body," the GPU, which can absolve or condemn them. They go over the border, their personalities effaced, and their real aim is "the war of liberation" through the alliance with the Big Man. The young comrade symbolizes—quite without the poet's realizing it—the revolutionary of the old type, who feels himself irresistibly attracted toward the masses and toward mass action. He must die, because he disturbs the state-action of the masked agents. He must disappear—totally.

Brecht has never, I am sure, been able to think out to its logical end this, his molding of these ideas of his time. His works are full of undigested and undigestible Marxist "theory." But being one of the few who have real talent, he is a characteristic reflection of certain moods and dreams of a generation that stood around the cradle of Nazism.

RUTH FISCHER

* In the play's language, this "aber ganz" is repeated over and over in a hammering, intense way.

Books

WAR DIARY. By Jean Malaquais. Doubleday, Doran. \$2.50.

Malaquais is a Pole who worked as a sailor, a miner and at a dozen other trades before he became, at thirty, a French author. In 1939 he left for the Western Front, as a private in the French Army, just before his first novel, *Men from Nowhere* (*Les Javanais*), came off the press. Influenced by Andre Gide, who took a warm interest in his work, Malaquais decided to keep a journal, taking Gide's notebooks as his model. He went through the whole "sitzkrieg", was taken prisoner, escaped, hid in Marseille, and finally made his way, via Venezuela, to Mexico City.

His book is a document of that strange war, where soldiers fought little and without conviction. He puts into words the feelings of the ordinary soldier: "This living in a public stable, which they call comradeship in arms—what an ominous farce!" I, too, lived through that period, when France came to a dead end, burdened with a Third Republic which the bourgeoisie didn't want and the masses didn't trust. Bleakly honest, Malaquais often writes powerfully, when he describes the stupidity, the coarseness and animality of men; the way it feels to be machine-gunned by a plane; the accesses of erotic hysteria of soldiers and peasants at the front.

The prevailing tone of his book is bitter, and justly so. Yet it is a bitterness which also defines the personality of the writer. "I think I have no great love for men; which is not to say I don't love man," he writes. This need of comforting himself by contrasting to the unworthy concrete individual a Man in the abstract whom he can love, is related to his tendency to react to human beings in a depressed and cruel way. Despite his socialist ideology, Malaquais' naturalism is pessimistic—monotonous and also unjust, for people are richer and above all more contradictory than his vision of them. His own personality melted into the ambience of the "sitzkrieg", and his book's value is that of a perfect rendering of this mood. Energy awakens only at the very end, when he fights a bit as he goes under, and even then it is simply a desperate protest: "the unspeakable savage joy of destroying"; "kill an Arab, squash a flea—what's the difference?" (apropos the story of the deliberate murder of an Arab prisoner by a German officer).

Since this is the journal of an observer who finds security only in himself, its testimony bears the marks of a certain egocentrism, and its scope is severely limited. Those social problems of which the war is simply the inhuman and catastrophic projection are alluded to only in brief formulae, clear enough but inadequate. If his motive was prudence, Malaquais was perhaps wise. A more explicit treatment might not have found a publisher. But if he himself is satisfied with these meagre hints, it is because the author, concerned only with self-analysis and with communicating his personal impressions to his audience, has taken precedence of the revolutionary—or, more simply, the individual with a social conscience. Malaquais belongs to an embattled generation whose struggles are only beginning, which must pose squarely the problems of changing the world, not in hints and not in exclusively literary terms.

This book is one of the first of a whole literature we may expect in the future. If when the soldiers come back from their hells-on-earth, freedom to write (and publish) still exist, the literature we shall get will be terrible and sen-

sational. It will be fruitful as well only if it breaks through the limitations of naturalistic description and egocentrism with a conscious will to change the world.

VICTOR SERGE

MAN THE MEASURE. By Erich Kahler. Pantheon. \$5.00.

Erich Kahler was born in Prague and has lived in Vienna, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and England. He came to the United States in 1938. This book, the first he has published here, is nothing less than an attempt at synthesizing all of history, though most of his discussion concerns only the Mediterranean and European cultures. He dissociates himself from Spengler and Toynbee with their pessimistic cyclical theories and returns to the method of Herder, which took history to be the "biography of mankind".

Kahler describes his book as "a new approach to history". His approach is new, however, only in the sense that it is more up to date than the approach of a great many religious socialists of the 19th century. There is nothing really new in saying that the history of man has moved dialectically from a state of primitive unities which were consolidated into a universal harmony by Christianity, that this harmony was wrecked by the destructive forces of Enlightenment, that society has now exploded in our faces, and that we must recapture our lost wholeness through a new universal religion of humanity. The French Revolution was responsible for whole schools of this kind of thought.

I find this book interesting, however, because its historical myth is peculiarly *the myth of the refugee*. And in this sense, the book is new. The experience of the refugee who leaves Europe and comes to America in the twentieth century is much more difficult and apocalyptic than the experience of earlier European refugees, for example, Hobbes or Locke or Marx or Mazzini. As Kahler says, "It has been reserved for our era to witness such spectacles as steamers crowded with helpless people roaming the ocean because they are not permitted to land anywhere, or the starving of such victims on the No Man's Land of a river island between borders." And for those few refugees who do succeed in coming to America, there is the tremendous experience of dissociating oneself from Europe, of being an unattached individual, standing between the New World and the Old, and of becoming assimilated into a new society. There is therefore a special poignancy in a theory of history which maintains, as Kahler's does, that man emerged from his original state of primitive solidarity by detaching himself as an individual from the universe and from society; that in the Renaissance man achieved his deliverance as a free individual; and that "the theme" of this century is "the struggle for man's reintegration in a clearly conceived universe and the struggle for a collective order."

This myth, so extremely pallid as a theory of world history, nevertheless makes Kahler a very good historian in particular instances. He is good at what used to be called "the higher criticism". Excluding the admirable appendix to Toynbee's *History* called "Christus Patiens", Kahler's chapter called "Genesis of Christianity from Judaism" is the best contemporary essay of this kind that I know of. In the great days of their culture, as well as later, the Jews were, of course, almost continuously a refugee people; and, as Kahler says, their greatness rises out of the tension between the perpetual forces of union and dispersion and out of their success in envisioning the universal brotherhood of man before the coming of Christ.

The morality of Christianity is the morality of Kahler's ideal future world order. And it was conceived by the refugee.

As a tract for the times, however, Kahler's book is not very valuable. The issue is clearly drawn: either you believe that the Enlightenment with its scientific method and its political realism still furnishes us with substantial possibilities for good or you believe that the Enlightenment was purely destructive and that it is responsible for the troubles of modern civilization. Kahler believes the latter. In the philosophy and method of naturalism he sees nothing but selfish capitalism and bourgeois corruption, both conservative and radical. More than that, he sees the apotheosis of naturalism in Hitler. Hitler is the historically inevitable result of the scientific temper. Hitler has at last succeeded on a national programmatic scale in doing what naturalism tried to do in the person of individual capitalists and Marxian socialists: subject mankind to "technics", turn men into mechanized slaves. Kahler speaks with the urgency, as well as the obscurantism, of religious prophecy when he announces that "the historic function of national socialism is to make a clean sweep; its deed is the ruthless, voluntary and involuntary annihilation and unmasking of all the rotting institutions, slogans, pretenses of modern times. With its magnetic appeal, national socialism draws everything that is shabby, base and egotistical into the limelight." One of the obvious mistakes of this attitude is that in a kind of backhanded way it accepts Nazism as an historical necessity.

There is a continual feeling of apocalypse in this book. (One recalls Arthur Koestler's recent revelation—in the *New York Times*—of "an irresistible global mood, a spiritual springtide like early Christianity or the Renaissance".) Everywhere Kahler looks he sees the terrors and evils of Western society suddenly laid bare, and he feels the mystic presence of a new utopian order; national socialism "reveals" and "dooms" the current condition of the world; our "modern paganism" (worship of production) is exposing itself against a fiery sky in all its sinful idolatry; our age is like the Hellenistic age immediately before the birth of Christ (see e.g., p. 284).

Aside from Kahler's religious objections to naturalism, there is in this book the traditional German dislike of the disparate, though here it is accentuated by the neuroses of the times almost into fear. Kahler makes much of the separation of states, parties, and intellectual disciplines after the Reformation. He correctly attaches the British and French doctrines of empiricism to this dispersion of the elements of culture. But whereas empirical rationalism welcomed, and still welcomes, the disparate universe as a battleground where the issues might be decided in the clash of contending parties, Kahler looks upon separate facts as so many separate tyrants ready to enslave the human being. Facts are not to be trusted until they have been disinfected and safely incorporated in a holism. The deadly political atrophy which accompanies this attitude is no novelty in Western thought.

In this book the German Ego abstracts itself from the world, as since Kant it has traditionally done, and softens the prospect of its loneliness with dreams of *Humanität* in a supernatural realm of "Perpetual Peace". For all this, it is better to consult Kant than Kahler. What makes Kahler's book worth reading is its new symbolization of the German Ego: the lost steamer, roaming the ocean and looking for reintegration with mankind.

RICHARD CHASE

A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT. By Eric Roll. Prentice-Hall. \$4.

"My aim has been to provide a historical background to the great theoretical controversies of today," writes Eric Roll in the introduction to this revised edition of his book. The only other text in the field I know of is Gide and Rist's, which is out of date and ultra-conservative. The general reader who wants to cover economic theory from the Old Testament prophets to John Maynard Keynes will, therefore, find this book a valuable and unique guide. Valuable because the contributions of economists of every school are described in conscientious detail—12 pages on Nassau William Senior, 5 on Proudhon, 6 on Pareto, etc. Unique because Roll's approach is sophisticated and not at all "textbookish", and because he writes from a historical-materialistic standpoint—both of these being unheard-of features in works of this kind.

The book has faults: the style often is needlessly stiff and abstract; the organization could be sharper, easier to follow. But these are minor matters. Over half the pages are devoted to the last hundred years, and the author constantly puts old ideas in a present-day context. "Plato's very small regard for foreign trade is shared by all the romantic schools of economics," he writes and one understands a little better the reactionary nature of pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism. Or again, he shows the lineal descent of Keynes's theories from Sismondi and Proudhon.

I also like the attention Roll pays to the political implications of economic theories. The very idea of devoting many pages to socialist and anarchist economists would not occur to more conventional textbook writers; the chapter on Marx is the longest in the book and its structural climax. One learns much more about Pareto, for example, than his purely economic ideas. Roll is well aware of the irony that this ultra-liberal exponent of *laissez faire*, whose development of the Lausanne School's mathematical economics "represents the logical extreme of the modern theory" should have evolved into the ideologist of fascism. "Pareto's own mental development," he comments, "suggests that the economist's human nature abhors the vacuum which this school would wish to create." D. M.

AS WE GO MARCHING. By John T. Flynn. Doubleday Doran. \$2.00.

John T. Flynn is a past-master at the art of building up to an awful letdown. In his latest book he is like a bull-fighter; the American people are the bull. Flynn frightens, wounds, tortures them—but he refuses to administer the coup de grace.

As We Go Marching is another devastating attack on the Roosevelt regime, a tremendous indictment. The Roosevelt regime, he says, is, in its present stage, four-fifths of fascism; and the fifth fifth—the totalitarian state—is fast on the way, he says. The book is a re-write of *It Can't Happen Here* as a primarily fiscal drama—a drama in which the protagonist is the Budget, with the fate of a nation depending on its ups and downs. And the drama rings true. "... fascism is a system of social organization which recognizes and proposes to protect the capitalist system and uses the device of public spending and debt as a means of creating national income to increase employment." (p.52). This is the basic element, which gives rise to its attendant evils of militarism, imperialism, war and totalitarianism, persecution of minorities, etc., each of which is often mistaken for the whole evil. Flynn proves his case through a detailed economic interpretation of the

modern histories of Italy and Germany, beginning with the roots of fascism in governmental crises long before Mussolini and Hitler.

As Flynn nears the end of his drama, he has his audience sitting on the edge of their seats, wringing their hands, wondering, "How will it all end?" On a note of salvation? No, sir, not from John T. Flynn! With satanic fury he pursues his task of "complete frankness and realism". He is ever the Great Destroyer. Unfortunately he destroys everything, himself and his audience in the bargain. With terrible logic he has shown how the fascization of America, like the fascization of the rest of the world, has developed inevitably out of the apparently inevitable capitalist disease of crisis ("an organic flaw of some sort", p.82)—a disease for which he, Flynn, has no remedy. Flynn is like a cantankerous old man—apparently still shrewd and clear-sighted, but actually, underneath, quite as bewildered and embittered as the worst of us. One feeble hope of salvation he does hold out—a salvation appropriately enough, through hard and bitter sacrifice. "We shall presently be presented with the final crisis—the necessity of taking the last few steps of the last mile to fascism in some generated crisis, of ending the prologue and running up the curtain on the swelling theme—or of calling off the whole wretched business in some costly yet inescapable convulsion . . ." He offers the hope, but no means of realizing the hope. "I did not undertake this book in order to outline a program of action," but only to warn you, he concludes!

This negativism reaches its logical climax when Flynn concludes that planned economy itself is the evil rather than the *for whom* and *for what* of fascism. He speaks of "Veblenian fascism", and calls communism (evidently considering the Soviet Union the be-all and end-all of communism) as well as fascism a "degrading condition".

So, capitalist crisis we must have—until, at least, Dr. Flynn hits on a remedy—but planned economy and centralized government we must not have. ". . . send," says Flynn, "all those non-federal powers back to the states and the cities where they belong." (p.242). Let the local fuehrers administer them! Back to "free enterprise and constitutional government"! How? I don't know, but let's do it! You see what comes of flirting with "the alluring pastime of reconstructing the capitalist system" (p.254)—fascism. So let's destroy the reconstruction; huzzah! Let's recapture the condition of, say, a hundred years ago!

Mr. Flynn's own budget needs balancing.

STANLEY LICHTENSTEIN

Periodicals

"The Evolutionist Revolt against Classical Economics: (1) In France—Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Simonde de Sismondi; (2) In England—James Steuart, Richard Jones, Karl Marx". By Henryk Grossman. THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Oct. and Dec., 1943.

In these articles, Henryk Grossman, the well-known Marxian economist, makes an important contribution both to cultural history and to the proper understanding of Marx today. His aim is "to show the decisive role of French and English economists in laying the basis for modern evolutionary theories of economics, and particularly for the work of Karl Marx". He shows that Marx was

not the first to "historicise" or "sociologize" economics—nor did Marx himself ever claim credit for this—and that this great task was performed not so much by Hegel, whose claims Grossman thinks have been exaggerated, as by the French and English writers he considers here. Marx "synthesized and completed the whole development" and was the first to work out the laws of development *within* a given society and "the objective and subjective conditions necessary for the transition from one system to another". "For the first time in the history of ideas, we encounter a theory which combines the evolutionary and revolutionary elements in an original manner to form a meaningful unit."

The studies of the six writers considered are rich in ideas and information. Grossman devotes most space to Condorcet and Richard Jones, neglected thinkers today but perhaps due to be "rediscovered" soon—or, in Jones' case, discovered. The rise of evolutionary theories at the time of the French Revolution, first in astrophysics: the curiously unhistorical character of the classical economists' approach; the connection between the rise of a sociological and historical conception of economics and the exposure, by the French Revolution, of the inadequacy of 18th century rationalism—these are the kind of questions discussed.

But what is especially interesting today are the close connections Grossman is able to establish between Marx and his English and French predecessors, and between all of them and the intellectual currents released by the Great French Revolution. Grossman shows that, in this field, Hegel was much less an ideological ancestor of Marx than is often alleged:

"All the great theorists of the French Enlightenment, with the exception of Rousseau, held the philosophic view that history was an endless progress marking man's path to reason. Endless progress necessarily implies that the existing reality . . . will not continue to exist indefinitely. Hegel, on the other hand, thought that history had reached its goal in his own day, that the idea and the reality had found their common ground. On this point, Marx was closer to the French tradition than to Hegel.

"In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel patterns the notion of freedom after the free ownership of property. The historical process thus becomes a glorification of the history of the middle class; and Hegel's *Philosophy of History* ends with the consolidation of middle-class society. Here was a social system no longer to be transcended. We shall see that the French tradition, from Condorcet through Saint-Simon and his disciples to Sismondi and Pecqueur, was very different . . . They stood opposed to the existing oppressive social system. Progress does not end with middle-class society. Quite the contrary, it will continue to unfold in the future in new social structures . . . Here, too, Marx was linked to French thought, not to Hegel."

It is a pity the editorialist of the *N. Y. Times* of December 22 last could not have found time to read these articles before he put on paper his considered opinion of Marxism as "the muddled thinking of a German doctor of philosophy named Karl Marx, who combined his typically German and Hegelian ideas of the supremacy of the state with a utopian dream born of his incompetence in dealing with the problems of existence in the London slums." (He *did* have time to read Max Eastman, evidently.) This bit of provincial spite and ignorance is rendered all the more piquant by the occasion, which was the dropping of the French-composed *Internationale* as the national anthem of Soviet Russia. The *Times* editorialist should also read Marx's lengthy and merciless critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of the State*. But the Grossman articles should be more than enough for his purposes. Some one should send him an offprint.

"Man of His Century: A Reconsideration of the Historical Significance of Karl Marx" by Solomon F. Bloom. THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Dec. 1943.

A tepid critique of Marx's ideas which fails to justify its pretentious title. When Bloom has finished his rather condescending survey of Marxism, he finds himself faced with a problem: how could a thinker whose main ideas are open to so many objections have been as influential as Marx was? To meet this difficulty, the author resorts to a common strategy of denigration: Marxism was a supreme expression of 19th century thought, hence its influence; but its significance is now mostly historical. It is, of course, important to rebut the sectarian claim that Marx found a timeless philosopher's stone by which to gauge all history—past, present and future—but it is absurd to go to the extreme of considering Marx as simply another Carlyle or Herbert Spencer, that is, a figure of tremendous significance in his day but with little to tell us now to the point. One might legitimately ask why, in that case, Bloom himself took the trouble to write a whole book several years ago on Marx's views on the national question?

"Is China's Economy to be Modelled on Japan's?" by the editors. AMERASIA, Feb. 4, 1944.

Reflecting the attitude and the powers back of the Kuomintang, various Chinese spokesmen have come out for the following plan for postwar China: 1. China is to remain a predominantly agricultural country. 2. Light industry for the production of consumer's goods is to be widely decentralized, with thousands of widely scattered minute producers. 3. There are to be a few very large centers of industry, largely under government control. This plan would serve to retain the power of the semi-feudal landlord class, for the second point would perhaps be under their control and the program as a whole would not disturb the relations of production existing in agriculture. If the government controlled or even owned the few huge industries, no independent and powerful industrial class would emerge to challenge the landlord's power over the country's total political economy. In Japan, a government-controlled heavy industry was grafted on a semi-feudal agrarian base; there was a blend of landed with industrial elite and thus the transition from feudal to capitalist economy was achieved with the minimum of social change in agricultural relations. A similar system is in the cards for China; but, of course, on this particular gaming table, several people have their own deck up their respective sleeves.

1. "Britain's Postwar Trade and World Economy" by Howard P. Whidden, Jr. FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, Dec. 15, 1943.

2. "Planning Industry's Future in Britain" by Walter Hill. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Winter, 1944.

1. is a valuable survey article, presenting the figures on Britain's probable postwar trade position. The heart of the question is this: in 1936-1938 Britain imported £950,000,000 worth of goods. She paid for these 59% with exports, 26% with income from investments (or from liquidating investments), 11% with shipping revenues, and 4% with insurance and banking receipts. After the war, her investment income will be halved, since she has had to liquidate investments to pay for the war and has had to

borrow great sums from the U. S., India, Canada, Egypt, etc. Her banking receipts will be lower because of the growth of New York City as an international finance center, at the expense of London. Her shipping revenues will also be lower because of shipping losses in the war and because of the rise of the American, Canadian, Australian and Indian merchant marines.

Thus in the first two postwar years, Britain may have a deficit in her foreign trade account of £200,000,000. To close that gap is the problem confronting her, a problem intensified by the fact that she is the world's No. 1 importing nation. Whidden thinks it will be done by expansion of exports. He says that it depends on America's postwar foreign trade policy whether this expansion is in the tradition of free trade on the world market or in that of Schacht's bilateral trade agreements, with quotas, licenses, special currencies, etc. (There is much evidence, however, that Britain has made her choice already, and for the Schachtian technique.)

2. is British propaganda, by an editor of the London *Economist*, designed to convince American businessmen that England is planning her postwar role in the world market in terms of free trade. It is mostly uncritical quotation of generalities by leading British spokesmen. But even here one gets some glimpses of how cartelized and State-controlled British business will be after the war. The famous plan of 120 British industrialists which he cites, for example, is a corporate state set-up, with trade associations made compulsory and given full control over the economy.

"From Moscow to Naples" by Gaetano Salvemini. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 1943. "'Liberated' Italy" by Gaetano Salvemini. THE NATION, Jan. 1, 1944.

Every now and then, Gaetano Salvemini publishes an article on developments in Italy in *The Nation* or *The New Republic*, usually the latter. These articles are as good political writing as is being done today: uncompromising in their honesty and realism, massively documented, written with the sharpness of controlled indignation. In the tepid atmosphere of the liberal press, muggy with compromise, fear and confusion, Salvemini's writing is a fresh breeze. Like Randolph Bourne in the last war, Salvemini's intelligence and honesty put him into increasingly sharp opposition to his fellow liberals. His comments on the developing Italian situation are required reading for all who would understand our foreign policy.

"Why War Workers Strike—the Case History of a Shipyard 'Wildcat'" by Victor H. Johnson. THE NATION, January 15, 1944.

The author, a minor official of the CIO shipyard workers union, tries to show that the War Labor Board is "a cautiously reactionary instrument under the domination of W. H. Davis" and that the liberals on it are there for "window-dressing". He tells a detailed story of the run-around the representatives of 43,000 ship workers got in Washington, and the wildcat strike which resulted. This little tale proves Johnson's criticisms of the WLB to the hilt. But it also proves a lot more—much more than the author, a rather naive labor-patriot, probably intended to reveal: namely, that the chief role of union leaders today is to prevent strikes.

"The union men who came into our office or who worked

side by side with us, we could hold against a strike. Our problem was the unorganized . . . who were more for striking than the organized. Non-unionists baited us for 'being afraid to strike' . . . Spontaneous work stoppages, slowdowns, sitdowns multiplied. Union officials had a busy time nipping departmental demonstrations in the bud and keeping resentment from crystallizing into a general walkout. *We tried to prevent news of the trouble from reaching the public; and so did the company, apparently.*" (italics mine) Thus a decade of the C.I.O. has brought American labor to the point that those not in the union show more fight and daring than the union members! Postwar reaction will have a walkover unless the American labor movement develops a slight amount of guts.

The Intelligence Office

The Civil Rights Defense Committee has issued a 32-page pamphlet, "Who are the 18 Prisoners in the Minneapolis Labor Case?", which contains a summary of the facts in the case, short biographies of the defendants, and other information on the Roosevelt Administration's persecution of the Minneapolis defendants. The pamphlets cost ten cents each, and are obtainable from the Committee at 160 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Last May a group of leftwing refugees in Mexico City joined with several Mexican radicals to form the "Socialism and Liberty" group. A month later, the group put out the first number of an illustrated review entitled "Mundo". Written in Spanish, the magazine justifies its title, covering the major regions of the world in special departments and printing the work of writers of a wide range of nationalities. Five numbers have appeared to date. Among the leading articles have been: "The Rebirth of Socialism" by Victor Serge; "Homage to Otto and Alice Ruhle"; "The Third Camp" by Julian Gorkin; "War Diary" by Jean Malaquais; "The Contradictions in Our Socialist Thinking" by Enrique Gironella. The Mexican Communists have denounced "Mundo" as "Goebbels' mouthpiece", and their adherents in the Mexico postoffice have sabotaged its distribution. (The Trotskyists dismiss the magazine as "miserable Centrist confusionism".) For some reason, very few copies of "Mundo" have reached this country, although many have been mailed to American addresses. Inquiry has so far not revealed whether this is due to Stalinist dirty work in Mexico City, or to the censors at the border—though it is hard to see what the latter could find to object to in the magazine, beyond its openly socialist bias.

TYPICAL REACTIONS TO VOL. I, NO. I.

"Congratulations on the first issue of POLITICS. It's about 25 times as lively as *The Nation* and *The New Republic*."

—R. C., NEW YORK CITY

"It is too much a one-man job . . . The comments are good but there are too many of them . . . The book reviews are the worst thing in the magazine. It is only occasionally possible to say anything pertinent about a 400-page

book in as many words . . . The periodical review section, on the other hand, is excellent . . . The Oakes piece is good—interesting, timely, provocative, the right length . . . The magazine needs something to lighten it—one or two cartoons, for instance . . . The cover seems to me surprisingly bad."—W. P., NEW YORK CITY

"Just happened across a copy of your February issue and found it the most stimulating reading experience in months. Instead of reading it thru readily with easy approval, I was challenged to some serious thinking—how few contemporary magazines can do the same for a reader."

—R. J., PHILADELPHIA, PA.

"Frankly, I don't like POLITICS too much—it's too reminiscent of the little Commie sectarian stuff which flooded the market in '34-'38. The best thing in it was the first part of the editorial, "Why Politics?"—now that's a swell prospectus. I only hope you can live up to it. But I can't quite square that with the 5 pp. of "Comment", all of it straight down the inevitable 'line' . . . I liked the Periodical section very much."—CPL. X., NEW HAVEN, CONN.

"If you really want to create a center for the Left, I believe you're going to have to modify the tone of the 'Comment', etc. We have to learn to write with more in-direction. It seems to me that this comes out best in choice of a vocabulary. Not only esthetically, but also in intellectual meaning and certainly in appealing to more people, there are terms that just don't go. Thus instead of "means of production" why not say "productive facilities"? "The ruling class" seems bad to me on two counts: first, its tone is stereotyped and arouses antagonism needlessly, but more importantly, it is ambiguous: class is clearly economic, ruling is a political category. By joining the two you hide a big problem, or a whole set of them . . . Almost all Marxist jargon is *needlessly* (that's the point) alienative. Cf. Oakes essay, which is a very nice thing, the language at times estranges many; and to hell with the chart—that was bad to include it! . . . I read the whole issue from cover to cover and enjoyed it immensely; it's lively and has the air of free and hardhitting truth-seeking (even if some of it shelled in by archaic language)."

—C. W. M., COLLEGE PARK, MD.

"POLITICS came to me in this forsaken climate with a richness that wholly pleases my now more refined standards. It carries every virtue the sectarian journals ever exploited, and some entirely new ones of its own—for one thing it is never 'liberal'; entirely revolutionary without any brazen 'radicalism'. The best I can say is that it is the first 'left' periodical I have seen."

—PFC., CAMP CROFT, S. C.

"SOLICIT YOUR SUBSCRIBERS IN MOSCOW FROM WHENCE COMES YOUR INSPIRATION! WAKE UP! YOUR TIME IN AMERICA IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE. THE TIDE IS RUNNING TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT. AND AMERICANISM. IT WILL SWEEP THE COUNTRY LIKE A TORNADO THIS YEAR AND NEITHER KARL MARX NOR 'POLITICS' WILL FIND A HAVEN HERE!"

(Written in red crayon on back of a sub blank. Unsigned Baltimore postmark.)

"POLITICS reminds me of the *Partisan Review* I 'discovered' in 1937. Like the young P.R., it is fresh, daring radical."—J. H. J., BLUEMONT, VA.

"I like your magazine and I think it will help radicals who are not too tired or too pessimistic or too doctrinaire to reset their sights."—F. M., DETROIT, MICH.

"The first issue was a little disappointing, but then I suppose that I expected too much merely because the need is so great . . . Although I do not actually disagree with any statement, Macdonald's enunciation of his political views was weak, and failed to say a good many important things . . . I liked Oakes' analysis, and I have no basis for challenging his predictions of the future. But the value of a prediction, in a political sense . . . is to enable us to formulate strategy and tactics in dealing with contemporary events. And the only conclusion that Oakes draws is that we need an independent labor party . . . and that this party should 'cope with the problems of living under a permanent war economy'—this statement is either a vague generality, or a belief that we can, at best, 'adjust' ourselves to the inevitable . . . I thought Lasky's article was very well written; and the reviews were all damned good. I read the "Theory of Popular Culture" with great interest. Some of the sweeping generalizations on both literary and political matters are arbitrary and superficial. But many of the things that he says have needed saying for a long time."—SGT. Z, CAMP LEE, VA.

THE BATTLE OF PETERSBURG

Sir:

I feel compelled to protest against the inclusion in your first issue of that "Letter from Petersburg, Va." It is just that kind of snide, snotty, sophomoric provincialism that is going to repel readers outside of N.Y.C. . . . There are some fine people around who wouldn't know George's bar from Chumley's, and who are all the more to be admired because they have the guts to work and struggle in intellectually inhospitable (in some cases hostile) surroundings.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

HARVEY SWADOS

To all those who live in Petersburg, Va., out of a sense of moral obligation, apologies for our correspondent's snide remarks, which are to be understood as applying only to those who live there for less elevated reasons.—ED.

FANCY WRITING AND UNCLE JOE

Sir:

I have rec'd Vol. 1, No. 1 of POLITICS and find it very much worth while. We need a journal that will in a fair and objective manner go into many things that are too hot for the *Nation* and *New Republic*.

I note that you do not like Uncle Joe, and that is OK by me. You know Adolph don't like him either. Nor does Pope Pius, Fulton Sheehan, or the Chi Tribune—all of which cuts no ice. Give old Joseph hell if you will—but deal in direct statements of fact that can be proven . . . Some of us think Uncle Joe has done pretty well—that his credits far exceed his debits. . . .

I also note that some of your writers have found and use peculiar and unusual words and if there is anything I detest in a writer it is that very thing. Verbosity, pedantry and cocky, smart-Alec writing just don't "fit my pistol".

I wish you good luck and will pass your mag on to my friends. Hope you don't turn out to be just another Trotskeyite outfit.

WEST TULSA, OKLA.

AUSTIN JOHNSON

AMERICAN WOMEN'S PLACE

Sir:

Dwight Macdonald doesn't know what he's talking about when he says in his article on Popular Culture that women are culturally subordinated to men in the country. I submit the enclosed as conclusive evidence.

STATEN ISLAND, N. Y.

TERENCE DONAGHUE

See cut below—ED.

N.Y. DAILY MIRROR,
Dec. 13, 1943. p. 4.



THE "TRIBUNE'S" LITTLE HELPER

Your aim "to create a center of consciousness on the Left, welcoming all varieties of radical thought" is one with which I am so enthusiastically in sympathy that it is very disappointing to find that you apparently limit your definition of "radical thought" to the prejudices of the anti-Stalin group. There seems to be no subject which you can discuss without making it an occasion for a slur on Russia. (If the views of the opposition were expressed, where were they?) I think that your analysis of the nature of the Soviet Union is superficial, and the article by Louis Clair on "Stalin's Policy in Europe" is downright childish—his theory that Russia is the "main pillar of reaction on the continent" would imply that Russia offered to oppose Germany before Munich because Stalin feared the liberalizing influence of Hitler on Czechoslovakia, and that Russia supported the Spanish Republic because he feared that Franco would lead a proletarian revolution.

This policy is simply suicidal. There is no reason whatever that I can see for a little helper for the *Chicago Tribune* in its crusade to discredit Russia. Every publication in United States, with very minor exceptions, is already working that side of the street.

What is the source of the strange compulsion that makes every liberal journal run through the list of all of Russia's alleged sins on every possible occasion? At whom is this directed, and to what end? I have lived for 42 fairly sociable years without meeting more than half a dozen people who were greatly interested in Russia or well enough informed to know what all the arguing was about. Even

if all that you think is true, the net effect of dragging it in on every possible occasion is as though a historian writing of England felt that he had to start every chapter with a recital of all that is wrong with imperialism—would you read many such chapters? How many would a person completely uninterested in imperialism read?

Actually, I think that there is an excellent case to be made for Russia—I shall be glad to go into details if you will undertake to read them, but shall not waste time itemizing the evidence in a letter which I am sure that you will toss aside as the outburst of a Communist. (I have never been a Communist and have only known two party members in all my life—and those two very briefly—believe it or not). It seems inexcusable, though, that a journal with any pretense to intellectual honesty should descend to the old trick of always coupling Russia and Nazi Germany together in mentioning dictatorships. They differ profoundly in particulars which I consider extremely important—notably, in their handling of racial conflicts, in their attitude toward education, and in their treatment of women. If you consider such things as these unimportant details, what, for Christ's sake, do you consider important?

Finally, I ask you to believe that I have inflicted all this on you because I am honestly interested in seeing such a journal as you proposed to create succeed—and because I still hope that *Politics* can be such a journal.

HAMILTON, OHIO

WILLIAM PALMER TAYLOR

The vehemence with which Mr. Taylor objects to POLITICS' anti-Stalinist flavor to some extent answers his question, why so much on faraway Russia? He himself takes Russia pretty seriously, or he would not have written so long and so strongly about it. There are two big reasons why the USSR today is dominant in leftwing consciousness: (1) it is incomparably the most powerful force on the left, and its relation to socialism poses the most important theoretical and practical political question of our time; (2) it is rapidly becoming the storm center of post-war world politics, as the Kremlin pursues an increasingly independent and aggressive foreign policy.

As for Mr. Taylor's objection to the linking of Nazism and Stalinism, I can only say (1) most liberal journals do NOT, today, say much about "Russia's alleged sins", and hence it seems important for some leftwing magazine to do so—all the more so precisely because the field is left too much to reactionary organs like the "Chicago Tribune", which distort more than they enlighten; (2) Peter Meyer's articles in this and the last issue give impressive documentation to the thesis that the similarities between Nazism and Stalinism are more significant than the dissimilarities.

Finally, I shall be glad to print any serious and competent article by Mr. Taylor or any one else, which argues the case, from a socialist viewpoint, for the present Government and social system in Russia.—ED.

WOODROW WILSON AND "POLITICS"

Sir:

Permit me to say I like your restoration of the word "politics" to its original and real meaning. Woodrow Wilson, who divided the old chair of Political Economy into the two chairs, Economics and Politics, at Princeton in about the year 1894 told me he chose for himself the title, "Professor of Politics", in order to help restore its original meaning to this word.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

GUY ALAN TAWNEY

CONTRIBUTORS

C. WRIGHT MILLS teaches sociology at the University of Maryland. He has written for *The New Republic*, *The Journal of Sociology*, *The New Leader* and other magazines . . . NICCOLO TUCCI has been in this country several years. He contributes to Italian periodicals, and writes short stories, one of which will soon appear in *POLITICS* . . . ARTHUR PINCUS, author of *Terror in Cuba* and other studies of Latin America, lives in New York City . . . FRANK MARQUART is educational director of Local 600 (Ford) of the United Automobile Workers, CIO . . . "PETER MEYER" is the pseudonym of a former member of the Jewish Bund of Poland, who now lives in Chicago . . . WELDON KEES is a poet and novelist who has contributed to *Partisan Review* and other magazines. He lives in New York City . . . RUTH FISCHER was one of the leaders of the German Communist Party in the mid-twenties. She now edits a news-letter *The Network*, devoted to factual exposes of current activities in the Stalinist movement . . . VICTOR SERGE, author of *Russia 20 Years After* and several novels on contemporary life in Russia, now lives in Mexico City . . . RICHARD CHASE is in the Department of English at Columbia University. His study of Toynbee's historical theories appears in the current *Partisan Review* . . . STANLEY LICHTENSTEIN is a young writer who lives in New York City.

He has three simple loyalties. They are to President Phil Murray of the CIO, President Roosevelt of the USA, and the United Automobile Workers Union, in approximately that order.—from a profile of R. J. Thomas, president of the UAW, in the Saturday Evening Post for Dec. 18, 1943.

Mr. Thomas' salary is paid by the United Automobile Workers, the United Automobile Workers, and the United Automobile Workers, in approximately that order.

FURTHER ADVENTURES OF MARY

The "Christian Century" (Jan. 26) reports that the Virgin Mary has been made an honorary general in the Argentine army. "She receives no salary but is assigned a vivaticum of ten dollars a day which is collected by the church."

—Fellowship, March, 1944

ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS

NORFOLK, VA., Mar. 7.—A stained glass window, executed by one of the country's best known artists in that field, who says it is the first time the Virgin has been represented as holding a warship instead of the Christ Child, will soon be installed in the Chapel of Our Lady of Victory at the Norfolk naval operating base.

—"Washington (D. C.) Evening Star", March 7, 1944

POT & KETTLE DEPT.

The conquests made by Japanese armies in Manchuria, Mongolia and China since 1931 have effected no formal addition to the Japanese empire, for a method of 'indirect rule' has been applied without annexation or even protectorate of the ordinary kind; Manchukuo is in Japanese theory a sovereign state, and any nation which so desires can have diplomatic representation at Hsinking — at the price of recognizing Manchukuo's sovereignty and detachment from China. The world in general does not take this theory very seriously and regards Manchukuo as merely an alias for Japan. But in keeping up the elaborate hocus-pocus of independence for a country she in reality controls. Japan is simply following an example set by Britain with the concurrence of the League of Nations, for the admission of India in 1919 to a society whose membership is by its constitution restricted to independent states and 'fully self-governing' colonies or dominions introduced into international relations an element of sheer humbug which the world will yet have cause to regret. If a state can be recognized as 'fully self-governing' when it lacks every attribute of real independence, the way is open for an unlimited faking of sovereignty. By virtue of the Geneva conception of national independence, Japan can at least claim that the people of Manchuria have not enjoyed less freedom in setting up the government of Manchukuo than has the 'fully self-governing' Indian nation in choosing Lord Linlithgow as its ruler. —"An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics", by G. F. Hudson, Marthe Rajchman, and G. E. Taylor, pp. 66-7 (John Day, 1942)