




PENGUIN  CLASSICS

KARL MARX

*Dispatches for the New York Tribune:
Selected Journalism of Karl Marx*

Edited by JAMES LEDBETTER with a foreword by FRANCIS WHEEN



DISPATCHES FOR THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE

Born in Trier in the Rhineland in 1818, KARL MARX was the son of a Jewish lawyer recently converted to Christianity. As a student in Bonn and Berlin, Marx studied law and then philosophy. He joined with the Young Hegelians, the most radical of Hegel's followers, in denying that Hegel's philosophy could be reconciled with Christianity or the existing State. Forced out of university by his radicalism, he became a journalist and, soon after, a socialist. He left Prussia for Paris and then Brussels, where he stayed until 1848. In 1844 he began his collaboration with Friedrich Engels and developed a new theory of communism to be brought into being by a proletarian revolution. This theory was brilliantly outlined in *The Communist Manifesto*. Marx participated in the 1848 revolutions as a newspaper editor in Cologne. Exiled together with his family to London, he tried to make a living writing for the *New York Tribune* and other journals, but remained financially dependent on Engels. His researches in the British Museum were aimed at underpinning his conception of communism with a theory of history that demonstrated that capitalism was a transient economic form destined to break down and be superseded by a society without classes, private property or state authority. This study was never completed, but its first part, which was published as *Capital* in 1867, established him as the principal theorist of revolutionary socialism. He died in London in 1883.

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Dispatches for the
New York *Tribune*
Selected Journalism of Karl Marx

Selected and with an Introduction by
JAMES LEDBETTER

Foreword by FRANCIS WHEEN

PENGUIN BOOKS

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Published by the Penguin Group

Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England

Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA

Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3

(a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.)

Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen's Green, Dublin 2, Ireland

(a division of Penguin Books Ltd)

Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia

(a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd)

Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi - 110 017, India

Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, North Shore 0632, New Zealand

(a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd)

Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa

Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England

www.penguin.com

This selection first published 2007

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Set in 10.25/12.25 pt PostScript Adobe Sabon

Typeset by Rowland Phototypesetting Ltd, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk

Printed in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives plc

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ISBN 978-0-141-44192-4

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
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Foreword

When my biography of Karl Marx was published, in 1999, some academic critics complained that the book was rather “journalistic”—one of the most damning insults in the university lexicon, even in an age when many dons are happy to dash off a thousand words on the cultural significance of Madonna’s new hairstyle. I had no defense against the charge: I *am* a journalist. If this is a crime, however, then Marx himself was guilty of it.

For freelance intellectuals who might otherwise spend all day closeted away in libraries, writing for newspapers is a useful discipline. It forces them to engage with the here and now, to test their theories against reality, to apply their understanding of history to the specific events of the day, and to write with a clarity that will reach into the minds of the general public. It can also provide the satisfaction of achieving immediate results: there are few greater pleasures than publishing an article that sparks off a controversy, or infuriates the high and mighty.

All of which is a pretty fair summary of what drew Marx to journalism in the first place, when as a young man in the early 1840s he started writing for the German press. As a student he had envisaged some sort of academic career for himself, but after leaving Berlin University his thoughts shifted from idealism to materialism, from the abstract to the actual. He had come to despise the nebulous, sentimental arguments of those German liberals who thought freedom was best honored in the starry firmament of the imagination instead of on the solid ground of reality. “Since every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time,” he wrote in 1842, “the time must come

when philosophy not only internally by its content, but also externally through its form, comes into contact and interaction with the real world of its day."¹ His new direction would require an exhausting, and exhaustive, course of self-education, but that was no discouragement to such an insatiable autodidact.

Marx produced his first article in February 1842 and sent it to a newspaper in Dresden, the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*. It was a brilliant polemic against the latest censorship instructions issued by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV—and, with glorious if unintended irony, the censor promptly banned it. The newspaper itself was closed down shortly afterward by order of the Federal Parliament. Marx then tried his luck at the *Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne.

It was immediately clear that he had qualities which are essential to all great journalists: a determination to speak truth to power, and absolute fearlessness even when writing about people whose friendship or support one might need. For proof, look at his first article for the *Rheinische Zeitung*—published in May 1842—which reported on the Rhine Provincial Assembly's debates about freedom of the press. Naturally Marx criticized the oppressive intolerance of Prussian absolutism and its lickspittles: this was brave enough, if unsurprising. But then, with an exasperated cry of "God save me from my friends!", he turned his blowtorch on the feeble-mindedness of the liberal opposition. At least the enemies of press freedom were driven by a pathological emotion that lent feeling and conviction to their arguments: "the defenders of the press in this assembly have on the whole no real relation to what they are defending. They have never come to know freedom of the press as a vital need. For them, it is a matter of the head, in which the heart plays no part."² Quoting Goethe, who had said that a painter can only succeed in depicting a type of beauty which he has loved in a real human being, Marx suggested that freedom of the press also has its beauty, which one must have loved in order to defend it. Yet the so-called liberals appeared to lead complete and fulfilled lives even while the press was in fetters.

Neither did Marx expect, even after taking over the editorship of the Cologne paper in October 1842, to offer any special

harbor to his left-wing comrades. He had no time for their stunts and tricks, warning his contributors that "I regard it as inappropriate, indeed even immoral, to smuggle communist and socialist doctrines, hence a new world outlook, into incidental theatre criticisms, etc. I demand a quite different and more thorough discussion of communism, if it should be discussed at all."³

Marx's own ability to discuss communism was slightly hampered by the fact that he knew nothing about it. His years of study had taught him plenty of philosophy, theology and law, but in politics and economics he was a novice. This is why his newspaper experience is so important to his intellectual development, and why it deserves far more attention than most writers have allowed. There are countless books about Karl Marx as an historian, an economist, a philosopher, a revolutionist or a sociologist, and even one or two about him as a mathematician, but hardly any devoted specifically to his journalism.

Marx admitted many years later that "as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, I experienced for the first time the embarrassment of having to take part in a discussion on so-called material interests."⁴ I know what he meant. When I graduated from university at the age of twenty-one, I wangled myself a job as a reporter on the *New Statesman*, which was the best crash course imaginable on learning about "material interests"—and not merely because the pay was so bad. I rushed off to cover strikes and lockouts, I visited Asian families in the East End of London who endured racist attacks almost daily, and I headed off to Scotland to interview feudal grandees who were persecuting local poachers so they could rent out their riverbanks to rich German tourists at £1,000 a week.

Marx's own crash course began similarly, with a long article about the new law dealing with thefts of wood from private forests. By ancient custom, peasants had been allowed to gather fallen branches for fuel, but now anyone who picked up the merest twig could expect a prison sentence. Even more outrageously, the offender would have to pay the forest owners the value of the wood, to be assessed by the owners themselves.

Reporting on this legalized larceny by rich landowners forced Marx to think deeply and concretely, perhaps for the first time, about questions of class, private property and the State. It also allowed him to exercise his talent for demolishing a thoughtless argument with its own logic. Quoting a comment by one of the aristocratic half-wits in the Provincial Assembly—"It is precisely because the pilfering of wood is not regarded as theft that it occurs so often"—he let rip with a characteristic *reductio ad absurdum*: "By analogy with this, the legislator would have to draw the conclusion: it is because a box on the ear is not regarded as murder that it has become so frequent. It should be decreed therefore that a box on the ear is murder."⁵

This was dangerous sarcasm for a journalist whose every word was closely scrutinized by the censors. By January 1843 the authorities had had enough, and ordered the newspaper to close down altogether at the end of March. Marx was never quite sure why his paper had been suppressed, since no official explanation was given. Little did he realize—though he might have been gratified to hear it—that the man behind the ban was no less a figure than Czar Nicholas I of Russia, who had taken offense at a piece in the *Rheinische Zeitung* and asked the Prussian King to do something about it. By the age of twenty-four, in other words, Karl Marx was already wielding a journalistic pen that could terrify the crowned heads of Europe.

Marx the historian grew out of Marx the journalist, but he would not have been a great political journalist if he didn't already have a sense of history. Newspaper writers who lack this sense are incapable of distinguishing between a genuinely significant event and a mere passing frenzy that will be forgotten within a week. In the words of the twentieth-century Marxist Isaac Deutscher, himself a successful journalist, "Awareness of historical perspective seems to me to provide the best antidote to excessive pessimism as well as extravagant optimism over the great problems of our time."⁶

Marx's images and historical parallels are not simply dashes of journalistic Tabasco, adding pungency to the stew. They are intended to accelerate thought, to suggest new interpretations. "There is something in human history like retribution," he


wrote (see this volume, p. 234) of the violent insurrection in 1857 by Sepoys, the native soldiers in the Anglo-Indian army, "and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself. The first blow dealt to the French monarchy proceeded from the nobility, not from the peasants. The Indian revolt does not commence with the Ryots, tortured, dishonored and stripped naked by the British, but with the Sepoys, clad, fed, petted, fatted and pampered by them." Or, to put it another way, political Frankensteins are usually destroyed by monsters of their own creation—as true now as it was then.

In a lecture a few years ago, after noting that many of today's columnists issue book-length collections of their work, I concluded with this appeal: "Is it too much to hope that some enlightened publisher might now do the same for Karl Marx?" Because of the *Communist Manifesto*, *Capital* and other masterpieces, the importance of his newspaper work has for too long been undervalued. Now, thanks to Jim Ledbetter, readers can judge it for themselves. My own verdict? Even if he had done nothing else, Marx would deserve to be remembered as one of the great nineteenth-century journalists.

Francis Wheen

NOTES

1. *Rheinische Zeitung*, July 14, 1842, translated in *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, hereafter MECW), vol. I (1975), p. 195.
2. *Rheinische Zeitung*, May 19, 1842, translated in MECW, vol. I (1975), p. 172.
3. Karl Marx to Arnold Ruge, November 30, 1842.
4. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), translated in *The Portable Karl Marx* (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 158.
5. *Rheinische Zeitung*, October 25, 1842, translated in MECW, vol. I (1975), p. 225.
6. Isaac Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), p. 7.



Chronology

- 1818 Born in Trier, German Rhineland, on May 5.
- 1835 Enrolled at the University of Bonn to study law.
- 1836 Transferred to Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Berlin and studied philosophy.
- 1842 First publication in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Met Friedrich Engels briefly in the newspaper's office.
- 1843 Married Jenny von Westphalen. Emigrated to Paris. Published *On the Jewish Question*.
- 1844 Met Engels again in Paris, this time for ten days. Daughter Jenny born.
- 1845 Wrote a monograph on philosophy later published as *Theses on Feurbach*. Daughter Laura born.
- 1845-6 With Engels, began collaboration on philosophical and economic writings which would later be collected and published as *The German Ideology*.
- 1846 Son Edgar born.
- 1847 Published *The Poverty of Philosophy*, an attack on the French socialist Proudhon.
- 1848 As revolutions swept across Europe, published *Manifesto of the Communist Party* with Engels.
- 1848-9 Moved to Cologne to edit the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Prussian authorities arrested the newspaper's staff and recommended that Marx be deported.
- 1850 With his family, moved to London, where they remained for the rest of his life. In November, his son Heinrich Guido died at the age of one.
- 1852 Began his collaboration with the *New York Tribune*, aided by Engels, who wrote an initial series of articles on

- the state of German politics. Publication of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.
- 1853 Outbreak of the Crimean War, which Marx and Engels covered regularly for the *Tribune*.
- 1855 Daughter Eleanor born.
- 1856-7 The *Tribune* fell on hard times and, for some months, published few of Marx's articles. The Indian Army rebellion broke out, and the "Arrow Incident" sparked the second Opium War, events which provided Marx with renewed inspiration.
- 1859 Published *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.
- 1862 Published his final article for the New York *Tribune*.
- 1864 Founding of the International Workingmen's Association, the First International. Marx elected to the body's General Council.
- 1867 Published *Capital*.
- 1871 A clash between troops and the French National Guard led to the founding of the socialist Paris Commune; Marx wrote an address to the Commune that was published as *The Civil War in France*. He clashed with Michael Bakunin over leadership and direction of the International.
- 1872 Published *The Fictitious Splits in the International*. The International voted to relocate the General Council to New York. Marx's daughter Jenny married.
- 1881 Wife died on December 2.
- 1883 Marx died at his London home on March 4.
- 1893 Publication of second volume of *Capital*.
- 1894 Publication of third volume of *Capital*.

Introduction

In 1848, the American newspaper editor Charles A. Dana was visiting Cologne for the first time. Dana had only recently joined the staff of the New York *Tribune*, which dispatched him abroad for eight months to cover the effects of the revolutions sweeping through Europe that year. On that trip, Dana, a twenty-nine-year-old literary utopian who spoke fluent German, met a radical poet named Ferdinand Freiligrath who in turn introduced him to Karl Marx. Barely thirty, Marx was already a formidable figure in German philosophy. Moreover, with the publication earlier that year of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx, along with his writing partner and great friend Friedrich Engels, had become the principal propagandist for European socialism. Although there is no record of the men's meeting, it's clear that Marx made an impression on Dana because three years later, Dana wrote to him to ask that he produce a series of articles for the *Tribune* on the changes that had taken place in Germany since the tumultuous events of 1848. The *Tribune* had been founded by Horace Greeley in 1841 as a crusading organ of progressive causes, albeit with a distinctly American and Christian flavor; one contemporary writer described the paper's political stance as "Anti-Slavery, Anti-War, Anti-Rum, Anti-Tobacco, Anti-Seduction, Anti-Grogshops, Anti-Brothels, Anti-Gambling Houses".¹ The *Tribune* had been profitable from its first year and was feeling flush enough to engage a team of foreign correspondents to give it a substantive leg up on more sensationalist rivals like the *Herald* and *Sun*. Marx, tempted both by the wide reach of the *Tribune*—during the period when he wrote for it, the paper had

more than 200,000 readers, making it the largest newspaper in the world at the time—and the prospect of steady income, agreed—and then immediately asked Engels to write the pieces for him.

That peculiar set of circumstances inaugurated a decade-long relationship between Marx and a progressive American newspaper that would represent the closest thing he ever had to a steady job. Of course, Marx had a journalistic career outside the *Tribune*; he had been writing for German newspapers since 1842, and in 1848 he had founded the radical Cologne daily the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Throughout his adult life he contributed articles to a variety of papers in both German and English, including the British Chartist organ *The People's Paper*, *Die Presse* and the *Neue Oder Zeitung*. But the *Tribune* was by far the largest publisher of Marx's (and, to a lesser extent, Engels's) work: in all, the paper published 487 articles, of which Marx alone wrote 350, Engels wrote 125, and together they wrote 12. The sheer volume of the work is remarkable: the *Tribune* articles together take up nearly seven volumes of the fifty-volume collected works of Marx and Engels—more than *Capital*, more than any work published by Marx, alive or posthumously, in book form. While Marx has been remembered as a philosopher, economist and political theorist, the historical record suggests that we should at least attempt to understand him as a journalist.

Why, then, are Marx's journalistic writings so little read today? Not so long ago, his role as a newspaperman was widely enough understood that US President John F. Kennedy, of all people, felt comfortable joking about it. "You may remember," Kennedy once told a group of newspaper publishers,

that in 1851 the *New York Herald* [sic] *Tribune* under the sponsorship and publishing of Horace Greeley, employed as its London correspondent an obscure journalist by the name of Karl Marx. We are told that foreign correspondent Marx, stone broke, and with a family ill and undernourished, constantly appealed to Greeley and managing editor Charles Dana for an increase in his munificent salary of \$5 per installment, a salary which he and

Engels ungratefully labeled as the "lousiest petty bourgeois cheating." But when all his financial appeals were refused, Marx looked around for other means of livelihood and fame, eventually terminating his relationship with the *Tribune* and devoting his talents full time to the cause that would bequeath the world the seeds of Leninism, Stalinism, revolution and the cold war. If only this capitalistic New York newspaper had treated him more kindly; if only Marx had remained a foreign correspondent, history might have been different.²

It is impossible to imagine a contemporary American president making such an allusion; even among some who know Marx well, his journalism remains largely unknown.

The relative obscurity of Marx's journalistic work is not due to any lapse in quality. As a quick glance at the essays in this volume will demonstrate, his rhetorical skills were at an all-time high during the period when he was writing for the *Tribune*. It is certainly true that the form of his articles does not correspond to modern notions of journalistic protocol: there is no first-hand reporting from the scene; there is a surfeit of historical observation; there is nothing approaching "objectivity". But in these respects, Marx's journalism varied from that of his contemporaries only by degree. The chief difference between his dispatches and traditional journalism, then and now, is his utter disdain for the use of high-placed sources. Marx was not a confidant of diplomats and mandarins, flitting from one society event to another: he was a serious scholar, poring through dusty records and foreign newspapers in the reading room of the British Museum. But one need only look at the ways in which officials led the press astray, then and now, to recognize Marx's independence from them as a strength, not a weakness. As the late American journalist Murray Kempton observed in a wonderful essay on Marx's journalism, "Of all the illusions one brought to journalism, the one most useful to lose is the illusion of access to sources . . . Persons privy to events either do not know what is important about them or, when they do, generally lie . . . Marx had neither the temptation nor the opportunity of access."³

One reason that Marx's *Tribune* contributions are not better known is that Marx himself often denigrated the work. The historical record is sprinkled with hints that he disliked—indeed greatly resented—the journalistic work he did for the *Tribune*, seeing in it the very capitalist exploitation that he made his lifework to destroy. “It’s truly nauseating,” he wrote to Engels in 1857, “that one should be condemned to count it a blessing when taken aboard by a blotting-paper vendor such as this. To crush up bones, grind them and make them into soup like paupers in the workhouse—that is what the political work to which one is condemned in such large measure in a concern like this boils down to.” Part of his objection was to the *Tribune* and its editing. By modern newspaper standards, his work was edited fairly lightly, yet he took great umbrage at every word change. More frustrating was the arbitrary use the *Tribune* made of his contributions: the articles might be published as articles under his byline, or as unsigned editorials, or not at all. “Of late the *Tribune* has again been appropriating all my articles as leaders and putting my name to nothing but rubbish,” he wrote to Engels in 1854.⁴ Sometimes the editors would insert explanatory remarks at the beginning of his articles, sometimes they would not. And, not surprisingly, Marx had numerous political disagreements with the *Tribune*'s editorial positions, on topics ranging from pan-Slavism to the dispatches of lesser intellects the paper employed in India.

For their part, the editors of the *Tribune* appear to have had similarly ambivalent feelings toward Marx's work. The paper was a prominent organ for those who opposed slavery in America, and it certainly dabbled in the squishy socialism popular at the time. The paper campaigned for workers to organize and was run to some degree like a cooperative, and there were staff members sympathetic to the utopian views of Charles Fourier. But Marx's commitment to revolutionary socialism, and the overall Germanic tone of his prose—even in English—kept his American editors at a distance. Introducing one of his essays, they felt compelled to disclaim “Mr Marx has very decided opinions of his own, with some of which we are far from agreeing,” before conceding that “those who do not read

his letters neglect one of the most instructive sources of information on the greatest questions of current European politics."⁵ Moreover, the paper, despite its early success, was subject to fluctuations both political and economic; the financial panic of 1857 (which Marx documented well in his columns) hit the *Tribune* hard—both advertising and circulation dipped, and one of its principal financial backers went into bankruptcy. This crisis was directly responsible for a reduction in both Marx's contributions and his pay, and while the *Tribune's* fortunes recovered, the outbreak of civil war in the United States led the paper in 1861 to dismiss all of its foreign contributors except Marx. By March 1862, Dana was writing to tell him to stop sending articles altogether.

Perhaps most galling to Marx was a sense that the constant demands of newspaper work in the 1850s diverted his focus from the masterwork on economics that was eventually to be published as *Capital*. In the introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, the 1859 book that functions as a curtain-raiser to *Capital*, Marx is downright apologetic to his readers, decrying "the imperative necessity of earning my living, which reduced the time at my disposal." He continues:

My collaboration, continued now for eight years, with the *New York Tribune*, the leading Anglo-American newspaper, necessitated an excessive fragmentation of my studies . . . Since a considerable part of my contributions consisted of articles dealing with important economic events in Britain and on the Continent, I was compelled to become conversant with practical detail which, strictly speaking, lie outside the sphere of political economy.⁶

Such statements, however, do not provide a complete view of the relationship between Marx and the *Tribune*, or between Marx and his journalism. For starters, he was a notorious, world-class procrastinator; he was fully capable of finding reasons to delay working on his masterwork without needing the excuse of regular newspaper commitments. Indeed, in 1857, when the *Tribune* began publishing fewer of his articles, he complained that he didn't have enough to do. But, more significantly,

he took frequent and conspicuous pride in the pieces he published in the *Tribune*; like most journalists, he was pleased when his published work received notice. In 1857, he wrote a scathing critique of Britain's 1844 Bank Act, and the economic consequences of bank failures in Britain (see this volume, page 192). Marx predicted that the Bank would have to be suspended, a prophecy which the *New York Times* labeled "simply absurd". Sure enough, the Bank was suspended and Marx wrote a letter to Engels boasting of his "gratifying" scoop.⁷ Marx was also very conscious that the *Tribune* dispatches gave him a high political profile in the United States, which he was loathe to lose. When he hit the slump in 1857, he complained bitterly that "the curs have succeeded in eclipsing the name I was making for myself among the Yankees and which would have enabled me to find another paper, or to hold over their heads the threat of transferring to another."⁸ And when it suited his purpose, he was eager to take advantage of the *Tribune's* international prestige. In 1859, when he began a massive publishing and legal feud with a German scientist and naturalist named Karl Vogt, Marx was all too happy to solicit—and receive—a character reference from Dana, who called him "not only one of the most highly valued, but one of the best paid contributors attached to the [*Tribune*]."⁹

But perhaps the greatest mystery about the relative obscurity of Marx's journalistic work today is that there is considerable and important overlap between it and the more "serious" work, which is still studied. In some instances, the connection is direct to the point of being obvious. Marx's 1853 column "The Duchess of Sutherland and Slavery" (see this volume, page 113), is a masterpiece of polemic and research, attacking elements of the British aristocracy for their hypocritical attitudes toward slavery in America. Upon its publication it caused a stir to which Marx gleefully alludes in the "Primary Accumulation" section of *Capital*.¹⁰ In other instances, his journalistic writing functioned as a kind of first draft for his more advanced opus. The only real difference, for example, between Marx's *Tribune* columns on the abusive working conditions in British factories (see this volume, pages 163, 189) and the very similar descrip-

tions that were published later in "The Working Day" section of *Capital* is the particular year of the official reports on which both were based.

That Marx should have used and reused basic research material is hardly surprising. As Roman Rosdolsky, one of the closest readers of his writing, has noted, Marx's journalism "did prove useful to him later: We need only refer to his numerous articles on economic conditions, on questions of trade policy, on the English working class movement and strikes. Moreover, his reporting on Irish and Scottish agrarian conditions, and on English policy in India, proved to be extremely useful in this respect". Samples of each are accordingly included in this volume, because, as Rosdolsky modestly suggests, "It would certainly be rewarding to make a closer comparison of the topics in economic history which Marx dealt with on the one hand in the *New York Tribune*, and on the other in *Capital*."¹¹

That challenge was taken up in part by the Italian theorist Sergio Bologna, who sees "a basic continuity between [Marx's *Tribune*] articles and his earlier writings on the laws governing the behaviour of the working class in the 1848 revolution (*The Class Struggles in France*)". In Bologna's view, Marx's need for timely, detailed information with which to persuade his *Tribune* readers both strengthened and broadened his theoretical understanding of capitalism and its crises: "Throughout this period we find him constantly writing to his friend Engels in Manchester, obsessively seeking reports on how the crisis was being experienced and understood in the cotton districts and in entrepreneurial and commercial circles; this is already the Marx of the first volume of *Capital*." Bologna attaches particular importance to a series (see this volume, page 171) Marx wrote on the establishment of the politically charged, economically unstable *Crédit Mobilier* bank in France, seeing in it a vital shift from analyses of the working class to analysis of credit and money.¹²

Of course, you don't have to be a specialist in Marxist economic theory to find these journalistic essays interesting. Regardless of what one thinks of Marx's politics, the sheer range of

topics on which he wrote authoritatively is breathtaking. Over the course of eleven years, Marx (sometimes with Engels's help) managed to tackle several British elections; the onset and conduct of the Crimean War; revolutionary uprisings in Spain, Italy and Greece; Britain's imperial role in India and its fallout; analyses of the clandestine diplomatic cunning of Louis Napoleon and the Russian Czar; critical examinations of the largest economies of his time (Britain, France and others); the role of China in world trade; the role of the slave trade in the conflict between the northern and southern United States; and still other topics. Moreover, because these articles are relatively short and were written for a wide audience, they can, unlike most of Marx's longer works, be digested today by those with only a modest familiarity with Marxist economics.

There are certainly some who would argue that the collapse of nearly every significant political party professing to rule in Marx's name means that his writing on most topics is now irrelevant. After all, everyone today accepts the tenets of free markets and capitalism, right? What's remarkable about such attempts to close the subject is that they were precisely the pillars of conventional wisdom when Marx was writing, too. Indeed, the most consistent theme in the essays in this volume is to erect some kind of barrier against the crashing wave of free-trade ideology that had swept across the developed world in the first half of the nineteenth century. Marx had been born into one of the great periods of economic liberalism on a global scale (although periodic wars in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often caused individual nations to revert to earlier protectionist measures). As Adam Smith's works were being translated and distributed abroad, free trade-ism was sweeping across the Continent. The Anti-Corn Law League was founded in Manchester in the late 1830s with the explicit aim of liberalizing the trade and price of one of Britain's most important commodities; the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846, perhaps the high-water mark of free-trade ideology at the time. According to its many adherents, free trade meant that tariffs would come down, that trade would flourish, and thus that the secret to widespread prosperity had been unlocked.

That was—and to some extent still is—the official view of history, but it was not the world that Marx saw. He saw a political system dominated by hypocrisy and illegitimate power. He saw, perhaps more clearly than anyone else of his time, that increasing wealth did not eliminate poverty and human suffering even in the world's most prosperous countries, and indeed appeared to make the problems worse. He saw Britain—ostensibly one of the world's most democratic countries—twist and conceal the diplomatic record in order to launch disastrous wars abroad, both in the Crimea and in China. He saw autocratic powers in France and Austria manipulate the fragile workings of democracy in order to preserve their own power and enrich their cronies. And, perhaps most of all, he saw that the prosperity of the West depended in no small part on the enforced trade of opium, and the increased trade in slavery—and that Western powers were all too willing to engage in lethal force to protect those trades.

Although the events they describe are long over, Marx's articles remain achingly relevant in a world of outsourcing, trade disputes between the West and China, wars over access to oil and even water, and campaigns to "make poverty history". For all the supposed consensus about the triumph of free trade, it is remarkable how little consensual understanding of economics has advanced since Marx's era. We are told that we are living through an era of globalization, and of course the evidence is all around us: Thomas Friedman has made the point acutely by tracing the origins of every element of his laptop. Yet implicit in the First-World understanding of globalization is the notion that increasing trade and other forms of commerce will benefit all world players equally. Over and over again, statistical evidence shows this to be untrue—just as it was when Marx was writing. Indeed, there is a compelling case to be made that both poverty in an absolute sense and inequality have increased in the face of globalization. According to United Nations figures, the average African household consumed 20 per cent less at the end of the twentieth century than it did a quarter century earlier. Falling commodity prices—a direct result of enforced free trade—and billions of dollars in protectionism


from First-World countries—an example of the limits of Western commitment to genuine free trade—mean that farmers in Africa and Latin America must increase production every year just to make the same amount of money—a treadmill Marx would have recognized all too well.

The specific issues of course change: While Marx was concerned with gunboat diplomacy which forced Indians to grow opium, today's Western protectionists rail against jobs being outsourced to Mumbai. While Marx wrote acidly of poverty in Britain, his successors aim to make poverty history in the Third World. And yet the dynamics are very much the same. In the developed West, countries which were staunch protectionists in the nineteenth century are selective free-traders today, while recent elections in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (2003) and Bolivia (2005) demonstrated that even where free trade takes hold in less-developed nations, it will not stay long if it does not provide the very benefits which Marx's nemeses confidently promised back in the early 1800s. The secrets to uniform, universal economic growth remain elusive even to the wisest economists and policymakers, and the persistence of global inequality means that there are always hundreds of millions of humans convinced that a better economic order must be possible. And that's why the concrete reports that Marx filed for daily newspapers retain such relevance: unlike the more developed theories of, say, *Capital*, these dispatches retain a fresh sense of a writer struggling on deadline to understand the dynamics of politics and the economy; of outrage at war, poverty and brutality; and, occasionally, of hope for revolutionary energy. We are not so different today.

NOTES

1. Cited in G. G. Van Deusen, *Horace Greeley: Nineteenth-Century Crusader* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), p. 51.
2. "The President and the Press: Address Before the American Newspaper Publishers Association," Speech delivered by Presi-

- dent John F. Kennedy, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, April 27, 1961 (available at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/jo42761.htm>).
3. Murray Kempton, "K. Marx, Reporter," *New York Review of Books*, June 15, 1967.
 4. Marx to Engels, April 22, 1854, in *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, hereafter MECW), vol. XXXIX (1983), p. 439.
 5. *New York Tribune*, April 7, 1853.
 6. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress, 1970), p. 23.
 7. Marx to Engels, December 8, 1857, MECW, vol. XL (1983), p. 215.
 8. Marx to Engels, January 20, 1857, MECW, vol. XL (1983), p. 93.
 9. Dana to Marx, March 8, 1860, MECW, vol. XVII (1981), pp. 323-4.
 10. *Capital*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1933), p. 809.
 11. Roman Rosdolsky, *The Making of Marx's "Capital"*, trans. Pete Burgess (London: Pluto Press, 1977), pp. 6-7.
 12. Sergio Bologna, "Money and Crisis: Marx as Correspondent of the *New York Daily Tribune*," in *Crisi e organizzazione operaia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974); trans. Ed Emery and John Merrington, and reprinted at <http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=05/02/27/1956213>.



A Note on the Text

The articles in this volume have been chosen and arranged by theme; they are broadly representative but of course not comprehensive. (Those wishing to see the complete articles may consult *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works*, published in fifty volumes since 1975 by Lawrence & Wishart in London.) I used several criteria for the selection. One is that these essays were, according to the best available scholarship, written entirely by Marx himself, as opposed to having been written by or with Engels. Secondly, I have tried to include essays which are of clear historical interest—such as those concerning the Indian revolt in 1857—or essays with particular relevance to today's global economic and political issues—such as those pertaining to trade in China. Finally, I have endeavored to include essays which either reflect theses Marx developed in his book-length works or which demonstrate his penetrating prose style.

Some of this material has been previously collected in book form, almost always organized around a single theme. For example, at the very end of the nineteenth century, Marx's daughter, the author and translator Eleanor Marx Aveling, edited a volume of his early *Tribune* essays under the title *Revolution and Counter-Revolution, or Germany in 1848: Articles Reprinted from the "New York Tribune"*, acknowledging, of course, that Engels in fact wrote much of that material. In 1951, Lawrence & Wishart, which was affiliated with the British Communist Party, produced *Marx on China, 1853-1860: Articles from the New York Daily Tribune*. In 1971, International Publishers issued *On Colonialism*, which was

largely based on *Tribune* articles. Perhaps the only attempt to look broadly at them was a 1966 New American Library volume, *The American Journalism of Marx & Engels, A Selection from the New York Daily Tribune*, edited by Henry Christman and with a first-rate introduction by Charles Blitzer. But while the present volume overlaps to some degree with all of these, this selection, and the attendant research, are my own.

To standardize the text, a few minor alterations have been made. Due to the fact that Marx's dispatches were delivered by ship, there was generally a ten-to-fifteen-day gap—sometimes longer—between a submission and its publication. For simplicity's sake, the article dates in this volume reflect those on which the essays were first published by the *Tribune* (whether in its daily, weekly or semi-weekly edition) rather than the dates when they were written. One essay, "The North American Civil War," was published in *Die Presse*; it is included here because it is the fullest expression of Marx's view on the subject. All spellings have been adapted to current American usage. Most of the articles are reproduced in their entirety; in some cases, Marx may have treated more than one topic in a column, and I have reproduced only the portion relevant to the section of this volume in which it has been placed. In still other cases, editorial cuts have been made for clarity and brevity. An ellipsis in square brackets indicates where I have made a cut; any other ellipses are in the original essays.

As noted above, the editors of the *Tribune* were inconsistent about how Marx's dispatches were reproduced in the paper. Perhaps more vexing is the question of titles. At times, the *Tribune* would give Marx's pieces titles by putting headlines on them; at other times, the pieces would run without titles. In subsequent collections, article titles were assigned by others. For consistency's sake, I have reproduced the titles used in *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works*. In instances where a title was assigned by that collection's editors, it appears here in square brackets; where the title is that used by *Tribune* editors, it appears without them.

CHINA

With the possible exception of human slavery, no topic raised Marx's ire as profoundly as the opium trade with China. It is difficult today to grasp the full degree to which opium dominated Chinese society in the nineteenth century. The cost in human lives was enormous, not only because tens of thousands of Chinese were addicted to a drug that made normal life impossible, but because by the time the century began, the British colonial and mercantile classes were willing to spill substantial amounts of blood in order to keep the narcotic flowing from India to China. Chinese rulers attempted to ban it, to little avail: as late as 1870, almost half of total imports to China consisted of opium.¹ As with the modern drug trade, the demand and profit margins were simply too high to keep opium out of the Chinese market. Hence the so-called Opium Wars, the first from 1839 to 1842, the second breaking out toward the end of 1856, during the period when Marx was writing for the *Tribune*. The catalyst for the second war was the "Arrow Incident," in which Chinese officials boarded a vessel suspected of smuggling and arrested twelve Chinese citizens. The British government used this as a pretext to attack Guangzhou and received military support from the French, thus setting off a conflict that would last until 1860. As can be seen from the articles in this section, Marx, like some of his contemporaries, believed that the pretext for war was flimsy and masked the more naked desires of the British to keep its monopoly on the opium trade alive. To provide the fullest context for his readers, in 1858 Marx produced a two-part history of the opium trade, which is as thorough and as damning an indictment of imperialism as anything else he wrote.

Of course, Marx's fury over the opium trade did not arise simply out of a moral objection to drugs; he believed that the Chinese population was as enslaved economically as it was by narcotics. It should be recalled that the dynamics of international trade were at the time little understood and, at least in Marx's London, most of those interested in the subject would have subscribed to some variation of the theories of David Ricardo—that is, to a belief that increasing China's commerce with the West would benefit both sides. Marx, examining the figures fairly soberly, saw something different: the opium trade was actually impeding the development of legitimate Chinese commerce. This was not solely because the drug impoverished its addicts, but because it corrupted customs officials, created inefficiencies by making both smuggling and law enforcement necessary, and—most importantly—drained the nation of much-needed cash. This created an incentive for the Chinese to minimize non-opium imports and maximize exports to the West. That trade imbalance, in turn, distorted Western markets and made them more vulnerable to commercial crises; by 1859, as Marx discusses in "Trade with China," British officials who'd hoped that the opening of Chinese markets would enrich the home market found themselves wondering if they had been the ones smoking opium. The Chinese were rapidly expanding exports, while resisting imports—a Chinese phenomenon about which Western governments complain to this day. In the twentieth century, economists and sociologists influenced by Marx would develop elaborate theories of "underdevelopment" and "dependency theory" to explain the recurring phenomenon of poverty in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia even in the wake of technological advance and foreign investment. The kernel of that later theory can be found in Marx's essays on China.

NOTE

1. Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 127.

Revolution in China and in Europe

Published June 14, 1853

A most profound yet fantastic speculator on the principles which govern the movements of Humanity, was wont to extol as one of the ruling secrets of nature, what he called the law of the contact of extremes.¹ The homely proverb that "extremes meet" was, in his view, a grand and potent truth in every sphere of life; an axiom with which the philosopher could as little dispense as the astronomer with the laws of Kepler or the great discovery of Newton.

Whether the "contact of extremes" be such a universal principle or not, a striking illustration of it may be seen in the effect the Chinese revolution² seems likely to exercise upon the civilized world. It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire,—the very opposite of Europe,—than on any other political cause that now exists,—more even than on the menaces of Russia and the consequent likelihood of a general European war. But yet it is no paradox, as all may understand by attentively considering the circumstances of the case.

Whatever be the social causes, and whatever religious, dynastic, or national shape they may assume, that have brought about the chronic rebellions subsisting in China for about ten years past, and now gathered together in one formidable revolution, the occasion of this outbreak has unquestionably been afforded by the English cannon forcing upon China that soporific drug called opium. Before the British arms the authority of the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces; the superstitious faith in the eternity of the Celestial Empire broke down; the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilized world was infringed; and an opening was made for that intercourse which has since proceeded so rapidly under the golden attractions of California and Australia. At the same time the silver coin of the Empire,

its lifeblood, began to be drained away to the British East Indies.

Up to 1830, the balance of trade being continually in favor of the Chinese, there existed an uninterrupted importation of silver from India, Britain and the United States into China. Since 1833, and especially since 1840, the export of silver from China to India has become almost exhausting for the Celestial Empire. Hence the strong decrees of the Emperor against the opium trade, responded to by still stronger resistance to his measures. Besides this immediate economical consequence, the bribery connected with opium smuggling has entirely demoralized the Chinese State officers in the Southern provinces. Just as the Emperor was wont to be considered the father of all China, so his officers were looked upon as sustaining the paternal relation to their respective districts. But this patriarchal authority, the only moral link embracing the vast machinery of the State, has gradually been corroded by the corruption of those officers, who have made great gains by conniving at opium smuggling. This has occurred principally in the same Southern provinces where the rebellion commenced. It is almost needless to observe that, in the same measure in which opium has obtained the sovereignty over the Chinese, the Emperor and his staff of pedantic mandarins have become dispossessed of their own sovereignty. It would seem as though history had first to make this whole people drunk before it could rouse them out of their hereditary stupidity.

Though scarcely existing in former times, the import of English cottons, and to a small extent of English woollens, has rapidly risen since 1833, the epoch when the monopoly of trade with China was transferred from the East India Company to private commerce, and on a much greater scale since 1840, the epoch when other nations, and especially our own, also obtained a share in the Chinese trade. This introduction of foreign manufactures has had a similar effect on the native industry to that which it formerly had on Asia Minor, Persia and India. In China the spinners and weavers have suffered greatly under this foreign competition, and the community has become unsettled in proportion.

The tribute to be paid to England after the unfortunate war

of 1840, the great unproductive consumption of opium, the drain of the precious metals by this trade, the destructive influence of foreign competition on native manufactures, the demoralized condition of the public administration, produced two things: the old taxation became more burdensome and harassing, and new taxation was added to the old. Thus in a decree of the Emperor, dated Peking, Jan. 5, 1853, we find orders given to the viceroys and governors of the southern provinces of Wu-chang and Hang-Yang to remit and defer the payment of taxes, and especially not in any case to exact more than the regular amount; for otherwise, says the decree, "how will the poor people be able to bear it?" "And thus, perhaps," continues the Emperor, "will my people, in a period of general hardship and distress be exempted from the evils of being pursued and worried by the tax-gatherer."

Such language as this, and such concessions we remember to have heard from Austria, the China of Germany, in 1848.

All these dissolving agencies acting together on the finances, the morals, the industry, and political structure of China, received their full development under the English cannon in 1840, which broke down the authority of the Emperor, and forced the Celestial Empire into contact with the terrestrial world. Complete isolation was the prime condition of the preservation of Old China. That isolation having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air. Now, England having brought about the revolution of China, the question is how that revolution, will in time react on England, and through England on Europe. This question is not difficult of solution.

The attention of our readers has often been called to the unparalleled growth of British manufactures since 1850. Amid the most surprising prosperity, it has not been difficult to point out the clear symptoms of an approaching industrial crisis. Notwithstanding California and Australia, notwithstanding the immense and unprecedented emigration, there must ever without any particular accident, in due time arrive a moment when

the extension of the markets is unable to keep pace with the extension of British manufactures, and this disproportion must bring about a new crisis with the same certainty as it has done in the past. But, if one of the great markets suddenly becomes contracted, the arrival of the crisis is necessarily accelerated thereby. Now, the Chinese rebellion must, for the time being, have precisely this effect upon England. The necessity for opening new markets, or for extending the old ones, was one of the principal causes of the reduction of the British tea-duties,³ as, with an increased importation of tea, an increased exportation of manufactures to China was expected to take place. Now, the value of the annual exports from the United Kingdom to China amounted, before the repeal in 1833 of the trading monopoly possessed by the East India Company, to only £600,000; in 1836, it reached the sum of £1,326,388; in 1845, it had risen to £2,394,827; in 1852, it amounted to about £3,000,000. The quantity of tea imported from China did not exceed, in 1793, 16,167,331 lbs.; but in 1845, it amounted to 50,714,657 lbs.; in 1846, to 57,584,561 lbs.; it is now above 60,000,000 lbs.

The tea crop of the last season will not prove short, as shown already by the export lists from Shanghai, of 2,000,000 lbs. above the preceding year. This excess is to be accounted for by two circumstances. On one hand, the state of the market at the close of 1851 was much depressed, and the large surplus stock left has been thrown into the export of 1852. On the other hand, the recent accounts of the altered British legislation with regard to imports of tea, reaching China, have brought forward all the available teas to a ready market, at greatly enhanced prices. But with respect to the coming crop, the case stands very differently. This is shown by the following extracts from the correspondence of a large tea-firm in London:

In Shanghai the terror is extreme. Gold has advanced upward of 25 per cent., *being eagerly sought for hoarding*, silver has so far disappeared that *none could be obtained* to pay the China dues on the British vessels requiring port clearance; and in consequence of which Mr Alcock has consented to become responsible to the

Chinese authorities for the payment of these dues, on receipt of East India Company's bills, or other approved securities. *The scarcity of the precious metals* is one of the most unfavorable features, when viewed in reference to the immediate future of commerce, as this abstraction occurs precisely at that period when their use is most needed, to enable the tea and silk buyers to go into the interior and effect their purchases, for which a *large portion of bullion is paid in advance, to enable the producers to carry on their operations* . . . At this period of the year it is usual to begin making arrangements for the new teas, whereas at present nothing is talked of but the means of protecting person and property, all transactions being at a stand . . . If the means are not applied to secure the leaves in April and May, the early crop, which includes all the finer descriptions, both of black and green teas, will be as much lost as unreaped wheat at Christmas.

Now the means for securing the tea leaves, will certainly not be given by the English, American or French squadrons stationed in the Chinese seas, but these may easily, by their interference, produce such complications, as to cut off all transactions between the tea-producing interior and the tea-exporting sea ports. Thus, for the present crop, a rise in the prices must be expected—speculation has already commenced in London—and for the crop to come a large deficit is as good as certain. Nor is this all. The Chinese, ready though they may be, as are all people in periods of revolutionary convulsion, to sell off to the foreigner all the bulky commodities they have on hand, will, as the Orientals are used to do in the apprehension of great changes, set to hoarding, not taking much in return for their tea and silk, except hard money. England has accordingly to expect a rise in the price of one of her chief articles of consumption, a drain of bullion, and a great contraction of an important market for her cotton and woolen goods. Even *The Economist*, that optimist conjuror of all things menacing the tranquil minds of the mercantile community, is compelled to use language like this: "We must not flatter ourselves with finding as extensive a market for our exports to China [. . .] It is more probable that our export trade to China should suffer,

and that there should be a diminished demand for the produce of Manchester and Glasgow.”

It must not be forgotten that the rise in the price of so indispensable an article as tea, and the contraction of so important a market as China, will coincide with a deficient harvest in Western Europe, and, therefore, with rising prices of meat, corn, and all other agricultural produce. Hence contracted markets for manufactures, because every rise in the prices of the first necessities of life is counterbalanced, at home and abroad, by a corresponding deduction in the demand for manufactures. From every part of Great Britain complaints have been received on the backward state of most of the crops. *The Economist* says on this subject:

In the South of England not only will there be left much land unsown, until too late for a crop of any sort, but much of the sown land will prove to be foul, or otherwise in a bad state for corn-growing. On the wet or poor soils destined for wheat, signs that mischief is going on are apparent. The time for planting mangel-wurzel⁴ may now be said to have passed away, and very little has been planted, while the time for preparing land for the turnip is rapidly going by, without any adequate preparation for this important crop having been accomplished . . . Oat-sowing has been much interfered with by the snow and rain. Few oats were sown early, and late sown oats seldom produce a large crop . . . In many districts losses among the breeding flocks have been considerable.

The price of other farm-produce than corn is from 20 to 30, and even 50 per cent. higher than last year. On the Continent, corn has risen comparatively more than in England. Rye has risen in Belgium and Holland full 100 per cent. Wheat and other grains are following suit.

Under these circumstances, as the greater part of the regular commercial circle has already been run through by British trade, it may safely be augured that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general

crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent. It would be a curious spectacle, that of China sending disorder into the Western World while the Western powers, by English, French and American war-steamers, are conveying "order" to Shanghai, Nanking, and the mouths of the Great Canal. Do these order-mongering powers, which would attempt to support the wavering Manchu dynasty, forget that the hatred against foreigners and their exclusion from the Empire, once the mere result of China's geographical and ethnographical situation, have become a political system only since the conquest of the country by the race of the Manchu Tartars? There can be no doubt that the turbulent dissensions among the European nations who, at the later end of the 17th century, rivaled each other in the trade with China, lent a mighty aid to the exclusive policy adopted by the Manchus. But more than this was done by the fear of the new dynasty, lest the foreigners might favor the discontent existing among a large proportion of the Chinese during the first half century or thereabouts of their subjection to the Tartars. From these considerations, foreigners were then prohibited from all communication with the Chinese, except through Canton, a town at a great distance from Peking and the tea-districts, and their commerce restricted to intercourse with the Hong merchants, licensed by the Government expressly for the foreign trade, in order to keep the rest of its subjects from all connection with the odious strangers. In any case an interference on the part of the Western Governments at this time can only serve to render the revolution more violent, and protract the stagnation of trade.

At the same time it is to be observed with regard to India, that the British Government of that country depends for full one seventh of its revenue on the sale of opium to the Chinese, while a considerable proportion of the Indian demand for British manufactures depends on the production of that opium in India. The Chinese, it is true, are no more likely to renounce the use of opium than are the Germans to forswear tobacco. But as the new Emperor is understood to be favorable to the culture of the poppy and the preparation of opium in China

itself, it is evident that a death-blow is very likely to be struck at once at the business of opium-raising in India, the Indian revenue, and the commercial resources of Hindostan. Though this blow would not immediately be felt by the interests concerned, it would operate effectually in due time, and would come in to intensify and prolong the universal financial crisis whose horoscope we have cast above.

Since the commencement of the eighteenth century there has been no serious revolution in Europe which had not been preceded by a commercial and financial crisis. This applies no less to the revolution of 1789 than to that of 1848. It is true, not only that we every day behold more threatening symptoms of conflict between the ruling powers and their subjects, between the State and society, between the various classes; but also the conflict of the existing powers among each other gradually reaching that height where the sword must be drawn, and the *ultima ratio* of princes be recurred to. In the European capitals, every day brings dispatches big with universal war, vanishing under the dispatches of the following day, bearing the assurance of peace for a week or so. We may be sure, nevertheless, that to whatever height the conflict between the European powers may rise, however threatening the aspect of the diplomatic horizon may appear, whatever movements may be attempted by some enthusiastic fraction in this or that country, the rage of princes and the fury of the people are alike enervated by the breath of prosperity. Neither wars nor revolutions are likely to put Europe by the ears, unless in consequence of a general commercial and industrial crisis, the signal of which has, as usual, to be given by England, the representative of European industry in the market of the world.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the political consequences such a crisis must produce in these times, with the unprecedented extension of factories in England, with the utter dissolution of her official parties, with the whole State machinery of France transformed into one immense swindling and stock-jobbing concern, with Austria on the eve of bankruptcy, with wrongs everywhere accumulated to be revenged by the people, with the conflicting interests of the reactionary powers themselves, and

with the Russian dream of conquest once more revealed to the world.

[*The Anglo-Chinese Conflict*]

Published January 23, 1857

The mails of the *America* which reached us yesterday morning bring a variety of documents concerning the British quarrel with the Chinese authorities at Canton, and the warlike operations of Admiral Seymour.⁵ The result which a careful study of the official correspondence between the British and Chinese authorities at Hong-Kong and Canton must, we think, produce upon every impartial mind, is that the British are in the wrong in the whole proceeding. The alleged cause of the quarrel, as stated by the latter, is that instead of appealing to the British Consul, certain Chinese officers had violently removed some Chinese criminals from a lorcha⁶ lying in Canton river, and hauled down the British flag which was flying from its mast. But, as says *The London Times*, "there are, indeed, matters in dispute such as whether the lorcha was carrying British colors, and whether the Consul was entirely justified in the steps that he took."

The doubt thus admitted is confirmed when we remember that the provision of the treaty, which the Consul insists should be applied to this lorcha, relates to British ships alone; while the lorcha, as it abundantly appears, was not in any just sense British. But in order that our readers may have the whole case before them, we proceed to give what is important in the official correspondence. First, we have a communication dated Oct. 21, from Mr. Parkes, the British Consul at Canton, to Governor-General Yeh, as follows:

On the morning of the 8th inst. the British lorcha *Arrow*, when lying among the shipping anchored before the city, was boarded, without any previous reference being made to the British Consul, by a large force of Chinese officers and soldiers in uniform, who,

in the face of the remonstrance of the master, an Englishman, seized bound and carried away twelve Chinese out of her crew of fourteen, and hauled down her colors. I reported all the particulars of this public insult to the British flag, and grave violation of the ninth article of the Supplementary Treaty, to your Excellency the same day, and appealed to you to afford satisfaction for the insult, and cause the provision of the treaty to be in this case faithfully observed. But your Excellency, with a strange disregard both to justice and treaty engagement, has offered no reparation or apology for the injury, and, by retaining the men you have seized in your custody, signify your approval of this violation of the treaty, and leave her Majesty's Government without assurance that a similar event shall not again occur.

It seems that the Chinese on board the lorcha were seized by the Chinese officers, because the latter had been informed that some of the crew had participated in a piracy committed against a Chinese merchantman. The British Consul accuses the Chinese Governor-General of seizing the crew, of hauling down the British flag, of declining to offer any apology, and of retaining the men seized in his custody. The Chinese Governor, in a letter addressed to Admiral Seymour, affirms that, having ascertained that nine of the captives were innocent, he directed, on Oct. 10, an officer to put them on board of their vessel again, but that Consul Parkes refused to receive them. As to the lorcha itself, he states that when the Chinese on board were seized, she was supposed to be a Chinese vessel, and rightly so, because she was built by a Chinese, and belonged to a Chinese, who had fraudulently obtained possession of a British ensign, by entering his vessel on the colonial British register—a method, it seems, habitual with Chinese smugglers. As to the question of the insult to the flag, the Governor remarks:

It has been the invariable rule with lorchas of your Excellency's nation, to haul down the flag when they drop anchor, and to hoist it again when they get under way. When the lorcha was boarded, in order that the prisoners might be seized, it has been satisfactorily proved that no flag was flying. How then could a

flag have been hauled down? Yet Consul Parkes, in one dispatch after another, pretends that satisfaction is required for the insult offered to the flag.

From these premises the Chinese Governor concludes that no breach of any treaty has been committed. On Oct. 12, nevertheless, the British Plenipotentiary demanded not only the surrender of the whole of the arrested crew, but also an apology. The Governor thus replies:

Early in the morning of Oct. 22, I wrote to Consul Parkes, and at the same time forwarded to him twelve men, namely, Leong Mingtai and Leong Kee-foo, convicted on the inquiry I had instituted, and the witness, Woo Ayu, together with nine previously tendered. But Consul Parkes would neither receive the twelve prisoners nor my letter.

Parkes might, therefore, have now got back the whole of his twelve men, together with what was most probably an apology contained in a letter which he did not open. In the evening of the same day, Governor Yeh again made inquiry why the prisoners tendered by him were not received, and why he received no answer to his letter. No notice was taken of this step, but on the 24th fire was opened on the forts, and several of them were taken; and it was not until Nov. 1 that Admiral Seymour explained the apparently incomprehensible conduct of Consul Parkes in a message to the Governor. The men, he says, has been restored to the Consul, but "not *publicly* restored to their vessel, nor had the required apology been made for the violation of the Consular jurisdiction." To this quibble, then, of not restoring in state a set of men numbering three convicted criminals, the whole case is reduced. To this the Governor of Canton answers, first, that the twelve men had been actually handed over to the Consul, and that there had not been "any refusal to return them to their vessel." What was still the matter with this British Consul, the Chinese Governor only learned after the city had been bombarded for six days. As to an apology, Governor Yeh insists that none could be given, as no fault

had been committed. We quote his words: "No foreign flag was seen by my executive at the time of the capture, and as, in addition to this, it was ascertained on examination of the prisoners by the officer deputed to conduct it, that the lorcha was in no respect a foreign vessel, I maintain that there was no mistake committed."

Indeed, the force of this Chinaman's dialectics disposes so effectually of the whole question—and there is no other apparent case—that Admiral Seymour at last has no resource left him but a declaration like the following: "I must positively decline any further argument on the merits of the case of the lorcha *Arrow*. I am perfectly satisfied of the facts as represented to your Excellency by Mr Consul Parkes."

But after having taken the forts, breached the walls of the city, and bombarded Canton for six days, the Admiral suddenly discovers quite a new object for his measures, as we find him writing to the Chinese Governor on Oct. 30: "It is now for your Excellency, by immediate consultation with me, to terminate a condition of things of which the present evil is not slight, but which, if not amended, can scarcely fail to be productive of the most serious calamities."

The Chinese Governor answers, that according to the Convention of 1849, he had no right to ask for such a consultation. He further says:

In reference to the admission into the city, I must observe that, in April, 1849, his Excellency the Plenipotentiary Bonham issued a public notice at the factories here, to the effect that he thereby prohibited foreigners from entering the city. The notice was inserted in the newspapers of the time, and will, I presume, have been read by your Excellency. Add to this that the exclusion of foreigners from the city is by the unanimous vote of the whole population of Kwang-Tung. It may be supposed how little to their liking has been this storming of the forts and this destruction of their dwellings; and, apprehensive as I am of the evil that may hence befall the officials and citizens of your Excellency's nation, I can suggest nothing better than a continued adherence to the policy of the Plenipotentiary Bonham, as to the correct

course to be pursued. As to the consultation proposed by your Excellency, I have already, some days ago, deputed Tseang, Prefect of Luy-chow-foo.

Admiral Seymour now makes a clean breast of it, declaring that he does not care for the convention of Mr. Bonham:

Your Excellency's reply refers me to the notification of the British Plenipotentiary of 1849, prohibiting foreigners from entering Canton. Now, I must remind you that, although we have indeed serious matter of complaint against the Chinese Government for breach of the promise given in 1847 to admit foreigners into Canton at the end of two years, my demand now made is in no way connected with former negotiations on the same subject, neither am I demanding admission of any but the foreign officials, and this only for the simple and sufficient reason above assigned. On my proposal to treat personally with your Excellency, you do me the honor to remark that you sent a Prefect some days ago. I am compelled therefore to regard your Excellency's whole letter as unsatisfactory in the extreme and have only to add that, unless I immediately receive an explicit assurance of your assent to what I have proposed, I shall at once resume offensive operations.

Governor Yeh retorts by again entering into the details of the Convention of 1849:

In 1848 there was a long controversial correspondence on the subject between my predecessor Seu and the British Plenipotentiary, Mr. Bonham, and Mr. Bonham, being satisfied that an interview within the city was utterly out of the question, addressed a letter to Seu in the April of 1849, in which he said, "At the present time I can have no more discussion with your Excellency on this subject." He further issued a notice from the factories to the effect that no foreigner was to enter the city, which was inserted in the papers, and he communicated this to the British Government. There was not a Chinese or foreigner of any nation who did not know that the question was never to be discussed again.

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Impatient of argument, the British Admiral hereupon forces his way into the City of Canton to the residence of the Governor, at the same time destroying the Imperial fleet in the river. Thus there are two distinct acts in this diplomatic and military drama—the first introducing the bombardment of Canton on the pretext of a breach of the Treaty of 1842 committed by the Chinese Governor, and the second, continuing that bombardment on an enlarged scale, on the pretext that the Governor clung stubbornly to the Convention of 1849. First Canton is bombarded for breaking a treaty, and next it is bombarded for observing a treaty. Besides, it is not even pretended that redress was not given in the first instance, but only that redress was not given in the orthodox manner.

The view of the case put forth by *The London Times* would do no discredit even to General William Walker of Nicaragua. "By this outbreak of hostilities," says that journal,

existing treaties are annulled, and we are left free to change our relations with the Chinese Empire as we please. The recent proceedings at Canton warn us that we ought to enforce that right of free entrance into the country and into the ports open to us, which was stipulated for in the Treaty of 1842. We must not again be told that our representatives must be excluded from the presence of the Chinese Governor-General, because *we have waived* the performance of the article which enabled foreigners to penetrate beyond the precincts of our factories.

In other words, "we" have commenced hostilities in order to break an existing treaty and to enforce a claim which "we" have waived by an express convention! We are happy to say, however, that another prominent organ of British opinion expresses itself in a more humane and becoming tone. "It is," says *The Daily News*,

a monstrous fact, that in order to avenge the irritated pride of a British official, and punish the folly of an Asiatic governor, we prostitute our strength to the wicked work of carrying fire and sword, and desolation and death, into the peaceful homes of

unoffending men, on whose shores we were originally intruders. Whatever may be the issue of this Canton bombardment, the deed itself is a bad and a base one—a reckless and wanton waste of human life at the shrine of a false etiquette and a mistaken policy.

It is, perhaps, a question whether the civilized nations of the world will approve this mode of invading a peaceful country, without previous declaration of war, for an alleged infringement of the fanciful code of diplomatic etiquette. If the first Chinese war, in spite of its infamous pretext, was patiently looked upon by other powers, because it held out the prospect of opening the trade with China, is not this second war likely to obstruct that trade for an indefinite period? Its first result must be the cutting off of Canton from the tea-growing districts, as yet, for the most part, in the hands of the imperialists—a circumstance which cannot profit anybody but the Russian overland tea traders.

[*Russian Trade with China*]

Published April 7, 1857

In the matter of trade and intercourse with China, of which Lord Palmerston and Louis Napoleon have undertaken the extension by force, no little jealousy is evidently felt of the position occupied by Russia. Indeed, it is quite possible that without any expenditure of money or exertion of military force Russia may gain more in the end, as a consequence of the pending quarrel with the Chinese, than either of the belligerent nations.

The relations of Russia to the Chinese Empire are altogether peculiar. While the English and ourselves—for in the matter of the pending hostilities the French are but little more than amateurs, as they really have no trade with China—are not allowed the privilege of a direct communication even with the Viceroy of Canton, the Russians enjoy the advantage of

maintaining an Embassy at Peking. It is said, indeed, that this advantage is purchased only by submitting to allow Russia to be reckoned at the Celestial Court as one of the tributary dependencies of the Chinese Empire. Nevertheless it enables Russian diplomacy, as in Europe, to establish an influence for itself in China which is by no means limited to purely diplomatic operations.

Being excluded from the maritime trade with China, the Russians are free from any interest or involvement in past or pending disputes on that subject; and they also escape that antipathy with which from time immemorial the Chinese have regarded all foreigners approaching their country by sea, confounding them, and not entirely without reason, with the piratical adventurers by whom the Chinese coasts seem ever to have been infested. But as an indemnity for this exclusion from the maritime trade, the Russians enjoy an inland and overland trade peculiar to themselves, and in which it seems impossible for them to have any rival. This traffic, regulated by a treaty made in 1768, during the reign of Catherine II, has for its principal, if not indeed its sole seat of operations, Kiakhta, situated on the frontiers of southern Siberia and of Chinese Tartary, on a tributary of the Lake Baikal, and about a hundred miles south of the City of Irkootsk. This trade, conducted at a sort of annual fair, is managed by twelve factors, of whom six are Russians and six Chinese, who meet at Kiakhta, and fix the rates—since the trade is entirely by barter—at which the merchandise supplied by either party shall be exchanged. The principal articles of trade are, on the part of the Chinese, tea, and on the part of the Russians cotton and woolen cloths. This trade, of late years, seems to have attained a considerable increase. The quantity of tea sold to the Russians at Kiakhta did not, ten or twelve years ago, exceed an average of forty thousand chests; but in 1852 it amounted to a hundred and seventy-five thousand chests, of which the larger part was of that superior quality well known to continental consumers as caravan tea, in contradistinction from the inferior article imported by sea. The other articles sold by the Chinese were some small quantities of sugar, cotton, raw silk and silk goods,

but all to very limited amounts. The Russians paid about equally in cotton and woolen goods, with the addition of small quantities of Russian leather, wrought metals, furs and even opium. The whole amount of goods bought and sold—which seem in the published accounts to be stated at very moderate prices—reached the large sum of upward of fifteen millions of dollars. In 1853, owing to the internal troubles of China and the occupation of the road from the tea provinces by bands of marauding rebels, the quantity of tea sent to Kiakhta fell off to fifty thousand chests, and the whole value of the trade of that year was but about six millions of dollars. In the two following years however, this commerce revived, and the tea sent to Kiakhta for the fair of 1855 did not fall short of a hundred and twelve thousand chests.

In consequence of the increase of this trade, Kiakhta, which is situated within the Russian frontier, from a mere fort and fair-ground, has grown up into a considerable city. It has been selected as the capital of that part of the frontier region, and is to be dignified by having a military commandant and a civil governor. At the same time a direct and regular postal communication for the transmission of official dispatches has lately been established between Kiakhta and Peking, which is distant from it about nine hundred miles.

It is evident that, should the pending hostilities result in a suppression of the maritime trade, Europe might receive its entire supply of tea by this route. Indeed, it is suggested that even with the maritime trade open, Russia may, upon the completion of her system of railroads, become a powerful competitor with the maritime nations for supplying the European markets with tea. These railroads will supply a direct communication between the ports of Cronstadt and Libau and the ancient city of Nijni Novgorod in the interior of Russia, the residence of the merchants by whom the trade at Kiakhta is carried on. The supply of Europe with tea by this overland route is certainly more probable than the employment of our projected Pacific Railroad for that purpose. Silk, too, the other chief export of China, is an article of such small bulk in comparison to its cost, as to make its transportation by land by no

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means impossible; while this Chinese traffic opens an outlet for Russian manufactures, such as they cannot elsewhere attain.

We may observe, however, that the efforts of Russia are by no means limited to the development of this inland trade. It is several years since she took possession of the banks of the River Amour, the native country of the present ruling race in China.⁷ Her efforts in this direction received some check and interruption during the late war,⁸ but will doubtless be revived and pushed with energy. She has possession of the Kurile Islands and the neighboring coasts of Kamtchatka. Already she maintains a fleet in those seas, and will doubtless improve any opportunity that may offer to obtain a participation in the maritime trade with China. This, however, is of little consequence to her compared with the extension of that overland trade of which she possesses the monopoly.

[*English Atrocities in China*]

Published April 10, 1857

A few years since, when the frightful system of torture in India was exposed in Parliament Sir James Hogg, one of the Directors of the Most Honorable East India Company, boldly asserted that the statements made were unfounded. Subsequent investigation, however, proved them to be based upon facts which should have been well known to the Directors, and Sir James had left him to admit either "willful ignorance" or "criminal knowledge" of the horrible charge laid at the Company's doors. Lord Palmerston, the present Premier of England, and the Earl of Clarendon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, seem just now to be placed in a similar unenviable position. At the late Lord Mayor's banquet, the Premier, said, in his speech, while attempting to justify the atrocities committed upon the Chinese:

If the Government had, in this case, approved of unjustifiable proceedings, they had undoubtedly followed a course which deserved to incur the censure of Parliament and of the country.

We were persuaded, however, on the contrary, that these proceedings were necessary and vital. We felt that a great wrong had been inflicted on our country. We felt that our fellow-countrymen in a distant part of the globe had been exposed to a series of insults, outrages and atrocities which could not be passed over in silence [Cheers]. We felt that the treaty rights of this country had been broken, and that those locally charged with the defense of our interests in that quarter of the world were not only justified, but obliged to resent those outrages, so far as the power in their hands would enable them to do so. We felt that we should be betraying the trust which the citizens of the country had reposed in us if we had not approved of the proceedings which we thought to be right, and which we, if placed in the same circumstances, should have deemed it our duty to have pursued [Cheers].

Now, however much the people of England and the world at large may be deceived by such plausible statements, his Lordship himself certainly does not believe them to be true, or if he does, he has betrayed a willful ignorance almost as unjustifiable as "criminal knowledge". Ever since the first report reached us of English hostilities in China, the Government journals of England and a portion of the American Press have been heaping wholesale denunciations upon the Chinese—sweeping charges of violation of treaty obligations—insults to the English flag—degradation of foreigners residing on their soil, and the like, yet not one single distinct charge has been made or a single fact instanced in support of these denunciations, save the case of the lorcha *Arrow*, and, with respect to this case, the circumstances have been so misrepresented and glossed over by Parliamentary rhetoric as utterly to mislead those who really desire to understand the merits of the question.

The lorcha *Arrow* was a small Chinese vessel, manned by Chinese, but employed by some Englishmen. A license to carry the English flag had been temporarily granted to her, which license had expired prior to the alleged "insult". She is said to have been used to smuggle salt, and had on board of her some very bad characters—Chinese pirates and smugglers—whom,

being old offenders against the laws, the authorities had long been trying to arrest. While lying at anchor in front of Canton—with sails furled, and no flag whatever displayed—the police became aware of the presence on board of these offenders, and arrested them—precisely such an act as would have taken place here, had the police along our wharves known that river-thieves and smugglers were secreted in a native or foreign vessel near by. But, as this arrest interfered with the business of the owners, the captain went to the English Consul⁹ and complained. The Consul, a young man recently appointed, and, as we are informed, a person of a quick and irritable disposition, rushes on board *in propria persona*, gets into an excited parley with the police, who have only discharged their simple duty, and consequently fails in obtaining satisfaction. Thence he rushes back to the Consulate, writes an imperative demand for restitution and apology to the Governor-General of the Quangtung Province, and a note to Sir John Bowring and Admiral Seymour at Hong-Kong, representing that he and his country's flag have been insulted beyond endurance, and intimating in pretty broad terms that now is the time for a demonstration against Canton, such as had long been waited for.

Gov. Yeh politely and calmly responds to the arrogant demands of the excited young British Consul. He states the reason of the arrest, and regrets that there should have been any misunderstanding in the matter; at the same time he unqualifiedly denies the slightest intention of insulting the English flag, and sends back the men, whom, although lawfully arrested, he desired not to detain at the expense of so serious a misunderstanding. But this is not satisfactory to Mr. Consul Parkes—he must have an official apology, and a more formal restitution, or Gov. Yeh must abide the consequences. Next arrives Admiral Seymour with the British fleet, and then commences another correspondence, dogmatic and threatening, on the side of the Admiral; cool, unimpassioned, polite, on the side of the Chinese official. Admiral Seymour demands a personal interview within the walls of Canton. Gov. Yeh says this is contrary to all precedent, and that Sir George Bonham had agreed that it should not be required. He would readily consent to an inter-

view, as usual, outside the walled town if necessary, or meet the Admiral's wishes in any other way not contrary to Chinese usage and hereditary etiquette. But this did not suit the bellicose representative of British power in the East.

Upon the grounds thus briefly stated—and the official accounts now before the people of England fully bear out the statement—this most unrighteous war has been waged. The unoffending citizens and peaceful tradesmen of Canton have been slaughtered, their habitations battered to the ground, and the claims of humanity violated, on the flimsy pretense that "English life and property are endangered by the aggressive acts of the Chinese!" The British Government and the British people—at least, those who have chosen to examine the question—know how false and hollow are such charges. An attempt has been made to divert investigation from the main issue, and to impress the public mind with the idea that a long series of injuries, preceding the case of the lorcha *Arrow*, form of themselves a sufficient *casus belli*. But these sweeping assertions are baseless. The Chinese have at least ninety nine injuries to complain of to one on the part of the English.

How silent is the press of England upon the outrageous violations of the treaty daily practiced by foreigners living in China under British protection! We hear nothing of the illicit opium trade, which yearly feeds the British treasury at the expense of human life and morality. We hear nothing of the constant bribery of sub-officials, by means of which the Chinese Government is defrauded of its rightful revenue on incoming and outgoing merchandise. We hear nothing of the wrongs inflicted "even unto death" upon misguided and bonded emigrants sold to worse than Slavery on the coast of Peru and into Cuban bondage. We hear nothing of the bullying spirit often exercised against the timid nature of the Chinese, or of the vice introduced by foreigners at the ports open to their trade. We hear nothing of all this and of much more, first, because the majority of people out of China care little about the social and moral condition of that country; and secondly, because it is the part of policy and prudence not to agitate topics where no pecuniary advantage would result. Thus, the English people at

home, who look no farther than the grocer's where they buy their tea, are prepared to swallow all the misrepresentations which the Ministry and the Press choose to thrust down the public throat.

Meanwhile, in China, the smothered fires of hatred kindled against the English during the opium war have burst into a flame of animosity, which no tenders of peace and friendship will be very likely to quench [. . .]

History of the Opium Trade [I]

Published September 20, 1858

The news of the new treaty wrung from China by the allied Plenipotentiaries¹⁰ has, it would appear, conjured up the same wild vistas of an immense extension of trade which danced before the eyes of the commercial mind in 1845, after the conclusion of the first Chinese war. Supposing the Petersburg wires to have spoken truth, is it quite certain that an increase of the Chinese trade must follow upon the multiplication of its emporiums? Is there any probability that the war of 1857-8 will lead to more splendid results than the war of 1841-2? So much is certain that the treaty of 1843, instead of increasing American and English exports to China proved instrumental only in precipitating and aggravating the commercial crisis of 1847. In a similar way, by raising dreams of an inexhaustible market and by fostering false speculations, the present treaty may help preparing a new crisis at the very moment when the market of the world is but slowly recovering from the recent universal shock. Beside its negative result, the first opium-war succeeded in stimulating the opium trade at the expense of legitimate commerce, and so will this second opium-war do, if England be not forced by the general pressure of the civilized world to abandon the compulsory opium cultivation in India and the armed opium propaganda to China. We forbear dwelling on the morality of that trade, described by Montgomery Martin, himself an Englishman, in the following terms:

Why, the slave trade was merciful compared with the opium trade: We did not destroy the bodies of the Africans, for it was our immediate interest to keep them alive; we did not debase their natures, corrupt their minds, nor destroy their souls. But the opium seller slays the body after he has corrupted, degraded, and annihilated the moral being of unhappy sinners, while every hour is bringing new victims to a Moloch which knows no satiety, and where the English murderer and Chinese suicide vie with each other in offerings at his shrine.

The Chinese cannot take both goods and drug; under actual circumstances, extension of the Chinese trade resolves into extension of the opium trade; the growth of the latter is incompatible with the development of legitimate commerce—these propositions were pretty generally admitted two years ago. A Committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1847 to take into consideration the state of British commercial intercourse with China, reported thus:

We regret that the trade with that country has been for some time in a very unsatisfactory condition, and that the *result of our extended intercourse has by no means realized the just expectations* which had naturally been founded in a *free access to so magnificent a market*. We find that the difficulties of the trade do not arise from any want of demand in China for articles of British manufactures, or from the increasing competition of other nations; *the payment for opium* absorbs the silver to the great inconvenience of the general traffic of the Chinese, and tea and silk must in fact pay the rest.

The Friend of China, of July 28, 1849, generalizing the same proposition, says in set terms: "The opium trade progresses steadily. The increased consumption of teas and silk in Great Britain and the United States would merely result in the increase of the opium trade; the case of the manufacturers is hopeless."

One of the leading American merchants in China reduced, in an article inserted in Hunt's *Merchant's Magazine*, for January, 1850, the whole question of the trade with China to this point:

“Which branch of commerce is to be suppressed, the opium trade or the export trade of American or English produce?”

The Chinese themselves took exactly the same view of the case. Montgomery Martin narrates: “I inquired of the Taoutai¹¹ at Shanghai which would be the best means of increasing our commerce with China, and his first answer to me, in presence of Capt. Balfour, Her Majesty’s Consul, was: ‘Cease to send us so much opium and we will be able to take your manufactures.’”

The history of general commerce during the last eight years has, in a new and striking manner, illustrated these positions; but, before analyzing the deleterious effects on legitimate commerce of the opium trade, we propose giving a short review of the rise and progress of that stupendous traffic, which, whether we regard the tragical collisions forming, so to say, the axis round which it turns, or the effects produced by it on the general relations of the Eastern and Western worlds, stands solitary on record in the annals of mankind.

Previous to 1767 the quantity of opium exported from India did not exceed 200 chests, the chest weighing about 133 lbs. Opium was legally admitted in China on the payment of a duty of about \$3 per chest, as a medicine; the Portuguese who brought it from Turkey being its almost exclusive importers into the Celestial Empire.

In 1773, Colonel Watson and Vice-President Wheeler—persons deserving to take a place among the Hermentiers, Palmers and other poisoners of world-wide fame—suggested to the East India Company the idea of entering upon the opium traffic with China. Consequently, there was established a depot for opium in vessels anchored in a bay to the southwest of Macao. The speculation proved a failure. In 1781 the Bengal Government sent an armed vessel, laden with opium, to China; and, in 1794, the Company stationed a large opium vessel at Whampoa, the anchorage for the port of Canton. It seems that Whampoa proved a more convenient depot than Macao, because, only two years after its selection, the Chinese Government found it necessary to pass a law which threatens Chinese smugglers of opium to be beaten with a bamboo and exposed in the streets

with wooden collars around their necks. About 1798, the East India Company ceased to be direct exporters of opium, but they became its producers. The opium monopoly was established in India; while the Company's own ships were hypocritically forbidden from trafficking in the drug, the licenses it granted for private ships trading to China contained a provision which attached a penalty to them if freighted with opium of other than the Company's own make.

In 1800, the import into China had reached the number of 2,000 chests. Having, during the eighteenth century, borne the aspect common to all feuds between the foreign merchant and the national custom-house, the struggle between the East India Company and the Celestial Empire assumed, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, features quite distinct and exceptional; while the Chinese Emperor, in order to check the suicide of his people, prohibited at once the import of the poison by the foreigner, and its consumption by the natives, the East India Company was rapidly converting the cultivation of opium in India, and its contraband sale to China, into integral parts of its own financial system. While the semi-barbarian stood on the principle of morality, the civilized opposed the principle of self. That a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating to the teeth of time, insulated by the forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself with delusions of Celestial perfection—that such an empire should at last be overtaken by the fate on occasion of a deadly duel, in which the representative of the antiquated world appears prompted by ethical motives, while the representative of overwhelming modern society fights for the privilege of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets—this, indeed, is a sort of tragical couplet, stranger than any poet would ever have dared to fancy.

History of the Opium Trade [II]

Published September 25, 1858

It was the assumption of the opium monopoly in India by the British Government, which led to the proscription of the opium trade in China. The cruel punishments inflicted by the Celestial legislator upon his own contumacious subjects, and the stringent prohibition established at the China custom-houses, proved alike nugatory. The next effect of the moral resistance of the Chinaman was the demoralization, by the Englishman, of the Imperial authorities, custom-house officers and mandarins generally. The corruption that ate into the heart of the Celestial bureaucracy, and destroyed the bulwark of the patriarchal constitution, was, together with the opium chests, smuggled into the Empire from the English storeships anchored at Whampoa.

Nurtured by the East India Company, vainly combatted by the Central Government at Peking, the opium trade gradually assumed larger proportions, until it absorbed about \$2,500,000 in 1816. The throwing open in that year of the Indian commerce, with the single exception of the tea trade, which still continues to be monopolized by the East India Company, gave a new and powerful stimulus to the operations of the English contrabandists. In 1820, the number of chests smuggled into China had increased to 5,147; in 1821, to 7,000, and in 1824, to 12,639. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government, at the same time that it addressed threatening remonstrances to the foreign merchants, punished the Hong merchants, known as their abettors, developed an unwonted activity in its prosecution of the native opium consumers, and, at its custom-houses, put into practice more stringent measures. The final result, like that of similar exertions in 1794, was to drive the opium depots from a precarious to a more convenient basis of operations. Macao and Whampoa were abandoned for the Island of Lintin, at the entrance of the Canton River, there to become permanently established in vessels armed to the teeth, and well manned. In the same way, when the Chinese Government temporarily succeeded in stopping the operations of the old Canton houses,

the trade only shifted hands, and passed to a lower class of men, prepared to carry it on at all hazards and by whatever means. Thanks to the greater facilities thus afforded, the opium trade increased during the ten years from 1824 to 1834 from 12,639 to 21,785 chests.

Like the years 1800, 1816 and 1824, the year 1834 marks an epoch in the history of the opium trade. The East India Company then lost not only its privilege of trading in Chinese tea, but had to discontinue and abstain from all commercial business whatever. It being thus transformed from a mercantile into a merely government establishment, the trade to China became completely thrown open to English private enterprise, which pushed on with such vigor that, in 1837, 39,000 chests of opium, valued at \$25,000,000, were successfully smuggled into China, despite the desperate resistance of the Celestial Government. Two facts here claim our attention: First, that of every step in the progress of the export trade to China since 1816, a disproportionately large part progressively fell upon the opium-smuggling branch; and secondly, that hand in hand with the gradual extinction of the ostensible mercantile interest of the Anglo-Indian Government in the opium trade, grew the importance of its fiscal interest in that illicit traffic. In 1837 the Chinese Government had at last arrived at a point where decisive action could no longer be delayed. The continuous drain of silver, caused by the opium importations, had begun to derange the exchequer, as well as the moneyed circulation of the Celestial Empire. Heu Naetse, one of the most distinguished Chinese statesmen, proposed to legalize the opium trade and make money out of it; but after a full deliberation, in which all the high officers of the Empire shared, and which extended over a period of more than a year's duration, the Chinese Government decided that, "On account of the injuries it inflicted on the people, the nefarious traffic should not be legalized." As early as 1830, a duty of 25 per cent would have yielded a revenue of \$3,850,000. In 1837, it would have yielded double that sum, but then the Celestial barbarian declined laying a tax sure to rise in proportion to the degradation of his people. In 1853, Hien-Fung, the present Emperor, under still

more distressed circumstances, and with the full knowledge of the futility of all efforts at stopping the increasing import of opium, persevered in the stern policy of his ancestors. Let me remark, *en passant*, that by persecuting the opium consumption as a heresy the Emperor gave its traffic all the advantages of a religious propaganda. The extraordinary measures of the Chinese Government during the years 1837, 1838 and 1839, which culminated in Commissioner Lin's arrival at Canton, and the confiscation and destruction, by his orders, of the smuggled opium, afforded the pretext for the first Anglo-Chinese war, the results of which developed themselves in the Chinese rebellion, the utter exhaustion of the Imperial exchequer, the successful encroachment of Russia from the North, and the gigantic dimensions assumed by the opium trade in the South. Although proscribed in the treaty with which England terminated a war, commenced and carried on in its defense, the opium trade has practically enjoyed perfect impunity since 1843. The importation was estimated, in 1856, at about \$35,000,000, while, in the same year, the Anglo-Indian Government drew a revenue of \$25,000,000, just the sixth part of its total State income, from the opium monopoly. The pretexts on which the second opium war has been undertaken are of too recent date to need any commentary.

We cannot leave this part of the subject without singling out one flagrant self-contradiction of the Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British Government. In its imperial capacity it affects to be a thorough stranger to the contraband opium trade, and even to enter into treaties proscribing it. Yet, in its Indian capacity, it forces the opium cultivation upon Bengal, to the great damage of the productive resources of that country; compels one part of the Indian ryots to engage in the poppy culture; entices another part into the same by dint of money advances; keeps the wholesale manufacture of the deleterious drug a close monopoly in its hands; watches by a whole army of official spies its growth, its delivery at appointed places, its inspissation and preparation for the taste of the Chinese consumers, its formation into packages especially adapted to the conveniency of smuggling, and finally its conveyance to

Calcutta, where it is put up at auction at the Government sales, and made over by the State officers to the speculators, thence to pass into the hands of the contrabandists who land it in China. The chest costing the British Government about 250 rupees is sold at the Calcutta auction mart at a price ranging from 1,210 to 1,600 rupees. But not yet satisfied with this matter of fact complicity, the same Government, to this hour, enters into express profit and loss accounts with the merchants and shippers, who embark in the hazardous operation of poisoning an empire.

The Indian finances of the British Government have, in fact, been made to depend not only on the opium trade with China, but on the contraband character of that trade. Were the Chinese Government to legalize the opium trade simultaneously with tolerating the cultivation of the poppy in China, the Anglo-Indian exchequer would experience a serious catastrophe. While openly preaching free trade in poison, it secretly defends the monopoly of its manufacture. Whenever we look closely into the nature of British free trade, monopoly is pretty generally found to lie at the bottom of its "freedom."

[*The Anglo-Chinese Treaty*]

Published October 5, 1858

The unsuccessful issue, in a commercial point of view, of Sir Henry Pottinger's Chinese treaty, signed on August 29, 1842, and dictated, like the new treaties with China, at the cannon's mouth, is a fact now recollected even by that eminent organ of British Free Trade, the London *Economist*. Having stood forward as one of the staunchest apologists of the late invasion of China, that journal now feels itself obliged to "temper" the sanguine hopes which have been cultivated in other quarters. *The Economist* considers the effects on the British export trade of the treaty of 1842, "a precedent by which to guard oneself against the result of mistaken operations." This certainly is sound advice. The reasons, however, which Mr. Wilson¹² alleges in explanation of the failure of the first attempt at forcibly

enlarging the Chinese market for Western produce, appear far from conclusive.

The first great cause pointed out of the signal failure is the speculative overstocking of the Chinese market, during the first three years following the Pottinger treaty, and the carelessness of the English merchants as to the nature of the Chinese demand. The English exports to China which, in 1836, amounted to £1,326,000, had fallen in 1842 to £969,000. Their rapid and continued rise during the following four years, is shown by these figures:

1842	£ 969,000	1844	£2,305,000
1843	1,456,000	1845	2,395,000

Yet in 1846 the exports did not only sink below the level of 1836, but the disasters overtaking the China houses at London during the crisis of 1847 proved the *computed* value of the exports from 1843 to 1846, such as it appears in the official return tables, to have by no means corresponded to the value actually *realized*. If the English exporters thus erred in the quantity, they did not less so in the quality of the articles offered to Chinese consumption. In proof of the latter assertion, *The Economist* quotes from Mr. W. Cooke, the late correspondent of the *London Times* at Shanghai and Canton, the following passages:

In 1843, 1844 and 1845, when the northern ports had just been opened, the people at home were wild with excitement. An eminent firm at Sheffield sent out a large consignment of knives and forks, and declared themselves prepared to supply all China with cutlery . . . They were sold at prices which scarcely realized their freight. A London house, of famous name, sent out a tremendous consignment of pianofortes, which shared the same fate. What happened in the case of cutlery and pianos occurred also, in a less noticeable manner, in the case of worsted and cotton manufactures. Manchester made a great blind effort when the ports were opened, and that effort failed. Since then she has fallen into an apathy, and trusts to the chapter of accidents.

Lastly, to prove the dependence of the reduction, maintenance or improvement of the trade, on the study of the wants of the consumer, *The Economist* reproduces from the same authority the following return for the year 1856:

	1845.	1846.	1856.
Worsted Stuffs (pieces)	13,569	8,415	7,428
Camlets	13,374	8,034	4,470
Long ells	91,530	75,784	36,642
Woolens	62,731	56,996	38,553
Printed Cottons	100,615	81,150	281,784
Plain Cottons	2,998,126	1,859,740	2,817,624
Cotton Twist, lbs	2,640,090	5,324,050	5,579,600

Now all these arguments and illustrations explain nothing beyond the reaction following the overtrade of 1843-45. It is a phenomenon by no means peculiar to the Chinese trade, that a sudden expansion of commerce should be followed by its violent contractions, or that a new market, at its opening, should be choked by British oversupplies; the articles thrown upon it being not very nicely calculated, in regard either to the actual wants or the paying powers of the consumers. In fact, this is a standing feature in the history of the markets of the world. On Napoleon's fall, after the opening of the European continent, British imports proved so disproportionate to the continental faculties of absorption, that "the transition from war to peace" proved more disastrous than the continental system itself. Canning's recognition¹³ of the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, was also instrumental in producing the commercial crisis of 1825. Wares calculated for the meridian of Moscow, were then dispatched to Mexico and Colombia. And in our own day, notwithstanding its elasticity, even Australia has not escaped the fate common to all new markets, of having its powers of consumption as well as its means of payment over-stocked. The phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese market is this, that since its opening by the treaty of 1842, the export to Great Britain of tea and silk of Chinese

produce has continually been expanding, while the import trade into China of British manufactures has, on the whole, remained stationary. The continuous and increasing balance of trade in favor of China might be said to bear an analogy to the state of commercial balance between Russia and Great Britain; but, then, in the latter case, everything is explained by the protective policy of Russia, while the Chinese import duties are lower than those of any other country England trades with. The aggregate value of Chinese exports to England, which before 1842 might be rated at about £7,000,000, amounted in 1856 to the sum of about £9,500,000. While the quantity of tea imported into Great Britain never reached more than 50,000,000 lbs. before 1842, it had swollen in 1856 to about 90,000,000 lbs. On the other hand, the importance of the British import of Chinese silks only dates from 1852. Its progress may be computed from the following figures:

	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.
Silk imp'd. lb.	2,418,343	2,838,047	4,576,706	4,436,862	3,723,693
Value £	-	-	3,318,112	3,013,396	3,676,116

Now take, on the other hand, the movement of the

BRITISH EXPORTS TO CHINA, VALUED IN POUNDS STERLING.

1834	£ 842,852	1836	£1,326,388
1835	1,074,708	1838	1,204,356

For the period following the opening of the market in 1842 and the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British, we find the following returns:

1845	£2,359,000	1853	£1,749,597
1846	1,200,000	1854	1,000,716
1848	1,445,950	1855	1,122,241
1852	2,508,599	1856, upward of	2,000,000

The Economist tries to account for the stationary and relatively decreasing imports of British manufacture into the

Chinese market by foreign competition, and Mr. Cooke is again quoted to bear witness to this proposition. According to this authority, the English are beaten by fair competition in the Chinese market in many branches of trade. The Americans, he says, beat the English in drills and sheetings. At Shanghai in 1856 the imports were 221,716 pieces of American drills, against 8,745 English, and 14,420 of American sheetings, against 1,240 English. In woolen goods, on the other hand, Germany and Russia are said to press hardly on their English rivals. We want no other proof than this illustration to convince us that Mr. Cooke and *The Economist* are both mistaken in the appreciation of the Chinese market. They consider as limited to the Anglo-Chinese trade features which are exactly reproduced in the trade between the United States and the Celestial Empire. In 1837, the excess of the Chinese exports to the United States over the imports into China was about £860,000. During the period since the treaty of 1842, the United States have received an annual average of £2,000,000 in Chinese produce, for which we paid in American merchandise £900,000. Of the £1,602,849, to which the aggregate imports into Shanghai, exclusive of specie and opium, amounted in 1855, England supplied £1,122,241, America £272,708, and other countries £207,900; while the exports reached a total of £12,603,540, of which £6,405,040 were to England, £5,396,406 to America, and £102,088 to other countries. Compare only the American exports to the value of £272,708, with their imports from Shanghai exceeding £5,000,000. If, nevertheless, American competition has, to any sensible degree, made inroads on British traffic, how limited a field of employment for the aggregate commerce of foreign nations the Chinese market must offer.

The last cause assigned to the trifling importance the Chinese import market has assumed since its opening in 1842, is the Chinese revolution,¹⁴ but notwithstanding that revolution, the exports to China relatively shared, in 1851-52, in the general increase of trade, and, during the whole of the revolutionary epoch, the opium trade, instead of falling off, rapidly obtained colossal dimensions. However that may be this much will be admitted, that all the obstacles to foreign imports originating

in the disordered state of the empire must be increased, instead of being diminished, by the late piratical war,¹⁵ and the fresh humiliations heaped on the ruling dynasty.

It appears to us, after a careful survey of the history of Chinese commerce, that, generally speaking, the consuming and paying powers of the Celestials have been greatly overestimated. With the present economical framework of Chinese society, which turns upon diminutive agriculture and domestic manufactures as its pivots, any large import of foreign produce is out of the question. Still, to the amount of £8,000,000, a sum which may be roughly calculated to form the aggregate balance in favor of China, as against England and the United States, it might gradually absorb a surplus quantity of English and American goods, if the opium trade were suppressed. This conclusion is necessarily arrived at on the analysis of the simple fact, that the Chinese finances and monetary circulation, in spite of the favorable balance of trade, are seriously deranged by an import of opium to the amount of about £7,000,000.

John Bull, however, used to plume himself on his high standard of morality, prefers to bring up his adverse balance of trade by periodical war tributes, extorted from China on piratical pretexts. He only forgets that the Carthaginian and Roman methods of making foreign people pay, are, if combined in the same hands, sure to clash with, and destroy each other.

The British and Chinese Treaty

Published October 15, 1858

The official summary of the Anglo-Chinese treaty, which the British Ministry has at last laid before the public, adds, on the whole, but little to the information that had already been conveyed through different other channels. The first and the last articles comprise, in fact, the points in the treaty of exclusively English interest. By the first article, "the supplementary treaty and general regulations of trade," stipulated after the conclusion of the treaty of Nankin, are "abrogated." That sup-

plementary treaty provided that the English Consuls residing at Hong Kong, and the five Chinese ports opened to British commerce, were to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in case any English vessels should arrive within the range of their consular jurisdiction with opium on board. A formal prohibition was thus laid upon English merchants to import the contraband drug, and the English Government, to some degree, constituted itself one of the Custom-House officers of the Celestial Empire. That the second opium war should end in removing the fetters by which the first opium war still affected to check the opium traffic, appears a result quite logical, and a consummation devoutly called for by that part of the British mercantile public which chanted most lusty applause to Palmerston's Canton fireworks. We are, however, much mistaken, if this official abandonment on the part of England of her hypocritic opposition to the opium trade is not to lead to consequences quite the reverse of those expected. By engaging the British Government to cooperate in the suppression of the opium traffic, the Chinese Government had recognized its inability to do so on its own account. The supplementary treaty of Nankin was a supreme and rather desperate effort at getting rid of the opium trade by foreign aid. This effort having failed, and being now proclaimed a failure, the opium traffic being now, so far as England is concerned, legalized, little doubt can remain that the Chinese Government will try a method alike recommended by political and financial considerations—viz.: legalize the cultivation of the poppy in China, and lay duties on the foreign opium imported. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Chinese Government, the very circumstances in which it finds itself placed by the treaty of Tien-tsin, show all that way.

That change once effected, the opium monopoly of India, and with it the Indian Exchequer, must receive a deadly blow, while the British opium traffic will shrink to the dimensions of an ordinary trade, and very soon prove a losing one. Till now, it has been a game played by John Bull with loaded dice. To have baffled its own object, seems, therefore, the most obvious result of the opium war No. II.

Having declared "a just war" on Russia, generous England desisted, at the conclusion of peace, from demanding any indemnity for her war expenses. Having, on the other hand, all along professed to be at peace with China itself, she, accordingly, cannot but make it pay for expenses incurred, in the opinion of her own present Ministers, by piracy on her own part. However, the first tidings of the fifteen or twenty millions of pounds sterling to be paid by the Celestials proved a quieter to the most scrupulous British conscience, and very pleasant calculations as to the beneficial effects of the Sycee silver¹⁶ upon the balance of trade, and the metal reserve of the Bank of England, were entered into by *The Economist* and the writers of money articles generally. But alas! the first impressions which the Palmerstonian press had given itself so much trouble to produce and work upon, were too tender to bear the shock of real information. A "separate article provides that a sum of two millions of taels"¹⁷ shall be paid "on account of the losses sustained by British subjects through the misconduct of the Chinese authorities at Canton; and a further sum of two millions of taels on account of the expenses of the war."

Now, these sums together amount to £1,334,000 only, while, in 1842, the Emperor of China had to pay £4,200,000, of which £1,200,000 was indemnity for the contraband opium confiscated, and £3,000,000 for the expenses of the war. To come down from £4,200,000, with Hong Kong into the bargain, to simple £1,334,000, seems no thriving trade after all; but the worst remains still to be said. Since, says the Chinese Emperor, yours was no war with China, but a "provincial war" with Canton only, try yourselves how to squeeze out of the province of Kwang-tung the damages which your amiable war steamers have compelled me to adjudge to you. Meanwhile, your illustrious Gen. Straubenzee¹⁸ may keep Canton as a material guaranty, and continue to make the British arms the laughing-stock even of Chinese braves. The doleful feelings of sanguine John Bull at these clauses, which the small booty of £1,334,000 is encumbered with, have already vented themselves in audible groans. "Instead," says one London paper,

of being able to withdraw our 53 ships-of-war, and see them return triumphant with millions of Sycee silver, we may look forward to the pleasing necessity of sending an army of 5,000 men to recapture and hold Canton, and to assist the fleet in carrying on that provincial war which the Consul's deputy has declared. But will this provincial war have no consequences beyond driving our Canton trade to other Chinese ports? . . . Will not the continuation of it [the provincial war] give Russia a large portion of the tea trade? May not the Continent, and England herself, become dependent on Russia and the United States for their tea?

John Bull's anxiety as to the effects of the "provincial war" upon the tea trade is not quite gratuitous. From McGregor's *Commercial Tariffs* it may be seen that in the last year of the former Chinese war, Russia received 120,000 chests of tea at Kiakhtha. The year after the conclusion of peace with China the Russian demand fell off 75 per cent, amounting to 30,000 only. At all events, the costs still to be incurred by the British in distraining Kwang-tung are sure so to swell the wrong side of the balance that this second China war will hardly be self-paying, the greatest fault which, as Mr Emerson justly remarks, anything can be guilty of in British estimation.

Another great success of the English invasion is contained in Art. 51, according to which "the term barbarian is not to be applied to the British Government nor to British subjects in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities."

The Chinese authorities styling themselves Celestial, how humble to their understanding must not appear John Bull, who, instead of insisting on being called divine or Olympian, contents himself with weeding the character representing the word barbarian out of the official documents.

The commercial articles of the treaty give England no advantage not to be enjoyed by her rivals, and, for the present, dissolve into shadowy promises, for the greater part not worth the parchment they are written on. Art. 10 stipulates:

British merchant ships are to be allowed to trade up the great river (Yang-tse), but in the present disturbed state of the Upper

and Lower Valley, no port is to be opened for trade with the exception of Chin-kiang, which is to be opened in a year from the signature of the treaty. When peace is restored, British vessels are to be admitted to trade at such ports, as far as Hankow, not exceeding three in number, as the British Minister, after consulting with the Chinese Secretary of State, shall determine.

By this article, the British are in fact excluded from the great commercial artery of the whole empire, from "the only line," as *The Morning Star* justly remarks, "by which they can push their manufactures into the interior." If they will be good boys, and help the Imperial Government in dislodging the rebels from the regions now occupied by them, then they may eventually navigate the great river, but only to particular harbors. As to the new seaports opened, from "all" the ports, as at first advertised, they have dwindled down to five ports, added to the five ports of the treaty of Nankin, and, as a London paper remarks, "they are generally remote or insular." Besides, at this time of the day, the delusive notion of the growth of trade being proportionate to the number of ports opened, should have been exploded. Consider the harbors on the coasts of Great Britain, or France, or the United States, how few of them have developed themselves into real emporiums of commerce? Before the first Chinese war, the English traded exclusively to Canton. The concession of five new ports, instead of creating five new emporiums of commerce, has gradually transferred trade from Canton to Shanghai, as may be seen from the following figures, extracted from the Parliamentary Blue-Book on the trade of various places for 1856-57. At the same time, it should be recollected that the Canton imports include the imports to Amoy and Fu-chow, which are transhipped at Canton.

"The commercial clauses of the treaty are unsatisfactory," is a conclusion arrived at by *The Daily Telegraph*, Palmerston's most abject sycophant; but it chuckles at "the brightest point in the programme," viz.: "that the British Minister may establish himself at Peking, while a Mandarin will install himself in London, and possibly invite the Queen to a ball at Albert Gate." However John Bull may indulge this fun, there can be no doubt

that whatever political influence may be exercised at Peking will fall to the part of Russia, which, by dint of the last treaty, holds a new territory, being as large as France, and, in great part, on its frontier, 800 miles only distant from Peking. It is by no means a comfortable reflection for John Bull that he himself, by his first opium-war, procured Russia a treaty yielding her the navigation of the Amoor and free trade on the land frontier, while by his second opium-war he has helped her to the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that from Czar Alexei Michaelowitch down to Nicholas, she has always attempted to get it. So deeply did the London *Times* feel that sting that, in its publication of the St. Petersburg news, which greatly exaggerated the advantages won by Great Britain, good care was taken to suppress that part of the telegram which mentioned Russia's acquisition by treaty of the valley of the Amoor.

	British import trade to		British export trade from	
	Canton.	Shanghai.	Canton.	Shanghai.
1844	\$15,500,000	\$2,500,000	\$17,900,000	\$ 2,300,000
1845	10,700,000	5,100,000	27,700,000	6,000,000
1846	9,900,000	3,800,000	15,300,000	6,400,000
1847	9,600,000	4,300,000	15,700,000	6,700,000
1848	6,500,000	2,500,000	8,600,000	5,000,000
1849	7,900,000	4,400,000	11,400,000	6,500,000
1850	6,800,000	3,900,000	9,900,000	8,000,000
1851	10,000,000	4,500,000	13,200,000	11,500,000
1852	9,900,000	4,600,000	6,500,000	11,400,000
1853	4,000,000	3,900,000	6,500,000	13,300,000
1854	3,300,000	1,100,100	6,000,000	11,700,000
1855	3,600,000	3,400,000	2,900,000	19,900,000
1856	9,100,000	6,100,000	8,200,000	25,800,000

Trade with China

Published December 3, 1859

At a time when very wild views obtained as to the impulse American and British commerce were sure to receive from the throwing open, as it was called, of the Celestial Empire, we undertook to show, by a somewhat elaborate review of Chinese foreign commerce since the commencement of this century, that those high-flown anticipations had no solid ground to stand upon. Quite apart from the opium-trade, which we proved to grow in an inverse ratio to the sale of Western manufactures, we found the main obstacle to any sudden expansion of the import trade to China in the economical structure of Chinese society, depending upon the combination of minute agriculture with domestic industry. We may now, in corroboration of our former statements, refer to the Blue Book entitled, "Correspondence Relative to Lord Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan."

Wherever the real demand for commodities imported into Asiatic countries does not answer the supposed demand—which, in most instances, is calculated on such superficial data as the extent of the new market, the magnitude of its population, and the vent foreign wares used to find at some outstanding seaports—commercial men, in their eagerness at securing a larger area of exchange, are too prone to account for their disappointment by the circumstance that artificial arrangements, invented by barbarian Governments, stand in their way, and may, consequently, be cleared away by main force. This very delusion has, in our epoch, converted the British merchant, for instance, into the reckless supporter of every Minister, who, by piratical aggressions, promises to extort a treaty of commerce from the barbarian. Thus the artificial obstacles foreign commerce was supposed to encounter on the part of the Chinese authorities, formed, in fact, the great pretext which, in the eyes of the mercantile world, justified every outrage committed on the Celestial Empire. The valuable information contained in

Lord Elgin's Blue Book, will, with every unprejudiced mind, go far to dispel such dangerous delusions.

The Blue Book contains a report, dated in 1852, of Mr. Mitchell, a British agent at Canton, to Sir George Bonham, from which we quote the following passage:

Our commercial treaty with this country (China) has now (1852) been nearly ten years in full work, every presumed impediment has been removed, one thousand miles of new coast have been opened up to us, and new marts established at the very threshold of the producing districts, and at the best possible points upon the seaboard. And yet, what is the result as far as the promised increase in the consumption of our manufactures is concerned? Why, plainly this: that at the end of ten years the tables of the Board of Trade show us that Sir Henry Pottinger found a larger trade in existence when he signed the supplementary treaty in 1843, than his treaty itself shows us at the end of 1850!—that is to say, as far as our home manufactures are concerned, which is the sole question we are now considering.

Mr. Mitchell admits that the trade between India and China, consisting almost exclusively in an exchange of silver for opium, has been greatly developed since the treaty of 1842, but, even in regard to this trade, he adds:

It developed itself in as fast a ratio, from 1834 to 1844, as it has done from the latter date to the present, which latter period may be taken as its working under the supposed protection of the treaty; while, on the other hand, we have the great fact staring us in the face, in the tables of the Board of Trade, that the export of our manufacturing stuffs to China was less by nearly three-quarters of a million sterling at the close of 1850, than it was at the close of 1844.

That the treaty of 1842 had no influence at all in fostering the British export trade to China will be seen from the following tabular statement:

DECLARED VALUE.

	1849.	1850.	1851.	1852.	1853.
Cotton Goods	1,001,283	1,020,915	1,598,829	1,905,321	1,408,433
Woolen do	370,878	404,797	373,399	434,616	203,875
Other articles	164,948	148,433	189,040	163,662	137,289
Total	1,537,109	1,574,145	2,161,268	2,503,599	1,749,597
	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	
Cotton Goods	640,820	883,985	1,544,235	1,731,909	
Woolen Goods	156,959	134,070	268,642	286,852	
Other articles	202,937	259,889	403,246	431,221	
Total	1,000,716	1,277,944	2,216,123	2,449,982	

Now, comparing these figures with the Chinese demand for British manufactures in 1843, stated by Mr. Mitchell to have amounted to £1,750,000, it will be seen that in five out of the last nine years the British exports fell far below the level of 1843, and in 1854 were only 10-17 of what they had been in 1843. Mr. Mitchell, in the first instance, explains this startling fact by some reasons which appear too general to prove anything in particular. He says:

The habits of the Chinese are so thrifty, and so hereditary, that they wear just what their fathers wore before them; that is to say, just enough and no more of anything, no matter how cheap it may be offered them [. . .] No working Chinaman can afford to put on a new coat which shall not last him at least three years, and stand the wear and tear of the roughest drudgery during that period. Now, a garment of that description must contain at least three times the weight of raw cotton which we put into the heaviest goods we import to China: that is to say, it must be three times as heavy as the heaviest drills and domestics we can afford to send out here.

Absence of wants, and predilection for hereditary modes of dress, are obstacles which civilized commerce has to encounter

in all new markets. As to the thickness and strength of drills, might British and American manufacturers not adapt their wares to the peculiar requirements of the Chinese? But here we come to the real point at issue. In 1844, Mr. Mitchell sent samples of the native cloth of every quality to England, with the prices specified. His correspondents assured him that they could not produce it in Manchester, and much less ship it to China, at the rates quoted. Whence this inability in the most advanced factory system of the world to undersell cloth woven by hand in the most primitive looms? The combination we have already pointed to, of minute agriculture with domestic industry, solves the riddle. We quote again from Mr. Mitchell:

When the harvest is gathered, all hands in the farm-houses, young and old together, turn to carding, spinning, and weaving this cotton; and out of this homespun stuff a heavy and durable material, adapted to the rough handling it has to go through for two or three years, they clothe themselves, and the surplus they carry to the nearest town, where the shopkeeper buys it for the use of the population of the towns, and the boat people on the rivers. With this homespun stuff, nine out of every ten human beings in this country are clothed, the manufacture varying in quality from the coarsest dungaree to the finest nanking, all produced in the farm-houses, and costing the producer literally nothing beyond the value of the raw material, or rather of the sugar which he exchanged for it, the produce of his own husbandry. Our manufacturers have only to contemplate for a moment the admirable economy of this system, and, so to speak, its exquisite dove-tailing with the other pursuits of the farmer, to be satisfied, at a glance, that they have no chance whatever in the competition, as far as the coarser fabrics are concerned. It is, perhaps, characteristic of China alone, of all countries in the world, that the loom is to be found in every well-conditioned homestead. The people of all other countries content themselves with carding and spinning, and at that point stop short, sending the yarn to the professional weaver to be made into cloth. It was reserved for the thrifty Chinaman to carry the thing out to perfection. He not only cards and spins his cotton, but he weaves

it himself, with the help of his wives and daughters, and farm servants, and hardly ever confines himself to producing for the mere wants of his family, but makes it an essential part of his season's operations to produce a certain quantity of cloth for the supply of the neighboring towns and rivers.


The Fukien farmer is thus not merely a farmer, but an agriculturist and a manufacturer in one. He produces his cloth literally for nothing, beyond the cost of the raw material; he produces it, as shown, under his own roof-tree, by the hands of his women and farm servants; it costs neither extra labor not extra time. He keeps his domestics spinning and weaving while his crops are growing, and after they are harvested, during rainy weather, when out-of-door labor cannot be pursued. In short, at every available interval throughout the year does this model of domestic industry pursue his calling, and engage himself upon something useful.

As a complement of Mr. Mitchell's statement, may be considered the following description Lord Elgin gives of the rural population he met with during his voyage up the Yang-tse-kiang:

What I have seen leads me to think that the rural population of China is, generally speaking, well-doing and contented. I worked very hard, though with only indifferent success, to obtain from them accurate information respecting the extent of their holdings, the nature of their tenure, the taxation which they have to pay, and other kindred matters. I arrived at the conclusion that, for the most part, they hold their lands, which are of very limited extent, in full property from the Crown, subject to certain annual charges of no very exorbitant amount, and that these advantages, improved by assiduous industry, supply abundantly their simple wants, whether in respect of food or clothing.

It is this same combination of husbandry with manufacturing industry, which, for a long time, withstood, and still checks, the export of British wares to East India; but there that combi-

nation was based upon a peculiar constitution of the landed property which the British, in their position as the supreme landlords of the country, had it in their power to undermine, and thus forcibly convert part of the Hindoo self-sustaining communities into mere farms, producing opium, cotton, indigo, hemp, and other raw materials, in exchange for British stuffs. In China the English have not yet wielded this power, nor are they likely ever to do so.



WAR, REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN EUROPE

It is no exaggeration to say that the historical event that most influenced Marx's writing and analysis was the revolutionary uprising that exploded in many Western European countries in 1848. During a few heady months that year, it seemed plausible that kings and landed aristocracies could be swept away and replaced by a surging coalition of workers, peasants and progressive elements of the bourgeoisie. Continent-wide socialism was perhaps too much to hope for, but certainly an increase in democracy and a rationalization of how nation-states were governed seemed very much at hand.

For the most part, however, those revolutions failed within a few months, and the energy behind them evaporated, falling victim to brutal crackdowns on some of Marx's would-be allies, the betrayal of the middle classes and the rise of autocratic nationalists such as France's Louis Napoleon; indeed, the manner in which France purged itself of revolutionary spirit after 1848 led Marx to write what many consider his greatest rhetorical work, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. For Marx this post-revolutionary period was characterized by two intellectual imperatives: first, a need to understand what had gone wrong in 1848—where the balance of forces had been off, where the masses were unprepared, what kind of education and agitation would be necessary to succeed—and second, a constant vigil for any hint of new revolutionary fever that might spread across Europe.

The *Tribune* columns provided Marx an ideal outlet for this latter task: He diligently scoured the European press and his private correspondence for every detail of rebellion and

insurrection, which he pored over with a political magnifying glass. Even if few actual, permanent revolutions presented themselves, events never failed to provide him with material. On the contrary: the sense that Europe was one giant political tinder box led Marx to seek sparks in some seemingly unlikely places, including Greece, Spain and the possibility that the outbreak of the Crimean War might dislodge the governments of France, Germany or Britain (in the latter case it did, though hardly to revolutionary effect). These analyses relied heavily on historic understanding of local culture and politics, far more than most of his American readers were likely to possess. They also brought out Marx's remarkable autodidactic spirit; in order to produce his significant volume of work on successive uprisings in Spain, for example, he taught himself Spanish, apparently becoming proficient in a matter of weeks.

It could be argued that through his insistence on seeing European revolution in the broadest possible context—always weighing the clout of the Great Powers, always insisting that hundreds or thousands of years of history must be brought to bear—Marx sometimes missed the importance of local, nationalist revolutions. By overestimating the influence of France and Austria, for example, he may have failed to see the long-term prospects of the Italian agitations that, within a few short years, would lead to the Risorgimento. On the other hand, his rigorous commitment to historical understanding led Marx to conclude that the deep-seated role of Islam in places like the Near East would make it impossible for the West to impose secularized government there without provoking the most fundamental crisis—a lesson the West would continue to grapple with for at least another 150 years.

The Greek Insurrection
Published March 29, 1854

The insurrection among the Greek subjects of the Sultan,¹⁹ which caused such alarm at Paris and London, has now been suppressed, but its revival is thought not impossible. With regard to this possibility we are able to say that after a careful investigation of the documents relating to the whole affair so far, we are convinced that the insurgents were found exclusively among the mountaineers inhabiting the southern slope of the Pindus, and that they met with no sympathy on the part of the other Christian races of Turkey, save the pious freebooters of Montenegro; and that the occupants of the plains of Thessaly, who form the only compact Greek community still living under Turkish supremacy, are more afraid of their compatriots than of the Turks themselves. It is not to be forgotten that this spiritless and cowardly body of population did not dare to rise even at the time of the Greek war of independence.²⁰ As to the remainder of the Greek race, numbering perhaps 300,000 souls, distributed throughout the cities of the Empire, they are so thoroughly detested by the other Christian tribes that, whenever a popular movement has been successful, as in Servia and Wallachia,²¹ it has resulted in driving away all the priests of Greek origin, and in supplying their places by native pastors.

But although the present Greek insurrection, considered with reference to its own merits, is altogether insignificant, it still derives importance from the occasion it affords to the western Powers for interfering between the Porte²² and the great majority of its subjects in Europe, among whom the Greeks count only one million against ten millions of the other races professing the Greek religion. The Greek inhabitants of the so-called kingdom as well as those living in the Ionian Isles²³ under British rule consider it, of course, to be their national mission to expel the Turks from wherever the Greek language is spoken, and to annex Thessaly and Epirus to a State of their own. They may even dream of a Byzantine restoration, although, on the whole, they are too astute a people to believe in such a fancy.

But these plans of national aggrandizement and independence on the part of the Greeks; proclaimed at this moment in consequence of Russian intrigues, as is proved by the lately detected conspiracy of the priest Athanasius, and proclaimed too by the robbers of the mountains without being reechoed by the agricultural population of the plain—all have nothing to do with the religious rights of the subjects of Turkey with which an attempt is made to mix them up.

As we learn from the English journals and from notice given in the House of Lords by Lord Shaftesbury, and in the Commons by Mr. Monckton Milnes, the British Government is to be called upon in connection, partly at least, with these Greek movements to take measures to meliorate the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Indeed, we are told explicitly that the great end aimed at by the western Powers is to put the Christian religion on a footing of equal rights with the Mahometan in Turkey. Now, either this means nothing at all, or it means the granting political and civil rights, both to Mussulmans and Christians, without any reference to either religion, and without considering religion at all. In other words, it means the complete separation of State and Church, of Religion and Politics. But the Turkish State, like all Oriental States, is founded upon the most intimate connection, we might almost say, the identity of State and Church, of Politics and Religion. The Koran is the double source of faith and law, for that Empire and its rulers. But how is it possible to equalize the faithful and the Giaour,²⁴ the Mussulman and the Rajah before the Koran? To do that it is necessary, in fact, to supplant the Koran by a new civil code, in other words to break down the framework of Turkish society and create a new order of things out of its ruins.

On the other hand, the main feature that distinguishes the Greek confession from all other branches of the Christian faith, is the same identification of State and Church, of civil and ecclesiastical life. So intimately interwoven were State and Church in the Byzantine Empire, that it is impossible to write the history of the one without writing the history of the other. In Russia the same identity prevails, although there, in contra-

distinction to the Byzantine Empire, the Church has been transformed into the mere tool of the State, the instrument of subjugation at home and of aggression abroad. In the Ottoman Empire in conformity with the Oriental notions of the Turks, the Byzantine theocracy has been allowed to develop itself to such a degree, that the parson of a parish is at the same time the judge, the mayor, the teacher, the executor of testaments, the assessor of taxes, the ubiquitous factotum of civil life, not the servant, but the master of all work. The main reproach to be cast upon the Turks in this regard is not that they have crippled the privileges of the Christian priesthood, but, on the contrary, that under their rule this all-embracing oppressive tutelage, control, and interference of the Church has been permitted to absorb the whole sphere of social existence. Mr. Fallmerayer very amusingly tells us, in his *Orientalische Briefe*,²⁵ how a Greek priest was quite astonished when he informed him that the Latin clergy enjoyed no civil authority at all, and had to perform no profane business. "How," exclaimed the priest, "do our Latin brethren contrive to kill time?"

It is plain then that to introduce a new civil code in Turkey, a code altogether abstracted from religion, and based on a complete separation of State and Church, would be not only to abolish Mahometanism, but also to break down the Greek Church as now established in that Empire. Can any one be credulous enough to believe in good earnest that the timid and reactionary valetudinarians of the present British Government have ever conceived the idea of undertaking such a gigantic task, involving a perfect social revolution, in a country like Turkey? The notion is absurd. They can only entertain it for the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the English people and of Europe.

*Declaration of War.—On the History of the
Eastern Question*

Published April 15, 1854

War has at length been declared.²⁶ The Royal Message was read yesterday in both Houses of Parliament; by Lord Aberdeen in the Lords, and by Lord J. Russell in the Commons. It describes the measures about to be taken as "active steps to oppose the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey." To-morrow *The London Gazette* will publish the official notification of war, and on Friday the address in reply to the message will become the subject of the Parliamentary debates.

Simultaneously with the English declaration, Louis Napoleon has communicated a similar message to his Senate and *Corps Législatif*.

The declaration of war against Russia could no longer be delayed, after Captain Blackwood, the bearer of the Anglo-French *ultimatissimum* to the Czar, had returned, on Saturday last, with the answer that Russia would give to that paper no answer at all. The mission of Capt. Blackwood, however, has not been altogether a gratuitous one. It has afforded to Russia the month of March, that most dangerous epoch of the year, to Russian arms.

The publication of the secret correspondence between the Czar and the English Government, instead of provoking a burst of public indignation against the latter, has—*incredibile dictu*—been the signal for the press, both weekly and daily, for congratulating England on the possession of so truly national a Ministry. I understand, however, that a meeting will be called together for the purpose of opening the eyes of a blinded British public on the real conduct of the Government. It is to be held on Thursday next in the Music Hall, Store-st.; and Lord Ponsonby, Mr. Layard,²⁷ Mr. Urquhart,²⁸ etc., are expected to take part in the proceedings.

The *Hamburger Correspondent* has the following: "According to advices from St. Petersburg, which arrived here on the 16th inst., the Russian Government proposes to publish various

other documents on the Eastern question. Among the documents destined for publication are some letters written by Prince Albert."

It is a curious fact that the same evening on which the Royal Message was delivered in the Commons, the Government suffered their first *defeat* in the present session; the second reading of the Poor-Settlement and Removal bill having, notwithstanding the efforts of the Government, been adjourned to the 28th of April, by a division of 209 to 183. The person to whom the Government is indebted for this defeat, is no other than my Lord Palmerston. "His lordship," says *The Times* of this day, "has *managed* to put himself and his colleagues between two fires (the Tories and the Irish party) without much prospect of leaving them to settle it between themselves."

We are informed that on the 12th inst. a treaty of triple alliance was signed between France, England and Turkey, but that, notwithstanding the personal application of the Sultan to the Grand Mufti, the latter supported by the *corps* of the Ulemas,²⁹ refused to issue his *fetva*³⁰ sanctioning the stipulation about the changes in the situation of the Christians in Turkey, as being in contradiction with the precepts of the Koran. This intelligence must be looked upon as being the more important, as it caused Lord Derby to make the following observation:

I will only express my earnest anxiety that the Government will state whether there is any truth in the report that has been circulated during the last few days that in this convention entered into between England, France and Turkey, there are articles which will be of a nature to establish a protectorate on our part as objectionable at least, as that which, on the part of Russia, we have protested against.

The Times of to-day, while declaring that the policy of the Government is directly opposed to that of Lord Derby adds: "We should deeply regret if the bigotry of the Mufti or the Ulemas succeeded in opposing any serious resistance to this policy."

In order to understand both the nature of the relations

between the Turkish Government and the spiritual authority of Turkey, and the difficulties in which the former is at present involved, with respect to the question of a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, that question which ostensibly lies at the bottom of all the actual complications in the East, it is necessary to cast a retrospective glance at its past history and development.

The Koran and the Mussulman legislation emanating from it reduce the geography and ethnography of the various peoples to the simple and convenient distinction of two nations and of two countries; those of the Faithful and of the Infidels. The Infidel is "*harby*," i.e. the enemy. Islamism proscribes the nation of the Infidels, constituting a state of permanent hostility between the Mussulman and the unbeliever. In that sense the corsair-ships of the Berber States³¹ were the holy fleet of Islam. How, then, is the existence of Christian subjects of the Porte to be reconciled with the Koran? "If a town," says the Mussulman legislation,

surrenders by capitulation, and its habitants consent to become *rayahs*, that is, subjects of a Mussulman prince without abandoning their creed, they have to pay the *kharatch* (capitation tax), when they obtain a truce with the faithful, and it is not permitted any more to confiscate their estates than to take away their houses . . . In this case their old churches form part of their property, with permission to worship therein. But they are not allowed to erect new ones. They have only authority for repairing them, and to reconstruct their decayed portions. At certain epochs commissaries delegated by the provincial governors are to visit the churches and sanctuaries of the Christians, in order to ascertain that no new buildings have been added under pretext of repairs. If a town is conquered by force, the inhabitants retain their churches, but only as places of abode or refuge, without permission to worship.

Constantinople having surrendered by capitulation, as in like manner has the greater portion of European Turkey, the Christians there enjoy the privilege of living as *rayahs*, under the

Turkish Government. This privilege they have exclusively by virtue of their agreeing to accept the Mussulman protection. It is, therefore, owing to this circumstance alone, that the Christians submit to be governed by the Mussulmans according to Mussulman law, that the patriarch of Constantinople, their spiritual chief, is at the same time their political representative and their Chief Justice. Wherever, in the Ottoman Empire, we find an agglomeration of Greek *rayahs*, the Archbishops and Bishops are by law members of the Municipal Councils, and, under the direction of the patriarch, [watch] over the repartition of the taxes imposed upon the Greeks. The patriarch is responsible to the Porte as to the conduct of his co-religionists. Invested with the right of judging the *rayahs* of his Church, he delegates this right to the metropolitans and bishops, in the limits of their dioceses, their sentences being obligatory for the executive officers, *kadis*,³² etc., of the Porte to carry out. The punishments which they have the right to pronounce are fines, imprisonment, the bastinado, and exile. Besides, their own church gives them the power of excommunication. Independent of the produce of the fines, they receive variable taxes on the civil and commercial law-suits. Every hierarchic scale among the clergy has its moneyed price. The patriarch pays to the Divan a heavy tribute in order to obtain his investiture, but he sells, in his turn, the archbishoprics and bishoprics to the clergy of his worship. The latter indemnify themselves by the sale of subaltern dignities and the tribute exacted from the popes. These, again, sell by retail the power they have bought from their superiors, and traffic in all acts of their ministry, such as baptisms, marriages, divorces, and testaments.

It is evident from this *exposé* that this fabric of theocracy over the Greek Christians of Turkey, and the whole structure of their society, has its keystone in the subjection of the *rayah* under the Koran, which, in its turn, by treating them as infidels—i.e., as a nation only in a religious sense—sanctioned the combined spiritual and temporal power of their priests. Then, if you abolish their subjection under the Koran by a civil emancipation, you cancel at the same time their subjection to the clergy, and provoke a revolution in their social, political and

religious relations, which, in the first instance, must inevitably hand them over to Russia. If you supplant the Koran by a *code civil*, you must occidentalize the entire structure of Byzantine society.

Having described the relations between the Mussulman and his Christian subject, the question arises, what are the relations between the Mussulman and the unbelieving foreigner?

As the Koran treats all foreigners as foes, nobody will dare to present himself in a Mussulman country without having taken his precautions. The first European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges originally personal, but afterward extended to their whole nation. Hence the origin of capitulations. Capitulations are imperial diplomas, letters of privilege, octroyed by the Porte to different European nations, and authorizing their subjects to freely enter Mohammedan countries, and there to pursue in tranquillity their affairs, and to practice their worship. They differ from treaties in this essential point that they are not reciprocal acts contradictorily debated between the contracting parties, and accepted by them on the condition of mutual advantages and concessions. On the contrary, the capitulations are one-sided concessions on the part of the Government granting them, in consequence of which they may be revoked at its pleasure. The Porte has, indeed, at several times nullified the privileges granted to one nation, by extending them to others; or repealed them altogether by refusing to continue their application. This precarious character of the capitulations made them an eternal source of disputes, of complaints on the part of Embassadors, and of a prodigious exchange of contradictory notes and firmans³³ revived at the commencement of every new reign.

It was from these capitulations that arose the right of a *protectorate* of foreign powers, not over the Christian subjects of the Porte—the rayahs—but over their co-religionists visiting Turkey or residing there as foreigners. The first power that obtained such a protectorate was France. The capitulations between France and the Ottoman Porte made in 1535, under

Soliman the Great and Francis I; in 1604 under Ahmed I and Henry IV; and in 1673 under Mohammed IV and Louis XIV, were renewed, confirmed, recapitulated, and augmented in the compilation of 1740, called "ancient and recent capitulations and treaties between the Court of France and the Ottoman Porte, renewed and augmented in the year 1740, A.D., and 1153 of the Hegira,"³⁴ translated (the first official translation sanctioned by the Porte) at Constantinople by M. Deval, Secretary Interpreter of the King, and his first Dragoman at the Ottoman Porte." Art. 32 of this agreement constitutes the right of France to a protectorate over all monasteries professing the Frank religion to whatever nation they may belong, and of the Frank visitors of the Holy Places.

Russia was the first power that, in 1774, inserted the capitulation, imitated after the example of France, into a *treaty*—the treaty of Kainardji. Thus, in 1802, Napoleon thought fit to make the existence and maintenance of the capitulation the subject of an article of treaty, and to give it the character of synallagmatic contract.³⁵

In what relation then does the question of the Holy Places stand with the protectorate?

The question of the Holy Shrines is the question of a protectorate over the religious Greek Christian communities settled at Jerusalem, and over the buildings possessed by them on the holy ground, and especially over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. It is to be understood that possession here does not mean proprietorship, which is denied to the Christians by the Koran, but only the right of *usufruct*. This right of *usufruct* excludes by no means the other communities from worshipping in the same place; the possessors having no other privilege besides that of keeping the *keys*, of repairing and entering the edifices, of kindling the holy lamp, of cleaning the rooms with the broom, and of spreading the carpets, which is an Oriental symbol of possession. In the same manner now, in which Christianity culminates at the Holy Place, the question of the protectorate is there found to have its highest ascension.

Parts of the Holy Places and of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher are possessed by the Latins, the Greeks, the Armenians, the

Abyssinians, the Syrians, and the Copts. Between all these diverse pretendents there originated a conflict. The sovereigns of Europe who saw, in this religious quarrel, a question of their respective influences in the Orient, addressed themselves in the first instance to the masters of the soil, to fanatic and greedy Pashas,³⁶ who abused their position. The Ottoman Porte and its agents adopting a most troublesome *système de bascule*³⁷ gave judgment in turns favorable to the Latins, Greeks, and Armenians, asking and receiving gold from all hands, and laughing at each of them. Hardly had the Turks granted a firman, acknowledging the right of the Latins to the possession of a contested place, when the Armenians presented themselves with a heavier purse, and instantly obtained a contradictory firman. Same tactics with respect to the Greeks, who knew, besides, as officially recorded in different firmans of the Porte and "*budjets*" (judgments) of its agents, how to procure false and apocryph titles. On other occasions the decisions of the Sultan's Government were frustrated by the cupidity and ill-will of the Pashas and subaltern agents in Syria. Then it became necessary to resume negotiations, to appoint fresh commissaries, and to make new sacrifices of money. What the Porte formerly did from pecuniary considerations, in our days it has done from fear, with a view to obtain protection and favor. Having done justice to the reclamations of France and the Latins, it hastened to make the same conditions to Russia and the Greeks, thus attempting to escape from a storm which it felt powerless to encounter. There is no sanctuary, no chapel, no stone of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, that had been left unturned for the purpose of constituting a quarrel between the different Christian communities.

Around the Holy Sepulcher we find an assemblage of all the various sects of Christianity, behind the religious pretensions of whom are concealed as many political and national rivalries.

Jerusalem and the Holy Places are inhabited by nations professing religions: the Latins, the Greeks, Armenians, Copts, Abyssinians, and Syrians. There are 2,000 Greeks, 1,000 Latins, 350 Armenians, 100 Copts, 20 Syrians, and 20 Abyssinians—3,490. In the Ottoman Empire we find 13,730,000 Greeks,

2,400,000 Armenians, and 900,000 Latins. Each of these is again subdivided. The Greek Church, of which I treated above, the one acknowledging the Patriarch of Constantinople, essentially differs from the Greco-Russian, whose chief spiritual authority is the Czar; and from the Hellens, of whom the King and the Synod of Athens are the chief authorities. Similarly, the Latins are subdivided into the Roman Catholics, United Greeks, and Maronites; and the Armenians into Gregorian and Latin Armenians—the same distinctions holding good with the Copts and Abyssinians. The three prevailing religious nationalities at the Holy Places are the Greeks, the Latins, and the Armenians. The Latin Church may be said to represent principally Latin races, the Greek Church, Slav, Turko-Slav, and Hellenic races; and the other churches, Asiatic and African races.

Imagine all these conflicting peoples beleaguering the Holy Sepulcher, the battle conducted by the monks, and the ostensible object of their rivalry being a star from the grotto of Bethlehem, a tapestry, a key of a sanctuary, an altar, a shrine, a chair, a cushion—any ridiculous precedence!

In order to understand such a monastical crusade it is indispensable to consider firstly the manner of their living, and secondly, the mode of their habitation. "All the religious rubbish of the different nations," says a recent traveler,

live at Jerusalem separated from each other, hostile and jealous, a nomade population, incessantly recruited by pilgrimage or decimated by the plague and oppressions. The European dies or returns to Europe after some years; the pashas and their guards go to Damascus or Constantinople; and the Arabs fly to the desert. Jerusalem is but a place where every one arrives to pitch his tent and where nobody remains. Everybody in the holy city gets his livelihood from his religion—the Greeks or Armenians from the 12,000 or 13,000 pilgrims who yearly visit Jerusalem, and the Latins from the subsidies and alms of their co-religionists of France, Italy, etc.

Besides their monasteries and sanctuaries, the Christian nations possess at Jerusalem small habitations or cells, annexed

to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, and occupied by the monks, who have to watch day and night that holy abode. At certain periods these monks are relieved in their duty by their brethren. These cells have but one door, opening into the interior of the Temple, while the monk guardians receive their food from without, through some wicket. The doors of the Church are closed, and guarded by Turks, who don't open them except for money, and close it according to their caprice or cupidity.

The quarrels between churchmen are the most venomous, said Mazarin. Now fancy these churchmen, who not only have to live upon, but live in, these sanctuaries together!

To finish the picture, be it remembered that the fathers of the Latin Church, almost exclusively composed of Romans, Sardinians, Neapolitans, Spaniards and Austrians, are all of them jealous of the French protectorate, and would like to substitute that of Austria, Sardinia or Naples, the Kings of the two latter countries both assuming the title of King of Jerusalem; and that the sedentary population of Jerusalem numbers about 15,500 souls, of whom 4,000 are Mussulmans and 8,000 Jews. The Mussulmans, forming about a fourth part of the whole, and consisting of Turks, Arabs and Moors, are, of course, the masters in every respect, as they are in no way affected with the weakness of their Government at Constantinople. Nothing equals the misery and the sufferings of the Jews at Jerusalem, inhabiting the most filthy quarter of the town, called *hareth-el-yahoud*, the quarter of dirt, between the Zion and the Moriah, where their synagogues are situated—the constant objects of Mussulman oppression and intolerance, insulted by the Greeks, persecuted by the Latins, and living only upon the scanty alms transmitted by their European brethren. The Jews, however, are not natives, but from different and distant countries, and are only attracted to Jerusalem by the desire of inhabiting the Valley of Jehosaphat, and to die in the very places where the redeemer is to be expected. “Attending their death,” says a French author, “they suffer and pray. Their regards turned to that mountain of Moriah, where once rose the temple of Solomon, and which they dare not approach, they

shed tears on the misfortunes of Zion, and their dispersion over the world.”

To make these Jews more miserable, England and Prussia appointed, in 1840, an Anglican bishop at Jerusalem, whose avowed object is their conversion. He was dreadfully thrashed in 1845, and sneered at alike by Jews, Christians and Turks. He may, in fact, be stated to have been the first and only cause of a union between all the religions at Jerusalem.

It will now be understood why the common worship of the Christians at the Holy Places resolves itself into a continuance of desperate Irish rows between the diverse sections of the faithful; but that, on the other hand, these sacred rows merely conceal a profane battle, not only of nations but of races; and that the Protectorate of the Holy Places which appears ridiculous to the Occident but all important to the Orientals is one of the phases of the Oriental question incessantly reproduced, constantly stifled, but never solved.

[*Revolution in Spain.—Bomarsund*]

Published September 4, 1854

The “leaders” of the *Assemblée Nationale*, *Times*, and *Journal des Débats* prove that neither the pure Russian party, nor the Russo-Coburg party, nor the Constitutional party are satisfied with the course of the Spanish revolution. From this it would appear that there is some chance for Spain, notwithstanding the contradiction of appearances.

On the 8th [of August] a deputation from the Union Club³⁸ waited on Espartero³⁹ to present an address calling for the adoption of universal suffrage. Numerous petitions to the same effect were pouring in. Consequently, a long and animated debate took place at the Council of Ministers. But the partisans of universal suffrage, as well as the partisans of the election law of 1845, have been beaten. The Madrid *Gaceta* publishes a decree for the convocation of the Cortes⁴⁰ on the 8th of November preceded by an *exposé* addressed to the Queen. At the

elections, the law of 1837 will be followed, with slight modifications. The Cortes are to be one Constituent Assembly, the legislative functions of the Senate being suppressed. Two paragraphs of the law of 1845 have been preserved, viz.: the mode of forming the electoral *mesas* (boards receiving the votes and publishing the returns), and the number of deputies; one deputy to be elected for every 5,000 souls. The Assembly will thus be composed of from 420 to 430 members. According to a circular of Santa Cruz, the Minister of the Interior, the electors must be registered by the 6th of September. After the verification of the lists by the provincial deputations, the electoral lists will be closed on the 12th of September. The elections will take place on the 3d of October, at the chief localities of the Electoral Districts. The scrutiny will be proceeded to on the 16th of October, in the capital of each province. In case of conflicting elections, the new proceedings which will thereby be necessitated, must be terminated by the 30th of October. The *exposé* states expressly that "the Cortes of 1854, like those of 1837, will save the monarchy; they will be a new bond between the throne and the nation, objects which cannot be questioned or disputed."

In other words, the Government forbids the discussion of the dynastic question; hence, *The Times* concludes the contrary, supposing that the question will now be between the present dynasty or no dynasty at all—an eventuality which, it is scarcely necessary to remark, infinitely displeases and disappoints the calculations of *The Times*.

The Electoral law of 1837 limits the franchise by the conditions of having a household, the payment of the *mayores cuotas* (the ship taxes levied by the State), and the age of twenty-five years. There are further entitled to a vote: the members of the Spanish Academies of History and of the Artes Nobles, doctors, licentiates in the faculties of Divinity, law, of medicine, members of ecclesiastical chapters, parochial curates and their assistant clergy, magistrates and advocates of two years' standing; officers of the army of a certain standing, whether on service or the retired list; physicians, surgeons, apothecaries of two years' standing; architects, painters and sculptors, honoured

with the membership of an academy; professors and masters in any educational establishment, supported by the public funds. Disqualified for the vote by the same law are defaulters to the common pueblo-fund, or to local taxation, bankrupts, persons interdicted by the courts of law for moral or civil incapacity; lastly, all persons under sentence.

It is true that this decree does not proclaim universal suffrage, and that it removes the dynastic question from the forum of the Cortes. Still it is doubtful that even this Assembly will do. If the Spanish Cortes forbore from interfering with the Crown in 1812, it was because the Crown was only nominally represented—the King having been absent for years from Spanish soil. If they forbore in 1837, it was because they had to settle with absolute monarchy before they could think of settling with the constitutional monarchy. With regard to the general situation, *The Times* has truly good reasons to deplore the absence of French centralization in Spain, and that consequently even a victory over revolution in the capital decides nothing with respect to the provinces, so long as that state of “anarchy” survives there without which no revolution can succeed.

There are, of course, some incidents in the Spanish revolution peculiarly belonging to them. For instance, the combination of robbery with revolutionary transactions—a connection which sprung up in the guerrilla wars against the French invasions,⁴¹ and which was continued by the “royalists” in 1823, and the Carlists⁴² since 1835. No surprise will therefore be felt at the information that great disorders have occurred at Tortosa, in Lower Catalonia. The *Junta Popular* of that city says, in its proclamation of 31st July: “A band of miserable assassins, availing themselves for pretext of the abolition of the indirect taxes, have seized the town, and trampled upon all laws of society. Plunder, assassination, incendiarism have marked their steps.”

Order, however, was soon restored by the Junta—the citizens arming themselves and coming to the rescue of the feeble garrison of the place. A military commission is sitting, charged with the pursuit and punishment of the authors of the catastrophe of July 30. This circumstances has, of course, given an occasion

to the reactionary journals for virtuous declamation. How little they are warranted in this proceeding may be inferred from the remark of the *Messenger de Bayonne*, that the Carlists have raised their banner in the provinces of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, and precisely in the same contiguous mountains where they had their chief nest in the old Carlist wars. It was the Carlists who gave origin to the *ladrones facciosos*, that combination of robbery and pretended allegiance to an oppressed party in the State. The Spanish guerrillero of all times has had something of the robber since the time of Viriathus;⁴³ but it is a novelty of Carlist invention that a pure robber should invest himself with the name of guerrillero. The men of the Tortosa affair certainly belong to this class.

At Lerida, Saragossa and Barcelona matters are serious. The two former cities have refused to combine with Barcelona, because the military had the upper hand there. Still it appears that even there Concha is unable to master the storm, and General Dulce is to take his place, the recent popularity of that general being considered as offering more guarantees for a conciliation of the difficulties.

The secret societies have resumed their activity at Madrid, and govern the democratic party just as they did in 1823. The first demand which they have urged the people to make is that all ministers since 1843 shall present their accounts.

The ministry are purchasing back the arms which the people seized on the day of the barricades. In this way they have got possession of 2,500 muskets, formerly in the hands of insurgents. Don Manuel Sagasti, the Ayacucho *Jefe Politico* of Madrid of 1843, has been reinstated in his functions. He has addressed to the inhabitants and the national militia two proclamations, in which he announces his intention of energetically repressing all disorder. The removal of the creatures of Sartorius from the different offices proceeds rapidly. It is, perhaps, the only thing rapidly done in Spain. All parties show themselves equally quick in that line.

Salamanca is not imprisoned, as was asserted. He had been arrested at Aranjuez, but was soon released, and is now at Malaga.

The control of the ministry by popular pressure is proved by the fact, that the Ministers of War, of the Interior, and of Public Works, have effected large displacements and simplifications in their several departments, an event never known in Spanish history before [. . .]

The chief cause of the Spanish revolution was the state of the finances, and particularly the decree of Sartorius, ordering the payment of six months' taxes in advance upon the year. All the public chests were empty when the revolution broke out, notwithstanding the circumstance that no branch of the public service had been paid; nor were the sums destined for any particular service applied to it during the whole of several months. Thus, for instance, the turnpike receipts were never appropriated to the use of keeping up the roads. The moneys set aside for public works shared the same destiny. When the chest of public works was subjected to revision, instead of receipts for executed works, receipts from court favorites were discovered. It is known that financiering has long been the most profitable business in Madrid [. . .]

Spain is the least taxed country of Europe, and the economical question is nowhere so simple as there. The reduction and simplification of the bureaucratic machinery in Spain are the less difficult, as the municipalities traditionally administer their own affairs; so is reform of the tariff, and conscientious application of the *bienes nacionales*⁴⁴ not yet alienated. The social question in the modern sense of the word has no foundation in a country with its resources yet undeveloped, and with such a scanty population as Spain—15,000,000 only [. . .]

Prussia

Published May 5, 1856

The strange frenzy which has converted France into a gambling-house, and identified the Napoleonic Empire with the Bourse, has by no means been confined within Gallic boundaries. That plague, unrestrained by political frontiers, has crossed the

Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine, and, wonderful to say, has seized upon solid Germany, where speculation in ideas has given way to speculation in stocks, the *summum bonum*⁴⁵ to the bonus, the mysterious jargon of dialectics to the no less mysterious jargon of the Exchange, and the aspiration for unity to the passion for dividends. Rhenish Prussia, from its proximity to France, as well as from the high development of its industry and commerce, was the first to catch the disease. Not only did the Cologne bankers enter into a formal alliance with the great swindlers at Paris, by purchasing with them the *Indépendance belge* as their common organ, and establishing an international bank at Luxemburg; not only did they drag into the whirlpool of the *Crédit Mobilier*⁴⁶ all South-Western Germany, but in the limits of Rhenish Prussia and in the Duchy of Westphalia they succeeded so well that at this moment every layer of society, except that formed by the working classes and smaller peasantry, is permeated by the gold mania, so that even the capital of the small middle class, diverted from its customary channels, seeks for wild adventure, and every shopkeeper is turned into an alchemist. That the rest of Prussia has not escaped the contagion will be seen by the following extract from the *Preussische Correspondenz*, a ministerial paper.

Observations recently made on the money market justify the assumption that there is again approaching one of those frightful commercial crises which return periodically. The feverish movement of an immoderate spirit of speculation, first prompted abroad, has, since last year, pervaded Germany to a great extent, and not only the Berlin Bourse and the Prussian capitalists have been dragged into this whirlpool, but also whole classes of society, which, at every former time, endeavored to shun any immediate participation in the hazards of the stock market.

On this apprehension of an imminent financial crisis, the Prussian Government grounded its refusal to allow the establishment of a *Crédit Mobilier*, the dazzling colors of which were suspected to conceal a swindling purpose. But what is not permitted under one form may be allowed in another; and

what is not permitted at Berlin will be tolerated at Leipsic and Hanover. The latest phase of the speculative mania has set in at the close of the war,⁴⁷ which, apart from the commercial excitement inseparable from any conclusion of peace—as witnessed in 1802 and 1815—is this time marked by the peculiar feature that Prussia has formally expressed her wish to throw open her markets to the importation of western capital and speculation. We shall, accordingly, soon hear of the grand Irkutsk trunk-line with branches to Peking, and other not less monstrous schemes, the question being not what is really designed for execution, but what fresh material may be offered for the spirit of speculation to feed upon. There was nothing wanting but the peace to hurry the great crash apprehended by the Prussian Government.

This uncommon participation by Prussia in the speculative movement of Europe would have been impossible but for the great strides made by its industry of late years. The capital invested in railways alone has been increased from 19,000,000 to 154,000,000 Prussian thalers, in the interval from 1840 to 1854-55. Other railroads at an estimated cost of 54,000,000, are in progress; and the Government have further authorized the construction of new lines at a cost of 57,000,000. Eighty-seven joint-stock companies, with a capital of 83,000,000, have sprung into life since 1849. From 1854-56, nine insurance companies, with a capital of 22,000,000, have been registered. In these last two years, likewise, six joint-stock companies, with a capital of 10,500,000, have commenced to run spinning-mills. From the Cotton Report it will be seen that the quantity of cotton received by the different ports of Europe, has, from 1853-56, varied in the following proportions, according to the return of the first seven months of the year the export of bales being as follows:

	1853	1854	1855	1856
To England	1,100,000	840,000	963,000	1,131,000
France	255,000	229,000	249,000	354,000
Other European ports	204,000	179,000	167,000	346,000

Hence it follows that the Continent, which in 1853 received only about one third of the cotton exported to England, received in 1856 as much as five eighths of it. To this must be added the cotton reshipped by England to the Continent. The great export to France is only so in appearance, considerable quantities being transported from Havre to Switzerland, Baden, Frankfort and Antwerp. The development of Continental industry as exhibited by the above figures denotes therefore, above all, the increase of German, and chiefly of Prussian industry. The wealth accumulated by the industrial middle classes of late years, is nearly rivaled by the appreciation of land-owners' profits during the war period of dearth and high price. Horses, cattle, live-stock in general, and not least corn, have kept so high in Germany itself, that the influence of foreign markets has hardly been needed to enable the great landholders to roll in gold. It is wealth—the rapid increase of wealth never before experienced by these two classes—which has furnished the basis for the present speculative murrain in Prussia.

The bursting of the bubble will put the Prussian State to a severe test. The different counter-revolutions it has undergone since 1849 have ended in placing the Government in the power of the narrow class of noble landowners, with respect to whom the King, who has done everything to create their supremacy, now finds himself in the same situation as did Louis XVIII toward the *Chambre introuvable*.⁴⁸ Frederick William had never the sense to put up with the dry bureaucratic machinery of Government bequeathed him by his father. He has all his life been dreaming of beautifying the Prussian State edifice by some romantico-gothic decoration. The short experience which he has had of his *Herrenhaus*,⁴⁹ however, must have satisfied him that in reality the landocracy or *Krautjunktors*, as they are called in Prussia, so far from deeming themselves happy in serving as a mediaeval ornament to the bureaucracy, are striving with all their might to degrade the bureaucracy and make it the simple executor of their class-interests. Hence the split between the Junkers and the Administration; between the King and the Prince of Prussia. To show the Government how much they are in earnest, they have just refused to renew the grant of

an additional tax which had been levied during the war—a thing unheard of in constitutional Prussia. They have coolly and deliberately proclaimed the doctrine that they are as much kings over their little estates as the King himself is over the country at large. They insist that the Constitution, while it is to remain a sham for all other classes, must be a reality for themselves. Emancipating themselves from all control of the bureaucracy, they wish to see it weigh with double force on the classes below.

The middle class, who betrayed the revolution of 1848, have now the satisfaction, even while they are accomplishing their social triumph by the unrestrained accumulation of capital, of seeing themselves politically annihilated. Moreover, the *Krautjunkers* delight in every day finding fresh occasions to make them feel their humiliation, even setting aside the common laws of etiquette. When the middle-class spokesmen get up in the House of Deputies, the Junkers leave their benches *en masse*, and when requested at least to listen to opinions contrary to their own, they laugh in the faces of the gentlemen of the Left. When the latter complain of the obstructions put in the way of elections, they are informed that it is simply the duty of the Government to protect the masses from seduction. When they contrast the licentiousness of the aristocratic, with the shackled condition of the liberal press, they are reminded that liberty in a Christian State is not to do as one pleases, but as pleases God and the authorities. One day they are given to understand that "honor" is the monopoly of an aristocracy; the next day they are stung to the quick by a practical illustration of the exploded theories of a Haller, a de Bonald and a de Maistre. Proud of his philosophical enlightenment, the Prussian citizen has the mortification of seeing the first scientific men driven from the universities, education handed over to a gang of obscurants, ecclesiastical courts meddling with his family concerns, and the police taking him to church on a Sunday. Not content with exempting themselves from taxes so far as they could, the Junkers have packed the middle class in guilds and corporations, adulterated their municipal institutions, abolished the independence and immovability of their Judges, can-

celled the religious equality of the different sects, and so forth. If at times their choking anger breaks through their fears, if they occasionally muster enough courage to threaten, from their seats in the Chamber, the Junkers with a coming revolution, they are sneeringly answered that the revolution has as heavy an account to settle with them as with the nobility.

Indeed, the higher middle class is not likely to find itself again, as in 1848, at the head of a Prussian revolution. The peasantry in Eastern Prussia have lost not only all that the revolution of 1848 had brought them in the shape of emancipation, but have been reduced once more, both administratively and judicially, under the direct yoke of the nobility. In Rhenish Prussia, by the attraction of capital toward industrial enterprise, they have sunk deeper into the bondage of the mortgage, at the same rate at which the interest on loans has risen. While in Austria something, at least, has been done to conciliate the peasantry, in Prussia nothing has been left undone to exasperate them. As to the working classes, the Government has prevented them from participating in the profits of their masters by punishing them for strikes, and has systematically excluded them from taking part in political affairs. A disunited dynasty, a Government broken up into hostile camps, the bureaucracy quarreling with the aristocracy, the aristocracy with the middle class—a general commercial crisis, and the disinherited classes brooding in the spirit of rebellion against all the upper layers of society: such is the aspect of Prussia at this hour.

[*Revolution in Spain*] [I]

Published August 8, 1856

The news brought by the *Asia* yesterday, though later by three days than our previous advices, contains nothing to indicate a speedy conclusion of the civil war in Spain. O'Donnell's coup⁵⁰ d'état, although victorious at Madrid, cannot yet be said to have finally succeeded. The French *Moniteur*, which at first put down the insurrection at Barcelona as a mere riot, is now

obliged to confess that "the conflict there was very keen, but that the success of the Queen's⁵¹ troops may be considered as secured."

According to the version of that official journal the combat at Barcelona lasted from 5 o'clock in the afternoon of July 18 till the same hour on the 21st—exactly three days—when the "insurgents" are said to have been dislodged from their quarters, and fled into the country, pursued by cavalry. It is, however, averred that the insurgents still hold several towns in Catalonia, including Gerona, Junquera, and some smaller places. It also appears that Murcia, Valencia and Seville have made their *pronunciamientos*⁵² against the coup d'état; that a battalion of the garrison of Pampeluna, directed by the Governor of that town on Soria, had pronounced against the Government on the road, and marched to join the insurrection at Saragossa; and lastly that at Saragossa, from the beginning the acknowledged center of resistance, Gen. Falcon had passed in review 16,000 soldiers of the line, reinforced by 15,000 militia and peasants from the environs.

At all events, the French Government considers the "insurrection" in Spain as not quelled, and Bonaparte, far from contenting himself with the sending of a batch of battalions to line the frontier, has ordered one brigade to advance to the Bidassoa, which brigade is being completed to a division by reinforcements from Montpellier and Toulouse. It seems, also, that a second division has been detached immediately from the army of Lyons, according to orders sent direct from Plombières on the 23d ult., and is now marching toward the Pyrenees, where, by this time, there is assembled a full *corps d'observation* of 25,000 men. Should the resistance to the O'Donnell government be able to hold its ground; should it prove formidable enough to inveigle Bonaparte into an armed invasion of the Peninsula, then the coup d'état of Madrid may have given the signal for the downfall of the coup d'état of Paris.

If we consider the general plot and the *dramatis personae*, this Spanish conspiracy of 1856 appears as the simple revival of the similar attempt of 1843, with some slight alterations of course. Then, as now, Isabella at Madrid and Christina⁵³ at

Paris; Louis Philippe, instead of Louis Bonaparte, directing the movement from the Tuileries; on the one side, Espartero and his *Ayacuchos*; on the other, O'Donnell, Serrano, Concha, with Narvaez⁵⁴ then in the proscenium, now in the background. In 1843, Louis Philippe sent two millions of gold by land and Narvaez and his friends by sea, the compact of the Spanish marriages being settled between himself and Madame Muñoz. The complicity of Bonaparte in the Spanish coup d'état—who has, perhaps, settled the marriage of his cousin Prince Napoleon with a Mdlle. Muñoz, or who at all events, must continue his mission of mimicking his uncle—that complicity is not only indicated by the denunciations hurled by the *Moniteur* for the last two months at the communist conspiracies in Castile and Navarre, by the behavior before, during and after the coup d'état of M. de Turgot, the French Ambassador at Madrid, the same man who was the Foreign Minister of Bonaparte during his own coup d'état; by the Duke of Alba, Bonaparte's brother-in-law, turning up as the President of the new *ayuntamiento* at Madrid, immediately after the victory of O'Donnell; by Ros de Olano, an old member of the French party, being the first man offered a place in O'Donnell's Ministry; and by Narvaez being dispatched to Bayonne by Bonaparte as soon as the first news of the affair reached Paris. That complicity was suggested beforehand by the forwarding of large quantities of ammunition from Bordeaux to Bayonne a fortnight in advance of the actual crisis at Madrid. Above all, it is suggested by the plan of operations followed by O'Donnell in his razzia against the people of that city. At the very outset he announced that he would not shrink from blowing up Madrid, and during the fighting he acted up to his word. Now, although a daring fellow, O'Donnell has never ventured upon a bold step without securing a safe retreat. Like his notorious uncle, the hero of treason, he never burnt the bridge when he passed the Rubicon. The organ of combativeness is singularly checked in the O'Donnells by the organs of cautiousness and secretiveness. It is plain that any general who should hold forth the threat of laying the capital in ashes, and fail in his attempt, would forfeit his head. How then did O'Donnell venture upon such delicate ground? The

secret is betrayed by the *Journal des Débats*, the special organ of Queen Christina.

O'Donnell expected a great battle, and at the most a victory hotly disputed. Into his provisions there entered the possibility of defeat. If such a misfortune had happened, the Marshal would have abandoned Madrid with the rest of his army, escorting the Queen, and turning toward the northern provinces, with a view to approach the French frontier.

Does not all this look as if he had laid his plan with Bonaparte? Exactly the same plan had been settled between Louis Philippe and Narvaez in 1843, which, again, was copied from the secret convention between Louis XVIII and Ferdinand VII, in 1823.

This plausible parallel between the Spanish conspiracies of 1843 and 1856 once admitted, there are still sufficiently distinct features in the two movements to indicate the immense strides made by the Spanish people within so brief an epoch. These features are: the political character of the last struggle at Madrid; its military importance; and finally, the respective position of Espartero and O'Donnell in 1856 compared with those of Espartero and Narvaez in 1843. In 1843 all parties had become tired of Espartero. To get rid of him a powerful coalition was formed between the *Moderados* and *Progresistas*. Revolutionary juntas springing up like mushrooms in all the towns, paved the way for Narvaez and his retainers. In 1856 we have not only the court and army on the one side against the people on the other, but within the ranks of the people we have the same divisions as in the rest of Western Europe. On the 13th of July the Ministry of Espartero offered its forced resignation; in the night of the 13th and 14th the Cabinet of O'Donnell was constituted; on the morning of the 14th the rumor spread that O'Donnell, charged with the formation of a cabinet, had invited Rios y Rosas, the ill-omened Minister of the bloody days of July, 1854, to join him. At 11 a.m. the *Gaceta* confirmed the rumor. Then the Cortes assembled, 93 deputies being present. According to the rules of that body,

20 members suffice to call a meeting, and 50 to form a quorum. Besides, the Cortes had not been formally prorogued. Gen. Infante, the President, could not but comply with the universal wish to hold a regular sitting. A proposition was submitted to the effect that the new Cabinet did not enjoy the confidence of the Cortes, and that her Majesty⁵⁵ should be informed of this resolution. At the same time, the Cortes summoned the National Guard to be ready for action. Their Committee, bearing the resolution of want of confidence, went to the Queen, escorted by a detachment of National Militia. While endeavoring to enter the palace they were driven back by the troops of the line, who fired upon them and their escort. This incident gave the signal for the insurrection. The order to commence the building of barricades was given at 7 in the evening by the Cortes, whose meeting was dispersed immediately afterward by the troops of O'Donnell. The battle commenced the same night, only one battalion of the National Militia joining the Royal troops. It should be noted that as early as the morning of the 13th, Señor Escosura, the Esparterist Minister of the Interior, had telegraphed to Barcelona and Saragossa that a coup d'état was at hand, and that they must prepare to resist it. At the head of the Madrid insurgents were Señor Madoz and Gen. Valdez, the brother of Escosura. In short, there can be no doubt that the resistance to the coup d'état originated with the Esparterists, the citizens and Liberals in general. While they, with the militia, engaged the line across Madrid from east to west, the workmen under Pucheta occupied the south and part of the north side of the town.

On the morning of the 15th, O'Donnell took the initiative. Even by the partial testimony of the *Débats*, O'Donnell obtained no marked advantage during the first half of the day. Suddenly, at about 1 o'clock, without any perceptible reason, the ranks of the National Militia were broken; at 2 o'clock they were still more thinned, and at 6 o'clock they had completely disappeared from the scene of action, leaving the whole brunt of the battle to be borne by the workmen, who fought it out till 4 in the afternoon of the 16th. Thus there were, in these three days of carnage, two distinct battles—the one of the

Liberal Militia of the middle class, supported by the workmen against the army, and the other of the army against the workmen deserted by the militia. As Heine has it: "It is an old story, but is always new."

Espartero deserts the Cortes; the Cortes desert the leaders of the National Guard; the leaders desert their men, and the men desert the people. On the 15th, however, the Cortes assembled again, when Espartero appeared for a moment. He was reminded by Señor Assensio and other members of his reiterated protestations to draw his grand sword of Luchana on the first day when the liberty of the country should be endangered. Espartero called Heaven to witness his unswerving patriotism, and when he left, it was fully expected that he would soon be seen at the head of the insurrection. Instead of this, he went to the house of Gen. Gurrea, where he buried himself in a bomb-proof cellar, à la Palafox, and was heard of no more. The commandants of the militia, who, on the evening before, had employed every means to excite the militiamen to take up arms, now proved as eager to retire to their private houses. At 2½ p.m. Gen. Valdez, who for some hours had usurped the command of the militia, convoked the soldiers under his direct command on the Plaza Mayor, and told them that the man who naturally ought to be at their head would not come forward, and that consequently everybody was at liberty to withdraw. Hereupon the National Guards rushed to their homes and hastened to get rid of their uniforms and hide their arms. Such is the substance of the account furnished by one well-informed authority. Another gives as the reason for this sudden act of submission to the conspiracy, that it was considered that the triumph of the National Guard was likely to entail the ruin of the throne and the absolute preponderance of the Republican Democracy. The *Presse* of Paris also gives us to understand that Marshal Espartero, seeing the turn given to things in the Congress by the Democrats, did not wish to sacrifice the throne, or launch into the hazards of anarchy and civil war, and in consequence did all he could to produce submission to O'Donnell.

It is true that the details as to the time, circumstances, and

break-down of the resistance to the coup d'état, are given differently by different writers; but all agree on the one principal point, that Espartero deserted the Cortes, the Cortes the leaders, the leaders the middle class, and that class the people. This furnishes a new illustration of the character of most of the European struggles of 1848-49, and of those hereafter to take place in the Western portion of that continent. On the one hand there are modern industry and trade, the natural chiefs of which, the middle classes, are averse to the military despotism; on the other hand, when they begin the battle against this same despotism, in step the workmen themselves, the product of the modern organization of labor, to claim their due share of the result of victory. Frightened by the consequences of an alliance thus imposed on their unwilling shoulders, the middle classes shrink back again under the protecting batteries of the hated despotism. This is the secret of the standing armies of Europe, which otherwise will be incomprehensible to the future historian. The middle classes of Europe are thus made to understand that they must either surrender to a political power which they detest, and renounce the advantages of modern industry and trade, and the social relations based upon them, or forego the privileges which the modern organization of the productive powers of society, in its primary phase, has vested in an exclusive class. That this lesson should be taught even from Spain is something equally striking and unexpected.

[*Revolution in Spain*] [II]

Published August 18, 1856

Saragossa surrendered on August 1, at 1:30 p.m., and thus vanished the last center of resistance to the Spanish counter-revolution. There was, in a military point of view, little chance of success after the defeats at Madrid and Barcelona, the feebleness of the insurrectionary diversion in Andalusia, and the converging advance of overwhelming forces from the Basque provinces, Navarre, Catalonia, Valencia and Castile. Whatever

chance there might be was paralyzed by the circumstance that it was Espartero's old aide-de-camp, General Falcon, who directed the forces of resistance; that "Espartero and Liberty" was given as the battlecry; and that the population of Saragossa had become aware of Espartero's incommensurably ridiculous fiasco at Madrid. Besides, there were direct orders from Espartero's headquarters to his bottle-holders at Saragossa, that they were to put an end to all resistance, as will be seen from the following extract from the *Journal de Madrid* of July 29: "One of the Esparterist ex-Ministers took part in the negotiations going on between General Dulce and the authorities of Saragossa, and the Esparterist member of the Cortes, Juan Martinez Alonso, accepted the mission of informing the insurgent leaders that the Queen, her Ministers and her generals, were animated by a most conciliatory spirit."

The revolutionary movement was pretty generally spread over the whole of Spain. Madrid and La Mancha in Castile; Granada, Seville, Malaga, Cadiz, Jaen, etc., in Andalusia; Murcia and Cartagena in Murcia; Valencia, Alicante, Alzira, etc., in Valencia; Barcelona, Reus, Figueras, Gerona, in Catalonia; Saragossa, Teruel, Huesca, Jaca, etc., in Aragon; Oviedo in Asturias; and Coruña in Galicia. There were no moves in Estremadura, Leon and old Castile, where the revolutionary party had been put down two months ago, under the joint auspices of Espartero and O'Donnell—the Basque provinces and Navarre also remaining quiet. The sympathies of the latter provinces, however, were with the revolutionary cause, although they might not manifest themselves in sight of the French army of observation. This is the more remarkable if it be considered that twenty years ago these very provinces formed the stronghold of Carlism—then backed by the peasantry of Aragon and Catalonia, but who, this time, were most passionately siding with the revolution; and who would have proved a most formidable element of resistance, had not the imbecility of the leaders at Barcelona and Saragossa prevented their energies from being turned to account. Even *The London Morning Herald*, the orthodox champion of Protestantism, which broke lances for the Quixote of the auto-da-fe, Don Carlos, some

twenty years ago, has stumbled over that fact, which it is fair enough to acknowledge. This is one of the many symptoms of progress revealed by the last revolution in Spain, a progress the slowness of which will astonish only those not acquainted with the peculiar customs and manners of a country, where "a la mañana" is the watchword of every day's life, and where everybody is ready to tell you that "our forefathers needed eight hundred years to drive out the Moors."

Notwithstanding the general spread of *pronunciamientos*, the revolution in Spain was limited only to Madrid and Barcelona. In the south it was broken by the *cholera morbus*,⁵⁶ in the north by the Espartero murrain. From a military point of view, the insurrections at Madrid and Barcelona offer few interesting and scarcely any novel features. On the one side—the army—everything was prepared beforehand; on the other everything was extemporized; the offensive never for a moment changed sides. On the one hand, a well-equipped army, moving easily in the strings of its commanding generals; on the other, leaders reluctantly pushed forward by the impetus of an imperfectly-armed people. At Madrid the revolutionists from the outset committed the mistake of blocking themselves up in the internal parts of the town, on the line connecting the eastern and western extremities—extremities commanded by O'Donnell and Concha, who communicated with each other and the cavalry of Dulce through the external boulevards. Thus the people were cutting off and exposing themselves to the concentric attack preconcerted by O'Donnell and his accomplices. O'Donnell and Concha had only to effect their junction and the revolutionary forces were dispersed into the north and south quarters of the town, and deprived of all further cohesion. It was a distinct feature of the Madrid insurrection that barricades were used sparingly and only at prominent street corners, while the houses were made the centers of resistance; and—what is unheard of in street warfare—bayonet attacks met the assailing columns of the army. But, if the insurgents profited by the experience of the Paris and Dresden insurrections, the soldiers had learned no less by them. The walls of the houses were broken through one by one, and the insurgents were taken in

the flank and rear, while the exits into the streets were swept by cannon-shot. Another distinguished feature in this battle of Madrid was that Pucheta, after the junction of Concha and O'Donnell, when he was pushed into the southern (Toledo) quarter of the town, transplanted the guerrilla warfare from the mountains of Spain into the streets of Madrid. The insurrection, dispersed, faced about under some arch of a church, in some narrow lane, on the staircase of a house, and there defended itself to the death.

At Barcelona the fighting was still more intense, there being no leadership at all. Militarily, this insurrection, like all previous risings in Barcelona, perished by the fact of the citadel, Fort Montjuick, remaining in the hands of the army. The violence of the struggle is characterized by the burning of 150 soldiers in their barracks at Gracia, a suburb which the insurgents hotly contested, after being already dislodged from Barcelona. It deserves mention that, while at Madrid [...] the proletarians were betrayed and deserted by the bourgeoisie, the weavers of Barcelona declared at the very outset that they would have nothing to do with a movement set on foot by Esparterists, and insisted on the declaration of the Republic. This being refused, they, with the exception of some who could not resist the smell of powder, remained passive spectators of the battle, which was thus lost—all insurrections at Barcelona being decided by its 20,000 weavers.

The Spanish revolution of 1856 is distinguished from all its predecessors by the loss of all dynastic character. It is known that the movement from 1808 to 1814 was national and dynastic. Although the Cortes in 1812 proclaimed an almost republican Constitution, they did it in the name of Ferdinand VII. The movement of 1820-23, timidly republican, was altogether premature and had against it the masses to whose support it appealed, those masses being bound altogether to the Church and the Crown. So deeply rooted was royalty in Spain, that the struggle between old and modern society, to become serious, needed a testament of Ferdinand VII, and the incarnation of the antagonistic principles in two dynastic branches, the Carlist and Cristina ones. Even to combat for a new principle the

Spaniard wanted a time-honored standard. Under these banners the struggle was fought out, from 1833 to 1843. Then there was an end of revolution, and the new dynasty was allowed its trial from 1843 to 1854. In the revolution of July, 1854, there was thus necessarily implied an attack on the new dynasty; but innocent Isabel was covered by the hatred concentrated on her mother, and the people reveled not only in their own emancipation but also in that of Isabel from her mother and the *camarilla*.

In 1856 the cloak had fallen and Isabel herself confronted the people by the coup d'état that fomented the revolution. She proved the worthy, coolly cruel, and cowardly hypocrite daughter of Ferdinand VII, who was so much given to lying that notwithstanding his bigotry he could never convince himself, even with the aid of the Holy Inquisition, that such exalted personages as Jesus Christ and his Apostles had spoken truth. Even Murat's massacre of the *Madrileños* in 1808 dwindles into an insignificant riot by the side of the butcheries of the 14-16th July, smiled upon by the innocent Isabel. Those days sounded the death-knell of royalty in Spain. There are only the imbecile legitimists of Europe imagining that Isabel having fallen, Don Carlos may rise. They are forever thinking that when the last manifestation of a principle dies away, it is only to give its primitive manifestation another turn.

In 1856, the Spanish revolution has lost not only its dynastic, but also its military character. Why the army played such a prominent part in Spanish revolutions, may be told in a very few words. The old institution of the Captain-Generalships, which made the captains the pashas of their respective provinces; the war of independence against France, which not only made the army the principal instrument of national defense, but also the first revolutionary organization and the center of revolutionary action in Spain; the conspiracies of 1814-19, all emanating from the army; the dynastic war of 1833-40, depending on the armies of both sides; the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie forcing them to employ the bayonets of the army against clergy and peasantry in the country; the necessity for Cristina and the *camarilla* to employ bayonets against the

Liberals, as the Liberals had employed bayonets against the peasants; the tradition growing out of all these precedents; these were the causes which impressed on revolution in Spain a military, and on the army a pretorian character. Till 1854, revolution always originated with the army, and its different manifestations up to that time offered no external sign of difference beyond the grade in the army whence they originated. Even in 1854 the first impulse still proceeded from the army, but there is the Manzanares manifesto of O'Donnell to attest how slender the base of the military preponderance in the Spanish revolution had become. Under what conditions was O'Donnell finally allowed to stay his scarcely equivocal promenade from Vicálvaro to the Portuguese frontiers, and to bring back the army to Madrid? Only on the promise to immediately reduce it, to replace it by the National Guard, and not to allow the fruits of the revolution, to be shared by the generals. If the revolution of 1854 confined itself thus to the expression of its distrust, only two years later, it finds itself openly and directly attacked by that army—an army that has now worthily entered the lists by the side of the Croats of Radetzky, the Africans of Bonaparte, and the Pomeranians of Wrangel. How far the glories of its new position are appreciated by the Spanish army, is proved by the rebellion of a regiment at Madrid, on the 29th of July, which, not being satisfied with the mere *cigarros* of Isabel, struck for the five franc pieces, and sausages of Bonaparte, and got them, too.

This time, then, the army has been all against the people, or, indeed, it has only fought against them, and the National Guards. In short, there is an end of the revolutionary mission of the Spanish army. The man in whom centered the military, the dynastic, and the bourgeois liberal character of the Spanish revolution—Espartero—has now sunk even lower than the common law of fate would have enabled his most intimate *connoisseurs* to anticipate. If, as is generally rumored, and is very probable, the Esparterists are about to rally under O'Donnell, they will have confirmed their suicide by an official act of their own. They will not save him.

The next European revolution will find Spain matured for

cooperation with it. The years 1854 and 1856 were phases of transition she had to pass through to arrive at that maturity.

[*On Italian Unity*]

Published January 24, 1859

Like the boy and his wolf alarm, the Italians have so repeatedly affirmed that "Italy is rife with agitation, and on the eve of a revolution," the crowned heads of Europe have so often prated about a "settlement of the Italian Question," that it will not be surprising if the actual appearance of the wolf should be unheeded, and if a real revolution and a general European war should break out and take us unawares! The European aspect of 1859 is decidedly warlike, and, should the hostile bearing, the apparent preparations of France and Piedmont for war with Austria, end in smoke, it is not improbable that the burning hate of the Italians toward their oppressors, combined with their ever-increasing suffering, will find vent in a general revolution. We limit ourselves to a *not improbable*—for, if hope deferred maketh the heart sick, fulfillment of prophecy deferred maketh the mind skeptical. Still, if we are to credit the reports of English, Italian and French journals, the moral condition of Naples is a *facsimile* of her physical structure, and a torrent of revolutionary lava would occasion no more surprise than would a fresh eruption of old Vesuvius. Writers from the Papal States dwell in detail on the increasing abuses of clerical government, and the deep-rooted belief of the Roman population that reform or amelioration is impossible—that a total overthrow of said government is the sole remedy—that this remedy would have been administered long since, but for the presence of Swiss, French and Austrian troops—and that, in spite of these material obstacles, such an attempt may be made at any day or at any hour.

From Venice and Lombardy, the tidings are more definite—and remind us forcibly of the symptoms that marked the close of 1847 and the commencement of 1848 in these provinces. Abstinence from the use of Austrian tobacco and manufactures

is universal, also proclamations to the populace to refrain from places of public amusement—studied proofs of hate offered to the Archduke⁵⁷ and to all Austrian officials—are carried to such a point that Prince Alfonso Parcia, an Italian nobleman devoted to the House of Hapsburg, dared not, in the public streets, remove his hat as the Archduchess passed, the punishment for which misdemeanor, administered in the form of an order from the Archduke for the Prince's immediate departure from Milan, acts as an incentive to his class to join the popular cry of *fuori i Tedeschi*.⁵⁸ If we add to these mute demonstrations of popular feeling the daily quarrels between the people and the soldiery, invariably provoked by the former, the revolt of the students of Pavia, and the consequent closing of the Universities, we have before our eyes a reenactment of the prologue to the five days of Milan in 1848.

But while we believe that Italy cannot remain forever in her present condition, since the longest lane must have a turning—while we know that active organization is going on throughout the peninsula, we are not prepared to say whether these manifestations are entirely the spontaneous ebullitions of the popular will, or whether they are stimulated by the agents of Louis Napoleon and of his ally, Count Cavour.⁵⁹ Judging from appearances, Piedmont, backed by France, and perhaps by Russia, meditates an attack on Austria in the Spring. From the Emperor's reception of the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, it would seem that he harbors no friendly designs toward the Government represented by M. Hübner;⁶⁰ from the concentration of so powerful a force at Algiers, it is not unnatural to suppose that hostilities to Austria would commence with an attack on her Italian provinces; the warlike preparations of Piedmont, the all but declarations of war to Austria that emanate daily from the official and semi-official portion of the Piedmontese press, give color to the surmise that the King will avail himself of the first pretext to cross the Ticino.⁶¹ Moreover, the report that Garibaldi,⁶² the hero of Montevideo and of Rome, has been summoned to Turin, is confirmed from private and reliable sources. Cavour has had an interview with Garibaldi, informed him of the prospects of a speedy war, and

has suggested to him the wisdom of collecting and organizing volunteers. Austria, one of the chief parties concerned, gives evident proof that she lends credence to the rumors. In addition to her 120,000 men, concentrated in her Italian provinces, she is augmenting her forces by every conceivable means; and has just pushed forward a reinforcement of 30,000. The defenses of Venice, Trieste, &c., are being increased and strengthened; and in all her other provinces land-owners and trainers are called on to bring forward their studs, as saddle-horses are required for the cavalry and pioneers. And while, on the one hand, she omits no preparations for resistance in a "prudent Austrian way," she is also providing for a possible defeat. From Prussia, the Piedmont of Germany, whose interests are diametrically opposed to her own, she can, at best, hope but for neutrality. The mission of her Ambassador, Baron Seebach, to St Petersburg, seems to have failed utterly to win a prospect of success in the case of attack. The schemes of the Czar,⁶³ in more ways than one, and not the least on the question of the Mediterranean, where he, too, has cast anchor, coincide too nearly with those of his ex-opponent, now fast ally, in Paris, to permit him to defend "the grateful" Austria. The well-known sympathy of the English *people* with the Italians in their hatred of the *giogo tedesco*⁶⁴ renders it very doubtful whether any British Ministry would dare to support Austria, anxious as one and all would be to do so. Moreover, Austria, in common with many others, has shrewd suspicions that the would-be "avenger of Waterloo"⁶⁵ has by no means lost sight of his anxiety for the humiliation of "perfidious Albion"—that, not choosing to beard the lion in his den, he will not shrink from hurling defiance at him in the East, attacking, in conjunction with Russia, the Turkish Empire (despite his oaths to maintain that empire inviolate), thus bringing half the British forces into action on the Eastern battle-field, while from Cherbourg he keeps the other half in forced inaction, guarding the British coasts. Therefore, in the case of actual war, Austria has the uncomfortable feeling that she must rely on herself alone; and one of her many expedients for suffering the least possible loss, in case of defeat, is worthy of notice for its impudent sagacity.

The barracks, palaces, arsenals and other official buildings throughout Venetian Lombardy, the erection and maintenance of which have taxed the Italians exorbitantly, are, nevertheless, considered the property of the Empire. At this moment the Government is compelling the different municipalities to purchase all these buildings at a fabulous price, alleging as its motive that it intends to *rent* instead of owning them for the future. Whether the municipalities will ever see a farthing of the *rent*, even if Austria retains her sway, is doubtful at best; but, should she be driven from all, or from any part of her Italian territory, she will congratulate herself on her cunning scheme for converting a large portion of her forfeited treasure into portable cash. It is asserted, moreover, that she is using her utmost efforts to inspire the Pope, the King of Naples, the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, with her own resolution to resist to the uttermost all attempts on the part of the people or the crowned heads to change the existing order of things in Italy. But none knows better than Austria herself how bad would be the best efforts of these poor tools to make head against the tide of popular insurrection or foreign interference. And, while war on Austria is the fervent aspiration of every true Italian heart, we cannot doubt that a large majority of Italians look upon the prospects of a war, begun by France and Piedmont, as doubtful, to say the least, in its results. While none conscientiously believe that the murderer of Rome⁶⁶ can by any human process be transformed into the Savior of Lombardy, a small faction favor Louis Napoleon's designs of placing Murat on the throne of Naples, profess to believe in his intention to remove the Pope from Italy or to confine him to the City and Campagna of Rome, and of assisting Piedmont to add the whole of Northern Italy to her dominions. Then there is a party, small but honest, who imagine that the idea of an Italian crown dazzles Victor Emmanuel, as it was supposed to dazzle his father; who believe that he anxiously awaits the first opportunity to unsheathe his sword for its attainment, and that it is with this sole end in view that the King will avail himself of help from France, or any other help, to achieve this coveted treasure. A much larger class, numbering adherents throughout

the oppressed provinces of Italy, especially in Lombardy and among the Lombard emigration, having no particular faith in the Piedmontese King or Piedmontese monarchy, yet say: "Be their aims what they may, Piedmont has an army of 100,000 men, a navy, arsenals, and treasure; let her throw down the gauntlet to Austria; we will follow her to the battle-field: if she is faithful, she shall have her reward; if she falls short of her mission, the nation will be strong enough to continue the battle once begun and follow it up to victory."

The Italian National party,⁶⁷ on the contrary, denounce as a national calamity the inauguration of an Italian War of Independence under the auspices of France and Piedmont. The point at issue with them is not, as is often erroneously supposed, whether Italy, once free from the foreigners, shall be united under a republican or monarchical form of government, but that the means proposed must fail to win Italy for the Italians, and can at best only exchange one foreign yoke for another equally oppressive. They believe that the man of the 2d of December will never make war at all, unless compelled by the growing impatience of his army, or by the threatening aspect of the French people; that, thus compelled, his choice of Italy as the theater of war would have for its object the fulfillment of his uncle's scheme—the making of the Mediterranean a "French lake"—which end would be accomplished by seating Murat on the throne of Naples; that, in dictating terms to Austria, he seeks the completion of his revenge, commenced in the Crimea, for the treaties of 1815, when Austria was one of the parties who dictated to France terms humiliating in the extreme for the Bonaparte family. They look upon Piedmont as the mere cat's-paw of France—convinced that, his own ends achieved, not daring to assist Italy to attain that liberty which he denies to France, Napoleon III will conclude a peace with Austria and stifle all efforts of the Italians to carry on the war. If Austria shall have at all maintained her ground, Piedmont must content herself with the addition of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to her present territory; but, should Austria be worsted in the fight, that peace will be concluded on the Adige, which will leave the whole of Venice and part of Lombardy in

the hands of the hated Austrians. This *peace upon the Adige*, they affirm, is already tacitly agreed on between Piedmont and France. Confident as this party feels of the triumph of the nation in the event of a national war against Austria, they maintain that, should that war be commenced with Napoleon for Inspirer, and the King of Sardinia for Dictator, the Italians will have put it out of their own power to move a step in opposition to their accepted heads, to impede in any manner the wiles of diplomacy, the capitulations, treaties and the riveting of their chains which must result therefrom; and they point to the conduct of Piedmont toward Venice and Milan in 1848, and at Novara in 1849, and urge their countrymen to profit by that bitter experience of their fatal trust in princes. All their efforts are directed to complete the organization of the peninsula, to induce the people to unite in one supreme effort, and not to commence the struggle until they feel themselves capable of initiating the great national insurrection which, while deposing the Pope, Bomba & Co., would render the armies, navies and war material of the respective provinces available for the extermination of the foreign foe. Regarding the Piedmontese army and people as ardent champions of Italian liberty, they feel that the King of Piedmont will thus have ample scope for aiding the freedom and independence of Italy, if he chooses; should he prove reactionary, they know that the army and people will side with the nation. Should he justify the faith reposed in him by his partisans, the Italians will not be backward in testifying their gratitude in a tangible form. In any case, the nation will be in a situation to decide on its own destinies, and feeling, as they do, that a successful revolution in Italy will be the signal for a general struggle on the part of all the oppressed nationalities to rid themselves of their oppressors, they have no fear of interference on the part of France, since Napoleon III will have too much home business on his hands to meddle with the affairs of other nations, even for the furtherance of his own ambitious aims. *A chi tocca-tocca?*²⁶⁸ as the Italians say. We will not venture to predict whether the revolutionists or the regular armies will appear first on the field. What seems pretty certain is, that a war begun in any part of Europe will not end where it

commences; and if, indeed, that war is inevitable, our sincere and heartfelt desire is, that it may bring about a true and just settlement of the Italian question and of various other questions, which, until settled, will continue from time to time to disturb the peace of Europe, and consequently impede the progress and prosperity of the whole civilized world.

A Historic Parallel
Published March 31, 1859

When Louis Napoleon, emulating the less lucky Marino Faliero of Venice,⁶⁹ vaulted to a throne by perjury and treason, by midnight conspiracy and the seizure of the incorruptible members of the Assembly in their beds, backed by an overwhelming display of military force in the streets of Paris, the sovereign princes and aristocracies of Europe, the great land-owners, manufacturers, *rentiers* and stockjobbers, almost to a man, exulted in his success as their own. "The crimes are his," was their general chuckle, "but their fruits are ours. Louis Napoleon reigns in the Tuileries; while we reign even more securely and despotically on our domains, in our factories, on the Bourse, and in our counting-houses. Down with all Socialism! *Vive l'Empereur!*"

And next to the Military, the fortunate usurper plied all his arts to attach the rich and powerful, the thrifty and speculating, to his standard. "The Empire is peace," he exclaimed, and the millionaires almost deified him. "Our very dear son in Jesus Christ," the Pope affectionately termed him; and the Roman Catholic priesthood saluted him (*pro tem.*) with every expression of confidence and devotion. Stocks rose; Banks of Cr dit Mobilier sprang up and flourished; millions were made at a dash of the pen in new railroads, a new slave-trade, and new speculations of every sort. The British Aristocracy, turning their back on the past, doffed their caps and pulled their forelocks to the new Bonaparte; he paid a family visit to Queen Victoria and was feasted by the City of London; the Exchange touched

glasses with the Bourse; there was general congratulation and hand-shaking among the apostles of stockjobbing, and a conviction that the golden calf had finally been fully deified, and that his Aaron was the new French autocrat.

Seven years have rolled away, and all is changed. Napoleon III has spoken the word that may never be unsaid nor forgotten. No matter whether he rushes on his destiny as recklessly as his forerunner did in Spain and Russia, or is forced by the indignant, universal murmur of the royalties and bourgeois of Europe into a position of temporary submission to their will, the spell is forever broken. They knew him long since as a villain; but they deemed him a serviceable, pliant, obedient, grateful villain; and they now see and rue their mistake. He has been using *them* all the time that they supposed they were using him. He loves them exactly as he loves his dinner or his wine. They have served him so far in a certain way; they must now serve him in another way or brave his vengeance. If "the Empire is peace" henceforth, it is peace on the Mincio or the Danube—peace with his eagles flaunting in triumph on the Po and the Adige, if not on the Rhine and Elbe as well—it is Peace with the Iron Crown on his brow; Italy a French satrapy, and with Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, merely satellites revolving around and lighted by the central orb France, the Empire of Charlemagne.

Of course, there is gnashing of teeth in royal palaces, but not less in the halls of bankers and merchant princes. For the year, 1859, was opening under auspices that promised a restoration of the golden days of '36 and '56. The long protracted stagnation of manufacturing had exhausted stocks of metals, wares and fabrics. The manifold bankruptcies had measurably purified the atmosphere of Commerce. Ships began again to have a market value; warehouses were about once more to be built and filled. Stocks were buoyant and millionaires decidedly jolly; in short, there was never a brighter commercial prospect, a more serene, auspicious sky.

A word changes all this; and that word is uttered by the hero of the *Coup d'État*—the Elect of December—the Savior of Society. It is spoken wantonly, coolly, with evident premeditation, to M. Hübner, the Austrian Envoy, and clearly indicates

a settled purpose to pick a quarrel with Francis Joseph or bully him into a humiliation more fatal than three lost battles. Though evidently calculated for instant effect on the Bourse, in aid of gambling stock sales to deliver, it betrayed a fixed purpose to recast the map of Europe. Austria must recede from all those nominally independent Italian States which she now practically occupies by virtue of treaties with their willing rulers, or France and Sardinia will occupy Milan and menace Mantua with such an army as Gen. Bonaparte never commanded in Italy. The Pope must reform the abuses of clerical rule in his States—abuses so long upheld by French arms—or follow the petty despots of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, &c., in their headlong race to find safety at Vienna. The Rothschilds groan over their Eleven Millions of Dollars lost by the depreciation of stocks consequent on the menace to Hübner, and utterly refuse to be comforted. The manufacturers and traders mournfully realize that their anticipated harvest of 1859 is likely to give place to a "harvest of death." Everywhere apprehension, discontent and indignation convulse the breasts on which the throne of the Man of December reposed so securely a few months ago.

And the cast-down, broken idol can never be set on its pedestal again. He may recoil before the storm he has raised, and again receive the benedictions of the Pope and the caresses of the British Queen; but neither will be more than lip-service. They know him now, what the peoples knew him long since—a reckless gambler, a desperate adventurer, who would as soon dice with royal bones as any other if the game promised to leave him a winner. They know him one who, having, like Macbeth, waded to a crown through human gore, finds it easier to go forward than to return to peace and innocence. From the hour of his demonstration against Austria, Louis Napoleon stood and stands alone among potentates. The young Emperor of Russia⁷⁰ may, for his own purposes, seem to be still his friend; but that seeming is an empty one. Napoleon I in 1813 was the prototype of Napoleon III in 1859. And the latter will probably rush on his fate as substantially as the former did.

What Has Italy Gained?

Published July 27, 1859

The Italian war is finished. Napoleon has ended it as suddenly and unexpectedly as the Austrians began it. Though brief, it has been costly. It has concentrated into a few weeks not only the exploits, the invasions and counterinvasions, the marches, the battles, the conquests and the losses, but also the expenditures, both in life and money, of many much longer wars. Some of the results of it are palpable enough. Austria has lost territory; her reputation for military prowess has been seriously damaged; her pride has been deeply wounded. But the lessons she has learned, if any, are, we apprehend, rather military than political, and any changes she may be led to make in consequence of this war, will be changes in drill, discipline and arms, rather than in her political system or her methods of administration. She may have been made a convert to the efficacy of rifled cannon. She may perhaps introduce into her service some imitation of the French Zouaves.⁷¹ This is much more likely than that she will essentially modify the government of what remains to her of her Italian provinces.


Austria has lost, too, at least for the present, that guardianship over Italy her persistence in which, in spite of the remonstrances and complaints of Sardinia, was made the occasion of the late war. But, though Austria has been obliged for the present to relinquish this office, the office itself does not appear to be vacant. It is a very significant fact that the new settlement of the affairs of Italy was decided at a short interview between the Emperors of France and Austria, both strangers, each at the head of an army of strangers, and that this settlement was made not only without the formality of even seeming to consult the parties who were the subjects of it, but without the knowledge on their part that they were thus being bargained away and disposed of. Two armies from beyond the Alps meet and fight in the plains of Lombardy. After a six weeks' struggle, the foreign sovereigns of these foreign armies undertake to settle and arrange the affairs of Italy without taking a single Italian

into their councils. The King of Sardinia, who in a military point of view had been placed on the level of a French general, seems to have had no more share or voice in the final arrangement than if he had been, in fact, merely a French general.

It was the ground of the complaints so loudly urged by Sardinia against Austria, not merely that she claimed a general superintendence of Italian affairs, but that she was the advocate of all existing abuses; that it was her policy to keep things as they were, interfering with the internal administration of her Italian neighbors, and claiming the right to suppress by force of arms any attempt on the part of the inhabitants of those countries to modify or improve their political condition. And what more respect is paid to Italian sentiment and wishes, or to that right of revolution of which Sardinia was the patron, under the new arrangement than under the old one? The Italian duchies south of the Po, though their proffered aid in the war was accepted, are, it would seem, under the treaty of peace to be handed back to their expelled princes. In no part of Italy has misgovernment been more complained of than in the States of the Church.⁷² The maladministration of those States and the countenance and support given by Austria to that maladministration, have been prominently set forth as one of the worst features, if not the very worst feature, in the late condition of Italian affairs. But, though Austria has been obliged to relinquish her armed protectorate of the States of the Church, the unfortunate inhabitants of those Territories have gained nothing by the change. France supports the temporal authority of the Holy See to full as great an extent as Austria ever did; and since the abuses of the Roman Government are regarded by the Italian patriots as inseparable from its sacerdotal character, there seems to be no hope of improvement. France, in the position which she now holds of sole protector of the Pope, makes herself in fact more responsible for the abuses of the Roman Government than Austria ever was.

With respect to the Italian Confederation which forms a part of the new arrangement, there is this to be observed: Either that Confederation will be a political reality possessing a certain degree of power and influence, or else a mere sham. If it be the

latter, Italian union, liberty, and development can gain nothing by it. If it be a reality, considering the elements of which it is composed, what can be expected from it? Austria (sitting in it for the Province or Kingdom of Venice), the Pope and the King of Naples combined in the interests of despotism, will easily carry the day against Sardinia, even if the other smaller States should side with her. Austria may even avail herself of this new standing ground to secure a control over the other Italian States quite as objectionable, to say the least, as that which she lately claimed to exercise under special treaties with them.



BRITISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY

More of Marx's *Tribune* dispatches dealt with Britain than with any other country, including his native Germany. In part, this was because he lived in London continuously from 1850 until his death; in addition, Britain was the European nation with which American readers could be presumed to be most familiar. But it's also the case that from Marx's point of view, Britain—particularly industrial England—in the 1850s represented human society in perhaps its most advanced form. That is to say, the Industrial Revolution had gone furthest there and had created a more robust proletarian class than in any other country. And on many other scores Britain was decades ahead of many other nations: slavery had been formally outlawed and the voting reforms of 1831 had opened up the political process to a historically large number of people: indeed Marx's very ability to live in the country was testament to Britain's political tolerance and free press.

Not that Marx entirely approved of his adopted homeland. One of the dominant themes of his coverage of British politics—particularly the pieces from the early 1850s included in this section—was that a good deal of Britain's much-praised democracy was a sham. For Marx, a Parliament elected almost exclusively by bourgeois and aristocratic voters was bound to produce results that reflected the interests of those classes. The nominal differences between the political parties or between the rapidly rotating sets of Ministers were, as far as Marx was concerned, dramatically less important than the class interests they represented. His task as a journalist was to strip the rhetoric away and deal with the economic agendas underneath.

Hence the huge number of columns that dealt with the free-trade politics and ideology that swept Britain after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. To Marx's eyes, the economic doctrines of the time were not simply misguided, they were deadly; his dispatches regarding needless starvation and the violent removal of the Irish and Scottish from estates are much closer to heart-tugging reportage than to classic economics. He believed that the British working class had potential (even if it had been largely untapped in the course of the Continent's 1848 uprisings); thus he documented the activities of trade unions, such as in the Stockport strike, and also supported the radical Chartist movement, often reprinting relevant *Tribune* pieces in their organ *The People's Paper*. And Marx believed, when free-trade economics brought on their inevitable crises, governments would inevitably turn to foreign adventures and wars in order to distract the masses, which he covered sometimes with anguish and sometimes—as when the Crimean War destroyed the government of Lord Aberdeen—with undisguised glee.

The Elections in England.—Tories and Whigs

Published August 21, 1852

The results of the General Election for the British Parliament are now known [. . .]

What were the parties which during this electioneering agitation opposed or supported each other?

Tories, Whigs, Liberal Conservatives (Peelites), Free Traders, *par excellence* (the men of the Manchester School,⁷³ Parliamentary and Financial Reformers), and lastly, the Chartists.

Whigs, Free Traders and Peelites coalesced to oppose the Tories. It was between this coalition on one side, and the Tories on the other, that the real electoral battle was fought. Opposed to Whigs, Peelites, Free Traders and Tories, and thus opposed to entire official England, were the Chartists.

The political parties of Great Britain are sufficiently known

in the United States. It will be sufficient to bring to mind, in a few strokes of the pen, the distinctive characteristics of each of them.

Up to 1846 the Tories passed as the guardians of the traditions of Old England. They were suspected of admiring in the British Constitution the eighth wonder of the world; to be *laudatores temporis acti*,⁷⁴ enthusiasts for the throne, the High Church, the privileges and liberties of the British subject. The fatal year, 1846, with its repeal of the Corn Laws,⁷⁵ and the shout of distress which this repeal forced from the Tories, proved that they were enthusiasts for nothing but the rent of land, and at the same time disclosed the secret of their attachment to the political and religious institutions of Old England. These institutions are the very best institutions, with the help of which the *large landed property*—the landed interest—has hitherto ruled England, and even now seeks to maintain its rule. The year 1846 brought to light in its nakedness the *substantial class interest* which forms the *real base* of the Tory party. The year 1846 tore down the traditionally venerable lion's hide, under which Tory class interest had hitherto hidden itself. The year 1846 transformed the Tories into *Protectionists*. Tory was the sacred name, Protectionist is the profane one; Tory was the political battle-cry, Protectionist is the economical shout of distress; Tory seemed an idea, a principle; Protectionist is an interest. Protectionists of what? Of their own revenues, of the rent of their own land. Then the Tories, in the end, are Bourgeois as much as the remainder, for where is the Bourgeois who is not a protectionist of his own purse? They are distinguished from the other Bourgeois, in the same way as the rent of land is distinguished from commercial and industrial profit. Rent of land is conservative, profit is progressive; rent of land is national, profit is cosmopolitical; rent of land believes in the State Church, profit is a dissenter by birth. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 merely recognized an already accomplished fact, a change long since enacted in the elements of British civil society, viz., the subordination of the landed interest under the moneyed interest, of property under commerce, of agriculture under manufacturing industry, of the country under the city.

Could this fact be doubted since the country population stands, in England, to the towns' population in the proportion of one to three? The substantial foundation of the power of the Tories was the rent of land. The rent of land is regulated by the price of food. The price of food, then, was artificially maintained at a high rate by the Corn Laws. The repeal of the Corn Laws brought down the price of food, which in its turn brought down the rent of land, and with sinking rent broke down the real strength upon which the political power of the Tories reposed.

What, then, are they trying to do now? To maintain a political power, the social foundation of which has ceased to exist. And how can this be attained? By nothing short of a *Counter-Revolution*, that is to say, by a reaction of the State against Society. They strive to retain forcibly institutions and a political power which are condemned from the very moment at which the rural population found itself outnumbered three times by the population of the towns. And such an attempt must necessarily end with their destruction; it must accelerate and make more acute the social development of England; it must bring on a crisis.

The Tories recruit their army from the farmers, who either have not yet lost the habit of following their landlords as their natural superiors, or who are economically dependent upon them, or who do not yet see that the interest of the farmer and the interest of the landlord are no more identical than the respective interests of the borrower and of the usurer. They are followed and supported by the Colonial Interest, the Shipping Interest, the State Church Party, in short, by all those elements which consider it necessary to safeguard their interests against the necessary results of modern manufacturing industry, and against the social revolution prepared by it.

Opposed to the Tories, as their hereditary enemies, stand the *Whigs*, a party with whom the American Whigs have nothing in common but the name.

The British Whig, in the natural history of politics, forms a species which, like all those of the amphibious class, exists very easily, but is difficult to describe. Shall we call them, with their opponents, Tories out of office? or, as continental writers love

it, take them for the representatives of certain *popular* principles? In the latter case we should get embarrassed in the same difficulty as the historian of the Whigs, Mr. Cooke,⁷⁶ who, with great *naïveté*, confesses in his "History of Parties" that it is indeed a certain number of "liberal, moral and enlightened principles" which constitutes the Whig party, but that it was greatly to be regretted that during the more than a century and a half that the Whigs have existed, they have been, when in office, always prevented from carrying out these principles. So that in reality, according to the confession of their own historian, the Whigs represent something quite different from their professed "liberal and enlightened principles." Thus they are in the same position as the drunkard brought up before the Lord Mayor, who declared that he represented the Temperance principle but from some accident or other always got drunk on Sundays.

But never mind their principles; we can better make out what they are in historical fact; what they carry out, not what they once believed, and what they now want other people to believe with respect to their character.

The Whigs, as well as the Tories, form a fraction of the large landed property of Great Britain. Nay, the oldest, richest and most arrogant portion of English landed property is the very nucleus of the Whig party.

What, then, distinguishes them from the Tories? The Whigs are the *aristocratic representatives* of the Bourgeoisie, of the industrial and commercial middle class. Under the condition that the Bourgeoisie should abandon to them, to an oligarchy of aristocratic families the monopoly of government and the exclusive possession of office, they make to the middle class, and assist it in conquering, all those concessions, which in the course of social and political development have shown themselves to have become *unavoidable* and *undelayable*. Neither more nor less. And as often as such an unavoidable measure has been passed, they declare loudly that herewith the end of historical progress has been obtained; that the whole social movement has carried its ultimate purpose, and then they "cling to finality." They can support, more easily than the Tories, a

decrease of their rental revenues, because they consider themselves as the heaven-born farmers of the revenues of the British Empire. They can renounce the monopoly of the Corn Laws, as long as they maintain the monopoly of government as their family property. Ever since the "glorious revolution"⁷⁷ of 1688 the Whigs, with short intervals, caused principally by the first French Revolution and the consequent reaction, have found themselves in the enjoyment of the public offices. Whoever recalls to his mind this period of British history, will find no other distinctive mark of Whigdom but the maintenance of their family oligarchy. The interests and principles which they represent besides, from time to time, do not belong to the Whigs; they are forced upon them by the development of the industrial and commercial class, the Bourgeoisie. After 1688 we find them united with the Bankocracy, just then rising into importance, as we find them in 1846, united with the Millocracy. The Whigs as little carried the Reform Bill of 1831,⁷⁸ as they carried the Free Trade Bill of 1846. Both Reform movements, the political as well as the commercial, were movements of the Bourgeoisie. As soon as either of these movements had ripened into irresistibility; as soon as, at the same time, it had become the safest means of turning the Tories out of office, the Whigs stepped forward, took up the direction of the Government, and secured to themselves the governmental part of the victory. In 1831 they extended the political portion of reform as far as was necessary in order not to leave the middle class entirely dissatisfied; after 1846 they confined their Free Trade measures so far as was necessary, in order to save to the landed aristocracy the greatest possible amount of privileges. Each time they had taken the movement in hand in order to prevent its forward march, and to recover their own posts at the same time.

It is clear that from the moment when the landed aristocracy is no longer able to maintain its position as an independent power, to fight, as an independent party, for the government position, in short, that from the moment when the Tories are definitively overthrown, British history has no longer any room for the Whigs. The aristocracy once destroyed, what is the use

of an aristocratic representation of the Bourgeoisie against this aristocracy?

It is well known that in the Middle Ages the German Emperors put the just then arising towns under Imperial Governors, "*advocati*," to protect these towns against the surrounding nobility. As soon as growing population and wealth gave them sufficient strength and independence to resist, and even to attack the nobility, the towns also drove out the noble Governors, the *advocati*.

The Whigs have been these *advocati* of the British middle class, and their governmental monopoly must break down as soon as the landed monopoly of the Tories is broken down. In the same measure as the middle class has developed its independent strength, they have shrunk down from a party to a coterie.

It is evident what a distastefully heterogeneous mixture the character of the British Whigs must turn out to be: Feudalists, who are at the same time Malthusians, money-mongers with feudal prejudices, aristocrats without point of honour, Bourgeois without industrial activity, finality-men with progressive phrases, progressists with fanatical Conservatism, traffickers in homeopathical fractions of reforms, fosterers of family-nepotism, Grand Masters of corruption, hypocrites of religion, Tartuffes of politics. The mass of the English people has a sound aesthetical common sense. It has an instinctive hatred against everything motley and ambiguous, against bats and Russellites. And then, with the Tories, the mass of the English people, the urban and rural proletariat, has in common the hatred against the "money-monger." With the Bourgeoisie it has in common the hatred against aristocrats. In the Whigs it hates the one and the other, aristocrats and Bourgeois, the landlord who oppresses, and the money lord who exploits it. In the Whigs it hates the oligarchy which has ruled over England for more than a century, and by which the people is excluded from the direction of its own affairs.

The Peelites (Liberals and Conservatives) are no party; they are merely the *souvenir* of a party man, of the late Sir Robert Peel. But Englishmen are too prosaic, for a *souvenir* to form,

with them, the foundation for anything but elegies. And now, that the people have erected brass and marble monuments to the late Sir Robert Peel in all parts of the country, they believe they are able so much the more to do without those perambulant Peel monuments, the Grahams, the Gladstones, the Cardwells, etc. The so-called Peelites are nothing but this staff of bureaucrats which Robert Peel had schooled for himself. And because they form a pretty complete staff, they forget for a moment that there is no army behind them. The Peelites, then, are old supporters of Sir Robert Peel, who have not yet come to a conclusion as to what party to attach themselves to. It is evident that a similar scruple is not a sufficient means for them to constitute an independent power [. . .]

Corruption at Elections

Published September 4, 1852

Just before the late House of Commons separated, it resolved to heap up as many difficulties as possible for its successors in their way to Parliament. It voted a Draconian law against bribery, corruption, intimidation, and electioneering sharp practices in general.

A long list of questions is drawn up, which, by this enactment, may be put to petitioners or sitting members, the most searching and stringent that can be conceived. They may be required on oath to state who were their agents, and what communications they held with them. They may be asked and compelled to state, not only what they know, but what they "believe, conjecture, and suspect," as to money expended either by themselves or any one else acting—authorized or not authorized—on their behalf. In a word, no member can go through the strange ordeal without risk of perjury, if he have the slightest idea that it is possible or likely that any one has been led to overstep on his behalf the limits of the law.

Now, even supposing this law to take it for granted that the new legislators will use the same liberty as the clergy, who only

believe *some* of the Thirty-Nine Articles,⁷⁹ yet contrive to sign them *all*, yet there remain, nevertheless, clauses sufficient to make the new Parliament the most virginal assembly that ever made speeches and passed laws for the three kingdoms. And in juxtaposition with the general election immediately following, this law secures to the Tories the glory, that under their administration the greatest purity of election has been theoretically proclaimed and the greatest amount of electoral corruption has been practically carried out.

A fresh election is proceeded with, and here a scene of *bribery, corruption, violence, drunkenness and murder* ensues, *unparalleled* since the times the old Tory monopoly reigned supreme before. We actually hear of soldiers with loaded guns, and bayonets fixed, taking Liberal electors by force, dragging them under the landlord's eyes to vote against their own consciences, and these soldiers, shooting with deliberate aim the people who dared to sympathize with the captive electors, and committing wholesale murder on the unresisting people! [Allusion to the event at Six Mile Bridge, Limerick, County Clare.] It may be said: That was in Ireland! Ay, and in England they have employed their police to break the stalls of those opposed to them; they have sent their organized gangs of midnight ruffians prowling through the streets to intercept and intimidate the Liberal electors; they have opened the cesspools of drunkenness; they have showered the gold of corruption, as at Derby, and in almost every contested place they have exercised systematic intimidation.

Thus far Ernest Jones's *People's Paper*. Now, after this Chartist weekly paper, hear the weekly paper of the opposite party, the most sober, the most rational, the most moderate organ of the industrial Bourgeoisie, *The London Economist*:

We believe we may affirm, at this general election, there has been more *truckling*, more *corruption*, more *intimidation*, more *fanaticism* and more *debauchery* than on any previous occasion . . . It is reported that bribery has been more extensively resorted to at this election than for many previous years . . . Of the amount

of intimidation and undue influence of every sort which has been practised at the late election, it is probably impossible to form an exaggerated estimate . . . And when we sum up all these things—the brutal drunkenness, the low intrigues, the wholesale corruption, the barbarous intimidation, the integrity of candidates warped and stained, the honest electors who are ruined, the feeble ones who are suborned and dishonored; the lies, the stratagems, the slanders, which stalk abroad in the daylight, naked and not ashamed—the desecration of holy words, the soiling of noble names—we stand aghast at the holocaust of victims, of destroyed bodies and lost souls, on whose funeral pile a new Parliament is reared.

The means of corruption and intimidation were the usual ones: direct Government influence. Thus on an electioneering agent at Derby, arrested in the flagrant act of bribing, a letter was found from Major Beresford, the Secretary at War, wherein that same Beresford opens a credit upon a commercial firm for electioneering monies. *The Poole Herald* publishes a circular from the Admiralty-House to the half-pay officers, signed by the commander-in-chief of a naval station, requesting their votes for the ministerial candidates.—Direct force of arms has also been employed, as at Cork, Belfast, Limerick (at which latter place eight persons were killed).—Threats of ejection by landlords against their farmers, unless they voted with them. The Land Agents of Lord Derby herein gave the example to their colleagues.—Threats of exclusive dealing against shopkeepers, of dismissal against workmen, intoxication, etc., etc.—To these *profane* means of corruption *spiritual* ones were added by the Tories; the royal proclamation against Roman Catholic Processions was issued in order to inflame bigotry and religious hatred; the No-Popery cry was raised everywhere. One of the results of this proclamation were the Stockport Riots.⁸⁰ The Irish priests, of course, retorted with similar weapons.

The election is hardly over, and already a single Queen's Counsel has received from twenty-five places instructions to invalidate the returns to Parliament on account of bribery and intimidation. Such petitions against elected members have been

signed, and the expenses of the proceedings raised at Derby, Cocker mouth, Barnstaple, Harwich, Canterbury, Yarmouth, Wakefield, Boston, Huddersfield, Windsor, and a great number of other places. Of eight to ten Derbyite members it is proved that, even under the most favorable circumstances, they will be rejected on petition.

The principal scenes of this bribery, corruption and intimidation were, of course, the agricultural counties and the Peers' Boroughs, for the conservation of the greatest possible number of which latter, the Whigs had expended all their acumen in the Reform Bill of 1831. The constituencies of large towns and of densely populated manufacturing counties were, by their peculiar circumstances, very unfavorable ground for such manoeuvres.

Days of general election are in Britain traditionally the bacchanalia of drunken debauchery, conventional stock-jobbing terms for the discounting of political consciences, the richest harvest times of the publicans. As an English paper says, "these recurring *saturnalia* never fail to leave enduring traces of their pestilential presence." Quite naturally so. They are saturnalia in the ancient Roman sense of the word. The master then turned servant, the servant turned master. If the servant be master for one day, on that day brutality will reign supreme. The masters were the grand dignitaries of the ruling classes, or sections of classes, the servants formed the mass of these same classes, the privileged electors encircled by the mass of the non-electors, of those thousands that had no other calling than to be mere hangers-on, and whose support, vocal or manual, always appeared desirable, were it only on account of the theatrical effect.

If you follow up the history of British elections for a century past, or longer, you are tempted to ask, not why British Parliaments were so bad, but on the contrary, how they managed to be even as good as they were, and to represent as much as they did, though in a dim refraction, the actual movement of British society. Just as opponents of the representative system must feel surprised on finding that legislative bodies in which the abstract majority, the accident of the mere number is decisive,

yet decide and resolve according to the necessities of the situation—at least during the period of their full vitality. It will always be impossible, even by the utmost straining of logical deductions, to derive from the relations of mere numbers the necessity of a vote in accordance with the actual state of things; but from a given state of things the necessity of certain relations of members will always follow as of itself. The traditional bribery of British elections, what else was it, but another form, as brutal as it was popular, in which the relative strength of the contending parties showed itself? Their respective means of influence and of dominion, which on other occasions they used in a *normal* way, were here enacted for a few days in an abnormal and more or less burlesque manner. But the premise remained, that the candidates of the rivaling parties represented the interests of the mass of the electors, and that the privileged electors again represented the interests of the non-voting mass, or rather, that this voteless mass had, as yet, no specific interest of its own. The Delphic priestesses had to become intoxicated by vapors to enable them to find oracles; the British people must intoxicate itself with gin and porter to enable it to find its oracle-finders, the legislators. And where these oracle-finders were to be looked for, that was a matter of course.

This relative position of classes and parties underwent a radical change from the moment the industrial and commercial middle classes, the Bourgeoisie, took up its stand as an official party at the side of the Whigs and Tories, and especially from the passing of the Reform Bill in 1831. These Bourgeois were in no wise fond of costly electioneering manoeuvres, of *faux frais* of general elections. They considered it cheaper to compete with the landed aristocracy by general moral, than by personal pecuniary means. On the other hand they were conscious of representing a universally predominant interest of modern society. They were, therefore, in a position to demand that electors should be ruled by their common national interests, not by personal and local motives, and the more they recurred to this postulate, the more the latter species of electoral influence was, by the very composition of constituencies, centered in the landed aristocracy, but withheld from the middle classes.

Thus the Bourgeoisie contended for the principle of moral elections and forced the enactment of laws in that sense, intended, each of them, as safeguards against the local influence of the landed aristocracy; and indeed, from 1831 down, bribery adopted a more civilized, more hidden form, and general elections went off in a more sober way than before. When at last the mass of the people ceased to be a mere chorus, taking a more or less impassioned part in the struggle of the official heroes, drawing the lots among them, rioting, in bacchantic carouse, at the creation of parliamentary divinities, like the Cretan Curetes at the birth of Jupiter, and taking pay and treat for such participation in their glory—when the Chartists surrounded in threatening masses the whole circle within which the official election struggle must come off, and watched with scrutinizing mistrust every movement taking place within it—then an election like that of 1852 could not but call for universal indignation, and elicit even from the conservative *Times*, for the first time, some words in favor of general suffrage, and make the whole mass of the British Proletariat shout as with one voice. The foes of Reform, they have given Reformers the best arguments; such is an election under the class system; such is a House of Commons with such a system of election!

In order to comprehend the character of bribery, corruption and intimidation, such as they have been practised in the late election, it is necessary to call attention to a fact which operated in a parallel direction.

If you refer to the general elections since 1831, you will find that, in the same measure as the pressure of the voteless majority of the country upon the privileged body of electors was increasing, as the demand was heard louder, from the middle classes, for an extension of the circle of constituencies, from the working class, to extinguish every trace of a similar privileged circle—that in the same measure the number of electors who actually voted grew less and less, and the constituencies thus more and more contracted themselves. Never was this fact more striking than in the late election.

Let us take, for instance, London. In the City the constituency numbers 26,728; only 10,000 voted. The Tower Hamlets

number 23,534 registered electors; only 12,000 voted. In Finsbury, of 20,025 electors, not one-half voted. In Liverpool, the scene of one of the most animated contests, of 17,433 registered electors, only 13,000 came to the polls.

These examples will suffice. What do they prove? The apathy of the privileged constituencies. And this apathy, what proves it? That they have outlived themselves—that they have lost every interest in their own political existence. This is in no wise apathy against politics in general, but against a species of politics, the result of which, for the most part, can only consist in helping the Tories to oust the Whigs, or the Whigs to conquer the Tories. The constituencies feel instinctively that the decision lies no longer either with Parliament, or with the making of Parliament. Who repealed the Corn Laws? Assuredly not the voters who had elected a Protectionist Parliament, still less the Protectionist Parliament itself, but only and exclusively the pressure from without. In this pressure from without, in other means of influencing Parliament than by voting, a great portion even of electors now believe. They consider the hitherto lawful mode of voting as an antiquated formality, but from the moment Parliament should make front against the pressure from without, and dictate laws to the nation in the sense of its narrow constituencies, they would join the general assault against the whole antiquated system of machinery.

The bribery and intimidation practised by the Tories were, then, merely violent experiments for bringing back to life dying electoral bodies which have become incapable of production, and which can no longer create decisive electoral results and really national Parliaments. And the result? The old Parliament was dissolved, because at the end of its career it had dissolved into sections which brought each other to a complete standstill. The new Parliament begins where the old one ended; it is paralytic from the hour of its birth.

[*Case of Starvation*]
Published February 2, 1853

[. . .] Your readers having accompanied us to such a length, through all the testimonials of the growing prosperity of England, I request them to stop a moment and to follow a poor needle-maker, Henry Morgan, who started out from London, on his journey to Birmingham, in search of work. Lest I should be charged with exaggerating the case, I give the literal account of *The Northampton Journal*.

Death from Destitution.—Cosgrove.—About nine o'clock on the morning of Monday, two laboring men, while seeking shelter from the rain in a lone barn, occupied by Mr. T. Slade, in the parish of Cosgrove, were attracted by groans, which were found to come from a poor man, lying in a heap-hole, in a state of extreme exhaustion. They spoke to him, kindly offering him some of their breakfast, but without receiving any answer; and upon touching him, found his body almost cold. Having fetched Mr. Slade, who was near by, this gentleman, after some time had elapsed, sent him, by a boy, in a cart, with a bed and covering of straw, to the Yardley-Gobion union-house about a mile distant, where he arrived just before one o'clock, but expired a quarter of an hour afterward. The famished, filthy, and ill-clad condition of the poor creature presented a most frightful spectacle. It appears that this unhappy being, on the evening of Thursday, the 2d, obtained a vagrant's order for a night's lodging at the Yardley-house, from the relieving officer at Stoney-Stratford, and, having then walked to Yardley, a distance of three miles and upward, was accordingly admitted: he had food given him, which he eat heartily, and begged to be allowed to remain the next day and night, which was granted, and upon leaving on Saturday morning early, after his breakfast (most likely his last meal in this world), took the road back to Stratford. It is probable that, being weak and footsore, for he had a bad place on one heel, he was soon glad to seek the first friendly shelter he could find, which was an open shed, forming part of some outfarming-

buildings, a quarter of a mile from the turnpike-road. Here he was found lying in the straw on Monday, the 6th, at noon, and, it not being wished that a stranger should remain on the premises, he was desired to go away. He asked leave to stay a little longer, and went off about four o'clock, once more to seek at nightfall the nearest place of rest and shelter, which was this lone barn, with its thatch partly off, with its door left open, and in the coldest possible situation, into the heap-hole of which he crept, there to lie without food for *seven days* more, till discovered, as has been described above, on the morning of the 13th. This ill-fated man had given his name as Henry Morgan, a needle-maker, and appeared between thirty and forty years of age, and in person, a good-framed man.

It is hardly possible to conceive a more horrible case. A stalwart, strong-framed man, in the prime of life—his long pilgrimage of martyrdom from London to Stoney-Stratford—his wretched appeals for help to the “civilization” around him—his seven days fast—his brutal abandonment by his fellow men—his seeking shelter and being driven from resting-place to resting-place—the crowning inhumanity of the person named Slade and the patient, miserable death of the worn-out man—are a picture perfectly astonishing to contemplate.⁸¹

No doubt he invaded the rights of property, when he sought shelter in the shed and in the lone barn!!!

Relate this starvation case in midst of prosperity, to a fat London City man, and he will answer you with the words of *The London Economist* of Jan. 8th: “Delightful is it thus to see, under Free Trade, all classes flourishing; their energies are called forth by hope of reward; all improve their productions, and all and *each* are benefited.”

[*Starvation*]

Published March 15, 1853

[. . .] On the Continent, hanging, shooting and transportation is the order of the day. But the executioners are themselves tangible and hangable beings, and their deeds are recorded in the conscience of the whole civilized world. At the same time there acts in England an invisible, intangible and silent despot, condemning individuals, in extreme cases, to the most cruel of deaths, and driving in its noiseless, every day working, whole races and whole classes of men from the soil of their forefathers, like the angel with the fiery sword who drove Adam from Paradise. In the latter form the work of the unseen social despot calls itself *forced emigration*, in the former it is called *starvation*.

Some further cases of starvation have occurred in London during the present month. I remember only that of Mary Ann Sandry, aged 43 years, who died in Coal-lane, Shadwell, London. Mr. Thomas Peene, the surgeon, assisting the Coroner's inquest, said the deceased died from starvation and exposure to the cold. The deceased was lying on a small heap of straw, without the slightest covering. The room was completely destitute of furniture, firing and food. Five young children were sitting on the bare flooring, crying from hunger and cold by the side of the mother's dead body [. . .]

The Duchess of Sutherland and Slavery

Published February 8-9, 1853

[. . .] During the present momentary slackness in political affairs, the address of the Stafford House Assembly of Ladies to their sisters in America upon the subject of Negro slavery, and the "Affectionate and Christian address of many thousands of the women of the United States of America to their sisters, the women of England," upon white slavery, have proved a godsend to the press. Not one of the British papers was ever

struck by the circumstance that the Stafford House Assembly took place at the palace and under the presidency of the Duchess of Sutherland, and yet the names of Stafford and Sutherland should have been sufficient to class the philanthropy of the British aristocracy—a philanthropy which chooses its objects as far distant from home as possible, and rather on that than on this side of the ocean.

The history of the wealth of the Sutherland family is the history of the ruin and of the expropriation of the Scotch-Gaelic population from its native soil. As far back as the tenth century, the Danes had landed in Scotland, conquered the plains of Caithness, and driven back the aborigines into the mountains. Mor-Fear Chattaibh, as he was called in Gaelic, or the "Great Man of Sutherland," had always found his companions in arms ready to defend him at the risk of their lives against all his enemies, Danes or Scots, foreigners or natives. After the revolution which drove the Stuarts from Britain, private feuds among the petty chieftains of Scotland became less and less frequent, and the British Kings, in order to keep up at least a semblance of dominion in those remote districts, encouraged the levying of family regiments among the chieftains, a system by which these *lairds* were enabled to combine modern military establishments with the ancient *clan* system in such a manner as to support one by the other.

Now, in order to distinctly appreciate the usurpation subsequently carried out, we must first properly understand what the *clan* meant. The *clan* belonged to a form of social existence which, in the scale of historical development, stands a full degree below the feudal state; viz., the *patriarchal* state of society. "*Klaen*" in Gaelic, means children. Every one of the usages and traditions of the Scottish Gaels reposes upon the supposition that the members of the *clan* belong to one and the same family. The "great man," the chieftain of the clan, is on the one hand quite as arbitrary, on the other quite as confined in his power, by consanguinity, etc., as every father of a family. To the clan, to the family, belonged the district where it had established itself, exactly as, in Russia, the land occupied by a community of peasants belongs, not to the individual peasants,

but to the community. Thus the district was the common property of the family. There could be no more question, under this system, of private property, in the modern sense of the word, than there could be of comparing the social existence of the members of the clan to that of individuals living in the midst of our modern society. The division and subdivision of the land corresponded to the military functions of the single members of the clan. According to their military abilities, the chieftain entrusted to them the several allotments, cancelled or enlarged according to his pleasure the tenures of the individual officers, and these officers again distributed to their vassals and under-vassals every separate plot of land. But the district at large always remained the property of the clan, and, however the claims of individuals might vary, the tenure remained the same; nor were the contributions for the common defense, or the tribute for the laird, who at once was leader in battle and chief magistrate in peace, ever increased. Upon the whole, every plot of land was cultivated by the same family, from generation to generation, under fixed imposts. These imposts were insignificant, more a tribute by which the supremacy of the "*great man*" and of his officers was acknowledged than a rent of land in the modern sense, or a source of revenue. The officers directly subordinate to the "*great man*" were called "*Taksmen*," and the district entrusted to their care, "*Tak*." Under them were placed inferior officers, at the head of every hamlet, and under these stood the peasantry.

Thus you see, the *clan* is nothing but a family organized in a military manner, quite as little defined by laws, just as closely hemmed in by traditions, as any family. But the land is the *property of the family*, in the midst of which differences of rank, in spite of consanguinity, do prevail as well as in all the ancient Asiatic family communities.

The first usurpation took place, after the expulsion of the Stuarts, by the establishment of the family regiments. From that moment, *pay* became the principal source of revenue of the "*Great Man*," the Mor-Fear-Chattaibh. Entangled in the dissipation of the Court of London, he tried to squeeze as much money as possible out of his officers, and they applied the same

system to their inferiors. The ancient tribute was transformed into fixed money contracts. In one respect these contracts constituted a progress, by fixing the traditional imposts; in another respect they were a usurpation, inasmuch as the "great man" now took the position of landlord toward the "taksmen" who again took toward the peasantry that of farmers. And as the "great man" now required money no less than the "taksmen," a production not only for direct consumption but for export and exchange also became necessary; the system of national production had to be changed, the hands superseded by this change had to be got rid of. Population, therefore, decreased. But that it as yet was kept up in a certain manner, and that man, in the 18th century, was not yet openly sacrificed to net revenue, we see from a passage in Steuart,⁸² a Scotch political economist, whose work was published ten years before Adam Smith's where he says [. . .]: "The rent of these lands is very trifling compared to their extent, but compared to the number of mouths which a farm maintains, it will perhaps be found that a plot of land in the highlands of Scotland feeds ten times more people than a farm of the same extent in the richest provinces."

That even in the beginning of the 19th century the rental imposts were very small is shown by the work of Mr. Loch (1820),⁸³ the steward of the Countess of Sutherland, who directed the improvements on her estates. He gives for instance the rental of the Kintradawell estate for 1811, from which it appears that up to then, every family was obliged to pay a yearly impost of a few shillings in money, a few fowls, and some days' work, at the highest.

It was only after 1811 that the ultimate and real usurpation was enacted, the forcible transformation of *clan property* into the *private property*, in the modern sense, of *the chief*. The person who stood at the head of this economical revolution was a female Mehemet Ali,⁸⁴ who had well digested her Malthus—the *Countess of Sutherland*, alias *Marchioness of Stafford*.

Let us first state that the ancestors of the Marchioness of Stafford were the "great men" of the most northern part of

Scotland, of very near three-quarters of Sutherlandshire. This county is more extensive than many French *Départements* or small German Principalities. When the Countess of Sutherland inherited these estates, which she afterward brought to her husband, the Marquis of Stafford, afterward Duke of Sutherland, the population of them was already reduced to 15,000. My lady Countess resolved upon a radical economical reform, and determined upon transforming the whole tract of country into sheep-walks. From 1814 to 1820, these 15,000 inhabitants, about 3,000 families, were systematically expelled and exterminated. All their villages were demolished and burned down, and all their fields converted into pasturage. British soldiers were commanded for this execution, and came to blows with the natives. An old woman refusing to quit her hut was burned in the flames of it. Thus my lady Countess appropriated to herself *seven hundred and ninety-four thousand acres of land*, which from time immemorial had belonged to the clan. In the exuberance of her generosity she allotted to the expelled natives about 6,000 acres—2 acres per family. These 6,000 acres had been lying waste until then, and brought no revenue to the proprietors. The Countess was generous enough to sell the acre at 2s. 6d., on an average, to the clan-men who for centuries past had shed their blood for her family. The whole of the unrightfully appropriated clan-land she divided into 29 large sheep farms, each of them inhabited by one single family, mostly English farm-laborers; and in 1821 the 15,000 Gaels had already been superseded by 131,000 sheep.

A portion of the aborigines had been thrown upon the seashore, and attempted to live by fishing. They became amphibious, and, as an English author says, lived half on land and half on water, and after all did not half live upon both.

Sismondi,⁸⁵ in his *Études Sociales*, observes with regard to this expropriation of the Gaels from Sutherlandshire—an example, which, by the by, was imitated by the other “great men” of Scotland:

The large extent of seignorial domains is not a circumstance peculiar to Britain. In the whole Empire of Charlemagne, in the

whole Occident, entire provinces were usurped by the warlike chiefs, who had them cultivated for their own account by the vanquished, and sometimes by their own companions in arms. During the 9th and 10th centuries the Counties of Maine, Anjou, Poitou were for the Counts of these provinces rather three large estates than principalities. Switzerland, which in so many respects resembles Scotland, was at that time divided among a small number of *Seigneurs*. If the Counts of Kyburg, of Lenzburg, of Habsburg, of Gruyères had been protected by British laws, they would have been in the same position as the Earls of Sutherland; some of them would perhaps have had the same taste for improvement as the Marchioness of Stafford, and more than one republic might have disappeared from the Alps in order to make room for flocks of sheep. Not the most despotic monarch in Germany would be allowed to attempt anything of the sort.

Mr. Loch, in his defense of the Countess of Sutherland (1820), replies to the above as follows: "Why should there be made an exception to the rule adopted in every other case, just for this particular case? Why should the absolute authority of the landlord over his land be sacrificed to the public interest and to motives which concern the public only?"

And why, then, should the slave-holders in the Southern States of North America sacrifice their private interest to the philanthropic grimaces of her Grace, the Duchess of Sutherland?

The British aristocracy, who have everywhere superseded man by bullocks and sheep, will, in a future not very distant, be superseded, in turn, by these useful animals.

The process of *clearing estates* which, in Scotland, we have just now described, was carried out in England in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Thomas Morus⁸⁶ already complains of it in the beginning of the 16th century. It was performed in Scotland in the beginning of the 19th, and in Ireland it is now in full progress. The noble Viscount Palmerston, too, some years ago cleared of men his property in Ireland, exactly in the manner described above.

If of any property it ever was true that it was *robbery*, it is literally true of the property of the British aristocracy. Robbery

of Church property, robbery of commons, fraudulent transformation accompanied by murder, of feudal and patriarchal property into private property—these are the titles of British aristocrats to their possessions. And what services in this latter process were performed by a servile class of lawyers, you may see from an English lawyer of the last century, Dalrymple,⁸⁷ who, in his “History of Feudal Property”, very naively proves that every law or deed concerning property was interpreted by the lawyers, in England, when the middle class rose in wealth, in favor of the *middle class*—in Scotland, where the nobility enriched themselves, in favor of the *nobility*—in either case it was interpreted in a sense hostile to the *people*.

The above Turkish reform by the Countess of Sutherland was justifiable, at least, from a Malthusian point of view. Other Scottish noblemen went further. Having superseded human beings by sheep, they superseded sheep by game, and the pasture grounds by forests. At the head of these was the Duke of Atholl. “After the conquest, the Norman Kings afforested large portions of the soil of England, in much the same way as the landlords here are now doing with the Highlands.” (R. Somers, *Letters from the Highlands*, 1848.)

As for a large number of the human beings expelled to make room for the game of the Duke of Atholl, and the sheep of the Countess of Sutherland, where did they fly to, where did they find a home?

In the United States of North America.

The enemy of British Wages-Slavery has a right to condemn Negro-Slavery; a Duchess of Sutherland, a Duke of Atholl, a Manchester Cotton Lord—never!

[*Capital Punishment*]

Published February 17, 1853

The Times of Jan. 25 contains the following observations under the head of “Amateur Hanging”: “It has often been remarked that in this country a public execution is generally followed

closely by instances of death by hanging, either suicidal or accidental, in consequence of the powerful effect which the execution of a noted criminal produces upon a morbid and unmaturing mind."

Of the several cases which are alleged by *The Times* in illustration of this remark, one is that of a lunatic at Sheffield, who, after talking with other lunatics respecting the execution of Barbour, put an end to his existence by hanging himself. Another case is that of a boy of 14 years, who also hung himself.

The doctrine to which the enumeration of these facts was intended to give its support, is one which no reasonable man would be likely to guess, it being no less than a direct apotheosis of the hangman, while capital punishment is extolled as the *ultima ratio* of society. This is done in a leading article of the "leading journal."

The *Morning Advertiser*, in some very bitter but just strictures on the hanging predilections and bloody logic of *The Times*, has the following interesting data on 43 days of the year 1849:

<i>Executions of:</i>		<i>Murders and Suicides:</i>	
Millan	March 20	Hannah Sandles	March 22
		M. G. Newton	March 22
Pulley	March 26	J. G. Gleeson—4 murders at Liverpool	March 27
Smith	March 27	Murder and suicide at Leicester	April 2
Howe	March 31	Poisoning at Bath	April 7
		W. Bailey	April 8
Landick	April 9	J. Ward murders his mother	April 13
Sarah Thomas	April 13	Yardley	April 14
		Doxey, parricide	April 14
		J. Bailey kills his two children and himself	April 17
J. Griffiths	April 18	Charles Overton	April 18
J. Rush	April 21	Daniel Holmsden	May 2

This table, as *The Times* concedes, shows not only suicides, but also murders of the most atrocious kind, following closely upon the execution of criminals. It is astonishing that the article in question does not even produce a single argument or pretext for indulging in the savage theory therein propounded; and it would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish any principle upon which the justice or expediency of capital punishment could be founded, in a society glorying in its civilization. Punishment in general has been defended as a means either of ameliorating or of intimidating. Now what right have you to punish me for the amelioration or intimidation of others? And besides, there is history—there is such a thing as statistics—which prove with the most complete evidence that since Cain the world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment. Quite the contrary. From the point of view of abstract right, there is only one theory of punishment which recognizes human dignity in the abstract, and that is the theory of Kant, especially in the more rigid formula given to it by Hegel. Hegel says: "Punishment is the *right* of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. The violation of right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. His crime is the negation of right. Punishment is the negation of this negation, and consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the criminal by himself."

There is no doubt something specious in this formula, inasmuch as Hegel, instead of looking upon the criminal as the mere object, the slave of justice, elevates him to the position of a free and self-determined being. Looking, however, more closely into the matter, we discover that German idealism here, as in most other instances, has but given a transcendental sanction to the rules of existing society. Is it not a delusion to substitute for the individual with his real motives, with multifarious social circumstances pressing upon him, the abstraction of "free-will"—one among the many qualities of man for man himself! This theory, considering punishment as the result of the criminal's own will, is only a metaphysical expression for the old "jus talionis": eye against eye, tooth against tooth, blood against blood. Plainly speaking, and dispensing with all paraphrases,

punishment is nothing but a means of society to defend itself against the infraction of its vital conditions, whatever may be their character. Now, what a state of society is that, which knows of no better instrument for its own defense than the hangman, and which proclaims through the "leading journal of the world" its own brutality as eternal law?

Mr. A. Quételet, in his excellent and learned work, *l'Homme et ses Facultés*, says:

There is a *budget* which we pay with frightful regularity—it is that of prisons, dungeons and scaffolds . . . We might even predict how many individuals will stain their hands with the blood of their fellow men, how many will be forgers, how many will deal in poison, pretty nearly the same way as we may foretell the annual births and deaths.

And Mr. Quételet, in a calculation of the probabilities of crime published in 1829, actually predicted with astonishing certainty, not only the amount but all the different kinds of crimes committed in France in 1830. That it is not so much the particular political institutions of a country as the fundamental conditions of modern *bourgeois* society in general, which produce an average amount of crime in a given national fraction of society, may be seen from the following table, communicated by Quételet, for the years 1822–24. We find in a number of one hundred condemned criminals in America and France:

Age	Philadelphia	France
Under twenty-one years	19	19
Twenty-one to thirty	44	35
Thirty to forty	23	23
Above forty	14	23
Total	100	100

Now, if crimes observed on a great scale thus show, in their amount and their classification, the regularity of physical phenomena—if as Mr. Quételet remarks, "it would be difficult

to decide in respect to which of the two" (the physical world and the social system) "the acting causes produce their effect with the utmost regularity"—is there not a necessity for deeply reflecting upon an alteration of the system that breeds these crimes, instead of glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of criminals to make room only for the supply of new ones [. . .]

[Irish Tenant Right]

Published July 11, 1853

[. . .] As the Coalition Ministry⁸⁸ depends on the support of the Irish party, and as all the other parties composing the House of Commons so nicely balance each other that the Irish may at any moment turn the scales which way they please, some concessions are at last about to be made to the Irish tenants. The "Leasing Powers (Ireland) Bill," which passed the House of Commons on Friday last, contains a provision that for the improvements made on the soil and separable from the soil, the tenant shall have at the termination of his lease, a compensation in money, the incoming tenant being at liberty to take them at the valuation, while with respect to improvements in the soil, compensation for them shall be arranged by contract between the landlord and the tenant.

A tenant having incorporated his capital, in one form or another, in the land, and having thus effected an improvement of the soil, either directly by irrigation, drainage, manure, or indirectly by construction of buildings for agricultural purposes, in steps the landlord with demand for increased rent. If the tenant concede, he has to pay the interest for his own money to the landlord. If he resist, he will be very unceremoniously ejected, and supplanted by a new tenant, the latter being enabled to pay a higher rent by the very expenses incurred by his predecessors, until he also, in his turn, has become an improver of the land, and is replaced in the same way, or put on worse terms. In this easy way a class of absentee landlords has been enabled to pocket, not merely the labor, but also the capital, of

whole generations, each generation of Irish peasants sinking a grade lower in the social scale, exactly in proportion to the exertions and sacrifices made for the raising of their condition and that of their families. If the tenant was industrious and enterprising, he became taxed in consequence of his very industry and enterprise. If, on the contrary, he grew inert and negligent, he was reproached with the "aboriginal faults of the Celtic race." He had, accordingly, no other alternative left but to become a pauper—to pauperise himself by industry, or to pauperise by negligence. In order to oppose this state of things, "Tenant Right" was proclaimed in Ireland—a right of the tenant, not in the soil but in the improvements of the soil effected at his cost and charges. Let us see in what manner *The Times*, in its Saturday's leader, attempts to break down this Irish "Tenant Right:"

There are two general systems of farm occupation. Either a tenant may take a lease of the land for a fixed number of years, or his holding may be terminable at any time upon certain notice. In the first of these events, it would be obviously his course to adjust and apportion his outlay so that all, or nearly all, the benefit would find its way to him before the expiration of his term. In the second case it seems equally obvious that he should not run the risk of the investment without a proper assurance of return.

Where the landlords have to deal with a class of large capitalists who may, as they please, invest their stock in commerce, in manufactures or in farming, there can be no doubt but that these capitalist farmers, whether they take long leases or no time leases at all, know how to secure the "proper" return of their outlays. But with regard to Ireland the supposition is quite fictitious. On the one side you have there a small class of land monopolists, on the other, a very large class of tenants with very petty fortunes, which they have no chance to invest in different ways, no other field of production opening to them, except the soil. They are, therefore, forced to become tenants-at-will. Being once tenants-at-will, they naturally run the risk of losing their revenue, provided they do not invest their small

capital. Investing it, in order to secure their revenue, they run the risk of losing their capital, also. "Perhaps," continues *The Times*,

it may be said, that in any case a tenantry could hardly expire without something being left upon the ground, in some shape or another, representing the tenant's own property, and that for this compensation should be forthcoming. There is some truth in the remark, but the demand thus created . . . ought, under proper conditions of society, to be easily adjusted between landlord and tenant, as it might, at any rate, be provided for in the original contract. We say that the conditions of society should regulate these arrangements, because we believe that no Parliamentary enactment can be effectually substituted for such an agency.

Indeed, under "proper conditions of society," we should want no more Parliamentary interference with the Irish land-tenant, as we should not want, under "proper conditions of society," the interference of the soldier, of the policeman, and of the hangman. Legislature, magistracy, and armed force, are all of them but the offspring of improper conditions of society, preventing those arrangements among men which would make useless the compulsory intervention of a third supreme power. Has, perhaps, *The Times* been converted into a social revolutionist? Does it want a *social* revolution, reorganizing the "conditions of society," and the "arrangements" emanating from them, instead of "Parliamentary enactments?" England has subverted the conditions of Irish society. At first it confiscated the land, then it suppressed the industry by "Parliamentary enactments," and lastly, it broke the active energy by armed force. And thus England created those abominable "conditions of society" which enable a small *caste* of rapacious lordlings to dictate to the Irish people the terms on which they shall be allowed to hold the land and to live upon it. Too weak yet for revolutionizing those "social conditions," the people appeal to Parliament, demanding at least their mitigation and regulation. But "No," says *The Times*; if you don't live under proper conditions of society, Parliament can't mend that. And if the

Irish people, on the advice of *The Times*, tried to-morrow to mend their conditions of society, *The Times* would be the first to appeal to bayonets, and to pour out sanguinary denunciations of "the aboriginal faults of the Celtic race," wanting the Anglo-Saxon taste for pacific progress and legal amelioration. "If a landlord," says *The Times*, "deliberately injures one tenant, he will find it so much the harder to get another, and whereas his occupation consists in letting land, he will find his land all the more difficult to let."

The case stands rather differently in Ireland. The more a landlord injures one tenant, the easier he will find it to oppress another. The tenant who comes in, is the means of injuring the ejected one and the ejected one is the means of keeping down the new occupant. That, in due course of time, the landlord, beside injuring the tenant, will injure himself and ruin himself, is not only a probability, but the very fact, in Ireland—a fact affording, however, a very precarious source of comfort to the ruined tenant. "The relations between the landlord and tenant are those between two traders," says *The Times*.

This is precisely the *petitio principii* which pervades the whole leader of *The Times*. The needy Irish tenant belongs to the soil, while the soil belongs to the English Lord. As well you might call the relation between the robber who presents his pistol, and the traveler who presents his purse, a relation between two traders. "But," says *The Times*, "in point of fact, the relation between Irish landlords and tenants will soon be reformed by an agency more potent than that of legislation . . . The property of Ireland is fast passing into new hands, and, if the present rate of emigration continues, its cultivation must undergo the same transfer."

Here, at least, *The Times* has the truth. British Parliament does not interfere at a moment when the worked-out old system is terminating in the common ruin, both of the thrifty landlord and the needy tenant, the former being knocked down by the hammer of the *Encumbered Estates* Commission, and the latter expelled by compulsory emigration. This reminds us of the old Sultan of Morocco. Whenever there was a case pending between two parties, he knew of no more "potent agency" for settling

their controversy, than by killing both parties. "Nothing could tend," concludes *The Times* with regard to Tenant Right, "to greater confusion than such a *communistic distribution of ownership* . . . The only person with any right in the land, is the landlord."

The Times seems to have been the sleeping Epimenides⁸⁹ of the past half century, and never to have heard of the hot controversy going on during all that time upon the claims of the landlord, not among social reformers and Communists, but among the very political economists of the British middle-class. Ricardo, the creator of modern political economy in Great Britain, did not controvert the "right" of the landlords, as he was quite convinced that their claims were based upon fact, and not on right, and that political economy in general had nothing to do with questions of right; but he attacked the land-monopoly in a more unassuming, yet more scientific, and therefore more dangerous manner. He proved that private proprietorship in land, as distinguished from the respective claims of the laborer, and of the farmer, was a relation quite superfluous in, and incoherent with the whole frame-work of modern production; that the economical expression of that relationship, the rent of land, might, with great advantage, be appropriated by the State; and finally that the interest of the landlord was opposed to the interest of all other classes of modern society. It would be tedious to enumerate all the conclusions drawn from these premises by the Ricardo School against the landed monopoly. For my end, it will suffice to quote three of the most recent economical authorities of Great Britain.

The London *Economist*, whose chief editor, Mr. J. Wilson, is not only a Free Trade oracle, but a Whig one, too, and not only a Whig, but also an inevitable Treasury-appendage in every Whig or composite ministry, has contended in different articles that exactly speaking there can exist no title authorizing any individual, or any number of individuals, to claim the exclusive proprietorship in the soil of a nation.

Mr. Newman,⁹⁰ in his *Lectures on Political Economy*, London, 1851, professedly written for the purpose of refuting Socialism, tells us:

No man has, or can have, a natural right to *land*, except so long as he occupies it in person. His right is to the use, and to the use only. All other right is the creation of artificial law (or parliamentary enactments as *The Times* would call it) . . . If, at any time, land becomes needed to *live upon*, the right of private possessors to withhold it comes to an end.

This is exactly the case in Ireland, and Mr. Newman expressly confirms the claims of the Irish tenantry, and in lectures held before the most select audiences of the British aristocracy.

In conclusion let me quote some passages from Mr. Herbert Spencer's work, *Social Statics*, London, 1851, also, purporting to be a complete refutation of Communism, and acknowledged as the most elaborate development of the Free Trade doctrines of modern England.

No one . . . may use the earth in such a way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it . . . Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land, or the rest would live on the earth by sufferance only. The landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether . . . It can never be pretended, that the existing titles to such property are legitimate. Should any one think so let him look in the Chronicles . . . The original deeds were written with the sword, rather than with the pen. Not lawyers but soldiers were the conveyancers: blows were the current coin given in payment; and for seals blood was used in preference to wax. Could valid claims be thus constituted? Hardly. And if not, what becomes of the pretensions of all subsequent holders of estates so obtained? Does sale or bequest generate a right where it did not previously exist? . . . If one act of transfer can give no title, can many? . . . At what rate per annum do invalid claims become valid? . . . The right of mankind at large to the earth's surface is still valid, all deeds, customs and laws notwithstanding . . . It is impossible to discover any mode in which land can become private property . . . We daily deny landlordism by our legislation. Is a canal, a railway, or a turnpike road to be made? We do not scruple to seize just as many acres as may be requisite . . . We do not wait for consent . . . The change required would simply

be a change of landlords . . . Instead of being in the possession of individuals, the country would be held by the great corporate body—society. Instead of leasing his acres from an isolated proprietor, the farmer would lease them from the nation. Instead of paying his rent to the agent of Sir John, or His Grace, he will pay to an agent, or deputy-agent of the community. Stewards would be public officials, instead of private ones, and tenantry the only land tenure . . . Pushed to its ultimate consequences, a claim to exclusive possession of the soil involves land-owning despotism.

Thus, from the very point of view of modern English political economists, it is not the usurping English landlord, but the Irish tenants and laborers, who have the only right in the soil of their native country, and *The Times*, in opposing the demands of the Irish people, places itself into direct antagonism to British middle-class science.

[*Chartism*]

Published July 14, 1853

[. . .] Strikes and combinations of workmen are proceeding rapidly, and to an unprecedented extent. I have now before me reports on the strikes of the factory hands of all descriptions at Stockport, of smiths, spinners, weavers, etc., at Manchester, of carpet-weavers at Kidderminster, of colliers at the Ringwood Collieries, near Bristol, of weavers and loomers at Blackburn, of loomers at Darwen, of the cabinet-makers at Boston, of the bleachers, finishers, dyers and power-loom weavers of Bolton and neighborhood, of the weavers of Barnsley, of the Spital-fields broad-silk weavers, of the lace makers of Nottingham, of all descriptions of workingmen throughout the Birmingham district, and in various other localities. Each mail brings new reports of strikes; the turn-out grows epidemic. Every one of the larger strikes, like those at Stockport, Liverpool, etc., necessarily generates a whole series of minor strikes, through great numbers of people being unable to carry out their resistance to

the masters, unless they appeal to the support of their fellow-workmen in the Kingdom, and the latter, in order to assist them, asking in their turn for higher wages. Besides it becomes alike a point of honor and of interest for each locality not to isolate the efforts of their fellow-workmen by submitting to worse terms, and thus strikes in one locality are echoed by strikes in the remotest other localities. In some instances the demands for higher wages are only a settlement of long-standing arrears with the masters. So with the great Stockport strike.

In January, 1848, the mill-owners of the town made a general reduction of 10 per cent. from all descriptions of factory-workers' wages. This reduction was submitted to upon the condition that when trade revived the 10 per cent. was to be restored. Accordingly the work-people memorialized their employers, early in March, 1853, for the promised advance of 10 per cent.; and as they would not come to arrangements with them, upward of 30,000 hands struck. In the majority of instances, the factory-workmen affirmed distinctly their *right to share* in the prosperity of the country, and especially in the prosperity of their employers.

The distinctive feature of the present strikes is this, that they began in the lower ranks of unskilled labor (not factory labor), actually trained by the direct influence of emigration, according to various strata of artizans, till they reached at last the factory people of the great industrial centers of Great Britain; while at all former periods strikes originated regularly from the heads of the factory-workers, mechanics, spinners, &c., spreading thence to the lower classes of this great industrial hive, and reaching only in the last instance, to the artizans. This phenomenon is to be ascribed solely to emigration.

There exists a class of philanthropists, and even of socialists, who consider strikes as very mischievous to the interests of the "workingman himself," and whose great aim consists in finding out a method of securing permanent average wages. Besides, the fact of the industrial cyclus, with its various phases, putting every such average wages out of the question. I am, on the very contrary, convinced that the alternative rise and fall of wages, and the continual conflicts between masters and men resulting

therefrom, are, in the present organization of industry, the indispensable means of holding up the spirit of the laboring classes, of combining them into one great association against the encroachments of the ruling class, and of preventing them from becoming apathetic, thoughtless, more or less well-fed instruments of production. In a state of society founded upon the antagonism of classes, if we want to prevent Slavery in fact as well as in name, we must accept war. In order to rightly appreciate the value of strikes and combinations, we must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the apparent insignificance of their economical results, but hold, above all things, in view their moral and political consequences. Without the great alternative phases of dullness, prosperity, over-excitement, crisis and distress, which modern industry traverses in periodically recurring cycles, with the up and down of wages resulting from them, as with the constant warfare between masters and men closely corresponding with those variations in wages and profits, the working-classes of Great Britain, and of all Europe, would be a heart-broken, a weak-minded, a worn-out, unresisting mass, whose self-emancipation would prove as impossible as that of the slaves of Ancient Greece and Rome. We must not forget that strikes and combinations among the serfs were the hot-beds of the mediaeval communes, and that those communes have been in their turn, the source of life of the now ruling bourgeoisie [. . .]

[*Prince Albert*]

Published February 11, 1854

[. . .] Public opinion is half-inclined to sacrifice Prince Albert at the shrine of rumor. A whisper, which was first insinuated for party uses, has grown into a roar, and a constructive hint has swelled into a positive and monstrous fiction. That those who seek the presence of the Queen should find Prince Albert with her Majesty, is a fact which rather won the sympathy and esteem of the English public; but then it was said that he attended

meetings of the Queen with her Ministers; next, that Ministers were made aware of his presence—that, however reluctant to proceed with business before a third party, they found it necessary to do so—that it even became necessary to defend their opinions before the Prince—that the Prince, in fact, interfered with their counsel to their Sovereign—that he not only influenced the Royal mind, but possessing the power of free communication with foreign Courts, he constituted an unlicensed channel for information between the confidential council of the Queen and the Cabinets of foreign potentates, perhaps of the enemies of England—that in short, Prince Albert was a traitor to his Queen, that he had been impeached for high treason, and finally, that on a charge of high treason he had been arrested and committed to the Tower. This was the story not only told in all parts of England a day or two back, but by some believed.

I quote the above passage from *The Spectator*, in order to show your readers how public rumor has been induced by the Palmerstonian press to make a poor stupid young man the scapegoat of the responsible Ministers. Prince Albert is a German Prince, connected with most of the absolute and despotic Governments of the Continent. Raised to the rank of Prince-Consort in Great Britain, he has devoted his time partly to fattening pigs, to inventing ridiculous hats for the army, to planning model lodging houses of a peculiarly transparent and uncomfortable kind, to the Hyde Park Exhibition, and to amateur soldiery. He has been considered amiable and harmless, in point of intellect below the general average of human beings, a prolific father and an obsequious husband. Of late, however, he has been deliberately magnified into the most influential man and the most dangerous character of the United Kingdom, said to dispose of the whole State machinery at the secret dictation of Russia. Now there can exist but little doubt that the Prince exercises a direct influence in Court affairs, and, of course, in the interest of despotism. The Prince cannot but act a Prince's part, and who was ever silly enough to suppose he would not? But I need not inform your readers of the utter impotency to which British Royalty itself has been reduced by the British

oligarchy, so that, for instance, King William IV, a decided foe to Russia, was forced by his Foreign Minister⁹¹—a member of the Whig oligarchy—to act as a foe to Turkey. How preposterous, then, to suppose Prince Albert to be able to carry one single point in defiance of the Ministry, except so far as little Court affairs, a dirty riband, or a tinsel star, are concerned! Use is made of his absolutist *penchants* to blind the people's eyes as to the plots and treacheries of the responsible Ministers. If the outcry and attack means anything it means an attack on royalist institutions. If there were no Queen there would be no Prince—if there were no throne there would be no Court influences. Princes would lose their power if thrones were not there to back them, and for them to lean upon. But, now mark! the papers which go the farthest in their "fearful boldness," which cry the loudest and try to make a sort of political capital out of Prince Albert, are the most eager in their assertions of loyalty to the throne and in fulsome adulation of the Queen. As to the Tory papers this proposition is self-evident. As to the radical *Morning Advertiser*, it is the same journal which hailed Bonaparte's coup d'état, and recently attacked an Irish paper for having dared to find fault with the Queen, on the occasion of her presence at Dublin, which reproaches the French Revolutionists with professing Republicanism, and continues to designate Lord Palmerston as the savior of England. The whole is a Palmerstonian trick. Palmerston, by the revelations of his Russianism and his opposition to the new Reform Bill, has become unpopular. The latter act has taken the liberal gilding off his musty gingerbread. Nevertheless, he wants popularity in order to become Premier, or at least Foreign Minister. What an admirable opportunity to stamp himself a Liberal again and to play the part of Brutus, persecuted by secret Court influences. Attack a Prince-Consort—how taking for the people. He'll be the most popular statesman of the age. What an admirable opportunity of casting obloquy on his present colleagues, of stigmatizing them as the tools of Prince Albert, and of convincing the Court that Palmerston must be accepted on his own terms. The Tories, of course, join in the cry, for church and crown are little to them compared with pounds and acres, and these the cotton-lords are

winning from them fast. And if the Tories, in the name of "constitution" and "liberty" talk daggers against a Prince, what enlightened Liberal would not throw himself worshipping at their feet [. . .]

The War Debate in Parliament

Published April 17, 1854

A singularity of English tragedy, so repulsive to French feelings that Voltaire used to call Shakespeare a drunken savage, is its peculiar mixture of the sublime and the base, the terrible and the ridiculous, the heroic and the burlesque. But nowhere does Shakespeare devolve upon the Clown the task of speaking the prologue of a heroic drama. This invention was reserved for the Coalition Ministry. Mylord Aberdeen has performed, if not the English Clown, at least the Italian Pantaloon. All great historical movements appear, to the superficial observer, finally to subside into the farce, or at least the common-place. But to commence with this is a feature peculiar alone to the tragedy entitled, *War with Russia*, the prologue of which was recited on Friday evening in both Houses of Parliament, where the Ministry's address in answer to Her Majesty's message was simultaneously discussed and unanimously adopted, to be handed over to the Queen yesterday afternoon, sitting upon her throne in Buckingham Palace. The proceedings in the House of Lords may be very briefly delineated. Lord Clarendon made the Ministerial, and Lord Derby the Opposition statement of the case. The one spoke as the man in office, and the other like the man out of it.

Lord Aberdeen, the noble Earl at the head of the Government, the "acrimonious" confidant of the Czar, the "dear, good, and excellent" Aberdeen of Louis Philippe, the "estimable gentleman" of Pius IX although concluding his sermon with his usual whinings for peace, caused, during the principal part of his performance, their lordships to be convulsed with laughter, by declaring war not on Russia, but on *The Press*, a London weekly

periodical. Lord Malmesbury retorted on the noble Earl; Lord Brougham, that "old, foolish woman," as he was styled by William Cobbett, discovered that the contest on which they were engaged was no "easy" one; Earl Grey, who, in his Christian spirit, had contrived to make the British Colonies the most miserable abodes of the world, reminded the British people that the tone and temper in which the war was referred to, the feeling of animosity evinced against the Czar and his Cossacks, was not the spirit in which a Christian nation ought to enter upon war. The Earl of Hardwicke was of opinion that England was weak in the means she possessed for dealing with the Russian navy; that they ought not to have a less force in the Baltic than 20 sail of the line, well armed and well manned, with disciplined crews, and not begin, as they had done, with a mob of newly raised men, a mob in a line of battle-ship during an action being the worst of all mobs. The Marquis of Lansdowne vindicated the Government, and expressed a hope as to the shortness and ultimate success of the war, because (and this is a characteristic mark of the noble lord's powers of conception) "it was no dynastic war, such a war involving the largest consequences, and which it was the most difficult to put an end to."

After this agreeable *conversazione* in which everybody had given his sentiment, the address was agreed to *nemine contradicente*.⁹²

All the new information to be gathered from this *conversazione* is limited to some official declarations on the part of Lord Clarendon, and the history of the secret memorandum of 1844.

Lord Clarendon stated that "at present the *agreement with France* consists simply of an *exchange of notes* containing arrangements with respect to military operations."

Consequently there exists, at this moment, *no treaty* between England and France. In reference to Austria and Prussia he stated that the former would maintain an armed neutrality, and the other a neutral neutrality; but that "with such a war as is now about to be waged upon the frontiers of both countries, it would be impossible for either power to preserve a neutrality." Finally he declared that the peace to be brought about by the

impending war, would only be a glorious peace "if they did secure equal rights and immunities for the Christian subjects of Turkey."

Now we know that the Sheik-ul-Islam has already been deposed for having refused to sanction by a fetva the treaty granting this equalization of rights; that the greatest excitement exists on the part of the old Turkish population at Constantinople; and by a telegraphic dispatch received to-day we learn that the Czar has declared to Prussia that he is willing to withdraw his troops from the Principalities if the Western Powers should succeed in imposing such a treaty upon the Porte. All he wants is to break the Osman rule.⁹³ If the Western Powers propose to do it in his stead, he, of course, is not the madman to wage war with them.

Now to the history of the secret memorandum, which I collect from the speeches of Derby, Aberdeen, Malmesbury and Granville. The memorandum was "intended to be a provisional, conditional and secret arrangement between Russia, Austria and England, to make certain arrangements with respect to Turkey, which France, without any consent on her part, was to be obliged to concur in."

This memorandum, thus described in the words of Lord Malmesbury, was the result of private conferences between the Czar, the Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. It was by the advice of Aberdeen that the Czar addressed himself to the Duke and to Sir Robert Peel. It remains a matter of controversy between Lord Aberdeen and his opponents, whether the memorandum was drawn up by Count Nesselrode, on the return of the Czar to St. Petersburg subsequently to his visit to England in 1844, or whether it was drawn up by the English Ministers themselves as a record of the communications made by the Emperor.

The connection of the Earl of Aberdeen with this document was distinguished from that of a mere Minister with an official document as proved, according to the statement of Malmesbury, *by another paper not laid before the House*. The document was considered of the greatest importance, and such as might not be communicated to the other powers, notwithstand-

ing Aberdeen's assurance that he had communicated the "substance" to France. The Czar, at all events, was not aware of such a communication having been made. The document was sanctioned and approved by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. It was not brought under the cognizance and consideration of the Peel Cabinet, of which Lord Derby was at that time a member. It remained not with the ordinary papers of the Foreign Office, but in the private custody of each successive Secretary of State, with no copy of it whatever in the Foreign Office. When Lord Derby acceded to office, he knew nothing of it, although himself a member of the Peel Cabinet in 1844. When the Earl of Aberdeen left office, he handed it over in a box to Lord Palmerston, who handed the box of Pandora over to his successor, Earl Granville, who, as he states himself, at the request of Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, handed it over to the Earl of Malmesbury on his accession to the Foreign Office. But, in the meantime, there appears to have been an alteration, or rather a falsification in the original indorsement of the document, since the Earl of Granville sent it to the Earl of Malmesbury with a note stating that it was a memorandum drawn up by *Baron Brunnow*, as the result of the conferences between the Emperor of Russia, Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen, the name of the Duke of Wellington not being mentioned at all. No other motive can be supposed for this false allegation but the anxiety to conceal the importance of the memorandum by describing it as a mere annotation of the Ambassador, instead of an official document issued from the Chancellory at St. Petersburg.

Such was the importance Russia attached to this document that 48 hours after Lord Malmesbury had been in office, Baron Brunnow came and asked him whether he had read it; but Malmesbury had not then done so, it being not forwarded to him till a few days after. Baron Brunnow urged on him the necessity of reading this document, which he stated *constituted the key of all conferences with Russia*. From that moment, however, he never mentioned the document again to the Derbyites, apparently judging the Tory Administration too powerless or too transitory for carrying out the Russian policy.

In December, 1852, the Derby Government went out, and shortly after the intelligence of the formation of the Coalition reaching St. Petersburg, on Jan. 11, the Czar again opened this question—a sufficient evidence this that he thought the cabinet of all the talents ready to act on the basis of this memorandum.

Here, then, we have the most compromising revelations made in the House of Lords by the most irreversible witnesses, all of them having been Prime or Foreign Ministers of Great Britain. An “eventual engagement”—the expression used in the memorandum—is secretly entered into with Russia by an English Foreign Minister, not only without the sanction of Parliament, but behind the backs of his own colleagues, two of them only having been initiated into the mystery. The paper is for ten years withheld from the Foreign Office and kept in clandestine custody by each successive Foreign Minister. Whenever a ministry disappears from the scene, the Russian Ambassador appears in Downing-st. and intimates to the new-comer that he had to look closely at the bond, the secret bond, entered into not between the nation as legally represented, but between some Cabinet-Minister and the Czar, and to act according to the line of conduct prescribed in a Russian memorandum drawn up in the Chancellory of St. Petersburg.

If this be not an open infraction of the Constitution, if not a conspiracy and high treason, if not collusion with Russia, we are at a loss to understand the meaning of these terms.

At the same time we understand from these revelations why the criminals, perfectly secure, are allowed to remain at the helm of the State, at the very epoch of an ostensible war with Russia, with whom they are convicted to have permanently conspired, and why the Parliamentary opposition is a mere sham, intended to annoy but not to impeach them. All Foreign Ministers, and consequently all the successive Administrations since 1844 are accomplices, each of them becoming so from the moment he neglected to accuse his predecessor and quietly accepted the mysterious box. By the mere affectation of secrecy each of them became guilty. Each of them became a party to the conspiracy by concealing it from Parliament. By law the concealer of stolen goods is as criminal as the thief. Any legal

proceeding, therefore, would ruin not only the Coalition, but their rivals also, and not only these Ministers, but the Parliamentary parties they represent, and not only those parties, but the governing classes of England.

[*Clearing of Estates in Scotland*]

Published June 2, 1854

[. . .] Your readers will remember my description of the process of clearing estates in Ireland and Scotland, which within the first half of this century swept away so many thousands of human beings from the soil of their fathers. The process still continues, and with a vigor quite worthy of that virtuous, refined, religious, philanthropic aristocracy of this model country. Houses are either fired or knocked to pieces over the heads of the helpless inmates. At Neagaat in Knoydart, the house of Donald Macdonald, a respectable, honest, hard-working man, was attacked last autumn by the landlord's order. His wife was confined to bed unfit to be removed, yet the factor and his ruffians turned out Macdonald's family of six children, all under 15 years of age, and demolished the house with the exception of one small bit of the roof over his wife's bed.

The man was so affected that his brain gave way. He has been declared insane by medical men, and he is now wandering about looking for his children among the ruins of the burnt and broken cottages. His starving children are crying around him, but he knows them not, and he is left roaming at large unaided and uncared for, because his insanity is harmless.

Two married females in an advanced stage of pregnancy had their houses pulled down about their ears. They had to sleep in the open air for many nights, and the consequence was that, amid excruciating sufferings, they had premature births, their reason became affected, and they are wandering about with large families, helpless and hopeless imbeciles, dreadful witnesses against that class of persons called the British aristocracy.

Even children are driven mad by terror and persecution. At

Doune, in Knoydart, the cottagers were evicted and took refuge in an old storehouse. The agents of the landlord surrounded that storehouse in the dead of night and set fire to it as the poor outcasts were cowering beneath its shelter. Frantic, they rushed from the flames, and some were driven mad by terror. *The Northern Ensign* newspaper says:

That one boy is deranged; that he will require to be placed in confinement; he jumps out of bed crying, "Fire! fire!" and assures those near him that there are men and children in the burning storehouse. Whenever night approaches, he is terrified at the sight of fire. The awful sight at Doune, when the storehouse was in flames, illuminating the district—when men, women, and children ran about half frantic with fear, gave such a shock to his reason.

Such is the conduct of the aristocracy to the able-bodied poor who make them rich [. . .]

But the ruffianism ends not here. A slaughter has been perpetrated at Strathcarron. Excited to frenzy by the cruelty of the evictions and the further ones that were expected, a number of women gathered in the streets on hearing that a number of sheriff's officers were coming to clear out the tenantry. The latter, however, were Excisemen, and not sheriff's officers; but on hearing that their real character was mistaken, these men instead of correcting the mistake, enjoyed it—gave themselves out for sheriff's officers, and said they came to turn the people out and were determined to do so. On the group of women becoming excited, the officers presented a loaded pistol at them. What followed we extract from the letter of Mr. Donald Ross, who went over from Glasgow to Strathcarron, and spent two days in the district, collecting information and examining the wounded. His letter is dated Royal Hotel, Tain, April 15, 1854, and states as follows:

My information goes to show a shameful course of conduct on the part of the sheriff. He did not warn the people of the intention on his part to let the police loose on them. He read no Riot Act.

He did not give them time to disperse; but, on the contrary, the moment he approached with his force, stick in hand, cried out: "Clear the way," and in the next breath said: "Knock them down," and immediately a scene ensued which baffles description. The policemen laid their heavy batons on the heads of the unfortunate females and leveled them to the ground, jumped and trampled upon them after they were down, and kicked them in every part of their bodies with savage brutality. The field was soon covered with blood. The cries of the women and of the boys and girls, lying weltering in their blood, was rending the very heavens. Some of the females, pursued by the policemen, jumped into the deep and rapid-rolling Carron, trusting to its mercies more than to that of the policeman or the sheriff. There were females who had parcels of their hair torn out by the batons of the policemen, and one girl had a piece of the flesh, about seven inches long by one and a quarter broad, and more than a quarter of an inch thick, torn off her shoulder by a violent blow with a baton. A young girl, who was only a mere spectator, was run after by three policemen. They struck her on the forehead, cut open her skull, and after she fell down they kicked her. The doctor abstracted from the wound a portion of the cap sunk into it by the baton of the savage police. The marks of their hobnails are still visible in her back shoulders. There are still in Strathcarron thirteen females in a state of great distress, owing to the brutal beating they received at the hands of the police. Three of these are so ill that their medical attendant has no hopes whatever of their recovery. It is my own firm conviction, from the appearance of these females and the dangerous nature of their wounds, coupled with medical reports which I have procured, that not one-half of these injured persons will recover; and all of them, should they linger on for a time, will bear about on their persons sad proofs of the horrid brutality to which they had been subjected. Among the number seriously wounded is a woman advanced in pregnancy. She was not among the crowd who met the sheriff, but at a considerable distance, just looking on; but she was violently struck and kicked by the policemen, and she is in a very dangerous condition.

We may further add that the women who were assailed numbered only eighteen. The name of the sheriff is Taylor.

Such is a picture of the British aristocracy in the year 1854 [...]

The English Middle Class

Published August 1, 1854

And as regards the journeyman of all descriptions, in what relation does he stand to his employer? All know with what opposition the employers met the "Ten Hours" bill. The Tories, out of spite for the recent loss of the Corn Laws, helped the working class to get it; but when passed, the reports of the district supervisors show with what shameless cunning and petty under-hand treacheries it was evaded. Every subsequent attempt in Parliament to subject Labor to more humane conditions has been met by the middle class representatives with the catch-cry of Communism! Mr. Cobden has acted thus a score of times. Within the workshops for years the aim of the employers has been to prolong the hours of labor beyond human endurance, and by an unprincipled use of the contract system, by pitting one man against another, to cut down the earning of the skilled to that of the unskilled laborer. It was this system that at last drove the Amalgamated Engineers to revolt, and the brutality of the expressions that passed current among the masters at that time showed how little of refined or humane feeling was to be looked for from them. Their boorish ignorance was further displayed in the employment by the Masters' Association of a certain third-rate litterateur, Sidney Smith, to undertake their defense in the public press and to carry on the war of words with their revolted hands. The style of their hired writer well fitted the task he had to perform, and when the battle was over, the Masters, having no more need of literature or the press, gave their hireling his congé. Although the middle class do not aim at the learning of the old school, they do not for that cultivate either modern science or literature.

The ledger, the desk, business, that is education sufficient. Their daughters, when expensively educated, are superficially endowed with a few "accomplishments;" but the real education of the mind and the storing it with knowledge is not even dreamed of.

The present splendid brotherhood of fiction-writers in England, whose graphic and eloquent pages have issued to the world more political and social truths than have been uttered by all the professional politicians, publicists and moralists put together, have described every section of the middle class from the "highly genteel" annuitant and Fundholder who looks upon all sorts of business as vulgar, to the little shopkeeper and lawyer's clerk. And how have Dickens and Thackeray, Miss Brontë and Mrs. Gaskell painted them? As full of presumption, affectation, petty tyranny and ignorance; and the civilized world has confirmed their verdict with the damning epigram that it has fixed to this class that "they are servile to those above, and tyrannical to those beneath them."

The cramped and narrow sphere in which they move is to a certain degree due to the social system of which they form a part. As the Russian nobility live uneasily betwixt the oppression of the Czar above them and the dread of the enslaved masses below them, so the English middle class are hemmed in by the aristocracy on the one hand and the working classes on the other. Since the peace of 1815, whenever the middle class have wished to take action against the aristocracy, they have told the working classes that their grievances were attributable to some aristocratic privilege and monopoly. By this means the middle class roused the working classes to help them in 1832 when they wanted the Reform Bill, and, having got a Reform Bill *for themselves*, have ever since refused one to the working classes—nay, in 1848, actually stood arrayed against them armed with special constable staves. Next, it was the repeal of the Corn Laws that would be the panacea for the working classes. Well, this was won from the aristocracy, but the "good time" was not yet come, and last year, as if to take away the last possibility of a similar policy for the future, the aristocracy were compelled to accede to a tax on the succession to real

estate—a tax which the same aristocracy had selfishly exempted themselves from in 1793, while they imposed it on the succession to personal estate. With this rag of a grievance vanished the last chance of gulling the working classes into the belief that their hard lot was due solely to aristocratic legislation. The eyes of the working classes are now fully opened: they begin to cry: “Our St. Petersburg is at Preston!” Indeed, the last eight months have seen a strange spectacle in the town—a standing army of 14,000 men and women subsidized by the trades unions and workshops of all parts of the United Kingdom, to fight out a grand social battle for mastery with the capitalists, and the capitalists of Preston, on their side, held up by the capitalists of Lancashire.

Whatever other shapes this social struggle may hereafter assume, we have seen only the beginning of it. It seems destined to nationalize itself and present phases never before seen in history; for it must be borne in mind that though temporary defeat may await the working classes, great social and economical laws are in operation which must eventually insure their triumph. The same industrial wave which has borne the middle class up against the aristocracy, is now assisted as it is and will be by emigration bearing the working classes up against the middle classes. Just as the middle class inflict blows upon the aristocracy, so will they receive them from the working classes. It is the instinctive perception of this fact that already fetters the action of that class against the aristocracy. The recent political agitations of the working classes have taught the middle class to hate and fear overt political movements. In their cant, “respectable men don’t join them, Sir”. The higher middle classes ape the aristocracy in their modes of life, and endeavor to connect themselves with it. The consequence is that the feudalism of England will not perish beneath the scarcely perceptible dissolving processes of the middle class; the honor of such a victory is reserved for the working classes. When the time shall be ripe for their recognized entry upon the stage of political action, there will be within the lists three powerful classes confronting each other—the first representing the land; the second, money; the third, labor. And as the second is tri-

umphing over the first, so, in its turn, it must yield before its successor in the field of political and social conflict.

Fall of the Aberdeen Ministry

Published February 17, 1855

Never in the whole annals of representative government has an administration been turned out half as ignominiously as the celebrated Cabinet of "all the Talents"⁹⁴ in England. To be in a minority is a thing which may happen to anybody, but to be defeated by 305 against 148, by more than two to one, in an assembly like the Commons' House of Great Britain, that was a distinction reserved for the galaxy of genius commanded by *ce cher Aberdeen*.

There is no doubt the Cabinet considered its days as numbered as soon as Parliament met. The scandalous proceedings in the Crimea, the utter ruin of the army, the helplessness of all and every one connected with the administration of the war, the outcry in the country, fed by the diatribes of *The Times*, the evident determination of John Bull to know for once who was to blame, or at least to wreak his wrath upon some one or another—all this must have proved to the Cabinet that the time had arrived when they must put their house in order.

Notices of threatening questions and motions were given in abundance and at once; above all, the notice of Mr. Roebuck's threatening motion,⁹⁵ for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war, and of all parties who had any responsibility in its administration. This brought matters to an issue at once. Lord John Russell's political scent made it at once clear to him that this motion would be adopted in spite of minorities; and a statesman like him, who boasts of more minorities than years, could not well afford to be again outvoted. Accordingly, Lord John Russell, with that spirit of pusillanimity and pettifogging meanness, which is visible during his entire career, through a cloak of important talkativity and constitutional precedentism, thought discretion the better part of valor, and decamped from

office without giving his colleagues even a moment's notice. Now, although he is a man who can hardly expect to be missed anywhere, yet it appears that "all the talents" were entirely upset by his sudden retreat. The press of Great Britain unanimously condemned the little statesman, but what of that? All the press and all its condemnations could not set the ministerial "higgledy piggedly" up again; and in this state of disorganization, with the Duke of Newcastle resigning the War Office, and Lord Palmerston not having taken possession of it, the Cabinet had to meet Mr. Roebuck's formidable motion.

Mr. Roebuck is a little lawyer, who would be just as funny a little Whig as Lord John Russell, and quite as inoffensive, had he only been more successful in his parliamentary career. But the *ci-devant* briefless barrister, and present parliamentary spouter, has failed, with all his sharpness and activity, to amass any political capital worth speaking of. Though generally a sort of secret and confidential understrapper to any Whig Ministry, he never succeeded in reaching that position which insures Place, the great goal of all British Liberals. Our friend Roebuck, blighted in his blandest hopes, underestimated by his own party, ridiculed by his opponents, gradually felt the milk of human kindness turning sour within his bosom, and became, by and by, as invidious, unsociable, unpleasant, provoking a little cur as ever barked on the floor of a House of Parliament. In this capacity he has served, in turns, all men who knew how to handle him, without ever gaining claims upon the gratitude or consideration of any party; and nobody knew how to make a better use of him than our old friend Palmerston, whose game he again was made to play on the 26th ult.

Mr. Roebuck's motion, as it actually stood, could hardly have any sense in an assembly like the British House of Commons. Everybody knows what clumsy, lazy, time-killing things the Committees of the Commons are; an investigation of the conduct of this war by such a committee would be of no practical use whatever, for its results would come many a month too late to do any good—even if any good did result from the inquiry. It is only in a revolutionary, dictatorial assembly like the French National Convention of 1793 that such committees might do

any good. But there the Government itself is nothing but such a committee—its agents are the commissioners of the assembly itself, and, therefore, in such an assembly similar motions would be superfluous. Yet, Mr. Sidney Herbert was not entirely wrong in pointing out that the motion (surely quite unintentionally on Mr. Roebuck's part) had a somewhat unconstitutional character, and in asking, with his usual historical accuracy, whether the House of Commons intended sending Commissioners to the Crimea, the same as the *Directory* (sic) did to General Dumouriez.⁹⁶ We may as well observe here that this same precious chronology which makes the Directory (instituted 1795) send Commissaries to Dumouriez, whom this latter General had arrested and delivered up to the Austrians as early as 1793—that this chronology is quite of a piece with the confusion of time and space reigning in all the operations of Mr. Sidney Herbert and colleagues. To return to Mr. Roebuck's motion, the informality alluded to served as a pretext to a great many candidates for place, not to vote for it, and thus to remain free to enter into any possible combination. And yet, the majority against Ministers was so crushing!

The debate itself was characterized particularly by the different departments of the Government quarreling among themselves. Each of them threw the blame upon the other. Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, said it was all the fault of the transport service; Bernal Osborne, Secretary of the Admiralty, said it was the viciously rotten system at the Horse Guards which was at the bottom of all the mischief; Admiral Berkeley, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, pretty distinctly advised Mr. Herbert to pull his own nose, &c. Similar amenities passed in the House of Lords, at the same time, between the Duke of Newcastle, War Minister, and Viscount Hardinge, Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Herbert's position, it is true, was rendered extremely difficult by Lord John Russell, who, in explanations respecting his resignation, confessed that all that the press had said on the state of the Crimean army was substantially correct, and that the condition of the troops was "horrid and heart-rending." After this, Sidney Herbert could do no better than to give in to the facts without a murmur, and to make a series of extremely

lame and partly unfounded excuses. He had to confess, even more pointedly, the complete incapacity and disorganization of the War Administration. We have succeeded with comparative ease in bringing 240,000 tons of stores of all descriptions, and a numerous army, after a 3,000 miles' journey, to Balaklava; and now follows a glowing account of all the clothing, the housing, the provisions, the luxuries even, sent in profusion to the army. But, alas! It was not at Balaklava they were wanted, but six miles higher up the country. Three thousand miles we can carry all the stores; but three thousand and six—impossible! The fact that they had to go six miles further has ruined everything!

For all that, his deprecating attitude might have aroused some pity for him, had it not been for the speeches of Layard, Stafford, and his own colleague, Gladstone. The two former members had but lately returned from the East; they had been eye-witnesses to what they recounted. And far from merely repeating what the papers had already published, they gave instances of neglect, mismanagement and incapacity; they described scenes of horror far surpassing what had been known before. Horses, shipped on sailing transports from Varna to Balaklava without any provender to feed them; knapsacks made to journey five or six times from the Crimea to the Bosphorus, while the men were starving, and cold and wet for want of their clothes contained in them; "reconvalescents" sent back for active duty to the Crimea while too weak to stand on their legs; then the disgraceful state of neglect, of exposure, of filth, to which the sick and wounded were exposed in Scutari, as well as in Balaklava and on board the transports—all this formed a picture, compared to which the descriptions of "Our Own Correspondent," or of private letters from the East, were pale in the extreme.

To counteract the terrible effect of these descriptions, the sapient self-complacency of Mr. Gladstone had to take its stand on the breach; and, unfortunately for Sidney Herbert, he retraced all the confessions made by his colleagues on the first night of the debate. Herbert had been asked point-blank by Roebuck: You sent 54,000 men from this country; there are now only

14,000 under arms; what has become of the remaining 40,000? Herbert merely replied by reminding Roebuck that some of them had died already at Gallipoli and Varna; he never questioned the general correctness of the numbers quoted as lost or disabled. But Gladstone now turns out to be better informed than the Secretary at War, and actually makes the army number, not 14,000, but 28,200 men, besides from 3,000 to 4,000 marines and sailors serving on shore, "at the dates of the last returns which have reached us!" Of course, Gladstone takes good care not to say what these "dates of the last returns" are. But in view of the exemplary idleness displayed in all departments, and most particularly in the Brigade, Divisional and General Staffs, as evinced by the slow returns of casualties, we may be allowed to suppose that Mr. Gladstone's wonderful returns bear a date somewhere about the first of December, 1854, and include a great many men who were definitively knocked up by the six weeks bad weather and overwork following that date. Gladstone appears actually to have that blind faith in official documents which he on former occasions expected the public to have in his financial statements.

I will not enter into a more lengthened analysis of the debate. Beside a host of *dii minorum gentium*,⁹⁷ Disraeli spoke, also Walpole, the late Tory Home Secretary, and finally Palmerston, who "nobly" stood up for his calumniated colleagues. Not a word had he said in the whole course of the debate, until he had ascertained its drift clearly. Then, and then only, he got up. The rumors brought up to the Treasury Bench by their understrappers, the general disposition of the House, made a defeat certain—a defeat which ruined his colleagues, but could not injure him. Though ostensibly turned out along with the remainder, he was so safe of his position, he was so sure to profit by their retirement, that it devolved upon him, almost as a duty of courtesy, to bow them out. And of this he acquitted himself by his speech just before the division.

Palmerston, indeed, has managed his resources well. Voted to be, on the Pacifico question,⁹⁸ the "truly English Minister," he has held that character ever since, to such an extent that in spite of all astounding revelations, John Bull always thought

himself sold to some foreign power as soon as Palmerston left the Foreign Office. Ejected out of this office by Lord John Russell in a very unceremonious way, he frightened that little man into silence respecting the causes of this ejection, and from that moment the "truly English Minister" excited a fresh interest as the innocent victim of ambitious and incapable colleagues, as the man whom the Whigs had betrayed. After the downfall of the Derby Ministry, he was put into the Home Office, a position which again made him appear the victim. They could not do without the great man whom they all hated, and as they would not put him into that position which belonged to him, they put him off with a place far too low for such a genius. So thought John Bull, and was prouder still of his Palmerston, when he saw how the truly English Minister bustled about in his subordinate place, meddling with Justices of the Peace, interfering with cabmen, reprimanding Boards of Sewerage, trying his powers of eloquence upon the licensing system, grappling with the great Smoke Question, attempting police centralization, and putting a barrier in the way of intramural interments. The truly English Minister! His rule of conduct, his source of information, his treasury of new measures and reforms, were the interminable letters of "Paterfamilias" in *The Times*. Of course, nobody was better pleased than Paterfamilias, whose like form the majority of the voting middle classes of England, and Palmerston became their idol. "See what a great man can make of a little place! what former Home Secretary ever thought of removing such nuisances!" For all that, neither were cabs reformed, nor smoke suppressed, nor intramural churchyards done away with, nor the police centralized, nor any of these great reforms carried—but that was the fault of Palmerston's envious and thick-headed colleagues! By and by, this bustling, meddling propensity was considered as the proof of great energy and activity; and this unsteadiest of all English statesmen, who never could bring either a negotiation or a bill in Parliament to a satisfactory issue, this politician who stirs about for the fun of the thing, and whose measures all end in being allowed to go quietly to sleep—this same Palmerston was puffed up as the only man whom his country

could count upon in great emergencies. The truth is, he contributed a great deal to this puffing himself. Not content with being co-proprietor of *The Morning Post*, where he was advertised every day as the future savior of his country, he hired fellows like the Chevalier Wykoff⁹⁹ to spread his praise in France and America; he bribed, a few months ago, *The Daily News*, by communication of telegraphic dispatches and other useful hints; he had a hand in the management of almost every paper in London. The mismanagement of the war brought on that emergency in which he intended to rise great, unattained and unattainable, upon the ruins of the Coalition. In this decisive moment he procured the unreserved support of *The Times*. How he managed to bring this about, what contract he made with Mr. Delane,¹⁰⁰ of course we cannot tell. Thus, the day after the vote, the whole daily press of London, *The Herald* only excepted, with one voice cried out for Palmerston as Premier; and we suppose he thought he had obtained the object of his wishes. Unfortunately, the Queen has seen too much of the truly English Minister, and will not submit to him, if she can help it.

[*The Increase of Lunacy in Great Britain*]

Published August 20, 1858

There is, perhaps, no better established fact in British society than that of the corresponding growth of modern wealth and pauperism. Curiously enough, the same law seems to hold good with respect to lunacy. The increase of lunacy in Great Britain has kept pace with the increase of exports, and has outstripped the increase of population. Its rapid progress in England and Wales during the period extending from 1852 to 1857, a period of unprecedented commercial prosperity, will become evident from the following tabular comparison of the annual returns of paupers, lunatics and idiots for the years 1852, 1854 and 1857:

Date.	Population.	Patients in County or Borough Asylums.	In licensed houses.	In Work- houses.	With friends or elsewhere.	Total of Lunatics and Idiots.	Proportion to population.
Jan. 1, 1852	17,927,609	9,412	2,584	5,055	4,107	21,158	1 in 847
Jan. 1, 1854	18,649,849	11,956	1,878	5,713	4,940	24,487	1 in 762
Jan. 1, 1857	19,408,464	13,488	1,908	6,800	5,497	27,693	1 in 701

The proportion of acute and curable cases to those of a chronic and apparently incurable kind was, on the last day of 1856, estimated to be somewhat less than 1 in 5, according to the following summary of official returns:

	Patients of all classes in Asylums.	Deemed curable.
In County and Borough Asylums	14,393	2,070
In Hospitals	1,742	340
In Metropolitan licensed Houses	2,578	390
In Provincial licensed Houses	2,598	527
Total	21,311	3,327
Deemed curable	3,327	
Deemed incurable	17,984	

There exist in England and Wales, for the accommodation of lunatics and idiots of all sorts and of all classes, 37 public asylums, of which 33 are county and 4 borough asylums; 15 hospitals; 116 private licensed houses, of which 37 are metropolitan and 79 provincial; and lastly, the workhouses. The public asylums, or lunatic asylums properly so called, were, by law, exclusively destined for the reception of the lunatic poor, to be used as hospitals for the medical treatment, not as safe places for the mere custody of the insane. On the whole, in the counties at least, they may be considered well regulated establishments, although of too extensive a construction to

be properly superintended, overcrowded, lacking the careful separation of the different classes of patients, and yet inadequate to the accommodation of somewhat more than one-half of the lunatic poor. After all, the space afforded by these 37 establishments, spreading over the whole country, suffices for the housing of over 15,690 inmates. The pressure upon these costly asylums on the part of the lunatic population may be illustrated by one case. When, in 1831, Hanwell (in Middlesex) was built for 500 patients, it was supposed to be large enough to meet all the wants of the county. But, two years later, it was full; after another two years, it had to be enlarged for 300 more; and at this time (Colney Hatch having been meanwhile constructed for the reception of 1,200 lunatic paupers belonging to the same county) Hanwell contains upward of 1,000 patients. Colney Hatch was opened in 1851; within a period of less than five years, it became necessary to appeal to the rate-payers for further accommodation; and the latest returns show that at the close of 1856 there were more than 1,100 pauper lunatics belonging to the county unprovided for in either of its asylums. While the existing asylums are too large to be properly conducted, their number is too small to meet rapid spread of mental disorders. Above all, the asylums ought to be separated into two distinct categories: asylums for the incurable, hospitals for the curable. By huddling both classes together, neither receives its proper treatment and cure.

The private licensed houses are, on the whole, reserved for the more affluent portion of the insane. Against these "snug retreats," as they like to call themselves, public indignation has been lately raised by the kidnapping of Lady Bulwer into Wyke House, and the atrocious outrages committed on Mrs. Turner in Acomb House, York.¹⁰¹ A Parliamentary inquiry into the secrets of the trade in British lunacy being imminent, we may refer to that part of the subject hereafter. For the present let us call attention only to the treatment of the 2,000 lunatic poor, whom, by way of contract, the Boards of Guardians and other local authorities let out to managers of private licensed houses. The weekly consideration per head for maintenance, treatment and clothing, allotted to these private contractors, varies from

five to twelve shillings, but the average allowance may be estimated from 5s. to 8s. 4d. The whole study of the contractors consists, of course, in the one single point of making large profits out of these small receipts, and consequently of keeping the patient at the lowest possible expense. In their latest report the Commissioners of Lunacy state that even where the means of accommodation in these licensed houses are large and ample, the actual accommodation afforded is a mere sham, and the treatment of the inmates a disgrace.

It is true that a power is vested in the Lord Chancellor of revoking a license or preventing its renewal, on the advice of the Commissioners in Lunacy; but, in many instances, where there exists no public asylum in the neighborhood, or where the existing asylum is already overcrowded, no alternative was left the Commissioners but to prevent the license to continue, or to throw large masses of the insane poor into their several workhouses. Yet, the same Commissioners add that great as are the evils of the licensed houses, they are not so great as the danger and evil combined of leaving those paupers almost uncared for in workhouses. In the latter about 7,000 lunatics are at present confined. At first the lunatic wards in workhouses were restricted to the reception of such pauper lunatics as required little more than ordinary accommodation, and were capable of associating with the other inmates. What with the difficulty of obtaining admission for their insane poor into properly regulated asylums, what with motives of parsimony, the parochial boards are more and more transforming the workhouses into lunatic asylums, but into asylums wanting in the attendance, the treatment and the supervision which form the principal safeguard of patients detained in asylums regularly constituted. Many of the larger workhouses have lunatic wards containing from 40 to 120 inmates. The wards are gloomy and unprovided with any means for occupation, exercise or amusement. The attendants for the most part are pauper inmates totally unfitted for the charge imposed upon them. The diet, essential above everything else to the unhappy objects of mental disease, rarely exceeds in any case that allowed for the healthy and able-bodied inmates. Hence, it is a natural result

that detention in workhouses not only deteriorates the cases of harmless imbecility for which it was originally intended, but has the tendency to render chronic and permanent cases that might have yielded to early care. The decisive principle for the Boards of Guardians is economy.

According to law, the insane pauper should come at first under the care of the district parish surgeon, who is bound to give notice to the relieving officers, by whom communication is to be made to the magistrate, upon whose order they are to be conveyed to the asylum. In fact, these provisions are disregarded altogether. The pauper lunatics are in the first instance hurried into the workhouses, there to be permanently detained, if found to be manageable. The recommendation of the Commissioners in Lunacy, during their visits to the workhouses, of removing to the asylums all inmates considered to be curable, or to be exposed to treatment unsuited to their state, is generally outweighed by the report of the medical officer of the Union, to the effect that the patient is "harmless." What the workhouse accommodation is, may be understood from the following illustrations described in the last Lunacy Report as "faithfully exhibiting the general characteristics of workhouse accommodation."

In the Infirmary Asylum of Norwich the beds of even the sick and feeble patients were of straw. The floors of thirteen small rooms were of stone. There were no water-closets. The night-watch on the male side had been discontinued. There was a great deficiency of blankets, of toweling, of flannels, of waistcoats, of washing basins, of chairs, of plates, of spoons and of dining accommodation. The ventilation was bad. We quote:


Neither was there any faith to be put in what, to outward appearance, might have been taken for improvement. It was discovered, for example, that in reference to a considerable number of beds occupied by dirty patients, the practice exists of removing them in the morning and of substituting, merely for show during the day, clean beds of a better appearance, by means of sheets and blankets placed on the bedsteads, which were regularly taken away at night and the inferior beds replaced.

Take, as another example, the Blackburn Workhouse:

The day rooms on the ground floor, occupied by the men, are small, low, gloomy and dirty, and the space containing 11 patients is much taken up by several heavy chairs, in which the patients are confined by means of straps, and a large, projecting fire-guard. Those of the women, on the upper floor, are also much crowded, and one, which is used also as a bedroom has a large portion boarded off as a privy; and the beds are placed close together, without any space between them. A bedroom containing 16 male patients was close and offensive. The room is 29 feet long, 17 feet 10 inches wide, and 7 feet 5 inches high, thus allowing 2.39 cubic feet for each patient. The beds throughout are of straw, and no other description is provided for sick or bed-ridden patients. The cases were generally much soiled and marked by the rusty iron laths of the bedsteads. The care of the beds seems to be chiefly left to the patients. A large number of the patients are dirty in their habits, which is mainly to be attributed to the want of proper care and attention. Very few chamber utensils are provided, and a tub is stated to be placed in the center of the large dormitory for the use of the male patients. The graveled yard in which the patients walk are two for each sex, surrounded by high walls, and without seats. The largest of these is 74 feet long, by 30 feet 7 inches wide, and the smallest 32 feet by 17 feet 6 inches. A cell in one of the yards is occasionally used for secluding excited patients. It is entirely built of stone, and has a small, square opening for the admission of light, with iron bars let in to prevent the escape of the patient, but without either shutter or casement. A large straw bed was on the floor, and a heavy chair in one corner of the room. Complete control of the department is in the hands of an attendant and the nurse: the master seldom interferes with them, nor does he inspect this as closely as he does the other parts of the workhouse.

It would be too loathsome even to give extracts from the Commissioners' report on the St. Pancras Workhouse at London, a sort of low Pandemonium. Generally speaking, there are few English stables which, at the side of the lunatic wards

in the workhouses, would not appear boudoirs, and where the treatment received by the quadrupeds may not be called sentimental when compared to that of the poor insane.



ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

One of the joys of reading Marx's journalistic writings is that they encompass a remarkably wide range of topics and writing styles. Depending on his subject matter, he was equally adept at employing the rhetorical tools of an economics professor, a political pamphleteer or even a tabloid sensationalist (how else can one characterize his description of factory operators as "vampyres fattening on the life-blood of the young working generation"). Yet each of these approaches seemed necessary to describe the 1850s, a period in which economic reality was changing faster than anyone could wholly perceive. This period saw the emergence, for the first time in human history, of truly global trade, albeit restricted to a few established channels and monopolies. The total value of international trade between 1800 and 1830, for example, grew from about £300 million to £400 million; in the period from 1840 to 1870 it grew more than fivefold, to more than £2,000 million.¹

Such "globalization" led many optimistic merchants and statesmen to believe that the secret of permanent economic growth had been discovered. Marx, by contrast, felt compelled to document all the ways in which this global trade spurt brought growing pains with it; he was convinced, for example, that in Britain pauperism rose with the institution of free trade, instead of shrinking as its advocates predicted. And he also saw that increased exports required longer working hours in England's factories, even if that fell afoul of the few laws that existed to protect their workers (many of whom were children).

But perhaps the most profound, dynamic economic phenomenon emerging in this period was the growing interdependence

between the state and the tools of private finance. A full-fledged recession struck the global economy in 1857; Marx had been divining its trail for several years. His writing on economics in this period captured, perhaps for the first time, the fact that the crisis in the working of the capitalist system was not simply a downturn in the economic cycle, or a breakdown in the operations of factories. Rather, it had to be seen as a systematic breakdown of the entire structure of European governments. Why? Because the Industrial Revolution had brought with it entirely new forms of government-sponsored credit and massive privately financed infrastructure projects which depended on government backing. Picking apart such schemes became a particular expertise of Marx's newspaper writing, sometimes with due earnestness—as with the three-part series on France's *Crédit Mobilier* bank—and sometimes with a Swiftian sense of the absurd—as with his critique of the "Project for the Regulation of the Price of Bread in France". Some latter-day Marxist scholars, such as Rosdolsky and Bologna, see these forays into the workings of public financial systems as a key transition point between Marx's earlier philosophical works and the more developed economic theories of *Capital*. Regardless of their place in the Marxist universe, they are unique journalistic contributions to the understanding of early state-supported capitalism.

NOTE

1. These figures are cited in Eric Hobsbawm's classic *Industry and Empire*, rev edn. (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 117.

*Pauperism and Free Trade.—The Approaching
Commercial Crisis*

Published November 1, 1852

In a malt-house in Banbury, Mr. Henley, President of the Board of Trade, lately explained to his assembled farming friends that Pauperism had decreased but by circumstances which had nothing to do with free trade; and above all, by the *famine of Ireland*, the discovery of gold abroad, the exodus of Ireland, the great demand consequent thereon for British shipping, &c., &c. We must confess that "the famine" is quite as radical a remedy against Pauperism as arsenic is against rats. "At least," observes *The London Economist*, "the Tories must admit the existing prosperity and its natural result, the emptied workhouses."

The Economist then attempts to prove to this incredulous President of the Board of Trade, that workhouses have emptied themselves in consequence of free trade, and that if free trade is allowed to take its full development, they are likely to disappear altogether from the British soil. It is a pity that *The Economist's* statistics do not prove what they are intended to prove.

Modern industry and commerce, it is well known, pass through periodical cycles of from 5 to 7 years, in which they, in regular succession, go through the different states of quiescence—next improvement—growing confidence—activity—prosperity—excitement—over-trading—convulsion—pressure—stagnation—distress—ending again in quiescence.

Recollecting this fact, we will revert to the statistics of *The Economist*.

From 1834, when the sum expended for the relief of the poor amounted to £6,317,255, it fell to a minimum of £4,044,741 in 1837. From that date it rose again every year until 1843, when it reached £5,208,027. In 1844, '45 and '46, it again fell to £4,954,204, and rose again in 1847 and '48, in which latter year it amounted to £6,180,764,—almost as high as in 1834, before the introduction of the new Poor Law.¹⁰² In 1849, '50, '51 and '52 it fell again to £4,724,619. But the period of 1834–37 was a period of prosperity; that of 1838–42, a period of

crisis and stagnation; 1843-46, a period of prosperity; 1847 and '48, a period of crisis and stagnation, and 1849-1852 again a period of prosperity.

What, then, prove these statistics? In the best of cases, the common-place tautology that British pauperism rises and falls with the alternate periods of stagnation and prosperity, independently of either free trade or protection. Nay, in the free trade year of 1852 we find the Poor Law expenditures higher by £679,878 than in the year of protection, 1837, in spite of the Irish Famine,¹⁰³ the "nuggets" of Australia,¹⁰⁴ and the steady stream of emigration.

Another British Free Trade paper attempts to prove that exports rise with free trade, and prosperity with exports, and that with prosperity pauperism must decrease and finally disappear; and the following figures are to prove this. The number of able-bodied human beings doomed to subsist by parish support was:

Jan. 1, 1849, in 590 Unions, 201,644
Jan. 1, 1850, in 606 Unions, 181,159
Jan. 1, 1851, in 606 Unions, 154,525

Comparing herewith the export lists, we find, for exports of British and Irish manufacture:

1848	£48,946,395
1849	58,910,833
1850	65,756,035

And what proves this table? An increase of exports of £9,964,438 redeemed above 20,000 persons from pauperism in 1849; a further increase of £6,845,202 redeemed 26,634 more in 1850. Now, even supposing free trade to do entirely away with the industrial cycles and their vicissitudes, then the redemption of the total number of able-bodied paupers would, under the present system, require an additional increase of the foreign trade of £50,000,000 annually, that is to say, an increase of very near 100 per cent. And these sober-minded

Bourgeois statisticians have the courage to speak of "Utopists."—Verily, there are no greater Utopists in existence than these Bourgeois optimists.

I have just got hold of the documents published by the Poor Law Board. They prove indeed that we are experiencing a numerical decrease of paupers against 1848 and '51. But from these papers there follows at the same time: From 1841-'44 the average of paupers was 1,431,571—1845-'48 it was 1,600,257. In 1850 there were 1,809,308 paupers receiving in-door and out-door relief, and in 1851 they numbered 1,600,329, or rather more than the average of 1845-'48. Now, if we compare these numbers with the population as verified by the census, we find that there were in 1841-'48, 89 paupers to every 1,000 of the population, and 90 in 1851. Thus in reality pauperism has increased above the average of 1841-'48, and that in spite of free trade, famine, prosperity, in spite of the nuggets of Australia and the stream of emigration [. . .]

Either side of the Bourgeois commercial policy, Free Trade or Protection, is, of course, equally incapable of doing away with facts that are the mere necessary and natural results of the economical base of Bourgeois society. And a matter of a million of paupers in the British workhouses is as inseparable from British prosperity, as the existence of eighteen to twenty millions in gold in the Bank of England [. . .]

The Labor Question

Published November 28, 1853

Golden opportunities, and the use made of them, is the title of one of the most tragi-comical effusions of the grave and profound *Economist*. The "golden opportunities" were, of course, afforded by free trade, and the "use" or rather "abuse" made of them refers to the working classes.

The working classes, for the first time, had their future in their own hands! The population of the United Kingdom began actu-

ally to *diminish*, the emigration carrying off more than its natural increase. How have the workingmen used their opportunity? What have they done? Just what they used to do formerly, on every recurrence of temporary sunshine, married and multiplied as fast as possible . . . At this rate of increase it will not be long before emigration is effectually counterbalanced, and the golden opportunity thrown away.

The golden opportunity of *not* marrying and *not* multiplying, except at the orthodox rate allowed by Malthus and his disciples! Golden morality this! But, till now, according to *The Economist* itself, population has diminished, and has not yet counterbalanced emigration. Overpopulation, then, will not account for the disasters of the times. "The next use the laboring classes should have made of their rare occasion ought to have been to accumulate savings and become capitalists . . . In scarcely one instance do they seem to have . . . risen, or begun to rise, into the rank of capitalists . . . They have thrown away their opportunity."

The opportunity of becoming capitalists! At the same time *The Economist* tells the workingmen that, after they had at last obtained ten per cent. on their former earnings, they were able to pocket 16s. 6d. a week instead of 15s. Now, the mean wages are too highly calculated at 15s. per week. But never mind. How to become a capitalist out of 15 shillings a week! That is a problem worthy of study. The workingmen had the false idea that in order to ameliorate their situation they must try to ameliorate their incomes. "They have struck," says *The Economist*, "for more than would have done them any service." With 15 shillings a week they had the very opportunity of becoming *capitalists*, but with 16s. 6d. this opportunity would be gone. On the one hand workingmen must keep hands scarce and capital abundant, in order to be able to force on the capitalists a rise of wages. But if capital turns out to be abundant and labor to be scarce, they must by no means avail themselves of that power for the acquisition of which they were to stop marrying and multiplying. "They have lived more luxuriously." Under the Corn Laws, we are told by the same *Economist*, they

were but half-fed, half-clothed, and more or less starved. If they were then to live at all, how could they contrive to live less luxuriously than before? The tables of importation were again and again unfolded by *The Economist*, to prove the growing prosperity of the people and the soundness of the business done. What was thus proclaimed as a test of the unspeakable blessings of free trade, is now denounced as a proof of the foolish extravagance of the working classes. We remain, however, at a loss to understand how importation can go on increasing with a decreasing population and a declining consumption: how exportation can continue to rise with diminishing importation, and how industry and commerce can expand themselves with imports and exports contracted.

The third use made of the golden opportunity should have been to procure the best possible education for themselves and their children, so as to fit themselves for the improvement in their circumstances, and to learn how to turn it to the best account. Unhappily, we are obliged to state that . . . schools have seldom been so ill attended, or school fees so ill paid.

Is there anything marvellous in this fact? Brisk trade was synonymous with enlarged factories, with increased application of machinery, with more adult laborers being replaced by women and children, with prolonged hours of work. The more the mill was attended by the mother and the child, the less could the school be frequented. And, after all, of what sort of education would you have given the opportunity to the parents and their children? The opportunity of learning how to keep population at the pace described by Malthus, says *The Economist*. Education, says Mr. Cobden, would show the men that filthy, badly ventilated, overstocked lodgings, are not the best means of conserving health and vigor. As well might you save a man from starving by telling him that the laws of Nature demand a perpetual supply of food for the human body. Education, says *The Daily News*, would have informed our working classes how to extract nutritive substance out of dry bones—how to make tea cakes of starch, and how to boil soup with devil's dust.

If we sum up then the golden opportunities which have thus been thrown away by the working classes, they consist of the golden opportunity of *not* marrying, of the opportunity of living *less* luxuriously, of not asking for higher wages, of becoming capitalists at 15 shillings a week, and of learning how to keep the body together with coarser food, and how to degrade the soul with the pestiferous doctrines of Malthus [. . .]

The Commercial Crisis in Britain

Published January 26, 1855

The English commercial crisis, whose premonitory symptoms were long ago chronicled in our columns, is a fact now loudly proclaimed by the highest authorities in this matter—the annual circulars issued from the British Chambers of Commerce, and the leading commercial firms of the kingdom, along with extensive bankruptcies, mills running short-time, and stinted export tables, which speak to the same effect. According to the latest official “accounts relating to trade and navigation,” the declared value of enumerated articles of export in the month ending Dec. 5, was:

	1852	1853	1854
	£6,033,030	£7,628,760	£5,771,772
Decrease in 1854	£ 261,258	£1,856,988	

One cannot be astonished at the endeavor of the professional free-traders of Great Britain to show that the present crisis, instead of flowing from the natural working of the modern English system, and being altogether akin to the crises experienced at periodical intervals almost since the end of the 18th century, must, on the contrary, proceed from accidental and exceptional circumstances. According to the tenets of their school, commercial crises were out of the question after the corn laws were abrogated, and free-trade principles adopted by

the British legislature. Now they not only have high prices of corn with an abundant harvest, but also a commercial crisis. California and Australia added to the markets of the world and pouring forth their golden streams, with electric telegraphs transforming the whole of Europe in one single Stock Exchange, and with railways and steamers centuplicating the means of communication and of exchange. If their panacea had to be put to the test, they could not have expected to do it under circumstances more favorable than those which signalize the period from 1849 to 1854 in the history of trade and commerce.

They have failed to realize their promises, and naturally enough the war¹⁰⁵ is now to be made the scapegoat of free-trade, just as the revolution in 1848 was. They cannot deny, however, that to a certain extent, the Oriental complication has delayed the revulsion, by acting as a check on the spirit of reckless enterprise, and turning part of the surplus capital to the loans recently contracted by most of the European powers; that some trades, like the iron trade, the leather trade and wool trade, have received some support from the extraordinary demand the war has created for these products; and, lastly, that in other trades, like the shipping, the woad trade, etc., where exaggerated notions as to the effects of the war fostered over-speculation on both sides of the Atlantic, only a partial outlet has been furnished to the already ruling and universal tendency to over-trading. However, their principal argument amounts to this, that the war has produced high prices for all sorts of grain, which high prices have engendered the crisis.

Now, it will be recollected that the average prices of corn ruled higher in 1853 than in 1854. If, then, these high prices are not to account for the unprecedented prosperity of 1853, they can as little account for the revulsion of 1854. The year 1836 was marked by commercial revulsion, notwithstanding its low corn prices; 1824 as well as 1853 were years of exceptional prosperity, notwithstanding the high prices that ruled in all sorts of provisions. The truth is, that although high corn prices may cripple industrial and commercial prosperity by contracting the home market, the home market in a country like Great Britain will never turn the balance, unless all foreign

markets be already hopelessly overstocked. High corn prices must, therefore, in such a country, aggravate and prolong the revulsion; which, however, they are unable to create. Besides, it must not be forgotten that, conforming to the true doctrine of the Manchester School, high corn prices, if produced by the regular course of nature, instead of by the working of protection, prohibitive laws and sliding scales, altogether lose their fatal influence, and may even work advantageously by benefiting the farmers. As the two very deficient harvests of 1852 and 1853 cannot be denied to have been natural events, the free-traders turn around upon the year 1854, and affirm that the Oriental war, working like a protective duty, has produced high prices notwithstanding a plentiful harvest. Putting aside, then, the general influence of the prices of breadstuffs upon industry, the question arises as to the influence exerted by the present war upon these prices.

The Russian importation of wheat and flour constitutes about 19 per cent. of the entire importation of the United Kingdom, and its whole importations forming but about 20 per cent. of its aggregate consumption, Russia affords but little more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the whole. According to the latest official returns which do not extend over the first nine months of 1853, the entire imports of wheat into Great Britain were 3,770,921 qrs., of which 773,507 were from Russia, and 209,000 from Wallachia and Moldavia. Of flour, the entire imports amounted to 3,800,746 cwts., of which 64 were supplied from Russia, and none at all from the Principalities. Such was the case before the war broke out. During the corresponding months of 1854, the importation of wheat from Russian ports direct was 505,000 qrs., against 773,507 in 1853, and from the Danubian Principalities 118,000 against 209,000; being a deficiency of 359,507 qrs. If it be considered that the harvest of 1854 was a superior, and that of 1853 a very bad one, nobody will affirm that such a deficiency could have exerted any perceptible influence on prices. We see, on the contrary, from the official returns of the weekly sales in the English market of home-grown wheat—these returns representing but a small portion of the entire sales of the country—that in the months

of October and November, 1854, 1,109,148 qrs. were sold, against 758,061 qrs. in the corresponding months of 1853—more than making up for the deficiency said to have been caused by the Russian war. We may remark, also, that had the English Cabinet not caused large stores of Turkish wheat to rot in the granaries of the Principalities by stupidly or treacherously blockading the Sulina, mouth of the Danube, and thus cutting off their own supplies, the war with Russia would not have stinted the importation of wheat even to the small amount it has done. Nearly two-thirds of the London imports of foreign flour being derived from the United States, it must be admitted that the failure of the American supply in the last quarter of 1854 was a much more important event for the provision trade than the Russian war.

If we are asked how to explain the high prices of corn in Great Britain in the face of an abundant harvest, we shall state that more than once during the course of 1853, the fact was pointed at in *The Tribune*, that the free-trade delusions had caused the greatest possible irregularities and errors to take place in the operations of the British corn-trade, by depressing prices in the summer months below their natural level, when their advance alone should have secured the necessary supplies and sufficient orders for future purchases. Thus it happened that the imports in the months of July, August, September and October, 1854, reached but 750,000 qrs. against 2,132,000 qrs. in the corresponding months of 1853. Besides, it can hardly be doubted that consequent upon the repeal of the corn laws such large tracts of arable land were transformed into pasture in Britain, as to make even an abundant harvest, under the new regime, relatively defective. "Consequently," to quote a circular of the Hull Chamber of Commerce, "the United Kingdom commences the year 1855 with very small stocks of foreign wheat, and with prices almost as high as in the beginning of 1854, while depending almost entirely on its own farmers' supplies until spring."

The reason of the English commercial revulsion of 1854, which is not likely to assume its true dimensions before the spring of the present year, is contained in the following few

arithmetical characters: The exports of British produce and manufactures having amounted, in 1846, to £57,786,000, reached, in 1853, the enormous value of £98,000,000. Of those £98,000,000 of 1853, Australia, which, in 1842, had taken off less than one million, and in 1850, about three millions, absorbed near fifteen millions; while the United States, which, in 1842, had only consumed £3,582,000, and, in 1850, somewhat less than £15,000,000, now took the enormous amount of £24,000,000. The necessary reaction upon the English trade of the American crisis, and the hopelessly glutted Australian markets, need no further explanation. In 1837 the American crisis followed at the heels of the English crisis of 1836, while now the English crisis follows in the tracks of the American one; but, in both instances, the crisis may be traced to the same source—the fatal working of the English industrial system which leads to over-production in Great Britain, and to over-speculation in all other countries. The Australian and the United States markets, so far from forming exceptions, are only the highest expressions of the general condition of the markets of the world, both being about equally dependent upon England. “We have the facts staring us in the face of glutted foreign markets and unprofitable returns, with few exceptions,” exclaims a Manchester circular, relating to the cotton trade. “Most of the foreign markets,” says another circular, relating to the silk trade, “usual vents for our surplus manufactures, have been groaning under the effects of overtrading.” “Production was enormously increased,” we are told by an account of the Bradford Worsted trade, “and the goods, for a time, found an outlet in foreign markets. Much irregular business has been done in reckless consignments of goods abroad, and we need scarcely remark that the results generally have been of the most unsatisfactory character.”

And so we might quote from a score of leading commercial circulars that reached us by the *Pacific*.

The Spanish Revolution and the consequent activity of smuggling in that quarter, has created an exceptional market for British produce. The Levant market, consequent upon the apprehensions arising from the Oriental war, seems to be the

only one which had not been overdone, but some three months since, as we learn, Lancashire set about retrieving what had been neglected in that quarter, and at this very moment we are told that Constantinople is also groaning under the overwhelming masses of cottons, woollens, hardware, cutlery, and all sorts of British merchandise. China is the only country where it can be pretended that political events have exerted a perceptible influence on the development of the commercial revulsion. "The hopes entertained about the gradual increase in our export trade with China," says a Manchester house, "have been almost entirely dispelled, and the rebellion spreading at present, in that country, at first considered as favorable to foreign intercourse, seems now to be organized for the depredation of the country and the total ruin of trade. The export trade with China, which once was expected to increase greatly, has almost entirely ceased."

Our readers will perhaps remember¹⁰⁶ that when the Chinese revolution first assumed anything like serious dimensions, we predicted the disastrous consequences now complained of by the English exporting houses.

While denying all connection between the war and the commercial crisis, the symptoms of which had become apparent before the war was ever thought of, we are of course aware that the latter may dangerously aggravate the severe ordeal Great Britain will now have to pass through. The continuance of the war is tantamount to an increase of taxation, and increased taxes are certainly no cure for diminished incomes.

The French Crédit Mobilier [I]

Published June 7, 1856

The London *Times* of the 30th of May is much surprised at the discovery that Socialism in France had never disappeared, but had rather been forgotten for some years. Whereof it takes occasion to congratulate England for not being pestered with that plague but free from that antagonism of classes on which soil the poisonous plant is produced. A rather bold assertion

this, coming from the principal journal of a country whose leading economist, Mr. Ricardo,¹⁰⁷ commences his celebrated work on the principles of political economy with the principle that the three fundamental classes of society, *i.e.*, of English society, *viz.*: the owners of the land, the capitalists, and the wages labourers, are forming a deadly and fatal antagonism; rents rising and falling in inverse ratio to the rise and fall of industrial profits, and wages rising and falling in inverse ratio to profits. If, according to English lawyers, the counterpoise of the three contesting powers is the keystone of the constitution of England, that eighth marvel of the world; according to Mr. Ricardo, who may be presumed to know something more about it than *The Times*, the deadly antagonism of the three classes representing the principal agents of production is the framework of English society.

While *The Times* contemptuously sneers at revolutionary Socialism in France, it cannot help casting a covetous glance at imperial Socialism in France, and would fain hold it up as an example for imitation to John Bull, the chief agents of that Socialism, the "Crédit Mobilier", having just sent *The Times* in an advertisement of about three close columns; the Report of the Board of Administration at the ordinary general meeting of shareholders on April 23rd, 1856, Mr. Pereire in the chair.

The following is the account that has enlisted the envious admiration of the *Times* shareholders, and dazzled the judgment of the *Times* editor:—

Liabilities.

	francs.	centimes.
On 31st December, 1855.		
Capital of the Society	60,000,000	
The balance of accounts current in December 31st, 1854,		
from a total of 64,924,379 to that of	103,179,308	64
Amount of bills payable of the creditors and for sundries	864,414	81
Total of reserve	1,696,083	59
Total of profits realised in 1855, after the deduction of		
the sum to be carried in the reserve	26,827,901	32
	192,567,708	36

		<i>Assets.</i>	
	In hand.	f.	c.
1. Rents		40,069,264	40
2. Debentures		32,844,600	20
3. Railway & other shares		59,431,593	66
		132,345,458	26
From which is to be deducted for calls not made up			
	31st Dec. last	31,166,718	62
	Balance asset	101,178,739	64
Investments for a fixed period in treasury bonds, continuations, advances on shares etc.			
		84,325,390	9
Value of premises and furniture			
		1,082,219	37
Disposable balance in hand and at the bank, and the amount of dividends to be received 31st of December last			
		5,981,359	26
	Total assets	192,567,708	36
The total amount of rents, shares, and debentures in hand on December 31, 1854			
		57,460,092	94
Has been augmented by subscriptions and purchases made in 1855			
		265,820,907	-3
	Total	323,280,999	97
Amount of realisation being			
		217,002,431	34
To which must be added the amount of securities remaining in hand			
		132,345,458	26
		349,347,889	60
These results show a profit of			
		26,066,889	63

A profit of 26 millions on a capital of 60 millions—a profit at the rate of 43½% these are indeed fascinating figures. And what has not this stirring mobilier effected with its grand capital of something like two and a half millions of pounds sterling?

With sixty million francs in hand they have subscribed to the French loans first 250 millions, and afterwards 375 millions more; they have acquired an interest in the principal railways of France—they have undertaken the issue of the loan contracted by the Austrian Association for the Railways of the State—they have participated in the Western and Central railways of Switzerland—they have taken an interest in a considerable operation, professing for its object the canalization of the Ebro from Saragossa to the Mediterranean—they had their hands in the amalgamation of the omnibuses at Paris, and in the constitution of the General Maritime Company—they have brought about by their intervention the amalgamation of all the old gas companies of Paris into one enterprise—they have, as they say, made a present of 300,000 francs to the people by selling them corn below the market price—they have decided on peace and war by their loans, erected new and propped up old lines of railways—illuminated cities, given an impulse to the creations of manufacture and the speculations of commerce, and lastly extended their swindling propaganda over France and scattered the fruitful seeds of their institution over the whole continent of Europe.

The "Crédit Mobilier" thus presents itself as one of the most economical phenomena of our epoch wanting a thorough sifting. Without such a research it is impossible either to compute the chances of the French Empire or to understand the symptoms of the general convulsion of society manifesting themselves throughout Europe. We shall investigate first into what the board calls its theoretic principles and then test their practical execution which, possibly, as the report informs us, have been until now but partially realized, and attend as immensely greater development in the future.

The principles of the society are set forth in its statutes, and in the different reports made to the shareholders. According to the preamble of the statutes, and [. . .]

considering the important services which might be rendered by the establishment of a society having for its aim to favour the development of the industry of the public works, and to realise the

conversion of the different titles of various enterprises through the means of consolidating them in one common fund, the founders of the "Crédit Mobilier" have resolved to carry into effect so useful a work, and consequently they have combined to lay down the basis of an anonymous society, under the denomination of the General Society of the "Crédit Mobilier".

Our readers will understand by the word "anonymous society," a joint-stock company with limited responsibility of the shareholders, and that the formation of such a society depends on a privilege arbitrarily granted by the Government.

The "Crédit Mobilier" then proposes to itself firstly to "favour the development of the industry of the public works," which means to make industry of public works in general dependent on the favour of the "Crédit Mobilier", and therefore on the individual favour of Bonaparte, on whose breath the existence of the society is suspended. The Board does not fail to indicate by what means it intends to bring about this its patronage, and that of its imperial patron, over the whole French industry. The various industrial enterprises carried on by joint stock companies, are represented by different titles, shares, obligations, bonds, debentures, etc. Those different titles are of course rated at different prices in the money market, according to the capital they trade upon, the profits they yield, the different bearing of demand and offer upon them, and other economical conditions. Now what intends the "Crédit Mobilier"?

To substitute for all these different titles carried on by different joint stock companies, one common title issued by the "Crédit Mobilier" itself. But how can it effect this? By buying up with its own titles the titles of the various industrial concerns. Buying up all the bonds, shares, debentures, etc.; in one word the titles of a concern, is buying up the concern itself. Hence the "Crédit Mobilier" avows the intention of making itself the proprietor, and Napoleon the Little¹⁰⁸ the supreme director of the whole great French industry. This is what we call Imperial Socialism.

In order to realise this programme, there are needed of course,

some financial operations, and M. Isaac Péreire in tracing their operations of the "Crédit Mobilier," naturally feels himself on delicate ground, is obliged to put limits to the society considered purely accidental and intended to disappear in its development, and rather throws out a feeler than to divulge at once his ultimate scheme to the world.

The social fund of the society has been fixed at 60,000,000 francs divided into 120,000 shares of 500 francs each, payable to the bearer.

The operations of the society, such as they are defined in the statutes, may be ranged under three heads. Firstly, operations for the support of the great industry, secondly, creation of a value issued by the society for replacing, or amalgamating the titles of different industrial enterprises, thirdly, the ordinary operations of banking, bearing upon public funds, commercial bills, etc.

The operations of the first category, intended to obtain for the society the patronage of industry, are enumerated in art. V of the statutes, which says:

To subscribe for, or acquire public funds, shares, or obligations in the different industrial or credit enterprises, constituted as anonymous societies, and especially those of railways, canals, mines, and other public works already established, or about to be established. To undertake all loans, to transfer and realise them, as well as all enterprises of public works.

We see how this article already goes beyond the pretensions of the preamble, by proposing to make the "Crédit Mobilier" not only the proprietor of the great industry, but the slave of the Treasury, and the despot of commercial credit.

The operations of the second category, relating to the substitution of the titles of the "Crédit Mobilier" for the titles of all other industrial enterprises, embraces the following: "To issue in equal amounts for the sums employed for subscriptions of loans and acquisitions of industrial titles the society's own obligations."

Articles 7 and 8 indicate the limits and the nature of the

obligations the society has power to issue. These obligations, or bonds

are allowed to reach a sum equal to ten times the amount of the capital. They must always be represented for their total amount by public funds, shares, and obligations in the society's hands. They cannot be made payable at less than 45 days notice. The total amount of the sums received in account-current and of the obligations created at less than a year's run shall not exceed twice the capital realised.

The third category, lastly, embraces the operations necessitated by the exchange of commercial values. The society "receives money at call." It is authorised "to sell or give in payment for loans all sorts of funds, papers, shares, and obligations held by it, and to exchange them for other values." It lends on "public funds, deposits of shares and obligations, and it opens account-currents on their different values." It offers to anonymous societies "all the ordinary services rendered by private bankers, such as receiving all payments on account of the societies, paying their dividends, interest, etc." It keeps a deposit of all titles of those enterprises, but in the operations relating to the trade in commercial values, bills, warrants, etc., "it is expressly understood that the society shall not make clandestine sales nor purchases for the sake of premium."

The French Crédit Mobilier [II]

Published June 24, 1856

It should be recollected that Bonaparte made his *coup d'état* on two diametrically opposite pretenses: on the one hand proclaiming it was his mission to save the *bourgeoisie* and "material order" from the Red anarchy to be let loose in May, 1852; and on the other hand, to save the working people from the middle-class despotism concentrated in the National Assembly. Besides, there was the personal necessity of paying

his own debts and those of the respectable mob of the Society of the *Dix Décembre*,¹⁰⁹ and of enriching himself and them at the joint expense of bourgeoisie and workmen. The mission of the man, it must be avowed, was beset by conflicting difficulties; forced as he was to appear simultaneously as the robber and as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. He could not give to the one class without taking from the other, and he could not satisfy his own wants and those of his followers without robbing both. In the time of the Fronde¹¹⁰ the Duc de Guise was said to be the most obliging man of France, because he had transformed all his estates into obligations held by his partisans. Thus Bonaparte also proposed to become the most obliging man of France, by converting all the property and all the industry of France into a personal obligation toward Louis Bonaparte. To steal France in order to buy France—that was the great problem the man had to solve, and in this transaction of taking from France what was to be given back to France, not the least important side to him was the percentage to be skimmed off by himself and the Society of December Tenth. How were these contradictory pretenses to be reconciled? how was this nice economical problem to be solved? how this knotty point to be untwined? All the varied past experience of Bonaparte pointed to the one great resource that had carried him over the most difficult economical situations—Credit. And there happened to be in France the school of St. Simon, which in its beginning and in its decay deluded itself with the dream that all the antagonism of classes must disappear before the creation of universal wealth by some new-fangled scheme of public credit. And St. Simonism in this form had not yet died out at the epoch of the *coup d'état*. There was Michel Chevalier, the economist of the *Journal des Débats*; there was Proudhon, who tried to disguise the worst portion of the St. Simonist doctrine under the appearance of eccentric originality; and there were two Portuguese Jews, practically connected with stockjobbing and Rothschild, who had sat at the feet of the Père Enfantin, and who with their practical experience had the boldness to suspect stockjobbing behind Socialism, Law behind St. Simon. These men—Emile and Isaac

Péreire—are the founders of the *Crédit Mobilier*, and the initiators of Bonapartist Socialism.

It is an old proverb, "*Habent sua fata libelli.*" Doctrines have also their *fate* as well as books. St. Simon to become the guardian angel of the Paris Bourse, the prophet of swindling, the Messiah of general bribery and corruption! History exhibits no example of a more cruel irony, save, perhaps, St. Just realized by the *juste milieu*¹¹¹ of Guizot, and Napoleon by Louis Bonaparte.

Events march swifter than man's consideration. While we, from an investigation of its principles and economical conditions, are pointing at the unavoidable crash foreboded by the very constitution of the *Crédit Mobilier*, history is already at work realizing our predictions. On the last of May, one of the Directors of the *Crédit Mobilier*, M. Place, failed for the sum of ten millions of francs, having only a few days before been "presented to the Emperor by M. de Morny" as one of the *dieux de la finance*. *Les dieux s'en vont!* Almost on the same day the *Moniteur* published the new law on the *Sociétés en commandite*,¹¹² which, on pretense of putting a check on the speculative fever, places those societies at the mercy of the *Crédit Mobilier* by making their formation dependent on the will of the government or of the *Crédit Mobilier*. And the English press, ignorant of even the existence of a difference, between *Sociétés en commandite* and *Sociétés anonymes*, to which latter the former are thus sacrificed, goes into ecstasies at this great "prudential act" of Bonapartist wisdom, imagining that French speculators will soon be speedily brought round to the solidity of the English Sadleirs, Spaders and Palmers.¹¹³ At the same time the law of drainage just passed by the famous *Corps Législatif*,¹¹⁴ and which is a direct infraction of all former legislation and the Code Napoleon, sanctions the expropriation of the mortgagors of the land, in favor of the government of Bonaparte, who by this machinery proposes to seize on the land, as by the *Crédit Mobilier* he is seizing on the industry, and by the Bank of France on the commerce of France; and all this to save property from the dangers of Socialism!

Meanwhile we do not think it superfluous to continue our examination of the *Crédit Mobilier*, an institution which, we

think, is destined yet to enact achievements of which the above are but small beginnings.

We have seen that the first function of the *Crédit Mobilier* consists in affording capital to such industrial concerns as are carried on by anonymous societies. We quote from the report of M. Isaac Péreire:

The *Crédit Mobilier* acts, with regard to the values representing industrial capital, a part analogous to the functions discharged by discount banks with regard to the values representing commercial capital. The first duty of this society is to support the development of national industry, to facilitate the formation of great enterprises which, abandoned to themselves, meet with great obstacles. Its mission in this respect will be more easily fulfilled, as it disposes of various means of information and research that escape the grasp of private individual for soundly appreciating the real value or prospects of undertakings appealing to its aid. In prosperous times our society will be a guide for capital anxious to find profitable employment; in difficult movements it is destined to offer precious resources for the maintenance of labor, and the moderation of the crises which result from a rash contraction of capitals. The pains which our society will take to invest its capital in all affairs only in such proportions and for such limited terms as will permit of a safe withdrawal, will enable it to multiply its action, to fructify in a small space of time a great number of enterprises, and to diminish the risks of its concurrence by the multiplicity of partial *commandités* (investments in shares).

Having seen in what manner Isaac develops the ideas of Bonaparte, it becomes important also to see the manner in which Bonaparte comments upon the ideas of Isaac, a comment which may be found in the Report addressed to him by the Minister of the Interior¹¹⁵ on June 21, 1854, with respect to the principles and the administration of the *Crédit Mobilier*: "Among all the establishments of credit existing in the world, the *Banque de France* is justly considered that which boasts of the most solid constitution;" so solid that the slight storm of

February, 1848, had borne it down in a day, but for the prop afforded it by Ledru-Rollin and Co.; for not only did the Provisional Government suspend the obligation of the *Banque de France* to pay its notes in cash, and thus roll back the tide of note and bondholders blocking up its avenues, but empowered it to issue notes of 50 francs, while it had never been permitted under Louis Philippe to issue less than 500 franc notes; and not only did they thus cover the insolvent Banque by their credit, but in addition they pledged the State forests to the Banque for the privilege of obtaining credit for the State. 'The *Banque de France* is at the same time a support and a guide for our commerce, and its material and moral influence gives to our market a very precious stability.'

This stability is such that the French have a regular industrial crisis each time when America and England condescend only to a little smash in their commerce.

By the reserve and prudence which direct all its operations, this admirable institution fulfills, therefore, the part of a regulator; but the commercial genius, to generate all the wonders it carries in its womb, wants, above all things, to be stimulated; and precisely because speculation is restrained in France in the strictest limits, there existed no inconvenience, but on the contrary a great advantage, in putting alongside of the *Banque de France* an establishment conceived in quite a different order of ideas, and which should represent in the sphere of industry and commerce the spirit of initiative.

The model for this establishment happily existed already; it is derived from a country celebrated by its severe loyalty, the prudence and solidity presiding over all its commercial operations. By placing at the disposition of all sound ideas and useful enterprises its capital, its credit, and its moral authority, the General Society of the Netherlands has multiplied in Holland canals, drainage, and a thousand other improvements which have raised the value of property a hundred fold. Why should not France likewise profit by an institution the advantages of which have been demonstrated by so dazzling an experience? This is the

thought which determined the creation of the *Crédit Mobilier*, authorized by the decree of 18th Nov., 1852.

According to the terms of its statutes this Society can, among other operations, buy and sell public effects or industrial shares, lend and borrow on them as securities, contract for public loans, and in a word, issue its paper at long dates, to the account of the values thus acquired.

It has thus the means in hand of summoning and combining at any moment, under advantageous conditions considerable wealth. In the good use it may make of these capitals the fertility of the institution resides. Indeed, the Society may arbitrarily invest in (*commanditer*) industry, take an interest in enterprises, participate in operations of a long term, which the constitution of the *Banque de France* and of the *Discount Office* forbids these establishments to do; in one word, it is free in its movements, and may change its action just as the wants of commercial credit require it. If it knows how, among the enterprises constantly brought forth, to distinguish the fruitful; if by the timely intervention of the immense funds which it has the disposition of, it enables works to be carried out highly productive in themselves, but absorbing an unusual duration, and otherwise languishing, if its concurrence be the sure index of a useful idea or a well-conceived project, the Society of the *Crédit Mobilier* will deserve and win the public approbation; floating capital will seek its channels and direct itself in mass whithersoever the patronage of the Society indicates a guaranteed employ. Thus, by the power of example, and by authority which will become attached to its support, more even than by any material aid, this Society will be the cooperator of all ideas of general utility. Thus it will powerfully encourage the efforts of industry, and stimulate everywhere the spirit of invention.

We shall take an early occasion to show how all these high-flowing phrases conceal but feebly the plain scheme of dragging all the industry of France into the whirlpool of the Paris Bourse, and to make it the tennis-ball of the gentlemen of the *Crédit Mobilier*, and of their patron Bonaparte.

The French Crédit Mobilier [III]

Published July 11, 1856

The approaching crash in Bonapartist finance continues to announce itself in a variety of ways. On May 31 Count Montalembert, in opposing a project of law to raise the postage on all printed papers, books, and the like, sounded the note of alarm in the following strain:

The suppression of all political life, by what has it been replaced? By the whirl of speculation. The great French nation could not resign itself to slumber, to inactivity. Political life was replaced by the fever of speculation, by the thirst for lucre, by the infatuation of gambling. On all sides, even in our small towns, even in our villages, men are carried away by the mania of making those rapid fortunes of which there are so many examples—those fortunes achieved without trouble, without labor, and often without honor. I seek for no other proof than the bill which has just been laid before you, against the *sociétés en commandite*. Copies have just been distributed to us; I have not had time to examine it; I feel, however, inclined to support it, despite the somewhat Draconian regulations which I fancy I discovered there. If the remedy is so urgent and so considerable, the evil must be so likewise. The real source of that evil is the sleep of all political spirit in France . . . And the evil which I point to is not the only one resulting from the same source. While the higher and middle classes—those ancient political classes—give themselves up to speculation, another labor presents itself among the lower classes of society, whence nearly all the revolutions emanated which France has suffered. At the sight of this fearful mania of gambling which has made a vast gambling booth of nearly all France, a portion of the masses, invaded by Socialists, has been more corrupted than ever, by the avidity of gain. Hence an unquestionable progress of secret societies, a greater and deeper development of those savage passions which almost calumniate Socialism by adopting its name, and which have been recently well shown up, in all their intensity, in the trials at Paris, Angers and elsewhere.

Thus speaks Montalembert—himself one of the original shareholders in the Bonapartist enterprise for saving order, religion, property and family!

We have heard, from Isaac Péreire, that one of the mysteries of the *Crédit Mobilier* was the principle of multiplying its action and diminishing its risks by embarking in the greatest possible variety of enterprises, and withdrawing from them in the shortest possible time. Now, what does this mean when divested of the flowery language of St. Simonism? Subscribing for shares to the greatest extent, in the greatest number of speculations, realizing the premiums, and getting rid of them as fast as it can be done. Stockjobbing, then, is to be the base of the industrial development, or rather all industrial enterprise is to become the mere pretext of stockjobbing. And, by the aid of what instrument is this object of the *Crédit Mobilier* to be attained? What are the means proposed to enable it thus to “multiply its action” and “diminish its risks?” The very means employed by Law. The *Crédit Mobilier* being a privileged company, backed by Government influence, and disposing of a large capital and credit, comparatively speaking, it is certain that the shares of any new enterprise started by it will, on the first emission, fetch a premium in the market. It has learned thus much from Law, to allot to its own shareholders the new shares at par, in proportion to the number of shares they hold in the mother society. The profit thus insured to them acts, in the first place, on the value of the shares of the *Crédit Mobilier* itself, while their high range, in the second place, insures a high value to the new shares to be emitted. In this manner the *Crédit Mobilier* obtains command over a large portion of the loanable capital intended for investment in industrial enterprises.

Now, apart from the fact that the premium is thus the real pivot on which the activity of the *Crédit Mobilier* turns, its object is apparently to affect capital in a manner which is the very reverse of the action of commercial banks. A commercial bank, by its discounts, loans, and emission of notes, sets free temporarily fixed capital, while the *Crédit Mobilier* fixes actually floating capital. Railway shares, for instance, may be very floating, but the capital they represent, i.e., the capital employed

in the construction of the railway, is fixed. A mill-owner who would sink in buildings and machinery a part of his capital out of proportion with the part reserved for the payment of wages and the purchase of raw material, would very soon find his mill stopped. The same holds good with a nation. Almost every commercial crisis in modern times has been connected with a derangement in the due proportion between floating and fixed capital. What, then, must be the result of the working of an institution like the *Crédit Mobilier*, the direct purpose of which is to fix as much as possible of the loanable capital of the country in railways, canals, mines, docks, steamships, forges, and other industrial undertakings, without any regard to the productive capacities of the country?

According to its statutes, the *Crédit Mobilier* can patronize only such industrial concerns as are carried on by anonymous societies, or joint-stock companies with limited responsibility. Consequently there must arise a tendency to start as many such societies as possible, and, further, to bring all industrial undertakings under the form of these societies. Now, it cannot be denied that the application of joint-stock companies to industry marks a new epoch in the economical life of modern nations. On the one hand it has revealed the productive powers of association, not suspected before, and called into life industrial creations, on a scale unattainable by the efforts of individual capitalists; on the other hand, it must not be forgotten, that in joint-stock companies it is not the individuals that are associated, but the capitals. By this contrivance, proprietors have been converted into shareholders, i.e., speculators. The concentration of capital has been accelerated, and, as its natural corollary, the downfall of the small middle class. A sort of industrial kings have been created, whose power stands in inverse ratio to their responsibility—they being responsible only to the amount of their shares, while disposing of the whole capital of the society—forming a more or less permanent body, while the mass of shareholders is undergoing a constant process of decomposition and renewal, and enabled, by the very disposal of the joint influence and wealth of the society, to bribe its single rebellious members. Beneath this oligarchic Board of

Directors is placed a bureaucratic body of the practical managers and agents of the society, and beneath them, without any transition, an enormous and daily swelling mass of mere wages laborers—whose dependence and helplessness increase with the dimensions of the capital that employs them, but who also become more dangerous in direct ratio to the decreasing number of its representatives. It is the immoral merit of Fourier¹¹⁶ to have predicted this form of modern industry, under the name of *Industrial Feudalism*. Certainly neither Mr. Isaac, nor Mr. Émile Péreire, nor Mr. Morny, nor Mr. Bonaparte could have invented this. There existed, also, before their epoch, banks lending their credit to industrial joint-stock companies. What they invented was a joint-stock bank aiming at the monopoly of the formerly divided and multiform action of the private money-lenders, and whose leading principle should be the creation of a vast number of industrial companies, not with the view of productive investments, but simply for the object of stockjobbing profits. The new idea they have started is to render the industrial feudalism tributary to stockjobbing.

According to the statutes, the capital of the *Crédit Mobilier* is fixed at 60,000,000 of francs. The same statutes allow it to receive deposits in accounts-current for twice that sum, i.e., for 120,000,000. The sum at the disposal of the society thus amounts altogether to 180,000,000 of francs. Measured by the bold scheme of obtaining the patronage of the whole industry of France, this is certainly a very small sum. But two-thirds of this sum can hardly be applied to the purchase of industrial shares, or such values as do not command the certainty of immediate realization, precisely because they are received on call. For this reason the statutes open another resource to the *Crédit Mobilier*. It is authorized to issue debentures amounting to ten times its original capital, i.e., to the amount of 600,000,000 francs; or, in other words, the institution intended for the accommodation of all the world is authorized to come into the market as a borrower for a sum ten times larger than its own capital. "Our debentures," says M. Péreire, "will be of two kinds. The first, issued for a short period, must correspond with our various temporary investments."

With this sort of debentures we have nothing to do here, as, by article VIII of the statutes, they are to be issued only to make up the supposed balance short of the 120,000,000 to be received in current account, which have been entirely received in that way. With respect to the other class of debentures,

they are issued with remote dates of payment, reimbursable by redemption, and will correspond with the investments of like nature, which we shall have made either in public funds or in shares and debentures of manufacturing companies. According to the economy of the system which serves as the basis of our Association, these securities will not only be secured by a corresponding amount of funds purchased under the control of Government, and the united total of which will afford, by the application of the principle of mutuality, the advantages of a compensation and division of the risks, but they will have, besides, the guarantee of a capital which, for that object, we have increased to a considerable amount.

Now, these debentures of the *Crédit Mobilier* are simply imitations of railway bonds—obligations redeemable at certain epochs and under certain conditions, and bearing a fixed interest. But there is a difference. While railway bonds are often secured by a mortgage of the railway itself, what is the security for the *Crédit Mobilier* debentures? The *rentes*,¹¹⁷ shares, debentures and the like, of industrial companies, which the *Crédit Mobilier* buys with its own debentures. Then, what is gained by their emission? The difference between the interest payable on the debentures of the *Crédit Mobilier* and the interest receivable on the shares and the like, in which it has invested its loan. To make this operation sufficiently profitable, the *Crédit Mobilier* is obliged to place the capital realized by the issue of its debentures in such investments as promise the most remunerative returns, i.e., in shares subject to great fluctuations and alterations of price. The main security for its debentures, therefore, will consist of the shares of the very industrial companies started by the Association itself.

Thus, while railway bonds are secured by a capital at least

twice in amount, these *Crédit Mobilier* debentures are secured by a capital only nominally of the same amount, but which must fall below, with every downward movement of the stock-market. The holders of these debentures, accordingly, share in all the risks of the shareholders, without participating in their profits. "But," says the last Annual Report, "the holders of the debentures have not only the guaranty of the investments in which it [the *Crédit Mobilier*] has placed its loans, but also that of its original capital."

The original capital, 60,000,000, responsible for the 120,000,000 of deposits, offers to serve as guaranty to 600,000,000 of debentures, beside the guaranties it may be required to furnish for the unlimited number of enterprises which the *Crédit Mobilier* is authorized to start. If the Association were to succeed in exchanging the shares of all industrial companies against its own debentures, it would indeed become the supreme director and proprietor of the whole industry of France, while the mass of ancient proprietors would find themselves pensioned with a fixed revenue equal to the interest on the debentures. But, on the road to this consummation, the bankruptcy which follows from the economical conditions we have above illustrated, will stop the bold adventurers. This little accident, however, has not been overlooked; on the contrary, the real founders of the *Crédit Mobilier* have included it in their calculations. When that crash comes, after an immensity of French interests has been involved, the Government of Bonaparte will seem justified in interfering with the *Crédit Mobilier*, as the English Government did in 1797 with the Bank of England. The Regent of France, that worthy sire of Louis Philippe, tried to get rid of the public debt by converting the State obligations into obligations of Law's Bank; Louis Bonaparte, the imperial Socialist, will try to seize upon French industry by converting the debentures of the *Crédit Mobilier* into State obligations. Will he prove more solvent than the *Crédit Mobilier*? That is the question.

Condition of Factory Laborers
Published April 22, 1857

The reports of the Inspectors of Factories, which have been recently issued for the half year ending 31st October, 1856, form a valuable contribution to the social anatomy of the United Kingdom. They will not a little help to explain the reactionary attitude taken by the mill-lords during the present general election.

During the Session of 1856, a Factory Act was smuggled through Parliament by which the "radical" mill-lords first altered the law in regard to the fencing of mill-gearing and machinery, and secondly introduced the principle of arbitration in the disputes between masters and men. The one law purported to provide for the better protection of the limbs and lives of the factory laborers; the other to place that protection under cheap courts of equity. In fact, the latter law intended to cheat the factory laborer out of law, and the former to cheat him out of his limbs. I quote from the joint report of the inspectors:

Under the new statute, persons whose *ordinary occupation* brings them near to mill-gearing, and who are consequently well acquainted with the dangers to which their employment exposes them, and with the necessity of caution, are protected by the law; while protection has been *withdrawn* from those who may be obliged, in the execution of special orders, to suspend their ordinary occupation and to place themselves in positions of danger, of the existence of which they are not conscious, and from which, by reason of their ignorance, they are unable to protect themselves, but who, on that very account, would appear to require the special protection of the Legislature.

The arbitration clause, in its turn, prescribes that the arbitrators shall be chosen from persons "skilled in the construction of the kind of machinery" by which bodily harm is inflicted. In one word, engineers and machine-makers are entrusted with the monopoly of arbitration. "It appears to us," say the Inspectors,

“that engineers and machine-makers ought to be considered *as disqualified* to act as factory arbitrators, by reason of their connection in trade with the factory occupiers, who are their customers.”

Under such provisions, it is not to be wondered at that the number of accidents arising from machinery, such as death, amputations of hands, arms, legs or feet, fracture of limbs and bones, of head and face, lacerations, contusions, &c., amount, during the six months ending on the 31st October, 1856, to the appalling number of 1,919. Twenty cases of death, inflicted by machinery, are registered in the industrial bulletin for half a year—about ten times the number lost by the British Navy during its glorious Canton massacre. Since the mill-lords, so far from endeavoring to protect the lives and limbs of their laborers, are thus only bent on escaping payment for arms and legs lost in their service, and shifting the cost of the wear and tear of their animated machines from their own shoulders, it need not surprise us that, according to the official reports, “overworking, in violation of the factory act, is on the *increase*.”

Overworking in the terms of that act means employing young persons for a longer time per day than is legally allowed. This is done in various ways: By beginning work before six in the morning, by not stopping it at six in the evening, and by abridging the terms the law has fixed for the meals of the workpeople. There are three periods of the day when the steam-engine starts, viz., when the work begins in the morning, and when it is resumed after the two meals of breakfast and dinner; and there are three periods when it stops, viz., at the beginning of each meal-time and when the work ceases in the evening. Thus there are six opportunities when five minutes may be stolen, or half an hour each day. Five minutes a day's increased work, multiplied by weeks, is equal to two and one-half days of produce in the year; but the fraudulent overworking goes far beyond that amount. I quote Mr. Leonard Horner,¹¹⁸ the Factory Inspector for Lancashire:

The profit to be gained by such illegal overworking appears to be a greater temptation than the manufacturers can resist. They

calculate upon the chance of not being found out, and when they see the small amount of penalty and costs which those who have been convicted have had to pay, they find that if they should be detected there will still be a considerable balance of gain.

Beside the trifling fines imposed by the factory act, the mill-owners took good care to have it so framed, that the greatest facilities are afforded for passing by its enactments, and as the inspectors unanimously declare, "almost insuperable difficulties prevent them from putting an effective stop to the illegal working." They also concur in stigmatizing the willful commission of fraud by persons of large property; the mean contrivances to which they have recourse in order to elude detection; and the base intrigues they set on foot against the inspectors and sub-inspectors entrusted with the protection of the factory slave. In bringing forward a charge of overworking, the inspectors, sub-inspectors, or their constables, must be prepared to swear that the men have been employed at illegal hours. Now, suppose they appear after 6 o'clock in the evening. The manufacturing machinery is immediately stopped, and although the people could be there for no other purpose than attending upon it, the charge cannot be sustained, by reason of the wording of the act. The workmen are then sent out of the mill in great haste, often more doors than one facilitating their rapid dispersion. In some instances the gas was extinguished, when the sub-inspectors entered the room, leaving them suddenly in darkness among complicated machinery. In those places which have acquired a notoriety for overworking, there is an organized plan for giving notice at the mills of the approach of an inspector, servants at railway stations and at inns being employed for this purpose.

These vampires, fattening on the life-blood of the young working generation of their own country, are they not the fit companions of the British opium smugglers, and the natural supporters of the "truly British Ministers?"

The reports of the factory inspectors prove beyond doubt that the infamies of the British factory system are growing with its growth; that the laws enacted for checking the cruel

greediness of the mill-lords are a sham and a delusion, being so worded as to baffle their own ostensible end and to disarm the men entrusted with their execution; that the antagonism between the mill-lords and the operatives is rapidly approaching the point of actual social war; that the number of children under 13 years, absorbed by that system, is increasing in some branches, and that of females in all; that, although the same number of hands are employed in proportion to the horsepower as at former periods, there are fewer hands employed in proportion to the machinery; that the steam-engine is enabled to drive a greater weight of machinery than ten years before by economy of force; that an increased quantity of work is now turned off by increase of speed of the machinery and other contrivances; and that the mill-lords are rapidly filling their pockets.

The interesting statistical facts illustrated in the Reports may properly claim further notice. Thus much will be understood at once, that the industrial slaveholders of Lancashire are in want of a foreign policy able to distract attention from home questions.

*[The Bank Act of 1844 and the Monetary Crisis
in England]*

Published November 21, 1857

On the 5th [of November] the Bank of England raised its minimum rate of discount from 8 per cent, at which it was fixed on October 19, to 9 per cent. This enhancement, unprecedented as it is in the history of the Bank since the resumption of its cash payments, has, we presume, not yet reached its highest point. It is brought about by a drain of bullion, and by a decrease in what is called the reserve of notes. The drain of bullion acts in opposite directions—gold being shipped to this country¹¹⁹ in consequence of our bankruptcy, and silver to the East, in consequence of the decline of the export trade to China and India, and the direct Government remittances made for

account of the East India Company. In exchange for the silver thus wanted, gold must be sent to the continent of Europe.

As to the reserve of notes and the influential part it plays in the London money market, it is necessary to refer briefly to Sir Robert Peel's Bank act of 1844,¹²⁰ which affects not only England, but also the United States, and the whole market of the world. Sir Robert Peel, backed by the banker Lloyd, now Lord Overstone, and a number of influential men beside, proposed by his act to put into practice a self-acting principle for the circulation of paper money, according to which the latter would exactly conform in its movements of expansion and contraction to the laws of a purely metallic circulation; and all monetary crises, as he and his partisans affirmed, would thus be warded off for all time to come. The Bank of England is divided into two departments—the issuing department and the banking department: the former being a simple manufactory of notes and the latter the real bank. The issuing department is by law empowered to issue notes to the amount of fourteen millions sterling, a sum supposed to indicate the lowest point, beneath which the actual circulation will never fall, the security for which is found in the debt due by the British Government to the Bank. Beyond these fourteen millions, no note can be issued which is not represented in the vaults of the issuing department by bullion to the same amount. The aggregate mass of notes thus limited is made over to the banking department, which throws them into circulation. Consequently, if the bullion reserve in the vaults of the issuing department amounts to ten millions, it can issue notes to the amount of twenty-four millions, which are made over to the banking department. If the actual circulation amounts to twenty millions only, the four millions remaining in the till of the banking department forms its reserve of notes, which, in fact, constitutes the only security for the deposits confided by private individuals, and by the State to the banking department.

Suppose now that a drain of bullion sets in, and successively abstracts various quantities of bullion from the issuing department, withdrawing, for instance, the amount of four millions of gold. In this case four millions of notes will be cancelled; the

amount of notes issued by the issuing department will then exactly equal the amount of notes in circulation, and the reserve of disposable notes in the till of the banking department will have altogether disappeared. The banking department, therefore, will not have a single farthing left to meet the claims of its depositors, and consequently will be compelled to declare itself insolvent; an act affecting its public as well as its private deposits, and therefore involving the suspension of the payment of the quarterly dividends due to the holders of public funds. The banking department might thus become bankrupt, while six millions of bullion were still heaped up in the vaults of the issuing department. This is not a mere supposition. On October 30, 1847, the reserve of the banking department had sunk to £1,600,000 while the deposits amounted to £13,000,000. With a few more days of the prevailing alarm, which was only allayed by a financial *coup d'état* on the part of the Government, the Bank reserve would have been exhausted and the banking department would have been compelled to stop payments, while more than six millions of bullion lay still in the vaults of the issuing department.

It is self-evident then that the drain of bullion and the decrease of the reserve of notes act mutually on each other. While the withdrawal of bullion from the vaults of the issuing department directly produces a decrease in the reserve of the banking department, the directors of the Bank, apprehensive lest the banking department should be driven to insolvency, put on the screw and raise the rate of discount. But the rise in the rate of discount induces part of the depositors to withdraw their deposits from the banking department, and lend them out at the current high rate of interest, while the steady decrease of the reserve intimidates other depositors, and induces them to withdraw their notes from the same department. Thus the very measures taken to keep up the reserve, tend to exhaust it. From this explanation the reader will understand the anxiety with which the decrease of the Bank reserve is watched in England, and the gross fallacy propounded in the money article of a recent number of *The London Times*. It says: "The old opponents of the Bank Charter Act are beginning to bustle in the

storm, and it is impossible to feel certain on any point. One of their great modes of creating fright is by pointing to the low state of the reserve of unemployed notes, as if when that is exhausted the Bank would be obliged to cease discounting altogether."

As a bankrupt, under the existing law it would be, in fact, obliged to do so.

But the fact is that the Bank could, under such circumstances, still continue the discounts on as great a scale as ever, since their bills receivable each day of course, on the average, bring in as large a total as they are ordinarily asked to let out. They could not increase the scale, but no one will suppose that, with a contraction of business in all quarters, any increase can be required. There is, consequently, not the shadow of a pretext for government palliatives.

The sleight-of-hand on which this argument rests is this: that the depositors are deliberately kept out of view. It needs no peculiar exertion of thought to understand that if the banking department had once declared itself bankrupt in regard to its lenders, it could not go on making advances by way of discounts or loans to its borrowers. Taken all-in-all, Sir Robert Peel's much vaunted Bank law does not act at all in common times; adds in difficult times a monetary panic created by law to the monetary panic resulting from the commercial crisis; and at the very moment when, according to its principles, its beneficial effects should set in, it must be suspended by Government interference. In ordinary times, the maximum of notes which the Bank may legally issue is never absorbed by the actual circulation—a fact sufficiently proved by the continued existence in such periods of a reserve of notes in the till of the banking department. You may prove this truth by comparing the reports of the Bank of England from 1847 to 1857, or even by comparing the amount of notes which actually circulated from 1819 till 1847, with that which might have circulated according to the maximum legally fixed. In difficult times, as in 1847, and at present by the arbitrary and absolute division

between the two departments of the same concern, the effects of a drain of bullion are artificially aggravated, the rise of interest is artificially accelerated, the prospect of insolvency is held out not in consequence of the real insolvency of the Bank, but of the fictitious insolvency of one of its departments.

When the real monetary distress has thus been aggravated by an artificial panic, and in its wake the sufficient number of victims has been immolated, public pressure grows too strong for the Government, and the law is suspended exactly at the period for the weathering of which it was created, and during the course of which it is alone able to produce any effect at all. Thus, on Oct. 23, 1847, the principal bankers of London resorted to Downing street, there to ask relief by a suspension of Peel's Act. Lord John Russell and Sir Charles Wood consequently directed a letter to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, recommending them to enlarge their issue of notes, and thus to exceed the legal maximum of circulation, while they took upon themselves the responsibility for the violation of the law of 1844, and declared themselves prepared to propose to Parliament, on its meeting, a bill of indemnity. The same farce will be again enacted this time, after the state of things has come up to the standard of the week ending on Oct. 23, 1847, when a total suspension of all business and of all payments seemed imminent. The only advantage, then, derived from the Peel Act is this: that the whole community is placed in a thorough dependence on an aristocratic Government—on the pleasure of a reckless individual like Palmerston, for instance. Hence the Ministerial predilections for the act of 1844; investing them with an influence on private fortunes they were never before possessed of.

We have thus dwelt on the Peel Act, because of its present influence on this country, as well as its probable suspension in England; but if the British Government has the power of taking off the shoulders of the British public the difficulties fastened upon them by that Government itself, nothing could be falser than to suppose that the phenomena we shall witness on the London money market—the rise and the subsiding of the monetary panic—will constitute a true thermometer for the inten-

sity of the crisis the British commercial community have to pass through. That crisis is beyond Government control.

When the first news of the American crisis reached the shores of England, there was set up by her economists a theory which may lay claim, if not to ingenuity, to originality at least. It was said that English trade was sound, but that, alas! its customers, and, above all, the Yankees, were unsound. The sound state of a trade, the healthiness of which exists on one side only, is an idea quite worthy of a British economist. Cast a glance at the last half-yearly return issued by the English Board of Trade for 1857, and you will find that of the aggregate export of British produce and manufactures, 30 per cent went to the United States, 11 per cent to East India, and 10 per cent to Australia. Now, while the American market is closed for a long time to come, the Indian one, glutted for two years past, is to a great extent cut off by the insurrectionary convulsions, and the Australian one is so overstocked that British merchandise of all sorts is now sold cheaper at Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne, than at London, Manchester or Glasgow. The general soundness of the British industrialists, declared bankrupt in consequence of the sudden failure of their customers, may be inferred from two instances. At a meeting of the creditors of a Glasgow calico printer, the list of debts exhibited a total of £116,000, while the assets did not reach the modest amount of £7,000. So, too, a Glasgow shipper, with liabilities of £11,800, could only show assets to meet them of £789. But these are merely individual cases; the important point is that British manufactures have been stretched to a point which must result in a general crash under contracted foreign markets, with a consequent revulsion in the social and political state of Great Britain. The American crisis of 1837 and 1839 produced a decline in British exports from £12,425,601, at which they stood in 1836, down to £4,695,225 in 1837, to £7,585,760 in 1838, and £3,562,000 in 1842. A similar paralysis is already setting in in England. It cannot fail to produce the most important effects before it is over.

[*The Crisis in Europe*]
Published January 5, 1858

The mails of the *Niagara* reached us yesterday, and a careful examination of our files of British journals only confirms the views we have lately had to express with regard to the probable course of the crisis in England. The London money market is decidedly improving; that is to say, gold is accumulating in the vaults of the Bank of England; the demand for discount at the Bank is decreasing; first-class paper may be discounted in Lombard street¹²¹ at $9\frac{1}{2}$ to $9\frac{3}{4}$ per cent; the public funds are firm, and the share market participates to some degree in this movement. This agreeable aspect of things is, however, badly impaired by great failures, recurring every two or three days in London; by daily dispatches, sad messengers of provincial disasters; and by the thunder of *The London Times*, inveighing more than ever against the general and helpless corruption of the British mercantile classes. In fact, the comparative easiness with which unexceptionable paper is discounted, seems to be more than balanced by the growing difficulty of finding paper which can pass as unexceptionable. Consequently, we are told in the London money articles of the latest date, that at Threadneedle street¹²² the applications are extremely "limited," and that at Lombard street but little business is doing. Still, as the supply on the part of the Bank and the discount houses is increasing—while the pressure upon them, the demand on the part of their customers, is decreasing—the money market must be said to be comparatively easy. Nevertheless the Bank of England Directors have not yet dared to lower the rate of discount, convinced as it would appear that the renewal of the monetary crisis is not a question of time, but of percentage, and that, consequently, as the rate of discount sinks, the monetary crisis is sure to rise again.

While the London money market, one way or the other, has thus got more easy, the stringency of the English produce market is increasing in intensity, a continuous fall in prices not being able to overcome the growing disinclination to purchase.

Even such articles as tallow, for instance, which had previously formed an exception to the general rule, have now, by dint of forced sales, been obliged to give way. On comparing the price current of the week ending December 18 with the weekly price current of November, it appears that the extreme depression in prices which prevailed in the latter month has again been reached; this time, however, not in the shape of a panic, but the methodic form of a sliding scale. As to the manufacturing markets, an earnest of the industrial crisis which we predicted has now been given in half a dozen failures of spinners and weavers in Lancashire, of three leading houses in the woolen trade in the West Riding, and an important firm in the carpet trade of Worcester.

Since the phenomena of this double crisis, in the produce market and among the manufacturing classes, will by and by become more palpable, we shall content ourselves, for the present, with quoting the following passage of a private letter from Manchester, which has been communicated for our columns:

Of the continuous pressure on the market and its disastrous effects you can hardly form any notion. No one can sell. Every day you hear of lower quotations. Things are come to that pass that respectable people prefer not to offer their commodities at all. Spinners and weavers are weighed down by utter despondency. No yarn commissioners sell yarn to the weavers except on cash or double securities. It is impossible for this state of things to go on without ending in a frightful collapse.

The Hamburg crisis has scarcely abated. It is the most regular and classical example of a monetary crisis that ever existed. Everything except silver and gold had become worthless. Firms of old standing have broken down, because they are unable to pay in cash some single bill that had fallen due, although in their tills there lay bills to a hundred times its value, which, however, for the moment were valueless, not because they were dishonored, but because they could not be discounted. Thus, we are informed that the old and wealthy firm of Ch. M. Schröder, before its bankruptcy, had offered to it two millions in

silver, on the part of L. H. Schröder, the brother, of London, but replied by telegraph: "Three millions or nothing." The three millions did not come forward, and Ch. M. Schröder went to the wall. A different instance is that of Ullberg & Co., a firm much spoken of in the European press, which, with liabilities amounting to 12,000,000 marks banco, including 7,000,000 of bills of exchange, had, as now appears, a capital of only 300,000 marks banco as the basis of such enormous transactions.

In Sweden, and especially in Denmark, the crisis has rather increased in violence. The revival of the evil after it appeared to have passed away is to be explained by the dates on which the great demands on Hamburg, Stockholm and Copenhagen fall due. During December, for instance, nine millions of bills drawn on Hamburg by Rio de Janeiro houses for coffee fell due, were all protested, and this mass of protests created a new panic. In January the drafts for the cargoes of sugar shipped from Bahia and Pernambuco will probably meet with a similar fate, and cause a similar revival of the crisis.

British Commerce and Finance

Published October 4, 1858

In reviewing the Report on the Crisis of 1857-58 of the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, we have, first, shown the ruinous tendencies of Sir Robert Peel's Bank act, and, secondly, done away with the false notion, attributing to banks of issue the power of affecting general prices by an arbitrary expansion or contraction of the paper currency. We arrive, then, at the question, What were the real causes of the crisis? The Committee state that they have established "to their satisfaction, that the recent commercial crisis in this country, as well as in America and in the North of Europe, was mainly owing to excessive speculation and abuse of credit." The value of this solution is certainly not in the least impaired by the circumstance that, to find it out, the world have not waited upon the Parliamentary Committee, and that all the profit

society may possibly derive from the revelation must at this time be fully discounted. Granted the truth of the proposition—and we are far from contesting it—does it solve the social problem, or does it but change the terms of the question? For a system of fictitious credit to spring up, two parties are always requisite—borrowers and lenders. That the former party should at all times be eager at trading upon the other people's capital, and endeavor to enrich themselves at other people's risk, seems so exceedingly simple a tendency that the opposite one would bewilder our understanding. The question is rather how it happens that, among all modern industrial nations, people are caught, as it were, by a periodical fit of parting with their property upon the most transparent delusions, and in spite of tremendous warnings repeated in decennial intervals. What are the social circumstances reproducing, almost regularly, these seasons of general self-delusion, of over-speculation and fictitious credit? If they were once traced out, we should arrive at a very plain alternative. Either they may be controlled by society, or they are inherent in the present system of production. In the first case, society may avert crises; in the second, so long as the system lasts, they must be borne with, like the natural changes of the seasons.

We consider this to be the essential defect not only of the recent Parliamentary Report, but of the "Report on the Commercial Distress of 1847," and all the other similar reports which preceded them—that they treat every new crisis as an insulated phenomenon, appearing for the first time on the social horizon, and, therefore, to be accounted for by incidents, movements and agencies altogether peculiar, or presumed to be peculiar, to the one period just elapsed between the penultimate and the ultimate revulsion. If natural philosophers had proceeded by the same puerile method, the world would be taken by surprise on the reappearance even of a comet. In the attempt at laying bare the laws by which crises of the market of the world are governed, not only their periodical character, but the exact dates of that periodicity must be accounted for. The distinctive features, moreover, peculiar to every new commercial crisis, must not be allowed to overshadow the aspects common to all

of them. We should overstep the limits and the purpose of our present task, were we even to give the faintest outline of such an inquiry. This much seems undisputed, that the Commons' Committee, so far from solving the question, has not even put it in its adequate terms.

The facts dwelt upon by the Committee, with a view to illustrate the system of fictitious credit, lack, of course, the interest of novelty. The system itself was in England carried on by a very simple machinery. The fictitious credit was created through the means of accommodation bills. The latter were discounted principally by joint-stock country banks, which rediscounted them with the London bill brokers. The London bill brokers, looking only to the indorsement of the Bank, not to the bills themselves, in their turn relied not upon their own reserves, but upon the facilities afforded to them by the Bank of England. The principles of the London bill brokers may be understood from the following anecdote, related to the Committee by Mr. Dixon, the late Manager Director of the Liverpool Borough Bank:

In incidental conversation about the whole affair, one of the bill brokers made the remark that if it had not been for Sir Robert Peel's act the Borough Bank need not have suspended. In reply to that, I said that whatever might be the merits of Sir Robert Peel's act, for my own part I would not have been willing to lift a finger to assist the Borough Bank through its difficulties, if the so doing had involved the continuance of such a wretched system of business as had been practiced, and I said if I had only known half as much of the proceedings of the Borough Bank before I became a Managing Director, as you must have known, by seeing a great many of the bills of the Borough Bank discounted, you would never have caught me being a stockholder. The rejoinder to which was: "Nor would you have caught me being a stockholder; it was very well for me to discount the bills, but I would not have been a shareholder either."

The Borough Bank in Liverpool, the Western Bank of Scotland, in Glasgow, the Northumberland and Durham District

Bank, into the operations of which three banks the Committee instituted the strictest inquiry, seem to have carried the palm in the race of mismanagement. The Western Bank in Glasgow, which had 101 branches throughout Scotland and connections in America, allowed to draw upon it for the mere sake of the commission, raised its dividend in 1854 from 7 to 8 per cent, in 1856 from 8 to 9 per cent, and declared a dividend of 9 per cent, still in June, 1857, when the greater part of its capital was gone. Its discounts which in 1853 were £14,987,000 had been increased in 1857 to £20,691,000. The rediscounts of the bank in London, amounting in 1852 to £407,000, had risen in 1856 to £5,407,000. The whole capital of the bank being but £1,500,000, the sum of £1,603,000 appeared on its failure, in Nov. 1857, to be owed to it by the four installment houses alone of McDonald, Monteith, Wallace and Pattison. One of the principal operations of the bank consisted in making advances upon "interests," that is to say, manufacturers were provided with capital, the security for which consisted in the eventual sale of the produce to be created through the means of the loan advanced. The levity with which the discount business was managed, appears from the circumstance that McDonald's bills were accepted by 127 different parties; only 37 being inquired about, the report on 21 of which turned out unsatisfactory or positively bad. Still McDonald's credit continued undiminished. Since 1848, a substitution was made in the books of the bank, by which debts were turned into credits, and losses into assets.

"The modes," says the Report,

in which this kind of disguise can be accomplished, will perhaps be best understood by stating the manner in which a debt called Scarth's debt, comprised in a different branch of the assets, was disposed of. That debt amounted to £120,000, and it ought to have appeared among the protested bills. It was, however, divided into four or five open credit accounts, bearing the names of the acceptors of Scarth's bill. These accounts were debited with the amount of their respective acceptances, and insurances were effected on the lives of the debtors to the extent of £75,000. On

these insurances, £33,000 have been paid as premiums by the bank itself. These all now stand as assets in the books.

Lastly, on examination it was found that £988,000 were due to the bank from its own shareholders.

The whole capital of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank amounting to £600,000 only, nearly £1,000,000 were loaned by it to the insolvent Derwent Iron Company. Mr. Jonathan Richardson, who was the moving spring of the Bank, in fact the person who managed everything, was, although no direct partner in the Derwent Iron Company, very largely interested in that unpromising concern, as holding the royalties upon the minerals which they worked. This case presents, therefore, the peculiar feature of the whole capital of a joint-stock bank being eaten up with the single view to improving the private speculations of one of its managing directors.

These two samples of the revelations contained in the Committee's report reflect a rather dismal light on the morality and general conduct of joint-stock trading concerns. It is evident that those establishments, the rapidly growing influence of which on the economy of nations can hardly be overvalued, are still far from having worked out their proper constitution. Powerful engines in developing the productive powers of modern society, they have not, like the medieval corporations, as yet created a corporate conscience in lieu of the individual responsibility which, by dint of their very organization, they have contrived to get rid of.

*[Project for the Regulation of the Price of Bread
in France]*

Published December 15, 1858

The Emperor of the French has just undertaken the execution of a favorite project of his, namely, the regulation of the price of bread throughout his empire. This idea he definitely announced as long ago as 1854, in his speech to the Legislative Body on

occasion of the declaration of war against Russia. His statement of the case at that time is worth quoting, and we give it as follows:

Above all, I recommend to your attention the system now adopted by the City of Paris; for if it extend, as I trust it will, to the whole of France, it will for the future prevent those extreme variations in the price of corn which, in times of abundance, cause agriculture to languish because of the low price of wheat, and, in years of scarcity, the poorer classes to suffer so greatly because of its dearth. That system consists in the establishment in all great centers of population of a credit institution called Baker's Bank (*Caisse de la Boulangerie*), which, during years of dearth, can give bread at a price infinitely lower than the official market quotation, on the condition of its price ranging a little higher in years of plenty. The good harvests being in general more numerous than the bad ones, it is easy to understand that the compensation between both may be effected with ease. In addition, the immense advantage would be gained of finding credit-companies which, instead of gaining from a rise in the price of bread, would, like every one else, be interested in its cheapness; for, contrary to what has existed to the present time, such companies would make money in seasons of fertility, and lose money in seasons of dearth.

The principle here set forth is that bread should be sold "infinitely" below its market price in bad, and only "a little" above that same price in good seasons—the compensation to result from the hope that the good years will by far overbalance the scarce ones. An Imperial decree having in December, 1853, established the Baker's Bank at Paris, the maximum price for the four-pound loaf was fixed at 40 centimes; the bakers being empowered to claim compensation for their loss from the Bank, which, in its turn, raised its funds by the issue of obligations guaranteed by the Municipality, which, on its part, raised the guaranty funds by contracting new debts, and enhancing the excise duties on articles of consumption at the gates of Paris. A certain sum was, besides, directly contributed by the Government from the public exchequer. At the end of 1854 the debts

thus contracted by the Municipality of Paris, together with the Government money, had already reached the sum of eighty millions of francs. The Government was then forced to rescind its steps, and to successively raise the maximum price of the loaf to 45 and 50 centimes. Thus, the Paris people had partly to pay in the form of increased excises what they saved in the price of bread, and the rest of France had to pay a general pauper tax for the metropolis, in the form of the direct Government subvention accorded to the Municipality of Paris. However, the experiment proved a complete failure; the Paris price of bread rising above the official maximum during the bad seasons, from 1855 to 1857, and sinking below it during the rich harvests of 1857 and 1858.

Nothing daunted by the failure of this experiment on a relatively small scale, Louis Napoleon has now taken to organizing, by his own ukase, the bakers' trade and the commerce in grain throughout the Empire. Some weeks ago, one of his newspapers in Paris attempted to convince the public that "a reserve of grain" was a necessity in all considerable towns. The argument was, that in the worst years of scarcity the maximum deficit of grain had been equal to 28 days' consumption of the whole population, and that the average number of consecutive bad years was three. From these premises it was calculated that "an effective reserve for three months will be all that can be enacted from human foresight." If extended only to towns with a minimum population of 10,000 inhabitants, the aggregate population of such towns in France (Paris excluded) amounting to 3,776,000 souls, each average soul consuming 45 kilogrammes of wheat for three months, and the present price of wheat being about 14f. the hectolitre—such a reserve, according to this view of the case, would cost between 31,000,000 and 32,000,000f.! Now, on the 18th of Nov. the *Moniteur* published a decree in the following terms:

Art. 1. The reserve of the bakers in all the towns in which the baking trade is regulated by decrees and ordinances is fixed at the quantity of grain or flour necessary for supplying the daily make of each baking establishment during three months.

Art. 2. Within a month from this date, the Prefects of Departments, after having consulted the municipalities, shall decide whether the reserves shall be established in grain or flour, and shall fix the period within which they shall be provided; also, the portion of them which may be deposited in public store-houses.

Annexed to this decree is a list of the towns "in which the baking trade is regulated," and which, consequently, have to lay in reserves. The list comprises all the towns and cities of France of a certain degree of importance, except Paris and Lyons, in which reserves already exist, and which consequently do not fall within the operation of the decree. In all, there are not fewer than 161 towns or cities, and among them are Marseilles, St. Quentin, Moulins, Caen, Angoulême, Dijon, Bourges, Besançon, Evreux, Chartres, Brest, Nîmes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Rennes, Tours, Grenoble, St. Étienne, Nantes, Orléans, Angers, Rheims, Chalôns, Metz, Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, Beauvais, Arras, St. Omer, Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Rouen, Havre, Mâcon, Le Mans, Amiens, Abbeville, and Toulon. According to the last census, the populations of the 161 towns and cities may now be set down at about 8,000,000! This gives us then 5,500,000 hectolitres, at a cost of between 70,000,000 and 80,000,000 francs for the reserves. In transmitting by circular the decree to the Prefects of Departments, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce tells them that, though they "must not constrain the bakers to fulfill precipitately the obligations imposed on them by the decree," they must "fix within reasonable limits the period allowed for so doing." He leaves the Prefects to decide, from local considerations, whether the reserves shall be laid in in grain or flour. He then tells them that the present measure, vast as it is, may be considered capable of extension.

The Government does not exaggerate, Monsieur le Prefect, the importance of the measure I have described. It is aware that the decree only concerns a small part of the population, and accordingly it has occupied itself with the possibility of extending its means of action. The inhabitants of hamlets and of villages

bake their own bread, and take from their crops the quantity of wheat necessary for their families during the year. The intervention of the Government with regard to them would be useless and impossible. But in a certain number of chief towns of departments, and in a greater number of the chief places of arrondissements and of cantons, and even in populous villages, bakers make an important part of the bread consumed, and yet they are not the object of any regulations, and are not obliged to make any reserves. Is it not possible to place the bakers of such places as these under the same *régime*, and to impose on them the same salutary law of prudence? The Government is disposed to think that its prescriptions in this respect would not meet with any serious objections.

Before, however, subjecting to the above decree all the rest of France, except the small villages, the Minister directs the Prefects to consult the Municipalities of the places which do not now fall within its operation. He then tells the Prefects how the reserves are to be stored up:

Bakers must, as far as possible, utilise the dependencies of their shops, as the *surveillance* of them will be easy. But you must invite the Municipalities to organize, and to place at the disposal of bakers, public store-houses calculated to receive, on payment of a rent to be fixed by tariff, the reserve they cannot receive themselves. I do not doubt that the enlightened cooperation of the municipal authorities will render these operations easy.

The Minister next arrives at the vital point—where to get the money for carrying out the decree:

As to the realization of the capital necessary, I am convinced that bakers will employ the most serious efforts to procure the sums they will need. Such an employment of capital presents commercial advantages so great, and promises to realize such legitimate profits that they can hardly fail to obtain credit, especially at a moment at which the interest on money is so low. Is it presuming too much on the good will of the capitalists in each commune to

hope for their cooperation in favor of the bakers? Would they not find in the reserves constituted a safe pledge of their advances—and a pledge which is rather destined to increase in value than to decline? I shall be happy if the efforts you may make in this matter may be crowned with success. *I ask myself, if the Municipalities could not, if necessary, in imitation of the Caisse de Paris, create resources and employ them in advances to bakers.* In order to encourage and facilitate such advances, and to multiply them by circulation, the granaries destined to receive the reserves might have the character of bonded warehouses (*magasins généraux*), conferred on them, and might deliver warrants which would safely be accepted with favor by our financial establishment, and especially by the Bank of France.

The Minister concludes his circular by directing that within twenty days the Prefects shall inform him what they propose in regard to the execution of the second article of the decree, and within a month shall report on what the Municipalities of the towns and villages not included in the decree recommend.

Now, we do not purpose to enter at this moment into the question of public granaries, but the immense importance of this economical *coup d'état* needs no long commentary. It is well known that the present price of grain is ruinously low in France, and that, consequently, signs of dissatisfaction are perceptible among the peasantry. By the artificial demand to be created through the means of three months' reserve, Napoleon tries to enhance prices artificially, and thus stop the mouth to agricultural France. On the other hand, he proclaims himself a sort of socialist providence to the proletarians of the towns, although in a rather awkward way, since the first palpable effect of his decree must be to make them pay more for their loaf than before. The "savior of property" shows the middle class that not even the formal intervention of his own mock Legislatures, but a simple personal ukase on his part, is all that is wanted to make free with their purses, dispose of municipal property, trouble the course of trade, and subject their monetary dealings to his private crochets. Lastly, the question is still to be considered from the pure Bonapartist point of view. Immense

buildings for public granaries will become necessary over the whole of France; and what a fresh field they will open for jobs and plunder. An unexpected turn is also given to the trade in breadstuffs. What profits to be pocketed by the *Crédit Mobilier* and the other gambling companions of his Imperial Majesty! At all events, we may be sure that the Imperial Socialist will prove more successful in raising the price of bread than he has been in attempts to reduce it.

INDIA AND IMPERIALISM

India represented a fascinating laboratory for Marx's theories. In the mid-nineteenth century there existed no more pure an example of a society dominated by imperialism. The British East India Company's almost total monopoly on British trade with the colony, which existed for nearly two centuries until 1813, had, in his view, completely transformed not only the Indian economy but its very structure. The company's ships and factories—to say nothing of its army, navy and civil administrators—destroyed traditional methods of production and distribution, turning the vast majority of Indian citizens into virtual slaves. When the Company began to suffer financially in the late eighteenth century, its principal lifeline derived from forcing Indian farmers to grow opium for Chinese consumption, a practice for which Marx reserved the kind of scorn that many feel for the Latin American cocaine trade today.

Yet Marx's analysis of India was neither rigidly economic nor without hope. As deeply as he denounced the British colonization of India, he did not hold a romantic notion that a nation's Golden Age had been destroyed. On the contrary, he believed that Hinduism had produced an "undignified, stagnant, and vegetative life . . . [that] rendered murder itself a religious rite". Marx's belief in dialectical progress predicted that the Indians would eventually use the productive forces the British introduced—including railroads and irrigation—to emancipate themselves. Thus the fissures in Britain's Indian rule that presented themselves throughout the mid-nineteenth century were for Marx harbingers of Indian independence. Indeed, the distinguished Asian historian Dilip Hiro believes

that Marx alone among contemporary commentators perceived the implications of the uprising that began in the Indian army in mid-1857.¹ The origins of the rebellion, he understood, were humble to the point of being obscure—a rumor to the effect that the British wanted to convert all Indians to Christianity. But the uprising showed both a deeper discontent and a system of oppression that would be difficult and expensive for the British to sustain. Hence, Marx saw in the revolt “the prologue of a most terrible tragedy that will have to be enacted”.

NOTE

1. Personal conversation.

The British Rule in India
Published June 25, 1853

[. . .] Last night the debate on India was continued in the House of Commons, in the usual dull manner. Mr. Blackett charged the statements of Sir Charles Wood and Sir J. Hogg with bearing the stamp of optimist falsehood. A lot of Ministerial and Directorial advocates rebuked the charge as well as they could, and the inevitable Mr. Hume summed up by calling on Ministers to withdraw their bill. Debate adjourned.

Hindustan is an Italy of Asiatic dimensions, the Himalayas for the Alps, the Plains of Bengal for the Plains of Lombardy, the Deccan for the Apennines, and the Isle of Ceylon for the Island of Sicily. The same rich variety in the products of the soil, and the same dismemberment in the political configuration. Just as Italy has, from time to time, been compressed by the conqueror's sword into different national masses, so do we find Hindustan, when not under the pressure of the Mohammedan, or the Mogul, or the Briton, dissolved into as many independent and conflicting States as it numbered towns, or even villages. Yet, in a social point of view, Hindustan is not the Italy, but

the Ireland of the East. And this strange combination of Italy and of Ireland, of a world of voluptuousness and of a world of woes, is anticipated in the ancient traditions of the religion of Hindostan. That religion is at once a religion of sensualist exuberance, and a religion of self-torturing asceticism; a religion of the Lingam and of the Juggernaut; the religion of the Monk, and of the Bayadere.

I share not the opinion of those who believe in a golden age of Hindostan, without recurring, however, like Sir Charles Wood¹²³ for the confirmation of my view, to the authority of Khuli-Khan. But take, for example, the times of Aurangzeb;¹²⁴ or the epoch, when the Mogul appeared in the North, and the Portuguese in the South; or the age of Mohammedan invasion, and of the Heptarchy in Southern India; or, if you will, go still more back to antiquity, take the mythological chronology of the Brahman himself, who places the commencement of Indian misery in an epoch even more remote than the Christian creation of the world.

There cannot, however, remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before. I do not allude to European despotism, planted upon Asiatic despotism, by the British East India Company, forming a more monstrous combination than any of the divine monsters startling us in the Temple of Salsette. This is no distinctive feature of British Colonial rule, but only an imitation of the Dutch, and so much so that in order to characterize the working of the British East India Company, it is sufficient to literally repeat what Sir Stamford Raffles, the *English* Governor of Java, said of the old Dutch East India Company:

The Dutch Company, actuated solely by the spirit of gain, and viewing their [Javan] subjects, with less regard or consideration than a West India planter formerly viewed a gang upon his estate, because the latter had paid the purchase money of human property, which the other had not, employed all the existing machinery of despotism to squeeze from the people their utmost mite of contribution, the last dregs of their labor, and thus aggravated

the evils of a capricious and semi-barbarous Government, by working it with all the practised ingenuity of politicians, and all the monopolizing selfishness of traders.

All the civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid, and destructive as the successive action in Hindostan may appear, did not go deeper than its surface. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo, and separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history.

There have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government; that of Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the exterior; and, finally, the department of Public Works. Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert, extending from the Sahara, through Arabia, Persia, India, and Tartary, to the most elevated Asiatic highlands, constituted artificial irrigation by canals and water-works the basis of Oriental agriculture. As in Egypt and India, inundations are used for fertilizing the soil in Mesopotamia, Persia, &c.; advantage is taken of a high level for feeding irrigative canals. This prime necessity of an economical and common use of water, which, in the Occident, drove private enterprise to voluntary association, as in Flanders and Italy, necessitated, in the Orient, where civilization was too low and the territorial extent too vast to call into life voluntary association, the interference of the centralizing power of Government. Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic Governments, the function of providing public works. This artificial fertilization of the soil, dependent on a Central Government, and immediately decaying with the neglect of irrigation and drainage, explains the otherwise strange fact that we now find whole territories barren and desert that were once brilliantly cultivated, as Palmyra, Petra, the ruins in Yemen, and large provinces of Egypt,

Persia, and Hindostan; it also explains how a single war of devastation has been able to depopulate a country for centuries, and to strip it of all its civilization.

Now, the British in East India accepted from their predecessors the department of finance and of war, but they have neglected entirely that of public works. Hence the deterioration of an agriculture which is not capable of being conducted on the British principle of free competition, of *laissez-faire* and *laissez-aller*. But in Asiatic empires we are quite accustomed to see agriculture deteriorating under one government and reviving again under some other government. There the harvests correspond to good or bad government, as they change in Europe with good or bad seasons. Thus the oppression and neglect of agriculture, bad as it is, could not be looked upon as the final blow dealt to Indian society by the British intruder, had it not been attended by a circumstance of quite different importance, a novelty in the annals of the whole Asiatic world. However changing the political aspect of India's past must appear, its social condition has remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of the 19th century. The hand-loom and the spinning-wheel, producing their regular myriads of spinners and weavers, were the pivots of the structure of that society. From immemorial times, Europe received the admirable textures of Indian labor, sending in return for them her precious metals, and furnishing thereby his material to the goldsmith, that indispensable member of Indian society, whose love of finery is so great that even the lowest class, those who go about nearly naked, have commonly a pair of golden ear-rings and a gold ornament of some kind hung round their necks. Rings on the fingers and toes have also been common. Women as well as children frequently wore massive bracelets and anklets of gold or silver, and statuettes of divinities in gold and silver were met with in the households. It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons. From 1818 to 1836 the export

of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. In 1824 the export of British muslins to India hardly amounted to 1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 of yards. But at the same time the population of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 20,000. This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry.

These two circumstances—the Hindoo, on the one hand, leaving, like all Oriental peoples, to the Central Government the care of the great public works, the prime condition of his agriculture and commerce, dispersed, on the other hand, over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in small centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits—these two circumstances had brought about since the remotest times, a social system of particular features—the so-called *village system*, which gave to each of these small unions their independent organization and distinct life. The peculiar character of this system may be judged from the following description, contained in an old official report¹²⁵ of the British House of Commons on Indian affairs:

A village, geographically considered, is a tract of country comprising some hundred or thousand acres of arable and waste lands; politically viewed it resembles a corporation or township. Its proper establishment of officers and servants consists of the following descriptions: The *potail*, or head inhabitant, who has generally the superintendence of the affairs of the village, settles the disputes of the inhabitants, attends to the police, and performs the duty of collecting the revenue within his village, a duty which his personal influence and minute acquaintance with the situation and concerns of the people render him the best qualified for this charge. The *kurnum* keeps the accounts of cultivation, and registers everything connected with it. The *tallier* and the *totie*, the duty of the former of which consists . . . in gaining information of crimes and offenses, and in escorting and protecting persons traveling from one village to another; the province of the

latter appearing to be more immediately confined to the village, consisting, among other duties, in guarding the crops and assisting in measuring them. The *boundary-man*, who preserves the limits of the village, or gives evidence respecting them in cases of dispute. The Superintendent of Tanks and Watercourses distributes the water . . . for the purposes of agriculture. The Brahmin, who performs the village worship. The schoolmaster, who is seen teaching the children in a village to read and write in the sand. The calendar-brahmin, or astrologer, &c. These officers and servants generally constitute the establishment of a village; but in some parts of the country it is of less extent, some of the duties and functions above described being united in the same person; in others it exceeds the above-named number of individuals . . . Under this simple form of municipal government, the inhabitants of the country have lived from time immemorial. The boundaries of the villages . . . have been but seldom altered; and though the villages themselves have been sometimes injured, and even desolated by war, famine or disease, the same name, the same limits, the same interests, and even the same families have continued for ages. The inhabitants gave themselves no trouble about the breaking up and divisions of kingdoms; while the village remains entire, they care not to what power it is transferred, or to what sovereign it devolves; its internal economy remains unchanged. The potail is still the head inhabitant, and still acts as the petty judge or magistrate, and collector or renter of the village.

These small stereotype forms of social organism have been to the greater part dissolved, and are disappearing, not so much through the brutal interference of the British tax-gatherer and the British soldier, as to the working of English steam and English free trade. Those family-communities were based on domestic industry, in that peculiar combination of hand-weaving, hand-spinning and hand-tilling agriculture which gave them self-supporting power. English interference having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, dissolved these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by blowing

up their economical basis, and thus produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia.

Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization, and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget the barbarian egotism which, concentrating on some miserable patch of land, had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetration of unspeakable cruelties, the massacre of the population of large towns, with no other consideration bestowed upon them than on natural events, itself the helpless prey of any aggressor who deigned to notice it at all. We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindostan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may

have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.

Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:

Sollte diese Qual uns quälen
 Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt,
 Hat nicht myriaden Seelen
 Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?¹²⁶

The Future Results of British Rule in India

Published August 8, 1853

[. . .] How came it that English supremacy was established in India? The paramount power of the Great Mogul was broken by the Mogul Viceroy. The power of the Viceroy was broken by the Mahrattas. The power of the Mahrattas¹²⁷ was broken by the Afghans, and while all were struggling against all, the Briton rushed in and was enabled to subdue them all. A country not only divided between Mahommedan and Hindoo, but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste; a society whose framework was based on a sort of equilibrium, resulting from a general repulsion and constitutional exclusiveness between all its members. Such a country and such a society, were they not the predestined prey of conquest? If we knew nothing of the past history of Hindostan, would there not be the one great and incontestable fact, that even at this moment India is held in English thralldom by an Indian army maintained at the cost of India? India, then, could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not

whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.

England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India, soon became *Hindooized*, the barbarian conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their subjects. The British were the first conquerors superior, and therefore, inaccessible to Hindoo civilization. They destroyed it by breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry, and by levelling all that was great and elevated in the native society. The historic pages of their rule in India report hardly anything beyond that destruction. The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless it has begun.

The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army, organized and trained by the British drill-sergeant, was the *sine qua non* of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. The free press, introduced for the first time into Asiatic society, and managed principally by the common offspring of Hindoos and Europeans, is a new and powerful agent of reconstruction. The Zemindari and Ryotwar themselves, abominable as they are, involve two distinct forms of private property in land—the great desideratum of Asiatic society. From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence, a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication with Europe, has connected its chief ports with those of the whole south-eastern ocean, and has revindicated it from the isolated position which

was the prime law of its stagnation. The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam-vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world.

The ruling classes of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it. But now the tables are turned. The millocracy have discovered that the transformation of India into a reproductive country has become of vital importance to them, and that, to that end, it is necessary, above all, to gift her with means of irrigation and of internal communication. They intend now drawing a net of railroads over India. And they will do it. The results must be inappreciable.

It is notorious that the productive powers of India are paralyzed by the utter want of means for conveying and exchanging its various produce. Nowhere, more than in India, do we meet with social destitution in the midst of natural plenty, for want of the means of exchange. It was proved before a Committee of the British House of Commons, which sat in 1848, that "when grain was selling from 6/ to 8/ a quarter at Khandesh, it was sold at 64/ to 70/ at Poona, where the people were dying in the streets of famine, without the possibility of gaining supplies from Khandesh, because the clay-roads were impracticable."

The introduction of railroads may be easily made to subserve agricultural purposes by the formation of tanks, where ground is required for embankment, and by the conveyance of water along the different lines. Thus irrigation, the *sine qua non* of farming in the East, might be greatly extended, and the frequently recurring local famines, arising from the want of water, would be averted. The general importance of railways, viewed under this head, must become evident, when we remember that irrigated lands, even in the districts near Ghauts, pay three times as much in taxes, afford ten or twelve times as much employment, and yield twelve or fifteen times as much profit, as the same area without irrigation.

Railways will afford the means of diminishing the amount and the cost of the military establishments. Col. Warren, Town Major of the Fort St. William, stated before a Select Committee of the House of Commons:

The practicability of receiving intelligence from distant parts of the country, in as many hours as at present it requires days and even weeks, and of sending instructions, with troops and stores, in the more brief period, are considerations which cannot be too highly estimated. Troops could be kept at more distant and healthier stations than at present, and much loss of life from sickness would by this means be spared. Stores could not to the same extent be required at the various dépôts, and the loss by decay, and the destruction incidental to the climate, would also be avoided. The number of troops might be diminished in direct proportion to their effectiveness.

We know that the municipal organization and the economical basis of the village communities has been broken up, but their worst feature, the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms, has survived their vitality. The village isolation produced the absence of roads in India, and the absence of roads perpetuated the village isolation. On this plan a community existed with a given scale of low conveniences, almost without intercourse with other villages, without the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance. The British having broken up this self-sufficient *inertia* of the villages, railways will provide the new want of communication and intercourse. Besides, 'one of the effects of the railway system will be to bring into every village affected by it such knowledge of the contrivances and appliances of other countries, and such means of obtaining them, as will first put the hereditary and stipendiary village artisanship of India to full proof of its capabilities, and then supply its defects' [. . .]

I know that the English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures. But when you have once introduced machinery

into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway-system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry. This is the more certain as the Hindoos are allowed by British authorities themselves to possess particular aptitude for accommodating themselves to entirely new labor, and acquiring the requisite knowledge of machinery. Ample proof of this fact is afforded by the capacities and expertness of the native engineers in the Calcutta mint, where they have been for years employed in working the steam machinery, by the natives attached to the several steam engines in the Burdwan coal districts, and by other instances. Mr. Campbell¹²⁸ himself, greatly influenced as he is by the prejudices of the East India Company, is obliged to avow "that the great mass of the Indian people possesses a great *industrial energy*, is well fitted to accumulate capital, and remarkable for a mathematical clearness of head, and talent for figures and exact sciences." "Their intellects," he says, "are excellent."

Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?

The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till

in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether. At all events, we may safely expect to see, at a more or less remote period, the regeneration of that great and interesting country, whose gentle natives are, to use the expression of Prince Soltykov,¹²⁹ even in the most inferior classes, "*plus fins et plus adroits que les Italiens,*" whose submission even is counterbalanced by a certain calm nobility, who, notwithstanding their natural langor, have astonished the British officers by their bravery, whose country has been the source of our languages, our religions, and who represent the type of the ancient German in the Jat, and the type of the ancient Greek in the Brahmin.¹³⁰

I cannot part with the subject of India without some concluding remarks.

The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of that great robber, Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of the national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the rajahs, who had invested their private savings in the Company's own funds? While they combatted the French revolution under the pretext of defending "our holy religion," did they not forbid, at the same time, Christianity to be propagated in India, and did they not, in order to make money out of the pilgrims streaming to the temples of Orissa and Bengal, take up the trade in the murder and prostitution perpetrated in the temple of Jugger-naut? These are the men of "Property, Order, Family, and Religion."

The devastating effects of English industry, when contemplated with regard to India, a country as vast as Europe, and

containing 150 millions of acres, are palpable and confounding. But we must not forget that they are only the organic results of the whole system of production as it is now constituted. That production rests on the supreme rule of capital. The centralization of capital is essential to the existence of capital as an independent power. The destructive influence of that centralization upon the markets of the world does but reveal, in the most gigantic dimensions, the inherent organic laws of political economy now at work in every civilized town. The bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world—on the one hand universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse: on the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the transformation of material production into a scientific domination of natural agencies. Bourgeois industry and commerce create these material conditions of a new world in the same way as geological revolutions have created the surface of the earth. When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.

The Revolt in the Indian Army

Published July 15, 1857

The Roman *Divide et impera*¹³¹ was the great rule by which Great Britain, for about one hundred and fifty years, contrived to retain the tenure of her Indian empire. The antagonism of the various races, tribes, castes, creeds and sovereignties, the aggregate of which forms the geographical unity of what is called India, continued to be the vital principle of British supremacy. In later times, however, the conditions of that supremacy have undergone a change. With the conquest of Scinde and the

Punjaub, the Anglo-Indian empire had not only reached its natural limits, but it had trampled out the last vestiges of independent Indian States. All warlike native tribes were subdued, all serious internal conflicts were at an end, and the late incorporation of Oude¹³² proved satisfactorily that the remnants of the so-called independent Indian principalities exist on sufferance only. Hence a great change in the position of the East Indian Company. It no longer attacked one part of India by the help of another part, but found itself placed at the head, and the whole of India at its feet. No longer conquering, it had become *the* conqueror. The armies at its disposition no longer had to extend its dominion, but only to maintain it. From soldiers they were converted into policemen; 200,000,000 natives being curbed by a native army of 200,000 men, officered by Englishmen, and that native army, in its turn, being kept in check by an English army numbering 40,000 only. On first view, it is evident that the allegiance of the Indian people rests on the fidelity of the native army, in creating which the British rule simultaneously organized the first general center of resistance which the Indian people was ever possessed of. How far that native army may be relied upon is clearly shown by its recent mutinies, breaking out as soon as the war with Persia had almost denuded the Presidency of Bengal of its European soldiers. Before this there had been mutinies in the Indian army, but the present revolt is distinguished by characteristic and fatal features. It is the first time that sepoy regiments have murdered their European officers; that Mussulmans and Hindoos, renouncing their mutual antipathies, have combined against their common masters; that "disturbances beginning with the Hindoos, have actually ended in placing on the throne of Delhi a Mohammedan Emperor;" that the mutiny has not been confined to a few localities; and lastly, that the revolt in the Anglo-Indian army has coincided with a general disaffection exhibited against English supremacy on the part of the great Asiatic nations, the revolt of the Bengal army being, beyond doubt, intimately connected with the Persian and Chinese wars.¹³³

The alleged cause of the dissatisfaction which began to spread

four months ago in the Bengal army was the apprehension on the part of the natives lest the Government should interfere with their religion. The serving out of cartridges, the paper of which was said to have been greased with the fat of bullocks and pigs, and the compulsory biting of which was, therefore, considered by the natives as an infringement of their religious prescriptions, gave the signal for local disturbances. On the 22nd of January an incendiary fire broke out in cantonments a short distance from Calcutta. On the 25th of February the 19th native regiment mutinied at Berhampore the men objecting to the cartridges served out to them. On the 31st of March that regiment was disbanded; at the end of March the 34th sepoy regiment, stationed at Barrackpore, allowed one of its men to advance with a loaded musket upon the parade-ground in front of the line, and, after having called his comrades to mutiny, he was permitted to attack and wound the Adjutant and Sergeant-Major of his regiment. During the hand-to-hand conflict, that ensued, hundreds of sepoys looked passively on, while others participated in the struggle, and attacked the officers with the butt ends of their muskets. Subsequently that regiment was also disbanded. The month of April was signalized by incendiary fires in several cantonments of the Bengal army at Allahabad, Agra, Umballah, by a mutiny of the 3d regiment of light cavalry at Meerut, and by similar appearances of disaffection in the Madras and Bombay armies. At the beginning of May an émeute¹³⁴ was preparing at Lucknow, the capital of Oude, which was, however, prevented by the promptitude of Sir H. Lawrence. On the 9th of May the mutineers of the 3d light cavalry of Meerut were marched off to jail, to undergo the various terms of imprisonment to which they were sentenced. On the evening of the following day the troopers of the 3d cavalry, together with the two native regiments, the 11th and 20th, assembled upon the parade-ground, killed the officers endeavoring to pacify them, set fire to the cantonments, and slew all the Englishmen they were able to lay hands on. Although the British part of the brigade mustered a regiment of infantry, another of cavalry, and an overwhelming force of horse and foot artillery, they were not able to move until

nightfall. Having inflicted but little harm on the mutineers, they allowed them to betake themselves to the open field and to throw themselves into Delhi, some forty miles distant from Meerut. There they were joined by the native garrison, consisting of the 38th, 54th and 74th regiments of infantry, and a company of native artillery. The British officers were attacked, all Englishmen within reach of the rebels were murdered, and the heir of the late Mogul¹³⁵ of Delhi proclaimed King of India. Of the troops sent to the rescue of Meerut, where order had been re-established, six companies of native sappers and miners, who arrived on the 15th of May, murdered their commanding officer, Major Frazer, and made at once for the open country, pursued by troops of horse artillery and several of the 6th dragoon guards. Fifty or sixty of the mutineers were shot, but the rest contrived to escape to Delhi. At Ferozepore, in the Punjaub, the 57th and 45th native infantry regiments mutinied, but were put down by force. Private letters from Lahore state the whole of the native troops to be in an undisguised state of mutiny. On the 19th of May, unsuccessful efforts were made by the sepoys stationed at Calcutta to get possession of Fort St. William. Three regiments arrived from Bushire at Bombay were at once dispatched to Calcutta.

In reviewing these events, one is startled by the conduct of the British commander at Meerut his late appearance on the field of battle being still less incomprehensible than the weak manner in which he pursued the mutineers. As Delhi is situated on the right and Meerut on the left bank of the Jumna—the two banks being joined at Delhi by one bridge only—nothing could have been easier than to cut off the retreat of the fugitives.

Meanwhile, martial law has been proclaimed in all the disaffected districts; forces, consisting of natives mainly, are concentrating against Delhi from the north, the east and the south; the neighboring princes are said to have pronounced for the English; letters have been sent to Ceylon to stop Lord Elgin and Gen. Ashburnham's forces, on their way to China; and finally, 14,000 British troops were to be dispatched from England to India in about a fortnight. Whatever obstacles the climate of

India at the present season, and the total want of means of transportation, may oppose to the movements of the British forces, the rebels at Delhi are very likely to succumb without any prolonged resistance. Yet even then, it is only the prologue of a most terrible tragedy that will have to be enacted.

The Indian Question

Published August 14, 1857

The three hours' speech delivered last night in "The Dead House,"¹³⁶ by Mr. Disraeli,¹³⁷ will gain rather than lose by being read instead of being listened to. For some time, Mr. Disraeli affects an awful solemnity of speech, an elaborate slowness of utterance and a passionless method of formality, which, however consistent they may be with his peculiar notions of the dignity becoming a Minister in expectance, are really distressing to his tortured audience. Once he succeeded in giving even commonplaces the pointed appearance of epigrams. Now he contrives to bury even epigrams in the conventional dullness of respectability. An orator who, like Mr. Disraeli, excels in handling the dagger rather than in wielding the sword, should have been the last to forget Voltaire's warning, that "Tous les genres sont bons excepté le genre ennuyeux."¹³⁸

Beside these technical peculiarities which characterize Mr. Disraeli's present manner of eloquence, he, since Palmerston's accession to power, has taken good care to deprive his parliamentary exhibitions of every possible interest of actuality. His speeches are not intended to carry his motions, but his motions are intended to prepare for his speeches. They might be called self-denying motions, since they are so constructed as neither to harm the adversary, if carried, nor to damage the proposer, if lost. They mean, in fact, to be neither carried nor lost, but simply to be dropped. They belong neither to the acids nor to the alkalis, but are born neutrals. The speech is not the vehicle of action, but the hypocrisy of action affords the opportunity for a speech. Such, indeed, may be the classical and final form

of parliamentary eloquence; but then, at all events, the final form of parliamentary eloquence must not demur to sharing the fate of all final forms of parliamentarism—that of being ranged under the category of nuisances. Action, as Aristotle said, is the ruling law of the drama. So it is of political oratory. Mr. Disraeli's speech on the Indian revolt might be published in the tracts of the Society for the Propagation of Useful Knowledge, or it might be delivered to a mechanics' institution, or tendered as a prize essay to the Academy of Berlin. This curious impartiality of his speech as to the place where, and the time when, and the occasion on which it was delivered, goes far to prove that it fitted neither place, time, nor occasion. A chapter on the decline of the Roman Empire which might read exceedingly well in Montesquieu or Gibbon would prove an enormous blunder if put in the mouth of a Roman Senator, whose peculiar business it was to stop that very decline. It is true that in our modern parliaments, a part lacking neither dignity nor interest might be imagined of an independent orator who, while despairing of influencing the actual course of events, should content himself to assume a position of ironical neutrality. Such a part was more or less successfully played by the late M. Garnier Pagès—not the Garnier Pagès of Provisional Government memory in Louis Philippe's Chamber of Deputies; but Mr. Disraeli, the avowed leader of an obsolete faction, would consider even success in this line as a supreme failure. The revolt of the Indian army afforded certainly a magnificent opportunity for oratorical display. But, apart from his dreary manner of treating the subject, what was the gist of the motion which he made the pretext for his speech? It was no motion at all. He feigned to be anxious for becoming acquainted with two official papers, the one of which he was not quite sure to exist, and the other of which he was sure not immediately to bear on the subject in question. Consequently his speech and his motion lacked any point of contact save this, that the motion heralded a speech without an object, and that the object confessed itself not worth a speech. Still, as the highly elaborated opinion of the most distinguished out-of-office statesman of England, Mr. Disraeli's speech ought to attract the attention

of foreign countries. I shall content myself with giving in his *ipsissima verba*¹³⁹ a short analysis of his "considerations on the decline of the Anglo-Indian Empire".

"Does the disturbance in India indicate a military mutiny, or is it a national revolt? Is the conduct of the troops the consequence of a sudden impulse, or is it the result of an organized conspiracy?" Upon these points Mr. Disraeli asserts the whole question to hinge. Until the last ten years, he affirmed, the British empire in India was founded on the old principle of *divide et impera*—but that principle was put into action by respecting the different nationalities of which India consisted, by avoiding to tamper with their religion, and by protecting their landed property. The Sepoy army served as a safety-valve to absorb the turbulent spirits of the country. But of late years a new principle has been adopted in the government of India—the principle of destroying nationality. The principle has been realized by the forcible destruction of native princes, the disturbance of the settlement of property, and the tampering with the religion of the people. In 1848 the financial difficulties of the East India Company had reached that point that it became necessary to augment its revenues one way or the other. Then a minute in Council was published, in which was laid down the principle, almost without disguise, that the only mode by which an increased revenue could be obtained was by enlarging the British territories at the expense of the native princes. Accordingly, on the death of the Rajah of Sattara, his adoptive heir was not acknowledged by the East India Company, but the Raj absorbed in its own dominions. From that moment the system of annexation was acted upon whenever a native prince died without natural heirs. The principle of adoption—the very corner-stone of Indian society—was systematically set aside by the Government. Thus were forcibly annexed to the British Empire the Rajs of more than a dozen independent princes from 1848–54. In 1854 the Raj of Berar, which comprised 80,000 square miles of land, a population from 4,000,000 to 5,000,000, and enormous treasures, was forcibly seized. Mr. Disraeli ends the list of forcible annexations with Oude, which brought the East India Government in collision not only with

the Hindoos, but also with the Mohammedans. Mr. Disraeli then goes on showing how the settlement of property in India was disturbed by the new system of government during the last ten years. "The principle of the law of adoption," he says, "is not the prerogative of princes and principalities in India, it applies to every man in Hindostan who has landed property, and who professes the Hindoo religion."

I quote a passage:

The great feudatory, or jaguedar, who holds his lands by public service to his lord; and the enamdar, who holds his land free of all land-tax, who corresponds, if not precisely, in a popular sense, at least with our freeholder—both of these classes—classes most numerous in India—always, on the failure of their natural heirs, find in this principle the means of obtaining successors to their estates. These classes were all touched by the annexation of Sattara, they were touched by the annexation of the territories of the ten inferior but independent princes to whom I have already alluded, and they were more than touched, they were terrified to the last degree, when the annexation of the Raj of Berar took place. What man was safe? What feudatory, what freeholder who had not a child of his own loins was safe throughout India? [Hear, hear]. These were not idle fears; they were extensively acted upon and reduced to practice. The resumption of jagheers and of inams commenced for the first time in India. There have been, no doubt, impolitic moments when attempts have been made to inquire into titles but no one had ever dreamt of abolishing the law of adoption; therefore no authority, no Government had ever been in a position to resume jagheers and inams the holders of which had left no natural heirs. Here was a new source of revenue; but while all these things were acting upon the minds of these classes of Hindoos, the Government took another step to disturb the settlement of property, to which I must now call the attention of the House. The House is aware, no doubt, from reading the evidence taken before the Committee of 1853, that there are great portions of the land of India which are exempt from the land-tax. Being free from land-tax in India is far more than equivalent to freedom from the land-tax in this

country, for, speaking generally and popularly, the land-tax in India is the whole taxation of the State.

The origin of these grants is difficult to penetrate, but they are undoubtedly of great antiquity. They are of different kinds. Beside the private freeholds, which are very extensive, there are large grants of land free from the land-tax with which mosques and temples have been endowed.

On the pretext of fraudulent claims of exemption, the British Governor General¹⁴⁰ took upon himself to examine the titles of the Indian landed estates. Under the new system, established in 1848,

That plan of investigating titles was at once embraced, as a proof of a powerful Government, vigorous Executive, and most fruitful source of public revenue. Therefore commissions were issued to inquire into titles to landed estates in the Presidency of Bengal and adjoining country. They were also issued in the Presidency of Bombay, and surveys were ordered to be made in the newly-settled provinces, in order that these commissions might be conducted, when the surveys were completed, with due efficiency. Now there is no doubt that, during the last nine years, the action of these commissions of Inquiry into the freehold property of landed estates in India has been going on at an enormous rate, and immense results have been obtained.

Mr. Disraeli computes that the resumption of estates from their proprietors is not less than £500,000 a year in the Presidency of Bengal; £370,000 in the Presidency of Bombay; £200,000 in the Punjaub, &c. Not content with this one method of seizing upon the property of the natives, the British Government discontinued the pensions to the native grandees, to pay which it was bound by treaty. "This," says Mr. Disraeli, "is confiscation by a new means, but upon a most extensive, startling and shocking scale."

Mr. Disraeli then treats the tampering with the religion of the natives, a point upon which we need not dwell. From all

his premises he arrives at the conclusion that the present Indian disturbance is not a military mutiny, but a national revolt, of which the Sepoys are the acting instruments only. He ends his harangue by advising the Government to turn their attention to the internal improvement of India, instead of pursuing its present course of aggression.

The Indian Revolt

Published September 16, 1857

The outrages committed by the revolted Sepoys in India are indeed appalling, hideous, ineffable—such as one is prepared to meet only in wars of insurrection, of nationalities, of races, and above all of religion; in one word, such as respectable England used to applaud when perpetrated by the Vendéans¹⁴¹ on the “Blues”, by the Spanish guerrillas on the infidel Frenchmen, by Servians on their German and Hungarian neighbors, by Croats on Viennese rebels, by Cavaignac’s Garde Mobile¹⁴² or Bonaparte’s Decembrists on the sons and daughters of proletarian France. However infamous the conduct of the Sepoys, it is only the reflex, in a concentrated form, of England’s own conduct in India, not only during the epoch of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but even during the last ten years of a long-settled rule. To characterize that rule, it suffices to say that torture formed an organic institution of its financial policy. There is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself.

The first blow dealt to the French monarchy proceeded from the nobility, not from the peasants. The Indian revolt does not commence with the Ryots, tortured, dishonored and stripped naked by the British, but with the Sepoys, clad, fed, petted, fattened and pampered by them. To find parallels to the Sepoy atrocities, we need not, as some London papers pretend, fall back on the middle ages, nor even wander beyond the history of contemporary England. All we want is to study the first Chinese

war,¹⁴³ an event, so to say, of yesterday. The English soldiery then committed abominations for the mere fun of it; their passions being neither sanctified by religious fanaticism nor exacerbated by hatred against an overbearing and conquering race, nor provoked by the stern resistance of a heroic enemy. The violations of women, the spittings of children, the roastings of whole villages, were then mere wanton sports, not recorded by Mandarins, but by British officers themselves.

Even at the present catastrophe it would be an unmitigated mistake to suppose that all the cruelty is on the side of the Sepoys, and all the milk of human kindness flows on the side of the English. The letters of the British officers are redolent of malignity. An officer writing from Peshawur gives a description of the disarming of the 10th irregular cavalry for not charging the 55th native infantry when ordered to do so. He exults in the fact that they were not only disarmed, but stripped of their coats and boots, and after having received 12d. per man, were marched down to the river side, and there embarked in boats and sent down the Indus, where the writer is delighted to expect every mother's son will have a chance of being drowned in the rapids. Another writer informs us that, some inhabitants of Peshawur having caused a night alarm by exploding little mines of gunpowder in honor of a wedding (a national custom), the persons concerned were tied up next morning, and "received such a flogging as they will not easily forget."

News arrived from Pindee that three native chiefs were plotting. Sir John Lawrence replied by a message ordering a spy to attend to the meeting. On the spy's report, Sir John sent a second message, "Hang them." The chiefs were hanged. An officer in the civil service, from Allahabad, writes: "We have power of life and death in our hands, and we assure you we spare not."

Another, from the same place: "Not a day passes but we string up from ten to fifteen of them (non-combatants)."

One exulting officer writes: "Holmes is hanging them by the score, like a 'brick.'"

Another, in allusion to the summary hanging of a large body of the natives: "Then our fun commenced."

A third: "We hold court-martials on horseback, and every nigger we meet with we either string up or shoot."

From Benares we are informed that thirty Zemindars were hanged on the mere suspicion of sympathizing with their own countrymen, and whole villages were burned down on the same plea. An officer from Benares, whose letter is printed in *The London Times*, says: "The European troops have become fiends when opposed to natives."

And then it should not be forgotten that, while the cruelties of the English are related as acts of martial vigor, told simply, rapidly, without dwelling on disgusting details, the outrages of the natives, shocking as they are, are still deliberately exaggerated. For instance, the circumstantial account first appearing in *The Times*, and then going the round of the London press, of the atrocities perpetrated at Delhi and Meerut, from whom did it proceed? From a cowardly parson residing at Bangalore, Mysore, more than a thousand miles, as the bird flies, distant from the scene of action. Actual accounts of Delhi evince the imagination of an English parson to be capable of breeding greater horrors than even the wild fancy of a Hindoo mutineer. The cutting of noses, breasts, &c., in one word, the horrid mutilations committed by the Sepoys, are of course more revolting to European feeling than the throwing of red-hot shell on Canton dwellings by a Secretary of the Manchester Peace Society, or the roasting of Arabs pent up in a cave by a French Marshal, or the flaying alive of British soldiers by the cat-o'-nine-tails under drum-head court-martial, or any other of the philanthropical appliances used in British penitentiary colonies. Cruelty, like every other thing, has its fashion, changing according to time and place. Caesar, the accomplished scholar, candidly narrates how he ordered many thousand Gallic warriors to have their right hands cut off. Napoleon would have been ashamed to do this. He preferred dispatching his own French regiments, suspected of republicanism, to St. Domingo, there to die of the blacks and the plague.

The infamous mutilations committed by the Sepoys remind one of the practices of the Christian Byzantine Empire, or the prescriptions of Emperor Charles V.'s criminal law, or the

English punishments for high treason, as still recorded by Judge Blackstone. With Hindoos, whom their religion has made virtuosos in the art of self-torturing, these tortures inflicted on the enemies of their race and creed appear quite natural, and must appear still more so to the English, who, only some years since, still used to draw revenues from the Juggernaut festivals, protecting and assisting the bloody rites of a religion of cruelty.

The frantic roars of the "bloody old *Times*," as Cobbett used to call it—its playing the part of a furious character in one of Mozart's operas, who indulges in most melodious strains in the idea of first hanging his enemy, then roasting him, then quartering him, then spitting him, and then flaying him alive—its tearing the passion of revenge to tatters and to rags—all this would appear but silly if under the pathos of tragedy there were not distinctly perceptible the tricks of comedy. *The London Times* overdoes its part, not only from panic. It supplies comedy with a subject even missed by Molière, the *Tartuffe of Revenge*. What it simply wants is to write up the funds and to screen the Government. As Delhi has not, like the walls of Jericho, fallen before mere puffs of wind, John Bull is to be steeped in cries for revenge up to his very ears, to make him forget that his Government is responsible for the mischief hatched and the colossal dimensions it has been allowed to assume.

[*Investigation of Tortures in India*]

Published September 17, 1857

Our London correspondent, whose letter with regard to the Indian revolt we published yesterday, very properly referred to some of the antecedents which prepared the way for this violent outbreak. We propose to-day to devote a moment to continuing that line of reflections, and to showing that the British rulers of India are by no means such mild and spotless benefactors of the Indian people as they would have the world believe. For this purpose, we shall resort to the official Blue Books on the subject of East-Indian torture, which were laid before the House

of Commons during the sessions of 1856 and 1857. The evidence it will be seen, is of a sort which cannot be gainsayed.

We have first the report of the Torture Commission at Madras, which states its "belief in the general existence of torture for revenue purposes." It doubts whether "anything like an equal number of persons is annually subjected to violence on criminal charges, as for the fault of non-payment of revenue."

It declares that there was "one thing which had impressed the Commission even more painfully than the conviction that torture exists; it is the difficulty of obtaining redress which confronts the injured parties."

The reasons for this difficulty given by the Commissioners are: 1. The distances which those who wish to make complaints personally to the Collector have to travel, involving expense and loss of time in attending upon his office; 2. The fear that applications by letter "will be returned with the ordinary indorsement of a reference to the Tahsildar"—the district police and revenue officer—that is, to the very man who, either in his person or through his petty police subordinates, has wronged him; 3. The inefficient means of procedure and punishment provided by law for officers of Government, even when formally accused or convicted of these practices. It seems that if a charge of this nature were proved before a magistrate, he could only punish by a fine of fifty rupees, or a month's imprisonment. The alternative consisted of handing over the accused "to the criminal Judge to be punished by him, or committed for trial before the Court of the Circuit."

The report adds that "these seem to be tedious proceedings, applicable only to one class of offenses, abuse of authority—namely, in police charges, and totally inadequate to the necessities of the case."

A police or revenue officer, who is the same person, as the revenue is collected by the police, when charged with extorting money, is first tried by the Assistant Collector; he then can appeal to the Collector; then to the Revenue Board. This Board may refer him to the Government or to the civil courts. "In such a state of the law, no poverty-stricken ryot could contend against any wealthy revenue officer; and we are not aware of

any complaints having been brought forward under these two regulations (of 1822 and 1828) by the people."

Further, this extorting of money applies only to taking the public money, or forcing a further contribution from the ryot for the officer to put into his own pocket. There is, therefore, no legal means of punishment whatever for the employment of force in collecting the public revenue.

The report from which these quotations are made applies only to the Presidency of Madras; but Lord Dalhousie himself, writing, in September, 1855, to the Directors,¹⁴⁴ says that "he has long ceased to doubt that torture in one shape or other is practiced by the lower subordinates in every British province."

The universal existence of torture as a financial institution of British India is thus officially admitted, but the admission is made in such a manner as to shield the British Government itself. In fact, the conclusion arrived at by the Madras commission is that the practice of torture is entirely the fault of the lower Hindoo officials, while the European servants of the Government had always, however unsuccessfully, done their best to prevent it. In answer to this assertion, the Madras Native Association presented, in January, 1856, a petition to Parliament, complaining of the torture investigation on the following grounds: 1. That there was scarcely any investigation at all, the Commission sitting only in the City of Madras, and for but three months, while it was impossible, except in very few cases, for the natives who had complaints to make to leave their homes; 2. That the Commissioners did not endeavor to trace the evil to its source; had they done so, it would have been discovered to be in the very system of collecting the revenue; 3. That no inquiry was made of the accused native officials as to what extent their superiors were acquainted with the practice. "The origin of this coercion," say the petitioners, "is not with the physical perpetrators of it, but descends to them from the officials immediately their superiors, which latter again are answerable for the estimated amount of the collection to their European superiors, these also being responsible on the same head to the highest authority of the Government."

Indeed, a few extracts from the evidence on which the Madras

Report professes to be founded, will suffice to refute its assertion that "no blame is due to Englishmen." Thus, Mr. W. D. Kohlhoff, a merchant, says: "The modes of torture practiced are various, and suitable to the fancy of the tahsildar or his subordinates, but whether any redress is received from higher authorities, it is difficult for me to tell, *as all complaints are generally referred to the tahsildars* for investigation and information."

Among the cases of complaint from natives, we find the following:

Last year, as our peasanum (principal paddy or rice crops) failed for want of rain, we were unable to pay as usual. When the jamabundy¹⁴⁵ was made, we claimed a remission on account of the losses, according to the terms of the agreement entered into in 1837, by us, when Mr. Eden was our collector. As this remission was not allowed, we refused to take our puttahs.¹⁴⁶ The tahsildar then commenced to compel us to pay with great severity, from the month of June to August. I and others were placed in charge of persons who used to take us in the sun. There we were made to stoop and stones were put on our backs, and we were kept in the burning sand. After 8 o'clock, we were let to go to our rice. Suchlike ill treatment was continued during three months, during which we sometimes went to give our petitions to the collector, who refused to take them. We took these petitions and appealed to the Sessions Court, who transmitted them to the collector. Still we got no justice. In the month of September, a notice was served upon us, and twenty-five days after, our property was distrained, and afterward sold. Beside what I have mentioned, our women were also ill treated; the kittee¹⁴⁷ was put upon their breasts.

A native Christian states in reply to questions put by the Commissioners: "When a European or native regiment passes through, all the ryots are pressed to bring in provisions, &c., *for nothing*, and should any of them ask for the price of the articles, they are severely tortured."

There follows the case of a Brahmin, in which he, with others of his own village and of the neighboring villages, was called

on by the Tahsildars to furnish planks, charcoal, firewood, &c., gratis, that he might carry on the Coleroon bridge work; on refusing, he is seized by twelve men and maltreated in various ways. He adds: "I presented a complaint to the Sub-Collector, Mr. W. Cadell, but he made no inquiry, and tore my complaint. As he is desirous of completing cheaply the Coleroon bridge work at the expense of the poor and of acquiring a good name from the Government, whatever may be the nature of the murder committed by the Tahsildar, he takes no cognizance of it."

The light in which illegal practices, carried to the last degree of extortion and violence, were looked upon by the highest authority, is best shown by the case of Mr. Brereton, the Commissioner in charge of the Loodhiana District in the Punjaub in 1855. According to the Report of the Chief Commissioner for the Punjaub, it was proved that

in matters under the immediate cognizance or direction of the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Brereton himself, the houses of wealthy citizens had been causelessly searched; that property seized on such occasions was detained for lengthened periods; that many parties were thrown into prison, and lay there for weeks, without charges being exhibited against them; and that the laws relating to security for bad character had been applied with sweeping and indiscriminating severity. That the Deputy-Commissioner had been followed about from district to district by certain police officers and informers, whom he employed wherever he went, and that these men had been the main authors of mischief.

In his minute on the case, Lord Dalhousie says:

We have irrefragable proof—proof, indeed, undisputed by Mr. Brereton himself—that that officer has been guilty of each item in the heavy catalogue of irregularities and illegalities with which the chief Commissioner has charged him, and which have brought disgrace on one portion of the British administration, and have subjected a large number of British subjects to gross injustice, to arbitrary imprisonment and cruel torture.

Lord Dalhousie proposes "to make a great public example," and, consequently, is of opinion that "Mr. Brereton cannot, *for the present*, be fitly intrusted with the authority of a Deputy Commissioner, but ought to be removed from that grade to the grade of a first class Assistant."

These extracts from the Blue Books may be concluded with the petition from the inhabitants of Talook in Canara, on the Malabar coast, who, after stating that they had presented several petitions to the Government to no purpose, thus contrast their former and present condition:

While we were cultivating wet and dry lands, hill tracts, low tracts and forests, paying the light assessment fixed upon us, and thereby enjoying tranquillity and happiness under the administration of "Ranee,"¹⁴⁸ Bhadur and Tippoo, the then Circar servants,¹⁴⁹ levied an additional assessment, but we never paid it. We were not subjected to privations, oppressions or ill-usages in collecting the revenue. On the surrender of this country to the Honorable Company, they devised all sorts of plans to squeeze out money from us. With this pernicious object in view, they invented rules and framed regulations, and directed their collectors and civil judges to put them in execution. But the then collectors and their subordinate native officials paid for some time due attention to our grievances, and acted in consonance with our wishes. On the contrary, the present collectors and their subordinate officials, *desirous of obtaining promotion on any account whatever*, neglect the welfare and interests of the people in general, turn a deaf ear to our grievances, and subject us to all sorts of oppressions.

We have here given but a brief and mildly-colored chapter from the real history of British rule in India. In view of such facts, dispassionate and thoughtful men may perhaps be led to ask whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects. And if the English could do these things in cold blood, is it surprising that the insurgent Hindoos should be guilty, in the fury of revolt and conflict, of the crimes and cruelties alleged against them?

The Approaching Indian Loan
Published February 9, 1858

The buoyancy in the London money market, resulting from the withdrawal of an enormous mass of capital from the ordinary productive investments, and its consequent transfer to the security markets, has, in the last fortnight, been somewhat lessened by the prospects of an impending *Indian loan* to the amount of eight or ten million pounds sterling. This loan, to be raised in England, and to be authorized by Parliament immediately on its assembling in February, is required to meet the claims upon the East India Company by its home creditors, as well as the extra expenditure for war materials, stores, transport of troops, &c., necessitated by the Indian revolt. In August 1857, the British Government had, before the prorogation of Parliament, solemnly declared in the House of Commons that no such loan was intended, the financial resources of the Company being more than sufficient to meet the crisis. The agreeable delusion thus palmed on John Bull was, however, soon dispelled when it oozed out that by a proceeding of a very questionable character, the East India Company had laid hold on a sum of about £3,500,000 sterling, intrusted to them by different companies, for the construction of Indian railways; and had, moreover, secretly borrowed £1,000,000 sterling from the Bank of England, and another million from the London Joint Stock banks. The public being thus prepared for the worst, the Government did no longer hesitate to drop the mask, and by semi-official articles in *The Times*, *Globe*, and other governmental organs, avow the necessity of the loan.

It may be asked why a special act on the part of the legislative power is required for launching such a loan, and then, why such an event does create the least apprehension, since, on the contrary, every vent for British capital, seeking now in vain for profitable investment, should, under present circumstances, be considered a windfall, and a most salutary check upon the rapid depreciation of capital.

It is generally known that the commercial existence of the

East India Company was terminated in 1834,¹⁵⁰ when its principal remaining source of commercial profits, the monopoly of the China trade, was cut off. Consequently, the holders of East India stock having derived their dividends, nominally, at least, from the trade-profits of the Company, a new financial arrangement with regard to them had become necessary. The payment of the dividends, till then chargeable upon the commercial revenue of the Company, was transferred to its political revenue. The proprietors of East India stocks were to be paid out of the revenues enjoyed by the East India Company in its governmental capacity, and, by act of Parliament, the Indian stock, amounting to £6,000,000 sterling, bearing ten per cent interest, was converted into a capital not to be liquidated except at the rate of £200 for every £100 of stock. In other words, the original East India stock of £6,000,000 sterling was converted into a capital of £12,000,000 sterling, bearing five per cent interest, and chargeable upon the revenue derived from the taxes of the Indian people. The debt of the East India Company was thus, by a Parliamentary sleight of hand, changed into a debt of the Indian people. There exists, besides, a debt exceeding £50,000,000 sterling, contracted by the East India Company in India, and exclusively chargeable upon the State revenues of that country; such loans contracted by the Company in India itself having always been considered to lay beyond the district of Parliamentary legislation, and regarded no more than the debts contracted by the Colonial Governments in Canada or Australia for instance.

On the other hand, the East India Company was prohibited from contracting interest-bearing debts in Great Britain herself, without the especial sanction of Parliament. Some years ago, when the Company set about establishing railways and electric telegraphs in India, it applied for the authorization of Indian Bonds in the London market, a request which was granted to the amount of £7,000,000 sterling to be issued in Bonds bearing 4 per cent interest, and secured only on the Indian State revenues. At the commencement of the outbreak in India, this bond-debt stood at £3,894,400 sterling, and the very necessity of again applying to Parliament shows the East India Company

to have, during the course of the Indian insurrection, exhausted its legal powers of borrowing at home.

Now it is no secret that before recurring to this step, the East India Company had opened a loan at Calcutta, which, however, turned out a complete failure. This proves, on the one hand, that Indian capitalists are far from considering the prospects of British supremacy in India in the same sanguine spirit which distinguishes the London press; and, on the other hand, exacerbates the feelings of John Bull to an uncommon pitch, since he is aware of the immense hoardings of capital having gone on for the last seven years in India, whither, according to a statement recently published by Messrs. Haggard & Paxley, there has been shipped in 1856 and 1857, from the port of London alone, bullion to the amount of £21,000,000. *The London Times*, in a most persuasive strain, has taught its readers that

of all the incentives to the loyalty of the natives, that of making them our creditors was the least doubtful; while, on the other hand among an impulsive secretive and avaricious people no temptation to discontent or treachery could be stronger than that created by the idea that they were annually taxed to send dividends to wealthy claimants in other countries.

The Indians, however, appear not to understand the beauty of a plan which would not only restore English supremacy at the expense of Indian capital, but at the same time, in a circuitous way, open the native hoards to British commerce. If, indeed, the Indian capitalists were as fond of British rule as every true Englishman thinks it an article of faith to assert, no better opportunity could have been afforded them of exhibiting their loyalty and getting rid of their silver. The Indian capitalists shutting up their hoards, John Bull must open his mind to the dire necessity of defraying himself in the first instance, at least, the expenses of the Indian insurrection, without any support on the part of the natives. The impending loan constitutes, moreover, a precedent only, and looks like the first leaf in a book, bearing the title Anglo-Indian Home Debt. It is no secret that what the East India Company wants are not eight millions,

or ten millions, but twenty-five to thirty millions pounds, and even these as a first installment only, not for expenses to be incurred, but for debts already due. The deficient revenue for the last three years amounted to £5,000,000; the treasure plundered by the insurgents up to the 15th October last, to £10,000,000, according to the statement of the *Phoenix*, an Indian governmental paper; the loss of revenue in the Northeastern provinces, consequent upon the rebellion, to £5,000,000, and the war expenses to at least £10,000,000.

It is true that successive loans by the Indian Company, in the London Money Market, would raise the value of money and prevent the increasing depreciation of capital; that is to say, the further fall in the rate of interest; but such a fall is exactly required for the revival of British industry and commerce. Any artificial check put upon the downward movement of the rate of discount is equivalent to an enhancement in the cost of production and the terms of credit, which, in its present weak state, English trade feels itself unable to bear. Hence the general cry of distress at the announcement of the Indian loan. Though the Parliamentary sanction adds no imperial guarantee to the loan of the Company, that guarantee, too, must be conceded, if money is not to be obtained on other terms; and despite all fine distinctions, as soon as the East India Company is supplanted by the British Government its debt will be merged into the British debt. A further increase of the large national debt seems, therefore, one of the first financial consequences of the Indian Revolt.

The Indian Bill

Published July 24, 1858

The latest India bill has passed through its third reading in the House of Commons, and since the Lords swayed by Derby's influence, are not likely to show fight, the doom of the East India Company appears to be sealed. They do not die like heroes, it must be confessed; but they have bartered away their power, as they crept into it, bit by bit, in a business-like way.

In fact, their whole history is one of buying and selling. They commenced by buying sovereignty, and they have ended by selling it. *They have fallen*, not in a pitched battle, but under the hammer of the auctioneer, into the hands of the highest bidder. In 1693 they procured from the Crown a charter for twenty-one years by paying large sums to the Duke of Leeds and other public officers. In 1767 they prolonged their tenure of power for two years by the promise of annually paying £400,000 into the Imperial exchequer. In 1769 they struck a similar bargain for five years; but soon after, in return for the Exchequer's foregoing the stipulated annual payment and lending them £1,400,000 at 4 per cent, they alienated some parcels of sovereignty, leaving to Parliament in the first instance the nomination of the Governor-General and four Councilors, altogether surrendering to the Crown the appointment of the Lord Chief Justice and his three Judges, and agreeing to the conversion of the Court of Proprietors from a democratic into an oligarchic body. In 1858, after having solemnly pledged themselves to the Court of Proprietors to resist by all constitutional "means" the transfer to the Crown of the governing powers of the East India Company, they have accepted that principle, and agreed to a bill penal as regards the Company, but securing emolument and place to its principal Directors. If the death of a hero, as Schiller says, resembles the setting of the sun, the exit of the East India Company bears more likeness to the compromise effected by a bankrupt with his creditors.

By this bill the principal functions of administration are intrusted to a Secretary of State in Council, just as at Calcutta the Governor-General in Council manages affairs. But both these functionaries—the Secretary of State in England and the Governor-General in India—are alike authorized to disregard the advice of their assessors and to act upon their own judgment. The new bill also invests the Secretary of State with all the powers at present exercised by the President of the Board of Control, through the agency of the Secret Committee—the power, that is, in urgent cases, of dispatching orders to India without stopping to ask the advice of his Council. In constituting that Council it has been found necessary, after all, to resort

to the East India Company as the only practicable source of appointments to it other than nominations by the Crown. The elective members of the Council are to be elected by the Directors of the East India Company from among their own number.

Thus, after all, the name of the East India Company is to outlive its substance. At the last hour it was confessed by the Derby Cabinet that their bill contains no clause abolishing the East India Company, as represented by a Court of Directors, but that it becomes reduced to its ancient character of a company of stockholders, distributing the dividends guaranteed by different acts of legislation. Pitt's bill of 1784 virtually subjected their government to the sway of the Cabinet under the name of the Board of Control. The act of 1813 stripped them of their monopoly of commerce, save the trade with China. The act of 1834 destroyed their commercial character altogether, and the act of 1854 annihilated their last remnant of power, still leaving them in possession of the Indian administration. By the rotation of history the East India Company, converted in 1612 into a joint-stock company, is again clothed in its primitive garb, only that it represents now a trading partnership without trade, and a joint-stock company which has no funds to administer, but only fixed dividends to draw.

The history of the Indian bill is marked by greater dramatic changes than any other act of modern Parliamentary legislation. When the Sepoy insurrection broke out, the cry of Indian reform rang through all classes of British society. Popular imagination was heated by the torture reports; the Government interference with the native religion was loudly denounced by Indian general officers and civilians of high standing; the rapacious annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie, the mere tool of Downing street; the fermentation recklessly created in the Asiatic mind by the piratical wars in Persia and China—wars commenced and pursued on Palmerston's private dictation—the weak measures with which he met the outbreak, sailing ships being chosen for transport in preference to steam vessels, and the circuitous navigation around the cape of Good Hope instead of transportation over the Isthmus of Suez—all these accumulated grievances burst into the cry for Indian Reform—reform of the

Company's Indian administration, reform of the Government's Indian policy. Palmerston caught at the popular cry, but resolved upon turning it to his exclusive profit. Because both the Government and the Company had miserably broken down, the Company was to be killed in sacrifice, and the Government to be rendered omnipotent. The power of the Company was to be simply transferred to the dictator of the day, pretending to represent the Crown as against the Parliament, and to represent Parliament as against the Crown, thus absorbing the privileges of the one and the other in his single person. With the Indian army at his back, the Indian treasury at his command, and the Indian patronage in his pocket, Palmerston's position would have become impregnable.

His bill passed triumphantly through the first reading, but his career was cut short by the famous Conspiracy bill,¹⁵¹ followed by the advent of the Tories to power.

On the very first day of their official reappearance on the Treasury benches, they declared that, out of deference for the decisive will of the Commons, they would forsake their opposition to the transfer from the Company to the Crown of the Indian Government. Lord Ellenborough's legislative abortion seemed to hasten Palmerston's restoration, when Lord John Russell, in order to force the dictator into a compromise, stepped in, and saved the Government by proposing to proceed with the Indian bill by way of Parliamentary resolution, instead of by a governmental bill. Then Lord Ellenborough's Oude dispatch, his sudden resignation, and the consequent disorganization in the Ministerial camp, were eagerly seized upon by Palmerston. The Tories were again to be planted in the cold shade of opposition, after they had employed their short lease of power in breaking down the opposition of their own party against the confiscation of the East India Company. Yet it is sufficiently known how these fine calculations were baffled. Instead of rising on the ruins of the East India Company, Palmerston has been buried beneath them. During the whole of the Indian debates, the House seemed to indulge the peculiar satisfaction of humiliating the *Civis Romanus*.¹⁵² All his amendments, great and small, were ignominiously lost; allusions of

the most unsavory kind, relating to the Afghan war, the Persian war, and the Chinese war, were continually flung at his head; and Mr. Gladstone's clause, withdrawing from the Indian Minister the power of originating wars beyond the boundaries of India, intended as a general vote of censure on Palmerston's past foreign policy, was passed by a crushing majority, despite his furious resistance. But although the man has been thrown overboard, his principle, upon the whole, has been accepted. Although somewhat checked by the obstructive attributes of the Board of Council, which, in fact, is but the well-paid specter of the old Court of Directors, the power of the executive has, by the formal annexation of India, been raised to such a degree that, to counterpoise it, democratic weight must be thrown into the Parliamentary scale.

Great Trouble in Indian Finances

Published April 8 and 12, 1859

I

The Indian financial crisis, which at this moment shares with the war rumors and the electioneering agitation in the privilege of absorbing public interest in England, must be considered in a double point of view. It involves both a temporary necessity and a permanent difficulty.

On the 14th of February Lord Stanley brought in a bill in the House of Commons authorizing the Government to raise a loan of £7,000,000 in England, in order to adjust the extra expenditure of the Indian administration for the current year. About six weeks later, John Bull's self-congratulations as to the small cost of the Indian rebellion were roughly interrupted by the arrival of the Overland Mail, conveying a cry of financial distress from the Government at Calcutta. On March 25, Lord Derby rose in the House of Lords to state that a further loan for India of £5,000,000, in addition to the £7,000,000 loan

now before Parliament, would be required to meet the demands of the present year, and that even then, certain claims for compensation and prize money, amounting to £2,000,000 at least, would remain to be paid from some source not yet apparent. To make things pleasant, Lord Stanley had, in his first statement, only provided for the wants of the Indian Treasury at London, leaving the British Government in India to its own resources, which, from the dispatches received, he could not but know to be far from sufficient. Quite apart from the expenses of the Home Government, or the Indian administration at London, Lord Canning¹⁵³ estimated the deficit of the Government at Calcutta for the current year of 1859-60 at £12,000,000, after allowing an increase in the ordinary revenue of £800,000, and a decrease on military charges of £2,000,000. Such was his penury that he had stopped paying part of his civil service; such was his credit that the Government 5 per cents were quoted at 12 per cent discount; and such was his distress that he could only be saved from bankruptcy by the shipment from England to India of £3,000,000 of silver within a few months. Three points thus become evident. First: Lord Stanley's original statement was a "dodge," and, so far from embracing all the Indian liabilities, did not even touch the immediate wants of the Indian Government in India. Secondly: During the whole period of the insurrection, if we except the sending from London in 1857 of £1,000,000 of silver to India, the Calcutta Government was left to shift for itself, to provide out of its own resources for the main part of the extraordinary war charges which, of course, had to be disbursed in India, for the barrack accommodation of some 60,000 additional Europeans, for the restoration of the treasures plundered, and for the replacing of all the revenues of the local Administrations which had been swept away. Thirdly: There is, apart from the wants of the Home Government, a deficit of £12,000,000, to be met in the present year. By operations, the questionable nature of which we forbear to dwell upon, this sum is to be reduced to £9,000,000, of which sum £5,000,000 are to be borrowed in India and £4,000,000 in England. Of the latter, £1,000,000 in silver bullion has already been shipped to Calcutta from London, and

£2,000,000 more is to be dispatched in the shortest possible period.

It will be seen from this succinct statement that the Indian Government was very unfairly dealt with by its English masters, who left it in the lurch, in order to throw dust in the eyes of John Bull; but it must, on the other hand, be admitted that the financial operations of Lord Canning surpass in awkwardness even his military and political exploits. Up to the end of January, 1859, he had contrived to raise the necessary means by loans in India, issued partly in Government stocks, partly in Treasury bills; but, strange to say, while his efforts had answered during the epoch of the revolution, they failed entirely from the moment English authority was restored by the force of arms. And not only did they fail, but there was a panic in regard to Government securities; there was an unprecedented depreciation in all funds, with protests from the Chambers of Commerce at Bombay and Calcutta, and, in the latter town, public meetings composed of English and native money-mongers, denouncing the vacillation, the arbitrary nature and the helpless imbecility of the Government measures. Now, the loanable capital of India which up to January, 1859, had supplied the Government with funds, began to fail after that period, when the power of borrowing seems to have been exceeded. In point of fact the aggregate loans which from 1841 to 1857 amounted to £21,000,000, absorbed in the two years of 1857 and 1858 alone about £9,000,000, equal to almost one-half of the money borrowed during the previous sixteen years. Such a failure of resources, while accounting for the necessity of successively screwing up the rate of interest on Government loans from 4 to 6 per cent, is, of course, far from explaining the commercial panic in the Indian security market, and the utter inability of the Governor-General to meet the most urgent requirements. The riddle is solved by the fact that it has become a regular maneuver with Lord Canning to bring out new loans at higher rates of interest than those given on existing *open loans*, without any previous notice to the public, and with the utmost uncertainty prevailing as to the further financial operations contemplated. The depreciation of the funds, in

consequence of these maneuvers, has been calculated at not less than £11,000,000. Pinched by the poverty of the Exchequer, frightened by the panic in the stock market, and roused by the protests on the part of the Chambers of Commerce and the Calcutta meetings, Lord Canning thought best to be a good boy and to try to come up to the desiderata of the monetary mind; but his notification of the 21st of February, 1859, shows again that the human understanding does not depend on human will. What was he required to do? Not to open simultaneously two loans on different conditions, and to tell the monetary public at once the sum required for the current year, instead of deceiving them by successive announcements, one contradictory of the other. And what does he do in his notification? In the first instance he says that there is to be raised by loan in the Indian market for the year 1859-60, £5,000,000, at 5½ per cent, and that "when this amount shall have been realized, the loan of 1859-60 shall be closed, and no further loan will be opened in India during that year."

In the very same proclamation, sweeping away the entire value of the assurances just given, he proceeds: "*No loan carrying a higher rate of interest will be opened in India in the course of the year 1859-60, unless under instructions from the Home Government.*"

But that is not all. He opens, in fact, a *double loan* on different terms. While announcing that "the issue of Treasury bills on the terms notified on Jan. 26, 1859, will be closed on April 30," he proclaims "that a new issue of Treasury bills will be notified from the 1st of May," bearing interest of nearly 5¾ per cent, and redeemable at the expiration of one year from the date of issue. Both loans are kept open together, while, at the same time, the loan opened in January has not yet been concluded. The only financial matter which Lord Canning seems able to comprehend is that his annual salary amounts to £20,000 in name, and to about £40,000 in fact. Hence, despite the sneers of the Derby Cabinet, and his notorious incapacity, he sticks to his post from "a feeling of duty."

The effects of the Indian financial crisis on the English home market have already become apparent. In the first instance, the

silver remittances on account of Government coming to swell the large remittances on mercantile account, and falling at an epoch when the ordinary silver supplies from Mexico are held back in consequence of the distracted condition of that country, have, of course, sent up the price of bar silver. On March 25, it had risen to the factitious price of $62\frac{3}{4}$ d. per ounce standard, causing such an influx of silver from every part of Europe that the price in London again fell to $62\frac{3}{8}$ d.; while the rate of discount at Hamburg rose from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent. Consequent upon these heavy importations of silver, exchanges have turned against England, and a drain of gold bullion has set in, which, for the present, only relieves the London money market of its plethora, but in the long run may seriously affect it, coupled, as it will be, with large Continental loans. The depreciation, however, on the London money market, of the Indian Government stocks and guaranteed railway securities, prejudicial as it must prove to the Government and railway loans still to be brought forward in the course of this season, is certainly the most serious effect on the home market as yet, resulting from the Indian financial crisis. The shares of many Indian railways, although 5 per cent interest upon them is guaranteed by the Government, are now at 2 or 3 per cent discount.

Taking all in all, however, I regard the momentary Indian financial panic as a matter of secondary importance, if compared with the general crisis of the Indian Exchequer, which I may perhaps consider on another occasion.

II

The latest overland mail, so far from showing any abatement of the financial crisis in India, reveals a state of derangement hardly anticipated. The shifts to which the Indian Government is driven in order to meet its most urgent wants, may be best illustrated by a recent measure of the Governor of Bombay. Bombay is the market where the opium of Malwa, averaging 30,000 chests annually, finds its outlet by monthly instalments of 2,000 or 3,000 chests, for which bills are drawn upon

Bombay. By charging 400 rupees upon every chest imported into Bombay, the Government raises a revenue of £1,200,000 annually on Malwa opium. Now, to replenish his exhausted Exchequer, and ward off immediate bankruptcy, the Bombay Governor has issued a notification, which raises the duty on each chest of Malwa opium from 400 to 500 rupees; but, at the same time, he declares that this increased duty will not be levied till after the 1st of July, so that the holders of opium in Malwa have the privilege of bringing in the drug under the old duties for four months longer. Between the middle of March, when the notification was issued, and the 1st of July, there are only two months and a half during which opium can be imported, the monsoon setting in on the 15th of June. The holders of opium in Malwa will, of course, avail themselves of the interval allowed them for sending in opium at the old duty; and, consequently, during the two months and a half pour all their stock in hand into the Presidency. Since the balance of opium, of the old and new crops, remaining at Malwa amounts to 26,000 chests, and the price of Malwa opium reaches 1,250 rupees per chest, the Malwa merchants will have to draw upon the Bombay merchants for no less a sum than £3,000,000, of which more than £1,000,000 must come into the Bombay Treasury. The aim of this financial dodge is transparent. With a view to anticipate the annual revenue from the opium duty, and induce the dealers in the article to pay it at once, an enhancement of the duty is held out prospectively *in terrorem*.¹⁵⁴ While it would be quite superfluous to expatiate upon the empirical character of this contrivance, which fills the Exchequer for the present by creating a corresponding void a few months hence, no more striking instance could be given of the exhaustion of ways and means, on the part of the great Mogul's successors.

Let us now turn to the general state of Indian finances, as it has grown out of the late insurrection. According to the last official accounts, the net revenue derived by the British from their Indian farm amounts to £23,208,000, say £24,000,000. This annual revenue has never sufficed to defray the annual expenses. From 1836 to 1850 the net deficit amounted to £13,171,096, or, on a rough average, to £1,000,000 annually.

Even in the year 1856, when the Exchequer was exceptionally filled by the wholesale annexations, robberies and extortions of Lord Dalhousie, the income and expense did not exactly square, but, on the contrary, a deficit of about a quarter of a million was added to the usual crop of deficits. In 1857 the deficiency was £9,000,000, in 1858 it amounted to £13,000,000, and in 1859 it is estimated by the Indian Government itself at £12,000,000. The first conclusion, then, which we arrive at is that even under ordinary circumstances, deficits were accumulating, and that under extraordinary circumstances they must assume such dimensions as to reach one-half and more of the annual income.

The question which next presents itself is, To what degree has this already existing gap between the expenses and the income of the Indian Government been widened by recent events? The new permanent debt of India accruing from the suppression of the mutiny is calculated by the most sanguine English financiers at between forty and fifty millions sterling, while Mr. Wilson estimates the *permanent deficit*, or the annual interest for this new debt to be defrayed out of the annual revenue, at not less than three millions. However, it would be a great mistake to think that this permanent deficit of three millions is the only legacy left by the insurgents to their vanquishers. The costs of the insurrection are not only in the past tense, but are in a high degree prospective. Even in quiet times, before the outbreak of the mutiny, the military charges swallowed sixty per cent at least of the aggregate regular income, since they exceeded £12,000,000; but the state of affairs is now changed. At the beginning of the mutiny the European force in India amounted to 38,000 effective men, while the native army mustered 260,000 men. The military forces at present employed in India amount to 112,000 Europeans and 320,000 native troops, including the native police. It may be justly said that these extraordinary numbers will be reduced to a more moderate standard with the disappearance of the extraordinary circumstances which swelled them to their present size. Yet the military commission appointed by the British Government has arrived at the conclusion that there will be required in India a

permanent European force of 80,000 men, with a native force of 200,000 men—the military charges being thus raised to almost double their original height. During the debates on the Indian finances, in the House of Lords, on April 7, two points were admitted by all speakers of authority: on the one hand that an annual expenditure upon the revenue of India little short of twenty millions for the army alone was incompatible with a net revenue of twenty-four millions only; and, on the other hand, that it was difficult to imagine a state of things which for an indefinite series of years would render it safe for the English to leave India without a European force double its amount before the outbreak of the mutiny. But suppose even that it would do to add permanently to the European forces not more than one-third of their original strength, and we get at a new annual permanent deficit of four millions sterling at least. The new permanent deficit, then, derived on one hand from the consolidated debt contracted during the mutiny, and on the other hand from the permanent increase of the British forces in India, cannot, on the most moderate calculation, fall below seven millions sterling.

To this must be added two other items—the one accruing from an increase of liabilities, the other from a diminution of income. By a recent statement of the Railway Department of the Indian office at London, it results that the whole length of railways sanctioned for India is 4,817 miles, of which 559 miles only are yet opened. The whole amount of capital invested by the different railway companies amounts to £40,000,000 sterling, of which £19,000,000 are paid and £21,000,000 are still to be called in—96 per cent of the aggregate sum having been subscribed in England and 4 per cent only in India. Upon this amount of £40,000,000, the Government has guaranteed 5 per cent interest, so that the annual interest charged upon the revenues of India reaches £2,000,000, to be paid before the railways are in working order, and before they can yield any return. The Earl of Ellenborough estimates the loss accruing to the Indian finances from this source, for the next three years to come, at £6,000,000 sterling, and the ultimate permanent deficit upon these railways at half a million annually. Lastly, of the

£24,000,000 of Indian net revenue, a sum of £3,619,000 is derived from the sale of opium to foreign countries—a source of revenue which, it is now generally admitted, must to a considerable extent be impaired by the late treaty with China. It becomes, then, evident, that apart from the extra expenditure still necessitated to complete the suppression of the mutiny, an annual permanent deficit of £8,000,000 at least, will have to be defrayed out of a net revenue of £24,000,000, which the Government may, perhaps, by the imposition of new taxes, contrive to raise to £26,000,000. The necessary result of this state of things will be to saddle the English taxpayer with the liability for the Indian debt and, as Sir G. C. Lewis declared in the House of Commons, “to vote four or five millions annually as a subsidy for what was called a valuable dependency of the British crown.”

It will be confessed that these financial fruits of the “glorious” reconquest of India have not a charming appearance; and that John Bull pays exceedingly high protective duties for securing the monopoly of the Indian market to the Manchester free-traders.

AMERICA AND SLAVERY

It is, as Christopher Hitchens has suggested, one of the great historic ironies of modern times that Marx's name became so venerated in Soviet Russia and so reviled in the United States because, while he was alive, he felt Russia a very backward place and held America in relative esteem (he never personally visited either place).¹ Part of the attraction of the United States for Marx was that it had no monarchy and no hereditary aristocratic class, and in that sense it represented a historically progressive state of social affairs to which other Western nations could only hope to aspire. Of course, the continued existence of legal slavery in America was for Marx a considerable stain on the society; one of the reasons that he was willing to write for the *Tribune* as long as he did despite considerable political differences with its editors was that the *Tribune* was the foremost anti-slavery organ of its day.

Indeed, Marx very rarely wrote about the subject of America without reference to the slave trade. It is clear from the writings reprinted here that he admired Abraham Lincoln and the original Republican Party for its anti-slavery stance—in fact he wrote and signed a letter from the International Workingmen's Association congratulating Lincoln on his re-election in 1864. But it is also the case that much of Marx's anti-slavery polemics were aimed as squarely at the British ruling class as at the slave-holding Southern plantation owners. He had no use for the arguments of states' rights or sovereignty used to justify slave-holding; instead, he saw the continuance of the institution in largely economic terms, and divined thereby that British mill-owners, despite officially objecting to the continued existence of

slavery, would nonetheless have an interest in its perpetuation, as it helped the free flow of cheap cotton.

As the North-South split deteriorated into outright conflict, Marx seemed especially concerned that Britain would enter the war on the side of the slave-holding South. That scenario, at least in the very early days of the Civil War, was not completely out of the question. In addition to the economic motivation, there were many in the British Establishment who were eager to avenge the rebellious colony, and who saw the possibility for British gain if America were to be weakened via a successful Southern secession. Hence, Marx devoted a good deal of space to shattering the arguments in mainstream British periodicals that tacitly or overtly supported the Secessionist movement. The Confederate states, for their part, actively sought British support, and events seemed to come to a head toward the end of 1861, when they sent two diplomats, James Mason and John Slidell, across the Atlantic via a British mail steamer, RMS *Trent*. The ship was intercepted by the Union naval blockade; Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS *San Jacinto* boarded the British vessel and held both men at Fort Warren in Boston harbor. As can be seen from Marx's writings, this diplomatic flap created considerable anxiety that Britain would in fact enter the war. However, the incident was resolved in January 1862 with an apology from the US Secretary of State.

While Marx would continue to write for other papers (including *Die Presse* of Vienna, in which the essay "The North American Civil War" was first published) about the American conflict, the *Tribune* itself was so consumed with the war that, after March 1862, it had no more use for the services of its London correspondent.

NOTE

1. Interview with Hitchens in *The Common Review*, 4/1 (Summer 2005), p. 11.

The British Government and the Slave-Trade

Published July 2, 1858

In the sitting of the House of Lords on June 17, the question of the slave-trade was introduced by the Bishop of Oxford, who presented a petition against that trade from the Parish of St. Mary in Jamaica. The impression these debates are sure to produce upon every mind not strongly prejudiced is that of great moderation on the part of the present British Government, and its firm purpose of avoiding any pretext of quarrel with the United States. Lord Malmesbury dropped altogether the "right of visit," as far as ships under the American flag are concerned, by the following declaration:

The United States say that on no account, for no purpose, and upon no suspicion shall a ship carrying the American flag be boarded except by an American ship, unless at the risk of the officer boarding or detaining her. I have not admitted the international law as laid down by the American Minister for Foreign Affairs, until that statement had been approved and fortified by the law officers of the Crown. But having admitted that, I have put it as strong as possible to the American Government that if it is known that the American flag covers every iniquity, every pirate and slaver on earth will carry it and no other; that this must bring disgrace on that honored banner, and that instead of vindicating the honor of the country by an obstinate adherence to their present declaration the contrary result will follow; that the American flag will be prostituted to the worst of purposes. I shall continue to urge that it is necessary in these civilized times, with countless vessels navigating the ocean, that there should be a police on the ocean; that there should be, if not a right by international law, an agreement among nations how far they would go to verify the nationality of vessels, and ascertain their right to bear a particular flag. From the language I have used, from the conversations which I had with the American Minister resident in this country, and from the observations contained in a very able paper drawn up by Gen. Cass on this subject, I am

not without strong hope that some arrangement of this kind may be made with the United States, which, with the orders given to the officers of both countries, may enable us to verify the flags of all countries, without running the risk of offense to the country to which a ship belongs.

On the Opposition benches there was also no attempt made at vindicating the right of visit on the part of Great Britain against the United States, but, as Earl Grey remarked,

The English had treaties with Spain and other powers for the prevention of the slave-trade, and if they had reasonable grounds for suspecting that a vessel was engaged in this abominable traffic, and that she had for the time made use of the United States flag, that she was not really an American ship at all, they had a right to overhaul her and to search her. If, however, she produced the American papers, even though she be full of slaves, it was their duty to discharge her, and to leave to the United States the disgrace of that iniquitous traffic. He hoped and trusted that the orders to their cruisers were strict in this respect, and that any excess of that discretion which was allowed their officers under the circumstances would meet with proper punishment.

The question then turns exclusively upon the point, and even this point seems abandoned by Lord Malmesbury, whether or not vessels suspected of usurping the American flag may not be called upon to produce their papers. Lord Aberdeen directly denied that any controversy could arise out of such a practice, since the instructions under which the British officers were to proceed on such an occurrence—instructions drawn up by Dr. Lushington and Sir G. Cockburn—had been communicated at the time to the American Government and acquiesced in by Mr. Webster, on the part of that Government. If, therefore, there had been no change in these instructions, and if the officers had acted within their limits, “the American Government could have no ground of complaint.” There seemed, indeed, a strong suspicion hovering in the minds of the hereditary wisdom, that Palmerston had played one of his usual tricks by effecting some

arbitrary change in the orders issued to the British cruisers. It is known that Palmerston, while boasting of his zeal in the suppression of the slave-trade, had, during the eleven years of his administration of foreign affairs, ending in 1841, broken up all the existing slave-trade treaties, had ordered acts which the British law authorities pronounced criminal, and which actually subjected one of his instruments to legal procedure and placed a slave-dealer under the protection of the law of England against its own Government. He chose the slave-trade as his field of battle, and converted it into a mere instrument of provoking quarrels between England and other States. Before leaving office in 1841 he had given instructions which, according to the words of Sir Robert Peel, "must have led, had they not been countermanded, to a collision with the United States." In *his own words*, he had enjoined the naval officers "to have no very nice regard to the law of nations." Lord Malmesbury, although in very reserved language, intimated that "by sending the British squadrons to the Cuban waters, instead of leaving them on the coast of Africa," Palmerston removed them from a station where, before the outbreak of the Russian war, they had almost succeeded in extinguishing the slave-trade, to a place where they could be good for little else than picking up a quarrel with the United States. Lord Woodhouse, Palmerston's own late Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg, concurring in this view of the case, remarked that, "No matter what instructions had been given, if the Government gave authority to the British vessels to go in such numbers into the American waters, a difference would sooner or later arise between us and the United States."

Yet, whatever may have been Palmerston's secret intentions, it is evident that they are baffled by the Tory Government in 1858, as they had been in 1842, and that the war cry so lustily raised in the Congress and in the press is doomed to result in "much ado about nothing."

As to the question of the slave-trade itself, Spain was denounced by the Bishop of Oxford, as well as Lord Brougham, as the main stay of that nefarious traffic. Both of them called upon the British Government to force, by every means in its

power, that country into a course of policy consonant to existing treaties. As early as 1814 a general treaty was entered into between Great Britain and Spain, by which the latter passed an unequivocal condemnation of the slave-trade. In 1817 a specific treaty was concluded, by which Spain fixed the abolition of the slave-trade, on the part of her own subjects, for the year 1820, and, by way of compensation for the losses her subjects might suffer by carrying out the contract, received an indemnity of £400,000. The money was pocketed, but no equivalent was tendered for it. In 1835 a new treaty was entered into, by which Spain bound herself formally to bring in a sufficiently stringent penal law to make it impossible for her subjects to continue the traffic. The procrastinating Spanish proverb, "*A la mañana,*" was again strictly adhered to. It was only ten years later that the penal law was carried; but, by a singular mischance, the principal clause contended for by England was left out, namely, that of making the slave-trade piracy. In one word, nothing was done, save that the Captain-General of Cuba, the Minister at home, the Camarilla, and, if rumor speaks truth, royal personages themselves, raised a private tax upon the slavers, selling the license of dealing in human flesh and blood at so many doubloons per head. "Spain," said the Bishop of Oxford,

had not the excuse that this traffic was a system which her Government was not strong enough to put down, because Gen. Valdez had shown that such a plea could not be urged with any show of truth. On his arrival in the island he called together the principal contractors, and, giving them six months' time to close all their transactions in the slave-trade, told them that he was determined to put it down at the end of that period. What was the result? In 1840, the year previous to the administration of Gen. Valdez, the number of ships which came to Cuba from the coast of Africa with slaves was 56. In 1842, while Gen. Valdez was Captain-General, the number was only 3. In 1840 no less than 14,470 slaves were landed at the island; in 1842 the number was 3,100.

Now what shall England do with Spain? Repeat her protests, multiply her dispatches, renew her negotiations? Lord Malmes-

bury himself states that they could cover all the waters from the Spanish coast to Cuba with the documents vainly exchanged between the two Governments. Or shall England enforce her claims, sanctioned by so many treaties? Here it is that the shoe pinches. In steps the sinister figure of the "august ally," now the acknowledged guardian angel of the slave-trade. The third Bonaparte, the patron of Slavery in all its forms, forbids England to act up to her convictions and her treaties. Lord Malmesbury, it is known, is strongly suspected of an undue intimacy with the hero of Satory. Nevertheless, he denounced him in plain terms as the general slave-dealer of Europe—as the man who had revived the infamous traffic in its worst features under the pretext of "free emigration" of the blacks to the French colonies. Earl Grey completed this denunciation by stating that "wars had been undertaken in Africa for the purpose of making captives, who were to be sold to the agents of the French Government." The Earl of Clarendon added that "both Spain and France were rivals in the African market, offering a certain sum per man; and there was not the least difference in the treatment of these negroes, whether they were conveyed to Cuba or to a French colony."

Such, then, is the glorious position England finds herself in by having lent her help to that man in overthrowing the Republic. The second Republic, like the first one, had abolished Slavery. Bonaparte, who acquired his power solely by truckling to the meanest passions of men, is unable to prolong it save by buying day by day new accomplices. Thus he has not only restored Slavery, but has bought the planters by the renewal of the slave-trade. Everything degrading the conscience of the nation, is a new lease of power granted to him. To convert France into a slave-trading nation would be the surest means of enslaving France, who, when herself, had the boldness of proclaiming in the face of the world: Let the colonies perish, but let principles live! One thing at least has been accomplished by Bonaparte. The slave-trade has become a battle-cry between the Imperialist and the Republican camps. If the French Republic be restored to-day, to-morrow Spain will be *forced* to abandon the infamous traffic.

The American Question in England

Published October 11, 1861

Mrs. Beecher Stowe's letter to Lord Shaftesbury,¹⁵⁵ whatever its intrinsic merit may be, has done a great deal of good, by forcing the anti-Northern organs of the London press to speak out and lay before the general public the ostensible reasons for their hostile tone against the North, and their ill-concealed sympathies with the South, which looks rather strange on the part of people affecting an utter horror of Slavery. Their first and main grievance is that the present American war is "not one for the abolition of Slavery," and that, therefore, the high-minded Britisher, used to undertake wars of his own, and interest himself in other people's wars only on the basis of "broad humanitarian principles," cannot be expected to feel any sympathy with his Northern cousins. "In the first place . . .," says *The Economist*, "the assumption that the quarrel between the North and South is a quarrel between Negro freedom on the one side and Negro Slavery on the other, is as impudent as it is untrue." "The North," says *The Saturday Review*, "does not proclaim abolition, and never pretended to fight for Anti-Slavery. The North has not hoisted for its *oriflamme* the sacred symbol of justice to the Negro; its *cri de guerre* is not unconditional abolition." "If," says *The Examiner*, "we have been deceived about the real significance of the sublime movement, who but the Federalists themselves have to answer for the deception?"

Now, in the first instance, the premiss must be conceded. The war has not been undertaken with a view to put down Slavery, and the United States authorities themselves have taken the greatest pains to protest against any such idea. But then, it ought to be remembered that it was not the North, but the South, which undertook this war; the former acting only on the defense. If it be true that the North, after long hesitations, and an exhibition of forbearance unknown in the annals of European history, drew at last the sword, not for crushing Slavery, but for saving the Union, the South, on its part, inaug-

urated the war by loudly proclaiming "the peculiar institution" as the only and main end of the rebellion. It confessed to fight for the liberty of enslaving other people, a liberty which, despite the Northern protests, it asserted to be put in danger by the victory of the Republican party and the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidential chair. The Confederate Congress boasted that its new-fangled constitution, as distinguished from the Constitution of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, and Adams's, had recognized for the first time Slavery as a thing good in itself, a bulwark of civilization, and a divine institution. If the North professed to fight but for the Union, the South gloried in rebellion for the supremacy of Slavery. If Anti-Slavery and idealistic England felt not attracted by the profession of the North, how came it to pass that it was not violently repulsed by the cynical confessions of the South?

The Saturday Review helps itself out of this ugly dilemma by disbelieving the declarations of the seceders themselves. It sees deeper than this, and discovers "*that Slavery had very little to do with Secession;*" the declarations of Jeff. Davis and company to the contrary being mere "conventionalisms" with "about as much meaning as the conventionalisms about violated altars and desecrated hearths, which always occur in such proclamations."

The staple of argument on the part of the anti-Northern papers is very scanty, and throughout all of them we find almost the same sentences recurring, like the formulas of a mathematical series, at certain intervals, with very little art of variation or combination. "Why," exclaims *The Economist*,

it is only yesterday, when the Secession movement first gained serious head, on the first announcement of Mr. Lincoln's election, that the Northerners offered to the South, if they would remain in the Union, every conceivable security for the performance and inviolability of the obnoxious institution—that they disavowed in the most solemn manner all intention of interfering with it—that their leaders proposed compromise after compromise in Congress, all based upon the concession that Slavery should not be meddled with.

“How happens it,” says *The Examiner*, “that the North was ready to compromise matters by the largest concessions to the South as to Slavery? How was it that a certain geographical line was proposed in Congress within which Slavery was to be recognized as an essential institution? The Southern States were not content with this.

What *The Economist* and *The Examiner* had to ask was not only why the Crittenden and other compromise measures¹⁵⁶ were *proposed* in Congress, but why they were not *passed*? They affect to consider those compromise proposals as accepted by the North and rejected by the South, while, in point of fact, they were baffled by the Northern party, that had carried the Lincoln election. Proposals never matured into resolutions, but always remaining in the embryo state of *pia desideria*,¹⁵⁷ the South had of course never any occasion either of rejecting or acquiescing in. We come nearer to the pith of the question by the following remark of *The Examiner*:

Mrs. Stowe says: “The Slave party, finding they could no longer use the Union for their purposes, resolved to destroy it.” There is here an admission that up to that time the Slave party had used the Union for their purposes, and it would have been well if Mrs. Stowe could have distinctly shown where it was that the North began to make its stand against Slavery.

One might suppose that *The Examiner* and the other oracles of public opinion in England had made themselves sufficiently familiar with the contemporaneous history to not need Mrs. Stowe’s information on such all-important points. The progressive abuse of the Union by the slave power, working through its alliance with the Northern Democratic party, is, so to say, the general formula of the United States history since the beginning of this century. The successive compromise measures mark the successive degrees of the encroachment by which the Union became more and more transformed into the slave of the slave-owner. Each of these compromises denotes a new encroachment of the South, a new concession of the North. At

the same time none of the successive victories of the South was carried but after a hot contest with an antagonistic force in the North, appearing under different party names with different watchwords and under different colors. If the positive and final result of each single contest told in favor of the South, the attentive observer of history could not but see that every new advance of the slave power was a step forward to its ultimate defeat. Even at the times of the Missouri Compromise¹⁵⁸ the contending forces were so evenly balanced that Jefferson, as we see from his memoirs, apprehended the Union to be in danger of splitting on that deadly antagonism. The encroachments of the slaveholding power reached their maximum point, when, by the Kansas-Nebraska bill,¹⁵⁹ for the first time in the history of the United States, as Mr. Douglas himself confessed, every legal barrier to the diffusion of Slavery within the United States territories was broken down, when, afterward, a Northern candidate bought his Presidential nomination by pledging the Union to conquer or purchase in Cuba a new field of dominion for the slaveholder; when, later on, by the Dred Scott decision,¹⁶⁰ diffusion of Slavery by the Federal power was proclaimed as the law of the American Constitution, and lastly, when the African slave-trade was de facto reopened on a larger scale than during the times of its legal existence. But, concurrently with this climax of Southern encroachments, carried by the connivance of the Northern Democratic party, there were unmistakable signs of Northern antagonistic agencies having gathered such strength as must soon turn the balance of power. The Kansas war,¹⁶¹ the formation of the Republican party, and the large vote cast for Mr. Frémont¹⁶² during the Presidential election of 1856, were so many palpable proofs that the North had accumulated sufficient energies to rectify the aberrations which United States history, under the slaveowners' pressure, had undergone, for half a century, and to make it return to the true principles of its development. Apart from those political phenomena, there was one broad statistical and economical fact indicating that the abuse of the Federal Union by the slave interest had approached the point from which it would have to recede forcibly, or *de bonne grace*.¹⁶³ That fact was the growth

of the North-West, the immense strides its population had made from 1850 to 1860, and the new and reinvigorating influence it could not but bear on the destinies of the United States.

Now, was all this a secret chapter of history? Was "the admission" of Mrs. Beecher Stowe wanted to reveal to *The Examiner* and the other political illuminati of the London press the carefully hidden truth that "up to that time the Slave party had used the Union for their purposes?" Is it the fault of the American North that the English pressmen were taken quite unawares by the violent clash of the antagonistic forces, the friction of which was the moving power of its history for half a century? Is it the fault of the Americans that the English press mistake for the fanciful crotchet hatched in a single day what was in reality the matured result of long years of struggle? The very fact that the formation and the progress of the Republican party in America have hardly been noticed by the London press, speaks volumes as to the hollowness of its Anti-Slavery tirades. Take, for instance, the two antipodes of the London press, *The London Times* and *Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper*, the one the great organ of the respectable classes, and the other the only remaining organ of the working class. The former, not long before Mr. Buchanan's career¹⁶⁴ drew to an end, published an elaborate apology for his Administration and a defamatory libel against the Republican movement. Reynolds, on his part, was, during Mr. Buchanan's stay at London, one of his minions, and since that time never missed an occasion to write him up and to write his adversaries down. How did it come to pass that the Republican party, whose platform was drawn up on the avowed antagonism to the encroachments of the Slaveocracy and the abuse of the Union by the slave interest, carried the day in the North? How, in the second instance, did it come to pass that the great bulk of the Northern Democratic party, flinging aside its old connexions with the leaders of Slaveocracy, setting at naught its traditions of half a century, sacrificing great commercial interests and greater political prejudices, rushed to the support of the present Republican Administration and offered it men and money with an unsparing hand?

Instead of answering these questions *The Economist* exclaims:

Can we forget . . . that Abolitionists have habitually been as ferociously persecuted and maltreated in the North and West as in the South? Can it be denied that the testiness and half-heartedness, not to say insincerity, of the Government at Washington, have for years supplied the chief impediment which has thwarted our efforts for the effectual suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa; while a vast proportion of the clippers actually engaged in that trade have been built with Northern capital, owned by Northern merchants and manned by Northern seamen?

This is, in fact, a masterly piece of logic. Anti-Slavery England cannot sympathize with the North breaking down the withering influence of slaveocracy, because she cannot forget that the North, while bound by that influence, supported the slave-trade, mobbed the Abolitionists, and had its Democratic institutions tainted by the slavedriver's prejudices. She cannot sympathize with Mr. Lincoln's Administration, because she had to find fault with Mr. Buchanan's Administration. She must needs sullenly cavil at the present movement of the Northern resurrection, cheer up the Northern sympathizers with the slave-trade, branded in the Republican platform, and coquet with the Southern slaveocracy, setting up an empire of its own, because she cannot forget that the North of yesterday was not the North of to-day. The necessity of justifying its attitude by such pettifogging Old Bailey pleas proves more than anything else that the anti-Northern part of the English press is instigated by hidden motives, too mean and dastardly to be openly avowed.

As it is one of its pet maneuvers to taunt the present Republican Administration with the doings of its Pro-Slavery predecessors, so it tries hard to persuade the English people that *The N. Y. Herald* ought to be considered the only authentic expositor of Northern opinion. *The London Times* having given out the cue in this direction, the *servum pecus*¹⁶⁵ of the other anti-Northern organs, great and small, persist in beating the same bush. So says *The Economist*:

In the height of the strife, New-York papers and New-York politicians were not wanting who exhorted the combatants, now that they had large armies in the field, to employ them, not against each other, but against Great Britain—to compromise the internal quarrel, the slave question included, and invade the British territory without notice and with overwhelming force.

The Economist knows perfectly well that *The N. Y. Herald's* efforts, which were eagerly supported by *The London Times*, at embroiling the United States into a war with England, only intended securing the success of Secession and thwarting the movement of Northern regeneration.

Still there is one concession made by the anti-Northern English press. *The Saturday* snob tells us: "What was at issue in Lincoln's election, and what has precipitated the convulsion, was *merely the limitation of the institution of Slavery to States where that institution already exists.*"

And *The Economist* remarks:

It is true enough that it was the aim of the Republican party which elected Mr. Lincoln to prevent Slavery from spreading into the unsettled Territories . . . It may be true that the success of the North, if complete and unconditional, would enable them to confine Slavery within the fifteen States which have already adopted it, and might thus lead to its eventual extinction—though this is rather probable than certain.

In 1859, on the occasion of John Brown's Harper's Ferry expedition,¹⁶⁶ the very same *Economist* published a series of elaborate articles with a view to prove that, by dint of an *economical law*, American Slavery was doomed to gradual extinction from the moment it should be deprived of its power of expansion. That "economical law" was perfectly understood by the Slaveocracy. "In 15 years more," said Toombs, "without a great increase in Slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves."

The limitation of Slavery to its constitutional area, as pro-

claimed by the Republicans, was the distinct ground upon which the menace of Secession was first uttered in the House of Representatives on December 19, 1859. Mr. Singleton (Mississippi) having asked Mr. Curtis (Iowa), "if the Republican party would never let the South have another foot of slave territory while it remained in the Union," and Mr. Curtis having responded in the affirmative, Mr. Singleton *said this would dissolve the Union*. His advice to Mississippi was the sooner it got out of the Union the better—"gentlemen should recollect that . . . Jefferson Davis led our forces in Mexico, and . . . still he lives, perhaps to lead the Southern army." Quite apart from the *economical law* which makes the diffusion of Slavery a vital condition for its maintenance within its constitutional areas, the leaders of the South had never deceived themselves as to its necessity for keeping up their *political* sway over the United States. *John Calhoun*, in the defense of his propositions to the Senate, stated distinctly on Feb. 19, 1847, "that the Senate was the only balance of power left to the South in the Government," and that the creation of new Slave States had become necessary "for the retention of the equipoise of power in the Senate." Moreover, the Oligarchy of the 300,000 slave-owners could not even maintain their sway at home save by constantly throwing out to their white plebeians the bait of prospective conquests within and without the frontiers of the United States. If, then, according to the oracles of the English press, the North had arrived at the fixed resolution of circumscribing Slavery within its present limits, and of thus extinguishing it in a constitutional way, was this not sufficient to enlist the sympathies of Anti-Slavery England?

But the English Puritans seem indeed not to be contented save by an explicit Abolitionist war. "This," says *The Economist* "therefore, not being a war for the emancipation of the Negro race . . . on what other ground can we be fairly called upon to sympathize so warmly with the Federal cause?" "There was a time," says *The Examiner*, "when our sympathies were with the North, thinking that it was really in earnest in making a stand against the encroachments of the Slave States," and in adopting "emancipation as a measure of justice to the black race."

However, in the very same numbers in which these papers tell us that they cannot sympathize with the North because its war is no Abolitionist war, we are informed that "the desperate expedient of proclaiming Negro emancipation and summoning the slaves to a general insurrection," is a thing "the mere conception of which . . . is repulsive and dreadful," and that "a compromise" would be "far preferable to success purchased at such a cost and *stained by such a crime.*"

Thus the English eagerness for the Abolitionist war is all cant. The cloven foot peeps out in the following sentences: "Lastly . . ." says *The Economist*, "is the *Morrill Tariff*, a title to our gratitude and to our sympathy, or is the certainty that, in case of Northern triumph, that Tariff should be extended over the whole Republic, a reason why we ought to be clamorously anxious for their success?" "The North Americans," says *The Examiner*, "are in earnest about nothing but a selfish protective Tariff. The Southern States were tired of being robbed of the fruits of their slave-labor by the protective tariff of the North."

The Examiner and *The Economist* comment each other. The latter is honest enough to confess at last that with him and his followers sympathy is a mere question of tariff, while the former reduces the war between North and South to a tariff war, to a war between Protection and Free-Trade. *The Examiner* is perhaps not aware that even the South Carolina Nullifiers of 1832,¹⁶⁷ as Gen. Jackson testifies, used Protection only as a pretext for secession; but even *The Examiner* ought to know that the present rebellion did not wait upon the passing of the Morrill tariff for breaking out. In point of fact, the Southerners could not have been tired of being robbed of the fruits of their slave labor by the Protective tariff of the North, considering that from 1846-1861 a Free-Trade tariff had obtained.

The Spectator characterizes in its last number the secret thought of some of the Anti-Northern organs in the following striking manner:

What, then, do the Anti-Northern organs really profess to think desirable under the justification of this plea of deferring to the

inexorable logic of facts? They argue that disunion is desirable, just because, as we have said, it is the only possible step to a conclusion of this "causeless and fratricidal strife;" and next, of course, only as an afterthought, and as an humble apology for Providence and "justification of the ways of God to man," now that the inevitable necessity stands revealed—for further reasons discovered as beautiful adaptations to the moral exigencies of the country, when once the issue is discerned. It is discovered that it will be very much for the advantage of the States to be dissolved into rival groups. They will mutually check each other's ambition; they will neutralize each other's power, and if ever England should get into a dispute with one or more of them, more jealousy will bring the antagonistic groups to our aid. This will be, it is urged, a very wholesome state of things, for it will relieve us from anxiety and it will encourage political "competition," that great safeguard of honesty and purity, among the States themselves.

Such is the case—very gravely urged—of the numerous class of Southern sympathizers now springing up among us. Translated into English—and we grieve that an English argument on such a subject should be of a nature that requires translating—it means that we deplore the present great scale of this "fratricidal" war, because it may concentrate in one fearful spasm a series of chronic petty wars and passions and jealousies among groups of rival States in times to come. The real truth is, and this very un-English feeling distinctly discerns this truth, though it cloaks it in decent phrases, that rival groups of American States could not live together in peace or harmony. The chronic condition would be one of malignant hostility rising out of the very causes which have produced the present contest. It is asserted that the different groups of States have different tariff interests. These different tariff interests would be the sources of constant petty wars if the States were once dissolved, and Slavery, the root of all the strife, would be the spring of innumerable animosities, discords and campaigns. No stable equilibrium could ever again be established among the rival States. And yet it is maintained that this long future of incessant strife is the providential solution of the great

question now at issue—the only real reason why it is looked upon favorably being this, that whereas the present great-scale conflict may issue in a restored and stronger political unity, the alternative of infinitely multiplied small-scale quarrels will issue in a weak and divided continent, that England cannot fear.

Now we do not deny that the Americans themselves sowed the seeds of this petty and contemptible state of feeling by the unfriendly and bullying attitude they have so often manifested to England, but we do say that the state of feeling on our part is petty and contemptible. We see that in a deferred issue there is no hope of a deep and enduring tranquillity for America, that it means a decline and fall of the American nation into quarrelsome clans and tribes, and yet we hold up our hands in horror at the present “fratricidal” strife because it holds out hopes of finality. We exhort them to look favorably on the indefinite future of small strifes, equally fratricidal and probably far more demoralizing, because the latter would draw out of our side the thorn of American rivalry.

The British Cotton Trade

Published October 14, 1861

The continual rise in the prices of raw cotton begins at last to seriously react upon the cotton factories, their consumption of cotton being now 25 per cent less than the full consumption. This result has been brought about by a daily lessening rate of production, many mills working only four or three days per week, part of the machinery being stopped, both in those establishments where short time has been commenced and in those which are still running full time, and some mills being temporarily altogether closed. In some places, as at Blackburn, for instance, short time has been coupled with a reduction of wages. However, the short-time movement is only in its incipient state, and we may predict with perfect security that some weeks later the trade will have generally resorted to three days working per

week, concurrently with a large stoppage of machinery in most establishments. On the whole, English manufacturers and merchants were extremely slow and reluctant in acknowledging the awkward position of their cotton supplies. "The whole of the last American crop," they said,

has long since been forwarded to Europe. The picking of the new crop has barely commenced. Not a bale of cotton could have reached us more than has reached us, even if the war and the blockade¹⁶⁸ had never been heard of. The shipping season does not commence till far in November, and it is usually the end of December before any large exportations take place. Till then, it is of little consequence whether the cotton is retained on the plantations or is forwarded to the ports as fast as it is bagged. If the blockade ceases any time *before the end of this year*, the probability is that by March or April we shall have received just as full a supply of cotton as if the blockade had never been declared.

In the innermost recesses of the mercantile mind the notion was cherished that the whole American crisis, and, consequently, the blockade, would have ceased before the end of the year, or that Lord Palmerston would forcibly break through the blockade. The latter idea has been altogether abandoned, since, beside all other circumstances, Manchester became aware that two vast interests, the monetary interest having sunk an immense capital in the industrial enterprises of Northern America, and the corn trade, relying on Northern America as its principal source of supply, would combine to check any unprovoked aggression on the part of the British Government. The hopes of the blockade being raised in due time, for the requirements of Liverpool or Manchester, or the American war being wound up by a compromise with the Secessionists, have given way before a feature hitherto unknown in the English cotton market, viz., American operations in cotton at Liverpool, partly on speculation, partly for reshipment to America. Consequently, for the last two weeks the Liverpool cotton market has been feverishly excited, the speculative investments

in cotton on the part of the Liverpool merchants being backed by speculative investments on the part of the Manchester and other manufacturers eager to provide themselves with stocks of raw material for the Winter. The extent of the latter transactions is sufficiently shown by the fact that a considerable portion of the spare warehouse room in Manchester is already occupied by such stocks, and that throughout the week beginning with Sept. 15 and ending with Sept. 22, Middling Americans had increased $3/8$ d. per lb, and fair ones $5/8$ d.

From the outbreak of the American war the prices of cotton were steadily rising, but the ruinous disproportion between the prices of the raw material and the prices of yarns and cloth was not declared until the last weeks of August. Till then, any serious decline in the prices of cotton manufactures, which might have been anticipated from the considerable decrease of the American demand, had been balanced by an accumulation of stocks in first hands, and by speculative consignments to China and India. Those Asiatic markets, however, were soon overdone. "Stocks," says *The Calcutta Price Current* of Aug. 7, 1861, "are accumulating, the arrivals since our last being no less than 24,000,000 yards of plain cottons. Home advices show a continuation of shipments in excess of our requirements, and so long as this is the case, improvement cannot be looked for . . . The Bombay market, also, has been greatly over-supplied."

Some other circumstances contributed to contract the Indian market. The late famine in the north-western provinces has been succeeded by the ravages of the cholera, while throughout Lower Bengal an excessive fall of rain, laying the country under water, seriously damaged the rice crops. In letters from Calcutta, which reached England last week, sales were reported giving a net return of $9\frac{3}{4}$ d. per pound for 40s twist, which cannot be bought at Manchester for less than $11\frac{1}{2}$ d., while sales of 40-inch shirtings, compared with present rates at Manchester, yield losses at $7\frac{1}{2}$ d., 9d., and 12d. per piece. In the China market, prices were also forced down by the accumulation of the stocks imported. Under these circumstances, the demand for the British cotton manufactures decreasing, their

prices can, of course, not keep pace with the progressive rise in the price of the raw material; but, on the contrary, the spinning, weaving, and printing of cotton must, in many instances, cease to pay the costs of production. Take, as an example, the following case, stated by one of the greatest Manchester manufacturers, in reference to coarse spinning:

	Per lb.	Margin.	Cost of spinning per lb
<i>Sept. 17, 1860.</i>			
Cost of cotton	6½d.	4d.	3d.
16s warp sold for	10½d.
Profit, 1d. per lb.			
<i>Sept. 17, 1861.</i>			
Cost of cotton	9d.	2d.	3½d.
16s warp sold for	11
Loss, 1½d. per lb.			

The consumption of Indian cotton is rapidly growing, and with a further rise in prices, the Indian supply will come forward at increasing ratios; but still it remains impossible to change, at a few months' notice, all the conditions of production and turn the current of commerce. England pays now, in fact, the penalty for her protracted misrule of that vast Indian empire. The two main obstacles she has now to grapple with in her attempts at supplanting American cotton by Indian cotton, is the want of means of communication and transport throughout India, and the miserable state of the Indian peasant, disabling him from improving favorable circumstances. Both these difficulties the English have themselves to thank for. English modern industry, in general, relied upon two pivots equally monstrous. The one was the *potato* as the only means of feeding Ireland and a great part of the English working class. This pivot was swept away by the potato disease and the subsequent Irish catastrophe.¹⁶⁹ A larger basis for the reproduction and maintenance of the toiling millions had then to be adopted. The second pivot of

English industry was the slave-grown cotton of the United States. The present American crisis forces them to enlarge their field of supply and emancipate cotton from slave-breeding and slave-consuming oligarchies. As long as the English cotton manufactures depended on slave-grown cotton, it could be truthfully asserted that they rested on a twofold slavery, the indirect slavery of the white man in England and the direct slavery of the black men on the other side of the Atlantic.

The North American Civil War
Published October 25, 1861

For months the leading weekly and daily papers of the London press have been reiterating the same litany on the American Civil War. While they insult the free states of the North, they anxiously defend themselves against the suspicion of sympathizing with the slave states of the South. In fact, they continually write two articles: one article, in which they attack the North, and another article, in which they excuse their attacks on the North. *Qui s'excuse s'accuse*.

In essence the extenuating arguments read: The war between the North and South is a tariff war. The war is, further, not for any principle, does not touch the question of slavery, and in fact turns on Northern lust for sovereignty. Finally, even if justice is on the side of the North, does it not remain a vain endeavor to want to subjugate eight million Anglo-Saxons by force! Would not separation of the South release the North from all connection with Negro slavery and ensure for it, with its twenty million inhabitants and its vast territory, a higher, hitherto scarcely dreamt-of, development? Accordingly, must not the North welcome secession as a happy event, instead of wanting to overrule it by a bloody and futile civil war?

Point by point we will probe the plea of the English press.

The war between North and South—so runs the first excuse—is a mere tariff war, a war between a protectionist system and a free trade system, and Britain naturally stands on the side of

free trade. Shall the slave-owner enjoy the fruits of slave labor in their entirety or shall he be cheated of a portion of these by the protectionists of the North? That is the question which is at issue in this war. It was reserved for *The Times* to make this brilliant discovery. *The Economist*, *The Examiner*, *The Saturday Review*, and *tutti quanti*¹⁷⁰ expounded the theme further. It is characteristic of this discovery that it was made, not in Charleston, but in London. Naturally, in America everyone knew that from 1846 to 1861 a free trade system prevailed, and that Representative Morrill carried his protectionist tariff through Congress only in 1861, after the rebellion had already broken out. Secession, therefore, did not take place because the Morrill tariff had gone through Congress, but, at most, the Morrill tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place. When South Carolina had its first attack of secession in 1831, the protectionist tariff of 1828 served it, to be sure, as a pretext, but only as a pretext, as is known from a statement of General Jackson. This time, however, the old pretext has in fact not been repeated. In the Secession Congress at Montgomery all reference to the tariff question was avoided, because the cultivation of sugar in Louisiana, one of the most influential Southern states, depends entirely on protection.

But, the London press pleads further, the war of the United States is nothing but a war for the forcible maintenance of the Union. The Yankees cannot make up their minds to strike fifteen stars from their standard. They want to cut a colossal figure on the world stage. Yes, it would be different if the war was waged for the abolition of slavery! The question of slavery, however, as *The Saturday Review* categorically declares among other things, has absolutely nothing to do with this war.

It is above all to be remembered that the war did not originate with the North, but with the South. The North finds itself on the defensive. For months it had quietly looked on while the secessionists appropriated the Union's forts, arsenals, ship-yards, customs houses, pay offices, ships, and supplies of arms, insulted its flag and took prisoner bodies of its troops. Finally the secessionists resolved to force the Union government out of its passive attitude by a blatant act of war, and *solely for this*

reason proceeded to the bombardment of Fort Sumter near Charleston. On April 11 (1861) their General Beauregard¹⁷¹ had learnt in a meeting with Major Anderson, the commander of Fort Sumter, that the fort was only supplied with provisions for three days more and accordingly must be peacefully surrendered after this period. In order to forestall this peaceful surrender, the secessionists opened the bombardment early on the following morning (April 12), which brought about the fall of the fort in a few hours. News of this had hardly been telegraphed to Montgomery, the seat of the Secession Congress,¹⁷² when War Minister Walker publicly declared in the name of the new Confederacy: "No man can say where *the war opened today* will end." At the same time he prophesied "that before the first of May the flag of the Southern Confederacy will wave from the dome of the old Capitol in Washington and within a short time perhaps also from the Faneuil Hall in Boston." Only now ensued the proclamation in which Lincoln called for 75,000 men to defend the Union. The bombardment of Fort Sumter cut off the only possible constitutional way out, namely the convocation of a general convention of the American people, as Lincoln had proposed in his inaugural address. For Lincoln there now remained only the choice of fleeing from Washington, evacuating Maryland and Delaware and surrendering Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia, or of answering war with war.

The question of the principle of the American Civil War is answered by the battle slogan with which the South broke the peace. Stephens,¹⁷³ the Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, declared in the Secession Congress that what essentially distinguished the Constitution newly hatched at Montgomery from the Constitution of the Washingtons and Jeffersons was that now for the first time slavery was recognized as an institution good in itself, and as the foundation of the whole state edifice, whereas the revolutionary fathers, men steeped in the prejudices of the eighteenth century, had treated slavery as an evil imported from England and to be eliminated in the course of time. Another matador of the South, Mr. Spratt, cried out: "For us it is a question of founding a great slave republic." If,

therefore, it was indeed only in defense of the Union that the North drew the sword, had not the South already declared that the continuance of slavery was no longer compatible with the continuance of the Union?

Just as the bombardment of Fort Sumter gave the signal for the opening of the war, the election victory of the *Republican* Party of the North, the election of Lincoln as President, gave the signal for secession. On November 6, 1860, Lincoln was elected. On November 8, 1860, a message telegraphed from South Carolina said: "Secession is regarded here as a settled thing;" on November 10 the legislature of Georgia occupied itself with secession plans, and on November 13 a special session of the legislature of Mississippi was convened to consider secession. But Lincoln's election was itself only the result of a split in the *Democratic* camp. During the election struggle the Democrats of the North concentrated their votes on *Douglas*, the Democrats of the South concentrated their votes on *Breckinridge*, and to this splitting of the Democratic votes the Republican Party owed its victory. Whence came, on the one hand, the preponderance of the *Republican* Party in the North? Whence, on the other, the disunion *within* the *Democratic* Party, whose members, North and South, had operated in conjunction for more than half a century?

Under the presidency of Buchanan the sway that the South had gradually usurped over the Union through its alliance with the Northern Democrats attained its zenith. The last Continental Congress of 1787 and the first Constitutional Congress of 1789-90 had legally excluded slavery from all Territories of the republic northwest of the Ohio. (Territories, as is known, is the name given to the colonies lying within the United States itself which have not yet attained the level of population constitutionally prescribed for the formation of autonomous states.) The so-called Missouri Compromise (1820), in consequence of which Missouri became one of the States of the Union as a slave state, excluded slavery from every remaining Territory north of 36°30' latitude and west of the Missouri. By this compromise the area of slavery was advanced several degrees of longitude, while, on the other hand, a geographical boundary-line to its

future spread seemed quite definitely drawn. This geographical barrier, in its turn, was thrown down in 1854 by the so-called Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the initiator of which was St[ephen] A. Douglas, then leader of the Northern Democrats. The Bill, which passed both Houses of Congress, repealed the Missouri Compromise, placed slavery and freedom on the same footing, commanded the Union government to treat them both with equal indifference, and left to the sovereignty of the people, that is, the majority of the settlers, to decide whether or not slavery was to be introduced in a Territory. Thus, for the first time in the history of the United States, every geographical and legal limit to the extension of slavery in the Territories was removed. Under this new legislation the hitherto free Territory of New Mexico, a Territory five times as large as the State of New York, was transformed into a slave Territory, and the area of slavery was extended from the border of the Mexican Republic to 38° north latitude. In 1859 New Mexico received a slave code that vies with the statute-books of Texas and Alabama in barbarity. Nevertheless, as the census of 1860 proves, among some 100,000 inhabitants New Mexico does not count even half a hundred slaves. It had therefore sufficed for the South to send some adventurers with a few slavers over the border, and then with the help of the central government in Washington and of its officials and contractors in New Mexico to drum together a sham popular representation to impose slavery and with it the rule of the slaveholders on the Territory.

However, this convenient method did not prove applicable in other Territories. The South accordingly went a step further and appealed from Congress to the Supreme Court of the United States. This Court, which numbers nine judges, five of whom belong to the South, had long been the most willing tool of the slaveholders. It decided in 1857, in the notorious Dred Scott case, that every American citizen possesses the right to take with him into any Territory any property recognized by the Constitution. The Constitution, it maintained, recognizes slaves as property and obliges the Union government to protect this property. Consequently, on the basis of the Constitution, slaves

could be forced to labor in the Territories by their owners, and so every individual slaveholder was entitled to introduce slavery into hitherto free Territories against the will of the majority of the settlers. The right to exclude slavery was taken from the Territorial legislatures and the duty to protect pioneers of the slave system was imposed on Congress and the Union government.

If the Missouri Compromise of 1820 had extended the geographical boundary-line of slavery in the Territories, if the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 had erased every geographical boundary-line and set up a political barrier instead, the will of the majority of the settlers, now the Supreme Court of the United States, by its decision of 1857, tore down even this political barrier and transformed all the Territories of the republic, present and future, from nurseries of free states into nurseries of slavery.

At the same time, under Buchanan's government the severer law on the surrendering of fugitive slaves enacted in 1850 was ruthlessly carried out in the states of the North. To play the part of slave-catchers for the Southern slaveholders appeared to be the constitutional calling of the North. On the other hand, in order to hinder as far as possible the colonization of the Territories by free settlers, the slaveholders' party frustrated all the so-called free-soil measures, i.e., measures which were to secure for the settlers a definite amount of uncultivated state land free of charge.

In the foreign, as in the domestic, policy of the United States, the interests of the slaveholders served as the guiding star: Buchanan had in fact obtained the office of President through the issue of the Ostend Manifesto, in which the acquisition of Cuba, whether by purchase or by force of arms, was proclaimed as the great task of national policy. Under his government northern Mexico was already divided among American land speculators, who impatiently awaited the signal to fall on Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Sonora. The unceasing piratical expeditions of the filibusters against the states of Central America were directed no less from the White House at Washington. In the closest connection with this foreign policy, whose manifest

purpose was conquest of new territory for the spread of slavery and of the slaveholders' rule, stood the *reopening of the slave trade*, secretly supported by the Union government. St[ephen] A. Douglas himself declared in the American Senate on August 20, 1859: During the last year more Negroes have been imported from Africa than ever before in any single year, even at the time when the slave trade was still legal. The number of slaves imported in the last year totalled fifteen thousand.

Armed spreading of slavery abroad was the avowed aim of national policy; the Union had in fact become the slave of the 300,000 slaveholders who held sway over the South. A series of compromises, which the South owed to its alliance with the Northern Democrats, had led to this result. On this alliance all the attempts, periodically repeated since 1817, to resist the ever increasing encroachments of the slaveholders had hitherto come to grief. At length there came a turning point.

For hardly had the Kansas-Nebraska Bill gone through, which wiped out the geographical boundary-line of slavery and made its introduction into new Territories subject to the will of the majority of the settlers, when armed emissaries of the slaveholders, border rabble from Missouri and Arkansas, with bowie-knife in one hand and revolver in the other, fell upon Kansas and sought by the most unheard-of atrocities to dislodge its settlers from the Territory colonized by them. These raids were supported by the central government in Washington. Hence a tremendous reaction. Throughout the North, but particularly in the Northwest, a relief organization was formed to support Kansas with men, arms, and money. Out of this relief organization arose the *Republican Party*, which therefore owes its origin to the struggle for Kansas. After the attempt to transform Kansas into a *slave Territory* by force of arms had failed, the South sought to achieve the same result by political intrigues. Buchanan's government, in particular, exerted its utmost efforts to have Kansas included in the States of the Union as a *slave state* with a slave constitution imposed on it. Hence renewed struggle, this time mainly conducted in Congress at Washington. Even St[ephen] A. Douglas, the chief of the Northern Democrats, now (1857-58) entered the lists

against the government and his allies of the South, because imposition of a slave constitution could have been contrary to the principle of sovereignty of the settlers passed in the Nebraska Bill of 1854. Douglas, Senator for Illinois, a Northwestern state, would naturally have lost all his influence if he had wanted to concede to the South the right to steal by force of arms or through acts of Congress Territories colonized by the North. As the struggle for Kansas, therefore, called the *Republican Party* into being, it at the same time occasioned the first *split within the Democratic Party* itself.

The Republican Party put forward its first platform for the presidential election in 1856. Although its candidate, John Frémont, was not victorious, the huge number of votes cast for him at any rate proved the rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the Northwest. At their second National Convention for the presidential elections (May 17, 1860), the Republicans again put forward their platform of 1856, only enriched by some additions. Its principal contents were the following: Not a foot of fresh territory is further conceded to slavery. The filibustering policy abroad must cease. The reopening of the slave trade is stigmatized. Finally, free-soil laws are to be enacted for the furtherance of free colonization.

The vitally important point in this platform was that not a foot of fresh terrain was conceded to slavery; rather it was to remain once and for all confined within the boundaries of the states where it already legally existed. Slavery was thus to be formally interned; but continual expansion of territory and continual spread of slavery beyond its old limits is a law of life for the slave states of the Union.

The cultivation of the southern export articles, cotton, tobacco, sugar, etc., carried on by slaves, is only remunerative as long as it is conducted with large gangs of slaves, on a mass scale and on wide expanses of a naturally fertile soil, which requires only simple labor. Intensive cultivation, which depends less on fertility of the soil than on investment of capital, intelligence, and energy of labor, is contrary to the nature of slavery. Hence the rapid transformation of states like Maryland and Virginia, which formerly employed slaves in the production of

export articles, into states which raise slaves to export them into the deep South. Even in South Carolina, where the slaves form four-sevenths of the population, the cultivation of cotton has been almost completely stationary for years due to the exhaustion of the soil. Indeed, by force of circumstances South Carolina has already been transformed in part into a slave-raising state, since it already sells slaves to the sum of four million dollars yearly to the states of the extreme South and Southwest. As soon as this point is reached, the acquisition of new Territories becomes necessary, so that one section of the slaveholders with their slaves may occupy new fertile lands and that a new market for slave-raising, therefore for the sale of slaves, may be created for the remaining section. It is, for example, indubitable that without the acquisition of Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas by the United States, slavery in Virginia and Maryland would have become extinct long ago. In the Secessionist Congress at Montgomery, Senator Toombs, one of the spokesmen of the South, strikingly formulated the economic law that commands the constant expansion of the territory of slavery. "In fifteen years," said he, "without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves."

As is known, the representation of the individual states in the Congress House of Representatives depends on the size of their respective populations. As the populations of the free states grow far more quickly than those of the slave states, the number of Northern Representatives was bound to outstrip that of the Southern very rapidly. The real seat of the political power of the South is accordingly transferred more and more to the American Senate, where every state, whether its population is great or small, is represented by two Senators. In order to assert its influence in the Senate and, through the Senate, its hegemony over the United States, the South therefore required a continual formation of new slave states. This, however, was only possible through conquest of foreign lands, as in the case of Texas, or through the transformation of the Territories belonging to the United States first into slave Territories and later into slave states, as in the case of Missouri, Arkansas, etc.

John Calhoun, whom the slaveholders admire as their statesman *par excellence*, stated as early as February 19, 1847, in the Senate, that the Senate alone placed a balance of power in the hands of the South, that extension of the slave territory was necessary to preserve this equilibrium between South and North in the Senate, and that the attempts of the South at the creation of new slave states by force were accordingly justified.

Finally, the number of actual slaveholders in the South of the Union does not amount to more than 300,000, a narrow oligarchy that is confronted with many millions of so-called poor whites, whose numbers have been constantly growing through concentration of landed property and whose condition is only to be compared with that of the Roman plebeians in the period of Rome's extreme decline. Only by acquisition and the prospect of acquisition of new Territories, as well as by filibustering expeditions, is it possible to square the interests of these "poor whites" with those of the slaveholders, to give their restless thirst for action a harmless direction and to tame them with the prospect of one day becoming slaveholders themselves.

A strict confinement of slavery within its old terrain, therefore, was bound according to economic law to lead to its gradual extinction, in the political sphere to annihilate the hegemony that the slave states exercised through the Senate, and finally to expose the slaveholding oligarchy within its own states to threatening perils from the "poor whites." In accordance with the principle that any further extension of slave Territories was to be prohibited by law, the Republicans therefore attacked the rule of the slaveholders at its root. The Republican election victory was accordingly bound to lead to open struggle between North and South. And this election victory, as already mentioned, was itself conditioned by the split in the Democratic camp.

The Kansas struggle had already caused a split between the slaveholders' party and the Democrats of the North allied to it. With the presidential election of 1860, the same strife now broke out again in a more general form. The Democrats of the North, with Douglas as their candidate, made the introduction of slavery into Territories dependent on the will of the majority

of the settlers. The slaveholders' party, with Breckinridge as their candidate, maintained that the Constitution of the United States, as the Supreme Court had also declared, brought slavery legally in its train; in and of itself slavery was already legal in all Territories and required no special naturalization. While, therefore, the Republicans prohibited any extension of slave Territories, the Southern party laid claim to all Territories of the republic as legally warranted domains. What they had attempted by way of example with regard to Kansas, to force slavery on a Territory through the central government against the will of the settlers themselves, they now set up as law for all the Territories of the Union. Such a concession lay beyond the power of the *Democratic* leaders and would only have occasioned the desertion of their army to the Republican camp. On the other hand, Douglas's "settlers' sovereignty" could not satisfy the slaveholders' party. What it wanted to effect had to be effected within the next four years under the new President, could only be effected by the resources of the central government, and brooked no further delay. It did not escape the slaveholders that a new power had arisen, the *Northwest*, whose population, having almost doubled between 1850 and 1860, was already pretty well equal to the white population of the slave states—a power that was not inclined either by tradition, temperament, or mode of life to let itself be dragged from compromise to compromise in the manner of the old Northeastern states. The Union was still of value to the South only so far as it handed over Federal power to it as a means of carrying out the slave policy. If not, then it was better to make the break now than to look on at the development of the Republican Party and the upsurge of the Northwest for another four years and begin the struggle under more unfavorable conditions. The slaveholders' party therefore played *va banque!*¹⁷⁴ When the Democrats of the North declined to go on playing the part of the "poor whites" of the South, the South secured Lincoln's victory by splitting the vote, and then took this victory as a pretext for drawing the sword from the scabbard.

The whole movement was and is based, as one sees, on the *slave question*. Not in the sense of whether the slaves within

the existing slave states should be emancipated outright or not, but whether the 20 million free men of the North should submit any longer to an oligarchy of 300,000 slaveholders; whether the vast Territories of the republic should be nurseries for free states or for slavery; finally, whether the national policy of the Union should take armed spreading of slavery in Mexico, Central and South America as its device [. . .]

The London Times on the Orleans Princes in America
Published November 7, 1861

On the occasion of the King of Prussia's visit at Compiegne,¹⁷⁵ *The London Times* published some racy articles, giving great offense on the other side of the Channel. The *Pays, Journal de l'Empire*, in its turn, characterized *The Times* writers as people whose heads were poisoned by gin, and whose pens were dipped into mud. Such occasional exchanges of invective are only intended to mislead public opinion as to the intimate relations connecting Printing-House Square to the Tuileries. There exists beyond the French frontiers no greater sycophant of the Man of December than *The London Times*, and its services are the more invaluable, the more that paper now and then assumes the tone and the air of a Cato censor toward its Caesar. *The Times* had for months heaped insult upon Prussia. Improving the miserable Macdonald affair,¹⁷⁶ it had told Prussia that England would feel glad to see a transfer of the Rhenish Provinces from the barbarous sway of the Hohenzollern to the enlightened despotism of a Bonaparte. It had not only exasperated the Prussian dynasty, but the Prussian people. It had written down the idea of an Anglo-Prussian alliance in case of a Prussian conflict with France. It had strained all its powers to convince Prussia that she had nothing to hope from England, and that the next best thing she could do would be to come to some understanding with France. When at last the weak and trimming monarch of Prussia resolved upon the visit at Compiegne, *The Times* could proudly exclaim: "*quorum magna pars fui*;"¹⁷⁷ but now the

time had also arrived for obliterating from the memory of the British the fact that *The Times* had been the pathfinder of the Prussian monarch. Hence the roar of its theatrical thunders. Hence the counter roars of the *Pays*, *Journal de l'Empire*.

The Times had now recovered its position of the deadly antagonist of Bonapartism, and, therefore, the power of lending its aid to the Man of December. An occasion soon offered. Louis Bonaparte is, of course, most touchy whenever the renown of rival pretenders to the French crown is concerned. He had covered himself with ridicule in the affair of the Duke d'Aumale's pamphlet¹⁷⁸ against Plon Plon, and, by his proceedings, had done more in furtherance of the Orleanist cause than all the Orleanist partisans combined. Again, in these latter days, the French people were called upon to draw a parallel between Plon Plon and the Orleans princes. When Plon Plon set out for America, there were caricatures circulated in the Faubourg St. Antoine representing him as a fat man in search of a crown, but professing at the same time to be a most inoffensive traveler, with a peculiar aversion to the smell of powder. While Plon Plon is returning to France with no more laurels than he gathered in the Crimea and in Italy, the Princes of Orleans cross the Atlantic to take service in the ranks of the National army. Hence a great stir in the Bonapartist camp. It would not do to give vent to Bonapartist anger through the venal press of Paris. The Imperialist fears would thus only be betrayed, the pamphlet scandal renewed, and odious comparisons provoked between exiled Princes who fight under the republican banner against the enslavers of working millions, with another exiled Prince, who had himself sworn in as an English special constable to share in the glory of putting down an English workingmen's movement.

Who should extricate the Man of December out of this dilemma? Who but *The London Times*? If the same *London Times*, which, on the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th of October, 1861, had roused the furies of the *Pays*, *Journal de l'Empire*, by its rather cynical strictures on the visit at Compiègne—if that very same paper should come out on the 12th of October, with a merciless onslaught on the Orleans Princes, because of their

enlistment in the ranks of the National Army of the United States, would Louis Bonaparte not have proved his case against the Orleans Princes? Would *The Times* article not be done into French, commented upon by the Paris papers, sent by the *Préfet de Police* to all the journals of all the departments, and circulated throughout the whole of France, as the impartial sentence passed by *The London Times*, the personal foe of Louis Bonaparte, upon the last proceedings of the Orleans Princes? Consequently, *The Times* of to-day has come out with a most scurrilous onslaught on these princes.

Louis Bonaparte is, of course, too much of a business man to share the judicial blindness in regard to the American war of the official public opinion-mongers. He knows that the true people of England, of France, of Germany, of Europe, consider the cause of the United States as their own cause, as the cause of liberty, and that, despite all paid sophistry, they consider the soil of the United States as the free soil of the landless millions of Europe, as their land of promise, now to be defended sword in hand, from the sordid grasp of the slaveholder. Louis Napoleon knows, moreover, that in France the masses connect the fight for the maintenance of the Union with the fight of their forefathers for the foundation of American independence, and that with them every Frenchman drawing his sword for the National Government appears only to execute the bequest of Lafayette. Bonaparte, therefore, knows that if anything be able to win the Orleans Princes good opinions from the French people, it will be their enlistment in the ranks of the national army of the United States. He shudders at this very notion, and consequently *The London Times*, his censorious sycophant, tells to-day the Orleans princes that "they will derive no increase of popularity with the French nation from stooping to serve on this *ignoble field of action*." Louis Napoleon knows that all the wars waged in Europe between hostile nations since his *coup d'état*, have been mock wars, groundless, wanton, and carried on on false pretenses. The Russian war, and the Italian war, not to speak of the piratical expeditions against China, Cochin-China, and so forth, never enlisted the sympathies of the French people, instinctively aware that both wars were

carried on only with the view to strengthening the chains forged by the *coup d'état*. The first grand war of contemporaneous history is the American war.

The peoples of Europe know that the Southern slaveocracy commenced that war with the declaration that the continuance of slaveocracy was no longer compatible with the continuance of the Union. Consequently, the people of Europe know that a fight for the continuance of the Union is a fight against the continuance of the slaveocracy—that in this contest the highest form of popular self-government till now realized is giving battle to the meanest and most shameless form of man's enslaving, recorded in the annals of history.

Louis Bonaparte feels, of course, extremely sorry that the Orleans Princes should embark in just such a war, so distinguished, by the vastness of its dimensions and the grandeur of its ends, from the groundless, wanton and diminutive wars Europe has passed through since 1849. Consequently, *The London Times* must needs declare: "To overlook the difference between a war waged by hostile nations, and this most groundless and wanton civil conflict of which history gives us any account, is a species of offense against public morals."

The Times is, of course, bound to wind up its onslaught on the Orleans Princes because of their "stooping to serve on such an ignoble field of action." With a deep bow before the victor of Sevastopol and Solferino, "it is unwise," says *The London Times*, "to challenge a comparison between such actions as Springfield and Manassas,¹⁷⁹ and the exploits of Sevastopol and Solferino."

The next mail will testify to the premeditated use made of *The Times's* article by the Imperialist organs. A friend in times of need is proverbially worth a thousand friends in times of prosperity, and the secret ally of *The London Times* is just now very badly off.

A dearth of cotton, backed by a dearth of grain; a commercial crisis coupled with an agricultural distress, and both of them combined with a reduction of Custom revenues and a monetary embarrassment compelling the Bank of France to screw its rate of discount to six per cent, to enter into transactions with

Rothschilds and Baring for a loan of two millions sterling on the London market, to pawn abroad French Government stock, and with all that to show but a reserve of 12,000,000 against liabilities amounting to more than 40,000,000. Such a state of economical affairs prepares just the situation for rival pretenders to stake double. Already there have been bread-riots in the Faubourg St. Antoine, and this of all times is therefore the most inappropriate time for allowing Orleans Princes to catch popularity. Hence the fierce forward rush of *The London Times*.

The News and Its Effect in London

Published December 19, 1861

Since the declaration of war against Russia I never witnessed an excitement throughout all the strata of English society equal to that produced by the news of the *Trent* affair, conveyed to Southampton by the *La Plata* on the 27th inst. At about 2 o'clock p.m., by means of the electric telegraph, the announcement of the "untoward event" was posted in the news-rooms of all the British Exchanges. All commercial securities went down, while the price of saltpeter went up. Consols¹⁸⁰ declined $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, while at Lloyds war risks of five guineas were demanded on vessels from New-York. Late in the evening the wildest rumors circulated in London, to the effect that the American Minister¹⁸¹ had forthwith been sent his passports, that orders had been issued for the immediate seizure of all American ships in the ports of the United Kingdom, and so forth. The cotton friends of Secession at Liverpool improved the opportunity for holding, at ten minutes' notice, in the cotton salesroom of the Stock Exchange, an indignation meeting, under the presidency of Mr. Spence, the author of some obscure pamphlet in the interest of the Southern Confederacy. Commodore Williams, the Admiralty Agent on board the *Trent*, who had arrived with the *La Plata*, was at once summoned to London.

On the following day, the 28th of November, the London press exhibited, on the whole, a tone of moderation strangely contrasting with the tremendous political and mercantile excitement of the previous evening. The Palmerston papers, *Times*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Morning Advertiser*, and *Sun*, had received orders to calm down rather than to exasperate. *The Daily News*, by its strictures on the conduct of the *San Jacinto*, evidently aimed less at hitting the Federal Government than clearing itself of the suspicion of "Yankee prejudices," while *The Morning Star*, John Bright's organ, without passing any judgment on the policy and wisdom of the "act," pleaded its lawfulness. There were only two exceptions to the general tenor of the London press. The Tory-scribblers of *The Morning Herald* and *The Standard*, forming in fact one paper under different names, gave full vent to their savage satisfaction of having at last caught the "republicans" in a trap, and finding a *casus belli*, ready cut out. They were supported by but one other journal, *The Morning Chronicle*, which for years had tried to prolong its checkered existence by alternately selling itself to the poisoner Palmer and the Tuileries. The excitement on the Exchange greatly subsided in consequence of the pacific tone of the leading London papers. On the same 28th of Nov., Commander Williams attended at the Admiralty, and reported the circumstances of the occurrence in the old Bahama Channel. His report, together with the written depositions of the officers on board the *Trent*, were at once submitted to the law officers of the Crown, whose opinion, late in the evening, was officially brought under the notice of Lord Palmerston, Earl Russell and other members of the Government.

On the 29th of November there was to be remarked some slight change in the tone of the ministerial press. It became known that the law officers of the Crown, on a technical ground, had declared the proceedings of the frigate *San Jacinto illegal*, and that later in the day, the Cabinet, summoned to a general council, had decided to send by next steamer to Lord Lyons instructions to conform to the opinion of the English law officers. Hence the excitement in the principal places of business, such as the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's, the Jerusalem,

the Baltic, etc., set in with redoubled force, and was further stimulated by the news that the projected shipments to America of saltpeter had been stopped on the previous day, and that on the 29th a general order was received at the Custom-House prohibiting the exportation of this article to any country except under certain stringent conditions. The English funds further fell $\frac{3}{4}$, and at one time a real panic prevailed in all the stock markets, it having become impossible to transact any business in some securities, while in all descriptions a severe depression of prices occurred. In the afternoon a recovery in the stock market was due to several rumours, but principally to the report that Mr. Adams had expressed his opinion that the act of the *San Jacinto* would be disavowed by the Washington Cabinet.

On the 30th of November (to-day) all the London papers, with the single exception of *The Morning Star*, put the alternative of reparation by the Washington Cabinet or—*war*.

Having summed up the history of the events from the arrival of the *La Plata* to the present day; I shall now proceed to recording opinions. There were, of course, two points to be considered—on the one hand the law, on the other hand the policy, of the seizure of the Southern Commissioners on board an English mail steamer.

As to the legal aspect of the affair, the first difficulty mooted by the Tory press and *The Morning Chronicle* was that the United States had never recognized the Southern Secessionists as belligerents, and, consequently, could not claim belligerent rights in regard to them.

This quibble was at once disposed of by the Ministerial press itself. "We," said *The Times*, "have already recognized these Confederate States as a belligerent power, and we shall, when the time comes, recognize their Government. Therefore we have imposed on ourselves all the duties and inconveniences of a power neutral between two belligerents."

Hence, whether or not the United States recognize the Confederates as belligerents, they have the right to insist upon England submitting to all the duties and inconveniences of a neutral in maritime warfare.

Consequently, with the exceptions mentioned, the whole

London press acknowledge the right of the *San Jacinto* to over-haul, visit, and search the *Trent*, in order to ascertain whether she carried goods or persons belonging to the category of "contraband of war." *The Times's* insinuation that the English law of decisions "was given *under circumstances very different from those which now occur*;" that "steamers did not then exist," and mail vessels, "carrying letters wherein all the nations of the world have immediate interest, were unknown;" that "we (the English) were *fighting for existence*, and did in those days *what we should not allow others to do*," was not seriously thrown out. Palmerston's private *Moniteur*, *The Morning Post*, declared on the same day that mail steamers were simple merchantmen, not sharing the exemption from the right of search of men-of-war and transports. The *right of search*, on the part of the *San Jacinto*, was in point of fact, conceded by the London press as well as the law officers of the Crown. The objection that the *Trent*, instead of sailing from a belligerent to a belligerent port, was, on the contrary, bound from a neutral to a neutral port, fell to the ground by Lord Stowell's decision that the right of search is intended to ascertain the destination of a ship.

In the second instance, the question arose whether by firing a round shot across the bows of the *Trent*, and subsequently throwing a shell, bursting close to her, the *San Jacinto* had not violated the usages and courtesies appurtenant to the exercise of the right of visitation and search. It was generally conceded by the London press that, since the details of the event have till now been only ascertained by the depositions of one of the parties concerned, no such minor question could influence the decision to be arrived at by the British Government.

The right of search, exercised by the *San Jacinto*, thus being conceded, what had she to look for? For *contraband of war*, presumed to be conveyed by the *Trent*. What is contraband of war? Are the *dispatches* of a belligerent Government contraband of war? Are the *persons* carrying those dispatches contraband of war? And, both questions being answered in the affirmative, do those dispatches and the bearers of them continue to be contraband of war, if found on a merchant ship bound from a neutral port to a neutral port? The London press

admits that the decisions of the highest legal authorities on both sides of the Atlantic are so contradictory, and may be claimed with such appearance of justice for both the affirmative and the negative, that, at all events, a *prima facie* case is made out for the *San Jacinto*.

Concurrently with this prevalent opinion of the English press, the English Crown lawyers have altogether dropped the material question, and only taken up the formal question. They assert that the law of nations was not violated in *substance*, but in *form* only. They have arrived at the conclusion that the *San Jacinto* failed in seizing, on her own responsibility, the Southern Commissioners, instead of taking the *Trent* to a Federal port and submitting the question to a Federal Prize-Court, no armed cruiser having a right to make himself a Judge at sea. A violation in the *procedure* of the *San Jacinto* is, therefore, all that is imputed to her by the English Crown lawyers, who, in my opinion, are right in their conclusion. It might be easy to unearth precedents, showing England to have similarly trespassed on the formalities of maritime law; but violations of law can never be allowed to supplant the law itself.

The question may now be mooted, whether the reparation demanded by the English Government—that is, the restitution of the Southern Commissioners—be warranted by an injury which the English themselves avow to be of *form* rather than of *substance*? A lawyer of the Temple, in the to-day's *Times*, remarks, in respect to this point:

If the case is not so clearly in our favor as that a decision in the American Court condemning the vessel would have been liable to be questioned by us as manifestly contrary to the laws of nations, then the irregularity of the American Captain in allowing the *Trent* to proceed to Southampton, clearly redounded to the advantage of the British owners and the British passengers. Could we in such a case find a ground of international quarrel in an error of procedure which in effect told in our own favor?

Still, if the American Government must concede, as it seems to me, that Capt. Wilkes has committed a violation of maritime

law, whether formal or material, their fair fame and their interest ought alike to prevent them from nibbling at the terms of the satisfaction to be given to the injured party. They ought to remember that they do the work of the Secessionists in embroiling the United States in a war with England, that such a war would be a godsend to Louis Bonaparte in his present difficulties, and would, consequently, be supported by all the official weight of France; and, lastly, that, what with the actual force under the command of the British on the North American and West Indian stations, what with the forces of the Mexican Expedition, the English Government would have at its disposal an overwhelming maritime power.

As to the policy of the seizure in the Bahama Channel, the voice not only of the English but of the European press is unanimous in expressions of bewilderment at the strange conduct of the American Government, provoking such tremendous international dangers, for gaining the bodies of Messrs. Mason, Slidell & Co., while Messrs. Yancey and Mann are strutting in London. *The Times* is certainly right in saying: "Even Mr. Seward himself must know that the voices of these Southern Commissioners, sounding from their captivity, are a thousand times more eloquent in London and in Paris than they would have been if they had been heard at St. James's and the Tuileries."

The people of the United States having magnanimously submitted to a curtailment of their own liberties in order to save their country, will certainly be no less ready to turn the tide of popular opinion in England by openly avowing, and carefully making up for, an international blunder the vindication of which might realize the boldest hopes of the rebels.

Progress of Feeling in England

Published December 25, 1861

The friends of the United States on this side of the Atlantic anxiously hope that conciliatory steps will be taken by the Federal Government. They do so not from a concurrence in the

frantic crowing of the British press over a war incident, which, according to the English Crown lawyers themselves, resolves itself into a mere error of procedure, and may be summed up in the words that there has been a breach of international law, because Capt. Wilkes, instead of taking the *Trent*, her cargo, her passengers, and the Commissioners, did only take the Commissioners. Nor springs the anxiety of the well-wishers of the Great Republic from an apprehension lest, in the long run, it should not prove able to cope with England, although backed by the civil war; and, least of all, do they expect the United States to abdicate, even for a moment, and in a dark hour of trial, the proud position held by them in the council of nations. The motives that prompt them are of quite a different nature.

In the first instance, the business next in hand for the United States is to crush the rebellion and to restore the Union. The wish uppermost in the minds of the Slaveocracy and their Northern tools was always to plunge the United States into a war with England. The first step of England as soon as hostilities broke out would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy, and the second to terminate the blockade. Secondly, no general, if not forced, will accept battle at the time and under the conditions chosen by his enemy. "A war with America," says *The Economist*, a paper deeply in Palmerston's confidence, "must always be one of the most lamentable incidents in the history of England; but if it is to happen, *the present is certainly the period at which it will do us the minimum of harm, and the only moment in our joint annals at which it would confer on us an incidental and partial compensation.*"

The very reasons accounting for the eagerness of England to seize upon any decent pretext for war at this "only moment" ought to withhold the United States from forwarding such a pretext at this "only moment." You go not to war with the aim to do your enemy "*the minimum of harm,*" and, even to confer upon him by the war, "*an incidental and partial compensation.*" The opportunity of the moment would all be on one side, on the side of your foe. Is there any great strain of reasoning wanted to prove that an internal war raging in a State is the least opportune time for entering upon a foreign war? At every

other moment the mercantile classes of Great Britain would have looked upon a war against the United States with the utmost horror. Now, on the contrary, a large and influential party of the mercantile community has for months been urging on the Government to violently break the blockade, and thus provide the main branch of British industry with its raw material. The fear of a curtailment of the English export trade to the United States has lost its sting by the curtailment of that trade having already actually occurred. "They" (the Northern States), says *The Economist*, "are wretched customers, instead of good ones." The vast credit usually given by English commerce to the United States, principally by the acceptance of bills drawn from China and India, has been already reduced to scarcely a fifth of what it was in 1857. Last, not least, Decembrist France, bankrupt, paralyzed at home, beset with difficulty abroad, pounces upon an Anglo-American war as a real god-send, and, in order to buy English support in Europe, will strain all her power to support "Perfidious Albion" on the other side of the Atlantic. Read only the French newspapers. The pitch of indignation to which they have wrought themselves in their tender care for the "honor of England," their fierce diatribes as to the necessity on the part of England to revenge the outrage on the Union Jack, their vile denunciations of everything American, would be truly appalling, if they were not ridiculous and disgusting at the same time. Lastly, if the United States give way in this instance, they will not derogate one iota of their dignity. England has reduced her complaint to a mere *error of procedure, a technical blunder* of which she has made herself systematically guilty in all her maritime wars, but against which the United States have never ceased to protest, and which President Madison,¹⁸² in his message inaugurating the war of 1812, expatiated upon as one of the most shocking breaches of international law. If the United States may be defended in paying England with her own coin, will they be accused for magnanimously disavowing, on the part of a single American captain, acting on his own responsibility, what they always denounced as a systematic usurpation on the part of the British Navy! In

point of fact, the gain of such a procedure would be all on the American side. England, on the one hand, would have acknowledged the right of the United States to capture and bring to adjudication before an American prize court every English ship employed in the service of the Confederation. On the other hand, she would, once for all, before the eyes of the whole world, have practically resigned a claim which she was not brought to desist from either in the peace of Ghent,¹⁸³ in 1814, or the transactions carried on between Lord Ashburton and Secretary Webster¹⁸⁴ in 1842. The question then comes to this: Do you prefer to turn the "untoward event" to your own account, or, blinded by the passions of the moment, turn it to the account of your foes at home and abroad?

Since this day week [. . .] British consols have again lowered, the decline, compared with last Friday, amounting to 2 per cent, the present prices being $89\frac{3}{4}$ to $\frac{7}{8}$ for money and 90 to $90\frac{1}{8}$ for the new account on the 9th of January. This quotation corresponds to the quotation of the British consols during the first two years of the Anglo-Russian war. This decline is altogether due to the warlike interpretation put upon the American papers conveyed by the last mail, to the exacerbating tone of the London press, whose moderation of two days' standing was but a feint, ordered by Palmerston, to the dispatch of troops for Canada, to the proclamation forbidding the export of arms and materials for gunpowder and lastly, to the daily ostentatious statements concerning the formidable preparations for war in the docks and maritime arsenals.

Of one thing you may be sure, Palmerston wants a legal pretext for a war with the United States, but meets in the Cabinet councils with a most determinate opposition on the part of Messrs. Gladstone and Milner Gibson, and, to a less degree, of Sir Cornwall Lewis. "The noble viscount" is backed by Russell, an abject tool in his hands, and the whole Whig Coterie. If the Washington Cabinet should furnish the desired pretext, the present Cabinet will be sprung, to be supplanted by a Tory Administration. The preliminary steps for such a change of scenery have been already settled between Palmerston

and Disraeli. Hence the furious war-cry of *The Morning Herald* and *The Standard*, those hungry wolves howling at the prospect of the long-missed crumbs from the public almoner.

Palmerston's designs may be shown up by calling into memory a few facts. It was he who insisted upon the proclamation, acknowledging the Secessionists as belligerents, on the morning of the 14th of May, after he had been informed by telegraph from Liverpool that Mr. Adams would arrive at London on the night of the 13th May. He, after a severe struggle with his colleagues, dispatched 3,000 men to Canada, an army ridiculous, if intended to cover a frontier of 1,500 miles, but a clever sleight-of-hand if the rebellion was to be cheered, and the Union to be irritated. He, many weeks ago, urged Bonaparte to propose a joint armed intervention "in the internecine struggle," supported that project in the Cabinet council, and failed only in carrying it by the resistance of his colleagues. He and Bonaparte then resorted to the Mexican intervention as a *pis aller*. That operation served two purposes, by provoking just resentment on the part of the Americans, and by simultaneously furnishing a pretext for the dispatch of a squadron, ready, as *The Morning Post* has it, "to perform whatever duty the hostile conduct of the Government of Washington may require us to perform in the waters of the Northern Atlantic." At the time when that expedition was started, *The Morning Post*, together with *The Times* and the smaller fry of Palmerston's press slaves, said that it was a very fine thing, and a philanthropic thing into the bargain, because it would expose the slaveholding Confederation to two fires—the Anti-Slavery North and the Anti-Slavery force of England and France. And what says the very same *Morning Post*, this curious compound of Jenkins and Rhodomonte, of plush and swash, in its to-day's issue, on occasion of Jefferson Davis's address? Hearken to the Palmerston oracle:

We must look to this intervention as one that may be in operation during a considerable period of time; and while the Northern Government is too distant to admit of its attitude entering materially into this question, the Southern Confederation, on the other

hand, stretches for a great distance along the frontier of Mexico, so as to render its friendly disposition to the authors of the insurrection of no slight consequence. The Northern Government has invariably railed at our neutrality, but the Southern with statesmanship and moderation has recognized in it all that we could do for either party; and whether with a view to our transactions in Mexico, or to our relations with the Cabinet at Washington, the *friendly forbearance* of the Southern Confederacy is an important point in our favor.

I may remark that the *Nord* of December 3—a Russian paper, and consequently a paper initiated into Palmerston's designs—insinuates that the Mexican expedition was from the first set on foot, not for its ostensible purpose, but for a war against the United States.

Gen. Scott's letter had produced such a beneficent reaction in public opinion, and even on the London Stock Exchange, that the conspirators of Downing street and the Tuileries found it necessary to let loose the *Patrie*, stating with all the airs of knowledge derived from official sources that the seizure of the Southern Commissioners from the *Trent* was directly authorized by the Washington Cabinet.

English Public Opinion
Published February 1, 1862

The news of the pacific solution of the *Trent* conflict was, by the bulk of the English people, saluted with an exultation proving unmistakably the unpopularity of the apprehended war and the dread of its consequences. It ought never to be forgotten in the United States that at least the *working classes* of England, from the commencement to the termination of the difficulty, have never forsaken them. To them it was due that, despite the poisonous stimulants daily administered by a venal and reckless press, not one single public war meeting could be held in the United Kingdom during all the period that peace trembled in

the balance. The only war meeting convened on the arrival of the *La Plata*, in the cotton salesroom of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, was a corner meeting where the cotton jobbers had it all to themselves. Even at Manchester, the temper of the working classes was so well understood that an insulated attempt at the convocation of a war meeting was almost as soon abandoned as thought of.

Wherever public meetings took place in England, Scotland, or Ireland, they protested against the rabid war-cries of the press, against the sinister designs of the Government, and declared for a pacific settlement of the pending question. In this regard, the two last meetings held, the one at Paddington, London, the other at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, are characteristic. The former meeting applauded Mr. Washington Wilkes's argumentation that England was not warranted in finding fault with the seizure of the Southern Commissioners; while the Newcastle meeting almost unanimously carried the resolution—firstly, that the Americans had only made themselves guilty of a *lawful* exercise of the right of search and seizure; secondly, that the captain of the *Trent* ought to be punished for his violation of English neutrality, as proclaimed by the Queen. In ordinary circumstances, the conduct of the British workmen might have been anticipated from the natural sympathy the popular classes all over the world ought to feel for the only popular Government in the world.

Under the present circumstances, however, when a great portion of the British working classes directly and severely suffers under the consequences of the Southern blockade; when another part is indirectly smitten by the curtailment of the American commerce, owing, as they are told, to the selfish "protective policy" of the Republicans; when the only remaining democratic weekly, *Reynolds's* paper, has sold itself to Messrs. Yancey and Mann, and week after week exhausts its horse-powers of foul language in appeals to the working classes to urge the Government, for their own interests, to war with the Union—under such circumstances, simple justice requires to pay a tribute to the sound attitude of the British working classes, the more so when contrasted with the hypocritical,

bullying, cowardly, and stupid conduct of the official and well-to-do John Bull.

What a difference in this attitude of the people from what it had assumed at the time of the Russian complication!¹⁸⁵ Then *The Times*, *The Post*, and the other Yellowplushes of the London press, whined for peace, to be rebuked by tremendous war meetings all over the country. Now they have howled for war, to be answered by peace meetings denouncing the liberticide schemes and the Pro-Slavery sympathy of the Government. The grimaces cut by the augurs of public opinion at the news of the pacific solution of the *Trent* case are really amusing.

In the first place, they must needs congratulate themselves upon the dignity, common sense, good will, and moderation, daily displayed by them for the whole interval of a month. They *were* moderate for the first two days after the arrival of the *La Plata*, when Palmerston felt uneasy whether any legal pretext for a quarrel was to be picked. But hardly had the crown lawyers hit upon a legal quibble, when they opened a charivari unheard of since the anti-Jacobin war.¹⁸⁶ The dispatches of the English Government left Queenstown in the beginning of December. No official answer from Washington could possibly be looked for before the commencement of January. The new incidents arising in the interval told all in favor of the Americans. The tone of the Transatlantic Press, although the Nashville affair¹⁸⁷ might have roused its passions, was calm. All facts ascertained concurred to show that Capt. Wilkes had acted on his own hook. The position of the Washington Government was delicate. If it resisted the English demands, it would complicate the civil war by a foreign war. If it gave way, it might damage its popularity at home, and appear to cede to pressure from abroad. And the Government thus placed, carried, at the same time, a war which must enlist the warmest sympathies of every man, not a confessed ruffian, on its side.

Common prudence, conventional decency, ought, therefore, to have dictated to the London press, at least for the time separating the English demand from the American reply, to anxiously abstain from every word calculated to heat passion,

breed ill-will, complicate the difficulty. But no! That "inexpressibly mean and groveling" press, as William Cobbett, and he was a *connoisseur*, calls it, really boasted of having, when in fear of the compact power of the United States, humbly submitted to the accumulated slights and insults of Pro-Slavery Administrations for almost half a century, while now, with the savage exultation of cowards, they panted for taking their revenge on the Republican Administration, distracted by a civil war. The record of mankind chronicles no self-avowed infamy like this.

One of the yellow-plushes, Palmerston's private *Moniteur*—*The Morning Post*—finds itself arraigned on a most ugly charge from the American papers. John Bull has never been informed—on information carefully withheld from him by the oligarchs that lord it over him—that Mr. Seward,¹⁸⁸ without awaiting Russell's dispatch, had disavowed any participation of the Washington Cabinet in the act of Capt. Wilkes. Mr. Seward's dispatch arrived at London on December 19. On the 20th December, the rumor of this "secret" spread on the Stock Exchange. On the 21st, the yellow-plush of *The Morning Post* stepped forward to gravely herald that "the dispatch in question does not in any way whatever refer to the outrage on our mail packet."

In *The Daily News*, *The Morning Star*, and other London journals, you will find yellow-plush pretty sharply handled, but you will not learn from them what people out of doors say. They say that *The Morning Post* and *The Times*, like the *Patrie* and the *Pays*, duped the public not only to politically mislead them, but to fleece them in the monetary line on the Stock Exchange, in the interest of their patrons.

The brazen *Times*, fully aware that during the whole crisis it had compromised nobody but itself, and given another proof of the hollowness of its pretensions of influencing the real people of England, plays to-day a trick which here, at London, only works upon the laughing muscles, but on the other side of the Atlantic, might be misinterpreted. The "popular classes" of London, the "mob", as the yellow-plush call them, have given unmistakable signs—have even hinted in newspapers—that

they should consider it an exceedingly seasonable joke to treat Mason (by the by, a distant relative of Palmerston, since the original Mason had married a daughter of Sir W. Temple), Slidell & Co. with the same demonstrations Haynau¹⁸⁹ received on his visit at Barclay's brewery. *The Times* stands aghast at the mere idea of such a shocking incident, and how does it try to parry it? It admonishes the people of England not to overwhelm Mason, Slidell & Co. with any sort of public ovation! *The Times* knows that its to-day's article will form the laughing-stock of all the tap-rooms of London. But never mind! People on the other side of the Atlantic may, perhaps, fancy that the magnanimity of *The Times* has saved them from the affront of public ovations to Mason, Slidell & Co., while, in point of fact, *The Times* only intends saving those gentlemen from public insult!

So long as the *Trent* affair was undecided, *The Times*, *The Post*, *The Herald*, *The Economist*, *The Saturday Review*, in fact the whole of the fashionable, hireling press of London, had tried its utmost to persuade John Bull that the Washington Government, even if it willed, would prove unable to keep the peace, because the Yankee mob would not allow it, and because the Federal Government was a mob Government. Facts have now given them the lie direct. Do they now atone for their malignant slanders against the American people? Do they at least confess the errors which yellow-plush, in presuming to judge of the acts of a free people, could not but commit? By no means. They now unanimously discover that the American Government, in not anticipating England's demands, and not surrendering the Southern traitors as soon as they were caught, missed a great occasion, and deprived its present concession of all merit. Indeed, yellow plush! Mr. Seward disavowed the act of Wilkes before the arrival of the English demands, and at once declared himself willing to enter upon a conciliatory course; and what did you do on similar occasions? When, on the pretext of impressing English sailors on board American ships—a pretext not at all connected with maritime belligerent rights, but a downright, monstrous usurpation against all international law—the *Leopard* fired its broadside at the *Chesapeake*, killed

six, wounded twenty-one of her sailors, and seized the pretended Englishmen on board the *Chesapeake*, what did the English Government do? That outrage was perpetrated on the 20th of June, 1807. The real satisfaction, the surrender of the sailors, &c., was only offered on November 8, 1812, five years later. The British Government, it is true, disavowed at once the act of Admiral Berkeley, as Mr. Seward did in regard to Capt. Wilkes; but, to punish the Admiral, it removed him from an inferior to a superior rank. England, in proclaiming her Orders in Council, distinctly confessed that they were outrages on the rights of neutrals in general, and of the United States in particular; that they were forced upon her as measures of retaliation against Napoleon, and that she would feel but too glad to revoke them whenever Napoleon should revoke his encroachments on neutral rights. Napoleon did revoke them, as far as the United States were concerned, in the Spring of 1810. England persisted in her avowed outrage on the maritime rights of America. Her resistance lasted from 1806 to 23d of June, 1812—after, on the 18th of June, 1812, the United States had declared war against England. England abstained, consequently, in this case for six years, not from atoning for a confessed outrage, but from discontinuing it. And this people talk of the magnificent occasion missed by the American Government! Whether in the wrong or in the right, it was a cowardly act on the part of the British Government to back a complaint grounded on pretended technical blunder, and a mere error of procedure, by an ultimatum, by a demand for the surrender of the prisoners. The American Government might have reasons to accede to that demand; it could have none to anticipate it.

By the present settlement of the *Trent* collision, the question underlying the whole dispute, and likely to again occur—the belligerent rights of a maritime power against neutrals—has not been settled. I shall, with your permission, try to survey the whole question in a subsequent letter. For the present, allow me to add that, in my opinion, Messrs. Mason and Slidell have done great service to the Federal Government. There was an influential war party in England, which, what for commercial, what for political reasons, showed eager for a fray with the

United States. The *Trent* affair put that party to the test. It has failed. The war passion has been discounted on a minor issue, the steam has been let off, the vociferous fury of the oligarchy has raised the suspicions of English democracy, the large British interests connected with the United States have made a stand, the true character of the civil war has been brought home to the working classes, and last, not least, the dangerous period when Palmerston rules single-headed without being checked by Parliament, is rapidly drawing to an end. That was the only time in which an English war for the slaveocrats might have been hazarded. It is now out of question.

Notes

1. *law . . . extremes*: The reference is to Hegel. Most of Marx's readers are unlikely to have grasped the allusion, as Hegel had yet to be translated into English.
2. *Chinese revolution*: The Taiping Rebellion (1851-3).
3. *reduction . . . tea-duties*: Gladstone's 1853 budget cut tea duties by more than 50 per cent over three years.
4. *mangel-wurzel*: Also known as mangold, a type of beet.
5. *Admiral Seymour*: Sir Michael Seymour (1802-1887) was commander-in-chief of the East Indies station of the British Royal Navy at the outbreak of the second Opium War.
6. *lorcha*: A light vessel used on the coasts of China.
7. *present ruling race in China*: The Manchu dynasty.
8. *late war*: The Crimean War (1853-6).
9. *English Consul*: Harry S. Parkes (1828-1885), a British diplomat who worked primarily in China and Japan. He was acting consul in Canton at the outbreak of the second Opium War.
10. *wrung from China . . . Plenipotentiaries*: The Treaty of Tientsin, signed on June 1, 1858.
11. *Taoutai*: High official.
12. *Mr. Wilson*: James Wilson (1805-1860), founder and editor of *The Economist*.
13. *Canning's recognition*: George Canning (1770-1827), British foreign secretary and, briefly, prime minister.
14. *Chinese revolution*: See note 2.
15. *late piratical war*: The first Opium War (1839-43).
16. *Sycee silver*: Silver currency in ingot form.
17. *taels*: A unit of silver used as Chinese currency.
18. *Gen. Straubenzee*: Sir Charles Thomas van Straubenzee (1812-1892), a British army official who led a force to take Canton during the second Opium War.

19. *the Sultan*: The head of the Ottoman Empire, in this case Abdulmecid (1823-1861).
20. *Greek war of independence*: War lasting from 1821 to 1832.
21. *Servia and Wallachia*: Principalities in south-central Europe, today parts of Macedonia and Romania.
22. *the Porte*: A shorthand reference to the seat of the Ottoman Empire.
23. *Ionian Isles*: Islands in the Aegean Sea off the west coast of Greece.
24. *Giaour*: A Turkish word denoting a non-Muslim. In 1813, Lord Byron published a poem entitled "The Giaour".
25. *Mr. Fallmerayer . . . Orientalische Briefe*: Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861), an Austrian traveler and writer. The work referred to is *Fragmentem aus dem Orient* (1845).
26. *War has . . . declared*: The Crimean War.
27. *Mr. Layard*: Austen Henry Layard (1817-1894), a British archeologist who held various government positions related to foreign policy during this period.
28. *Mr. Urquhart*: David Urquhart (1805-1877), a Scottish writer and Parliamentarian who became a fierce critic of Palmerston and a sometime collaborator with Marx.
29. *Ulemas*: Muslim scholars.
30. *fetva*: An official legal pronouncement in Islam, also called a *fatwa*.
31. *the Berber States*: A reference to the pirates and privateers who operated in the western Mediterranean from the time of the Crusades through the nineteenth century.
32. *kadis*: Judges who rule according to *Sharia* law.
33. *firmans*: Royal mandates issued by the Ottoman Empire.
34. *Hegira*: The first year of the Muslim calendar, corresponding to the migration of Muhammed and his followers to Medina in AD 622.
35. *synallagmatic contract*: Bilateral, reciprocal, contract.
36. *Pashas*: High-ranking officials in the Ottoman Empire.
37. *systeme de bascule*: System of weights.
38. *Union Club*: An organization of liberal Spanish figures that advocated freedom of assembly and the press and the abolition of the death penalty.
39. *Espartero*: Baldomero Espartero (1793-1879) was a general who, after the defeat of the Carlists (see note 42) in 1839, became an important figure in the governance of Spain.

40. *Cortes*: The national legislature of Spain. The ability of the legislature to act independently of the monarchy was a critical issue in nineteenth-century Spanish politics.
41. *the French invasions*: France controlled much of Spain during the Napoleonic Wars.
42. *Carlists*: The Carlists were conservative Catholic followers of Carlos, a pretender to the throne of Spain, after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833. Several armed conflicts took place across Spain between Carlists and supporters of Ferdinand's daughter Isabella.
43. *Viriathus*: A leader (180–139 BC) of the Lusitanian tribe who resisted Roman control of what is now Portugal and western Spain.
44. *bienes nacionales*: State lands.
45. *summum bonum*: Supreme good.
46. *Crédit Mobilier*: A state-affiliated bank established by allies of Louis Napoleon that issued bonds for infrastructure. See Marx's three-part article on pp. 171–88.
47. *the war*: The Crimean War.
48. *Chambre introuvable*: After the restoration of the Bourbons in France, Louis XVIII surrounded himself with a group of ultra-loyalists whom he called the "*chambre introuvable*"—i.e. a government body the likes of which could not be found.
49. *Herrenhaus*: The upper house of the Prussian parliament.
50. *O'Donnell's coup*: Leopoldo O'Donnell (1809–1867) was a Spanish general and statesman. He forced the Espartero government from power by marching on Madrid in July 1856.
51. *the Queen*: Isabella II.
52. *pronunciamientos*: Mutinies.
53. *Isabella . . . Christina*: Maria Christina and Isabella were the acting regents.
54. *Narvaez*: Don Ramón María Narváez y Campos (1800–1868), the acting president under Isabella in 1856.
55. *her Majesty*: Isabella II.
56. *cholera morbus*: Cholera epidemic.
57. *the Archduke*: Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph.
58. *fuori i Tedeschi*: Out with the Germans.
59. *Count Cavour*: Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810–1861), a significant figure in the unification of Italy and its first prime minister when it became an independent kingdom.
60. *M. Hübner*: Count Joseph Alexander Hübner (1811–1892) was Austria's ambassador to Rome at this time.

61. *the Ticino*: The Ticino was the border between Piedmont and Lombardy, which at the time was occupied by Austrian troops.
62. *Garibaldi*: Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) was the principal military figure in establishing the independence of Italy.
63. *the Czar*: Alexander II.
64. *giogo tedesco*: German yoke.
65. "*avenger of Waterloo*": Napoleon III.
66. *the murderer of Rome*: After Louis Bonaparte took over the French Republic, the French military destroyed the Roman Republic and restored the political power of the Pope in 1849.
67. *Italian National party*: The Italian National Committee, established by Giuseppe Mazzini in London in October 1850, advocated the unification and independence of Italy.
68. *A chi tocca-tocca?*: Who is to begin?
69. *Marino Faliero of Venice*: Faliero, the fifty-fifth doge of Venice, attempted a coup in 1355 to make himself prince. He failed and was executed. Lord Byron wrote a drama about this in 1820.
70. *The young Emperor of Russia*: Alexander II.
71. *Zouaves*: A French infantry regiment first organized in Algeria in 1831; their exploits in the Crimean War were widely praised.
72. *the States of the Church*: The Papal States, a section of central Italy in which the Pope exercised civil authority until Italian independence.
73. *men of the Manchester School*: Free-trade advocates.
74. *laudatores temporis acti*: Those who laud the past.
75. *Corn Laws*: Import tariffs in force between 1815 and 1846, designed to protect British farmers from cheap grain imports. They became the focus of the free-trade debate and the major dividing line between Britain's political parties from the 1830s on.
76. *Mr. Cooke*: George Wingrove Cooke, *The History of Party: From the Rise of the Whig and Tory Factions in the Reign of Charles II, to the Passing of the Reform Bill* (London: J. Macrone, 1836).
77. *the "glorious revolution"*: The overthrow of James II, a Catholic.
78. *the Reform Bill of 1831*: The bill became the Reform Act of 1832, which extended voting rights in Britain and reapportioned seats in Parliament.
79. *the Thirty-Nine Articles*: The articles of faith for clergy in the Church of England, which were promulgated in 1571.
80. *the Stockport Riots*: Outbreaks of anti-Irish and -Catholic violence in Stockport, England, in 1852.
81. *astonishing to contemplate*: In *Capital*, Marx linked the prevalence of starvation in Britain with the rejection of its provisions

- for the poor: "The terrible increase in deaths by starvation in London during the last decade bears witness to the increasing repugnance of working folk for the slavery of the workhouse, the penitentiary for those who are unfortunate enough to be poor" (vol. I, pt 3, "Capitalist Accumulation").
82. *Steuart*: James Steuart, *An Inquiry Into the Principles of Political Economy* (London: A. Millar, 1767).
 83. *Loch*: James Loch, *An Account of the Improvements of the Estates of the Marquess of Stafford* (1820).
 84. *Mehemet Ali*: An Ottoman statesman and diplomat (1815-1872).
 85. *Sismondi*: Jean-Charles-Leonard de Sismondi, *Etudes sur l'économie politique* (1837).
 86. *Thomas Morus*: A reference to Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516).
 87. *Dalrymple*: Sir John Dalrymple, *An Essay Towards a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain* (London: A. Millar, 1757).
 88. *the Coalition Ministry*: The ministry of George Hamilton-Gordon, the fourth Earl of Aberdeen, was principally a coalition of Whigs and Peelites but also had the support of the short-lived Independent Irish Party, founded by forty Irish Members of Parliament.
 89. *the sleeping Epimenides*: Epimenides was a sixth-century BC Greek seer who supposedly fell asleep for fifty-seven years and awoke with the ability to predict the future.
 90. *Mr. Newman*: Francis William Newman, *Lectures on Political Economy* (London: John Chapman, 1851).
 91. *his Foreign Minister*: Palmerston.
 92. *nemine contradicente*: Without opposition.
 93. *Osman rule*: Under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire.
 94. *Cabinet of "all the Talents"*: Marx frequently used this term ironically to describe the Whig-Peelite coalition government that ruled Britain, under Lord Aberdeen, from 1852 until early 1855. His use is confusing, as the "Ministry of All the Talents" is more commonly used to refer to the multi-faction government that ruled from 1806 to 1807.
 95. *Mr. Roebuck's . . . motion*: John Arthur Roebuck (1802-1879), a Liberal Member of Parliament whose mission to investigate misconduct in the Crimean War brought down the Aberdeen government.
 96. *General Dumouriez*: Marx satirizes Herbert's garbling of chronology. In 1793, General Dumouriez was ordered to appear before

- the French Revolutionary Convention to be charged with treason; he refused, then arrested his accusers and turned them over to the Austrians. The Directory was not established until 1795.
97. *dii minorum gentium*: Second-rate gods.
 98. *the Pacifico question*: This alludes to Palmerston's assertion of the rights of British citizens in a conflict that arose in 1850 after the Athens house of a Portuguese merchant (who was a British citizen) was set on fire.
 99. *Chevalier Wykoff*: Henry Wikoff—both spellings were common—(1813–1884), an author and diplomat who traveled widely through Europe and the United States during this period, at times employed by Palmerston.
 100. *Mr. Delane*: John Thadeus Delane (1817–1879) was the editor of *The Times* and a close associate of Lord Aberdeen.
 101. *kidnapping of . . . York*: These were cases of abuse of the mental-health system notorious at the time. Rosina Bulwer-Lytton (1802–1882) had been married to the novelist and politician Edward Bulwer-Lytton, but, following their divorce, she campaigned against him and was committed in June 1858. Similarly, Mrs. Turner was found to have been wrongly committed and mistreated.
 102. *the new Poor Law*: The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, which did little to address the numerous flaws in Britain's treatment of the poor, particularly its reliance on workhouses.
 103. *Irish Famine*: Between 1845 and 1850, more than half a million Irish died of hunger, a famine which Marx and others attributed in part to abusive English economic policy.
 104. *the "nuggets" of Australia*: Australia experienced a gold rush in the 1850s, attracting many would-be prospectors from Britain.
 105. *the war*: The Crimean War.
 106. *will perhaps remember*: See "Revolution in China and Europe," pp. 3–10.
 107. *Mr. Ricardo*: David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817).
 108. *Napoleon the Little*: Napoleon III.
 109. *Society of the Dix Décembre*: A secret Bonapartist society; Marx refers to it in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.
 110. *the Fronde*: A civil war in France (1648–53).
 111. *juste milieu*: Golden mean.
 112. *Sociétés en commandite*: The difference between these and *Sociétés anonymes* is roughly analogous, in Anglo-American cor-

- porate law, to that between a corporation and a limited partnership.
113. *the English Sadleirs, Spaders and Palmers*: References to contemporary banking scandals in Britain.
114. *Corps Législatif*: One of the bodies of the French legislature.
115. *the Minister of the Interior*: Jean-Gilbert-Victor Fialin, duc de Persigny (1808–1872), French statesman.
116. *Fourier*: Charles Fourier, *Théorie des quatre mouvements et des destinées générales* (1808). It seems possible that Marx meant “immortal,” but “immoral” is what was published.
117. *rentes*: State securities.
118. *Mr. Leonard Horner*: Horner’s reports were among Marx’s favorite sources; Horner is cited no fewer than thirteen times in *Capital*, where Marx describes him as having “rendered invaluable services to the English working class”.
119. *to this country*: The United States.
120. *Peel’s Bank act of 1844*: This was the Bank Charter (or Bank of England) Act of 1844, which, among other provisions, gave the Bank sole responsibility for issuing paper currency. Due to numerous abuses, it had to be suspended by the Cabinet in 1857. Marx also discusses Parliament’s investigations into the Act in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859).
121. *Lombard street*: Historically, the street in the City of London where private lenders kept offices.
122. *Threadneedle street*: The site of the Bank of England.
123. *Charles Wood*: The first Viscount of Halifax (1800–1885). He was at the time of the article the president of the Board of Control and thus responsible for overseeing the British East India Company.
124. *Aurangzeb*: 1618–1707; ruler of the Mughal Empire 1658–1707. Also known as Alamgir I.
125. *old official report*: The House report in question was issued in 1812. According to Henry M. Christman, Marx was quoting here from a German version of it.
126. *Sollte . . . aufgezehrt?*: “Should this torture then torment us / Since it brings us greater pleasure? / Were not through the rule of Timur / Souls devoured without measure?” From Goethe’s “An Suleika,” *Westöstlicher Diwan*.
127. *Mahrattas*: Hindu state of India which existed from 1674 to 1818.
128. *Mr. Campbell*: George Campbell, *Modern India: A Sketch of the System of Civil Government* (London: John Murray, 1852).

129. *Soltykov*: The reference is to Alexei Dimitrivich Saltykov's *Lettres sur l'Inde* (Paris, 1848). The phrase translates as "more subtle and adroit than the Italians".
130. *Jat*: The Jatts are descendants of Indo-Aryan tribes who inhabit northern India and modern-day Pakistan.
131. *Divide et impera*: Divide and conquer.
132. *late incorporation of Oude*: The annexation of Oude had taken place in 1856.
133. *Persian and Chinese wars*: The Anglo-Persian War took place in 1856-7, the second Opium War in 1856-60.
134. *émeute*: A seditious tumult.
135. *the late Mogul*: Bahadur Shah II (1775-1862), the last Mughal emperor of India, who had come to power in 1838.
136. "*The Dead House*": The House of Commons.
137. *Mr. Disraeli*: Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), a significant figure in the founding of the Conservative Party, would go on, as Marx implies here, to serve as prime minister in the 1860s and '70s.
138. "*Tous les . . . ennuyeux*": All genres are good except the boring ones.
139. *ipsissima verba*: Very words.
140. *British Governor General*: James Ramsey, the first Marquess of Dalhousie (1812-1860); Dalhousie was governor general of India from 1848 to 1856.
141. *Vendeans*: Citizens of the French region of Vendée, and Catholic opponents of the French Revolution who mounted a violent insurrection between 1793 and 1796.
142. *Cavaignac's Garde Mobile*: French general Eugene Cavaignac led a citizens' militia against the Parisian workers' uprising of 1848.
143. *The first Chinese war*: The first Opium War (1839-42).
144. *the Directors*: Court of directors of the East India Company.
145. *jamabundy*: A settlement of the tax assessment for a region.
146. *puttahs*: Leases granted to farmers by government officials.
147. *kittee*: A vise-like instrument of torture somewhat like the thumbscrew.
148. *Ranee*: Queen.
149. *Bhadur . . . servants*: Two servants of the government.
150. *terminated in 1834*: Parliament removed the Company's trading monopoly with China in 1833 but kept its administrative functions, renewing its charter for another twenty years.
151. *Conspiracy bill*: In February 1858, Palmerston, in response to an attempt on the life of Napoleon III, tried to pass legislation that

- would make a felony of any assassination attempt plotted on British soil. The bill was defeated and led to Palmerston's resignation.
152. *Civis Romanus*: A reference to Palmerston's speech during the Pacifico Affair; see "Fall of the Aberdeen Ministry", pp. 145-50.
153. *Lord Canning*: Charles John Canning, governor general of India from 1856 to 1862.
154. *in terrorem*: As a threat.
155. *Mrs. Beecher . . . Shaftesbury*: In 1853, the American anti-slavery author Harriet Beecher Stowe toured London and made many friends among the ruling classes. She organized British women to sign and submit anti-slavery petitions in the 1850s and '60s.
156. *the Crittenden . . . measures*: In December 1860, Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden, in one of many Congressional attempts to avert secession, introduced a measure that would have allowed for the continuance of slavery in Southern states. Although popular among many Southern officials, it was rejected by both houses of Congress in 1861.
157. *pia desideria*: Pious desire.
158. *the Missouri Compromise*: Passed in 1820, this bill prohibited slavery in any new state north of the border between Missouri and the Arkansas territory.
159. *the Kansas-Nebraska bill*: This bill, passed in 1854, allowed new territories within the United States to decide by popular sovereignty whether or not they would permit slavery within their borders.
160. *Dred Scott decision*: This 1857 Supreme Court decision gave slave owners rights even in territories where slavery had not been established, and effectively dictated that even freed slaves could never become citizens of the United States.
161. *The Kansas war*: Beginning in 1854, there were violent skirmishes between abolitionists and pro-slavery forces in Kansas. This conflict was of particular interest to the *Tribune*, which coined the term "Bleeding Kansas" to describe the battles.
162. *Mr. Frémont*: John Charles Frémont (1813-1890), a military officer who in 1856 was the first presidential candidate of the Republican Party.
163. *de bonne grace*: Of its own accord.
164. *Mr. Buchanan's career*: James Buchanan (1791-1868) was the fifteenth president of the United States; during his presidency the country steadily slipped into civil war.

165. *servum pecus*: Servile herd.
166. *Harper's Ferry expedition*: The abolitionist John Brown led a raid on a Federal armory in Harper's Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, with the intention of freeing slaves; he was captured and hanged.
167. *South Carolina Nullifiers*: In 1832, the leaders of South Carolina declared a Federal tariff to be null and void within their territory. President Andrew Jackson sent a naval flotilla to enforce the law.
168. *the blockade*: In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln declared a blockade of all Southern ports.
169. *Irish catastrophe*: See note 103.
170. *tutti quanti*: All such.
171. *General Beauregard*: Pierre Gustave Toutant de Beauregard (1818-1893) was a general in the Confederate Army.
172. *Secession Congress*: Initially, the Confederate capital was established in Montgomery, Alabama; it later moved to Richmond, Virginia.
173. *Stephens*: Alexander Hamilton Stephens (1812-1883) was the vice president of the Confederate states.
174. *va banque!*: Betting it all.
175. *King . . . Compiègne*: William I visited the French town of Compiègne in 1861.
176. *Macdonald affair*: A diplomatic incident arising from the arrest and imprisonment of a Scottish citizen in Bonn.
177. "*quorum magna pars fui*": Much of the credit for this is mine.
178. *affair of the . . . pamphlet*: Henri-Eugène-Philippe-Louis d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale (1822-1897), published a *Letter upon the History of France* in 1861 condemning Emperor Napoleon's attacks on the House of Orléans.
179. *Springfield and Manassas*: Early battles in the American Civil War.
180. *Consols*: British government bonds.
181. *the American Minister*: Charles Francis Adams (1807-1886) was the American ambassador to England.
182. *President Madison*: James Madison (1751-1836), fourth president of the United States.
183. *peace of Ghent*: The Treaty of Ghent, signed in 1814, ended the War of 1812 between the United States and Britain.
184. *Secretary Webster*: Daniel Webster (1782-1852) was the American secretary of state from 1841 to 1842.
185. *the Russian complication*: The Crimean War.
186. *anti-Jacobin war*: Britain's attacks on France following the French Revolution.

187. *the Nashville affair*: A diplomatic flap that occurred when a Confederate cruiser being repaired in England was blockaded by a Federal warship.
188. *Mr. Seward*: William H. Seward (1801-1872) was Lincoln's secretary of state.
189. *Haynau*: Julius Jacob von Haynau (1786-1853), a conservative Austrian general who was attacked while visiting a London brewery in 1850.

