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VLADIMIR KOROLENKO *
By ROSA LUXEMBURG

"My soul, of a three-fold nationality, has at last found a home —
and this above all in the literature of Russia," Korolenko says in his memoirs. This literature, which to Korolenko was fatherland, home and nationality, and which he himself adorns, was historically unique.

For centuries, throughout the Middle Ages and down to the last third of the 18th century, Russia was enveloped in a crypt-like silence, in darkness and barbarism. She had no cultivated literary language, no scientific literature, no publishing houses, no libraries, no journals, no centers of cultural life. The gulf stream of the Renaissance which had washed the shores of all other European countries and was responsible for a flowering garden of world literature, the rousing storms of the Reformation, the fiery breath of 18th century philosophy — all this had left Russia untouched. The land of the Czars possessed as yet no means for apprehending the light rays of Western culture, no mental soil in which its seeds could take root. The sparse literary monuments of those times, in their outlandish ugliness, appear today like native products of the Solomon Islands or the New Hebrides. Between them and the art of the Western world, there apparently exists no essential relation, no inner connection.

But then something like a miracle took place. After several faltering attempts towards the end of the 18th century to create a national consciousness, the Napoleonic Wars flashed up like lightning. Russia’s profound hum-

* Introduction to V. Korolenko’s DIE GESCHICHTE MEINES ZEITGENOSSEN. (Translated into German from the Russian by Rosa Luxemburg.) This introduction was written July, 1918, in Breslau Prison.
itution, arousing for the first time in Czardom a national consciousness, just as the triumph of the Coalition did later, resulted in drawing the Russian intellectuals toward the West, toward Paris, into the heart of European culture, and bringing them into contact with a new world. Overnight a Russian literature blossomed forth, springing up complete in glistening armor like Minerva from the head of Jupiter; and this literature, combining Italian melody, English virility and German nobility and profundity, soon overflowed with a treasure of talents, radiant beauty, thought and emotion, culture, and bringing them into contact with a new world. Overnight a Russian literature blossomed forth, springing up complete in glistening armor like Minerva from the head of Jupiter; and this literature, combining Italian melody, English virility and German nobility and profundity, soon overflowed with a treasure of talents, radiant beauty, thought and emotion. The chief characteristic of this sudden emergence of Russian literature is that it was born out of opposition to the Russian regime, out of the spirit of struggle. This feature was obvious throughout the entire 19th century. It explains the richness and depth of its spiritual quality, the fullness and originality of its artistic form, above all, its creative and driving social force. Russian literature became, under Czarism, a power in public life as in no other country and in no other time. It remained at its post for a century until it was relieved by the material power of the masses, when the word became flesh.

It was this literature which won for that half-asiatic despotistic state a place in world culture. It broke through the Chinese Wall erected by absolutism, and built a bridge to the West. Not only does it appear as a literature that borrows, but also as one that creates, not only is it a pupil, but also a teacher. One has only to mention three names to illustrate this: Tolstoy, Gogol and Dostoevsky.

In his memoirs, Korolenko characterizes his father, a government official at the time of serfdom in Russia, as a typical representative of the honest people in that generation. Korolenko's father felt responsible only for his own activities. The gnawing feeling of responsibility for social injustice was strange to him. "God, Czar, and the Law" were beyond all criticism. As a district judge he felt called upon only to apply the law with the utmost scrupulosity. "That the law itself may be inefficient is the responsibility of the Czar before God. He, the judge, is as little responsible for the law as for the lightning of the high heavens, which sometimes strikes an innocent child . . ." To the generation of the 1840's and '50's social conditions as a whole were fundamental and unshakable. Under the scourge of officialdom, those who served loyally, without opposition, knew they could only bend as under the onslaught of a tornado, hoping and waiting that

the evil might pass. "Yes," said Korolenko, "that was a view of the world out of a single mold, a kind of imperturbable equilibrium of conscience. Their inner foundation were not undermined by self-analysis, the honest people of that time did not know that deep inner conflict which comes with the feeling of being personally responsible for the whole social order." It is this kind of view which is supposed to be the true basis of Czar and God, and as long as this view remains undisturbed, the power of absolutism is great indeed.

It would be wrong, however, to consider the state of mind which Korolenko characterizes as specifically Russian or as pertaining only to the period of serfdom. That attitude toward society, which enables one to be free of gnawing self-analysis and inner discord and considers "God-willed conditions" as something elemental, accepting the acts of history as a sort of divine fate is compatible with the most varied political and social systems. In fact it is found even under modern conditions, and was especially characteristic of German society throughout the first world war.

In Russia, this "imperturbable equilibrium of conscience" had already begun to crumble in the 1860's among wide circles of the intelligentsia. Korolenko describes in an intuitive manner this spiritual change in Russian society, and shows just how this generation overcame the slave psychology and was seized by the trend of a new time, the predominant characteristic of which was the "gnawing and painful, but creative spirit of social responsibility."

To have aroused this high sense of citizenship, and to have undermined the deepest psychological roots of absolutism in Russian society, is the great merit of Russian literature. From its first days, at the beginning of the 19th century, it never denied its social responsibility - never forgot to be socially critical. Ever since its unfolding with Pushkin and Lermontov, its life principle was a struggle against darkness, ignorance, and oppression. With desperate strength it shook the social and political chains, bruised itself sore against them and paid for the struggle in blood.

In no other country did there exist such a conspicuously early mortality among prominent representatives of literature as in Russia. They died by the dozens in the bloom of their manhood, at the youthful age of twenty-five or twenty-seven, or at the oldest around forty, either on the gallows, or as suicides - directly or disguised as duel,— some through insanity, others by premature exhaustion. So died the noble poet of liberty, Ryleyev, who in the year 1826 was executed as the leader of the Decembrist uprising. Thus, too, Pushkin and Lermontov, those genial creators of Russian poetry — both victims of duels — and their whole prolific circle. So died Belinsky, the founder of literary criticism and proponent of Hegelian philosophy in Russia, as well as Dobrolyubov; and so the excellent and tender poet Kozlov, whose songs grew into Russian folk-poetry like wild garden flowers; and the creator of Russian comedy, Griboyedov, as well as his greater successor,
Gogol; and in recent times, those sparking short-story writers, Garshin and Chekhov. Others pined away for decades in penitentiaries, jails, or in exile, like the founder of Russian journalism, Novikov; like the leader of the Decembrists, Bestuzhev; like Prince Odoevsky, Alexander von Herzen, Dostoyevsky, Chernyshhevsky, Shevchenko, and Korolenko.

Turgenev relates, incidentally, that the first time he fully enjoyed the song of the lark he was somewhere near Berlin. This casual remark seems very characteristic. Larks warble in Russia no less beautifully than in Germany. The huge Russian empire contains such great and manifold beauties of nature that an impressionable poetic soul finds deep enjoyment at every step. What hindered Turgenev from enjoying the beauty of nature in his own country was just that painful disharmony of social relations, that ever-present awareness of responsibility for those outrageous social and political conditions from which he could not rid himself, and which, piercing deeply, did not permit for a moment any indulgence in complete self-oblivion. Only away from Russia, when the thousands of depressing pictures of his homeland were left behind, only in a foreign environment, the orderly exterior and material culture of which had always naively impressed his countrymen, could a Russian poet give himself up to the enjoyment of nature untroubled and wholeheartedly.

Nothing, of course, could be more erroneous than to picture Russian literature as a tendencious art in a crude sense, nor to think of all Russian poets as revolutionists, or at least as progressives. Patterns such as "revolutionary" or "progressive" in themselves mean very little in art.

Dostoyevsky, especially in his later writings, is an outspoken reactionary, a religious mystic and hater of socialists. His depictions of Russian revolutionaries are malicious caricatures. Tolstoy's mystic doctrines reflect reactionary tendencies, if not more. But the writings of both have, nevertheless, an inspiring, arousing and liberating effect upon us. And this is because their starting points are not reactionary, their thoughts and emotions are not governed by the desire to hold on to the status quo, nor are they motivated by social hatred, narrow mindedness or caste-egotism. On the contrary, theirs is the warmest love for mankind and the deepest response to social injustice. And thus the reactionary Dostoyevsky becomes the artistic agent of the "Insulted and Injured," as one of his works is called. Only the conclusions drawn by him and Tolstoy, each in his own way, only the way out of the social labyrinth which they believed they have found leads them into the by-paths of mysticism and asceticism. But with the true artist, the social formula that he recommends is a matter of secondary importance; the source of his art, its animating spirit, is decisive.

Within Russian literature one also finds a tendency which, though on a considerably smaller scale, and unlike the deep and world-embracing ideas of a Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky, propagates more modest ideals, that is, material culture, modern progress and bourgeois proficiency. Of the older genera-

...
For a lasting effect, for the real education of society, more than talent is needed. What is required is poetic personality, character, individuality, attributes which are anchored deeply in a great and well-rounded view of the world. It is just this view of the world, just this sensitive, social consciousness which sharpened so greatly the insight of Russian literature into the social conditions of people and into the psychology of the various characters and types. It is this almost aching sympathy that inspires its descriptions with colors of glowing splendor; it is the restless search, the brooding over the problems of society which enables it to observe artistically the enormity and inner complexity of the social structure and to lay it down in great works of art.

Murder and crimes are committed everywhere and every day. “Barber X murdered and robbed wealthy Mrs. Y. Criminal Court Z. condemned him to die.” Everyone has read such announcements of three lines in the morning paper, has gone over them with an indifferent glance in order to look for the latest news from the race tracks or the new theater schedule. Who else is interested in murders besides the police, the public prosecutor and the statisticians? Mostly writers of detective stories and movies.

The fact that one human being can murder another, that this can happen near us every day, in the midst of our “civilization”, next door to our Home, Sweet Home, moves Dostoyevsky to the very bottom of his soul. As with Hamlet, who through his mother’s crime finds all the bonds of humanity united and the world out of joint, so it is for Dostoyevsky when he faces the fact that one human being can murder another. He finds no rest, he feels the responsibility for this dreadfulness weighing upon him as it does on everyone of us. He must elucidate the soul of the murderer, must trace his misery, his afflictions down to the most hidden folds of his heart. He suffers all his tortures and is blinded by the terrible understanding that the murderer himself is the most unhappy victim of society. With a mighty voice, Dostoyevsky sounds an alarm. He awakens us from the stupid indifference of civilized egotism that delivers the murderer to the police inspector, the public prosecutor and his henchmen, or to the penitentiary with the hope that thereby we shall all be rid of him. Dostoyevsky forces us to go through all the tortures the murderer goes through and in the end leaves us all crushed. Whoever has experienced his Raskolnikov, or the cross-examination of Dimitri Karamasov the night after the murder of his father, or the “Memoirs from a Deathhouse,” will never again find his way back to the supporting shell of philistine and self-satisfying egotism. Dostoyevsky’s novels are furious attacks on bourgeois society in whose face he shouts: the real murderer, the murderer of the human soul, is you!

No one has taken such merciless revenge on society for the crimes committed on the individual, nobody has put society on the rack so cunningly as Dostoyevsky. This is his specific talent. But the other leading spirits of Russian literature also perceive the act of murder as an accusation against existing conditions, as a crime done to the murderer as a human being, for which we are all responsible — each one of us. That is why the greatest talents again and again return to the subject of crime as if fascinated by it, putting it before our eyes in the highest works of art in order to arouse us from our thoughtless indifference. Tolstoy did it in the “Power of Darkness” and in “Resurrection,” Gorki in “The Lower Depths” and in “Three of Them,” Korolenko in his story “The Rustling of the Woods” and in his wonderful Siberian “Murderer.”

Prostitution is as little specifically Russian as tuberculosis; it is rather the most international institution of social life. But, although it plays an almost controlling part in our modern life, officially, in the sense of the conventional lie, it is not approved of as a normal constituent of present day society. Rather it is treated as the scum of humanity, as something allegedly beyond the pale. Russian literature deals with the prostitute not in the pungent style of the boudoir novel, nor the whining sentimentality, of tendencious literature, nor as the mysterious, rapacious vampire as in Wedekind’s “Erdegeist.” No literature in the world contains descriptions of fiercer realism than the magnificent scene of the orgy in the “Brothers Karamasov” or in Tolstoy’s “Resurrection.” In spite of this, the Russian artist, however, does not look at the prostitute as a “lost soul,” but as a human being whose suffering and inner struggles need all his sympathy. He dignifies the prostitute and rehabilitates her for the crime that society has committed on her by letting her compete with the purest and loveliest types of womanhood for the heart of the man. He crowns her head with roses and elevates her as does Mahádó his Bejáderé from the purgatory of corruption and her own agony to the heights of moral purity and womanly heroism.

Not only the exceptional person and situation that stands out grossly from the gray background of every day life, but life itself, the average man and his misery awakens a deep concern in the Russian writer whose senses are strongly aware of social injustice. “Man happiness,” says Korolenko in one of his stories, “honest human happiness is salubrious and elevating to the soul. And I always believe, you know, that man is rather obliged to be happy.” In another story, called “Paradox”, a cripple, born without arms, says, “Man is created for happiness, as a bird for flight.” From the mouth of the miserable cripple such a maxim is an obvious “paradox.” But for thousands and millions of people it is not accidental physical defects which make their “vocation of happiness” seem so paradoxical but the social conditions under which they must exist.

That remark of Korolenko actually contains an important element of social hygiene: happiness makes people spiritually healthy and pure, as sunlight over the open sea effectively disinfects the water. Furthermore, under abnormal social conditions, and all conditions based on social inequality are fundamentally abnormal — most heterogeneous deformations of the soul are apt to be a mass phenomenon. Permanent oppression, insecurity, injust-
tice, poverty and dependence, as well as that division of labor which leads to one-sided specialization mold people in a certain manner. And this goes for both the oppressor and the oppressed, the tyrant and the slave, the boaster and the parasite, the ruthless opportunist and the indolent idler, the pedant and the jester — all alike are products and victims of their circumstances.

It is just the peculiar psychological abnormality, the warped development of the human soul under the influence of everyday social conditions, which aroused writers like Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Goncharov, Saltykov, Uspenski, Chekhov and others to descriptions of Balzacian fervor. The tragedy of the triviality of the average man as described by Tolstoy in his “Death of Ivan Ilyich” is unsurpassed in world literature.

There are, for example, those rogues who, without a vocation and unfit to make a normal living, are torn between a parasitic existence and occasional conflicts with the law, forming the scum of bourgeois society for whom the Western world puts up signs “No beggars, peddlers or musicians allowed”. For this category — the type of Korolenko’s ex-official Popkov — Russian literature always had a lively and artistic interest and good-natured smile of understanding. With the warm heart of a Dickens, but without his bourgeois sentimentality, Turgenev, Uspenski, Korolenko and Gorki look upon these “stranded” folk, the criminal as well as the prostitute, with a broad-minded realism, as equals in human society, and achieve, just because of this genial approach, works of a high artistic effect.

Russian literature treats the world of the child with exceptional tenderness and affection, as is shown in Tolstoy’s “War and Peace” and “Anna Karenina,” in Dostoevsky’s “Karamasov,” Goncharov’s “Oblimov,” Korolenko’s “In Bad Company” and “At Night”, and in Gorki’s “Three of Them”. Zola, in his novel “Page d’Amour” from the cycle “Les Rougon-Macquart”, describes the sufferings of a neglected child. But here the sickly and hypersensitive child, morosely affected by the love affair of an egotistical mother, is only a “means of evidence” in an experimental novel, a subject to illustrate the theory of inheritance.

To the Russian, however, the child and its soul is an independent entity, the object of artistic interest to the same extent as the adult, only more natural, less spoiled and certainly more helplessly exposed to the evils of society. “Whoosh shall offend one of these little ones ... it were better for him that a milestone were hanged about his neck,” and so on. Present society offends millions of those little ones by robbing them of what is most precious and irretrievable, one may call its own, a happy, sorrowless, harmonious childhood.

As a victim of social conditions, a child’s world with its misery and happiness is especially near to the Russian artist’s heart. He does not stoop to the child in the false and playful manner which most adults believe necessary, but treats it with honest and sincere comradeship, yes, even with an inner shyness and respect for the untouched little being.

The manner in which literary satire is expressed is an important indicator of the cultural level of a nation. Here England and Germany represent the two opposing poles in European literature. In tracing the history of satire from Von Hutten to Heinrich Heine, one may also include Grimmelshausen. But in the course of the last three centuries, the connecting links in this chain display a frightful picture of decline. Beginning with the ingenious and rather fantastic Fischart, whose exuberant nature distinctly reveals the influence of the Renaissance, to Mosherosh, and from the latter, who at least dares to pull the bigwig’s whiskers, to that small philistine Rabener — what a decline! Rabener, who gets excited about the people who dare to ridicule princelings, the clergy and the “upper-classes” because a well-behaving satirist should learn to be, in the first place, “a loyal subject,” exposes the mortal spot of German satire. In England, however, satire has taken an unparalleled upswing since the beginning of the 18th century, that is, after the great revolution. Not only has British literature produced a string of such masters as Mandeville, Swift, Sterne, Sir Philip Francis, Byron and Dickens, among whom Shakespeare, naturally, deserves first place for his Falstaff, but satire has turned from the privilege of the intellectuals into a universally-owned property. It has become, so to speak, nationalized. It sparkles in political pamphlets, leaflets, parliamentary speeches, and newspaper articles, as well as in poetry. Satire has become the very life and breath for the Englishman, so much so that even the stories of a Croker, written for the adolescent girl of the upper middle classes, contain the same acid descriptions of English aristocracy as those of Wilde, Shaw, or Galsworthy.

This tendency towards satire has been derived from, and can be explained by England’s political freedom of long standing. As Russian literature is similar to the English in this respect, it shows that not the constitution of a country, nor its institutions, but the spirit of its literature and the attitude of the leading social circles of society are the determining factors. Since the beginning of modern literature in Russia, satire has been mastered in all its phases and has achieved excellent results in every one of them. Pushkin’s poem “Eugene Onegin,” Lermontov’s short stories and epigrams, Krylov’s fables, Nekrasov’s poems and Gogol’s comedies are just so many masterpieces each in its own way. Nekrasov’s satiric epic, “Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia?” reveals the delightful vigor and richness of his creations.

In Saltykov (Shchedrin) Russian satire has finally produced its own genius, who for a grimmer scourging of despotism and bureaucracy, invented a very peculiar literary style and a unique and untranslatable language of his own, and by so doing, profoundly influenced intellectual development. Thus with a highly moral pathos Russian literature combined within itself an artistic comprehension which covers the entire scale of human emotions. It created in the midst of that huge prison, the material poverty of Czarism, its own realm of spiritual freedom, and an exuberant culture wherein one may breathe and partake of the intellectual and cultural life. It was
thus able to become a social power, and, by educating generation after ge-
neration, to become a real fatherland for the best of men, such as Korolenko.

II

Korolenko's nature is truly poetic. Around his cradle gathered the
dense fog of superstition. Not the corrupt superstition of modern cosmo-
politan decadence as practiced in spiritualism, fortune-telling and Christian
Science, but the naive superstition found in folk-lore — as pure and spice-
scented as the free winds of the Ukrainian plains, and the millions of wild
iris, yarrows and sage that grow luxuriantly among the tall grass. The
spooky atmosphere in the servants' quarters and the nursery of Korolenko's
father's house reveals distinctly that his cradle stood not far from Gogol's
fairy-land with its elves and witches and its heathen Christmas spook.

Descended at once from Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine, Korolenko
has to bear, even as a child, the brunt of the three "nationalisms", each one
expecting him "to hate or persecute someone or another." He failed these
expectations, however, thanks to his healthy common sense. The Polish
traditions with their dying breath of a historically vanquished past touched
him but vaguely. His straightforwardness was repelled by that mixture
of clownish tomfoolery and reactionary romanticism of Ukrainian national-
ism. The brutal methods used in russifying the Ukraine served as an effective
warning against Russian chauvinism because the tender boy instinctively
felt himself drawn toward the weak and oppressed, not toward the strong
and triumphant. And thus, from the conflict of three nationalities that fought
in his native land of Volhynia, he made his escape into humanitarianism.

Fatherless at the age of seventeen, depending on nobody but himself,
he went to Petersburg where he threw himself into the whirlpool of univer-
sity life and political activity. After studying for three years at a school
of technology, he moved on to the Academy of Agriculture in
Moscow. Two years later his plans were crossed by the "supreme power", as happen-
ed to many others of his generation. Arrested as a spokesman of a student
demonstration, Korolenko was expelled from the Academy and exiled to
the district of Vologda in the far north of European Russia. When released,
he was obliged to reside in Kronstadt under police-parole. Years later he
returned to Petersburg and, planning a new life again, learned the cobbler's
trade in order to be closer to the working people and to develop his per-
sonality in other directions. In 1879 he was arrested again and was sent
even further northeastward, to a hamlet in the district of Vyatka, at the
end of the world.

Korolenko took it gracefully. He tried to make the best of it by prac-
ticing his newly acquired cobbler's trade, which helped him to make a living.
But not for long. Suddenly and apparently without reason, he was sent to
western Siberia, from there back to Perm, and finally to the remotest spot
of far-eastern Siberia.

But even this did not mark the end of his wanderings. After the as-
sassination of Alexander II, in 1881, the new Czar Alexander III ascended
the throne. Korolenko, who in the meantime had advanced to the position
of railway official, took the obligatory oath to the new government together
with the other employees. But this was declared insufficient. He was re-
quested to pledge the oath again as a private individual and political exile.
Like all the other exiles, Korolenko refused to do so and as a result was sent
to the ice-wastes of Yakutsk.

There can be no doubt that the whole procedure was only an "empty
gesture", though Korolenko did not try to be demonstrative. Social condi-
tions are not altered directly or materially regardless of whether or not an
isolated exile, somewhere in the Siberian Taiga near the Polar region,
sweats allegiance to the Czar's government. However, it was the custom
in Czaristic Russia to insist on such empty gestures. And not only in Russia
alone. The stubborn Eppur si mouve of a Galileo reminds us of a similar
empty gesture, having no other effect than the vengeance of the Holy In-
quisition wreaked on a tortured and incarcerated man. And yet, for thous-
ands of people who have only the vaguest idea of Copernicus' theory, the
name Galileo is forever identical with this beautiful gesture, and it is ab-
solutely immaterial that it did not happen at all. The very existence of such
legends with which men adorn their heroes is proof enough that such "empty
gestures" are indispensable in our spiritual realm.

For his refusal to take the oath, Korolenko suffered exile for four years
among half-savage nomads at a miserable settlement on the banks of the
Aldan, a branch of the river Lena, in the heart of the Siberian waste-land,
and under the hardships of sub-zero weather. But privations, loneliness, all
the sinister scenery of the Taiga and isolation from the world of civiliza-
tion did not change the mental elasticity of Korolenko nor his sunny disposi-
tion. He eagerly took part in the interests of the Yakuts and shared their
destitute life. He worked in the field, cut hay and milked cows. In winter,
he made shoes for the natives — and even icons. The exile's life in Yakutsk,
which George Kennan called a period of "being buried alive," was des-
cribed by Korolenko without lament or bitterness, but with humor and in
pictures of the most tender and poetic beauty. This was the time when his
literary talent ripened, and he gathered a rich booty in studying men and

In 1885, after his return from exile which lasted, with short interrup-
tions, almost ten years, he published a short story, "Makar's Dream", which
at once established him among the masters of Russian literature. This first
yet fully matured product of a young talent burst upon the leaden atmo-
sphere of the Eighties like the first song of a lark on a gray day in Febru-
ary. In quick succession other sketches and stories followed — "Notes of
a Siberian Traveller," "The Rustling of the Woods," "In Pursuit of the
All of them show the identical characteristics of Korolenko's creations: enchanting descriptions of nature, lovable simplicity, and a warm-hearted interest in the "Humiliated and Disinherited".

Although of a highly critical nature, Korolenko's writings are by no means polemical, educational, or dogmatic as is the case with Tolstoy. They reveal simply his love for life and his kind disposition. Aside from being tolerant and good-natured in his conceptions, and apart from his dislike of chauvinism, Korolenko is through and through a Russian poet, and perhaps the most "nationalistic" among the great Russian prose-writers. Not only does he love his country, he is in love with it like a young man; he is in love with its nature, with all the intimate charms of this gigantic country, with every sleepy stream and every quiet wood-fringed valley; he is in love with its simple people and their naive piety, their rugged humor and brooding melancholy. He does not feel at home in the city nor in a comfortable train-compartment. He hates the haste and rumble of modern civilization, his place is on the open road. To walk briskly with knapsack and hand-cut hiking staff, to give himself entirely to the accidental — following a group of pious pilgrims to a thaumaturgical image of a saint, chatting with fishermen at night by a fire, or mixing with a colorful crowd of peasants, lumbermen, soldiers, and beggars on a little battered steamboat and listening to their conversation — such is the life that suits him best. But unlike Turgenev, the elegant and perfectly groomed aristocrat, he is no silent observer. He finds no difficulty in mingling with people, knowing just what to say to make friends and how to strike the right note.

In this manner he wandered all over Russia. With every step he experienced the wondrous of nature, the naive poetry of simplicity, which had also brought smiles to Gogol's face. Enraptured, he observed the elementary fatalistic indolence characteristic of the Russian people, which in times of peace seems unceasing and profound, but in stormy times turns into heroism, grandeur and steel-like power. It was here that Korolenko filled his diary with vivid and colorful impressions, which, growing into sketches and novels, were still covered with dewdrops and heavy with the scent of the soil.

One peculiar product of Korolenko's writings is his "Blind Musician." Apparently a purely psychological experiment, it deals with no artistic problem. Being born a cripple may be the cause of many conflicts, but is, in itself, beyond all human interference and beyond guilt or vengeance. In literature as well as in art, physical defects are only casually mentioned, either in a sarcastic manner to make an ugly character more loathsome, as Homer's Thersites and the stammering judges in the comedies of Moliere and Beaumarchais, or with good-natured ridicule as in genre-paintings of the Dutch Renaissance, for instance, the sketch of a cripple by Cornelius Dussart.

Not so with Korolenko. The anguish of a man born blind and tormented with an irresistible longing for light is the center of interest. Korolenko finds a solution, which unexpectedly shows the keynote of his art and which is incidentally, characteristic of all Russian literature. The blind musician experiences a spiritual rebirth. While detaching himself from the egotism of his own hopeless suffering by making himself the spokesman for the blind and for their physical and mental agonies, he attains his own enlightenment. The climax is the first public concert of the blind man, who surprises his listeners by choosing the well-known songs of the blind minstrels for his improvisations, thus arousing a stirring compassion. Sociality and solidarity with the misery of men mean salvation and enlightenment for the individual as well as for the masses.

III

The sharply defined line of demarkation between belles-lettrist and journalistic writers, observed nowadays in Western Europe, is not so strictly adhered to in Russia because of the polemical nature of its literature. Both forms of expression are often combined in making pathways for new ideas, as they were in Germany at the time when Lessing guided the people through the medium of theater reviews, drama, philosophical-theological treatises, or essays on esthetics. But whereas it was Lessing's tragic fate to remain alone and misunderstood all his life, in Russia a great number of outstanding talents in various fields of literature worked successfully as advocates of a liberal view of the world.

Alexander von Herzen, famous as a novelist, was also a gifted journalist. He was able, during the 1850's and '60's, to arouse the entire intelligentsia of Russia with his "Bell", a magazine he published abroad. Possessed with the same fighting spirit and alertness, the old Hegelian Chernyshovsky was equally at home in journalistic polemics, treatises on philosophy and national economy, and political novels. Both Belinsky and Dobrolyubov used literary criticism as an excellent weapon to fight backwardness and to propagate systematically a progressive ideology. They were succeeded by the brilliant Mikhailovsky who for several decades governed public opinion and was also influential in Korolenko's development. Besides his novels, short-stories, and dramas, Tolstoy, too, availed himself of polemical pamphlets and moralizing fairy-tales. Korolenko, on his part, constantly exchanged the palette and brush of the artist for the sword of the journalist in order to work directly on social problems of the day.

Some of the features of old Czarist Russia were chronic famine, drunkenness, illiteracy and a deficit in the budget. As a result of the ill-conceived Peasant Reform introduced after the abolition of serfdom, stifling taxes combined with the utmost backwardness in agricultural practices afflicted the peasants with crop failure regularly during the entire eighth decade. The year 1891 saw the climax: in twenty provinces an exceptionally severe drought was followed by a crop failure resulting in a famine of truly biblical dimensions.
An official inquiry to determine the extent of the losses yielded more than seven hundred answers from all parts of the country, among which was the following description from the pen of a simple parson:

“For the last three years, bad harvests have been sneaking up on us and one misfortune after another plagues the peasants. There is the insect pest. Grasshoppers eat up the grain, worms nibble on it and bugs do away with the rest. The harvest has been destroyed in the fields and the seeds have been parched in the ground; the barns are empty and there is no bread. The animals groan and collapse, cattle move meekly, and the sheep perish with the rest. The harvest has been destroyed in the fields and the seeds have been parched in the ground; the barns are empty and there is no bread. Grasshoppers eat up the grain, worms nibble on it and bugs do away with the rest. The harvest has been destroyed in the fields and the seeds have been parched in the ground; the barns are empty and there is no bread. The animals groan and collapse, cattle move meekly, and the sheep perish from thirst and want of fodder. Millions of trees and thousands of farmhouses have become a prey to flames. A wall of fire and smoke surrounded us. It is written by the prophet Zephania: ‘I will destroy everything from the face of the earth, saith the Lord, man, cattle, and wild beasts, the birds and the fish.’ How many of the feathered ones have perished in the forest-fires, how many fish in the shallow waters! The elk has fled from our woods, the raccoon and the squirrel have died. Heaven has become barren and hard as ore; no dew falls, only drought and fire. The fruit trees have withered away and so also the grass and the flowers. No raspberries ripen any more, there are no blackberries, blueberries or whortleberries far and wide; bogs and swamps have burned out. Where are you, green of the forests, oh delicious air, balsamic scent of the firs that gave blueberries or whortleberries far and wide; bogs and swamps have burned out. Where are you, green of the forests, oh delicious air, balsamic scent of the firs that gave berries far and wide; bogs and swamps have burned out. Where are you, green of the forests, oh delicious air, balsamic scent of the firs that gave blackberries, blueberries or whortleberries far and wide; bogs and swamps have burned out. Where are you, green of the forests, oh delicious air, balsamic scent of the firs that gave

In consequence a war flared up between the reactionary groups and the progressive intelligentsia. Russian society was gripped with excitement; writers sounded the alarm. Relief-committees were established on a grand scale: doctors, writers, students, teachers, and women of intellectual pursuits rushed by the hundreds into the country to nurse the sick, to set up feeding stations, to distribute seeds, and to organize the purchase of grain at low prices. All this, however, was not easy. All the disorder, all the time-honored mismanagement of a country ruled by bureaucrats and the army came to the fore. There was rivalry and antagonism between state and county administrations; between government and rural offices, between the village scribes and the peasants. Added to this, the chaos of ideas, demands and expectations of the peasants themselves, their distrust of city people, the differences existing between the rich kulaks and the impoverished peasants — everything conspired to erect thousands of barriers and obstacles in the way of those who had come to help. No wonder they were driven to despair. All the numerous local abuses and suppressions with which the daily life of the peasants had been normally confronted, all the absurdities and contradictions of the bureaucracy came to light. The fight against hun-

er, in itself merely a simple charitable act, changed at once into a struggle against the social and political conditions of the absolutist regime.

Korolenko, like Tolstoy, headed the progressive groups and devoted to this cause not only his writings but his whole personality. In the spring of 1892, he went to a district of the Province Nishi-Novgorod, the wasp-nest of the reactionary nobility, in order to organize soup-kitchens in the stricken villages. Although completely unacquainted with local circumstances, he soon learned every detail and began a tenacious struggle against the thousands of obstacles that barred his way. He spent four months in this area, wandering from one village to another, from one government office to another. After the day’s work, he wrote in his notebooks in old farmhouses far into the night by the dim light of a smoky lamp and at the same time conducted a vigorous campaign against backwardness in the newspapers of the capital. His diary, which became an immortal monument of the Czarist regime, presents a gruesome picture of the entire Golgotha of the Russian village with its begging children, silent mothers steeped in misery, wailing old men, sickness and hopelessness.

Famine was followed immediately by the second of the apocalyptic horsemen, the Plague. It came from Persia in 1893, covered the lowlands of the Volga and crept up the river, spreading its deadly vapors overstarved and paralyzed villages. The new enemy created a peculiar reaction among the representatives of the government which, bordering on the ridiculous, is nevertheless the bitter truth. The Governor of Baku fled into the mountains when the plague broke out, the Governor of Saratov kept in hiding on a river boat during the ensuing uprisings. The Governor of Astrakhan, however, took the prize: fearing the ships on their way from Persia and the Caucasus might bring the plague with them, he ordered patrol-boats to the Caspian Sea to bar the entrance of the Volga for all water-vehicles. But he forgot to supply those quarantined with bread and drinking water. More than four hundred steam-boats and barges were intercepted, and ten thousand people, healthy and sick ones, were destined to die of hunger, thirst and the plague. Finally, a boat came down the Volga toward Astrakhan, a messenger of governmental thoughtlessness. The eyes of the dying looked with new hope to the rescue ship. Its cargo was coffins.

The people’s wrath burst forth like a thunderstorm. News about the blockade and the sufferings of the quarantined prisoners swept like fire up the Volga river, followed by the cry of despair that the government was intentionally helping to spread the plague in order to diminish its population. The first victims of the “Plague Uprising” were the samaritans, those selfsacrificing men and women, who had heroically rushed to the stricken areas to nurse the sick and administer precautions to safeguard the healthy. Hospital barracks went up in flames, doctors and nurses were slain. Afterwards, there was the usual procedure — penalty expeditions, bloodshed, martial law and executions. In Saratov alone twenty death sentences were pronounced.
world war, traditions of the Neanderthal man unexpectedly became very popular. In the land of thinkers and poets, the "great time" was accompanied by a sudden return to the instincts of the contemporaries of the mammoth, the cave-bear and the wooly rhinoceros.

To be sure, the Russia of the Czars was not as yet a real culture-state and the mistreatment of foreigners and other public activities were not expressions of the psyche of the people. It was, rather, the monopoly of the government, fostered and organized at the proper moment by state institutions and encouraged with the help of governmental Vodka.

There was, for example, the famous trial of the "Multan Votiaks" that took place in the '90's. Seven Votiak peasants from the village of "Great Multan" in the Province of Viatka, half heathens and savages, had been accused of a ritual murder and thrown into jail. This so-called ritual murder trial was, of course, only a small and casual incident of the government policy, which tried to change the depressed mood of the hungry and enslaved masses by offering them a little diversion. But here again, the Russian intelligentsia, with Korolenko in the lead once more, took up the cause of the half-savage Votiaks. Korolenko eagerly threw himself into the fight, unravelling the maze of misunderstandings and deceit. He worked patiently and with an infallible instinct for finding the truth, which reminds one of Jaurès in the Dreyfus case. He mobilized the press and public opinion, obtained a resumption of the trial, and by personally taking over the defense finally won an acquittal.

In Eastern Europe, the subject most preferred for diverting the people's bad disposition has always been the Jews, and it is questionable whether they have yet played their role to the end. The circumstances under which the last public scandal — the famous Bejliss trial — took place was definitely still in style. This Jewish ritual murder case in 1913 was — so to speak — the last performance of a despotic government on its way out. One could call it the "Necklace Affair" of the Russian ancien régime. As a belated follow-up to the dark days of the 1907-1911 counter-revolution, and at the same time as a symbolic forrunner of the world war, this ritual murder case of Kishinev immediately became the center of public interest. The progressive intelligentsia in Russia identified itself with the cause of the Jewish butcher of Kishinev. The trial turned into a battlefield between the progressive and the reactionary camps of Russia. The shrewdest lawyers and best journalists gave their services to this cause. Needless to say, Korolenko, too, was one of the leaders of the fight. Thus shortly before the bloody curtain of world war was to be raised, Russian reaction suffered one more crushing moral defeat. Under the onslaught of the oppositional intelligentsia the murder indictment collapsed. There was revealed also at the same time the whole hypocrisy of the Czarist regime, which, already dead and rotten internally, was only waiting for the coup de grâce to be administered by the movement for freedom.

During the '80's, after the assassination of Alexander II, a period of paralyzing hopelessness enveloped Russia. The liberal reforms of the '60's with regard to the judiciary and to rural self-administration were everywhere repealed. A death-like silence prevailed during the reign of Alexander III. Discouraged by both the failure to realize peaceful reforms and the apparent ineffectiveness of the revolutionary movement, the Russian people were completely overcome with depression and resignation.

In this atmosphere of apathy and despondency, the Russian intelligentsia began to develop such metaphysical-mystical tendencies as were represented by Soloviev's philosophy. Nietzsche's influence was clearly noticeable. In literature the pessimistic undertones of Gar9hin's novels and Nadson's poetry predominated. Fully in accord with the prevailing spirit was Dostoyevsky's mysticism, as expressed in "The Brothers Karamasov," and also in Tolstoy's ascetic doctrines. The idea of "non-resistance to evil", the repudiation of violence in the struggle against powerful reaction, which was now to be opposed by the "purified soul" of the individual, such theories of social passivity became a serious danger for the Russian intelligentsia of the Eighties. The more so, as it was presented by such captivating means as Tolstoy's literary genius and moral authority.

Mikhaylovsky, the spiritual leader of the organization of the "People's Will," directed an extremely angry polemic against Tolstoy. Korolenko, too, came to the fore. He, the tender poet who never could forget an incident of his childhood, be it a rustling forest, a walk in the evening through the quiet fields, or the memory of a landscape in its manifold lights and moods, Korolenko, who fundamentally despised all politics, now raised his voice with determination, preaching aggressive, saber-sharp hatred and bellicerent opposition. He replied to Tolstoy's legends, parables and stories in the style of the gospel with the "Legend of Florus."

The Romans governed Judea with fire and sword, exploiting land and people. The people moaned and bent under the hated yoke. Stirred by the sight of his suffering people, Menachem the Wise, son of Yehuda, appealed to the heroic traditions of their forebears and preached rebellion against the Romans, a "Holy War." But then up spoke the sect of the gentle Sosaians (who like Tolstoy, repudiated all violence and saw a solution only in the purification of the soul, in isolation and self-denial.) "You are sowing great misery when you call men to battle," they said to Menachem. "If a city is besieged and shows resistance the enemy will spare the lives of the humble, but will put to death all those who are defiant. We teach the people to be submissive, so that they may be saved from destruction ... One cannot dry water with water nor quench fire with fire. Therefore, violence will not be overcome with violence, it is evil itself."

To which Menachem answered unwaveringly: "Violence is neither good nor evil, it is violence. Good or evil is only its application. The violence of the arm is evil when it is lifted to rob or suppress the weak; but if
it is lifted for work or in defense of thy neighbor, then violence is welfare. It is true, one does not quench fire with fire nor dry water with water, but stone is shattered with stone and steel must be parried with steel, and violence with violence. Knoweth this: the power of the Romans is the fire but your humbleness is ... wood. And the fire will not stop until it has eaten all the wood."

The "Legend" closes with Menachem's prayer: "O Adonai, Adonai! Let us never as long as we live fail the holy command: to fight against injustice ... Let us never speak these words: save yourself and leave the weak to their destiny ... I too believe, O Adonai, that your kingdom will be on earth. Violence and suppression will disappear and the people will gather to celebrate the feast of brotherhood. And never again shall man's blood be shed by man's hand."

Like a refreshing breeze, this defiant creed stormed through the deep fog of indolence and mysticism. Korolenko was ready for the new historic "violence" in Russia which soon was to lift its beneficent arm, the arm to work and to fight for liberty.

Maxim Gorki's "My Childhood" is in many respects an interesting counterpart to Korolenko's "History of a Contemporary." Artistically, they are poles apart. Korolenko, like his adored Turgenev, has an utterly lyrical nature, is a tender soul, a man of many moods. Gorki, in the Dostoevskyan tradition, has a profoundly dramatic view of life; he is a man of concentrated energy and action. Although Korolenko is strongly aware of all the dreadfulness of social life, he has Turgenev's capacity to present even the cruellest incidents in the mood of an ameliorating perspective, enveloped in the vapors of poetic vision and all the charm of natural scenery. For Gorki as well as for Dostoevsky, even sober every-day events are full of gruesome ghosts and torturing visions, presented in thoughts of merciless pungency, relentless, without perspective, and almost devoid of all natural scenery.

If according to Ulrici drama is the poetry of action, the dramatic element is positively evident in Dostoevsky's novels. They are bursting with action, experience and tension to such an extent that their complex and irritating compilations seem at times to crush the epic element of the novel, to break through its boundaries at any moment. After reading with breathless anxiety one or two of his voluminous books it seems incredible that one has lived through the events of only two or three days. It is equally characteristic of Dostoevsky's dramatic aptitude to present both the main problem of the plot and the great conflicts which lead to the climax at the beginning of the novel. The preliminaries of the story, its slow development, the reader does not experience directly. It is left to him to deduce them from the action in retrospect. Gorki, too, even in portraying complete inertia, the bankruptcy of human energy, as he did in "The Lower Depths," chooses the drama as his medium and actually succeeds in putting life into the pale countenance of his types.

Korolenko and Gorki not only represent two literary personalities, but also two generations of Russian literature and freedom-loving ideology. Korolenko's interest still centers around the peasant; Gorki, enthusiastic pupil of German scientific socialism, is interested in city proletarians and in their shadows, the Lumpenproletariat. Whereas nature is the normal setting for Korolenko's stories, for Gorki it is the workshop, the garret and the flophouse.

The key to both artists' personalities is the fundamental difference in their backgrounds. Korolenko grew up in comfortable, middle-class surroundings. His childhood provided him with the normal feeling that the world and all that is in it is solid and steady, which is so characteristic of all happy children. Gorki, partly rooted in the petty-bourgeoisie and partly in the Lumpenproletariat, grew up in a truly Dostoevskyan atmosphere of horror, crime and sudden outbreaks of human passion. As a child, he already behaved like a little hunted wolf baring his sharp teeth to fate. His youth, full of deprivations, insults and oppressions, of uncertainty and abuse, was spent close to the scum of society and embraced all the typical features of the life of the modern proletariat. Only those who have read Gorki's autobiographies are able to conceive fully his amazing rise from the depths of society to the sunny heights of modern education, ingenious artistry and an outlook on life based on science. The vicissitudes of his life are symbolic of the Russian proletariat as a class, which in the remarkably short time of two decades has also worked its way up from the uncultured, uncouth and difficult life under the Czar through the harsh school of struggles to historical actions. This is surely quite inconceivable to all the culture-philistines who think that proper street illumination, trains that run on time, clean collars, and the industrious clatter of the parliamentary mills stand for political freedom.

The great charm of Korolenko's poetic writing also constitutes its limitations. He lives wholly in the present, in the happenings of the moment, in sensual impressions. His stories are like a bouquet of freshly gathered field flowers. But time is hard on their gay colors, their delicate fragrance. The Russia Korolenko describes no longer exists, it is the Russia of yesterday. The tender and poetic mood which envelopes his land and his people is gone. A decade and a half ago it made room for the tragic and thunder-laden atmosphere of the Gorki's and their like, the screeching storm-birds of the revolution. It was replaced in Korolenko himself by a new belligerency. In him as in Tolstoy the social fighter triumphed in the end, the great fellow-citizen succeeded the poet and dreamer. When in the Eighties Tolstoy began to preach his moral gospel in a new literary form as folk-lore, Turgenev wrote letters imploring the wise man of Yasnaya Polyana in the name of the fatherland to turn back to the realm of pure art. The friends of Korolenko, too, grieved when he abandoned his fragrant poetry and threw
himself eagerly into journalism. But the spirit of Russian literature, the feeling of social responsibility, proved to be stronger in this richly endowed poet than his love for nature, his longing for an unhampered life of wandering and his poetic desires. Carried along by the rising revolutionary flood at the turn of the century, the poet in him was slowly silenced while he unsheathed his sword as a fighter for liberty, as the spiritual center of the opposition movement of the Russian intellectuals. The "History of a Contemporary," published in his review, "The Russian Treasury," is the last product of his genius, only half poetry, but wholly the truth, like everything else in Korolenko's life.

(Translated by Frieda Mattick)

THE MODERN MACHIAVELLIANS

James Burnham's second attempt*) to purge himself of the misunderstood Marxism of his earlier years is slightly more successful than his first effort, The Managerial Revolution. In the latter book, he still tried to explain the problem of power in economic terms, although no longer from the social point of view of Marx but from that of the technocrats. Nevertheless, he insisted that not the politicians, but those who control the means of production directly, are the real rulers of society. In the present book he finds that in addition to the economic there are several other modes of analyzing events, that one can reach approximately the same conclusions about history from any number of different approaches. This, of course, does not reconcile his former opinion that power must be explained in technical-economic terms — that economics is the determinative of politics — with his present Machiavellian point of view, which deals with the struggle for power in purely political terms.

Burnham begins his exposition of power politics with Dante in order to demonstrate what the Machiavellians are not. In Dante's writing he discovers a divorce between its formal and its real meaning. Although the real meaning is there, it is rendered irresponsible since it is not subject to open and deliberate intellectual control. High-minded words of formal meaning are used to arouse passion, prejudice and sentimentality in favor of disguised real aims. This method cannot serve the truth, yet throughout history and down to the present it is consistently used to deceive people in the interests of the mighty.

The Machiavellians, on the other hand, proceed scientifically; they call a spade a spade. Like Dante, Machiavelli, too, pursued a practical goal. But he did not fool himself, nor others, as to the character of the

*) THE MACHIAVELLIANS. By James Burnham. John Day Company, New York, 1942. (270 pp., $2.50.)

goal nor as to the means to be used to achieve it. He divorced politics from ethics in the sense that every science must be divorced from ethics or, rather he divorced politics from transcendental ethics in order to locate both ethics and politics in the real world of space and time and history. He used words not to express his emotions and attitudes, but in such a way that their meaning could be tested and understood in terms of the real world. And he found that politics is the struggle for power among men.

Though it must be said that Machiavelli was often scientific by instinct and impulse rather than design, the modern Machiavellians — Mosca, Michels, and Pareto — have an altogether clear understanding of scientific method. They are fully conscious of what they are doing and of the distinction between an art and a science. Mosca, like all Machiavellians, Burnham says, rejects any monistic view of history because such theories do not accord with the facts. In his search for truth — which is the purpose of all Machiavellians — Mosca discovers as the primary and universal social fact the existence of two "political classes," a ruling class — always a minority — and the ruled. And he believes that not only has this always been and is now the case, but that it always will be.

Before dealing with Michels and Pareto, Burnham finds it necessary to say a few things about Sorel and the function of myth and violence. Sorel, a syndicalist, thought that if the socialists were to take over governmental power, this would lead not to socialism but merely to the substitution of a new élite as ruler over the masses. This fits him into the Machiavellians. However, he thought that a real revolutionary program could be carried out with the help of an all-embracing myth, which would arouse the masses to uncompromising action.

A true Machiavellian, Burnham continues, separates scientific questions concerning the truth about society from moral disputes over what type of society is most desirable. Thus Robert Michels makes no attempt to offer a "new system" but merely tries to promote understanding. He deals with the nature of organisation in relation to democracy. The Marxists believe that the elimination of economic inequalities will lead to the attainment of genuine democracy. But they fail to demonstrate the possibility of organizing a classless society. The Machiavellians, Burnham says, agree with the Marxists' negative critique of capitalism but, on the basis of evidence from historical experience, they hold the Marxist goal to be unattainable. Social life cannot dispense with organization. And by a study of organization, particularly labor organizations, Michels found that a tendency toward oligarchy is inherent in organization itself and is thus a necessary condition of life. The mechanical, technical, psychological, and cultural conditions of organization require leadership, and guarantee that the leaders rather than the mass shall exercise control. The autocratic tendencies are neither arbitrary nor accidental nor temporary, but inherent in the nature of organization. This iron law of oligarchy holds good for all social movements.
and all forms of society. It makes impossible the democratic ideal of self-
government.

Pareto is the last of the Machiavellians interpreted by Burnham.
Pareto, he says, disavows any purpose other than to describe and correlate
social facts. To understand Pareto's general analysis of society, one must
be clear about the distinctions he makes between "logical" and "non-logical"
conduct. A man's conduct is "logical" when his action is motivated by a
goal or purpose deliberately sought after, when that goal is possible, and
and when the steps taken to reach the goal are in fact appropriate for reaching
it. If, however, any one or more of the conditions for logical conduct are
not present, the actions are then non-logical. Recalling the disparity between
the "formal" goal and the "real" goal discussed in connection with Dante,
one can say that where this disparity exists action is non-logical. In logical
actions, the formal goal and the real goal are identical. There exists, how-
ever, a tendency to logicalize the non-logical.

This leads to the concepts of residues and derivations used by Pareto.
Man, Pareto says, is pre-eminently a verbal animal. Peculiar and deceptive
problems arise in connection with his conduct which is verbal but at the
same time non-logical. Examining this kind of conduct, Pareto discovers
in it a small number of relatively constant factors which change little or
not at all from age to age. These factors he calls "residues." Along with
these there are other factors which change rapidly and which differ from age
to age and from nation to nation. These variable factors he calls "deriva-
tions." "Residue" simply means the stable, common elements which we may
discover in social actions, the nucleus, so to speak, which is left over when
the variable elements are stripped away. Residues are discovered by com-
paring and analyzing huge numbers of social actions. They correspond to
some fairly permanent human impulses, instincts, or sentiments. Pareto,
Burnham informs us, is concerned not so much with the question of where
residues come from as with the fact that social actions may be analyzed
in terms of them, whatever their origin.

Residues may be divided into different classes as, for example, the
instinct for combinations, group-persistencies, self-expression, sociality, in-
tegrity of the individual and his appurtenances, and the sex residue. These
form the relatively unchanging nuclei of non-logical conduct which makes
up the greater proportion of human action. Along with these residues go
the derivations, that is, the verbal explanations, dogmas, doctrines and theor-
ies with which man clothes the non-logical bones of the residues. Concrete
theories in social connections are made up of residues and derivations. The
residues are manifestations of sentiments; the derivations comprise logical
reasonings, unsound reasonings and manifestations of sentiments used for
purposes of derivations. They are manifestations of the human being's hun-
ger for thinking. If that hunger were satisfied by logico-experimental rea-
sonings only, there would be no derivations. Instead we should get logico-
experimental theories.

Pareto believes, however, that derivations have little effect in determin-
ing important social changes. Residues are the abiding, significant and in-
fluential factor. The influence on people's actions and on the course of
events that derivations seem at times to have is always deceiving the surface
observer. But the seeming influence of the derivations is in reality the in-
fluence of the residue which it expresses. It is for this reason that the
"logical" refutation of theories used in politics never accomplishes anything
so long as the residues remain intact.

Disputes over the best form of society and government are derivations
which never reach objective stability but come and go with every shift in
fashion and sentiment. Such disputes, according to Pareto, may be
interpreted in terms of the notion of "social utility." And here it is necessary
to distinguish between the utility "of a community" and the utility "for a
community." The first refers to the community's strength and power of
resistance as against other communities; the second to a community's internal
welfare. The first may be objectively studied. The second, however, is
purely subjective or relative, since what is internally useful depends on what
the members of the community want. Internal and external utility seldom
coincide. Because a community is sub-divided into various groups, utility
means different things to different people. Programs are put forward which,
though favorable only to a particular group, claim to favor the whole of
society. Because of the disparity between the internal and external utility,
it is useful for society to make people believe that their own individual hap-
iness is bound up with the acceptance of the community's standards. Though
this is not true, the truth is not always advantageous to society, falsehood
or nonsense not always harmful. Whether one or the other should be em-
ployed can be found out only by concrete investigation.

Summing up Pareto's ideas, Burnham mentions five forces that make
society what it is and that bring about social changes. 1) The physical
environment; 2) residues; 3) economic factors; 4) derivations, and 5) the
circulation of the elites. The last point interests Burnham most. Human
beings, he says, are not distributed evenly over the scale. At the top there
are very few, there are considerably more in the middle, but the overwhelm-
ing majority is grouped near the bottom. The elite is always a small minor-
ity. Within the elite we may further distinguish a "governing elite" from a
"non-governing elite." According to Pareto, Burnham continues, the char-
acter of a society is above all the character of its elite. The elite is never
static. If, in the selection of members of the elite, there existed a condition
of perfectly free competition so that each individual could rise just as high
in the social scale as his talents and ambition permitted, the elite could be
presumed to include, at every moment and in the right order, just those per-
sons best fitted for membership in it. Under such conditions society would
remain dynamic and strong; automatically correcting its own weaknesses.
But such conditions are never found in reality. Special principles of selection, different in different societies, affect the composition of the elite so that it no longer includes all those persons best fitted for social rule. Weaknesses set in, and, since they are not compensated for by a gradual day-by-day circulation, are sharply corrected by social revolution. It follows that a relatively free circulation of elites is a prerequisite for a healthy society. Otherwise society is threatened either with revolution or destruction from outside. Of course, it is not enough to keep the elite more or less flexible. The kind of individuals admitted or excluded is also very important, for the character of the society is determined not only by the basic residues present in the entire population, but also by the distribution of residues among the various social classes; and this distribution may change quite rapidly. Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elites is, in brief, a theory of social change, of social development and degeneration.

At the end of his study of the Machiavellians, who speak mostly for themselves, (about half of the book consists of quotations), Burnham summarizes his findings into a few main principles in terms of which he then analyzes 1) the nature of the present historical period, 2) the meaning of democracy, and 3) whether or not politics can be scientific.

II

Before following Burnham in this endeavor it may be well to point out that his present respect for the Machiavellians most probably stems from his previous respect for Marxism. His interpretation of Machiavelli is, by and large, the long-accepted one of Marxism or, for that matter, of all reasonable people. Like science and industry, politics had to emancipate itself from transcendental ethics, that is, from the power of the Church in feudalism. It should also be noted that all the modern Machiavellians Burnham deals with have been profoundly influenced by Marx. Most of their principles, as, for instance, that one must distinguish between the words and the meanings of programs, that one must recognize that most social actions are "non-logical", that there are rulers and ruled, that politics is the struggle for power, that the elite determines the "character" of society and that its rule is based upon force and fraud, that ideologies support the ruling classes, that elites circulate, that revolutions are inevitable, and so on — all these ideas are also found in Marxism, though sometimes in another connection and with more or less meaning than is to be found in Burnham's study. If Burnham nevertheless prefers the Machiavellian version to the Marxian, it is for the sole reason that he believes the former to represent an objective science of politics and society which describes and correlates observable social facts, whereas the Marxists do not believe that politics can be an objective science, neutral to any practical political goal. However, one must also differentiate between the Machiavellians' avowed aim and what they are really doing.

Aside from the question of whether or not politics can be an objective science, Burnham's Machiavellians did not succeed in making politics scientific. Their theories are part and parcel of the ideologies of their time. This may be noticed least in Sorel and Michels. But it is very clear in Mosca and Pareto and would be apparent in Burnham's interpretations if he had been less taken in by the prevailing fascist ideology. It is, for example, a little more than fair to say, as Burnham does, that Pareto was less concerned with the question of where residues come from than with the fact that social actions may be analyzed in terms of them, whatever their origin. Pareto explained every sociological and psychological fact by assuming a specific instinct or sense for it in human nature. His vagueness and ambiguity in this respect must not be taken for disregard as to the origin of things, but rather as an indication of Pareto's own limitations.

It is, furthermore, not possible to understand Pareto by merely dealing with his sociology, for the latter is closely bound up with his economic theory. Pareto was an ardent proponent of a liberal system of economics — the only system which he considered logical and scientific. But as there never was, save as an ideology, and never could be a capitalist system of economics such as he constructed in his mind, he could not help losing belief in its realization. But neither could he make himself admit its impossibility and thus he concluded that there was nothing wrong with his scientific theory, but that the unreasonable attitude which opposed liberalism was too strong to be successfully combated. Out of his disappointment came his theory of non-logical actions and their unchangeability. His thinking of the past, however, was not entirely wasted: it was utilized in his theory of the circulation of elites. His sociology may be explained as a by-product of laissez-faire ideology at a time when, due to the development of capitalism, the facts of the real world began increasingly to contradict its ideology, developed earlier.

Despite his apparent detachment from particular political interests, Pareto's "scientific attitude" is a mere illusion. His treatment of observable facts is on the same level that modern economics treats the facts of production and distribution. For apologetic and "practical" reasons, bourgeois economy rejected the labor theory of value and tried to develop a workable subjective value theory which only resulted, in the end, in its giving up all attempts to explain prices. The given market prices — the observable facts — became the economists' sole concern. The value theory served merely decorative purposes. In Pareto's sociology, too, the axioms with which he works are only decorated with, but not based upon, the residues he established. Despite his apparent attempt to search for the causes of social conduct, what is really important in his theory are unexplained actions, witnessed and described by him.

The categories of bourgeois economics are thought to hold good for all mankind, under all circumstances. In like manner Pareto's residues are
also unchangeables. Of course, actual changes cannot be denied but, just as in the case of economics where all such changes leave undisturbed the idea of human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means, so in Pareto’s sociology, too, all changes, for whatever reasons, remain determined by the residues.

If it were not for the predictions made by the Machiavellians, most of what they said could be accepted; indeed there was little that they brought forth that had not already been recognized, in one way or another, by Marxism. Neither is there any objection to the application of scientific methods to social problems — in Burnham’s words to the accurate and systematic description of public facts — nor to the attempts to correlate sets of these facts in laws, and, through these correlations, to attempt to predict, with some degree of probability, future events. Of course the wish and the possibility are two different things. In many of its fields social science cannot be experimental. No social system is as empirical as are the natural sciences, not to mention the great and numerous difficulties that stand in the way of “objectivity” which the class character of society imposes. According to Burnham, predictions about future events must be based on evidence of the past. One could agree here, too. But what is the evidence of the past?

For Machiavelli the past simply meant that political life is never static but is continually changing. Deliberate actions of men have very little to do with this situation, which is laid at the doorstep of “fortune.” Fortune remains unexplained; so also is the reason for political life. The latter is merely acknowledged. Machiavelli is satisfied with “political man,” says Burnham, just as Adam Smith was with “economic man”; neither was interested in “human nature as a whole.” Contrary to what Burnham says, however, human nature for Adam Smith consisted precisely in “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,” and “political man” is the whole man for Machiavelli. For both it was not the evidence of the past which caused them to be concerned only with “political man” and “economic man” but their interest in the developing capitalist society and in its prerequisite, the nation-state. In reality both “political man” and “economic man” were only the results of the development of the social forces of production which underlie all social change.

Because the real evidence of the past was considered neither by Machiavelli nor by Adam Smith, they had to introduce either “fortune” or the “invisible hand” which supposedly accompanies the social development, based, as it was, on the peculiar character of human nature, described as “political” or as “economic” man. It was Marx who showed how untrue this kind of “realism” really was, first, by showing that economics determine politics and, secondly, by showing that economics are determined not by human nature but by social relations which arise in connection with the development of the social forces of production.

In comparison with pre-capitalistic ideology, the new ideology of Machiavelli and Adam Smith was, of course, quite realistic. There simply is no such thing as “realism.” Like everything else, realism, too, must be considered historically. To accept Machiavellian realism at the present time is a step backward from an already established social realism corresponding to the present level of general development, to a level that belongs to the early stages of present-day society. In this connection it is amusing to notice that the same people who no longer believe in laissez faire ideology now find refuge in the still more primitive form of that same ideology, namely, in Machiavellianism. Such a great retreat cannot, of course, be regarded as an attempt to consider the evidence of the past. It is plainly an attempt to learn from the evidence at the disposal of the politicians of the Renaissance.

To be sure, when Marx showed that economics determine politics, he was dealing with a particular stage of capitalist development — its laissez faire stage — during which business and not naked force found emphasis. This stage had been preceded by political struggles in which business seemed to play a secondary role. But as Robert A. Brady recently expressed it, “the natural frame of reference of ownership is, and has been from the beginning, as clearly political as economic, as obviously ‘Machiavellian’ as ‘Ricardian’.” What bourgeois economy understood as “economical” in distinction to “political” was that the exchange mechanism itself established a social order which, save for external purposes, made political interferences quite unnecessary. And in fact, after the political basis for an national economy had been established by way of wars and revolutions and far-reaching state-interferences there came a time for the foremost capitalist nations, when politics was almost entirely subordinated to the needs of business, when the state was in fact the servant of capital. It was in this sense that Marx could speak of the determination of politics by economics.

However, by considering the attempts to establish, defend, or expand the national basis of capitalist economics one can also speak of the subordination of economics to politics. If one is interested only in a definite phase of capitalist development under particular conditions one may speak of the predominance of “politics” or the predominance of “economics” in determining national policy. But if one speaks of capitalism in general, such a distinction can no longer be made, save for the methodological reason of showing more clearly different aspects of the same thing.

Internally, too, a distinction may be made between economics and politics, depending upon whether or not the social frictions, caused by the class character of society, demand the employment of direct force. At times economic control suffices, at other times it must be supplemented by open terror. Yet, for a considerable length of time, the direct use of force against the workers was the exception, not the rule. The control of the means of production was enough to guarantee the undisturbed exploitation of labor
by capital. The capitalist ideology was strong enough to keep the police-
budget low.

By saying that economy determines politics, Marx showed what was
behind Machiavellianism. But he also showed what was behind both
Machiavellianism and the capitalist economy by pointing out that history
was the history of class struggles determined by the development of the
social forces of production, which include both technics and social relations.

"The sum total of the relations of production," Marx wrote, "constitute
the economic structure of society — the real foundation on which rise legal
and political superstructures and to which correspond definite social con-
sciousness." Definite systems of economics such as feudalism and capitalism,
which determine the politics of their time, are in turn determined — just
as these politics are inseparably connected with the economic structure in
which they operate — by the forces of social production in which the history
of mankind characterizes itself.

This is the reason for Burnham’s charge that Marxism is a monistic
theory, relating everything to the last cause of materialistic economics.
However, Marx’s concept of history is both monistic and pluralistic, de-
pending upon what is to be investigated. When Burnham’s Machiavellians,
Mosca for example, reject Marxism because of its monistic aspect, his own
pluralistic theory of history is pluralistic only because he stops at a definite
point of investigation. Because like all capitalist theoreticians, he refuses to
recognize the merely historical character of capitalist relations, he is not able
go beyond the superficial investigation of surface phenomena. Like Pareto’s
Mosca’s ideas, are based upon some constant psychological laws. But the
validity of these psychological laws cannot be demonstrated. What remains
of his theory are the so-called “social forces” which stand for all human
activities with significant and political influence, such as those connected
with war, religion, land, labor, money, education, science, technological skill,
and so forth. These “social forces” account for Mosca’s theory of general
social behavior, which is then boiled down to an investigation of politics.
The whole endeavor finally yields nothing but this — that the stratification
of society into rulers and ruled is universal and permanent.

We have seen that Pareto, too, speaks of five forces that make society
what it is and that account for its changes. First, there is the physical en-
vironment. No theory of history disregards environment, that is, geographic
and climatic factors, either utilized or combated by man. Without certain
raw materials, furthermore, certain technical and social relations could not
have been possible. But the existence of these production possibilities alone
does not explain their utilization. The physical environment is a necessary
condition for social history, but does not explain it. The second factor is
residues, derived from a long-rejected instinct psychology. These we have
already discussed. The third are economic factors. As an independent force
they make no sense in his theory. Pareto, as we know, considered economic
theory as logical and scientific. It belongs thus to the derivations, which
play no real part in history, determined as it is by residues. There remains
the fifth factor: the circulation of élites, that is, the capitalist theory of
economic competition expressed in political terms. As such this factor, too,
belongs to the derivations. Thus the pluralistic approach boils down to a
monistic psychological theory of history.

Marxism has no objection to dealing separately with the “social for-
tices” enumerated by Mosca and to considering their influence upon society
and upon the course of history. In contrast to Pareto, Marxism holds that
“derivations”, that is, scientific theories and ideologies, are in one sense real
forces in history. Because in class societies all factors are, so to speak, partly
real and partly ideological, for all practical purposes Marxism cannot restrict
itself to the underlying cause of all the separate movements and ideas that
bring about changes in the social structure and social relations. It deals
with the “logical” as well as with the “non-logical.” But instead of merely
separating them, Marxism inquires into the reason for their being and dis-
covers that history has been not only the struggle between men and nature
but also, within this setting, the struggle between men and men. The latter
struggle is based on positions with respect to the means of production, for
one can exploit and rule only by exploiting the labor of others and by ruling
over the laborers.

By recognizing that the double character of all activity and thought
stems from social production-relations, it is possible to see through the dif-
ferent fetishism that different societies adhere to at different times. One
can at once admire Machiavell’s attempt to rid politics of transcendental
ethics or, for that matter, despite all the inconsistent and incoherent verbiage
accompanying Mosca’s and Pareto’s ideas, agree with their re-discovery that
society is divided into rulers and ruled. Marxism, however, is not interested
merely in the recognition and classification of social facts. It wants to change
the existing society. Being critical of all that exists gives it the incentive
to search as thoroughly as possible for the reasons for previous social changes
in order to be able to base its hypotheses on the evidence of the past and
present. It was this revolutionary seriousness which led to Marx’s predie-
tions, the correctness of which is now almost generally acknowledged —
at least as far as economic development is concerned. The connection be-
tween class structure, economics, politics, and ideology which is brought
to light in historical materialism and in the theory of the fetishism of com-
modities has, indirectly, also found recognition, though in a perveted cap-
italistic form, in the present vogue of Machiavellianism, semantics, psycho-
logy, positivism, and in the growing cynicism generally.

It was the class-approach, that is, the search for the weaknesses of
present-day society, which made Marxism differ from bourgeois economics,
sociology and philosophy. Whoever does not want to change society, will
look for its strong points. Both approaches undoubtedly tend somewhat
towards a distorted, one-sided picture of society and its possibilities. But
history itself corrects it again. Each side, of course, always desires to see
clearly both the weakness and the strength of the adversary but, aside from
the power of ideology, the dearth of empirical data in the social field makes
this quite difficult. What can be gained are approximations of the true
status of society at any particular time. And here the evidence points to
the superiority of the Marxian approach.

Society is in continuous flux; to some degree all its changes affect its
underlying socio-economic basis. At certain times the changes bring the
underlying relations into sharper relief; at other times they cloud them
still further. The restlessness of society itself prevents Marxism from
crystallizing into a dogma. Where it became a dogma it ceased to be Marx-
ism and turned into an ideology to cover up an un-Marxian practice. As
an ideology it has been attacked and as such it need not be defended. But
as a realistic theory for the struggle against present-day society it has found
no substitute. There is no other scientific theory concerned with goals
that presuppose the destruction of present-day society. There is thus no
theory so critical as Marxism. And it is precisely the lack of criticism which
prevents the non-Marxian scientist from going beyond the superficially given
facts and which makes him, wherever he tries to do so, indulge in mysticism
garbed in scientific phraseology.

Marxism as a dogma must be rejected. A Marxist will therefore ap-
preciate the work of Sorel and Michels in so far as they shed light upon
reality darkened by dogmatism. The development of labor organizations,
investigated by Sorel and Michels, roughly paralleled the development of
liberal capitalism. The rapid increase of exploitation allowed for both suf-
ficient profits for capital accumulation and the betterment of proletarian
living conditions in the advanced capitalist nations. The labor movement
ceased to be a revolutionary force. It became a part of capitalism, one cap-
italist institution among others. Both the political and the economic organ-
izations of labor changed into ordinary enterprises, supporting and parti-
cipating in the exploitation of labor. Marxism served as the ideology which
hid this fact, just as it serves in Russia today to cover up the exploitation
of labor by the privileged under state-capitalism.

Sorel and Michels witnessed this development. Sorel thought that it
had something to do with political parliamentarianism, which he considered
an impossible way to reach socialism. It would merely change the personnel
of the state apparatus but would not affect the lot of the workers. He also
thought that the "scientific" approach of the socialists, being a part of the
bourgeois ideology of science, was the wrong approach for the solution of
social problems. This science was able to describe things, but unable to alter
them. It could never lead to actions powerful enough to change social con-
ditions. A social movement, in his opinion, needs ideas which guarantee
success in advance of its struggle — a myth, so to speak, which, though not
a strictly scientific theory, is nevertheless not arbitrary but able to direct
energies towards the solution of social problems. The particular myth he
advocated was the myth of the general-strike, for this myth, he thought,
was capable of incorporating in itself all the ideas that were needed, and
actually bound up, with class necessities and the desires of the proletariat.
It was in the strike that the class struggle found its sharpest and truest
expression, in which the interests and feelings of the workers came mostly
to the fore. In the strike, furthermore, they were directly engaged, not
merely represented as in the so-called political actions of that time. A real
general strike could work as the lever which would dislodge capitalism.
It could not, however, be brought about in a purely rationalistic manner.
It must be initiated and carried on with a deep conviction on the part of the
masses that it would succeed and solve their problems in order to arouse the
maximum of proletarian solidarity, activity and strength.

Sorel was right in his criticism of the state-socialism of the Second
International. But the same criticism could be made, and was made, from
a Marxian point of view. One did not need to be a "Machiavellian" to
recognize that the political success of the socialists would not lead to social-
ism but merely to a change of politicians in the state apparatus. This was
quite obvious from the behavior of the socialists within capitalism. But
Sorel's road was not a road to socialism either. The "economic" organiza-
tions, syndicalist or otherwise, succumbed to the growing power of capital
just as much as the political wing of the labor movement did. The "general
strike" could not be made into an all-embracing myth, able to become a social
force strong enough to destroy capitalism, for myth-making, too, is a cap-
italist monopoly. Controlling the means of production and destruction,
capitalism controls also the making of myths and ideologies. To propagate
a myth or to utilize science in order to get the masses into motion for the
abolishment of present-day society are equally unrealistic.

Behind the ideas of socialists and syndicalists there was finally no more
than the capitalist liberal ideology itself, that is, the illusion that capitalism
would largely remain a competitive, decentralized, planless, uncoordinated
system, by virtue of which it was possible to build something new in the
shell of the old. Did not capitalism, too, develop within the framework of
feudalism? The hope of being able to utilize liberalism for the class pur-
poses of the proletariat was even stronger in the syndicalists than in the
socialists. The syndicalists combated "Marxism" not only because it aspired
to control the state, but also because it had no real objections to the central-
izing forces of capitalism and intended to make the state the controller of
all the means of production. This centralism, the syndicalists thought, would
foster exploitative social relations. They favored the decentralization of
power and production. A kind of non-capitalistic "laisser faire" system was
to insure self-government of the various unions or syndicates. It must also
be noted here that syndicalism flourished best in those nations where the
centralization process of capital was only in its infancy, where numerous small enterprises dominated, whereas in the highly-developed capitalistic nations socialist unions professed to share the centralizing ideas of the socialist parties.

The “Machiavellian” in Sorel, of which Burnham speaks, did not prevent his falling victim to the ideology of liberal capitalism. The more Machiavellian he tried to be the more he succumbed to it. The Marxists at least recognized that the capitalist centralization process had its basis not only in capitalist competition but also in the increasing socialization of production by the spreading of the division of labor under capitalistic conditions, by the development of large-scale industry and the world-wide expansion of the capitalist mode of production, which created not only a different relationship between men and men but also a different relationship between man and nature. If capitalist competition can be changed, it must be changed in a manner which does not contradict the necessities of the increasing socialization of production. With the coming of capitalism, furthermore, centralization or de-centralization in the direction and use of the means of production ceased to be a debatable question, for capitalism always means the control over more means of production by always relatively fewer men. A new society can only be a society in which neither centralism nor de-centralism plays any important part, in which the producers organize their production rationally in accordance with the real needs of society without being too much concerned with questions of organization — where organization is merely a part of the production and distribution process like any other machine, factory, or material entering production, and not simultaneously a question of power and privilege.

In any class society, organization has two functions: to secure the life of society and to secure the position of the ruling class. The history that the Machiavellians deals with is the history of class societies. There is no doubt that the evidence of the past suggests an *iron law of oligarchy* based on the social need for organization which Robert Michels speaks of. Social life cannot dispense with organization, it is true, but from this it does not follow that social life cannot dispense with classes. It may not be able to dispense with classes under certain conditions. But conditions can be changed. Specifically, under conditions of a social production which is unable to satisfy the needs of the people, it is difficult to envision modern society as a classless society. In a society in which the necessities of life exist in potential abundance, classes may co-exist. Yet it is not impossible to envision such a society as classless.

It is certainly not scientific to conclude from the evidence of experience that no new experiences are possible. From the experience of organizations in class societies, one cannot draw the conclusion that organizations cannot be “democratic,” whatever the conditions. Organization by itself has no meaning; it has meaning only in connection with social activity and will mean different things for different activities in different societies. Michels' concept of organization is a timeless concept, more crude but of the same order as, for instance, Hans Kelsen’s timeless concept of law or, for that matter, the timeless economic categories of bourgeois economy. These timeless concepts, however, have their sole justification in methodology. They may or may not help in understanding the historically-conditioned and class-determined real law, real organization, real economy and so forth. But no direct conclusions with regard to past and present realities and the possibilities of the future can be drawn from these general concepts. The attempts to abstract political and economic systems from time and space in order to find elements common to all times and all people are made, of course, to enable bourgeois social scientists to proceed in their field with the "objectivity" that the natural scientists employ in their fields. Yet even if such common elements have been found, they must still be taken up anew in their special historical setting. There they take on a new character in need of special investigation, for they never exist by themselves.

Michels advances some mechanical and technical reasons for the imposibility of “democracy” in organization. All of them, however, refer to democratic political organizations under liberal capitalism. His experiences in this field he offers as evidence for his position that all organizations, at all times, even the “economic democracy” of socialism, are by necessity always oligarchic. We have already pointed out that the labor organizations, investigated by Michels, had been thoroughly capitalized, so that their structure did not differ from the structure of so-called bourgeois democracy. Pareto’s theory of the circulation of elites is a restatement of the theory of capitalist competition in political terms, whereas in Michels’ theory the experiences with bourgeois political democracy form the sole content of his seemingly timeless concept of organization.

According to Michels the need for organization and the mechanics of organization make a classless and democratic society impossible. In other words, social life itself prevents a real sociality. But one cannot deal with organization per se. There was, for example, a pre-capitalist division of labor which differed from the division of labor under capitalism which will differ from the division of labor under socialism. To repeat, for methodological reasons one may deal with the division of labor per se. Yet, in order to make statements referring to the world of facts, one must return from this abstract investigation to the division of labor under specific conditions, at a particular time. Therefore, when Burnham says that a Machiavellian will be “scientific”, that is, will be satisfied with "the systematic description of public facts and the attempt to correlate sets of these facts in laws; and, through these correlations, attempt to predict, with some degree of probability, future events," the facts he can deal with are not the timeless concepts with which the Machiavellians operate — such as Machiavelli’s "political man", Mosca’s "constant psychological law", Sorel’s ever-necessary "function of myth", Michels’ "iron law of oligarchy", and Pareto’s "residues" — but the prevailing facts of the society in which the predictions are made.
A closer investigation than Burnham's of the Machiavellian principles will lead to the recognition that they have been derived not from discovered permanent and universal laws operating in all societies but from the observable facts that characterize the capitalist form of society. To discover these capitalist laws is to discover some of the secrets of capitalism's strength and perspicacity, but not the permanency of exploitation and class rule. This whole endeavor serves either as an apology for capitalism which, after all, appears now to be doing only what is unavoidable, or it expresses the psychological state of despair that spreads in the turmoil of crisis when the first actions against capitalism are themselves still of a capitalist character.

The Machiavellian ideology is finally nothing but the political expression of the prevailing fetishism of commodity production. In capitalism it is only at the point of exchange, on the market, that the social character of production can assert itself. The result of the market and price fluctuations, which determine the fortunes and mishaps of individuals, is that the social movement of the producers takes on the form of a movement of things which rule the producers. Here the process of production masters man, instead of being mastered by him. The idea of the impersonal and automatic character of the economic order created by the exchange mechanism is carried over to other fields of human activity. It reappears in the "political laws" of Machiavellianism, which also supposedly control the behavior of men, and in the unalterable "laws of organizations" which subject men to their rule. But just as the exchange relations, which control men, are of man's own creation, so the political laws and the laws of organization, too, are of man's own making. If men made them, they can unmake them. If, by virtue of their own actions, men are now mastered by economics, politics and organizations, they may come to master directly and consciously their social problems by different actions.

The development of Machiavellian theory reflects the whole historical development of capitalism itself. Every particular stage in this development gave a particular twist to Machiavellianism, but it remained throughout, merely a special way of expressing the ruling capitalist ideology. The fetishism of commodity production and the false consciousness to which it gives rise cannot be ended short of the abolition of capitalism. Capitalism, however, is disintegrating. The present vogue of Machiavellianism is explained by the fact that the market mechanism, the basis of capitalist ideology, has ceased to function as it did before. With the growth of monopoly and with increasing state-control, it becomes more and more difficult to reconcile the old ideology with the new facts of social life. The modern Machiavellians try to overcome the difficulty by a change of terminology. What hitherto has been expressed largely in economic terms is now expressed once more in political language. Although it does not matter what kind of terminology is used, there still exists indecision as to which one to choose. And this brings us back to Burnham who, in his earlier Managerial Revolution, tried to find the economic meaning of contemporary fascism, but is now quite ready to disregard all but the political and organizational aspects of this "new" and also "very old" Machiavellian movement.

III

From his newly acquired Machiavellian point of view, Burnham analyzes first the nature of the present historical period. It is still the Managerial Revolution. This revolution, he says, "was in fact anticipated and its general course predicted by the modern Machiavellians more than a generation ago." This, of course, is not so. All that Mosca, Michels, and Pareto "predicted" was that there always will be rulers and ruled, and that a truly socialistic society is an impossibility. This view, as everyone knows, was shared by the great majority of people in all nations. It was challenged only by those who opposed capitalism.

This Machiavellian "prediction," furthermore, has been proven "true" only for people who assert that the political and economic changes in the twentieth century were of an anti-capitalist nature that have led to new social relations and a new form of society. Without this assertion the "prediction" would be meaningless. It would amount to saying that capitalism consists of rulers and ruled. Nobody ever doubted that. However, Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism are transformations of capitalist society which have left intact its basic relationship, that is, the divorce of the workers from the means of production and the consequent exploitation of the many by the few. These transformations cannot prove the impossibility of socialism and the correctness of the Machiavellian point of view. They were designed from the first either to safeguard the existing basic capitalist relationships or, in backward nations, to install them more securely in order to counteract the onslaught of imperialism. The Machiavellian "prediction" consists of nothing more than the empty statement that socialism is not possible because it is not here.

For Burnham, a social revolution has the restricted meaning of a "comparatively rapid shift in the composition and structure of the élite and in the mode of its relation to the non-élite." Yet even in this restricted sense one cannot define the present fascist movement as a revolutionary movement for, though in shifts the composition and structure of the élite, it does not alter the mode of the relation of the élite to the non-élite. Because this latter relation is not changed, Burnham has to confine himself to the more superficial aspects of the conditions for social change. He names as the "principal" one the contradiction between the institutions and the technology of society. This contradiction in his view, however, is merely the result of the incapacies of the old élite; they arise not from the social relations of production but from the degeneration of the ruling class which, instead of being self-confident and realistically brutal, becomes cultural philosophical and interested in the pursuit of sensuous pleasures. And also because this élite refuses to assimilate the new up-starts clamoring for power.
The new elite, now in formation, will include elements of the old. But the new elite — specifically, the managers of industry and professional soldiers — will dominate society and determine future events. The whole content of the “social revolution” now in progress consists, for Burnham, in fact that the managers have gained more power in determining the policy of particular enterprises, trusts, and cartels than they possessed previously, and in the fact that because of the war the professional soldier came to the fore. However, as Robert S. Lynd has put it, “behind the fiction of the ‘manager class’ . . . stands the same old power. ‘The voice is Jacob’s voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.’" The soldiers and managers of Burnham’s “world revolution” together with all other capitalistic groups and interests are not out to make a revolution; rather, they strive to prevent a possible revolution against the capitalist world. Of course from a Machiavellian, that is, from a capitalist point of view, the change of the elite is everything and the real social movement nothing, for of space and time and history”. They are merely apologists of capitalism, content of the “social revolution” now in progress consists, for Burnham, soldiers — will dominate society and determine future events. The whole course from a Machiavellian, that is, from a capitalist point of view, the change of the elite is everything and the real social movement nothing, for capitalistically one can assert oneself only in a “revolution” which involves no more than a change of the elite. In a revolution which attempts to end the “circulation of élites”, Machiavellianism cannot serve as a guide to action. It is for this reason that a proletarian revolution can never be “Machiavellian.” It can, however, appreciate Machiavelli as a bourgeois revolutionist in politics. But Burnham’s “modern Machiavellians” do not think and act as Machiavelli did, that is, as a revolutionary force out to destroy a conservative force. Their world is not Machiavelli’s “real world of space and time and history”. They are merely apologists of capitalism, for the bourgeois revolution is long past. Today a revolutionary movement is exclusively of the non-élite, or it is not revolutionary. The theory of the non-élite, however, is still best developed in Marxism. And thus the line of revolutionary thinking does not lead from Machiavelli to Mosca, Michels and Pareto, but from Machiavelli to Marx.

Democracy is the second problem Burnham deals with. Historical experience forces us, he says, to conclude that democracy, in the sense of “self-government”, is an impossibility. The psychological tendencies and technical conditions of social organization, as shown by the Machiavellians, reduce democracy to a myth, formula, or derivation. As a myth it helps, of course, to make the ruling minority secure and to prevent the disintegration of the social structure. As a formula, democracy is used today to strengthen the international trend towards Bonapartism. But it is wrong to think, he adds, that Bonapartism violates the formula of democracy; it is rather the logical and historical culmination of the democratic myth.

Democracy can, however, be defined in other terms than that of self-government. It can be defined, Burnham says, as a system in which “liberty” exists, that is, “juridical defense” or the “right to opposition.” So defined, democracy is not a myth. In this sense it is a necessary condition of scientific advance and the only effective check on the power of the governing elite, for only power can restrain power.

This definition is, of course, the necessary one for Machiavellianism. Without it, the theory of the “circulation of élites” would have no base to rest upon. If there were not the right to opposition, there would be no new élite able to oppose the old. And also the “pluralistic view” of history would suffer greatly if there were not a number of “social forces” in society, fought or used by the opposing élites. And thus it turns out that a “true Machiavellian” must defend “liberty" as against the centralistic tendencies in the prevailing society. Behind Burnham’s reasoning still stands the same old laisser faire ideology.

“Liberty” is possible only, he says, if no single force among the various “social forces” enumerated by Mosca becomes strong enough to swallow up the rest. To be sure, he admits that present-day development tends to destroy the basis for social opposition. Nevertheless, he is not “yet convinced that freedom . . . is impossible.” Private-capitalist property rights in the instruments of production, even under trust and monopoly conditions, he says, “were a sufficient fragmentation of economic power to provide a basis for liberty.” Complete state control of all economic power destroys this basis. But one does not need to defend the first in order to prevent the second, for there are other means than capitalist property rights to prevent centralization. The state itself, Burnham suggests vaguely, could be decentralized or organizations along syndicalist and corporative lines could be instituted.

To make the defense of Machiavellian “democracy” more to the taste of the non-élite, Burnham discovers finally that “through a curious and indirect route by way of freedom, we return to self-government, which we were unable to discover by any direct path.” The existence of an opposition in society, he says, indicates a cleavage in the ruling class. In a society with public opposition, the conflict within the ruling class cannot be solved within the ruling class itself. Since rule depends upon the ability to control the existing social forces, the opposition seeks to draw forces to its side. It must promise certain benefits to various groups and, when in power, it must keep some of these promises. And thus the “masses, blocked by the iron law of oligarchy from directly and deliberately ruling themselves, are able to limit and control, indirectly, the power of their rulers.” This tricky business is, of course, only another formulation of Hegel’s “cunning of reason” and of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” And under certain circumstances these ideas contain some truth, for the absence of regulation is itself a kind of regulation, and the various limitations that beset the actions of the ruling class give to its behavior a certain direction. Yet it is plain nonsense to say that the masses control their rulers because they are controlled by them.

To make promises and to keep promises are two different things. At times the former “Marxist” in Burnham recognizes that “the general pattern of social development is determined by technological change and by other factors quite beyond the likelihood of human control.” At other times, however, he forgets that there are objective limits to the actions of men and
the actions of élites. At any rate, he does not trouble himself to find out in what situations the life-conditions of the non-élite may be improved by way of the struggle between the out-élite and the in-élite, and under what conditions the struggle of élites is unable to affect the life of the masses in other ways than negative ones. But without such concrete investigations, the idea of the "indirect rule" of the masses can serve only ideological purposes. It sweetens the "bitter truth" that masters there must be, and it soothes the conscience of the élite which, after all, appears now as the servant of the people.

We come now to the last question raised by Burnham: Can politics be scientific? The question itself he finds ambiguous. Before it can be answered, he says, it must be resolved into several more precise questions, 1) can there be a science of politics and society, 2) can the masses act scientifically in political affairs, and 3) can the élite, or some section of the élite, act scientifically?

The first question he answers with yes, for all that is needed here, he says, is the recording and systematization of observable events, from which generalizations and hypotheses can be derived and which can be tested through predictions about future events. That a social and political science is possible he demonstrates with academic researches in such fields as mortality, diseases, certain economic facts, suicide, crime, literacy and so on. The work of the Machiavellians and some findings of Marx he also offers in support of his affirmative answer.

One cannot deny that the application of scientific method to social problems has yielded some results. Indeed, as Peguy once said, under capitalism one knows more and more about less and less. Science has increased the knowledge of details. But this knowledge, too, largely serves the ruling class and the society it calls its own. Like everything else in capitalism, science is partly real and partly ideological. Since this is so, it is not "neutral" but, like any other activity, machine, or organization it has the twofold purpose of making social life secure in order to make the life of the ruling classes secure. It can function only in this double sense or it is rejected as subversive and thus as "unscientific." To be sure, in certain fields of scientific investigation the two-fold character of science, though never totally absent, is almost completely hidden. But in regard to political and social questions, it is not science that rules but class interests.

The second question—whether or not the masses can act scientifically—Burnham answers in the negative. To think scientifically, he says, means to consciously select real goals and to take the proper practical steps for reaching those goals. Scientific procedure, he says, in answer to his last question, is possible for sections of the élite. The ignorance of the masses as to the methods of administration and rule, the fact that they must spend their energies on the bare making of a living, a lack of ambition and ruthlessness and so on, prevents the masses from acting scientifically. It is different with the élite. Comprising sections smaller than the large mass groups, the members of the élite know all about administration and rule; they do not have to make their own living and have the time to cultivate their political skill. They are ambitious and ruthless and thus able to proceed logically.

For Burnham it is a "realistic goal" to stay in or to enter the élite. "Real means" to reach this goal are force and fraud. As far as politics is concerned, other means and other means are non-logical, for society is forever condemned to be divided between rulers and ruled. The criterion for logical behavior is success. Individuals, he says, can "by deliberate scientific means, rise into the very top rank of social and political power." But they must take the appropriate steps to secure their power and privilege. They must not fall victims to myths but proceed scientifically as previously described.

A "logically acting" ruling class is a blessing for the ruled, for there is often "a certain correlation between the interests of the rulers and the interests of the ruled." Such ruling élite will not fail to keep its ranks open. This too, benefits some of the ruled and "permits a greater expansion of creative social energies." To keep the ranks open is "liberty" and this "liberty" is a safeguard against bureaucratic degeneration . . . and a protection against revolution.

The gist of Burnham's writing consists of a plea, directed at the ruling class in the so-called democratic nations, to learn from the example of Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism what to do and what not to do in order to stay in power. The "Machiavellian way" is to defend "freedom." It is, however, also a way to destroy it. If it can do both equally well, it is independent of a particular form of society or a definite historical period. It is therefore merely inconsistent of Burnham to maintain that a true Machiavellian should adapt his actions "to the broad pattern of social change established by factors beyond deliberate human control." If these "broad pattern" change a liberal into a fascist society, a Machiavellian must also change from a defender to a destroyer of "freedom." But if his actions are determined by social changes independent of the actions of men, then, whatever a Machiavellian does will be determined not by his "scientific" and deliberate activity, but instead, this so-called "scientific" and deliberate activity will be determined by uncontrollable social changes. Burnham's argument, finally, boils down to his admission that, though the Machiavellians do not know what makes for social change, they have learned nevertheless that all previous changes did not alter the fact that some people ruled and others were ruled. Therefore, the smart man will be a liberal with the liberals and a fascist with the fascist, but he will always try to be on top.

Although, according to Burnham, "logical actions" open the way into the élite, they do not insure leadership. In order to use and control the masses, the leaders must stoop to their level of non-logical thinking. "The political life of the masses and the cohesion of society," he says, "demand
the acceptance of myths." The leaders must profess belief in myths — in short, they must lie, for of course they know better. Since it is hard to lie continuously, the liars often fall victim to their own lies. The deceivers deceive themselves. They cease to be "scientific" and in consequence the whole society suffers. The "most shattering crisis of recorded history," which we are experiencing today, is an example of what happens when an elite ceases to be scientific with the lie. However, all is not yet lost. Burnham still believes that our society will "somehow" survive, because out of its present crisis a new elite of better scientists and greater liars may emerge who perhaps can stabilize society once more.

All that can be said about Burnham's "science" is that it yields no more than a few ordinary observations as to the "character" of the elite and a re-statement of the long-known difference between reality and ideology. The "logic" of the elite and the "non-logic" of the masses is of course identical with the relationship between owners and non-owners of the means of production. The appropriation of the means of production by a special class, the division of labor, and the expansion of production and commerce generally created a particular social relationship which gave rise to the prevailing ideology. Because the means of production are not directly the producers' tools for making a living, but stand apart from and opposed to them as capital, people believe that capital is needed to secure the existence of society. The workers find it necessary for their existence. The capitalists control them by virtue of their control over both rulers and ruled. In capitalism the rulers have the advantages. That is why they rule. They have them by virtue of their control of the means of production. To make this control secure, their rule is extended over the means of destruction. The workers have nothing but their labor power and, at times, their powerless organizations. Their behavior is necessarily "non-logical" because, lacking the means to reach objectives favorable to themselves, they have no such objectives. Their acceptance of the ruling ideology indicates their lack of power. The ruling class, on the other hand, has all the power. It can afford to adhere to any ideology. Generally, it accepts the obvious one which grows out of the existing social relations. It can also be "scientific," that is, recognize where its real power lies. It can be aware of the function of ideology and also of the fact that ideologies are perishable. But whether the rulers are "scientific," or "deceived deceivers," in any case they have the power and exercise it in their own interests. At times, of course, they may trust too much to the force of ideology, or neglect necessary ideological "reforms," or fail to coordinate ideology properly with military and economic instruments of class rule. And then they may be pushed aside by other politicians riding in on the crest of movements, breaking through the actual and ideological boundaries that enclose the masses. Or the entrenched rulers may be forced to share their power with the upstarts who are ready to replace them.

The "logic" of the rulers is, however, no more than a function of their power, just as the "non-logic" of the masses stems from their lack of power. If the situations were reversed, so would the distribution of "logic" between rulers and ruled be reversed. A successful revolution by a suppressed class will "prove" that the defeated did not act "scientifically." The new class in power will have "logic" on its side. So it has been in all bourgeois revolutions in which one group of exploiters was pushed out of power by another group. The bourgeois era was the "era of enlightenment," or "rationalism." Yet it did not solve the problems of society, not even the problems of the bourgeoisie. In the name of "science" it spread a new kind of chaos all over the world.

The controllers are controlled by socio-economic forces beyond their comprehension. They are not merely "deceived" by their own home-made myths, but subjected to the social anarchy which they cannot end without ending their own existence as a ruling class. Being powerless in the face of the real problems which plague society — despite all their power over the masses — the rulers, too, find refuge in ideology which some of their spokesmen now prefer to call "science."

If the evidence of the past shows anything, it shows that man has changed many things — his surroundings, his life conditions, and himself. Until now he has left undisturbed the class division of society. To do away with this relationship presupposes the removal of many obstacles in the way of a rational society, foremost among them an insufficient social productivity. However, more and more of these obstacles are disappearing; the time seems near when another decisive social change may be brought about.
is because of this that the ruling class strives harder than ever to safeguard the class nature of society. But the more "scientific" it becomes in order to secure its own existence, the more it disrupts the conditions of class rule. Yet its enormous offensive against the further development of sociality makes it appear stronger than ever before. The powerless in society are more than ever conscious of their weakness, they bend their heads still lower. The frightened intellectuals rush forward to swear new allegiance to the dominant powers. In order to maintain some sort of self-respect they do not hesitate to represent their fear as "scientific insight." Yet all the while, the contradiction between class rule and social needs is growing.

The means of production are still in the hands of the ruling class. But to keep them there, the means of destruction are now placed in the hands of the masses. With such means at their disposal, they can now have objectives. They can become "logical" and "scientific." In times of great social crisis ideologies wear away quickly; new ones can hardly be developed fast enough to take full possession of men's minds and to cover up and make bearable the reality of present-day existence, which has as its ends death and destruction. It is quite possible that favorable circumstances, or the force of circumstance, may allow, or force, the masses to act in accordance with their own interests. If they do, they can abolish classes, for history is made not by some men, but by all men. If some men try once more to reduce for their own narrow purposes the coming mass movements directed against existing powers, they may once again succeed. Yet they cannot succeed in terminating the social crisis which has its basis, finally, in nothing but the neglected need for abolishing class relations in order that the existing productivity may be utilized for the welfare of all. But then again they may not succeed, because the gap between their narrow goal and the real social necessities is already too wide. It may prove impossible to end the present slaughter of men by men in any other way than by the abolition of all special interests and privileges. Whatever happens, there is no single valid reason for assuming that classes cannot be abolished. Instead there are many valid reasons for believing that the abolition of class relations will solve some of the present's most urgent problems.

Paul Mattick

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN RESISTANCE

The purpose of this essay is to discuss some of the psychological, social and political factors involved in the problem of Russian resistance. Those factors have been either completely neglected, inadequately treated or incorrectly correlated in the numerous articles and books purporting to deal with this problem. In general, the rationalizations and fallacies are based upon various premises which can be organized into four parts. (1) The Army and Party purges and mass executions which so shocked the world now turn out to have been dictated by stern necessity in order to rid the country of fifth columnists. Thanks to these purges and in contrast to other nations, Russia found herself free to concentrate upon the military struggle and not worry about the home front (Joseph E. Davies, Pierre Van Paassen and others). (2) The élan of the Russian fighting masses, to which all correspondents have attested, is proof positive that the Russian is a free man who supports his regime; slaves, as Max Lerner puts it, do not fight like that. The fierceness of Russian resistance is explained in large measure by the social and economic gains which the Russians have achieved since the October Revolution (Wm. Henry Chamberlin, A. Yugow, Maurice Hindus, John Scott). (3) It may be true that there have been hardships, privations, and vast decimations of Russian masses during the periods of industrialization and collectivization, but all those were unavoidable means to a necessary end, namely, the complete militarization of the nation. In view, then, of the subsequently successful defense of the country against the invading Nazis, the whole economic and political procedure was "worth it." (Joseph E. Davies, Simeon Strunsky, Maurice Hindus, Harry Elmer Barnes, Ralph Barton Perry.) (4) From a purely military standpoint (materiel, strategy, leadership, etc.) the Russian army was very well prepared to meet the Germans; they were not caught by surprise and they knew for a long time that they had to fight the Nazis (Max Werner, Pierre Van Paassen, John Scott, Anna Louise Strong). Let us examine these statements.

First, as to the absence of fifth columnists, etc.: Uncritical apologists of the Russian regime are performing a rather dubious service in making their ridiculous statements. The Russian themselves have made statements to the contrary. To cite a few examples, (a) Stalin has warned the country against "disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers, spies and diversionsists." He warned moreover, that such destructive elements were to be found even in the Red Army itself; (b) Voroshilov complained of saboteurs
in the Moscow factories; "Izvestia" demanded the most severe punishment for saboteurs, and "Pravda" attacked "grafters, cowards, and traitors" within the Communist Party, as well as those in power who were responsible for depriving the Russian masses of "fuel, food, shelter, medicine and proper transportation"; (c) recently the Moscow radio has reported high treason at Krasnodar in connection with Gestapo atrocities at the Kuban capital; and we are now informed that General Vlassov, former head of the Soviet Military Mission from 1936 to 1939, holder of the Order of Lenin and Red Banner, who was in charge of the Valkov front, was backed by the Nazis in Smolensk as a Red Quisling.

There is nothing unusual about perfidy; every country in the world has its share of fifth columnists. The people of the democratic countries take it for granted that there are disruptive elements in their midst since they have learned to accept the fact that the democratic process, in permitting opposition opinions, runs the risk of generating seditious forces. The complete absence — if that were at all possible — of a fifth column in a totalitarian country would merely indicate that it had an exceptionally vigilant police force and effective concentration camps capable of handling not only fifth columnists but all honest opposition as well. The classic non-sequitur was offered years ago by Leon Trotsky in his polemic against Karl Kautsky. The famous Social-Democrat was complaining about the silencing of other working-class parties by Bolshevik terror, and the former head of the Red Army replied that in contrast to capitalist countries, there were no social, political or economic conditions in the Soviet Union which could bring forth parties opposed to the Bolsheviks. The persuasive finality of the Cheka squads in dealing with oppositionists apparently never occurred to Trotsky.

Our totalitarian liberals, having been propagandized for over fifteen years by both the Russian government and the American Communist Party to the effect that all those countless thousands who have been liquidated by means of trials, purges and concentration camps were "traitors, wreckers, spies, etc." still continue to believe that every last "Trotskyist and Bukharinist dog" has been exterminated, and that therefore, the Soviet Union is singularly free from fifth columnists. Pierre Van Paassen, for example, who surely must be aware that no dictatorial regime can succeed in completely annihilating its opposition, seems to find an exception in the case of Russia. There is, he says, no more opposition to the Stalin regime. The reason for this would seem to be the superiority of G. P. U. methods over those of the Gestapo. If this is his explanation (and even Russian writers still employ the expression the dictatorship of the proletariat), he is guilty of closing the discussion at the very point where it should be initiated. What are those personal, social, economic or political factors which make it necessary for the U. S. S. R. to maintain the largest secret police force in the world? By refusing to transcend the limitations of G.P.U. power in solving profound national problems, Van Paassen merely shows that his political orientation in this case entails only force and suppression. He is guilty of still another logical fallacy. He says, for example, that Hitler could find no Laval or Weygand to do his bidding among the Russians. Of course not, but not for the reason Van Paassen gives, namely, that the Russians, unlike the French, have no fifth columnists among them, especially among the ranks of their leading political and military figures. France and Russia are not comparable phenomena. Van Paassen commits the very common error of treating a nation as an entity, instead of evaluating specific national problems as they relate themselves to the type of economy, for instance, to relationships among classes, historical traditions, the racial and religious temper of various sections of the population, the political philosophy of government leaders, etc. Such an illogical approach to the problem, even by an ardent defender of Russian policies, is as fruitless as that of the many hostile critics of Russia (Sidney Hook, Dorothy Thompson and others) who argued during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact that such an agreement was quite natural since Germany and Russia were, in all essentials, identical regimes, when nothing could have been farther from the truth. Crude analogies are no substitute for political analysis.

Hitler must find it difficult to make a deal with a Red Quisling simply because any Russian counterpart of a Laval, for instance, would have little appeal to the Russian masses. What could he, an agent of Nazism, offer people who had been propagandized for a quarter of a century on the subject of capitalism as a perpetually encircling and hostile enemy, a system which always threatened to bring back the hated Czaristic and White Guard landlords who would once again divide, enslave and pillage! The older capitalistically-minded kulaks, hostile to the Soviet regime, were liquidated long ago. The later wealthy and middle-layer peasants, who have profited tremendously from the nationalized economy like their urban counterparts, the Stakhanovites, and highly-paid trust executives, would not be attracted to any foreign "liberator" who had been painted in press, radio, drama and literature as avaricious and bestial. Finally, it should be pointed out to Van Paassen and others that no Quisling in any country has succeeded in gaining significant support among his countrymen. No one knows that better than Joseph Stalin who tried to foist both a "people's government" and a Kuusinen upon the Finns, and who as a result suffered not only a political and diplomatic defeat, but a cynical rebuff from his own people.

Second, there is the question of the Russian whose fierce fighting bears evidence to his being a free man, a supporter of his regime, and a defender of his social and economic gains, etc. (a) It is interesting to see how otherwise rational men who can discuss the social, economic and psychological reasons behind mass warfare will suddenly stop dead in their analyses when they have to deal with the Russian fighting man. He is treated as though he were unique. The usual motivations adduced to explain why men fight, such as self-preservation, nationalism, racism, religion, pugnacity, frustra-
tion, xenophobia, fanaticism, adventure, etc., apparently do not apply to the Russians.

The innocent man on the street, having been completely demoralized by the spectacle of unchecked Axis aggression, as well as of democratic vacillation and capitulation, began to feel “instinctively” that perhaps most men preferred the security of enslavement to the responsibilities of liberty. If he happened to be sufficiently sophisticated, he could find corroboration for his feelings in the writings of many psychoanalysts who, like Erich Fromm, explain the “masochistic” or “escape” potential in contemporary man’s psyche. He was surprised and encouraged, therefore, when he rediscovered an obvious fact of human nature, namely, that there are still men in this world not to be intimidated by Hitler’s psychological warfare, secret weapons and legendary invincibility. This man in the street had also temporarily forgotten (under the additional influence of uninformed pacifist propaganda and political isolationism reinforced by an anti-British bias) to notice and draw correct deductions from the defense of the British people who had withstood the might of the German offensive for two years.

The average citizen in this country made another mistake. Using his own democratic privileges as a criterion and erroneously informed that only free men fight (at least defensively, since he could see that the Nazis who were supposed to be slaves could fight very well on the offensive), he was naturally surprised to witness the Russians fighting so furiously. They were also living, he had been informed, under an iron dictatorship. He began to feel that some things called for an explanation. (b) As a matter of fact, it should be obvious to anyone with even a superficial knowledge of world history that men have fought under every type of regime throughout primitive, ancient, medieval and modern society. This is another way of saying, therefore, that not only have men fought for a multiplicity of reasons but that slaves and serfs have given their lives serving masters or their own deluded impulses, just as free men have died serving their own libertarian principles. Russian serfs fought not only under benevolent czars but also under tyrants like Ivan the Terrible. They fought in the Napoleonic Wars, they were bled white for three years during the First World War fighting under a corrupt leadership, and now they fight under a dictatorship just as Germans and Japanese fight under theirs.

If one is really interested in discovering what makes a nation fight, he must discard the usual vague or blanket generalities about a whole country. He must approach the question in terms of economic classes, political programs, group relations, etc. Perhaps the Russian problem can be understood more clearly if we look at the American scene. Why does the American fight not only on his own soil as the Russian does but thousands of miles away from his own land? He fights, first of all, because he has no choice in the matter; he is drafted. It is no secret that millions of Americans in the armed forces alone are unaware of the ideological implications of this war. This is amply substantiated by correspondents reporting from all theatres of war. A soldier, for example, may be an ardent supporter of the Republican Party; may even believe that the war could be more effectively prosecuted if Wendell Willkie were President. But this loyalty as an American is not questioned. Fighting with him may be another American who not only opposes Roosevelt politically, but has for many years fought the very system he is nonetheless defending; he is a socialist or an anarchist, who believes that the capitalist system must be abolished, that all governments are forces of coercion and oppression. But if we could view the battle and watch these men fighting and dying, we could not distinguish the pro-Roosevelt Democrat from the liberal, laborite, anarchist or Wilkie supporter.

On the Russian battlefield men are fighting who support the political philosophy of “Communism”. One group supports Stalin, another believes that military and political affairs could be managed more effectively if Commissars A, B and C were removed, and Comrades X, Y and Z given command; still another group subscribes to a reform communism, arguing that if only the Stalinist bureaucracy could be eliminated the democratic potentialities of the masses could be fully realized; but they regard Hitler as a still greater threat to their country at the moment. Still another group believes that Russia’s economic and political salvation lies only in a return to some form of democratic capitalism or mild socialism; perhaps a modern Miliukov or a Kerensky would be the answer. But still they believe that the Nazis must be crushed and driven from Russian soil before anything else can take place. In neither of the examples given can one detect either political partisanship or ideological heresies.

What then becomes of the contention that men fight only when they support their regime? Probing beneath this over-all picture of general ideological groupings and taking into account the class or caste stratification, one finds more specific answers to the question of why Russians fight. The fighters of any nation can be divided into three groups: those with definite interests to preserve, those with no other choice before them, and those who have been so propagandized that they know only what they have been told, regardless of their actual interests. Among those in Russia having definite stakes are the ruling classes; the leading party functionaries; the heads of the G.P.U., the trusts, the collectives, the trade-unions; the administrative bureaucracy, the army chiefs, the prominent technicians, engineers, etc. Among those who see no alternative for themselves are the various political oppositionists and the millions of long-suffering, self-sacrificing workers and peasants. What do they stand to gain by not fighting, assuming that they have had the luxury of leisure and the free man’s intellectual training for weighing alternatives? Even if they hate the regime of Stalin, a Hitler victory is certain to bring absolute slavery, starvation and death. In other words, the simple law of self-preservation provides the motive for their actions. The third group would be represented primarily by the youth of the nation which has been steeped in the virtues of party loyalty, self-sac-
rifice, fanaticism and devotion to the ideals of state-socialism. The same process can be seen in both German and Japanese life.

Not only has the Russian child been subjected to formal types of definite instruction. He has also absorbed the propaganda which has been dinned into the ears of his peasant parents for more than twenty years; namely, that Russia is surrounded by capitalist enemies, that there is an irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and communism which the former intends to resolve only by bloody war, and that the rigors of industrialization are unavoidable by-products of successfully defending the country. Admitting great suffering on the part of the masses, the government defends itself by saying there is no alternative so long as the capitalist nations, incapable of organizing their own economies, will be driven to further imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union in order to solve their own problems.

When war was finally unleashed against the Russians, it gave apparent validity to Stalin's predictions. All propaganda of this type was a perfect complement to certain nationalistic traits long associated with the Russians — stoicism, toughness and fearlessness. The Germans only appeared ridiculous in the eyes of the Russians with their attempts at psychological "blitzing," for Russians have a long history of suffering and courage. The alacrity with which they met the attack of the Germans (in spite of military and bureaucratic blunders admitted by the regime itself) was in sharp contrast to the apathy and cynicism which were widespread during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Russian-Finnish campaign.

William Henry Chamberlin, A. Yugow and others insist that one of the most important reasons for the fierceness of Russian resistance is the fact that although the Russian masses enjoy less personal and civil liberty than they did under the czar, they have greater social democracy, i.e., there is more equality of opportunity for the common man. There are striking contradictions in these writers' positions. For example, in the concluding chapter of Yugow's "Russia's Economic Front for Peace and War" which explains the Russian struggle in terms of social and economic gains, he refutes his position taken in previous sections which describe bureaucratic tyranny, class exploitation and dictatorial mismanagement. And Chamberlin in "The Russian Review", Autumn 1942, after describing the "very wide variations in salaries and wages", and the distribution of the "perquisites of office for the men of the ruling class, etc." presents the surprising conclusion that "old barriers of wealth, class and race have been swept away." Is it not fair to assume, then, that old barriers have merely been superceded by new ones, and that nothing new has been presented to explain why Russians fight? In other words, men in any country and under any political government will fight if they are personally involved. Chamberlin, however, offers other well-argued reasons to explain Russian resistance, such as nationalism, religion, etc., as well as the political-military factor of the collectivized economy's acting as a force in mobilization, discipline and common effort. It is Yugow who leans rather heavily upon the socio-economic gain theory. It is pertinent at this point to refer to the position of the Trotskyists (a variation of this theory), that the Russian masses are fighting against a possible restoration of private property relations characteristic of capitalist society, that they are struggling to defend Russian nationalized property. This the Trotskyists call the economic basis of a workers' state — inconsistently, however, since at the same time they admit that the Russian masses are denied the rights and privileges which derive from nationalized property.

If one accepts the Chamberlin-Yugow thesis, one subscribes to a rather gloomy and cynical view not only of Russians but of human nature in general: men can be galvanized into action for bread alone, since they are denied civil and individual liberty. They fought under the czar for a little bread, and they fight for Stalin apparently for the same reason, the only difference between the two being a quantitative one. According to this thesis, the older generation which remembers the period of the pre-Bolshevik Revolution should not fight at all, because such students of Russian history and economy as Mark Kninoy, Elias Tartak and Manya Gordon, maintain that in terms of pure economics the Russian masses were far better off under the czars than they are under the present regime.

Actually, no such interpretation of human nature is justified when one takes into account what is revealed as a new note in contemporary Russian literature. Vera Alexandrova, and Helen Iswolsky who have been studying Russian novels, plays and poetry, report a constant emphasis upon factors in no way related to those political, economic and industrial problems so dear to the hearts of pre-war Russian poets and dramatists. What is still more startling, moreover, is that the Party-man as protagonist is no longer the dominant figure in Russian plays. There is a note of constant reproach by the great mass of non-politicized people, especially the peasantry who have been let down, neglected and betrayed by the urban intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, the "infallible" leaders, and all those who to them seem responsible for having brought such conditions upon the country. The ruling strata have become aware of those millions for whom they have had the utmost contempt, those same millions who are now fighting the invader. It is the height of political expediency, therefore, for the ruling strata not only publicly to recognize their benefactors, but to admit their own administrative derelictions.

What, then, instead of the usual political and industrial theme, is emphasized throughout Russian literature? Aside from the hostility, frustration and newly-recognized importance of the non-communist masses, there is a constant underlining of those aspects of human behavior which, for lack of a better term, may be called "spiritual." They are the expressions of human conduct which manifest themselves during periods of nation-wide catastrophe and common danger. They are ideas, feelings and activities...
associated with such purely human experiences as fortitude, compassion, faith, self-preservation and kinship. Such are the themes of contemporary Russian literature. The conclusion, then, which seems to be clearly indicated is that contrary to those who explain Russian resistance in terms of social and economic gains, one must emphasize the qualities of the human spirit. Man does not live by bread alone, at least not in Russia. Here is a situation in which ironically it is not the pre-war factors of the Russian regime which explain the elan of the masses, but the war itself which has released those powers. One must keep this idea constantly in mind in evaluating the non-military factors adduced by such writers as Chamberlin, Hindus, Lerner and Fischer to explain Russian resistance.

After all, not very much light is being thrown upon the problem when we are informed that there has been a great development in nationalism or religion, for example, among the Russians. Such terms as nationalism and religion must be used within a specific historical framework. Nationalism today is different from that of the 18th and 19th centuries and must be defined differently in each country. Nationalism in Russia, in Italy, in Switzerland and in the United States are not comparable. Furthermore, each person of these countries understands the concept in terms of his own spontaneous and individualized experiences or in the degree to which he has been indoctrinated by his government. Once the premise of the spiritual factors is accepted, we begin to comprehend the distinctive quality of that type of nationalism which follows logically from it. It is a nationalism far removed from chauvinism, arrogance, pride or superiority; it is that close attachment which people feel for their homes, their land, and the thousand and one psychological associations clustering about their relatives, friends and fellow-countrymen. It is a nationalism which generates comradeship, solidarity and that self-sacrificing cooperation which explains the feverish productivity in factory and farm. Such manifestations of group behavior are not to be confused with the nationalistic propaganda developed by the Russian government consisting of chauvinistic proclamations celebrating czaristic generals and feudal tyrants.

Whether the Soviet government's motive was purely internal politics, in which case Stalin would be exploiting the mass spirit and catering to the conservative tendencies within the ruling strata, or whether the motive was international power politics, in which case Stalin would be reassuring his allies and placating those hostile forces within both England and the United States who might jeopardize his Lend-Lease material if Russian policies could in any way be construed as still having a threatening communist internationalism — in either case, it is a nationalism which bespeaks a government's attempt to cement cohesiveness, and it is not the spontaneous cooperation of endangered masses facing a relentless invader. According to William Henry Chamberlin, one of the most important reasons for the successful military resistance of the Russians is the scrapping of the "more utopian aspirations of the first period of the Bolshevik Revolution." The present army, in other words, is nationalistic, not internationally-minded; and with this nationalism Chamberlin and others note certain concomitant features: rigid discipline, a sharp differentiation between officers and men, and a complete absence of class-war ideology. In thus divorcing the military factor from the economic, social and political forces affecting all phases of Russian life, he subscribes to an approach which is fruitless in a study of any country, especially Russia, where the relationships in the early years of the Revolution between the Red Army and the civilian masses were entirely different from those in any other country in the world. In essence he states that, given all those internal developments that have taken place since about 1928, we have the kind of army which one would expect, namely, a military expression of social and economic inequality, of bureaucratic privilege and political isolationism. Why, moreover, such an army should be superior to one defending the principles of equality, liberty and international fraternity is not explained. Surely Chamberlin cannot deny the formidable striking power of the Red Army between 1918-1921, nor would he dismiss lightly the tremendous potentialities which an actual revolutionary army would have today, possessed of the political weapons of international socialism.

The same sociological and political approach which we used to discuss the concept of nationalism is valid in analyzing the new wave of religious feeling among the Russians. Here, too, is a personal and social expression which may be a psychological escape, or an endless source of spiritual power in the face of human tragedy; but no matter how we define it, we must differentiate it from that kind of religious worship and organization which has existed since the Bolshevist Revolution under different conditions varying from governmental persecution and atheistic contempt to mild indifference. This has been religion on the defensive, and not that aggressive manifestation of the human spirit which writers on the Russian scene are describing today. Again, as in the case of mass nationalism, the government as an administrative gesture toward mass unity seems to be making very definite efforts to further this religious development. Other political motives would be: to influence religious opinion in the democracies, to counteract anti-communist sentiment throughout Catholic countries, and to supplement its other political and racial activities in connection with various Pan-Slavic movements throughout the Balkans.

Third, as to those who justify the famines, purges and mass decimation associated with the rapid tempo of industrialization and forced collectivization as unavoidable concomitants in establishing the country on a successful military basis, etc. In this group there are many people who only yesterday were in the forefront of prominent libertarian groups condemning the employment of "ruthless," "inhuman" and "tyrannical" means to attain "dubious" ends. Today the picture has changed. Strangely enough, the mere fact of the successful Russian resistance to the German onslaught has furnished sufficient reason for their change of mind. For example, Harry Elmer Barnes in an article, "Realism on Russia" ("The Progressive", Aug., 1943)
states that it is high time for someone to present an objective picture of
Joseph Stalin, and goes on to say that (a) "pure of heart" socialists depart
amazingly from their usual sanity and realism in their reactions to Uncle
Joe and his land, because they expected Stalin to conduct his Russian ex-
periment as Norman Thomas might lead an L.I.D. symposium", and Norman
Thomas "would have shed just as much blood had he been in Uncle Joe's
shoes." (b) "Stalin is the supreme practical leader of which Russia stood
in sore need about 1928 in order to make good the promise of the Revolu-
tion; he created the new material Russia and made it work through his
five-year plans . . . his policies, however stern and sanguinary, brought unity
and discipline to Russia in the most critical period of Soviet history; and his
progress in socializing Russia has been nothing short of amazing." (c) "no
honest and informed student of Russian history can doubt that sabotage,
intrigue and treason were rife in the Soviet Union in the mid-thirties. Sta-
lin's purges were certainly necessary, even if carried out with unjustifiable
savagery at times, but we can hardly be final judge on this latter point."

First, it was not only Stalin who realized the danger of capitalist encircle-
ment and intervention and therefore advocated the necessity of military prep-
paration. The constant threat of the combined capitalist attack upon Russia
once the revolution took place was an eventuality which all the early Bol-
sheviks envisioned. Four years of intervention and civil war substantiated
their predictions. At the conclusion of the wars, their vigilance was never
relaxed for a moment. Every member of the Communist Party and every
man, woman and child throughout the land was prepared to expect a capi-
talist attack as inevitable, and to prepare for that war to the fullest extent.
Second, the ravages of the Civil Wars and the intervention, the economic
and political isolation, the ideological and agrarian remnants of feudalism,
all these made necessary some kind of industrial and agricultural planning,
which had been proposed even by some non-communist engineers during
the latter days of Lenin's life. Within the Communist Party itself it was
the faction of the Bolshevik-Leninists headed by Trotsky, Rakovsky and oth-
ers that made the first concrete proposals for an economic plan. It was
Stalin, Bukharin and other Right-Wing members who opposed the plan com-
pletely, but who, once they had crushed and exiled the Bolshevik-Leninists
took it over in toto and adopted it as their own.

Let us turn to some of the political and ethical implications of the in-
dustrial and military defense of the country. (a) When the early Bolshe-
viks subscribed to the idea of a continual threat of capitalist intervention,
they were merely drawing an inevitable conclusion from one of their prem-
isses i.e., since the Soviet Union represented, in the international arena, the
interests of a group, the proletariat, which was the class enemy of the bour-
geoisie within each capitalist country, war had to be expected between the
capitalist nations and the first Workers' State. And something more, too.
Because of this important class distinction any number of capitalist powers
could find common ground for attacking the Soviets sooner than they could
find reasons for fighting among themselves. That being the case, it would
be impossible for a single communist country like Russia, which was pre-
dominantly peasant, or for any other communist country no matter how
highly industrialized, to withstand a combined attack of all the major capi-
talist countries of the world. Mere military preparation alone, no matter
how extensive, would be insufficient to guarantee a successful defense; at
least one other factor was of even greater importance. The greatest ally of
the Workers' State would be found in its own class allies throughout
the world. Not only would the proletariat of the world be an unques-
tionable ally if they succeeded in effecting their own revolutions, but they could
be a powerful force in preventing their own bourgeois governments from
attacking the Soviets.

Due to Stalin's ruthless power politics within the country and to the
disastrous Comintern tactics, Russia found herself in the late twenties dan-
gerously isolated and defenseless. It became necessary to make up for lost
time and lost international political opportunities by feverish industrial and
agricultural "planning." Making an unqualified virtue of necessity should
not be passed off as the height of political wisdom. Many students, after
analyzing Russian economy and hearing the constant complaints, which filled
the Russian press, of administrative negligence and inefficiency, the appalling
loss of machinery, tools, rolling stock, etc., and the shoddy quality of in-
dustrial products, wondered how it was that the military machine stood up so
well in the days before Russia began receiving material from England and
the United States. Since no foreigner has to this day been permitted to visit
either the fighting front beyond specified areas, or to accompany Lend-Lease
material into Russia, we do not know what actually took place during the
first year of the war. One can only conjecture that a great deal of what
has passed for "Bolshevik self-criticism" was a feverish attempt to keep
the production of military material up to at least certain minimum levels.
The Russians, as is well-known by this time, can be very secretive, so much
so that they succeeded in giving the world the impression that all their mil-
itary production was as poor in quality as that which the outsider was per-
mitted to see. One must also remember that a country of such vastness,
of almost inexhaustible natural resources and manpower, can sustain losses
which would very quickly ruin a smaller nation.

(b) Whenever Barnes, Laski, Hindus and others argue about the virtues
of furiously-paced industrialization and forced collectivization, they try to
forestall criticism by admitting that the Russian government was guilty of
cruelty, oppression, terror and death, which they consider unfortunately
necessary. These men apparently never stop to ask or to find out whether
what happened during the periods of the various plans was actually neces-
sary. Can industrialization and military planning in a country be carried
out successfully in any other fashion than by methods of brutality and waste?
Was there any opportunity to present alternate proposals which were demo-
cratically discussed and passed upon? Are unequal demands of sacrifice,
demoralizing disparity of wages, incomes and privileges, secret trials, mass purges and concentration camps "necessary" ingredients of industrializing a nation—any nation—let alone one which speaks in terms of "socialism" and the "brotherhood of man"? The apologists not only never pose such questions, they blithely assume that anything which occurred in Russia could have been done in no other way. To such important philosophical questions posed by well-intentioned and ethically-minded people as "Can the means of needless oppression and cruelty lead to the ends of peace and freedom?" or "Who is to decide whether it is just and wise to build a dam or railroad even though it may mean the sacrifice of millions of unwilling lives?", the answer of the apologists is not long in forthcoming. Peace and freedom can be attained, is the retort, if one will only trust the political, economic and social wisdom of the Party or the Committee or the Leader who knows what is best for the masses "in the long run." Or the answer is based on lofty morality justified by famous historical precedents. For example, Howard Selsam in his "Socialism and Ethics" writes that examples of human activity "in the direction of freedom . . . are the slave revolts of ancient Rome, the Cromwellian Revolution, the American, French and Russian Revolutions, John Brown's Raid on Harper's Ferry, the great strikes of the modern Labor movement, the Protestant Reformation or the Soviet Trials and executions of spies and saboteurs". Before placing the Moscow trials in the category of the great liberating movements of history, it is necessary to analyze them as juridical phenomena. It is only after historical facts have been established with certainty that questions of ethical theory can be posed. And it is Selsam himself who admits that it is not "easy to determine in every given case in what direction freedom lies and how it is best attained." After all these revealing years since the trials and despite all the factual material we now have at our disposal, Barnes still finds it more convenient to substitute conjectures for facts.

To transcend the limitations of mere factual material concerning Russian history and pose pertinent and valid ethical questions, let us consider the following: granting for the moment the validity of the apologists' argument of the infallible expert or elite, and admitting that the hitherto successful defense of Russia against the Nazis justified the ruthless pre-war policies of the government, what follows? Leaving aside the very important question which has preoccupied political and moral philosophers since Plato, namely, whether any man has the ethical right to decide the fate of another without the latter's consent, how is one to differentiate between Stalin's actions in the defense of Russia and those employed by other dictators of the present and tyrants of the past? Have they not also employed "free" and slave labor to build roads, clear swamps and construct fortifications to defend their own property, power and prestige? Since the most ruthless means seem to be justified for one ostensible purpose, i.e., the defense of the country (which in reality turns out to be, as far as the masses are concerned, merely a defense against being enslaved by a foreign conqueror) where is one to stop? Suppose, for example the ruling elite of any country decides to sacrifice a great portion of the population in preparation for the defensive war; and suppose, furthermore, that millions are decimated during the war itself, but the country is finally victorious. The invader has been repelled, and the elite continues to live. Suppose once more that this process repeats itself in a series of similar ruthless preparations and "successful" wars. The dictatorial dynasties continue to flourish, but the masses always do the dying. If the people in time could articulate their misery, they would be answered with the statement that at least they had their "freedom", they were not the subjects of a foreign conqueror. Such an answer would be cold comfort to masses of people who would begin to realize that life under such static, repetitious circumstances is only a choice between the lesser of two evils, with all avenues of escape or future liberation blocked. Military defense cannot be abstracted from the rich context of inter-related social, economic, political and moral forces within society. From the standpoint of the ruled, a philosophy which conceives life as a constant choice of lesser evil has no viability. And from the standpoint of the ruler, such a philosophy can offer either opportunistic maneuvering or eventual destruction. In terms of the nation as a whole, one would be justified in saying that its inhabitants live both a degraded and a precarious existence.

Fourth, as to the explanations of, and apologies for, the problem of pure military strategy and tactics. As previously indicated, many writers such as Max Werner, Van Paassen, John Scott, Anna Louise Strong, and others, have pointed out that (a) the Russians were not taken by surprise since they had been preparing a long time for the Nazi attack (even during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact); (b) the Russian military success was doubly assured when such military saboteurs and traitors as Tukhachevsky, Gamarik and others were assassinated; (c) all those "swivel-chair" strategists, as Van Paassen contemptuously refers to them, who predicted the defeat of the Russian Army while it was retreating rapidly during the early phases of the war, misinterpreted what was in reality a very clever military maneuver. The Russians were merely carrying out, according to the apologists, a well-laid plan in retreating to heavily fortified positions far into the rear.

First of all, as for the Russians' not having been taken by surprise. The fact of the matter is that the government itself in official announcements made by Molotov and Stalin proclaimed to the world that the Germans had struck without warning and without even having submitted any demands beforehand. It was Stalin, himself, who in attempting to explain the rapid German advances and to rally the Russian masses, admitted that the Nazis had surprised them by their sudden attack. In spite of constant warnings by foreign correspondents who saw the heavy German preparations on the Eastern Front only days before the offensive, and in spite of specific warnings by our own State Department, Stalin and Molotov issued the most vehement denials and accused the "pluto-democracies" of attempting to create a rift between the friendly powers, Russia and Germany. Broadcasts
from Moscow only the day before hostilities broke out reassured listeners that Russia thought such predictions of impending war were vicious rumors, and the commentator added that the streets were full of soldiers on leave. Granting even the most generous interpretation of Stalin's statements as being rationalizations for home consumptions, the question must still be asked, where was the Russian intelligence, the Secret Police and the vigilant border patrol defenses? Stalin, of course, committed a serious blunder in thinking that Hitler would present final, formal demands before striking. Stalin could hardly be considered a political innocent committed to strict legality, since he had before him a whole series of treaties and pacts broken by Hitler.

Secondly, as to the allegedly traitorous activities of Tukhachevsky and the other leading officers who were killed, it is impossible to discuss these, since, contrary to the Hollywood fable, "Mission to Moscow," these men were tried (if at all) in secret, and all that we know is what Stalin wants us to know. But one can draw certain conclusions from available facts and statements. By the admissions of the Russians themselves and their apologists, not only did the Soviets in Strong's phrase "expect it", but according to Max Werner and other pro-Soviet military commentators, in the summer of 1941 Russian material, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was equal to that of the Germans. The Russian were supposed to have had the edge on motorization, air-power, para-troops and manpower. Why, then, the early defeats? Is it not logical to assume that an army which had purged seventy-five per cent of its officers over the rank of colonel (officers who had achieved international reputation among military men for their accomplishments in the field of tactics and for their development of the Frunze School of Artillery) would suffer from a lack of leadership? Once again it was Stalin who, in explaining the early disasters, accused the military leadership of "complacency and frivolousness." Without technical knowledge in military affairs, one is in no position to evaluate either the Russian achievements or mistakes; that must be left to the experts. What seems incomprehensible to a layman is how a retreat which at the beginning of the war cost the Russians 30% of their wheat, 37% of their railroads, 50% of their coal, 60% of their pig-iron, 60% of their steel, and a sacrifice of 50 million Russians living in German occupied territory could be interpreted as a well-laid plan to move back to fortified positions. (The reader interested in purely military matters is referred to two articles written anonymously for Foreign Affairs, January and July, 1942, which point out in what way the Russian forced retreat differed from the famous Tukhachevsky "defense in depth"). What the Russians were doing was to take advantage of what has always been their traditional ally, space. From the standpoint of the Germans, advance meant the constant danger of over-extended lines, since Hitler, in spite of the General Staff's warning, committed himself to the stupid task of annihilating the entire Red Army. German literature on military matters has been replete with warnings and dire predictions concerning the dangers inherent in the vast spaces of Russia which have been described as "hopeless, enigmatic and double-faced." General Von Tempelhoff, the famous German military authority, expressed himself as follows, "If the Red masters are confident of their people, they can evade the victorious aggressor in order to annihilate him after he has crossed the climax of his victory."

Thirdly, what so many apologists of Russian resistance conveniently forget is what the earlier apologists for industrialization forgot, namely, the continuous aid which has poured in from the allies. Just as no account of Russia's industrial achievements which neglects the foreign contributions of technicians, engineers, tools, machinery, etc., can be complete, so no account of Russia's resistance and present offensive can be intelligible without a reference to the tremendous flow of military material, food, and medical supplies from the United States and England, not to mention the factor of the Allied military operations. The most formidable foe which the Germans still face is the productive capacity of Russia's allies.

Finally, let us examine the conditions existing at the beginning of the war within the Red Army, the relationship between it and certain civilian factors, and what has apparently taken place since that time. Contrary to what the apologists would like us to believe, the Nazi offensive did not find the Russian Army well prepared at all. Incidentally, it was not the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact which was responsible for the Russian military preparation. It was the lamentable showing of the Red Army during the Russo-Finnish War. The military campaigns revealed serious weaknesses in organization, discipline, co-ordination and transport, as is amply attested to by official Russian sources. John Scott and others report that there was mass apathy, bureaucratic mismanagement and general cynicism. It was only after a series of drastic military revisions that the war was brought to an end.

What actually happened in Russian military affairs when the Russo-German War began can best be inferred from a play which is the first drama ever to be published in Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party. Such an event is not to be taken lightly, since any play published for mass consumption in a totalitarian country must have an importance which transcends the incidental interest of mere entertainment. The play, written by Andrei Koneichuk, Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, is called "The Front." Its general intent is to make scapegoats of all those "negative heroes" responsible for the early defeats in the war, and to celebrate the new hero who is called a "positive" type. The play accomplishes the following objectives: it attacks those bureaucratic administrators and chiefs who sacrificed the quality of material demanded by the Army to quantity and speed-ups; it ridicules those conservative officers and executives who wear medals and only give orders, factory directors who boast of their "poor man's origin", and all "fools ignoramuses, sycophants, nincompoops and wheedlers" who should be "beaten bloody into a pulp". It recommends a purge of the
been generated by provided the elan and the fighting forces. On the contrary, the qualities, economic conditions which existed before the war, and which allegedly in the resistance of the Russian masses derives not from those social and sequences of their own administration and leadership. 

if one wants to call it qualities, manifested by the Russians, are not related to the type of regime under which they live, they are qualities which have been generated by the war itself.

George Kimmelman

Army, especially of those who fought in the Civil Wars of the 20's and it applauds the drastic move of placing technicians and engineers in places of power.

These conclusions can be drawn from the play. It was necessary for the regime to “explain” to the masses the reasons for the apparent mismanagement on the home front as well as on the battleline. The suggested remedies of purging and liquidation indicate that they must have already been put into effect. Stalin and his associates in creating scapegoats for administrative errors are attempting to absolve themselves from any responsibility, even though those men who are reviled in the play were not democratically elected but chosen, honored and decorated by Stalin himself. Stalin, as well as other close members of the ruling strata, are maneuvering their political positions so as to take advantage of what is evidently a new shift in the composition of various social classes. There is, of course, emphasis upon the importance of both the military youth and the technicians (both essential to the successful prosecution of the war), and upon the upper layers of the peasantry. Not only are there the continual national developments in directions diametrically opposed to those of the Bolshevik Revolution, but there are severely critical remarks directed against the Army Commissars; and at the same time there is also a catering to the large numbers of non-communist masses throughout the land. As far as the problem of mere military resistance is concerned, one is driven to the conclusion that was arrived at in discussing the factors of civilian morale, nationalism and religion. 

It is clear from the facts presented that there must have been a very severe military crisis, just as there was a crisis on the home front, but that together with the important factors of almost inexhaustible manpower and precious vast spaces, there was time yet to tap the great military reserves of youthful initiative, resourcefulness and courage. The country was in a critical condition, and the government, the Party and officialdom had to depend upon those who dared, who possessed skill and inventiveness, and not upon those who were completely responsible for the catastrophic consequences of their own administration and leadership.

What needs to be stressed, therefore, is that what has been acclaimed in the resistance of the Russian masses derives not from those social and economic conditions which existed before the war, and which allegedly provided the elan and the fighting forces. On the contrary, the qualities, if one wants to call it qualities, manifested by the Russians, are not related to the type of regime under which they live, they are qualities which have been generated by the war itself.

PRAGMATISM:

THE LOGIC OF CAPITALISM

The purpose of this article is to amplify the details of our general position expressed in a previous issue,*) namely, the connection between Instrumentalist logic and the social economy of capitalism in America. We have already shown that there is not a mechanical relation between the economy and the logic but rather a dynamic, dialectical relationship in terms of social forces and the ideas generated by them under modern capitalism.

The history of America extends over a period of more than three hundred years, but we have selected only such particular phases as are pertinent to our inquiry, especially the period between the Civil War and World War I. It was during this epoch that Instrumentalist logic developed as America moved ahead to become one of the foremost capitalist powers of the world.

On the social side this entails the characteristics of American capitalism — its economy, its polity, its bourgeois democracy. On the logical side it involves a discussion of the work of four outstanding figures in the Pragmatist movement — Charles S. Peirce, the founder, William James, the psychologist, John Dewey, the educator, and James Mark Baldwin, the logician.

The years that saw the Puritans settle in America — the 1620's — were the very ones, it will be recalled, that brought a new kind of logic to modern England in the celebrated work of Francis Bacon, the self-styled “inductive logic” that has had a long subsequent history. Between 1620 and 1860 America built a republic based on an economy of expansion. It spread in a number of distinct regions: the industrial North, the plantation South, the Pioneering West. Vast multitudes of workers were drawn here to constitute the future laboring population. In due time, the problem of unification or nationality held the center of the stage. The Civil War made manifest the significance of the industrial North as the sovereign of American capitalism. The irresponsible conflict assumed the proportions of a kind of “second economic revolution.”

We had no particular philosophy of our own until the Civil War. There were of course several different threads of philosophy prior to that, fragments of European philosophy. But whatever the origin of the frag-

ment — whether Kant or Hegel, Spencer, Comte, Transcendentalism or Positivism — the prevailing ideas were ordered to the system of Idealism.

It was only during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War that America began to hammer out its own philosophy. It was then that America began to assert itself as a country and a people of commerce and industry, of transportation, of exchange, of machinery and scientific appliances, all of which were the first bold precursors of our present-day "business civilization." The election of Ulysses S. Grant brought to a head several crises of an economic and political nature that made Reconstruction a much larger problem than merely that of the aftermath of civil strife. For one thing, there occurred during this time our first great industrial panic in spite of all the growth and prosperity of the nation. There was, indeed, an enormous development of manufactures at the time — a new source of exploitation in the oil fields of Ohio and Pennsylvania, in the gold and silver mines of the Far West — as well as the reorganization of currency, taxation and banking. All this aided the rapid growth of wealth and large fortunes.

Examining the politics that accompanied these changes, we find the imminent need for labor revealed in the euphemistic phrases of the Fifteenth Amendment that guaranteed "the right of citizens to vote . . . not denied on account of race, creed or color or previous condition of servitude." The country was under the domination of Grant's Republican Party, which found itself involved in extensive rebuilding. Simultaneously there was disclosed the beginning of serious contradictions in the entire system of capitalism.

Furthermore, Grant involved us in foreign relations as well. There were, for instance, our dealings with England, France and Russia. And the affair of Santo Domingo turned out to be an X-ray of the entire character of our American form of capitalism. Far-reaching economic and industrial changes soon transformed the United States into a powerful enterprise of capitalism, wherein the machine showed itself as one of the great titans of the modern world. And while there were already sporadic movements, here and there, of working-class organizations, it remained for a later period to institute the socialist parties in America.

It became clear that there was need for unifying the people with respect to a system of ideas or principles of philosophy. The philosophy imported from across the seas no longer satisfied. All systems of Idealism were indigenous to the countries of Europe, as the latter sought to shed their feudalist residues in the face of bourgeois emancipation which was initiated by the French Revolution. What America needed was the fashioning of its own ideas, a new body of principles. Hence we find — in 1878 — the beginnings of a new philosophy, Pragmatism.

It will be recalled that capitalism readily made use of science for its social objectives, chief of which were the exploitation of natural resources as well as of the workers operating them under wage-slavery. America developed its laboratories to fully utilize the physical sciences. In this sense, there was greater opportunity here to foster the experimental method in order to perfect the machinery of capitalist industry and production. Technological schools, for instance, came into prominence, as the field of science increased in usefulness to society. This, in turn, gave impetus toward research, so that we find many phases of theory provoked by industrial need. At the same time, there were evidences of even "pure" theory, as is always the case under these circumstances.

The major point is that science — physical science — engendered traits and habits in these laboratories, so that the time came when our American thinkers were obliged to recognize this phenomenon as they came to reflect on the larger significance of science.

In England Bacon had performed a similar function as he reflected on the beginnings of all modern science — physics in particular. He saw the larger, social meanings of the pioneers of mechanics — of Galileo in particular — as science revealed its possibilities as a social agency for power over the natural resources for the benefit of the rising bourgeois class. Knowledge was power in this earthly sense of commerce and trade, of wealth and domination. It was with this in mind that Bacon broke with the old logic of Aristotle as he attempted the inauguration of the new, "inductive" logic of the New Organon.

Similarly, the rise of Pragmatism in America found its impetus in the scientific laboratories as an ally of the social needs of American capitalism. Here we find the beginnings of still another phase of logic, namely that of the modern Instrumental logic of the pragmatists. For it was Charles S. Peirce who first suggested that the New World had need of a different logical approach. Forthwith he enunciated his famous principle, the Maxim of Peirce. Grounded in the physical sciences, he had come to the brilliant conclusion that the way of the laboratory might furnish the proper clue to a new approach to thinking and logic. Accordingly we find Peirce reducing his observations, experiences and reflections concerning manner and method of physical science to the following terms: "Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our concept to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception on the object."

Behind this statement is a new method of proceeding with the nature of concepts, or ideas, or notions. To realize the significance of this Maxim, we must briefly inquire into the logical methods of thinking prior to Pragmatism. So far as the traditional methods were concerned, the logic was the Formal Logic of Aristotle. An idea, or concept, was neatly set out in
terms of categories — precise, exact, perfect, immutable. Definition meant logical definition, which in turn entailed genus, species and differentiae — according to the set rules of the Aristotelian system. Everything was finished, ready-made, inflexible, just as every word had a single definition, and every concept was rendered in terms of the predictions of the subject by virtue of the notorious categories.

Such scholasticism prevailed all through feudal civilization and even beyond to assume sovereignty over all logic. But the rising tide of capitalism which co-existed with the science of the Renaissance introduced such a wealth of new physical facts about the terrestrial earth that it gradually became evident that formal logic was not at all efficacious for the new scientific pursuits. This was the background of Bacon's initial flourish toward induction, which was continued and deepened as capitalism in England steadily increased. Even before Peirce — by thirty-five years, in fact — Mill framed a series of new methods with which to probe nature's phenomena.

Peirce sought to break with formal logic in a new manner, namely, by a rule of logic, or maxim, designed to indicate how ideas may be expressed in terms of action rather than words; by results, rather than definitions; by consequences rather than speculation; in terms of function rather than form. An idea is "what conduct it is fitted to produce," as James later expressed it. Hence a concept is exhibited in results and consequences, under the test of experiment and experience.

The issue now resolves itself into noting the differences involved between 1) the maxim of Peirce and formal logic, and 2) the maxim of Peirce as the beginning of Pragmatism compared with the positivist logic of John Stuart Mill's type of induction. If formal logic represents the vestiges of feudal economy, primarily, Mill's contribution falls definitely within the shadow of modern capitalism and under the utilitarian economics of Mid-Victorian England. And if we are to grasp the basic social significance of Peirce's maxim of logic, it is necessary to understand the difference between Mill's inductive logic and that of American instrumentalist logic.

First, the definitions of traditional logic are formal. They are verbal statements descriptive of the predications about the subject, expressed in terms of categorical adjectives. For example, take the definition of the word "silver," It is a "metal that is lustrous." Here we observe that the syllogistic classifications hold, since the trait of "lustrousness" modifies or predicates the substance, the subject, "metal." In other words, it is a verbal categorization of the term to be defined. It follows, consistently, the metaphysics of being behind the definition, namely, the distinct "kinds" in nature.

Hence, when we say traditional logic's definitions are formal, we mean specifically that the one and only form is that of the subject-predicate nature. This is in keeping with the syllogism as the sole technique of the old logic.
in specific situations where they serve operatively. The maxim, therefore, was not designed to render concepts amenable to the neat precision of being fitted into a system of logic, nor into a preordained system of principles. That is why the whole enterprise of logic becomes decidedly one of an experimental nature. The concepts are for use and functions in situations under the "irritation" of doubt and indeterminateness. They have a duty to perform, a service to render. And hence the maxim stresses clarity of meanings by virtue of the office and function of the consequences brought about. It is clarity of meaning through action and behavior rather than that of the traditional methods of exactness and perfection made possible, presumably, by consistent adherence to an ordered system of logic.

III

The development of capitalism in America, since the initial years of Peirce's maxim of Pragmatism (1878), gives us the apposite social background of the next steps in the progress of philosophy. This history includes the enormous growth of cities, the assimilation of the West within the larger fold of industry, agriculture and ideology, the rising tide of tariff reforms, foreign entanglements and above all, the drift toward imperialism with its experimental nature. The concepts are for use and functions in situations under the "irritation" of doubt and indeterminateness. They have a duty to perform, a service to render. And hence the maxim stresses clarity of meanings by virtue of the office and function of the consequences brought about. It is clarity of meaning through action and behavior rather than that of the traditional methods of exactness and perfection made possible, presumably, by consistent adherence to an ordered system of logic.

As the population grew and the industry thrived, the whole capitalist machine became geared to the almost boundless expansion of capital and markets. It was just about then that America first launched its business expansion beyond its own borders — that is became more and more involved in affairs of an imperialist nature. Thus, in 1898, we annexed the Hawaiian Islands. Simultaneously, we entered a war on Spain, which resulted in new gains including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. The Samoan Islands followed, as more and more the Pacific was brought into the arena, not forgetting the "open door" which looked in upon the markets of China. A new world was opened to us as we exploited our benevolent interests in Latin-America, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Cuba, and the like.

It was no mere accident that the very same year of our imperialist innovations, 1898, found William James in California, where he delivered his famous lecture that once again repeated the pragmatic message of the new philosophy. For it was in this very discussion that James strikingly presented the larger meanings of the maxim of Peirce, as he demonstrated the import of the Pragmatism he sponsored. It will be recalled that James had started his career as a doctor of medicine teaching physiology at Harvard. It was but a short step to the new psychology geared to the findings of Darwinian biology. Here then was the proper tie-up between science and philosophy to meet the demands of industrial, imperialist America.

The logical rule of the maxim of Peirce, the initial spurt toward Pragmatism, James fruitfully expanded and welded with the new, functional psychology based on Darwinian evolution. Once again we note that the residues of Mill's positivism, his strictly mechanical causality were eliminated as evolutionary psychology came to replace the utilitarian associationism of England. This turn of events in the field of ideas is important on two grounds: 1) it showed that capitalism could no longer retain the old mechanism in science, 2) it showed that with the upward curve of prosperity and success, capitalism had to ingest the meanings of change and evolution — up to a point.

The connection between psychology and Pragmatism — the distinctive contribution of James — marks one of the most significant contributions of American thinking. In the Old World formal logic had been mated with the kind of psychology that aided the retention of formalism in thinking. The marked change brought about by the new biology, Darwinism, found its true ally in the functional psychology of the pragmatic movement. Thus it is that logic itself formerly addicted to the ways of theology and metaphysics found a new lease on life on the American continent, as its apologists drove logic forward with new psychological and scientific implementations.

It has often been said that James was not interested at all in logic, that he was, in fact, anti-logical. There is a sense in which this is true, for he was primarily devoted to the battle against vicious intellectualism,
the spearhead of which had always been formal logic. However, the story has yet another aspect. It is worth mentioning because of its direct connection with the Instrumentalist logic of pragmatism. James was very much interested, indeed, in our processes of reasoning. As a psychologist and educator he was devoted to research in this field. But what he was really after was a method of using reason and our reasoning processes directly in the service of human purposes. Hence his stress upon the functional, the biological, the telic human scene. His objections to the old logic lay just here: for he argued that it had had no earthly connection with our direct, human problems, and hence it deserved in this sense to be discarded as useless.

James fought against those very props upon which the old logic was based. He argued against forms and essences and absolutes and ready-made formulae, all of which were outmoded in the light of the new world about us. That he utilized psychology instead of basic, economic foundations was the result of his close ties with the class in control. Consequently, he sponsored the notions of change and process, of transformation and evolution, of dynamism and reconstruction only in so far as his class limitations permitted. Within the scope of these limitations, he made a brilliant contribution to our store of ideas, particularly since he advanced the attitude to ideas in terms of biologic, evolutionary, functional purposes.

In this connection, we can recommend no better text for the proper understanding of Pragmatism than James' two classic volumes, entitled, "Principles of Psychology," first published in 1898. Here we find doctrines set forth — particularly as they are related to the various phases of human experience — of great psychological value. On the positive side, these volumes are an outstanding contribution to the logical phase of this philosophy; their limitations lie in the omissions common to all thinking of this school, namely, the failure to cope with the economic fundamentals underlying the entire ideology.

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Thus far, then, we have the contributions of two of the pioneers in Pragmatism: 1) Peirce, the founder, with his maxim capable of logical application, and expressed in terms of the method of "making ideas clear" by experimentally observing their workings; and 2) the functional psychology of James as he brought the meaning of Darwinian evolution to the field of ideas as directly teleological, purposive, functional and instrumental for human needs.

This brings us to the events that led up to World War I. Against this latter background, we shall discuss the contribution of John Dewey and James Mark Baldwin, centering our attention particularly on Instrumentalist logic.

We have already mentioned that with all the apparent national prosperity, there were still obvious symptoms of contradiction in the economy, as, for instance, the panics of 1837 and 1873. The historians who try to minimize these crises proceed on the assumption that a panic is nothing but a stress and strain in gold or silver, as if that were the whole story. Actually panics reveal rather flagrantly the inner nature of the type of social economy. In every instance, they are symptomatic of crisis, grounded and rooted as they are in economic and class contradictions. Under the Roosevelt administration, at the turn of the present century, the President had his hands full with many problems inherent in the contradictions. There were not only the issues of trustification, railway regulation, another panic, foreign relations, the Japanese question, the Philppines, but also the greater problems of labor — the A.F. of L. and eventually the Socialist Party of America. All these issues could not be shrugged away as being atomic incidents existing in a void. They were, rather, evidences of a social continuum brought about by the brute facts of the failure of the economic system of capitalism, even under the auspices of growth and expansion.

In the face of these critical conditions, it is obvious that the philosophy of Pragmatism had to strengthen its hold the better to cope with patent evidences of disintegration. The logic of Pragmatism took on a sterner front in the work of John Dewey who realized more than either James or Peirce that somehow of other there were dangerous rifts in the society about us. How was he to proceed? Where should he begin? For in all the voluminous literature that came from Dewey's pen there were always significant phrases about "trouble", "predicament", "precariousness", "indeterminate situation" and "problem." These were the key-words of his idiom, even though he could not, or would not, get to the bottom of the irreconcilable economic contradictions underlying them.

Dewey was, above all, an educator, interested in the welfare of the young in the society which they would eventually meet face to face. Education, therefore, meant nothing but ways of experience in the natural and social world at hand. A strong strain of naturalism permeates Dewey's essays. At the same time, he was dedicated to two chief aims of education in America: 1) to grant the child its own experiential autonomy, and 2) to improve our methods of thinking. On the one score Dewey advanced his particular revision of pragmatic logic in the direction of Instrumentalism, making use of the maxim of Peirce along with the functional psychology of James. On the other he promulgated his views of Democracy in Education.

Instrumentalist logic may best be viewed in the light of Dewey's initial essays — published in 1903 — under the title "Studies in Logical Theory." This symposium volume contained articles on the pragmatic outlook by several writers, Dewey being the editor and author of the first four essays. Other contributors were Thompson, McLennan, Ashley, Gore, Heidel, Stuart, and Moore.
The argument was pitted against Idealist logic, the so-called "epistemological logic" with Lotze as chief protagonist. On the positive side, Dewey sought to fashion a "logic of genetic evolution," based on the tenets of James' functional psychology. The main point of the new logic was that ideas and concepts, notions and hypotheses, judgments and truths were all basically functional and instrumental, since they had a specific job to do in a specific problematical situation. "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation." We find here the main ingredients of Instrumentalist logic: 1) the doctrine of the situation, 2) the doctrine of evolution, 3) the doctrine of adjustment and 4) the doctrine of instrumentation. Behind them lies the Darwinian theory of Evolution - originally enunciated in 1859. Logic was to be lifted off its former idealist and empiricist foundations by way of the experiences of men in reconstructing situations and specific situations under the aegis of evolution and instrumentation.

Experience is interpreted in terms of biological significance and history is taken to be of a similar continuum, to wit, natural history. For this is as far as the Pragmatist philosopher suffers change, evolution and transformation to be meaningful for his logic and for his society. Where, then, does society enter? Where do social and economic relations come in? Are these to be permitted a natural evolution, also, even as man, the biological animal? Are the specific situations to be disparate, atomic, sporadic, independent, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation." We find here the main ingredients of Instrumentalist logic: 1) the doctrine of the situation, 2) the doctrine of evolution, 3) the doctrine of adjustment and 4) the doctrine of instrumentation. Behind them lies the Darwinian theory of Evolution - originally enunciated in 1859. Logic was to be lifted off its former idealist and empiricist foundations by way of the experiences of men in reconstructing situations and specific situations under the aegis of evolution and instrumentation.

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The idealist would muster his preconceptions for the problem, the empiricist would favor the psychology of impression and associations. Neither of these hit the mark, according to Dewey. The Pragmatist asserts the predicament calls for "adaptation," as thinking becomes the tool for reconstructing the situation to "evolving" experience. The vicious circle is broken by "action," for only thus is the predicament to be resolved in order to keep experience going beyond the temporary individual blocking. Hence the offices of thinking are functional, not formal; they are activist, not associative; they are instrumental and purposive for the end in view. This is the gospel of the means-and-ends affair, the Pragmatist's philosophy of thinking as instrumentalist logic.

What does all this amount to when we consider the entire process as indicated? What kind of predicament is it? That of the individual, the person. Who is to do the reconstructing? The person, the individual undergoing the predicament. And, finally, what kind of thinking does the instrumentalist logician have in view? The psychology of the individual making use of his biological instrument, namely, his individual thinking. Thus the individual goes on in his life and experience, constantly facing these numerous and disparate individual predicaments of his until his whole biological experience undergoes the natural evolution of a lifetime.

Nothing at all is said, here, as to the kind of society in which all this individual experience transpires. Nothing is indicated of the particular economic system in which these predicaments occur. Furthermore, it seems as if the Darwinian concepts of a natural history of evolution constitute the entire environment and foreground. This amounts to Dewey's basic omission of the kind of history that matters most for our human experience, including the individual, about whom he is most concerned. It is as if Dewey takes experience to be opaque environment, common to all men as biological animals, without due regard for the actual transformations that have specifically appeared in the economic and social history of the past and present — and is yet to come in the immediate future. It is no wonder that Dewey, failing to ground his thinking on this economic, social history, ignores the dynamic of the class-struggle throughout history, the pivotal dynamic of man's historical growth and evolution throughout the centuries of changing economy.

It follows that Dewey's instrumentalist logic is brusquely lifted to a psychology of functioning, an individual psychology of functioning, as if these existed apart from their foundation in particular social economics, that is, the progressive class-struggles from ancient slavery to capitalism and beyond. Hence his logic is imbedded in biology and psychology — functional, to be sure — and not in the economics and material histories which generate them. Hence his apotheosis throughout of the individual or person taking part in individual and personal predicaments.

Yet Dewey — or any other thinker — cannot deny that we are living today under a specific and particular system of economy and polity, namely, the capitalistic system. Rather than ignore this cardinal fact of historical reality in any philosophy of thinking or in any logic, we should stress it as basic and fundamental. Consequently, it is not the individual or person, nor is it the individual's personal predicament that is foremost in importance. It is the nature of the basic economy that constitutes every individual's
predicament and situation. Furthermore, it is the dynamics of the capitalist economy that produces the conditions of and the clue to the problems we face, including the very thinking demanded of us. Failure, therefore, to regard this as fundamental brings with it the concomitant failure to grasp the meaning of the nature of the class-struggle.

Actually, Dewey does not provide us with a technique or logical method for thinking our way through our problems. We are given, rather, the psychology of a particular social class behind the instrumentalist, or class-logic, of Dewey and his fellow-pragmatists. The antagonism to idealist logic springs from the desire on the pragmatist's part to shed the residues of a past economy, a past kind of logic no longer efficacious in the current scene. And the antipathy to empirical logic derives from a similar inefficacy on its part to be equal to the present stage of capitalist economy, so that, beyond both Lotze and Mill, Dewey wishes us to move forward to the instrumentalist logic of the middle-classes under current capitalism.

V

We have already observed that the Theodore Roosevelt administration had its hands full with the inner contradictions of the economy. Of special import to us is the growth of Socialism in America. The question is not whether Socialism was feeble or strong in its analysis. It is rather that events gave rise to a movement dedicated to indicting the kind of economy under which we were living and having our "experiences." How did it happen that not one of the Pragmatists found themselves in the ranks of Socialism? These philosophers of change and evolution were dedicated to the reconstruction of our logic and psychology of thinking; they were interested in our children's welfare, in the schools; they took on themselves the evolutionary reconstruction of our predicaments of experience. And yet, they could not join the new social forces interested in changing the form of economy from capitalism to socialism.

The explanation lies in the fact that instrumentalist logic — like the philosophy of Pragmatism itself — is the ally of the class in power today, safeguarding the vested interests of the capitalist preserves. Change may be biological and evolutionary, but it is not to be social, class nor revolutionary; it does not attack the very foundations of the prevailing economy.

The eclectic nature of this logic — a logic of the discrete, the isolate, the sporadic and the disparate — is manifest once again in its application to education. It tries desperately to formulate a synthesis in its philosophy of education. But in vain, since there are no solid foundations upon which to rear its structure because, to repeat, pragmatism disregards economics and therefore fails to formulate a philosophy of history. Such progress as Dewey represents results from his break with idealism, as we may observe if we compare his ideals with those of Prof. H. H. Horne, whose philosophy of education held sway at the time.

The bourgeoisie of England preceded Dewey in laying up the foundations of its new education, aided by Mill's Utilitarianism with its inductive logic and methods of experimental inquiry. In 1860 came the work of Herbert Spencer in which education was based on science, practical application, and the principles of evolution, all of which were aimed at the democratization and liberalization of education. It remained for Dewey to add functional psychology (James), instrumentalist logic, and the doctrine of meaning.

Let us see what Dewey's philosophy of education tried to do, even if it did not achieve its aims. Instrumentalist logic, as applied to education, finds its expression in Dewey's "How We Think" (1910), and in his "Democracy and Education" (1916). Both are designed to combat the formalism of our schools in the interests of training our children for the tasks they are to perform under the expanding economy of monopoly capitalism. The emphasis is placed, therefore, upon the pragmatic nature of thinking, side by side with the "shared experience" of bourgeois democracy. Education being a state function, what is Dewey's philosophy of state? To call it just "democracy" is merely to refer to its political machinery. There is, behind this philosophy — as Dewey does not make clear — the particular social economy of the modern state, the class-economy of the bourgeoisie mode of production. Hence, Dewey is really training his children for a class-state, for a class-economy, for a democracy under capitalism.

The proof of this lies in the ideas of the two volumes under discussion. "How We Think" advocates practical application and use as the mainsprings of concepts instead of the traditional method of formalism. The guiding factor is the solution of a perplexity by way of pragmatic reconstruction to further experience. Thus, in this view, the trouble with our schools is that they provide our children with formalist, ready-made products of knowledge, neatly set out in ready-made categories of subject-matter. These products are drilled into the child, with similar disciplines of formalism, and hence children are not activated to thought, particularly scientific methods of thought. The way out, as Dewey suggests, is instrumentalist logic.

What we have, here, is really no system of logic at all, but rather Dewey's sponsorship of the psychology he wishes to introduce, namely, the functional psychology of James. As such, it is a valuable contribution, both because it reforms our educational methods, bringing them up-to-date in the modern, scientific world about us, and because its value for education lies in the emphasis upon "process" and "growth." All this unmistakably pushes the boundaries beyond feudal economy, feudal education and the formalism of the traditional methods of thinking attuned to Aristotelian syllogism.

However, there are other alternatives besides the old syllogistic logic, as for instance, the symbolic logic of our day and the dialectical logic of the Hegelian variety, which came into prominence at the time Dewey wrote by way of the English logicians, Bradley and Bosanquet. We are still
within the precincts of capitalist ideology. Dewey does not favor symbolic logic but in several chapters in "How We Think" he actually draws a few lessons from the Hegelian idealists in the English group. Consider Dewey's attitudes toward inference and judgment, in order to see how heavily he leans in the direction of neo-idealism in logic. After declaring that there is a close connection between inference and judgment, Dewey goes on to view the latter as an "interpretation of facts" which serves him as guide to the subsequent doctrine of Meaning. For the idealist logicians — Bradley, Boscage, Lotze even — judgment is the "constructive interpretation of our present perception . . . for the process of interpretative amplification... It contains an identification of some ideal element, enlargement, or interpretation, with that relatively given element which reveals itself." Thus, in both schools of modern logic, there is a common trend away from formalism, away from syllogistic methods, in terms of judgment and inference as processes of reconstructing and interpreting the facts of reality. And in so far as Dewey makes meaning the clue to his psychology of thinking in education, his differences with the idealist logicians of England crystallize around differences of philosophy, since Pragmatism is the American way out.

But what is the Pragmatic view of Meaning, as a psychology of thinking in education? It means to take the particular fact before us, only to lift it up into a larger whole, as suggested to the person confronted with the fact. It is significant, it is indicative, it is directive. For Dewey, the process of meaning lies in the practical uses and applications of the concept. This makes the meaning pragmatic. Hence, education must break with formalism in order to provide the proper educative forces in school and in the course of study. The child is thereby encouraged to acquire the requisite attitude which will lead toward the pragmatic nature of meaning or meanings. Meanings for Dewey are applicative, instrumental, functional, psychologically prior.

Now what has this to do with logic in education? The answer lies, once again, in the fact that the philosophy of pragmatism offers no logic, but rather makes the definitive contribution of a new psychology. Thus, the so-called Instrumentalist logic is a functional psychology, and at best a theory of logic, or logical theory, offered as a break with formal logic.

In allocating the logic of Pragmatism — in education — we are not unmindful of its historical contribution within the ideology of the bourgeoisie; nor are we drawing any moral in favor of either neo-idealistic logic, nor yet present-day symbolic logic. What we refer to is its failure to integrate thinking into a system of logic, and hence its reformatory and inadequate character as a psychology, not as a logic. Furthermore, the psychology itself is taken to be the thinking implement, or tool, as if it were totally apart and detached from its proper social, economic, bourgeois foundation in society. That the psychology is aimed toward the proper training of children in thinking is only half the story; for the psychology itself has no use nor purpose except to meet the patent needs of the kind of social set-up behind the new kind of education. In other words, the psychology is nothing but the distinctive social psychology of the ruling class. And since economy and state indissolubly go together, it follows that education — its psychology and its "logic" — is of the same capitalist fabric and texture.

From 1903, the date of Dewey's initial offerings in logical theory to 1910, and then to 1916 — the respective dates of the two books under consideration — America's factories, machines, industry and commerce certainly demanded a new kind of schooling for its purposes. The idealists had succeeded, up to a point, in furnishing our schools with a philosophy of education, but America was no longer the country it was in the '70's and the '80's. It was now launched on the course of imperialist enterprise, and hence there was a demand, a fortiori, for the kind of psychology and "logic" suitable to our social needs. And this was supplied by the philosophers of Pragmatism — James, Dewey, Baldwin — who were specialists in the new science of psychology drawn to the doctrines of evolution.

VI

The development of the socialist movement during the period referred to is indicative of the critical nature of both the economy and the state. Panic, crises and strikes were too repetitive to be considered "sporadic." The Marxian analysis — originally that of De Leon within the S.L.P. — laid bare the fundamental indictment of the American form of capitalism. Movements assumed first a political wing and then a more direct action, as for instance, the I.W.W. When the Socialist Party rose to prominence, its literature and message of socialism attracted the attention of Americans for the first time since Edward Bellamy.

We have seen, already, how Pragmatism eschewed any affiliation whatsoever with socialism. So long as the latter signified the advent of working class control, its materialism in philosophy was definitely objectionable to Pragmatism. But as socialism revealed its middle-class tendencies more and more prominently, it was not strange that the Socialist Party seized upon Pragmatism as being the philosophy. This attempt to mate two irreconcilables—Marxism and Pragmatism—an attempt which young Americans today associate with Sidney Hook — thus finds its beginning in the Socialist Party. An instance in point is W. English Walling's "The Larger Aspect of Socialism" (1913) wherein Pragmatism furnishes this socialist with his ideas on education, philosophy, psychology, all in Deweyan vein. Furthermore, Walling cites chapter and verse to show that both Marx and Engels were "pragmatists", even before the advent of America's pragmatists. Pragmatism in America thus became a kind of Revisionism, paralleling the educators of the Second International.

Dewey's "Democracy and Education" will not concern us too much, at this point. We shall merely indicate the general nature of its message. The volume particularly aims at stressing education on new bases: 1) science, 2) evolutionism, 3) experimentalism, and 4) democracy. In the body
of the book, however, there is no historical analysis of democracy, nor of the connections of politics and the state to economy. We learn of kinds of education—in ancient Greece, and in the more recent German monarchy; but these systems are not defined in terms of their basic class struggles, nor in their connection with ancient slavery and the feudal, landed economy; nor yet with the emergence of modern capitalism. As to the next step beyond our present American democracy, Dewey has nothing at all to say. The reason is that Pragmatism really has no future in face of changes already apparent. But taking democracy as it is, what kind of analysis does Dewey offer? Ignoring the nature of commodity-production, what remains for the philosopher to say about democracy? Only that it is “shared experience,” that it provides for “individual opportunity,” that it provides the child with the chance to “develop its own faculties,” and that “the child must be educated for the society of his generation,” and so on... Reduced to their concrete, social connotations, what do these expressions mean if not the safeguarding of the present social scheme against any possible radical change toward socialism? Hence education towards democracy is nothing but a system of guidance for teachers to encourage our children to think and think scientifically, the better to take their positions—if they are allowed to—as upholders of the capitalism of their elders. It is a bourgeois individualism for the retention of bourgeois economy.

VII

Accepting the Darwinian principles as fundamental James Mark Baldwin, very early in his carrier as thinker perceived the possibilities of a “genetic” psychology. Growth and development, transformation and process, evolution and change were to be the key-ideas of his approach to the mind. His interest in psychological processes led Baldwin eventually into the camp of the Instrumentalists or Pragmatists, with whom he was in closest sympathy. At the time when that philosophy had not reached its culminating stage as an influential force in America, Baldwin manifested a few minor differences between the ideas of the others about him and those of his own, personal innovation. Today, however, we can regard his thought as belonging within the group under discussion.

When the logical problem became important, Baldwin saw a chance to offer his own “genetic” views toward the reconstruction of this science on similar Darwinian principles. These were incorporated—beginning in 1906—in a series of volumes on the subject, collectively known as “Thought and Things.” The reader interested in the logic of Instrumentalism in America will find these volumes a rich mine of reference for the salient features of this type of approach to logic.

What does Baldwin attempt to do with his logic? When all is said and done, he has provided us not with a system of logic but with a psychology. We have observed a similar phenomenon in the case of Dewey. The question resolves around the “genetic” origin and function of the psychological processes as they transpire in the mind of the individual. We must insist upon this point of the individual, since that is exactly what Baldwin means by the term “genetic”: he is interested in the modes of behavior that the mind goes through as it exercises these processes within the individual mind. There is nothing social, sociological nor even societal about the concept as he uses it. Consequently, it is an individual psychology resembling that of Dewey’s individualism. That Baldwin was aware of the social aspects of our environment is made clear in other works of his, and here, too, there is a bipartite division: on the one hand, the growth of the individual’s mental capacities; on the other, the social evolution of humanity. We mention this because it is dangerous to read into these conceptions any kind of organic connection between the individual and society, since that would be to distort the implications. For Baldwin, the person exists, the individual’s mind has a growth and development, psychologically; but society is quite a different matter. In fact, in so far as Baldwin touches social matters, he always puts the person, the individual first. For example, he refers to “the individual in society,” but he does not make society a sum of individuals, for society has its own history, whatever that may mean to Baldwin.

“Genetic” psychology moves along in three continuous stages as the individual’s mind moves along its own growth and development with the aid of these processes. These stages are: 1) pre-logical, 2) logical, and 3) hyperlogical. According to Baldwin, what happens in the “logical” stage? There are processes of inference and judgment, processes of reasoning and thinking. The instrumentalist view reveals itself here, since these are all geared to purpose, function, interest, use, motivation and meaning. It is valuable, therefore, to follow the argument about the above-mentioned processes in the individual’s mind. Judgment, for instance, partakes of the nature of individualized meanings. Inference connotes the implications of meanings. Hence, Baldwin’s ideas on meaning constitute his main drive in the reconstruction of logic on the pragmatic, or instrumentalist basis. In other words, our task is to see just what our logician means by meaning. The answer is furnished readily, as we meet instance upon instance of the manner in which Baldwin assumes that the processes of the individual’s mind work up these meanings, namely, purpose, interest, use, all of which are individual and personal in nature.

What we have here is nothing but the reflex of the organic structure of the economy behind this psychology. We reiterate this fact, since it turns out to be common to all psychologists of the Pragmatic school. It is the doctrine that fits so neatly into the social patterns demanded by the current economy, as the work of the world is done under the present order of things. My meaning is mine, your meaning is yours, his meaning is his, and all depend upon the individual in question. For, as Baldwin puts it, the individual from infancy is trained to cope with the world about him, in so far as the meanings of life are acquired in this directly personal and individual fashion. But Baldwin does not question at any time the nature of the society within which the individual takes his place.
The natural question arises as to how meanings of an individual's own mind, how the processes mentioned happen to function in the society about us as we are confronted with our fellow-men. How are meanings communicated? How are they brought into a common area of functioning for the welfare of society? What are the "genetic" problems of logic? Since Baldwin always thinks in terms of individual genesis, he seeks a way out in similar fashion: the individual imitates his betters, his elders, his masters, and the like. We may readily grant the power of suggestion as a social force, but at the same time we must realize that it is too hazardous for society to rely on this type of induction, for meanings, especially. A more reliable and more integral social force must be sought, and this elsewhere. The split that Baldwin made in behalf of the individual renders him incapable of solving this problem.

On the other hand, his suggestion that speech, or language, acts as the agency is a point well made, as there is no doubt that language is one of the cardinal binding forces in any society; in fact we may go even further and say that language is logic, a point that Baldwin does not even sense because of his individual and individualist psychology of "genesis." For if this were the case, then logic as language would be plunged into the possibility of involving the whole structure of social relations behind language and speech.

Meaning, here as with Dewey, follows the new psychology with the result that it breaks with idealism, and hence advances the reconstruction toward a new view of logic. Meaning as purposive, as functional, as experimental, as pragmatic—all this removes the problem of logic from the dusty and barren precipices of Idea and Ideal, of Eternal and Immutable, of Heavenly and Divine. This is progress in the history of thinking, for the psychology of the Pragmatists was a powerful weapon against the dogma and authority of the period in philosophy prior to the twentieth century. Or, to put it another way, Pragmatism was a decided reform in thinking away from formalism and structure, away from the perfectionist and the absolutist. It was not, however, rooted in the basic fundamentals of thinking in terms of the social realities of the world about us.

The logic and the psychology of the Instrumentalists are of a piece: they are allies and bed-fellows; they are joint weapons in a common exploitation. Tethered to the economy that generated them, they bear the brand of the class in power, the objectives it has before it. Thus, a psychology of function engenders a logic of function, and both are chiefly concerned with the individual in his purposes and motivations in life, in his desires and aims in life. How, then, are we to fare when the very prop is pulled at from under? Genetic logic is a grand scheme for understanding the human mind as the individual goes through the mental processes of growth and development. But if we were to ask Baldwin what kind of individual he has in view, whether his logic and psychology obtain for any kind of society, what kind of answer would be forthcoming? The individual under the economy of ancient Athens must have had genetic processes of mind; and if we are to take an illustration nearer home, is it possible that Baldwin's thesis would hold equally well under the fascism of Germany? Either Baldwin means his psychology and logic to apply to all individuals, even as biology does, or he must see that changes in individuals—their lives, their minds, their logical processes—have something in their functioning that bespeak the various kinds of society, the various kinds of economy under which they live.

That is the main issue. How does the individual conduct himself in the different epochs in society—past and present? On this view we should be impelled to see "genesis" in its historical features, and thus be driven to the inclusion of class-struggles and class forces. To regard the individual as an omnibus for all times is either to ignore society or to permit no social backgrounds for the very "genesis" of the individual. The upshot of this failure to base his inquiry into logic and psychology on their socio-genetic foundations, plunges Baldwin into his final debacle. This is evident at the close of his work wherein he announces himself as a "pancalist," his own particular variety of Instrumentalist logic. He goes on to explain that Pancealism is the sum of it all, the definite and only proper view of reality, an apotheosis of Beauty in life. Such an out-and-out lesson in leisure-class collapse we have yet to see anywhere in the modern scene. After harping endlessly on purpose, growth, evolution, activity, functions—the leading concepts of this philosophy of reconstruction—we find ourselves at the rainbow-end in view of the mystical vision of Beauty. Now all's right with the world, Beauty is on earth. That the life of contemplation is the be-all and end-all is the net conclusion of this logic of the genetic.

* * *

In closing, let us see what we have found in the American annals of the philosophy of Pragmatism, with its weapon of thinking, Instrumentalist logic. As we go over the ideology of the pragmatic representatives of American capitalism—Peirce, James, Dewey, Baldwin—it becomes clear that there is a vital connection between bourgeois economy and bourgeois logic. The system of commodity-production, with its dynamic of exploitation and its basic class-struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, has developed its own experimental, functional and genetic logic. This replaces the logic of idealism—residues of feudalism and initial capitalism abroad, that is, formal logic, primarily—on behalf of activity, pragma, use, purpose, function, in order to safeguard the economy of competitive individualism. Hence its logical outlook is always in terms of either the individual mind, the personal mind, the self, the individual experience, the isolated situation, the disparate predicament. Following in the wake, historically, of the logics of induction and positivism, it pushes forward on behalf of the class in power the better to channel thinking for the preservation of what is at stake. Any threat of fundamental change is anathema to this type of reformist reconstruction, since it would lead to the dialectical logic of materialism and to a classless psychology.

C. P. West

This superficial book about the "disease of cartelizeation" serves the propaganda needs of the United States in her war against Germany, and aims to justify the policies of the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice. It speaks of a German master plan concocted by the "ruthless Teutonic vanity that finds release in war." This plan, it turns out, however, consists of no more than the various activities of the numerous German cartels which differ in no way from the activities of other cartels in other nations. Although the authors realize that in America, too, cartels and trusts foster totalitarianism, they find that only the German cartels were sufficiently developed to be dangerous to the peace of the world. Apparently all other cartels were merely the dupes of the Germans, for while cartelizeation in the democracies meant restricted production and unpreparedness, in Germany it meant greater production and preparation for war. Even before the war these clever Germans acquired "more colonies" than Germany had before Versailles. Their conquests were "made by contract, which allowed German firms to 'divide and rule' world markets." The war must be fought to alter this situation. To guarantee peace the "principles of democracy," which oppose private planning and industrial oligarchy, must be victorious. Fortunately, despite all her planning in economics, science, and technology designed to weaken other nations and build up her own strength, Hitler's Germany started the war too soon, the democracies rallied their forces rapidly enough, and thus Germany will be defeated because of a miscalculation in time.


This book contains a selection of articles, bulletins and letters pertaining to discussions within the Socialist Workers Party before its last split. It all circles around Trotsky's attitude toward Russia and the war and around his orthodoxy in regard to dialectical materialism, and also touches on smaller things, such as whether or not Trotsky should have been ready to testify before the Dies Committee. All this is quite instructive if one is interested in knowing what goes on in a Leninist organization in which different factions fight for control. Behind the "big issues" discussed are small things concerning the influence of personalities within the organization. In his controversy with Trotsky, for instance, Burnham points out that nobody, not even the Old Man himself, objected to this disbelief in dialectics so long as he shared his, Trotsky's, political views. The controversy on the dialectic itself yields nothing new. Trotsky insists that it is absolutely necessary in order to think correctly, but Burnham prefers "science" to Trotsky's "religion."

On the other main issue — the defense or non-defense of Russia — Trotsky's position is the more consistent one. If one believes that nationalization of property is a progressive step, it has to be defended against the onslaught of other nations less "progressive" in this respect. The defeatist position of the opposition is illogical so long as it agrees with Trotsky as to what constitutes the economic base of socialism. If Russia's basis is socialistic, it must be defended whether or not one likes the personalities who occupy the lucrative positions. However, for those who see no choice between a Stalinist and a Trotskyist bureaucracy, the whole debate is senseless.
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