THE FOOD STAMP EXPLOSION

by

TIMOTHY JAY REYNOLDS, B.A.

THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
December, 1980
COPYRIGHT
by
Timothy Jay Reynolds
1980
To my parents
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Approaches to Poverty and Welfare</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benign Neglect and the Work Incentive</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Humanitarian Inducement, the Democratic Process</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the Human Capital Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Welfare for Social Control and Labor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Stabilization</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Analysis Based on a Working Class Perspective</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Summary of the Cycles of Struggles Around Food and Food Stamps</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Expansion of the Food Stamp Program from a Working Class Perspective</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A Brief History of Pre-1960 Workers' Struggles for food and Federal Food Programs for Low Income and Unwaged Workers</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Government Policy in Planning the Economy</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Working Class Confrontations with Capital and the State, Direct Appropriation, Government Intervention and the Implementation of Food Stamp Projects</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Autonomous and "Official" Working Class Organizations .................... 110

Chapter III
The Capitalist Counterattack ....................... 127
The Counterattack on the Struggles ............... 127
The Impoundment of Food Program Funds .......... 130
Restructuring in New York City .................. 133
Food Supply Reduction in the U. S. and Inflation . 136
The Nixon-Ford Administration Attacks .......... 139
The Carter Administration Proposals for Food
Stamp Reform ................................... 143
The Legislative Attacks ........................ 146
The Food Stamp Act of 1977 ..................... 165
The 1979 Food Stamp Program Cutback Proposals ... 168

Chapter IV
Low Income and Unwaged Workers' Struggles for Food
Stamps During the '70s .......................... 170
Recessions and Food Stamps ..................... 171
Workers' Struggles Rollback the Nixon Initiative . 181
Food Stamps as a Factor of the Refusal to Work .. 183
Individual Acts of Counterfeiting, Direct Appropriation and Fraud in the Food Stamp Program ... 187
Legal Struggles for Food Stamps ................ 194
Lobby Efforts by Official Working Class Organizations .................... 201

Direct Appropriation and Confrontations with the State During the '70s ............... 203

The Circulation of Food Stamp Struggles to Puerto Rico ......................... 207

Working Class Counterattack to the Food Stamp Act of 1977 ....................... 209

Chapter V

Conclusion and Implications: "You Can Get it if you Really Want, But You Must Try" .... 211

Appendices ........................................ 221
Footnotes .......................................... 263
Bibliography ...................................... 285
INTRODUCTION

Historically and empirically we know that economic and political relations in the United States are structured by a mixed economy based on a particular organization of capitalism involving government intervention in a representative democratic state. Above all, "capital" should be understood as a social relation whose essential nature is the imposition of work through the commodity form and inherently involves a struggle against work.¹ On the one hand, there are institutions made up of individuals who impose work on other individuals and themselves: the capitalists and the functionaries of capital. And on the other hand, there are individuals who have work imposed on them: workers (and functionaries of capital). Therefore, we must understand "functionaries of capital" as being at the same time both workers and servants of capital because they mediate capital's rule over workers even though they may also struggle against work and for increased wages for themselves. Thus functionaries of capital are higher on the wage hierarchy because they impose work on others and promote the more efficient reproduction of capital, e.g., efficient engineers help reorganize production in order to break workers' organizational strength, efficient professors produce additional disciplined workers, efficient attorneys reinforce discipline compatible
with capital accumulation, and efficient physicians help maintain a healthy workforce.

Capital (via its functionaries) rules by various methods. Dividing various workers against each other keeps them from attacking capital. For example, divisions are based on hierarchical distinctions between being waged or being unwaged, between nationalities, races, sexes, ages, levels of education, etc. Capital uses technological innovation to reorganize production. Crisis and inflation increases unemployment and reduces workers' incomes in order to maintain the social relations of capital. Under the rule of capital intimidation is a constant and force is used when necessary.

The working class is defined by its struggle against capital and implicit in its struggle for increased wages and reduced work is the demand not to be working class, i.e., to go beyond the capitalist relations of production. Therefore, working class struggle can be understood as all of those activities that workers undertake that are not conducive to the reproduction of capital, e.g., wage demands that outstrip productivity, working less, absenteeism, sabotage of the production process, acts of direct appropriation, etc.

With this definition of the working class we can understand "the working class" as a broader classification than previously used by most analysts. For example, unwaged workers (housewives,
students, etc.) are workers because they produce human labor-power as a commodity to be sold in the labor market. Housewives' work concerns the reproduction of their husbands, children, etc. Their non-wage income from capital is mediated through their husband--or the state in the case of welfare recipients. But housewives struggle for higher pay and less work, e.g., better clothes, vacations, vacuum cleaners, instead of brooms, welfare, etc. Students are temporarily out of the waged labor market. They are supposed to be investing in their education in order to enhance their labor-power. This is supposed to increase their earning potential in a differentiated and hierarchical market by increasing their productivity. But students also struggle against work; e.g., they cheat on exams, cut classes, refuse to repay loans, demand food stamps, etc.²

Thus housewives and students have work forced on them by mediators or functionaries of capital, e.g., husbands, cohabitators, professors, instructors, etc. These unwaged workers are on the bottom of the working class hierarchy, but when they increase their own power, the power for all of the working class is increased because the threat of being pushed down the hierarchy is not as strong a source of discipline. Therefore, a stronger unwaged sector of the working class increases the bargaining power of all sectors of the working class.
These very political social relations in the United States are partly structured by the democratic state and this political organization is part of the terrain of the class struggle. Like all institutions of capital, the democratic state is hierarchal in form. Local governments are subordinate to state governments and both are dominated by the federal government. At various times working class strength allows workers to gain control of various local government institutions. But as long as capital is the dominant force in society, the content of state institutional activity is the reproduction of capital on an extended scale. We know that the democratic state is capital reproduced in a collective form because the majority of its actions are conducive to the reproduction of the social relations of capital. Nevertheless, frequently the working class and their "official" organizations force the state to make concessions. The increase of working class demands on the democratic state has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent times. Working class demands on the democratic state and the resulting concessions are the political points of focus in this thesis. These concessions by the democratic state may harm individual capitalists, but they are viewed as being in the interest of collective capital as a whole because they purportedly appease discontent. Therefore, from this perspective, it is inaccurate to classify the state as solely a tool of capital. Thus state representatives, officials, and workers
in the public sector act as functionaries of capital but to some degree struggle against capital in relation to their own interests and in the interest of others.

The low income and unwaged sector of the working class, some of whom get income from the state, is commonly viewed as helpless and politically impotent. Conversely, government welfare programs are often seen as benevolently generous. This is a misleading representation of the real activities of this sector of the working class and of the government functionaries of capital. This sector of the working class is neither helpless nor impotent nor are the government programs of welfare the result of benevolent action. It has rather been the combination of various working class struggles, such as violent confrontations with the state, direct appropriation, legal suits, lobbying in Congress, and fraud that have forced the expansion of these programs. In this thesis these processes are examined through an analysis of the creation of the food stamp program and the limitation of numerous government attempts to restrict its expansion. As a result of workers struggles, the food stamp program is the fastest growing federal government welfare program. It began in 1961 with less than 50,000 participants and a government appropriation of $381 thousand. In 1981, the program will have over 20 million participants and is expected to require over $10 billion in funding, thereby making it the largest federal welfare program.
The position that is taken by this author is significantly different from that of most other contemporary analysts of poverty and welfare. Because the analysis that will be used is diametrically opposed to the prevalent interpretations of the politics of this history, it is necessary at certain points in the argument to make general statements based on this analysis in order to situate the specifics of poverty and welfare within the macro-political economy. Consequently, at different stages of the analysis the generalizations may appear to overwhelm the specific points being made. Some arguments for these generalizations are made here and have been made elsewhere, but a full treatment of the broader issues within this perspective is not possible given the limited scope of the present work. Nevertheless, generalizations are necessary in this context of heresy in order to demonstrate the perspective being used and to link the specifics of welfare and poverty to other aspects of society. Therefore, within this perspective, this author hypothesizes that because of the development, intensity, and circulation of the struggles of both low income and unwaged workers who have politically threatened the economic system, the federal government food programs have expanded continually since the early 1960s.

In the first chapter, this author will position himself in the literature on poverty and welfare that relate to the analysis of workers' struggles and federal food programs. What seems useful
in earlier discussions will be pointed out in order to bring out the similarities between other analyses and the type that will be used by this author. The misconceptions and oversights of other analysts that have weakened our understanding of the recomposition of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class will also be pointed out.5

In the second chapter there will be a brief historical sketch of the earlier government food distribution program that was instituted as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. The relationship between waged and unwaged workers' struggles will also be discussed, i.e., how these two sectors' activities have circulated and complemented each other, thus forcing private and state capital to meet their demands for increased income and food. This will involve a discussion of the link between the waged workers' struggles during the '30s, '40s, and '50s in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing that led to the introduction of labor-saving technology and high levels of unemployment and unwaged workers' struggles during the '60s, '70s, and '80s that are the result of automation and an attempt by capital to discipline the working class. The relation between workers' struggles and the capitalist response during the '30s, '40s, and '50s demonstrates how the stage was set for the tremendous "welfare explosion" of the '60s and '70s. In chapter two this author will also show how workers' struggles in the 1960s have forced collective capital to increase the social wage paid to the low income and unwaged sector
of the working class in the form of food and food stamps. In doing this, the concrete forms of struggles, the organizations that were formed during and as a result of these actions, and the effect that workers' militance had on the implementation and expansions of the food stamp program will be examined.

In chapter three a response to this attack by workers will be presented, i.e., how the state has attempted to and to some degree succeeded in restricting the expansion of benefits and participation in the food stamp program.

In chapter four the changing composition of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class and the different forms of struggles that emerged during the 1970s will be presented. In this chapter we will see that no one official working class organization has led the food struggles.

In the last chapter the implications of the workers' struggles will be analyzed for possible directions of future efforts.
CHAPTER I

Contemporary Approaches to Poverty and Welfare

The literature on poverty and welfare in the United States can be broken down into four categories: _laissez-faire_ individualism, exemplified by Daniel Moynihan moral-humanitarianism, democratic-liberalism and welfare-capitalism, such as that espoused by Michael Harrington, Nick Kotz and Gilbert Steiner; "radical" socialist reformism, typified by Francis Piven and Richard Cloward; and what may be called an analysis that puts at the forefront the working class point of view--this perspective seems to be embodied in the tradition of the Johnson-Forrest Tendency, _Socialism ou Barberie_, the Italian New Left and _Zerowork_.¹

The first three of these forms of analysis obscure important aspects of the politics of poverty and welfare, yet they provide insights that advance our understanding of the expansion of the food stamp program. The most important thing to note is that the majority of the literature in this field is written from capitals' point of view. That is to say, when most authors describe the factors that they consider to have had the most influence on the expansion of the food stamp program, they concentrate on what is going on among representatives or functionaries of the capitalist system, e.g., businessmen, government bureaucrats, liberal reformers, etc. By looking at the history of the development of the food
stamp program in this way, these authors see only half of the dialectic of class conflict and have no sense of working class power. Another way the dominant approaches distort the reality of poverty and welfare is by not addressing the function of poverty. And where the function of poverty is addressed, most of the current literature does not analyze it in the context of the cyclical nature of growth in the capitalist economy, i.e., in terms of the dialectic between expansion and recession where some workers are periodically thrown out of work in order to restore profitability.

Benign Neglect and the Work Incentive

One of the oldest interpretations of poverty is that it is due to individual slothfulness. Consequently, the "welfare" solution suggested by this view is that individuals must work themselves out of the situation. One of the most widely acclaimed formulations of this thesis is put forward by Daniel Moynihan in such works as The Negro Family (1965), Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (1969), and The Politics of a Guaranteed Income (1973). In the first work, Moynihan hypothesized that one of the causes of the social upheavals of the '60s was the dissolution of the black family. He sees welfare payments as promoting this dissolution and creating a "dependency problem" for the government. The solution to this problem in Moynihan's view is to get the blacks off welfare and put them in low paying jobs. Thus for him, essential
to stopping the dissolution of the family and the consequent social breakdown is the imposition of work.

In *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, Moynihan essentially reasserts his position by coming out against the majority of the Great Society programs as being unstable means of social change. He interprets the situation in this way in order to remove the responsibility of poverty from the government. He argues that, "Power to the People...positions throughout the twentieth century have been the rallying cry of totalitarian forces working to destroy democratic institutions, and government officials have no business lending their support to them."² "The role of social science" Moynihan says, "lies not in the formulation of social policy, but in the measurement of its results."³

During Moynihan's term of service to the Nixon administration, he worked on an aborted program aimed at welfare reform: the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The FAP is the topic of the third work mentioned and is based on a negative income tax. The FAP proposal initially included food stamp supplements to the participants, but the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program would have been eliminated. The FAP proposal would have worked something like the following:

For a family of four (previously) on welfare, with no outside income, the basic Federal payment would be $1,600 a year...those who work would no longer be discriminated against. For example, a family of five in which the father earns $2,000 a year—which is the hard fact of life for many families in America today—would
get family assistance payments of $1,260, so that they would have a total income of $3,260. A family of seven earning $3,000 a year would have its income raised to $4,360. Thus, for the first time, the government would recognize that it has no less an obligation to the working poor than to the nonworking poor; and for the first time, benefits would be scaled in such a way that it would always pay to work.4 [emphasis added]

The significance of the Nixon-Moynihan proposal is that it tries to reassert the link between income (money and food stamps) and work by making federal assistance so low that a person cannot survive on it. As Steiner points out, FAP "was not designed to assure benefit increases for the great majority of AFDC recipients...more than 80 percent of AFDC clients spread over forty-two states...benefits under family assistance will be no greater."5 In fact, the overall effect of FAP is to reduce welfare costs. The Nixon administration's final cost estimate submitted for approval in 1970 was $4.1 billion and the actual amount spent during that year on AFDC was $4.8 billion. During that time, the Bureau of Budget projected AFDC costs by 1975 to be $8 billion (actually $1.2 billion too low) and the FAP estimate for the same date was $6.6 billion. As Moynihan says, "The advocates of FAP held out as the hope--it was not more than that and was never stated in stronger terms--of a gradual decline in the total population receiving income supplementation as the combined effects of economic growth and income maintenance moved families out of poverty and dependence."6 The low income workers would have been the only ones to receive new benefits from FAP. But the overall effect of
reduced welfare costs for the state would, it was hoped, result in an increase in work or a reduction in consumption for the low income and unwaged sector of the working class as a whole. It can be argued that the national minimum income provided by FAP would have helped welfare recipients in, for example, Texas and Mississippi who would have had welfare payment increases. But this initial gain for a relatively small group of the low income and unwaged workers would not compensate for the overall reduction of the social wage. It should also be noted that regional disparities in welfare payments have to some degree been offset by labor migration, i.e., from low to high payment areas.

Therefore, Moynihan's analysis attempts to remove the responsibility for supporting the vast majority of the low income and unwaged workers from the state and shift it back to the level of the individual through a stronger work incentive contingency. Thus from Moynihan's point of view, there is no justification for the expansion of the welfare system. Even though the FAP did not pass and there is little support for such a program, it clearly reflected the needs of a capitalist economy and has been repeatedly offered as an alternative to the present welfare system.

The Humanitarian Inducement, the Democratic Process, and the Human Capital Strategy

Those who espouse the thesis of moral-humanitarianism, democratic-liberalism, and welfare-capitalism generally see the
"poor" as being passive and lacking the power to change their situation. They do not see, as Marx did, the function of the "poor" as a reserve pool of unemployed laborers who put a downward pressure on wages and can be called upon to work during an expansion. They do see the capitalist economy as being productive enough to provide for the "poor" and see that provision as a moral obligation and a humanitarian cause. They believe that democratic institutions provide the means to bring about the necessary welfare commitment from the free enterprise system. This is not to say that they totally disagree with those who assert the necessity of work, only that they do call for limited government intervention to deal with poverty resulting from "involuntary" unemployment, i.e., unemployment that is forced on workers who would rather be employed. And while they clearly know that a large amount of unemployment is not involuntary, they fear to say so because it would help conservatives and appear to be racist. Thus their liberal guilt and the demands by low income and unwaged workers force them to support welfare programs. Some of the most noted authors in this category are Michael Harrington, Nick Kotz, and Gilbert Steiner.

Michael Harrington wrote in The Other America, "society must help them [the 'poor'] before they can help themselves." But when we evaluate this humanitarianism, we can see that with the massive migration of blacks from the rural South to the urban ghettos of the North, Northeast and West during the 40s, 50s and
60s, a political realignment complemented the new geographic concentration. Thus the fight against poverty that Harrington called a "moral obligation" rapidly became a political necessity during the mid-60s. With this increased accumulation of the low income and unwaged sectors of the working class in large urban ghettos their social and political behavior changed. As the decade came to an end, less and less could they be described as isolated, complacent, silent, victims, fearful, and psychologically depressed as Harrington did. Instead by the late 60s, the low income and unwaged blacks broke out of their "culture of poverty" and became a movement under the banner of civil rights and then of "black power."

Another misconception that Harrington perpetuates is that low income and unwaged workers are simply "victims of this triumphant agricultural technology," that forced them to migrate to the urban centers. But Harrington provides no sense of why technology was introduced into the agricultural sector. To understand this process we can look at the increased demand for food and the resultant necessity to increase the supply of food to meet the demand. With respect to the demand side, the growth in power and wages of the working class during the first half of the 20th century forced private and collective capital to initiate the production of larger quantities of food at a reasonable price. In order to bring under control the crisis of the 30s, price supports were paid by the government mainly to large farmers to maintain their incomes and allow them to
invest in productivity-increasing technology. As we will see in the next chapter, the need to introduce more technology into agriculture and to promote farm labor migration from Mexico goes along with the need to break the power of agricultural workers based on the previous technological organization of production and to replace sharecroppers and tenant farmers with wage laborers. By bringing out these aspects of the need for capital to introduce new technology, we no longer need to look at the low income and unwaged sector of the working class as simply lacking power or being "poor" in the usual sense of the word. Instead we can see it as a major force within capitalist development. If historically working class demands have prompted the expansion of agricultural output, the next step in the struggle has been for the working class to appropriate for their own purposes the wealth that they have forced to be produced. This attainment of income independent of work for capital is what the struggle for food stamps is all about and is in direct opposition to a social system that imposes work for purposes of social control.

During the 1950s there was a consistent gap between potential gross national produce (GNP) and actual GNP. One strategy that was used to help fill this gap was the investment in human capital. According to this theory as developed by Solow, Becker, Schultz and others, investment in human labor power is a value-creating process that allows workers to be more productive in the long run. This investment may be made in such areas as health, education,
welfare, nutrition, etc. For example, the government spends money on welfare so that low income and unwaged women can stay at home and raise healthy, disciplined and productive children for the capitalist economy.

Harrington embraced this strategy as a solution to poverty. He asserted,

First of all there must be planning....Secondly, there must be billions of dollars in social investments....Instead of institutionalizing a Federal minimum income which is well below the poverty line, the United States should adopt the principle that all of its citizens are legally entitled to a decent income. [emphasis added]

"Such a program," he was quick to admit, "should have, of course, a work incentive"¹³ [emphasis added]. Walter Heller, the Chairman of President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors, also saw welfare as an investment. He interpreted training programs and the "war on poverty" programs, which included the food stamp program, as adjustment mechanisms that stimulated growth in the economy as a whole.¹⁴ While these programs are similar in theory to what Moynihan advocates, in practice they have been more generous than his proposals. Thus we can see that Harrington's solution coincided with the conventional wisdom of the day concerning strategies for economic growth. But as we will see, in the 60s food stamps, as opposed to the food distribution program, became increasingly dis-engaged from productivity, e.g., welfare mothers inadequately discipline their children to become docile members of the workforce.
Therefore, increasingly food stamps have emerged more as a political payment to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class and have not been administered in a countercyclical manner. Thus this political payment has become increasingly difficult to cut off and it continues to expand as the struggles have continued. This process began during the 60s, as the low income and unwaged sector, whom Harrington once called "politically invisible," became highly visible in places like Watts, Detroit, and Newark. While the violent confrontations with the state during the mid-60s occurred after the first edition of The Other America in 1962, Harrington failed to analyze them in the revised edition of his book that appeared in 1971.

Another important book about poverty in the U.S. and the politics of hunger that falls in this category of analysis is Nick Kotz's Let Them Eat Promises. His analysis was similar to Harrington's in that he saw poverty, hunger and malnutrition as basically moral problems, since the "poor" themselves are not seen to have the political power to influence what is provided for them by the system. His theory of social change was that if the right people, i.e., representatives of the government, "discover" poverty, then "effective use of the political process" can deal with the problems of hunger and malnutrition. To show how this process works, he cites the examples of the Citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition, the Field Foundation, and the Citizens'
Crusade Against Poverty—organizations that lobbied for increased food appropriations for the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. But the role of these groups cannot be accurately assessed without looking at their relation to the concrete struggles of workers. They did not begin their lobby efforts until April of 1967, after the growth of workers struggles had led to major confrontations with the state. Kotz did not see this, but this author will outline the relation in analyzing that cycle of struggles. While Kotz ignored the various concrete forms of struggle by low income and unwaged workers, he did recognize that there were several forces acting to favor the food programs. He said, "the Food Stamp Program had been advocated by Agriculture Department economists with the rationale that it would provide more monetary benefits to the farmer than did the commodity programs." But without looking at the specific events and the concurrent results of those events it is hard to say what forces were the most influential. This is what this author will do in presenting an analysis of the expansion of the food stamp program.

Again like Harrington, Kotz saw the solution in terms of a human capital strategy. As he says, "part of the cost can be measured in economic terms...it is in the terms of the ability of a child to function at school and to respond to his widening world, in terms of a man's ability to work and respect the society
in which he lives that hunger becomes a national tragedy"[emphasis added].

Although Gilbert Steiner's book, The State of Welfare (1971) fits into this category of analysis, it provides a slightly different perspective on the politics of food stamps. In his chapter, "Stamps for the Hungry," Steiner tries to show us how the food stamp program is "mixed up" and poorly evaluated because the questions asked have not been "sufficiently complete." His argument that the food stamp program is inefficient is based on the observation that the program's pilot projects were awarded only to Democratic districts, that the program has been unable to solve the "problem" of excess agricultural production, that it has failed to utilize unused agricultural capacity, and that nonmandatory county participation in the food stamp program has led to low levels of individual participation. Therefore, he approaches the situation from a liberal reformist perspective and seemingly believes that if the correct modifications are made within the limitations of welfare capitalism, then efficiency can be achieved.

Part of the problem with Steiner's analysis is that he does not look behind the partisan politics of the legislature to see what goes on between workers and their "official" organizations. This is especially apparent in his discussion of the case of the United Mine Workers. Six of the original eight pilot projects for the food stamp program were not merely Democratic districts,
but they were also areas of high unemployment for miners. Throughout the post World War II period, the union bureaucracy had had problems containing rank and file militancy in order to deliver a stable labor force.\(^9\) Increased mechanization in mining and the 1960 recession exacerbated the situation. During late 1960, Thomas Kennedy, International President of the United Mine Workers of America, stated before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor that,

> It is evident to us that drastic action must be taken if complete chaos is to be averted. The economic plight of these unemployment pools are a constant threat to the well-being of our nation....In certain sections of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky as much as 40 percent of the entire population of mining counties are subsisting on government surplus foods. In most of these areas unemployment of 15 percent is not uncommon.... Only a transfusion of outside aid and/or a revitalization of the coal industry can prevent complete economic collapse."\(^{20}\)

Consequently, Kennedy's decision to implement food stamp programs in these areas can be seen as a way of improving the credibility of the union bureaucracy's ability to wrestle concessions out of the new Democratic administration, consolidating his election support, and as a means of maintaining control over the areas of chronic high unemployment. This concern is reflected in Kennedy's first order issued as President on January 21, 1961, the day after he was inaugurated:

> The Secretary of Agriculture shall take immediate steps to expand and improve the program of food distribution throughout the United States...so as to make available
for distribution, through appropriate state and local agencies, to all needy families a greater variety and quantity of food out of our agricultural abundance.\footnote{21}

Furthermore, when Steiner labels the simultaneous existence of "excess" production and unused capacity in agriculture as a "problem," we can see that this situation is a problem only for government policy makers. It is \textit{not} a problem for the low income and unwaged workers. Their problem is their limited access to food supplies dictated by limited income. While the food stamp program helps to solve the "problem" of insufficient demand in food products, that is only part of its function. That it does help increase aggregate demand is secondary to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class, but the complementarity of the struggles between this sector and the farmers makes it harder to attack the food programs. (This is not to say that these two sectors can always interlink their demands and serve a common goal. For example, when Nixon approved the grain sales to the Soviet Union, the resulting increase in food prices was a direct attack on the purchasing power of the majority of the working class. But this author will return to this topic later.)

With respect to county and individual nonparticipation in the food stamp program, what Steiner and the authors in this category do not realize is that it is not in collective capital's interest to solve completely the problems of hunger and malnutrition. In fact, collective capital will fight with a vengeance to keep
subsidies to the working class low. Hubert Humphrey said in relation to U.S. foreign policy, "Food is power. In a very real sense it is our extra measure of power..." His statement is just as applicable to domestic policy. It is only a secondary concern to agricultural capital (e.g., the grain marketers who buy from the individual farmers and sell directly on the international market) who is fed and who is not. In some instances engineered famines may even meet the needs of certain capitalist countries. What is important to agricultural capitalists is that they get the highest price for their product. Low income and unwaged workers were initially required to spend some money in order to get the "bonus" value of food stamps. This purchase requirement thereby serves to limit participation and can be seen as a mechanism of triage within the human capital strategy. That is, those who qualify and need a small supplement to their income are aided easily and sent on their way. Others who need and can afford somewhat more help receive the aid and it significantly contributes to their sustenance. Those who can not afford the initial purchase price are left to make do as they can since their productivity is zero from capital's point of view.

Consequently, Steiner's analysis is very similar to all of the other liberal reformers who seek to make the system work better without understanding the content of the system itself, i.e., that it seeks the expansion of work as a means of social control.
on the aggregate level. By understanding this and the fact that both waged and unwaged workers are struggling for income independent of work at this historical stage of development of the capitalist mode of production, we can more clearly analyze how this struggle manifests itself in relation to the food stamp program and the de-structuring of the state.24

Public Welfare for Social Control and Labor Market Stabilization

The only important work in the U.S. that recognizes the power of workers' struggles in the formulation of welfare programs is that of Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward in their books, Regulating the Poor and Poor People's Movements. Their central thesis is that: "Historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated or expanded during occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored."25 Although there are limitations to this assertion of cyclically expansionary appropriations for poverty programs, it marks a major break from the humanitarian-moral obligation theory of social change. This approach seems useful in explaining the operation of the federal food programs during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s as we will see later. But the problem with this analysis is that it ignores the linkages between the struggles of waged and unwaged workers. The authors do not see the economic conditions of recessions and depressions as being caused by workers through their
demands for increased consumption or as being used against them to establish the basis for a new cycle of growth. Moreover, their analysis does not seem to apply to the 1960s and 1970s, at least in so far as the food stamp program is concerned. While the authors designate "mass" unemployment as a cause of "civil disorders" this was actually not the case during the 1960s. It is true that there were high levels of unemployment in the black ghettos. In some instances it ranged from 25 to 50 percent. But the problems with this characterization of the situation are two-fold: (1) unemployment among black youths in urban ghettos and "civil disorders" are not closely correlated since the former has continued but the latter have not; and (2) the occurrence of "civil disorders" is not perfectly related to the generosity of transfer payments since the latter have continued to rise even though "civil disorders" have ceased to occur on a major scale. And even while they recognize that the "weakening of the family" played a significant role, this still does not give us a full understanding of the struggles that have been going on and of the composition of the urban working class. For example, it is important to note that the vast majority of people in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program are women, and AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for food stamps. Additionally, while Piven and Cloward indicate that "disorder," "turmoil" and "riots" are fruitful means of struggle for the working class, they ignore such day to day struggles
as fraud with respect to the food stamp program that are not as widely reported and provide an effective method of acquiring income independent of work for capital (see Chapter 4).

Whereas Nick Kotz seemingly trusts any informed, responsible, elected official to represent the low income and unwaged workers, Piven and Cloward see "disorder" and "turmoil" in combination with the electoral process as weeding out the politically responsive from those who are not. They contend that, "under conditions of severe electoral instability, the alliance of public and private power is sometimes weakened, if only briefly, and at these moments a defiant poor may make gains...[thus]...the political impact of institutional disruption depends upon electoral conditions." 28 Therefore, according to Piven and Cloward, capital's action is to be seen in terms of politicians who are vulnerable at the polls unless they support cyclically generous appropriations in response to unemployment and "turmoil." And to reward the electorate, "in the 1960s the Great Society administration circumvented city governments in order to make sure that benefits reached ghetto voters..." 29 But if we observe the Great Society strategy and Piven and Cloward's method of analysis on the aggregate level, we see that both were a failure and incorrect. Social welfare payments as a percentage of national output did not increase cyclically, but rather grew steadily from 10.3% in the early 60s to 15.7% during the mid-70s. 30 When the confrontations with the state fell off the food stamp payments
did not. Moreover, the voting participation of eligible blacks dropped from 58% in 1964 to 48% in 1976 at the national level.\textsuperscript{31} According to Piven and Cloward's analysis we would expect a drop in programs in their interests as they declined in voting importance. Yet the facts show otherwise: there has not been a reduction in the food stamp program. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that workers struggles have been moving away from electoral politics and their power has been increasingly exerted in other arenas. It is their actions in these other arenas that has enabled them to force up their social wage (understood as income in money and in kind from the government) continually and not cyclically since the early 1960s. This is particularly true for the food stamp program, because it has grown faster than any other federal transfer program. For example, while the number of recipients in the AFDC program increased from one to ten million, the number of recipients in the food stamp program increased from under fifty thousand in 1961 to over 20 million in 1980 and the amount spent on the program by the federal government increased from under four-hundred thousand to over ten billion dollars during the same period; i.e., food stamps as a percent of the AFDC program in dollar terms increased from under one percent to approximately 50 percent.\textsuperscript{32}

James W. Button's book, \textit{Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots}, is similar to and complements Piven and
Cloward's book, *Regulating the Poor*. Button writes that he expected that not only the severity of a single riot, but the number of riots experienced over a period of time and their total intensity effect may well have had an impact on the expenditure increases of the federal government... [and]...official knowledge of the grievances underlying a particular riot, as reflected at least somewhat in the immediate reported cause for the outbreak, might have induced federal increases or decreases.33

The complementarity of this book with Piven and Cloward's is that it reinforces their analysis of OEO and extensively covers government programs that they did not analyze, namely, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Department of Justice. Button states,

Convinced that the turmoil in the cities was spawned by the deplorable social and economic conditions in the ghettos, many OEO policy makers revitalized their efforts to eradicate the conditions underlying black frustrations.34

He further asserts that,

Results do suggest [as in the case of OEO] that the simple occurrence of black riots in 1967-1968 may have attracted greater than average HUD expenditures to disorder cities [i.e., those cities such as Detroit, Newark and New York City that were the scene of confrontations with the state] ...[in addition]...of the 18 cities having experienced one or more serious riots sometime between 1964 and mid-1968, 83 applied for Model Cities grants by the end of the decade. This compares to the more general Model Cities initial funding ratio of only 63 cities out of 193 (33 percent) that submitted planning applications in 1967, although this ratio improved somewhat by 1969 as more funding became available. This suggests that the occurrence of a riot, not the number or severity of riots was a key variable that influenced the flow of Model Cities funds.35

Nevertheless, while Button points out these gains by the low income and unwaged sector of the working class as the result of
violent action, he insists on characterizing the response by HUD and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the confrontations with the state as being "moderate." Naturally, small appropriations are not as desirable as large appropriations from the low income and unwaged workers point of view. But we can look at any transfer of resources to this sector of the working class as significant if it increases their income and improves their ability to struggle against capital. This is also true because it strengthens the working class as a whole by putting a floor on the level of poverty in this country. By accepting capital's terminology as perspective, Button, like Piven and Cloward, is unable to develop a framework to politically understand the dynamics of workers' struggles. Thus Button's most valuable contribution is seen when he does not evaluate his thesis but only summarizes. For example, he says,

Those who argue that collective violence is necessarily beyond the pale of effective political action and totally counterproductive in terms of achieving any of the goals set forth by the practitioners of violence are, on the basis of this study, in serious error.³⁶

Moreover,

data indicate(s) that many federal executive officials (as well as a number of officials in larger cities) generally perceive domestic violence by disadvantaged groups as a form of political participation or as a viable means of making demands upon those in power.³⁷

This contrasts with his pessimism reflected in the evaluation that, "no programs were implemented that were capable of substantially altering socioeconomic power relations."³⁸ This latter
view is seemingly shared by Piven and Cloward in light of their analysis that government programs only expand in times of massive violence. But with respect to the food stamp program specifically and in terms of all forms of a social wage in general, one can note that the quantitative increases in workers' incomes can lead to qualitative changes in their ability to struggle and in the forms of struggle they pursue.

Button sees Department of Justice and Department of Defense expenditures in response to confrontations with the state as part of a transition from a "Riot Prevention to a Riot Control" strategy. This is essentially an accurate discussion of the subject, although he does not attempt to look at these actions during the 60s as part of an urgent response by U.S. collective capital to the then emerging historical crisis of the capitalist world order that was caused by an international cycle of the working class struggles. 39 Looking at the violent confrontations with the state in the urban ghettos in the U.S. as one manifestation of the global crisis we can today see why the massive acts of repression by the state were necessary if collective capital was to maintain control at home as they define it. Therefore, it was necessary to complement repression abroad, e.g., Vietnam, with stronger control at home.

The analysis that will be used in this thesis to study poverty and welfare can only be understood as part of a global
analysis of workers' struggles and the present historical crisis of the capitalist mode of production. As the 1970-71 U.S. recession was a response to the domestic accumulation problems caused by both local and Asian workers' struggles, similarly, the 1973-75 global recession and continued slow growth, high unemployment and double digit inflation was capital's response to that international cycle of working class struggles. With this global perspective in mind we can now turn to a brief exposition of the type of analysis that will be used by this author. The initial exposition is necessarily limited because a fuller understanding can only be achieved by looking at the specific circumstances of low income and unwaged workers and the government food programs.

**An Analysis Based on a Working Class Perspective**

The form of analysis that will be used in this paper is based on what can be called a "working class perspective." A working class perspective is not a formal theory because it is a political strategy that is not static; i.e., the form or tactics that workers use to fight capital are always changing with the changing composition of the working class and capital. For example, workers' struggles for food stamps have changed from violent confrontations with the state to lobbying Congress and legal action to widespread fraud. Nevertheless, the content of the struggle from a working class perspective is always the same as long as capital is the dominant organizational force in
society; i.e., it is action against the reproduction of capital and the self-realization of the working class. The historical development of this analysis is traced by Harry Cleaver in Reading Capital Politically. While a working class perspective of this type has not been extensively and systematically discussed as part of the contemporary political debate in the United States, its support can be seen daily in the action of workers globally. Several articles that use this type of analysis to study the struggles of low income and unwaged workers in the United States have been published in Zerowork (U.S.) and in Quaderni Del Territorio (Italy).

Within this literature an analysis of the contemporary conflicts of the working class and capital is developed. By looking at the present social relations from a working class perspective one can see how working class struggles have contributed to the present crisis that is characterized by slow growth, inflation, recessions, virtually zero productivity growth, persistent nominal wage gains and an ever-increasing social welfare budget. The working class is defined by its struggle against capital and this author will analyze various sectors of both the waged and unwaged within the social factory. This analysis includes a study of the content, direction, development and circulation of workers' struggles. It focuses on the dynamics of the different sectors of the working class and how they interact with one another and with
capital. It is on the basis of such analysis that the relation between workers and their "official" organizations is studied. Finally, all of these aspects are related to capitalist initiatives. In order to understand this dialectic between the working class and capital, this author will also focus on how the working class changes its composition into a more powerful force. This involves the process of political recomposition, i.e.,

the level of unity and homogeneity that the working class reaches during a cycle of struggle...[or]...the overthrow of capitalist divisions, the creation of new unities between different sectors of the class, and an expansion of the boundaries of what the "working class" comes to include.42

Work already completed within this perspective shows how this political recomposition has imposed the present crisis on capital insofar as both the waged and unwaged workers have successfully demanded higher incomes independent of work, e.g., through income increases greater than productivity increases, absenteeism, direct appropriation, welfare and food stamp payments, etc. Therefore, the present crisis is a historical crisis because of the content of workers' struggles, the refusal of work, attacks the heart of capital accumulation.

Several of the articles in this perspective focus on issues that directly relate to the food stamp struggles. Harry Cleaver has looked at workers' struggles as the major factor in reducing hunger in the world. By looking at food as a moment in the class struggle, he has related the international production
and consumption of food to the overall development of the capitalist system. Thus he has analyzed the consumer demands, and the increasingly high level of technology in the agriculture sector. Paolo Carpignano has described the Great Society programs as purposefully established as a means of political control over the communities that were the scene of the confrontations with the state during the 1960s. But he argues that the welfare movement became, "the basis for the amplification and circulation of social struggle, for the homogenization of demands, and ultimately, for the process of recomposition of the working class." Carpignano goes on to argue that the state has become the target of social struggles and the bargaining site of workers' demands. William Cleaver has looked at how food stamps as a social wage have been used by mine workers in Appalachia to reject the constraints of work. Mario Montano has contended that capital's counterattack against workers during the 1960s involved the isolated attack of whole sectors of the working class, such as those receiving unemployment insurance, food stamps, public jobs and workfare. But what he has overlooked is the explosion of workers' demands in some of these programs. Thus his analysis of food is mainly from capitals' point of view, i.e., how it is made a tool of control by limiting its availability.

Therefore, the examination of waged and unwaged workers' struggles indicates that their content has included simultaneous
demands for higher income and less work. These central demands have a long history in capitalist development and over the long run, as productivity has increased, workers have forced the number of working hours to be reduced and their real income to be increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. These demands are juxtaposed to the interests of the capitalist who bargains for a joint growth of productivity and wages to maintain profitability. These interests are in conflict with one another and the evolution of public policy must be seen within this struggle. This paper takes a working class perspective in the sense that it is written to show how policy develops in relation to the circulation and complementarity of waged and unwaged workers' struggles for food and food stamps. It attempts to understand how the strategies used by capital are partly responses to working class struggles and are implemented in order to maintain social control and profitability in the system. In order to understand this process as a dialectic, we can look at the changing composition of the working class—how political divisions are related to the organization of production. Then it is necessary to look at the working class' political recomposition around the organization of production. Finally, one can look at how capital tries to decompose working class power as part of its own development and restructuring. The evolution of each stage of this process of composition-recomposition-decomposition can be seen as a cycle of working class struggle made up of heterogeneous and autonomous struggles.
Basically, the cycles of struggles in relation to the food stamp program can be characterized in the following manner:

**A Summary of the Cycles of Struggles Around Food and Food Stamps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Class Struggles</th>
<th>Capitalist Response/Counter-attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s-50s—Waged workers' struggles in mining, agriculture and manufacturing led to increased mechanization and &quot;pockets&quot; of high unemployment. Miners' struggles took the form of the refusal to migrate, but displaced rural blacks migrated to the cities. Both sectors demanded increased income in the form of government aid to compensate for their &quot;structural unemployment.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62—During this period, food stamps were used in conjunction with other programs to make up a human capital strategy. To the extent that food stamp programs were implemented in rural areas in place of the food distribution program, it made those low income and unwaged workers who stayed worse off because they could not afford to pay the price to get the bonus value in food stamps. Also the food stamp program provided more benefits to the farmer than did the food distribution program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-68—This cycle marks the most visible and politically active years of struggle for an increased social wage by the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
low income and unwaged sectors of the working class. It is characterized by massive violence in the streets, confrontation with the state, and widespread direct appropriation. The most significant gain was the introduction of 985 new food stamp projects that increased the potential for greater participation.

1968, 1969, and the 1970s--This period of attack by capital is a direct response to the urban insurrection of the 1960s. The federal government first implemented a national program to control urban confrontations and direct appropriation. At various times the Executive Branch and the Department of Agriculture tried to impound money appropriated for the food programs and inflation took a heavy toll on the money that was spent. This was also the period that work registration rules were implemented and various regulations were manipulated in order to reduce benefits and limit the continually expanding participation in the food stamp program.

1970s--In terms of material payoffs, this cycle of struggles is more successful than that of the 1960s. The level of participation and benefits increased dramatically during these years. These increases are mainly a function of the high levels of unemployment during the two recessions, individual fraud, lobbying and legal action taken by the "official" organizations of the working class.
CHAPTER II

The Expansion of the Food Stamp Program
from a Working Class Perspective

In this chapter a brief history of the federal food programs will be presented and the expansion of the food stamp program in terms of the class relations involved will be analyzed. The expansion of food programs is beneficial to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. In terms of absolute availability, the expansion of the food programs has not been a threat to the consumption of other sectors of the working class, because from 1929 to 1978 while the population of the United States increased only 80%, the increase in farm output measured in terms of the annual volume of net farm production available for eventual human consumption increased 130%.

Thus, more food could be made available for consumption for everyone. Nonetheless, in terms of the tax burden, food program expenditure on low income and unwaged individuals as a percent of the nondefense federal budget has increased from 2% in 1961 to almost 10% in 1977. Thus there is some basis for arguing that the tax structure has pitted various sectors of the working class against one another with respect to the consumption of food. Furthermore, government programs such as land set-asides that have restricted the level of farm output
have contributed to this conflict by raising the cost of food programs.

I. A Brief History of Pre-1960 Workers' Struggles for Food and Federal Food Programs by Low Income and Unwaged Workers

What is important to understand in the Great Depression is the link between the struggles of waged workers during the previous period of economic expansion and the demands of unwaged workers who were laid off during the crisis. Those workers who struggled for increased wages when they were employed during the expansion of the 1920s continued their struggles when they were unemployed during the 1930s. No longer dealing with individual employers, these unwaged workers directed their struggles against the state. The success of these struggles can partly be measured by government intervention to increase employment, support unions, etc., and partly by the implementation of the New Deal welfare system that included a food distribution program. Negri and others have noted that 1929 marks the end of laissez-faire capitalism and the beginning of systematic state intervention on the side of workers to overcome the structural frictions created by the market economy and the competition between individual capitalists. Thus the Great Depression is an historic turning point that represents the collapse of wide-spread poverty as the basis of the imposition of work and the beginning of the new state of social capital.
With respect to agricultural production and distribution in the depression of the 1930s, the federal government had some basic problems to deal with. One problem was the market surplus of agricultural products and low prices to farmers resulting from limited demand and "overproduction." The limited demand was largely due to the staggering number of unemployed workers who could not pay for the food needed for a nutritious diet. Consequently, the federal government developed a number of programs that were intended both to stabilize the market for surplus agricultural commodities through price support mechanisms and commodity purchase programs and to create agencies that would promote exports and the donation of surplus commodities to needy persons in the United States and abroad. In other words, state expenditures and the stimulation of export demand were designed to bolster low farm and personal incomes.

For the purposes of this thesis the author will focus on the second of the programs: the distribution of food to low income and unwaged workers.

During the Great Depression, because capital refused to continue production, the labor market was very competitive. This crisis strategy or strike by capital was used to increase unemployment and accentuate the division between waged and unwaged workers and thus weaken their power in relation to capital. But unemployment was not enough in some instances to maintain a downward pressure on wages because certain sectors of the working class continued to
struggle against capital for higher wages, less work, and union representation. Consequently, when business used force that was sanctioned by the state, the struggles of workers against private capital were intense and militant. For example, in March of 1932 an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 unemployed workers organized by the Communist Party marched on the Ford Motor Company in Detroit. They were demanding jobs, a seven-hour workday, no more speed-ups, sanctioned rest periods and equal opportunity for blacks. The marchers were met at the plant site by firehoses, pistols and a machine gun. When the marchers requested that their demands be heard, shots were fired and general melee ensued with hand to hand fighting. When the confrontation ended four workers were dead and their demands went unmet. Again in 1937, workers struggles were suppressed with the help of state police and armed guards. On Memorial Day of that year, 3,000 strikers marched on the Republic Steel Company in Chicago demanding union representation. The Chicago police and hired armed guards, who had protected strike breakers and broken up picket lines, stopped the marchers. A confrontation ensued with ten workers being killed, six shot in the back. Thus the workers' demands were rejected and the Chicago press praised the police for suppressing the "revolutionary tide." Through generally aggressive actions and militant confrontations like these, waged and unwaged workers as a whole were eventually able to stop and roll back the attack on their real wage level,
develop the new industrial unions like the C.I.O., and force Roosevelt to restore growth and full employment through increased planning with his New Deal legislation. Yet during the early 1930s, the spreading strike by capital led to rising unemployment and the growth of a class of unwaged workers.

As the number of unemployed people who could not afford to pay for food began to grow and they increasingly demanded free food and often directed their struggles against the government. During January of 1931, some 500 farmers carried out an armed march through England, Arkansas demanding free food for themselves and their families. If their demands were not met they vowed to appropriate it from the stores themselves.⁴ Again in January of 1931, in Oklahoma City a crowd of men and women broke into a grocery store and appropriated food. Twenty-six persons were arrested and a sympathy demonstration at the jail was broken up with the use of fire hoses. A meeting held later by the Oklahoma City Unemployed Council demanded that government officials provide relief immediately.⁵ During February of the same year, a group of several hundred Minneapolis unemployed demonstrators smashed plate glass windows in a grocery store and meat market. The hungry mob helped themselves to bacon and ham, fruit and canned goods. Similar events on a smaller scale occurred in near-by St. Paul after a meeting by workers protesting unemployment.⁶ During March of 1931, in Harlan County, Kentucky, 2,000 miners turned out at a
United Mine Workers meeting over wage cuts and reduced employment. When 200 miners were later fired for attending the meeting, 11,000 miners walked off their jobs. Violence broke out and hungry workers appropriated food from the company commissaries. In August of 1931, 1,500 unemployed workers stormed the Indiana Harbor, Indiana plant of the Fruit Growers Express Company. They demanded jobs to keep them from starving, but were attacked by the police instead. In December of 1931, the Communist Party organized a hunger march in Washington, D.C., composed of 1,500 jobless workers. Twenty-five percent of the marchers were former servicemen, 25 percent were women, 30 percent were blacks and they represented 30 states and 19 industries. Five thousand jobless held a conference at the Washington Auditorium and a petition was drafted to be presented to Congress. The marchers were denied the right to march near the Capitol grounds and police officers were placed at hundred-foot intervals around the White House while every man in the police force was made available to contain the marchers. As the march proceeded, 10,000 spectators watched alongside squads of police with riot guns and tear gas. Secret Servicemen and detectives mingled in the crowds. Nevertheless, there was no immediate response from the state in the form of new income support programs.

With the economy in crisis and discontent spreading, the government was beset by repeated protest and demonstrations. In Chicago during April of 1932, five hundred low income
children paraded through the downtown streets to the Board of Education offices demanding that the school system provide them with free food. In the spring of 1932, 20,000 jobless, mostly World War I veterans, converged on Washington, D.C. to demand early payment of World War I bonuses. But Congress and President Hoover resisted the calls for state action. Hoover, who feared Communist Party organizational strength, was only willing to convince Congress to pay the demonstrators' transportation back home. The jobless remained unsatisfied and Hoover then ordered General MacArthur, along with Eisenhower and Patton, to use the Army to disperse the jobless. When four troops of the calvary, four companies of steel-helmeted infantry with fixed bayonets and six tanks moved on the "Bonus Camp" a confrontation occurred. One person died and numerous people were wounded as the troops fired shots, used tear gas and burned the camp. Although their demands had been rejected, other working class actions continued. During June of 1932, 25 hungry Boston children raided a buffet lunch for Spanish War veterans. In Cleveland during August of 1932, a grocery store advertised for its opening that it would give free baskets of food to the first 1,500 persons. When 6,000 persons gathered, a confrontation occurred and 52 people were injured.

In December of 1932 another hunger march was staged. This time 3,000 marchers who came to Washington, D.C., were elected delegates from forty-two thousand Unemployed Councils who spent
months collecting funds to cover the expenses of the delegates. The National Committee of the Unemployed Councils, a Communist Party organization, expressed their demands as decent housing, food and clothing for all unemployed workers and their families. Ten-thousand soldiers and marines were on hand this time along with 370 firemen who were sworn in and given revolvers and tear gas. A declaration of martial law was avoided when arrangements were made to turn over any prisoners to the civil authorities. Vice President Curtis received a committee of marchers. Some sympathy for their cause was expressed. Robert Cantwell in Common Sense noted,

as the marchers passed something curious happened; the crowd (of 75,000 to 100,000) split up into elements; you could see the division of classes working out before your eyes, the breaking up into elements like a chemical in the test tube. The businessmen, the clerks, the women shoppers did not follow the marchers. The unemployed kept moving...Going through the poorer sections there were three parades—the hunger marchers in the street, with the police flanking them, and on the sidewalks on both sides, parades of spectators going along with the marchers.14 [emphasis added]

A month later several hundred unemployed workers surrounded a New York City restaurant demanding to be fed without charge. When the manager refused he was stabbed with a knife and police riot squads were called to the scene.15

The only federal response to these actions was the funds that were made available by the Federal Farm Bureau during 1932 for the purchase of surplus wheat. This wheat was transferred to
the American Red Cross for the milling into flour and distribution to needy persons. However, within a year (October 1933), the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (FSRC) was organized as a nonprofit corporation to distribute price-depressing agricultural surpluses to state relief agencies for families with low levels of consumption. The Board of Directors of this private corporation was made up of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the Administrator of the Public Works Administration. The Administrator of the Emergency Relief Administration was the President. The funds for food donation programs were appropriated from duties collected under the customs laws at 30 percent of gross receipts per year. Then the money was given over to the Department of Agriculture that had the authority to purchase surplus commodities from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The CCC had been established to obtain and store surplus agricultural commodities from the price support programs.

As the 1930s progressed the consistently high unemployment led to continuing conflict over government aid. During January of 1934, unemployed workers in Denver stormed the Colorado State Senate demanding relief, threatening the representatives and running them out of the chambers. The Nation reported that later in a special meeting Senators,

heard how a crowd of almost 400 desperate men, armed with clubs and other weapons, had met on a vacant lot in
the eastern part of the city the previous Sunday at four o'clock in the morning ready to loot the chain stores for food....[Impressed by the workers sincerity, a few days later]...the General Assembly, now completely cowed, not by lobbyists but by hungry mobs, sent a relief bill to Governor Johnson, who signed it at 9:45 Saturday night. It was a compromise bill designed to raise $2,000,000.... The emergency [also] brought a promise that $500,000 would arrive in Denver [from the federal government]. 18

Piven and Cloward have also noted that a confrontation between the state and unemployed workers occurred in Chicago during 1934 when food allowances were cut by 10 percent. The workers were successful in their struggle and the cuts were restored after a vote by the city council. 19

Therefore, we can see that in some instances the local, state, and federal representatives of collective capital did respond directly to workers' demands. Nevertheless, when employment or government aid were not available seemingly unrelated incidents triggered violence and direct appropriation. For example, in Harlem during 1935, a 16 year-old black was arrested for theft. A crowd gathered at the site of the incident and speakers were arrested. Violence broke out and direct appropriation was widespread, particularly with respect to food and clothes. Gunfire was exchanged and one black was killed. More than 100 persons were injured and property damage was estimated to be $2,000,000. 20

Throughout the '30s, the food distribution program provisions were expanded and the Department of Agriculture's authority was spelled out more clearly. On November 18, 1935, the charter
of FSRC was amended and the name of the corporation was changed to the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (FSCC). Along with this change the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was elected to the Presidency of FSCC by the Board of Directors and this led the control of FSCC to be shifted from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration to the Department of Agriculture. With these changes and a somewhat improved economy in general, there was a change in emphasis at FSCC from relief to agricultural production. Policies came to be directed more toward reduction of agricultural surpluses, achievement of price stabilization, and increased effective demand rather than providing relief for the unemployed.\textsuperscript{21} Agricultural markets were stimulated by government purchases of foodstuffs from commodity exchanges and processors or packers. Department of Agriculture officials were also convinced that by exposing low income and unwaged workers to a greater variety of agricultural products through the distribution program, they would eventually be "strengthening commercial demand for the (surplus) commodity by developing new consumers."\textsuperscript{22}

The development of the original food stamp plan in 1939 was also the result of the Department of Agriculture's two-sided search to expand the domestic market for American farmers and to feed militantly hungry unemployed workers. The food stamp plan was hailed as being more efficient for both purposes because it used regular trade channels.\textsuperscript{23} This plan allowed eligible
participants to purchase food stamps for the amount that they usually spent on food and they would receive an additional quantity of stamps that could be used to purchase food commodities that were declared to be in surplus supply. By 1941 this original food stamp program reached its peak participation level at some four million persons. The program covered 1,741 counties and 88 cities, but was not operated systematically on a nationwide basis. In early 1943, the food stamp program was terminated to get people off the income support program and participate in the mobilization for World War II and as a result of increased employment and production that were necessary for the war. After the war, the food distribution program was expanded again to ease the soldiers' transition back into civilian employment (see Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1).

During the post World War II period, President Truman and Eisenhower were both more concerned about wage inflation than economic growth based on the level of employment. In dealing with this problem Truman ran a federal budget surplus in 1947 and 1948. The result was a recession that began in late 1948 and continued through 1949 with wages being brought under control; average gross weekly earnings in the private nonagricultural sector decreased from $68.13 in 1947 to $67.96 in 1948 (in 1967 dollars). When Eisenhower came into office he could not use a budget surplus to slow down wage demands in the U. S., because
Table 2.1

Federal Food Distribution Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity (1,000 lbs.)</th>
<th>Cost ($1,000)</th>
<th>Number of Persons Participating</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,000) (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>653,798</td>
<td>75,158</td>
<td>5,764</td>
<td>3,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>862,817</td>
<td>136,855</td>
<td>7,134</td>
<td>3,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>619,822</td>
<td>190,472</td>
<td>6,033</td>
<td>4,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>644,266</td>
<td>104,446</td>
<td>4,891</td>
<td>2,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>524,418</td>
<td>134,648</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>296,679</td>
<td>97,359</td>
<td>4,624</td>
<td>2,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>171,781</td>
<td>60,937</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>3,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>44,113</td>
<td>16,935</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>40,616</td>
<td>7,326</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>237,780</td>
<td>25,304</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>2,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>255,112</td>
<td>24,452</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>3,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>173,913</td>
<td>14,002</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>3,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>180,191</td>
<td>13,742</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>2,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>139,750</td>
<td>2,873</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>2,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>74,130</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>2,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>105,600</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>189,616</td>
<td>11,753</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>296,983</td>
<td>15,447</td>
<td>3,069</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>822,251</td>
<td>26,146</td>
<td>6,230</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,169,059</td>
<td>66,684</td>
<td>10,252</td>
<td>5,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,694,890</td>
<td>57,674</td>
<td>11,910</td>
<td>8,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,941,344</td>
<td>66,264</td>
<td>13,091</td>
<td>9,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,021,351</td>
<td>35,375</td>
<td>8,956</td>
<td>10,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>600,137</td>
<td>21,305</td>
<td>8,889</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>634,665</td>
<td>31,792</td>
<td>10,431</td>
<td>9,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Peak month participation, i.e., participation during the month of the year when the largest number of persons participating in the program.

2Persons 16 years old and over except, prior to 1947, 14 years and over.

Figure 2.1. Federal Food Distribution Program Participation and Unemployment

Source: Table 2.1 and Business Conditions Digest, U. S. Department of Commerce.
large federal expenditures were required to contain the expansion of the eastern
form of state capital in Korea and keep the area open for U.S. corporate
investments and influence. Thus the Eisenhower Administration began to use
monetary policy to undercut workers' wage demands and business-introduced
technological innovations to break workers' organizational base, increase
unemployment and hamper their bargaining position. These joint policies
resulted in three recessions during the Eisenhower Administrations in an
attempt to restore profitability to the economy by throwing large numbers of
workers out of their jobs.\textsuperscript{25} We can see in Table 2.1 how the food
distribution program expanded when the economy was being slowed down and
reduced when an expansion was in progress.

What is important to understand is not only that the expansion of the food
distribution program was a response to low income and unwaged workers'
struggles. It also fluctuated because the working class strength was broken and
profitability was restored through the successful implementation of the
Keynesian employment policies in which the class struggle was integrated
into the development of the expansion, e.g., through the use of "money illusion,"
and as a result of the numerous recessions during the '40s and '50s. Another
strategy of collective capital to control the degree of intensity of working class
struggles can be seen with respect to military service. During the '40s
and '50s, many workers' struggles were diverted into World War II and the Korean War. These factors along with the fact that many of the black workers were still dispersed in agricultural production during this time period help explain why the food distribution program was administered in a cyclical manner. But we will see when we look at the continual expansion of the food stamp program during the '60s and '70s that the working class recomposed itself. That is, various sectors of the working class were complementary and unified in their struggle against capital. For example, students in the universities dodged the draft and marched against the Vietnam war while soldiers were fragging officers and refusing to go out on dangerous missions.26

II. Government Policy in Planning the Economy

President Kennedy began his term in office during the tenth month of a recession. The actual gross national product (GNP) was running an estimated $50 billion short of potential GNP at the beginning of 1961. And it was clear from the start that Kennedy's method of dealing with the economy was going to be quite different from Eisenhower's recessionary strategy. The major difference was an increased role for government and one of Kennedy's methods for dealing with the ailing economy was to rely heavily on investment in human capital in order to increase the nation's productivity.1 In Kennedy's words,
Another fundamental ingredient of a program to accelerate long-run economic growth is vigorous improvement in the quality of the nation's human resources. Modern machines and advanced technology are not enough unless they are used by a labor force that is educated, skilled and in good health. This is one important reason why in the legislative programs that I will submit in the days to come, I will emphasize so strongly programs to raise the productivity of our growing population, by strengthening education, health, research and training activities.

Part of Kennedy's efforts to improve the health and productivity of the labor force included the doubling of the food distribution program and the establishment of eight pilot food stamp projects. These two actions represented part of the administration's Program for Economic Recovery and Growth and indicates the degree of involvement of the government in the planning of the economy. With respect to food stamps this planning included various aspects such as a purported counter-cyclical manipulation of aggregate demand, more efficient distribution of food in order to keep the cost of the human capital strategy down and qualitatively improving the diet of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class.

The commodity distribution food program had helped the low income and unwaged sector of the working class and protected farm incomes during periods of excess supply on the market, but it presented problems with respect to storage and disposal. On the other hand, the food stamp program uses the regular commercial channels of transportation and storage and thus also benefits
the retail business through increased sales. Therefore, the retail business's efforts to increase their sales complemented the demands of the low income and unwaged workers for increased food subsidies as exemplified by jobless miners in the various high concentration areas of unemployment. A 1962 U. S. Department of Agriculture study showed that the dollar volume of food sales in a sample of retail stores in the eight pilot project areas was increased by eight percent between tests before and after the implementation of the food stamp program. In Unionstown, Pennsylvania, the bonus value of food stamps was adding $170,000 monthly to the Fayette County economy and had a multiplier effect throughout the county. The food stamp program was such a boost to the locally depressed economy that the secretary of the Fayette County Grocers Association declared, "they're not going to take Santa Claus (referring to the food stamp program) out of Fayette County without a lot of screaming from everyone." The Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association was so enthusiastic about the program that they voted to recommend that the food stamp program be expanded to a statewide operation.

Other aspects of the food stamp program that made its acceptance easier by recipients and conservatives who had rather spend money on the defense budget were brought out in the same 1962 Department of Agriculture study. In the report, it was shown that one third to one half of the participants in two of the pilot
projects had a nutritionally better diet compared to low income and unwaged families not participating in the food stamp program. The program was also hailed as being more efficient because it reduced the administrative costs to the local governments when compared to the food distribution program, since it uses the already existing banking system and market means of distribution. For example, in Detroit, one of the first areas to get a pilot project, the mayor estimated that the establishment of a food stamp program in place of the food distribution program would represent a $300,000 annual savings to the local government. 

Therefore, if we characterize a more nutritious diet for increased productivity, increased food demand and increased food program efficiency as representing greater government planning in the reproduction of labor power and an attempt to reduce the cost of this process, then we must look at the implementation of the food stamp program itself as a counterattack by capital. That is, we will see in the following sections how the food stamp program was a response to the unemployment caused by workers' struggles that led to or resulted from automation in mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. While some labor stability was achieved through automation, decentralization, and the recessionary strategy, it was apparent to the Kennedy Administration, as the central planning agent of collective capital, that satisfactory levels of growth and employment could not be achieved
that way. Therefore, it became necessary for the state to use legislative actions to plan the changes in the social factory due to the changing composition of the working class. This process of waged struggles leading to unwaged struggles can be seen in the following examples. Abstractly one can understand this process as one in which machinery is substituted for labor when the cost of the latter rises relative to the former. But as we will see, the wage paid to labor does not increase due to the benevolence of capital. It is only through persistent action that workers improve their living standards. Nonetheless, automation under capital leads to unemployment and the absence of income for some. This is because increased productivity under capital is not used to reduce the aggregate amount of work and increase income. Instead, it means at best a marginally reduced amount of work for those employed and an increase in the accumulation of capital and the number of unemployed workers who are supposed to put a downward pressure on wages.

Working Class Struggles, Mechanization in Mining and the Introduction of Food Stamps

The continuation of workers' struggles when they involuntarily leave the waged sector and go into the unwaged sector can be seen in the following example. During the '40s and '50s, the class conflict in mining was characterized by official and wildcat strikes, dramatic wage increases, the government seizure
of mines, the reorganization of production that eliminated many jobs and a changed composition of the working class in this sector. Table 2.2 below shows work stoppages in mining during this period and gives us some indication of the intensity of workers' struggles in this sector. From 1940 to 1960, as a result of these struggles the average gross hourly earnings in bituminous coal mining rose from 85 cents to $3.15, an increase of 270 percent. But in another sense, the power of coal miners was undercut by the implementation of labor saving technology that caused a substantial number of miners to be displaced. The number of wage and salary workers in mining in general fell from 925,000 in 1940 to 709,000 in 1960, while productivity more than doubled during this time period.\textsuperscript{8} Unemployment in mining also grew as many industries switched from coal to petroleum and natural gas as their energy sources reducing the demand for coal. The government and business undoubtedly expected the high unemployment in mining to be a transitory phenomenon as workers relocated to other areas and to other industries. However, the unemployment in the mining areas proved persistent due to the fact that miners refused to migrate.\textsuperscript{9} Since many of these miners were out of work either for a long time or permanently, their struggles began to be channeled through the union bureaucracy and directed against the government for assistance. Thomas Kennedy, International President of the United Mine Workers, testifying before the
Table 2.2  
Statistics in the Mining Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Work Stoppages (thousands)</th>
<th>Average Annual Income in Bituminous Coal Industry (millions)</th>
<th>Capital Assets Less Reserves (millions)</th>
<th>Man Hours Worked (thousands)</th>
<th>Output per Man Hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>5,376</td>
<td>8,938</td>
<td>281,528</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>5,322</td>
<td>8,618</td>
<td>296,031</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>7,829</td>
<td>322,229</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>7,643</td>
<td>408,207</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>4,944</td>
<td>7,236</td>
<td>433,622</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>4,550</td>
<td>6,959</td>
<td>419,379</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>6,111</td>
<td>387,950</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>5,806</td>
<td>513,594</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>6,208</td>
<td>593,696</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>3,831</td>
<td>5,878</td>
<td>697,247</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>3,268</td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>711,390</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>4,636</td>
<td>642,476</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>3,383</td>
<td>4,271</td>
<td>898,321</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>3,212</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>949,539</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>879,628</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>2,906</td>
<td>958,591</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>3,535</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>1,078,474</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>1,034,541</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>3,625</td>
<td>1,021,078</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,128</td>
<td>921,536</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>4,432</td>
<td>840,416</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Special Committee of the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor during late 1960 stated that,

Over 100,000 coal miners, both anthracite and bituminous, are idle due to no fault of their own. Unemployment insurance should be paid for the full period of joblessness and should provide up to 75 percent of the average weekly wage....The necessities of daily life do not stop with income. Food, clothing, shelter, and medical care must be paid for.10

In order to deal with the unemployment problem that was the result of workers' struggles (that had led to automation), Kennedy began to restructure the United States Employment Service so that it would be more adept at coordinating the jobless with available employment. Kennedy and his economic advisers felt that the lack of geographic labor mobility contributed to the lack of responsiveness of labor to employment opportunities. But in the interim, between the establishment of the "pockets" of high unemployment and the movement of labor out of these areas, it was necessary for the state to help sustain the unemployed workers with a minimal amount of government aid until they had been placed in jobs. Therefore, Kennedy had four of the initial five food stamp pilot projects implemented in the coal mining regions of Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kentucky. But by placing the food stamp projects in the mining districts, Kennedy helped legitimize the union bureaucracy's ability to deal with the Administration and reward electoral support. This was clearly in anticipation that they would reciprocate by delivering a stable labor force and loyal electorate in the mining
areas. Nevertheless, this economic strategy was questionable from the beginning because of the degree to which the mine workers refused to migrate. Food stamps made it even easier for the miners to stay home. Furthermore, the value of food stamps to miners can be seen in their effectiveness of enabling them to stay out on strike longer. ¹¹ Thus the ability of the leaders of the United Mine Workers to deliver a stable and flexible workforce continued to be weakened.

Let us look at some examples of these cases. One of the initial food stamp pilot projects was in West Frankfort, Illinois about 320 miles south of Chicago. After World War II, 7,000 to 8,000 men went into the coal mines daily, but by 1961, the number of workers employed in the mines had dropped to somewhere between five and seven hundred. Automation had been introduced that allowed two men to do the work that had once been done by four teams of two to four miners. Consequently, 4,000 in this city of 38,000 were unemployed. ¹² These workers were targeted in the food stamp program. In 1961 in Uniontown, Pennsylvania there were 12,200 workers unemployed out of a workforce of 45,900. Originally 5,458 received food stamps and it was estimated that eventually 69,000 persons in the county would be eligible for these benefits. ¹³ Welch, West Virginia and Prestonsburg, Kentucky were also localities in the initial pilot programs and all four of these coal mining regions were
designated by the Department of Labor as "areas of substantial and persistent labor surplus." This meant that the unemployment rate was 12 percent or more. In these areas, job seekers were substantially in excess of job openings and the condition was expected to continue for at least four months. Therefore, the injection of food stamps into these areas meant that this additional income was to support these workers while they were in between jobs. This support was intended to be temporary, because the federal government tried to encourage the unemployed persons to leave the area by informing them of jobs elsewhere. The problem for capital was that these payments became a social wage independent of work when the workers refused to migrate.

Working Class Struggles and the Increased Mechanization in Agriculture and Manufacturing

It is necessary to look at the economic expansion during and after World War I in order to have a clearer understanding of the capital restructuring and working class decomposition in United States agriculture during the 1930s and 1940s. During this time the industrial economies of the United States, England, Germany, and France had reached a mature stage of development. Along with this rapid economic growth came significant real wage increases for the industrial working class (see Table 2.3).

During this cycle of expanding wages, demand for agricultural products was also increasing. For example, during the
Table 2.3
Wage and Price Indices 1914-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wages Prices</td>
<td>Wages Prices</td>
<td>Wages Prices</td>
<td>Wages Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>- 125</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>- 148</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>- 180</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>- 210</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>- 215</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'20s the population in the U. S. increased by some 17 million and the index of food consumption per capita increased from 82.6 to 86.7. But agricultural production increased greater than the expansion of demand, e.g., the world wheat production index rose from 40 during 1920 to 100 in 1930, sugar rose from 50 to 120, and cotton fluctuated from 100 to 120. The price index with respect to these crops declined respectively in wheat from 160 to 80, in sugar from 160 to 70, and in cotton from 180 to 70.\textsuperscript{15} The reason for this dramatic "overproduction"\textsuperscript{16} in agriculture was due to the increased acreage utilization in producer nations and the opening up of land in such areas as the Dominions, Argentina, and Uruguay. Nevertheless, it was not until 1932 that world production of primary commodities peaked and prices bottomed out.

When the "overproduction problem" started to cut into farmers incomes in the United States unrest followed. During August of 1931, dairymen in Oregon went on a five day strike. They blocked all highways leading to Portland and stopped trucks taking milk to the city. Thousands of gallons of milk were dumped into ditches and the strike ended with the big milk distributors of Portland agreeing to increase prices. In September of 1931, the Farmers' Union in North Dakota called for a farm debt moratorium. To the large landowners loan foreclosures might mean a reduction in holdings. To the small landowners or tenants bankruptcy meant not only a loss of income, but possible removal from
the land and their means of subsistence. In Council Bluff, Iowa, during May of 1932, 300 armed farmers picketed in protest of their plight. The sheriff's department tear-gassed the farm and took their arms. In Cherokee, Iowa, 14 men were wounded when a group of armed strike breakers fired into picket lines. This violence allowed the sheriff to call in the state militia and numerous picketers were arrested. But in Clinton, Cherokee, Sioux City, and Des Moines the prisoners were freed when crowds of belligerent farmers threatened to liberate the jails. In Oklahoma a group of farmers halted a foreclosure sale by bringing a World War I cannon to the proceedings. During January of 1933, Iowa farmers discouraged an insurance company representative from bidding on foreclosed farm property by presenting him with a hangman's noose. 17

As the farmers' struggles circulated thousands of foreclosure sales were stopped. One report from Omaha noted, "These farmers are no longer in good humor. They are in ugly temper, intimidating sheriffs and bidders on farms. They are telling some courts what they will stand for and what they will not stand for." 18 In one case, farmers took over an Iowa county court building as their headquarters. In response to the action, large insurance companies from New York were forced to declare a moratorium on farm mortgages nominally worth about $1.7 billion. 19
In March of 1933, delegates from Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, Nebraska, and Kansas gathered in Des Moines for the national convention of the Farm Holiday Association. Resolutions were passed calling for parity pricing, a moratorium on property foreclosures, and the right of eminent domain by the federal government in order to appropriate land from insurance and mortgage companies "on a fair basis of settlement" and to reopen the land for settlement. These demands were accompanied by a threat of a marketing strike if the demands were unanswered by May 3. While the farmers did not go through with their strike plans, they did stop evictions in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South Dakota. The Governor of Iowa called for a moratorium on foreclosures, but they continued. In April of 1933, some 600 farmers crowded into a courtroom in Le Mars, Iowa, and demanded the local judge to cease all foreclosure sales. When he refused he was blindfolded, removed from the bench, severely beaten, and threatened with death by men in bandanas. This revolt lead to martial law and the arrest of the farmers involved, but the conflict between farmers and business interests did not cease. In Denison, Iowa, during the same week, a group of farmers assaulted agents and deputies trying to foreclose a farm. The Governor responded by putting six counties under martial law and sending in the National Guard. Some 150 men were arrested in Plymouth and Crawford Counties. As the
farmers escalated their use of force local and state governments responded firmly. In Wisconsin, when a farmer refused to surrender his farm, "an army of deputy sheriffs...laid down a barrage with machine guns, rifles, shotguns, and tear gas bombs." In New York, state troopers used riot-guns to keep the highways open to milk transporters. In Pennsylvania, farmers were fired on by police when they gathered to prevent a foreclosure sale. Thus violent repression was one aspect of the government response.

The plight of the farmers was not uniform and the disparity of power between landowners and tenants manifested itself in different forms of organizations. During September of 1932, a group of tenants and dispossessed owners met in Sioux City for a Rank-and-File Conference. They drafted proposals for action against high taxes, fixed interest charges, banks, insurance companies, wealthy farmers, and the leaders of the farm movement. In December the group took their proposals to Washington and demanded relief, but nothing specific was provided. In early 1933, the organization re-emerged as the National Committee for Action (NCA). They gained the support of conservative food growers in Pennsylvania, New York and New England in addition to farmers in the Northwest. NCA organized marches on state legislatures in Iowa and Nebraska, initiated tax strikes in Indiana and Michigan, and agitated dairy farmers in New York.
This political differential within the farmers' movement was also reflected in the government action. For example, the Agriculture Adjustment Administration paid "farmers" money to reduce crop production of commodities in surplus. But these payments for the most part went to landowners and not tenants, sharecroppers or waged laborers. This was due to the fact that landowners controlled the local committees that administered the federal programs. In many cases if the tenants or sharecroppers did receive some of the federal money it was used to pay off their debts to the landowners or merchants for unpaid debts or future supplies. As Myrdal points out, "the agricultural policies, and particularly the Agricultural Adjustment program (AAA), which was instituted in May, 1933, was the factor directly responsible for the drastic curtailment in the number of Negro and white sharecroppers and Negro cash and share tenants." As can be seen in Table 2.4, tenancy was on the decline during this period. There was 192,000 less black and 150,000 less white tenants in 1940 than in 1930.

In order to deal with this attack on their income and means of subsistence, sharecroppers tried to organize. During the summer of 1931, sharecroppers in the area of Camp Hill, Alabama, attempted to form a union. The local authorities and landowners felt threatened by the action. The local sheriff's posse raided the sharecroppers meeting and one black was killed,
Table 2.4

Number of Farm Operators in the South, by Tenure and Color*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Owners and Managers</th>
<th>Tenants Other than Croppers</th>
<th>Croppers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Thousands

three wounded, and seventeen arrested (four disappeared "mysteriously"). Nevertheless, the newly-formed Share Croppers Union continued to grow stronger in the Camp Hill area. Its threat was again met with violence in December of 1932. When several dozen sharecroppers and renters gathered at one union member's cabin, a deputy-escorted lynch mob attacked. Seven sharecroppers were killed and numerous blacks were arrested. Thus this attempt at organization by the sharecroppers was violently suppressed.

During July of 1934, in Poinsett County, Arkansas, black and white sharecroppers and laborers met to form an organization, the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU). The effort was led by two young socialists and backed by the Socialist party. Socialists and ministers made up a large percentage of the organizers and by 1935 the organization had 10,000 members in 80 localities. Kester described the political recomposition of the black and white sharecroppers in the following way:

Now the sharecroppers were no longer willing to be slaves. Slaves begged for mercy but men demanded justice, and justice was all they asked. The planters were afraid of the union because it promised freedom to the enslaved sharecroppers. Now the white and black slaves had stopped fighting one another and had joined together to struggle against their common enemy, the planter could no longer use the white man to beat down the black man or the black man to beat down the wages and living conditions of the white man. These ancient enemies were together now. That made a difference—a world of difference.
STFU's main goal was to get their legal share of the benefits granted under the A.A.A. contracts. But STFU also demanded the eviction from land be stopped; the right to organize free schools with transportation, textbooks, and lunches; and higher wages to reflect the cost of living, shorter hours, and better living conditions. 30 Thus their demands were a threat to the traditional organization of production in the South and would have initiated significant changes in the political and economic relations.

In practice, the sharecroppers continued to be severely repressed politically and exploited economically. In Arkansas, STFU meetings were raided by landowners and local authorities, STFU members were beaten and killed, and sharecroppers were evicted from their land if they associated with the union. Sharecroppers and tenants who stayed on the land were entitled to the rent-free use of the land under government contracts, but the landowners seldom followed these provisions. Instead, sharecroppers were forced to pay rent even though they were not growing crops. In order to pay rent many sharecroppers were forced to take low paying waged labor jobs that could not be refused if sharecroppers were to qualify for relief. Landowners would find out the names of those on relief rolls and they would then be forced to work. In Arkansas relief work in the radish fields paid between 12 and 15 cents for a 10 to 12 hour day. 31 Dispossessed sharecroppers demonstrated against low wages and in one case successfully
carried out a strike, but their struggles were effectively contained. Nevertheless, these actions of defiance served as a threat to the landowners and intensified their interest in removing sharecroppers from the area.

By the late 1930s landowners began to use mechanization as another method of reducing their dependence on sharecroppers. Mechanization reduced the need for labor, promoted a wage and rent system, and further divorced sharecroppers and tenants from the land that was their source of income and family subsistence. There were 29,100 tractors in use in the ten cotton states of the South during 1920, 111,900 in 1930, 223,300 in 1940, and 743,400 in 1950.\textsuperscript{32} This mechanization was made possible partially through the use of government aid and loans to farmers (see Table 2.5).

In class terms one can see this increased use of machinery in agriculture as a method of removing the sharecroppers from the land and an attack on their previous form of organization of production of labor power. Thus sharecroppers were pushed off the land because they were no longer needed in agricultural production and were beginning to pose a political threat to the social order of the South. Sharecroppers were also pulled off the land to some extent by the war mobilization during the 1940s (see Table 2.6).
Table 2.5
Government Subsidies, Increased Mechanization and Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Direct Payments to Farmers (millions)</th>
<th>Commodity Credit Corp. Loans (millions)</th>
<th>Farming Sector Physical Assets (billions)</th>
<th>Index of Farm Output Per Man Hour</th>
<th>Value of Agriculture Raw Materials (billions)</th>
<th>% Personal Consumption Expenditure on Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>3,543</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29,621</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29,395</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28,886</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29,448</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28,604</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>3,355</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27,507</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27,160</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26,430</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25,028</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24,870</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25,238</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26,162</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25,062</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25,388</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24,839</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25,750</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23,190</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23,675</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21,552</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20,828</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6
Population Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net Black Out-Migration from the South</th>
<th>Annual Average Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1950</td>
<td>1,595,000</td>
<td>159,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>1,457,000</td>
<td>145,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1966</td>
<td>613,000</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Those workers remaining in agriculture during the 1940s and 1950s were in a better bargaining position for increased wages due to the increased productivity and because the "excess" labor had left the South. Consequently, from 1940 to 1960 the increase in the weighted average of all farm wage rates on a per hour basis went from 16 cents to 81 cents, a 500 percent increase. During this same period of time, the number of agricultural workers declined from 9,540,000 to 5,696,000, a 40 percent decrease. It can be seen in Table 2.5 that the end result of these struggles in the agricultural sector, both on the supply side and on the demand side, has been to reduce the percent of personal consumption expenditures spent on food.

With Tables 2.6 and 2.7 we can see that as the blacks left the South many of the metropolitan areas became their homes.
Table 2.7
Urban Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Non-White Population</th>
<th>% of Non-White in Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>275,969</td>
<td>1,046,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>329,157</td>
<td>605,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>127,477</td>
<td>276,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>317,285</td>
<td>483,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>171,877</td>
<td>361,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
<td>115,423</td>
<td>137,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>150,088</td>
<td>216,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>188,106</td>
<td>266,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>215,398</td>
<td>342,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

It is apparent that much of the growth in the urban areas was due to migration, because the rates of growth were too fast to be accounted for simply by births. At the same time because of increased automation in the factories (aimed at increasing production and decomposing workers' organizational power) the number of jobs was declining in some areas and not growing fast enough in other areas to employ the increase in population to the birth rate and migration.
From 1940 to 1960, the average gross hourly earnings in manufacturing rose from 65 cents to $2.26, a 240 percent increase, and during the same time the number of wage and salary workers in manufacturing as a percentage of the total wage and salary workers dropped from 34 to 30 percent.\textsuperscript{34} This trend could also be seen in seven of the nine metropolitan areas listed in Table 2.7.\textsuperscript{35} In New York City, from 1950 to 1960, the number of manufacturing employees as a percent of the total nonagricultural employment not only dropped from 30 to 27 percent, but also the total number of manufacturing jobs fell from 1,038,900 in 1950 to 946,800 in 1960.\textsuperscript{36} In Michigan, decentralization and automation led to the state's share of total auto production workers falling from 56 percent in 1951 to 36 percent in 1960.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, while many blacks were becoming concentrated in urban areas, the number of manufacturing jobs available to them was falling steadily. Consequently they were forced either to take lower paying service sector jobs or continue their unwaged struggles. In the urban areas these unwaged workers' struggles increasingly took the form of struggle for aid from the government.

The degree to which these struggles were successful in Detroit can be seen by the fact that during the spring of 1961, before the food stamp project was introduced, the Detroit Welfare Department was the largest distributor of food in the city. It distributed food each month to 190,000 persons, 12 percent of
the population of the city. During March of 1962, Detroit accounted for 80,000 of the 140,000 persons benefiting from the six original food stamp pilot projects; half of those participating in Detroit were on welfare. Thus income supplementation of the labor force in this area seemed necessary. Consequently, the concentration of low income and unwaged blacks continued to accumulate in the city's ghetto area and were effectively supported by the food stamp project.

The Breakdown of the Family

Another element of the changing composition of the working class that is related to the expansion of the food stamp program is the breakdown of the family. This is important because separated, divorced or widowed women on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children roles are automatically eligible for food stamps.

While black women in particular had more children, the black population also had a substantially higher than average percentage of divorced persons during the '50s and '60s, along with the total number of separated black women being six times that of the corresponding white population. There was also a higher incidence of widowed blacks during this time period, 20 percent for the blacks as compared to 6.9 percent for whites in the 14 to 35 years of age group. Although black families were only 10 percent of all of the families in 1960, they represented 21 percent of all of the families with a woman head.
Therefore at the beginning of the '60s we see a situation in which there was a large concentration of low income and unwaged workers in the urban areas. The fact that low income and unwaged workers' ability to gain concessions from the government was enhanced by their concentration in the urban areas has been pointed out by Piven and Cloward. But what Piven and Cloward have failed to grasp is the continuity between the waged and unwaged struggles; i.e., they do not draw a link between the waged workers' struggles in agriculture, mining and manufacturing in the '30s, '40s, and '50s which led to the introduction of labor saving technology and high levels of unemployment to unwaged workers struggles during the '60s and '70s that are the result of automation and an attempt by capital to discipline the working class.

III. Working Class Confrontations with Capital and the State, Direct Appropriation, Government Intervention and the Implementation of Food Stamp Projects

The period from 1964 to 1968 represents a cycle of struggles on the part of black low income and unwaged workers with a level of circulation, complementarity, development and intensity that has never been reached before. It was a cycle in which the blacks ignored the capitalist laws of property and price designed to keep them on the bottom of the social and wage hierarchy and took their struggles to the streets. This
author will focus on the struggles themselves, their content, their form, the intervening forces and the concessions granted. But first it will be useful to look at how the urban confrontations with the state during the late 1960s have been analyzed, the problems with these interpretations, and how they can be understood from the perspective of low income and unwaged workers.

Edward Banfield writes in *The Unheavenly City Revisited* that "race, poverty, and injustice, although among the conditions that made the larger riots possible, were not the causes of them and had very little to do with the lesser ones." Nevertheless, he goes on to argue that in the "foray for pillage" type of confrontation with capital and the state by lower class workers have theft or direct appropriation as the main motive. Banfield notes that in Harlem during 1964, "Looting and rock throwing became the mob's principal activities...." In Watts during 1965, he notes that, "rioters had shown themselves more interested in burning and looting than in fighting the police." He also points out that in Detroit during 1967, "Almost all the arrests made were for looting...." Therefore, we can see that he is trying to separate the content of the confrontations with capital and the state, i.e., the direct appropriation, from the causes of the occurrence. He justifies this separation by saying that all sectors of the working class participate in various types of confrontations with capital and the state. But by arguing for
a general approach to studying all sectors of the working class in relation to all of the various forms of confrontation with capital and the state, he looses any sense of explaining specific actions by specific sectors of the working class in a given situation. Nonetheless, we can see his political motives for doing this when he states his policy recommendations. For example:

It is naive to think that efforts to end racial injustice and to eliminate poverty, slums, and unemployment will have an appreciable effect upon the amount of rioting that will be done in the next decade or two. These efforts are not likely to be very serious or, if they are, very successful. But even if they are both serious and successful they will not significantly affect the factors that produce riots. Boys and young men of the lower classes will not cease to "raise hell" once they have adequate job opportunities, housing, schools, and so on.

Therefore, we can see that he supports the policy of benign neglect, because to do otherwise would have no effect on the number and magnitude of confrontations with capital and the state.

Anthony Oberschall in his study of the 1965 Los Angeles Watts confrontations with the state does seem to link the causes of the occurrence to the actions that happened during the event itself. He states,

Nothing is gained by defining riot behavior as irrational a priori. There is considerable evidence that the rioters observed certain bounds, that they directed their aggression at specific targets, and that they selected appropriate means for the ends they intended to obtain.... While riot behavior cannot be called "rational" in the everyday common meaning of that term, it did contain normative and rational elements and was much more situationally determined than the popular view would have it.
He goes on to say that the attraction of direct appropriation "to people lacking the consumer goods others take for granted needs no complex explanation beyond the simple desire to obtain them when the opportunity to do so involves a low risk of apprehension by the police. Such action is facilitated by low commitment to the norms of private property...." Therefore, Oberschall's analysis runs counter to Banfield, but this is unusual in the literature on poverty and welfare.

Robert Fogelson in his study of violence as protest also tries to play down the actions of low income and unwaged workers during the confrontations with capital and the state during the late 1960s. He argues that:

The Negroes looted to acquire goods most Americans deem their due, and burned to even the score with unscrupulous white merchants; they did not attempt to undermine property rights in general. Also, they assaulted patrolmen to express specific resentments against the local police and not, as the Negroes' respect for the National Guard indicates, overall disaffection with public authority. Perhaps even more pertinent, the rioting was confined to the ghettos; the rioters did not destroy private property elsewhere, they did not attack courts, jails, and government buildings. If anything, these patterns reveal that the Negroes' violent acts were directed against the system's abuses and not the system itself.8

This statement is undoubtedly the most ludicrous attempt this author has seen by a social "scientist" to explain the behavior of low income and unwaged workers. To say that the blacks did not attack the National Guard simply due to respect is to ignore the fact that to have done so would have been tantamount to
suicide. That is to say, he ignores the fact that on numerous occasions federal troops were escorted by armed personal carriers and army tanks. This is why the blacks had "respect" for the National Guard and did not generalize their actions to areas outside of the ghetto. Blacks also did not attack courts, jails, and government buildings because they are not for the most part located in ghetto areas. Therefore, to draw conclusions about the intentions of blacks from their actions that could not have been generalized is the equivalent of saying that Hitler did not intend to dominate the world because he had too much respect for the Allies' military capabilities.

Fogelson's lack of understanding of the capitalist economy is further brought out when he states that "most Negroes do not want to overthrow American society but simply to belong to it as equals." For blacks and all other workers to participate in society as equals is a myth, because if they did it would be the end of the wage and income hierarchy that capital uses to divide and control the working class. Therefore, to argue that blacks want to be treated as equals is actually a revolutionary statement, if equality is in fact what is demanded. That is, if blacks demand equal results as opposed to equal exploitation.

In order to understand the dynamics of the violent confrontations which took place in this cycle in terms of the social
relations involved, we must look behind the headlines and rhetorical arguments and analyze the content of the conflicts. From capital's point of view, a "riot" means the breakdown of social control and civil disorder. When "looting" is involved, there is a disintegration of the price form, i.e., money no longer mediates workers' access to the commodities they need. The effects of these events from capital's point of view are measured in terms of "costs to the community," i.e., damage to private property, loss of merchandise, increased police and military expenditures, human lives, etc. (To the extent that "mom and pop" stores were the target of direct appropriation and violence then intra-class appropriation was involved, but as most studies have noted, direct appropriation and violence was primarily directed against large scale capitalist merchants.)

From the perspective of those workers involved, a "riot" is partially an end in itself and partially the means to an end. For the low income and unwaged sector of the working class, a "riot" with "looting" and the breakdown of social control under capital is the creation of a different kind of order, not disorder. It is the order of direct confrontation with the capitalist social relations and with a state that maintains them at the bottom of the social and wage hierarchy. It is the order of direct appropriation of social wealth. For example, in July of 1964, workers in the New York City confrontation with the state directed much of their direct appropriation at liquor stores. Several
food stores were also "liberated," thus allowing the low income and unwaged workers to subsidize their diets. As the struggle circulated to Rochester, the number of stores that were the target of direct appropriation or damaged exceeded 200. Similar events took place in Philadelphia during the same summer.

During 1965 in Watts, one reporter described a situation in which, "looters, including women and small children, ran wild throughout the day, grabbing everything in sight--clothes, liquor, drugs, appliances, weapons, shoes, food. Then they burned the empty stores." Why one man participated in the direct appropriation was apparent in his statement that he "couldn't eat civil rights....I'm a hungry man and a hungry man is a dangerous man." During 1967, in Newark direct appropriation by workers was aimed at grocery, liquor, clothing, furniture, appliance and drug stores. Pawnshops and cleaners were also primary targets and guns were appropriated from a Sears store. The Kerner Commission reported that, "as news of the disturbance...spread...people...flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many bowed to temptation and joined the looting." During the same summer in Detroit, eyewitnesses told of the "carefree mood with which people ran in and out of stores, looting and laughing and joking with the police officers....A number of cars were noted to be returning again and again, their occupants methodically looting stores. Months
later, goods stolen during the riot were still being peddled.\textsuperscript{16}

The executive director of the Associated Food Dealer of Greater Detroit stated,

Some 380 retail food and beverage stores alone were affected by rioting, inflicting damages ranging from broken windows and extensive looting to total destruction. Of this figure, some 120 stores were completely destroyed. Total amount of damage due to the riots amounted to between $25 and $30 million, which includes store equipment and inventory in addition to buildings.\textsuperscript{17}

Workers in Detroit also caused one unburned store "$50,000 in damages and carried off everything from sides of beef to beer and thousands of bottles of wine."\textsuperscript{18} During 1968 in Washington D.C.,

the threat of a serious food shortage arose...as reports mounted that food stores in Negro areas were being looted....Safeway Stores Incorporated reported at least 19 stores looted--with many burned or otherwise damaged--out of about 50 in the metropolitan area....Negro looters, often in a laughing, holiday mood, made frequent comments indicating that some of their resentment was against the stores they selected and focused on what they regarded as unfair credit and pricing policies.\textsuperscript{19}

In New York, during that same period, the situation was described as one in which, "the sun shone brightly and warmly on Eighth Avenue in Harlem...highlighting the contrast between a row of colorful storefronts and a looted and burned out A & P Supermarket boarded up with plywood."\textsuperscript{20} Thus during the confrontations with the state, direct appropriation was a central aim of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. It was
implicitly an attempt by those workers to go beyond the capitalist social relations of production and distribution.

Another part of the content of the confrontation with capitalist social relations can be seen by looking at the precipitating event that led to full scale violence in some situations. Although these revolts against the particular events that led to more violence did not represent the totality of the grievances by the low income and unwaged sector of the working class, it does give some indication of their contempt for the police who protect capitalist social relations. For example, during the summer of 1964, in New York City a young black schoolboy was shot by a policeman and this triggered seven days of confrontations with the state. Police and firemen were assaulted and over 500 stores had commodities appropriated or structures damaged.21 During the same summer in Rochester, the report that a black man was attacked by a police dog led to the gathering of a crowd of over 2,000 that began throwing beer cans and bottles at the police.22 Also during 1964 in Philadelphia, when a policeman shot a woman a crowd gathered and this began three days of violent confrontations.23 In Chicago during the summer of 1965, the death of a black woman by a fire engine from an all white fire station that had been the target of black demands for integration led to members of the black community fighting white citizens and policemen with rocks, bottles and Molotov cocktails that
damaged passing cars and neighborhood stores. In 1966 violence again erupted in Chicago after the police turned off a fire hydrant being used to beat the summer heat. Rock throwing, direct appropriation, fire-bombing and sniping lasted for four days. During the summer of 1967 in Tampa, after a black youth was shot by a white police officer, a crowd of around 500 gathered. Rock throwing at police cars and the throwing of Molotov cocktails followed for three days. During the same summer in Detroit, a police raid on an after-hours drinking and gambling spot led to the largest confrontation of the decade. Probably the single most explosive event was the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968. As a result, confrontations with the state sprung up in New York City, Washington D.C., Chicago, Baltimore and Pittsburg. As the confrontations developed, in several instances, armed combat between the participants and the state evolved. Sniper fire was reported in Newark and Detroit, and in Plainfield 46 carbines were appropriated from a local arms manufacturing factory and "reports of sniper firing, wild shooting, and general chaos continued until the early hours of the morning." The central theme of all of these instances was that the states' use of force was answered by force. This sector of the working class was demanding a change in content of the social order.
This cycle of struggles started with the replacement of civil rights sit-ins, civil disobedience and violence against the demonstrators by violent confrontations against the state by the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. And as the intensity of the struggles grew, the qualitative definition of civil rights and the list of demands increased from the right to sit in a restaurant to the right to the same meal on the plate, i.e., from equality of opportunity to equality of results. Some indication of the development of the increasing intensity of this cycle of struggles can be seen in Table 2.8. Thus we can see that the apex of this cycle of struggles was during 1967, specifically during the summer of that year when the confrontations in Newark and Detroit occurred.

Table 2.8
The Expansionary Part of the Cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major Confrontations</th>
<th>Number Killed</th>
<th>Number Injured</th>
<th>Number Arrested</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>10,245</td>
<td>$ 40.1 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>10.2 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>16,389</td>
<td>664.5 mil.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonviolence Reinforcing Violent Actions

While the 1964-1968 cycle of struggles was basically characterized by violent confrontations with the state, those struggles were also complemented and reinforced with nonviolent confrontations by various groups and representatives of low income and unwaged workers. For example, the food struggles in 1964 first came to the public's attention during February, when one-hundred hunger marchers held an hour-long, peaceful sit-in outside the office of Mayor Daley in Chicago. The group changed, "No food, no go." But the demonstrators left after the mayor threatened to have them arrested.30 Also in February, fifteen black marchers walked through Cambridge, Maryland with signs demanding jobs and federal surplus foods. The marchers were arrested without bail and the city was placed under martial law with protests being banned.31 During March more than 3,000 persons participated in a "march on Albany" to present their demands to the New York State legislature for social reforms.32 In Mississippi there were no major violent confrontations with the state during 1964, but the escalation of the nonviolent "civil rights" movement had reached such a scale that Benjamin Muse in his book, The American Negro Revolution called it an "invasion." By the end of the summer there were over a thousand civil rights workers in the state agitating for the rights of black citizens. In response to this activism, the Mississippi State Highway Patrol was increased from 275 to 475 men.33
In Mississippi during 1966, we further see how the working class uses different methods in different circumstances. Seizing a recently abandoned Air Force base near Greenville because of delays in the local food distribution program, 110 civil rights protesters and low income and unwaged blacks carried out a "live-in." Local officials had them ejected but the federal Office of Economic Opportunity stepped in and employed over 400 of the low income and unwaged population in the area to distribute twenty-four million dollars of surplus food in the area.34 In the face of continued local government inaction, nonviolent demonstrations continued in 1967. In August, 800 blacks marched on Jackson, the state capital. But when they arrived, they were turned away by state troopers.35 Nonetheless, during November the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People set up three offices in Mississippi to help the low income and unwaged black workers not on welfare to buy food stamps.36 Thus we can see that workers' struggles for increased food income during this time took various forms.

Aside from the local distributors of food that were the targets of direct appropriation during the confrontations with the state, many workers organized their struggles against the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the command center for collective capital's food production and food supplement programs. In Alabama during March of 1968, nonviolent confrontations with
slow moving state governments continued when 130 blacks filed suit in federal court demanding that the Secretary of Agriculture force food stamp programs into the counties that did not have them. But the judge ruled against the blacks saying that the food programs had been implemented to their legal limits.\textsuperscript{37} Later that month private lawyers hired by 258 blacks requested that the courts force the Secretary of Agriculture to declare six counties in Alabama to be in a state of "starvation emergency" and to provide food to those areas. As a result of this action the Department of Agriculture set up the distribution of free food to low income and unwaged families in one of the counties. At the same time a Congressional oversight committee attacked the Department of Agriculture for not asserting its authority to force county governments without food programs to act against widespread hunger and malnutrition.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, we can see that as nonviolent struggles complemented violent action the state began to increase the social wage paid to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class.

During April of 1968, the Citizens Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition charged that the policy of the Department of Agriculture was responsible for the hunger of ten million Americans because federal food programs were feeding only a little over a quarter of the poverty population of 29 million persons.\textsuperscript{39} A month later over 3,000 persons in what was called the Poor People's Campaign converged on Washington D.C. They camped out
near the Washington Monument in order to bring public attention to the plight of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. On May 24, 300 nonviolent demonstrators confronted the Secretary of Agriculture demanding that he liberalize the food stamp and surplus food distribution programs. After the meeting the Secretary committed himself to begin the distribution of surplus foods in 331 new counties by July 1. 40 A few days later the Senate approved a bill that freed 200 to 300 million dollars of Agriculture Department funds to supplement the food programs. During June, nonviolent demonstrators began a sit-in at the Department of Agriculture building in Washington D.C. The demonstrators blocked the doorways and demanded that the food program spending be increased. There was no immediate response except that 87 demonstrators were arrested, but it is likely that the spector of continuing conflict spurred the Department into a more speedy execution of its promises. 41

During 1968 workers' struggles for food took various forms. Two months after a major confrontation with the state in Chicago, 100 black teenagers in the city raided open supermarkets appropriating food and money from cash registers. 42 At a different level of struggle, the Columbia University Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law attorneys filed suit in the Federal District Court of 26 states in order to force the Department of Agriculture to implement food distribution or food stamp programs
in 500 counties. They also sought to establish a new legal
document in the courts that hunger would be ruled illegal.43
While neither of these motions were acted on directly, the food
programs continued to expand as the glow of Watts, Newark,
Detroit, Chicago, Washington, and New York City remained active
in the memory of the functionaries of collective capital.

During November of 1968, the Department of Agriculture
announced that it would begin a five year, ten million dollar
program to help 175,000 low income families plan more nutritious
meals from the food donated by the government or bought with food
stamps.44 In December, the Department reported a revision
in the food stamp plan that would allow a half million of the
lowest income and unwaged workers to receive ten dollars more
in food stamps for the same money and would cost the Department
another thirty-nine million dollars in the next two years.45
Thus various forms of nonviolent confrontations with the state
were clearly one important factor in gaining concessions for
the low income and unwaged sector of the working class in this
period of both violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal struggle.

The Circulation of Struggles

Another important phenomenon to analyze during this cycle
is the circulation of struggles. For example, it is revealing to
note that each year numerous confrontations in different locations
occurred within a few days of each other. Television appears
to have contributed to much of the dissemination of the news of the confrontations nationally. Banfield notes that, "The main point here is that, thanks to television, knowledge that 'they could do it' was widely disseminated to people who otherwise would have been slow to discover it for themselves."\(^{46}\) A Kerner Commission survey of 567 persons in seven cities indicated that 86 percent of the ghetto residents regularly watch television for national news from five to seven in the evening.\(^{47}\) Janowitz has noted that this widespread network of television viewers has its greatest impact on spreading the contagion throughout urban areas and the nation.... The sheer ability of the rioters to command media attention is an ingredient in developing legitimacy. In highbrow intellectual circles in the United States, a language of rationalization of violence has developed. The mass media serve to disseminate a popular version of such a justification.\(^{48}\)

The mass media also helped coordinate direct appropriation within the confrontation areas. Oberschall notes in reference to the confrontations with the state in Los Angeles during 1965 that,

The success of the store breakers, arsonists, and looters in eluding the police can in part be put down to the role of the mass media during the riot week.... By listening to the continuous radio and TV coverage, it was possible to deduce that the police were moving toward or away from a particular neighborhood. Those who were active in raiding stores could choose when and where to strike, and still have ample time for retreat.\(^{49}\)

Personal contact also played an important factor in circulating the struggles within the confrontation areas. The Kerner Commission survey notes that 79 percent of the sample respondents
first heard about the confrontations by word of mouth. The Commission reports that, "Telephone and word of mouth exchanges on the streets, in churches, stores, pool halls, and bars, provide more information--and rumors--about events of direct concern to ghetto residents than the more conventional news media." 50

Another source of communication that increased the circulation of struggles during the confrontations was walkie-talkies. An example of the use of walkie-talkies was given to the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation by a Detroit merchant. An example of the "commands" and responses that the merchant picked up during the 1967 confrontations in Detroit were as follows:

Voice A: "Hey, did you get Williams? Be sure and burn Williams."

Voice B: "But he didn't do anything."

Voice A: "Burn it! God damn it! Don't argue about it!"

Voice C: "Did you clear out Seward's Pharmacy?"

Voice D: "But there's people still in there."

Voice C: "Burn the mother f----es!" 51

This pattern of proximate in time between the occurrence of confrontations in different locations can be seen during each year of this cycle of struggles. In 1964 on July 16, there was a major confrontation in New York City; within the next two weeks there was a confrontation in Rochester and Jersey City. On August 13 of that year there was a minor confrontation in Paterson and
Elizabeth, New Jersey and within a few days the violence spread to Dixmoor, Illinois; Kensbury, New Jersey; and Cleveland, Ohio. During 1965 on August 12 there was a major confrontation in Watts. By August 14, the violence had circulated to Chicago and two days later confrontations erupted in Philadelphia. Almost every day in July and August of 1966, confrontations with the state occurred in some American city. Metropolitan areas with either serious or extended confrontations were: Amityville (Long Island), Atlanta, Benton Harbor, Chicago, Cleveland, Dayton, Des Moines, Jackson (Michigan), Jacksonville (Florida), Lansing, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York City, Oakland, Perty Amboy (New Jersey), Philadelphia, Providence, San Francisco, South Bend, St. Louis, Troy (New York) and Waukegan (Illinois). During 1967, the struggles circulated with increasing frequency as can be seen in Table 2.9. During April of 1968, five major confrontations with the state occurred essentially at the same time in response to the shooting of Martin Luther King Jr., the civil rights leader. The confrontations occurred in Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, Baltimore and Pittsburg. Thus we can see that once confrontations begin to occur, the likelihood that more will occur is increased.

The mass media also served as an important link between the various sectors of the working class. During May of 1968, the Columbia Broadcasting Station aired a documentary called
Table 2.9

Confrontations with the State during 1967
by Month and Level of Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Major Disorders</th>
<th>Number of Serious Disorders</th>
<th>Number of Minor Disorders</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


"Hunger in America," that depicted the need for reform in the federal food programs.54 The problems of the isolated groups of individuals in the low income and unwaged sector of the working class was also reported in a special series of articles published in the New York Times early in 1969 also called "Hunger in America." The reports were from South Carolina, the Southwest, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Florida. In San Antonio, Reverend Ralph H. Ruiz spoke about why the Mexican-Americans had been
overlooked with respect to the implementation of federal food programs. In his statement he caught the essence of why this subsector of the working class had not received federal food programs. He said,

For although there are nearly five million of them scattered throughout the Southwest, the Mexican-Americans have generally been undemonstrative about their misery, complaining so seldom of empty stomachs that the "Anglos" (the non-Mexican whites) give them scant attention. "Brown Power" has not yet taken to the streets of San Antonio.55

In South Carolina a local doctor in the coastal area of Beaufort County described to the Times a situation in which "most black children of his area were infested with worms, and that families were living in hovels worse than the pigsties of his native Nebraska."56 In Yazoo City, Mississippi, the general response of the white establishment was that "we treat our niggers fine," but a local doctor told the Times that he sometimes wondered if the blacks were not better off in slavery. The doctor said,

In open Slavery times human life was of some value. If master paid $100 for a man he'd see that his property was well taken care of, just like a prize bull. But now the black people are no longer on the plantations. There is no feeling of responsibility toward them, no need to help them.57

And after an aide to the Secretary of Agriculture toured Mississippi, he told the Times, "There are families existing with no discernible income."58 In Isaquena County, Mississippi, a leader of the
Freedom Democratic Party, described to the Times the situation as, "Grown folks have been hungry a long, long, time, but the kids just got here and we don't want them mixed up with blood disorders. If you can't get enough food, your brain won't work." 59

In San Antonio, the situation was described in the Times as one in which about one third of the waged workers earned less than the accepted poverty level, at that time, $3,000 a year. Sixty-seven percent of the adults surveyed had inadequate food consumption in the 24 hours preceding the interview. On a Navajo Indian reservation in Arizona, the president of the local junior college told the Times that malnutrition is one of the major problems for Indian children in the classroom. "They look weak and gaunt to begin with," he said. "Their attention span is abnormally limited." A local doctor was convinced that many of the children were "permanently stunted" by hunger. 60 The government, which had withheld $240 million designated for food program implementation considered this problem one of "bureaucratic conflict," but from the working class's perspective this could equally be considered a policy of triage.

Back in the hollows around Prestonsburg, Kentucky, the Times reported that many of the mountaineers were uninformed of their eligibility to receive welfare payments or participate in the federal food programs. They would be rejected the first time they applied for government aid and go back into the hills without
demanding a hearing. Some families had been denied aid because the father was an unemployed miner, but "able bodied" nonetheless. This was justified by some officials of the area because, "If you feed 'em they won't work." The Times also reported that when a group of U. S. Senators toured Florida, they found a situation in which the county officials had refused the implementation of federally aided food programs because they said that the programs would be too costly and migrant farm workers might be tempted to settle down in the area instead of leaving for the North. It was also said that the low income and unwaged workers might refuse to pick the crops if they received free food.

Thus we can see that the mass media did help to inform other sectors of the working class about the problems of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. To the extent that this information served to initiate action to help this sector then we can say that it was a factor in circulating the struggles. It would be difficult to measure this effect, but in general the mass media seems to have had positive impact on the circulation of workers' struggles for food and food stamps.

Working Class Composition of the Confrontation Participants

Although some of the evidence is contradictory and biased (due to the fact that there is only information on those arrested and those answering surveys), we do have a general understanding
of the composition of those workers who participated in the confrontations with the state during the urban conflicts of the 1960s. If we look at the data for those persons participating in the Watts confrontations during 1965, we can see that the evidence does not fit the "criminal riff-raff and hoodlum theory." Twenty-six percent of those arrested in Watts had no prior record, 29 percent had an arrest record but no conviction, 7 percent had convictions of less than 90 days, 18 percent had one or two convictions of 90 days or more, 4 percent had 3 or more convictions of 90 days or more, and 11 percent had prior prison records. No information was available on the remaining 5 percent. The most frequent charge for those arrested in Watts was for burglary, although the most common conviction was for trespassing. Since the booking charges were usually more serious than the conviction charges, most persons were convicted with misdemeanors, ranging from assault and petty theft to trespassing, curfew violation, disturbing the peace, drunkenness and drunken driving, etc. Only 63 cases, less than 3 percent of those arrested, were sentenced to six months or more in jail. Participants were mainly male in the 14 to 50 year old category, but 41 percent of those arrested were in the 25 to 39 age group, 17 percent were 40 years old and over. Thus it is inaccurate to say that the participants were basically young hoodlums. The evidence in Watts also indicates that the participants were not "recent migrants" to Los Angeles. The median years of education of the 1057 convicted
adult participants was over ten years completed. Ten percent of those arrested were in the non-manual workers category, 9.4 percent were skilled workers, and 22.6 percent were unemployed. Of the 556 juveniles arrested, 338 cases were referred to formal probation supervision. Eighty-two percent of those juveniles were in school and 15 percent were dropouts. Eighty-one percent of the cases were described as having "acceptable" to "good" relations with their families. Fifty-seven percent had never been on probation before and 26 percent only once. Thirty-four percent of the families of the juveniles were on public assistance and only 26 percent were living in homes with both parents present. Over 50 percent of the juveniles lived in families classified as having a "major family problem" by the Probation Department, the most frequent problem being a major economic problem such as unemployment and poverty. Therefore, from this study we can see that most of the participants in the confrontations with the state were on the lower end of the wage and income wage hierarchy.

The Kerner Commission made a survey of the confrontation participants in Detroit and Newark during 1967 and found similar but somewhat contradictory statistics. Eighty-three percent of those arrested were blacks and 15 percent were whites. Most of the participants were in their late teens or young adults; for example, 22.6 percent of those in the Detroit survey were between 15 and 24 and 38.3 percent were between 15 and 35. Most
of the participants were single; for example, in Newark 56.2 percent were single as opposed to 49.6 percent for individuals who were not involved in the confrontations. Participants were also more likely to have been separated, 14.2 percent for participants and 6.4 percent for nonparticipants. Over one fourth of the participants were brought up in homes where no adult male was present. Those brought up in the area where the confrontation occurred were more likely to have participated, 74.4 percent for those in Detroit and 74 percent for those in Newark. The data indicates that the participants were not necessarily the "poorest of the poor." For example, in Detroit, the annual family income for 38.6 percent of the confrontation participants was under $5,000. Less than 9 percent of both those who participated in the confrontations and those who did not earned more than $10,000 annually. The average family size for the low income and unwaged workers in these urban areas was 4.8 persons. The majority of the confrontation participants in both Detroit and Newark were not high school graduates. Of those answering the survey in Detroit, 29.6 percent of the participants were unemployed and 29.7 percent were unemployed in Newark. Self-reported participants were also more likely to be only intermittently employed. Those persons involved in the confrontations were also considered to be more informed about local politics and associated in activities having to do with black rights.⁶⁴
The information reported here seems to indicate that most of the participants in the confrontations with the state during the 1960s were members of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. It seems apparent that implicit in their actions of confrontation with the state and of direct appropriation that these workers were attempting to go beyond the social relations of capital; i.e., they no longer wanted the state to mediate their social relations and they no longer wanted money to mediate their economic relation to the commodities they needed for consumption. Because these actions threatened the social relations based on capital, the state responded immediately. First, the state responded with the "stick;" i.e., force was used to bring the confrontations and direct appropriation to a halt and to keep it from spreading. Second, the state responded with the "carrot," e.g., food stamp programs, to calm down the situation and bring the low wage and unwaged sectors back into the social factory in order to carry out the uninterrupted reproduction of the system.

"The Stick": Capital's Use of Force

While we now have some idea of how and why the confrontations with the state began and circulated, it is also important to understand what were the forces that came into play that caused the confrontations to be quelled. The major means that the state used to stop the violence and direct appropriation was the use of force. The organizations that the state used were the police,
state troopers, the National Guard and the regular Army. In Table 2.9 we can see that as the intensity of the struggles increased through the cycle more and more men and firepower was used to bring the insurrections to an end. The state complemented the use of the standing army to quell the confrontations with propaganda designed to inhibit the circulation of these violent struggles. The most common ploy was to label them "race riots"—an application of the old capitalist strategy of divide and conquer aimed at pitting one sector of the working class against another. By refocusing public attention in the media away from the economic aspects of the confrontations, the state and the media tried to provoke anger with the participants rather than sympathy or support.

"The Carrot": The Implementation of Food Stamp Programs as a Response to the Confrontations with the State

With respect to the implementation and expansion of federal food programs, we must look at the confrontations with the state as factors that have caused the state to increase its income supplement to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class (see Appendix XIII). As stated earlier, Piven and Cloward have pointed this out, although they indicated that this was done in a cyclical manner with respect to welfare, i.e., the payments contract when the violence subsides. This cyclical "generosity" does not fit with respect to the food stamp program. In the
Table 2.9
Organizations of Repression Used Against the Working Class during the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Local Police</th>
<th>State Troopers</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Regular Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Watts</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jackson, Miss.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tallahassee</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This type of organization was used but the numbers were unrecorded in the news media.

following examples, we can see the process. After the confrontations in 1964, the number of federal food stamp programs did not increase significantly but the total value of food commodities distributed did increase by almost one hundred million dollars. In 1965 the pattern of confrontations with the state and the federal response is even clearer. Four months after the confrontations in Watts a food stamp program was implemented and it continued to grow throughout the decade. In Philadelphia, a food stamp program was implemented nine months after the confrontations in 1965 and it also continued to expand in a non cyclical manner. In Chicago, the food stamp program was implemented before the confrontations with the state in 1965, but after the violence the program showed significant increases in participation and benefits. During 1966, eleven of the twenty-one cities that have been noted as having serious or extended confrontations (see page 96) were provided with a food stamp program either the same year of the confrontation or the next. Three of the counties had their programs expanded, while eight of the counties did not have a program implemented in the near future. The fact that some areas did not have food stamp programs implemented after the confrontations with the state was presumably the result of the acceptance of the food distribution program that was expanding in some areas. In Cook County, where Chicago is located, participation in the food stamp program increased by ten
thousand in the year following the confrontation in 1966 and in Cleveland participation increased by more than six thousand after confrontations with the state there. During April and May of 1967, confrontations in Chicago, Cleveland, Louisville, Nashville and Omaha led to food stamp program implementation or expansion. And in June of that year the Secretary of Agriculture lowered the minimum purchase price of food stamps from two dollars to fifty cents a month.\textsuperscript{67} After the confrontations with the state in Tampa during 1967, no food stamp program was implemented but the number of people benefiting from the commodity distribution program in the state grew by over twenty-five thousand persons over the next fiscal year. Similarly, after confrontations with the state in Atlanta during 1967, the state food distribution program was extended to an additional forty thousand persons during the next fiscal year. After confrontations with the state during 1967 in the New Jersey cities of Newark, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Plainfield, New Brunswick and Englewood, the state participation level in the commodity distribution program increased by ten thousand persons over the next year and two of the counties received food stamp programs. In response to the intensity of violence in Detroit that began on July 22, 1967, U. S. Senator Joseph W. Clark, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, called on July 28 for "quick action to get food to hungry Americans as a step toward eliminating the causes of urban riots."\textsuperscript{68} Also on the
same day, President Johnson ordered two million dollars worth of flour, canned meat and dried milk to be sent to Detroit as an emergency response. In addition, the food stamp program was expanded in Detroit during the period after the violence. After the confrontations with the state in April of 1968, Chicago, Baltimore, Pittsburg and Washington, D.C. all received increased food stamp participation or benefits. Thus while it is true that federal food programs were one short-term means used by the government to "pacify" the low income and unwaged sector of the working class in those areas where confrontations with the state had occurred, nevertheless the support continued to grow after the initial period. Moreover the number of areas receiving an increase in funding, additional participation and new food stamp projects without experiencing any violent confrontations was greater than the number of areas that received increased income supplementation in direct response to violence. We can see that in those areas where violence occurred, those struggles represented the leading sector of low income and unwaged workers' struggles. The state's response to their struggles was broader. It was national in scope and aimed at heading off the spread of violence. It became increasingly apparent in the late 1960s that the "mood" of the working class was changing and government intervention in the social factory was necessary to efficiently deal with activism on all fronts. Now that we have an understanding of what forms of
struggles were used during this cycle, we can look at the types of organizations that workers used.

IV. Autonomous and "Official" Working Class Organizations

In analyzing the relationship between workers and capital in their struggles for food and food stamps, it is necessary to look at how workers organize themselves at different times during the struggle in order to understand what forms of organizations are useful and what forms fail to forward their cause. If we look at this process of formation-functioning-nonfunctioning-dissolution that organizations go through, then we can see that only when the organizations are conducive to the promotion of workers' struggles do they continue to be used by workers. Broadly speaking these organizations can be autonomous or "official."

The autonomous organizations are those that have no formal hierarchy and do not divide their members between those who pay dues and those who are paid an income to work for the organization. The autonomous workers' struggles may in fact be for the most part struggles against and outside of the "official" organizations. The "official" working class organizations are characterized by a bureaucratic structure that may reproduce rather than go beyond the capitalist relations of production, e.g., unions, "worker's parties," and welfare organizations. The most significant thing to note with respect to an analysis of such "official" working class organizations that have promoted the food struggles during
this cycle (and those that follow) is that no one organization has centrally managed all of the various forms of struggles. Rather numerous forms of working class organizations have been independent of one another. They have, to varying degrees, been the vehicles for bringing pressure to bear on the state in relation to different aspects of the food struggles.

In studying the bureaucratic working class organizations, we look at the reciprocal relation between (1) workers and capital, (2) workers and their "official" organizations, and (3) workers' "official" organizations and capital. A criterion that we may use to decide if an "official" organization is representative of the needs of the working class is if the organization's relation to capital reflects the antagonistic relation between workers and capital. If so, then the organization is expressive of the working classes' needs and consequently, the workers relation to their organization is nonantagonistic. But to the degree that the "official" organization ceases to operate in a manner that forwards workers' struggles, then the workers relation to the organization becomes antagonistic. Conversely, in this situation, the "official" organization has begun to function as part of capital.

The two broadest categories into which we can divide working class organizations are those that do or do not advocate violence as a means to their end. Within these categories are several subcategories. Each of these two categories contains
the following subcategories: local autonomous groups that are not linked to a national organization, national formal organizations supporting various causes that were formed before the cycle of struggles under analysis, national organizations that were formed during the cycle, and national organizations that are linked to international organizations and were formed during this cycle of struggles under analysis.

Organizations that Advocate Violence

In the subcategory of locally autonomous groups that advocate violence, the loose organizations based on friendship or family ties are obvious examples. These groups generally do not support any particular ideological framework and are mostly concerned with their own interests. This is the case of many of the participants during the 1964 to 1968 cycle of struggles. These workers' relation to capital was unmediated; i.e., they directly appropriated the social wealth they needed for consumption and in some cases used the commodities as means to obtain income. These kinds of local autonomous organizations thus obtained immediate results. Furthermore, as we saw in Section III of this chapter, these confrontations with the state have been highly correlated with the implementation of food programs. The limitations on this kind of organization include the following. These activities are considered "illegal" and the members can be thrown in jail. There is also a problem with linking such autonomous groups in
order to increase the intensity and circulation of the struggles. There is no doubt that black gangs and "bands of youngsters" were involved in the 1964 to 1968 confrontations with the state and engaged in acts of direct appropriation. But to say that all gangs are representative working class organizations would be quite false. In the case of the Blackstone Rangers, an organization of several thousand from the Woodlawn section of Chicago, they emulated capital. On the one hand, because of the youth gang's association with a church-operated job training andplacement program, The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), the Rangers were able to funnel Office of Economic Opportunity money into their group. This was accomplished by the employment of gang members by TWO. Other gang members were paid to take the TWO training, but they actually played pool and gave kickbacks to the gang leaders. However, exactly because of these ties, the Rangers had a strong interest in maintaining amiable relations with the state. The result was that they were willing to perform police functions, quelling attempts at direct appropriation in the Woodlawn section of Chicago during the confrontations with the state after Martin Luther King Jr.'s death. At the same time, the Rangers used their police power to their own advantage. If local merchants did not pay them for protection, then they would allow those particular merchants to be target of direct appropriation and violence.¹
Another subcategory of those who advocated violence is that of national organizations with a common goal of overthrowing the form of capitalism in the United States. Many are, to some degree, based on the Marxist-Leninist concept of the vanguard party. Their activities for the most part have been concerned with building their organization and raising the consciousness of workers in general. One example of this type of organization was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The organization was founded in April of 1960 by Martin Luther King, Jr., but the membership broke from his leadership within a year because of his nonviolence. One of the organization's early leaders, Stokely Carmichael, asserted that black power signified "bringing this country to its knees" and "using any force necessary" to obtain black goals. He also claimed that "violence is inevitable in the struggle for Negro liberation," and he called for blacks in this country to "prepare for bloody revolution." Another organization that initially fell in this subcategory was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) formed in 1962 with the Port Huron statement. While not overtly advocating violence, this organization actively opposed the war in Vietnam and the draft and supported a wide variety of civil disobedience. Another organization in this subcategory is the Black Panther Party that advocated the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to solve the problems of blacks in this country. An example of their activities can be
seen by their invasion of the Assembly of the State of California on May 2, 1967 while it was in session. The 24 invaders were armed with pistols, shotguns, and rifles and were portesting gun registration laws.4 The Panthers also at various times supported the need for "breakfast for children programs" that the Department of Agriculture eventually implemented. Another "official" working class organization in this subcategory is the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). Founded during 1963 in Detroit, RAM according to its own literature is "dedicated to the overthrow of the capitalist system, by violence if necessary, and to its replacement by a socialistic system oriented toward the Chinese Communist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism."5 Some of the activities of this organization can be seen by its members being convicted for conspiring to assassinate the mayor and police commissioner of Philadelphia, President Johnson, and other officials.6 They have also published pamphlets and papers that support "rebellion against racial oppression." To some degree the organizations in this subcategory may have helped circulate and coordinate workers' struggles, but they have had a low appeal to most workers because of their identification with foreign states, where the actual practice of the ideology being pushed is unacceptable as an alternative form of social organization. Some of these organizations were directly or indirectly connected with the Communist Party in the Soviet Union or China. Therefore,
there was no antagonistic relation to capital because this was a link to state capitalism. Consequently, while the form of these "official" organizations was apparently antagonistic to capital, in content these organizations were not antagonistic to the social relations of capital.

Nonviolent Organizations

Those organizations that advocate nonviolence have a long history in this country and numerous "official" working class organizations in this category predate the 1964 to 1968 cycle of struggles for food and food stamps. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NCAAP) was founded in 1909, the National Urban League (NUL) was founded in 1911, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was founded in 1942, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was founded in 1957. The major thrust of these organizations was the promotion of civil rights, such as equal access to public facilities, voting privileges, equal employment opportunities for minorities and the promotion of black capitalism. They supported these causes by organizing sit-ins, protest demonstrations, marches and lobbying in Congress. The leadership of these organizations was basically black middle class who had already achieved a certain degree of success, but they mobilized black workers in the early phases of the civil rights struggles. Nevertheless, these organizations were increasingly bypassed as workers' demands changed and the
leadership could not. This was due to the fact that the leadership could not gain sufficient concessions from capital to appease the workers. For example, in Paterson and Elizabeth, New Jersey during the confrontations with the state in 1964, the state president of the NAACP said, "The civil rights leadership has not been able to reach these youngsters. The whole power structure hasn't given us anything to take back to them." Thus we can see that the usefulness of these organizations is limited because they work within the capitalist state organizations rather than against them. A more detailed discussion on the limitations of this subcategory of "official" working class organizations will be presented in the next section on nonviolent organizations that were formed during the 1964 to 1968 cycle of struggles.

There are numerous nationally based organizations that advocate nonviolence and were founded during the 1964 to 1968 cycle of struggles for food and food stamps. Their protest methods are basically the same as those national nonviolent organizations that were formed during previous struggles, i.e., sit-ins, protest demonstrations, marches, and lobbying in Congress. One of the organizations in this subcategory is the Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP). After the summer of 1965 and the Watts confrontations with the state, Richard Boone left his job with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to found CCAP and became its executive director. CCAP's major financial
supporters were Walter Reuther and the United Auto Workers bureaucracy, who donated one million dollars, the National Council of Churches, the United Presbyterian Church and the Field Foundation. During his time at OEO, Boone had been credited with the original conception of many of the '60s antipoverty slogans and projects, e.g., "maximum feasible participation by the poor," Vista Volunteers, Upward Bound, Foster Grandparents, and American Indian activist projects. He saw CCAP as an organization that would link itself to black, Mexican-American and white poverty groups who sought autonomous control over their programs. While CCAP helped organize eligible persons to obtain the federal benefits which they were legally entitled, most of their efforts were directed at Congress to influence legislation that affected low income and unwaged workers.

During the spring of 1966, various local autonomous health care, education, antipoverty and welfare groups were cropping up all over the nation. This process caught the attention of George Wiley, one time associate national director of CORE and at that time employed with CCAP. Wiley proposed to CCAP that they set up a national agency to coordinate the activities of these groups, but he was turned down. On May 23, 1966, Wiley and a staff of four set up the Poverty/Rights Action Center (P/RAC) in Washington, D.C. His strategy was based on a "massive assault on the Welfare system," which amounted to
attempting to get all of those persons eligible for government aid on the roles. P/RAC provided program information materials, organizing strategies, funding techniques, advice on ways to deal with the federal bureaucracies, and a national newsletter to all local groups connected with their organization. During August of 1966, P/RAC held a national convention of recipient "leaders" to exchange ideas and lay the ground work for a national movement. In February of 1967, another national convention was held and it was attended by some 200 autonomous welfare groups from seventy cities and twenty-six states. Some of the participating groups represented were the "Committee to Save Unemployed Fathers," "Mothers of Watts," "Mothers for Adequate Welfare," and "Welfare Union of the West Side Organization." From these meetings their objectives became: (1) the encouragement of nationwide support for antipoverty measures, (2) providing nationwide support for "significant" local antipoverty and civil rights movements, (3) pressuring and overseeing the federal agencies providing services to low income and unwaged workers, and (4) providing consultation and assistance to local groups lobbying in Congress for aid to their programs. 10

While the focus of P/RAC was initially poverty in general, it was soon apparent that welfare recipients made up the majority of members. Consequently, out of the August 1966 national convention came the formation of a National Coordinating Committee
of Welfare Groups (NCCWG). This group was made up of one welfare recipient from each of eleven states that had local organizations. The NCCWG set policy for national organizing that included guidelines for members representing recipients at hearings with local welfare administrators; guidelines for local members bargaining collectively on behalf of recipient representation for illegally denied recipients; the initiation of pickets, sit-ins, hearings and court actions; and the public exposition of administrative practices that broke the welfare laws. By December of 1966 the influence of the NCCWG had become strong enough to proclaim P/RAC as the headquarters of the newly formed National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO). This group claimed to represent some 200 welfare rights organizations in 70 cities and 26 states.

While this is the background of NWRO, its official founding came during a national convention in August of 1967, after the confrontations in Newark and Detroit. At this time the NCCWG set up a dues-paying process in which any local organization of 25 or more persons who paid one dollar each could be represented at the national conventions. Out of the already existing members, a constitution, national officers, and a set of objectives was agreed on. The major function of the local groups was to solve the grievances of the existing recipients. This was usually done through demonstrations and group pressure against the local
welfare agencies. While Wiley's policy was that no welfare recipient would receive NWRO assistance unless they were a member, many local groups did not adhere to this policy. The national bureaucratic organization of NWRO put most of its energies into lobbying and when welfare reform became an election issue in 1968, NWRO designated itself as the spokesperson of the national welfare movement. But there is little evidence that NWRO was very influential with respect to the formation of national welfare legislation. By the end of 1974 the organization was bankrupt because while focusing on lobbying the membership campaign was ignored. As a result of this detachment of the organization from the people it was supposed to serve, the national headquarters was closed.11

After a spring 1967 report by Robert B. Choate based on U. S. Census statistics revealed that where poverty and infant mortality were the greatest, the federal food and welfare benefits were the lowest, Richard Boone of CCAP decided to form the Citizens Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States. In mid-June of 1967, after numerous minor confrontations with the state and a major confrontation in Tampa, the Board was formed with financial support from the Field Foundation of New York. The Board was composed of medical doctors, lawyers, university professors, and social action groups, organized labor, and various religious organizations. The Board met during July with the
purpose of implementing a complete investigation of the federal
government food programs. The Board operated much like a con-
gressional fact finding committee by holding public hearings,
making field trips, and then directing public attention to its
findings by calling press conferences. In some cases the Board
members traveled with the Senate Subcommittee on Employment,
Manpower, and Poverty. The Board lawyers were also involved in
court suits challenging food stamp regulations. On April 22,
1968, the Board released Hunger USA, the results of their inves-
tigation of the food programs. It was a bitter attack on the
Department of Agriculture and Appropriations Committees of Congress,
the medical and public health professions, food manufacturers,
and local governments. In the document, the Board listed 256
counties in the United States which would require immediate emer-
gency food assistance. Liberal reaction to the document attrib-
uted hunger to lack of money. Conservatives said malnutrition
was a problem of ignorance. The Board sided with liberals and
cited a 1965 Department of Agriculture study which indicated that
low income and unwaged workers actually make better use of their
money in buying nutritional food than higher income sectors of
the working class. Thus they came to the conclusion that money
was the most important factor in improving the diets of low income
and unwaged workers.
Another organization that worked for the expansion of federal food programs during this cycle of struggles was the Committee on School Lunch Participation. It was also financed by the Field Foundation and was sponsored by the United Church Women, the National Board of the Y.M.C.A., the National Council of Catholic Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the National Council of Negro Women. In April of 1968, they published "Their Daily Bread," a study on the failure of the National School Lunch Program designed to help the children of low income and unwaged parents.\textsuperscript{13}

The National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition (NCHM) was founded in 1969 by nutritionist Jean Mayer as a recipient organization to work for reform in the federal food programs and follow up the work done by the Citizens Board of Inquiry. NCHM lobbied in Congress, developed grass roots support and filed law suits to protest and expand the food programs. The National Council joined forces with the Columbia University Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in 1969 and brought court suits against the Department of Agriculture in order to force unspent food program funds to be released.\textsuperscript{14}

The Food Research and Action Center (FRAC) was organized in 1970 by a group of food activists as a nonprofit law firm and advocacy group working with low income and unwaged workers in order to eliminate hunger and malnutrition in the United States.
FRAC is funded primarily by the Community Services Administration, the Campaign for Human Development of the United States Catholic Conference, and grants from other philanthropic organizations. Their basic focus has included the development and implementation of federal food programs, the improvement of those programs, the development of information to help people understand the food programs, the training of community based food advocates, and the coordination of lobby efforts on the behalf of the participants in the food programs. This organization has been the most effective food group during the 1970s in increasing the legal participation of workers in the food stamp program as we will see in chapter four.

If we look closely at these national organizations that advocate nonviolence, we can see that they do not reflect the same degree of antagonism that is demonstrated between workers and capital in their unmediated relation. Piven and Cloward in their book, Poor People's Movements, have looked at this type or organization and have noted some aspects that they consider problematic: (1) they cannot sustain participation because there is no continuing inducement and thus membership is hard to expand and sustain; e.g., once an individual's grievance is solved the organization is no longer needed; (2) once the local organization is formalized their relation to the local welfare administration becomes one of bureaucratic arrangements; (3) when the organization
gets formalized so that coalition building and lobbying are the main concerns, there is no longer concern over intensifying disruption at the local or national level; (4) membership begins to be promoted only for dues collection in order to sustain those in office; and (5) once the organization becomes totally involved with government officials and private groups, it is transformed from a protest organization to a collective bargaining and lobbying organization. The fact that these organizations that no longer serve a function for workers cannot sustain or expand membership does not seem to be problematic from a working class perspective; i.e., if they are not functional they should be abandoned. Thus when the recipients do not have a participatory relation to the "official" organization because the organization does not need their support, we can say that the organization no longer reflects the necessary antagonistic relation between workers and capital. Therefore, to the extent that these organizations no longer have the power to wrestle concessions from capital then they are not a threat to capital, because it has become part of capital through its close association to the foundations and lobbying process in Congress.

Now with some understanding of the different types of "official" working class organizations, it is necessary to evaluate their advantages, limitations and usefulness. With respect to the informal small scale local autonomous organizations
that operated in the violent confrontations with the state during the 1964 to 1968 cycle of struggles, it is apparent that the unmediated relation of workers directly to the social wealth controlled by capital had its immediate payoffs through direct appropriation. Another payoff was the response of the federal government opening up numerous new food stamp projects. During this cycle of struggles the number of food stamp projects increased from 42 in 21 states to 1,027 in 44 states. Thus the potential for increasing the participation in the food stamp program was expanded enormously. This can be seen as analogous to the initiation of the social welfare programs during the 1930s in response to workers' struggles, that allowed for the potential expansion of the participation. To the extent that various other "official" organizations contributed to the antagonism of these confrontations with the state, they deserve credit for creating a response from the state. Those organizations that focus mainly on the use of nonviolent democratic process, e.g., CCAP, NWRO, etc., can mainly be credited with expanding the participation in federal food programs. With respect to the food stamp program specifically, this is especially true of FRAC that has outreach programs which we will examine later.
CHAPTER III

The Capitalist Counterattack

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the capitalist counterattack to the low income and unwaged workers' struggles for food and food stamps that were discussed in Chapter II. In this chapter we will see how capital through the state, i.e., the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, has attempted and sometimes succeeded in undermining workers' struggles in general and the expansion of the food stamp program participation and appropriations specifically. We will see that while most of the attacks have their origin in the executive branch many members of Congress have continually supported cutbacks in the program. The limitation of these attacks and support for the expansion of the program will be analyzed in the next chapter by looking at workers' struggles and the legislative mediations that complement those struggles.

The Counterattack on the Struggles

If the confrontations with the state during the '60s were a cause of the expansion of the food stamp program, then the actions taken by the state to quell the violence must be understood as a means of limiting both social demands and ultimately the amount of federal aid to the low income and unwaged sectors of
the working class. As early as January of 1968, local police
departments in the major U. S. cities began to stockpile armored
vehicles, helicopters, high-powered rifles, shotguns, mace spray
guns and other anti-"riot" equipment in anticipation of further
confrontations.¹ Local efforts were reinforced at the federal
level with the passage of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act that called for the reorganization of state and local
police and law enforcement operations.² Conferences were held for
police chiefs and high ranking city officials in order to inform
them of the methods of confrontation control and prevention. U. S.
Army teams visited over a hundred cities to discuss conditions and
a special command center for confrontation control was set up in
the Pentagon to be used if the level of confrontations reached
the point at which the need for federal troop intervention was
considered necessary. The government as collective capital was
clearly gearing up to win what was feared to be an emerging civil
war. The Justice Department also dispensed 3.9 million dollars
in federal grants to forty states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico for the implementation of programs to detect, prevent
and control confrontations with the state.³

After a series of confrontations in the spring of 1968 that
were precipitated by the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.,
a bill was signed into law that made it a federal crime to travel
from one state to another (or use federal facilities) with the
intent to incite a "riot" or to manufacture, sell or demonstrate firearms, firebombs or other explosive devices meant to be used in a confrontation with the state. High government officials were also calling for restraint by the news media in the coverage of confrontations with the state because it was seen that the television was a "catalyst to the spread of rioting," i.e., to the circulation of this form of struggle. Some educators even considered direct appropriation as an "explosive response" to the general depiction of violence on television. Thus by the end of 1968, local, state and the federal government were well-organized and equipped to deal with urban confrontations with the state. Consequently, the intense series of confrontations during the summer of 1968 was the last period of major conflict. The number of confrontations and the level of violence drastically subsided after then. Faced with overwhelming military force the urban working class withdrew its energies from this form of struggle--at least temporarily--and continued to struggle in other ways--as we will see in the next chapter.

Beyond the immediate containment of street violence and the subsequent implementation of food and welfare programs, it was not long before capital sought to withdraw the concessions it had been forced to grant by restricting the availability of the food programs to this sector. These new policies included Administrative attacks such as the impoundment of food program
funds and reduced food supplies, restructuring in New York City, food price inflation, and the manipulation of food program regulations by acts of Congress. Together these actions add up to a major attack on the food consumption of all workers during the '70s. These moves, whose importance has grown over time, have shown the degree to which capital has sought to limit or roll back the gains of the '60s. Gone were the early days of the 1960s with the optimistic investments in human capital by increasing nutrition, education, housing, etc. The workers had used the increased consumption to strengthen their struggles without becoming productive labor. Workers' struggles now appeared to have produced one-way income transfers to workers. For example, welfare mothers received Aid for Families with Dependent Children and food stamps and raised undisciplined children to be recalcitrant students and workers who placed more demands on the system; also, the use of food stamps by strikers allows them to stay off the job longer and pressure business for higher wage concessions. Their practices had to be stopped.

The Impoundment of Food Program Funds

Even though the state legally granted concessions to low income and unwaged workers during the cycle of struggles during the '60s, tight restraint on actual federal expenditures was sometimes maintained. By 1967, more than $500 million in Section 32 funds had accumulated as the Department of Agriculture's
share of customs receipts, but only $300 million could carry forward from one fiscal year to the next to be spent on food programs. Consequently, in response to the demands of conservative southern politicians in Congress, the Secretary of Agriculture returned $200 million to the U. S. Treasury on July 1. This was almost double the amount spent on food stamps during the same year. Again on April 23, 1968, the Department of Agriculture reported that it returned $220 million to the Treasury that had been appropriated for the food programs. This sum of money was some $40 million more than the amount spent on the food stamp program during fiscal year 1968. The reason given for the move was that "bureaucratic conflicts" with county officials prevented the implementation of either the food stamp program or the food distribution program. Nevertheless, we might better understand this as a conflict between some factions in Congress, who at this time were still responding to the needs and threats of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class by appropriating funds for the food programs, and the Executive Branch and other factions in Congress who were being more heavily influenced by the needs of capital and were slow to carry out the demands of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class. What assures one that these moves were actually planned attacks to limit food program expenditures is the fact that the Department of Agriculture had the authority to set up its own emergency machinery for the
distribution of commodities if the community officials refused to participate in either of the federal food programs. Instead of setting up such programs, it seized the opportunity to restrict the transfer of income to workers. Nevertheless despite these slowdowns this period was one of expanding concessions and growing expenditures on the programs.

As the focus of working class struggles shifted from the streets to the bureaucracy, food program advocates increased their knowledge of the operation of the Department of Agriculture. Therefore, they would no longer knowingly allow the Department of Agriculture to let appropriated funds go unspent and be returned to the treasury.

In January of 1972, the impoundment attacks became more obvious. It was then disclosed that the Nixon Administration had impounded $202 million of the food stamp program funds, about 10 percent of the total appropriations. As a result of an immediate protest by hunger lobby groups and much bad publicity, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that the money had been released. But less than a month later, the Nixon Administration rekindled its attack on federal subsidies to working class struggles by announcing that it would cut the funds of the emergency food and health program from a $57 million budget of two years past to a $3.5 million budget in fiscal year 1972. During June of 1972, the Nixon Administration was accused of returning over $400
million in food stamp funds to the Treasury. The Administration did not deny the charges this time and said it was due to the fact that there had been a difficulty in estimating the funding needs; i.e., they overestimated the increase in participation levels and the degree of food price inflation both of which influence total expenditures.\textsuperscript{17} When the 1972 food program budgets had been closed out, it was discovered that $469.1 million in food program funds had been successfully returned to the Treasury. This figure included $418 million from the food stamp program appropriations and $41.1 million from the commodity distribution program.\textsuperscript{12} Thus while food program lobby organizations and some members of Congress thought they had stopped the Administration's efforts to reduce the food program expenditures by not allowing the passage of some 1972 regulation changes, they were actually outflanked when the money appropriated had not even been spent at all. This attack was possible because the threat of confrontations with the state by low income and unwaged workers had been removed through massive police and military intervention and extensive outreach efforts to increase food program participation were not in place yet.

Restructuring in New York City

In the New York City area welfare struggles included the successful winter clothing demonstrations of 1965-1966, the week long sit-ins that led to the increase of special grants from
about $40 per recipient during 1965 to $100 during 1968, and the march by 2,000 protesters during the summer of 1966 demanding higher welfare payments. During 1967, AFDC mothers staged hundreds of sit-ins at district welfare offices in Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and the Bronx. The crowds ranged from 25 to 500 persons and when demonstrations were organized for the central welfare offices, 500 to 2,000 protesters would attend. During the same year, welfare rights activists also staged a sit-in at a conference organized by the Governor of New York and business leaders to discuss the "welfare problem." Another indicator of the level of struggle in the area can be seen by some 4,800 dues paying members in local welfare rights organizations during 1968. In May of 1968, thousands of Puerto Rican mothers and children successfully exercised a week long sit-in at relief centers in the South Bronx. The states response to these actions over the period 1965-1968 was to allow more individuals to participate in the programs and increase the payments per recipient.

By 1968, the welfare situation in New York City had gotten completely out of hand from the point of view of both business and the city budget. The number of welfare recipients in New York City had increased from 324,000 in 1960 to 889,000 in 1968, largely as a result of the struggles of women in the welfare rights organizations. This transfer of money to the low income and unwaged sector of the working class through welfare payments was complemented
in the waged sectors of the working class with decreased productivity and higher wage demands in both the private and public sector. These forces along with the confrontations with the state made the New York City metropolitan area a less profitable place to do business. Therefore, old businesses were less inclined to make new investments on plants and equipment and other firms had little incentive to locate in the area. Consequently, productivity continued to decline and many small businesses and large corporations moved out of the area in order to find a more docile labor market. When this flight of capital reached a significant level, the ability of the city to raise tax revenues was impaired and a budget crisis ensued.¹⁴

The development, circulation and complementarity of these struggles by workers led to an attack by the city and state governments on welfare spending and an attempt to place more of the burden of paying for the programs on the federal government. During April of 1969, the governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, called for the increased use of federal as opposed to local food programs and the mayor of New York City sought approval from city officials and the federal government to change the city from the surplus commodity program to the food stamp program in order to save the city an estimated $161,000 a year in reduced administrative costs and placate the demands of recipients for increased nutritional consumption.¹⁵ During the same period, the state
also undertook a food program in order to cushion the effects of the welfare cutbacks that were implemented under the auspices of the growing fiscal crisis. These changes only slowed the growth in welfare rolls and by 1971, the level of food stamp participation in New York was again under attack by the city government and business. In January of 1972, the Nixon Administration proposed new national food stamp regulations that, by one estimate, would have reduced the benefits of some 500,000 to 800,000 recipients in the New York City area and would have eliminated approximately 20,000 from the rolls altogether. At the same time these regulations would have increased the food stamp benefits for 1.7 million persons in the South and West at the expense of over two million participants in the industrial states.\textsuperscript{16} Although these changes were not implemented due to public outcry on workers' behalf, the Nixon Administration was clearly trying to divide and conquer, pitting one area against the other so that workers would attack each other and not capital. That is, workers in the Northeast and in the industrial states would have hopefully (from capital's point of view) complained that the workers in the South and West were getting their benefits rather than unite with those recipients to demand increased benefits for all low income and unwaged workers.

\textbf{Food Supply Reduction in the U. S. and Inflation}

Despite spreading drought and bad weather that was reducing food production in the U.S.S.R., Asia and Africa, the U. S.
Department of Agriculture headed by Earl Butz reduced the acreage allotments for grain production in the U. S. in 1970, 1971 and 1972. This obviously contributed to the drop in world food supply during these years and represented a global attack on workers' income and consumption levels. But U. S. and third world workers were further attacked because the amount of agricultural exports to Europe also increased. This increase can be seen by the fact that the dollar value of U. S. agricultural exports increased from $7.8 billion in 1971 to $22.4 billion in 1974. A large component of this increase in food exports was due to the "Russian Grain Deal." In 1972, the Soviet government purchased 30 million metric tons of grain from the U. S. The reason for their transactions were not so apparent then as they are now, but it should be understood that it was a response to workers' struggles in the Soviet Union. 17 The result of these manipulations of food production and distribution that reduced the U. S. food supply was a jump in the consumer price index for food by over 40 percent between 1972 and 1975.

Other factors that contributed to this price increase in agricultural products were the rise in the cost of fertilizers and the higher wages and profits in the food processing and retailing businesses. Because the agricultural sector had grown increasingly dependent on fertilizers between 1940 and 1970, the jump in energy prices in 1974 contributed to a sharp increase in the cost
of producing food. While workers' incomes were decreased by the food price increase, some businesses profited considerably as a result of this. Profits increased 10 percent in supermarkets between 1972 and 1973. And the profit margins for the middlemen of farm products continued to reach record levels during 1974. Agriculture Department statistics indicated that 80 percent of the 15 percent increase in retail food prices in 1973 was the result of retailer costs that include labor costs and high profits. From 1970 to 1974 the gross average weekly earnings for nondurable goods workers increased from $120 to $156, 6 percent annually. The earnings of food processing companies were also increasing substantially during this period, an average of 7 percent annually. But some companies' profits were increasing appreciably better than that during the first nine months of 1974, e.g., Borden Inc., up 22 percent, H.J. Heinz up 19 percent and Kraftco Corp. up 22 percent. 18

All of these price increases in the various stages of food production resulted in a transfer of value from the working class to capital. And as is usually the case, the low income and unwaged workers were affected more harshly than other sectors, because a larger percent of their income is spent on food. During 1974, in a report to the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 100 specialists on nutrition and food reported that, "Over the past three to four years, our nation's needy have become hungrier and poorer...over the past several years we have moved
backwards in our struggle to end hunger, poverty, and malnutrition." This was not completely true because many of the low income and unwaged workers were able to receive food stamps whose real value was growing despite inflation, but those members of this sector of the working class who could not were being attacked with a vengeance.

The Nixon-Ford Administration Attacks

During May of 1969, the Nixon Administration postponed indefinitely comprehensive long range plans for the eradication of hunger and opted for more short range and less expensive programs. This action was facilitated by the changing political climate, e.g., the confrontations with the state had subsided, the massive marches were over, and the Office of Economic Opportunity funds that subsidized local agitation were cut back. This was also during the time period that the Nixon Administration proposed but failed to pass legislation that would have replaced the welfare system based on Aid to Families with Dependent Children with a negative income tax program that included work incentives and the eventual complete elimination of the food stamp program. The National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition (NCHM) estimated that this proposal would have reduced the income of 87 percent of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients.

Although NCHM and other food lobby organizations convinced the Nixon Administration officials to have a White House conference
on hunger and malnutrition, they later found out that the administration attempted to use $400,000 appropriated for federal food programs to pay for the expenses of the conference. While the Nixon Administration publicly supported the food programs, they covertly lobbied against Senate food stamp proposals that were "too expensive." These events foreshadowed further manipulations of the regulations and administrative procedures in order to reduce recipient benefits.

A Nixon Administration proposed change in the food stamp regulations that did not go into effect but would have further strengthened the work contingency was the refusal of food stamps to strikers. This initiative was supported by the Chamber of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, and some members of Congress. Food stamps for strikers were seen as a threat to business because their use tilted the "stability" of the collective bargaining process toward labor's side. This was a clear recognition of how higher income means greater power for workers to struggle.

There were various other initiatives undertaken during the Nixon years that were used to limit the expansion and restrict the participation in the food programs. One of the effects of the 1972 "freeze" on federal spending was that some 15,000 children in New York City were forced to go without breakfast during the school year. To ensure that only the "appropriate" food items were purchased with food stamps, when stores were caught selling
non-sanctioned items, they were disqualified from the food stamp program. In 1973, a U. S. District Judge in Washington rejected the contention of a group of welfare recipients that the government approved level of food stamp allotments were not sufficient to provide a nutritious diet, thus sanctioning the low levels of consumption. It was also uncovered in 1974 that a Department of Agriculture confidential memorandum called for an all out opposition to legislation that would allow the continuation of open market purchases of food for school lunches and direct assistance to low income and unwaged workers. Thus we can see that the thrust of the Nixon Administration's plans and policies was to reduce government expenditures on the cost of reproducing low income and unwaged workers' labor power by attempting and to some degree succeeding in shifting this burden back onto the individuals.

In the following example, we can again see that the "government" does not act as a monolithic body. Rather there are conflicts between the various organs of government that reflect the basic class conflict in society. Therefore, we must understand the realm of government as part of the terrain of class struggle. In 1973, although the Congress, under pressure from food lobby organizations, passed legislation to tie the value of food stamps to the rate of inflation, the Ford Administration continued to attack the income of program participants trying to drive down
the floor on the social wage paid by the government and thus weaken-
ing the forces contributing to inflation. (Nominal wages here
must be understood as the main source of continuing inflation.
Therefore, breaking the floor on the social wage would mean that
capital's use of the inflationary tool would be less necessary.)

During the winter of 1974, even with the recession going on
with full force, the Ford Administration proposed but did not
get approved food stamp regulations that would have reduced the
level of benefits by increasing the amount paid by the recipients
for food stamps to the legal maximum. The effect would have been
to increase the percentage of the low income and unwaged worker's
budget devoted to food from 24 to 30 percent of their net monthly
income and to reduce the total bonus value paid by the government
by $645 million per year. But for all of its attempts to reduce
the costs of the food stamp program, the Ford Administration did
not achieve its goal. During his Administration, President Ford
saw participation in the food stamp program rise from just over
14,000,000 to a high of over 19,000,000 and the cost to the govern-
ment rise from $4.3 billion in fiscal year 1975 to $5.3 billion
in fiscal 1976. Therefore, when the Carter Administration took
office, the food stamp program was certainly considered by business
to be out of control and in need of restraint.
The Carter Administration Proposals for Food Stamp Reform

When the Carter Administration took office the President promised those who elected him that one of his goals would be a balanced federal budget by 1980. The most apparently vulnerable target for expenditure cuts were as usual social programs such as the food stamp program. Thus the most recent period of attacks on the food stamp program began in 1977 with the Carter Administration proposals for legislative reform. The new Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland, described the elimination of the purchase requirement as the "cornerstone" of the Administration's proposal and he said the reform was designed to "tighten up the program, to eliminate or reduce benefits to the households with the highest incomes, to reduce errors and to curb the possibilities for abuse." In lieu of a complete reorganization of the entire federal welfare system, the Carter Administration proposed a two-year rather than the normal four-year extension of the food stamp program. This shorter appropriation period was initiated in order to give the Administration more time to reorganize the entire federal welfare system and allow them to do this before the deadline for a balanced federal budget. Thus the plan for an intermediate food stamp reform that could lead to the eventual elimination of the program can be seen as an attempt to lower administrative costs, reduce fraud and embezzlement and in general hold down the growth of the transfer payments to low income and unwaged individuals.
The Administration had a dual purpose for eliminating the purchase requirements. It was a means of pacifying food lobby groups who supported this part of the legislative proposals, because it would allow low income families to participate. And, if the purchase requirement were abandoned, it would mean that $3 billion less in stamps would be printed, shipped, stored and redeemed, because in the initial program recipients paid money for stamps and they received an additional or bonus value from the government so that when the coupons were redeemed the face value was the sum of the purchase price plus the bonus amount. By eliminating the purchase price vendors would now be required to handle only coupons instead of both cash and coupons. Thus there would be a reduction in administrative costs and the likelihood of fraud and embezzlement would be diminished. The Administration also proposed the elimination of the itemized system of deductions that was the source of 30 percent of all errors made in the program. This was to be replaced with two standard deductions that would be adjusted semi-annually to reflect changes in the consumer price index for items other than food. The standard deduction proposal would have eliminated or reduced the benefits of 56 percent of the participating households in the Northeast, while approximately 19 percent would have their benefits increased and 25 percent would have maintained the same amount of benefits. In the Southeast, some 30 percent would have had their benefits
eliminated or reduced and approximately 37 percent of the participating households in this area would have stood to gain from the proposal, but about 34 percent would remain the same. Once more this change would have led to struggles that would have (hopefully from capital's point of view) pitted one geographical area of the working class against the other and accentuated the divisions within regions created by the income hierarchy. The Administration also called for the end of the automatic eligibility for food stamps by Supplemental Security Income and AFDC recipients. It was also proposed that the federal government would increase from 50 to 75 percent the funding that it provided for the investigation and prosecutions of fraud and abuse conducted by the states. In order to reduce participation the Administration also called for a work requirement by students and the re-definition of a household to be understood as a group that lives together and purchases food and prepares meals together, rather than the more loosely defined household that could be made up of separate "economic units" that were each eligible for food stamps independent of the other. Thus the Administration proposals were considerably stricter than the previous program. Planning the cost of reproduction of labor power was to be increased, fraud was to be controlled more efficiently, incomes more closely monitored and the work requirement was to be enforced to a greater degree when possible.
The Legislative Attacks

While most of the impetus for the attacks on the food stamp program came from the executive branch, numerous members of Congress were willing to support the reduction of funds and participation. Therefore, in order to better understand the mediation between workers' struggles and the counterattack of collective capital we can look at the legislative process. And since the heart of the present historical crisis for capital is the imposition of work, we can see that this has also been a major dispute in the food stamp struggles.

While the work requirement for food stamp recipients was suggested but did not get enacted during 1969, it was part of the 1970 law that extended the program through fiscal 1973. These provisions requiring recipients to register for work or training passed in the House by 290 to 68. This provision was made more palatable for low income and unwaged worker advocates because it included a three-year extension of the program and the reduction of the minimum purchase price of food stamps to 50 cents. Conservative Democrats and Republicans voting for the bill supported the inclusion of the work requirement while liberal Democrats' support can be seen as based on the coupon price reduction and the extension. Thirty-eight Republicans and thirty Democrats voted against the bill. Sixteen representatives voting against the bill were from rural districts with a higher than average
percentage of blacks, a median income lower than the country as a whole and higher levels of unemployment than the national average. Thus their vote can be seen as an attempt to limit the income supplement to these workers and keep them at the bottom of the income hierarchy. Thirteen of those voting no came from districts with the same characteristics except that the unemployment level was below the national average. Eleven of the representatives voting no were from rural districts with lower than the national average percentage of blacks, a median income below the national median and lower than the national percent unemployed. We can assume that rural representatives are safer voting against social welfare programs, because the probability of confrontations with the state is lower in those areas. The urban representatives voting against the bill came from districts with either low levels of unemployment or higher than the national median level of income or both. 32

The House-Senate Conference Committee modified the House report language that required able-bodied persons to look for and accept employment as a prerequisite for participation in the food stamp program. It relaxed the requirements so that no person would be forced to accept a job that paid less than: (1) the applicable federal or state minimum wage, (2) the applicable federal regulation, or (3) $1.30 an hour if the job was not covered by federal or state minimum wage laws. One Senator noted that
he had not signed the conference report because the work requirement read "more like the declaration of serfdom for America's hungry poor."\textsuperscript{33}

During 1976, the Senate passed legislation to transfer funds and authority for the work registration requirements of the food stamp program from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Labor in order to increase the coordination of the food stamp program with the work incentive program.\textsuperscript{34} In 1977, the Senate revised its reform legislation for the food stamp program and some aspects of the work registration provisions were again strengthened. In addition to the already tightened policies, the bill lowered from 18 to 12 as the age of a dependent child that allowed the parent or caretaker to be exempt from work registration. It disqualified recipient households when individuals 18 to 60: (1) refuse to register for work during application procedures and every six months thereafter, (2) refuse to meet job search requirements, and (3) refuse to accept, without "good cause" an offer of employment paying the federal or state minimum wage or not less than 80 percent of the federal minimum wage. The 1977 work registration requirements also disqualified for 60 days households if the income earner quit a job without "good cause."\textsuperscript{35} In the 1977 revisions, the Congress also required the Secretary of Agriculture to set up fourteen "workfare" pilot projects where able-bodied food stamp recipients were to be
required to perform public service work in return for their coupons. \textsuperscript{36} During 1978, the Congress extended the deadline on the implementation of these projects from March 29, 1979 to October 1, 1980. \textsuperscript{37} Thus we can see through these actions that the work requirement is a central attack by capital on this form of subsidy to low income and unwaged workers. As we will see in the next chapter, the work registration requirement has been a failure. Thus this attempt to introduce a productivity deal into this form of transfer payments has failed.

Welfare payments have always been considered as a disincentive to work by the business community and in 1968 an amendment was adopted by the House of Representatives, by a vote of 315 to 83, that prohibited the use of food stamps by strikers unless they qualified for the program before going out on strike. \textsuperscript{38} The reason the striker provision passed by such a wide margin was because it was attached to an amendment that allowed for open-ended appropriations for the food stamp program for fiscal 1969 through fiscal 1972. But when the bill reached the conference committee the striker restriction was rejected in exchange for an extension of the program until fiscal 1970 instead of fiscal 1972. \textsuperscript{39} Again during final debates on the House floor another vote was taken on the ban on strikers. This time it was defeated by a vote of 187 to 159. Thirty-four of the forty-three Democrats voting for this amendment were from rural districts with a
higher percentage of blacks than the national level and a lower median income level than the national median. Thus again their votes can be seen as an attack on their working class constituency because voting against food stamps for strikers further weakens their bargaining position. Nineteen of the thirty-seven Republicans voting against the amendment were from urban districts with a higher median income than the national median and their vote can be seen as serving the industrial workers interests in their area. 40

An amendment to the Department of Agriculture appropriations bill was again introduced in 1971 that would have denied food stamps to families who were in need of assistance because the wage earner was on strike. The supporters of this amendment claimed that during the 1970 General Motors strike the families of the United Auto Workers strikers received more than $6 million in food stamps. The conservative representative who introduced the restrictive amendment charged that the dispersing of food stamps to families "constitutes an unwarranted intrusion by government into the labor-management bargaining process. It tips the scales to labor's advantage in a situation where the Federal government should remain as neutral as possible."41 Although the amendment was defeated by a vote of 225 to 172, it represented the needs of capital to restrict the use of food stamps by workers to strengthen their struggles. 42 The 181 Democrats' votes against
the bill can be seen as their traditional support of working
class causes and vice versa for the 124 Republican votes for the
amendment. Of the 48 Democrats voting for this bill 19 were from
rural districts with a percentage of black residents higher than
the national average, a median income lower than the national
median income, and a lower percent of unemployment than the
national average. Fifteen of the Democrats voting for the amendment
shared these characteristics except that the level of unemployment
in their districts was above the national level. Therefore, one
can interpret their vote for the amendment as an action to keep
the low income and unwaged workers in their districts at the
bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy. Seventeen of the forty-four
Republicans voting against the amendment came from urban districts
with a lower than the national average percentage of blacks, a
higher median income than that of the nation as a whole, low levels
of unemployment, and a substantial working class population that
could use food stamps during strike periods as indicated by the
level of industrialization in the area.

The same amendment was introduced again during 1972 and
was rejected by a vote of 180 to 199 in the House. This vote
involved essentially the same members of the 91st Congress and
their was no significant change in the way the representatives
voted. During 1973, several more bills were introduced to prohibit
the use of food stamps by strikers. The sponsor of one bill
stated, "The system depends on pressure on both sides to negotiate a settlement, and if strikers are receiving enough public assistance—a greater part of which is food stamps—to keep them from needing to go back to work, there is obviously not the same amount of pressure on the strikers as there is on management." A member of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) argued that strikers would not starve if food stamps were denied to them. "Since the timing of a strike is well-known before it is called, and its duration is largely dependent on the voluntary action of strikers themselves, adequate preparation can be made to prevent anything approaching alleged starvation." A professor from the University of Maryland, speaking on behalf of NAM, added that research showed that strikes can last longer due to the use of food stamps. He also noted that the cost of food stamps provided for strikers might cost $240 million during the average year in which three million workers went on strike. A representative of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association argued before the House of Agriculture Committee that the only strikers who should be able to acquire food stamps are those whose families qualify for participation in the program during non-strike periods. In another testimony, a member of the National Federation of Independent Businesses told the Committee that 85 percent of the federation's 337,000 members supported the refusal of food stamps to strikers. A representative of the U. S.
Chamber of Commerce also demanded that food stamps not be given to strikers not qualified for participation in the program. Therefore, we can see that there was strong support from the business community to limit the use of food stamps.

Nevertheless, the Senate voted 56 to 32 to table the amendment to make strikers ineligible for food stamps. The House agreed with the Senate version of the bill that deleted provisions banning food stamps to strikers. The vote was 252 to 151. Ten of the twelve Democrats in the Senate voting against the motion to table the amendment came from rural states with lower levels of industrialization and thus a less likelihood that their constituency would use food stamps during strike periods. Fifteen of the eighteen Republican Senators voting to table the amendment came from urbanized industrial states. When the House approved the Senate version of the farm extension bill it added an amendment that called for farmers to produce as much as possible. Although this amendment was meaningless in itself, it meant that no other amendments could be added to the bill. Thus proponents of the amendment to ban food stamps to strikers were faced with the option of either their amendment or no farm bill at all. Forty-eight of the fifty-two Republicans voting for the bill were from rural districts, thus their vote for the farm program extension was presumably more important to them than voting for a ban on food stamps for strikers. Thus in the House the ban
on food stamps was defeated by an alliance of liberals and labor supporters with cotton interests that wanted to defeat a stringent $20,000 subsidy ceiling in the farm bill. And in this case the lobby efforts by the various representatives of capital was defeated.

The striker amendment was again introduced on the floor of the Senate during 1974 and was rejected by a vote of 34 to 55. Nine of the twelve Democrats in the Senate voting for the ban were from rural states and seven of the fourteen Republicans against the amendment were from highly industrial urban states with large working class constituencies. A similar bill was defeated by the full House during 1974 by a vote of 147 to 169. Sixteen of the twenty-four Republicans voting against the ban were from areas with a substantial industrial base and/or had a median income in the district that was higher than the national median level of income. Twenty of the thirty-six Democrats voting for the ban were from rural districts with a higher percentage of blacks than the national level and a lower median level of income than the national median. Consequently, their votes can be seen as an attempt to further weaken the position of low income and unwaged workers in their districts.

During 1976, when food stamp reform legislation was again before the Congress most business lobby organizations continued to focus their activities on preventing strikers from receiving food stamps. Nevertheless, the Senate voted to table an amendment, by
a vote of 48 to 26, that called for persons who refused to work because of a strike or other labor dispute as refusing employment and thus unqualified for food stamps, unless the family was eligible for food stamps before the dispute. 53 Again rural state Democrats voted against the motion and urban industrial state Republican Senators voted for the motion to table.

Again during 1977, business lobby groups sought to have the ban on food stamps to strikers implemented. In a statement to the House Committee on Agriculture, a Chamber of Commerce member stated,

Public assistance to strikers in general, and food stamp benefits in particular, directly affect the public by increasing the number and length of strikes and raising the level of wage settlements. Food stamps represent one of the largest sources of federal government support for strikers and amounts to federal intervention on the side of one party to a labor dispute....therefore...Strikers and those who voluntarily quit their jobs without good cause should not be allowed to receive food stamps.54

A statement by the National Association of Manufacturers before the Committee argued:

There are many alternatives for strikers. During the pre-food stamp days, many strikers showed considerable personal initiative in providing for themselves and their families. Common examples include the use of personal savings, temporary jobs, borrowing from friends, or extended credit from merchants. There are also strike benefits from the union. All of these alternatives are still possible and should be sufficient for the overwhelming majority of strikers. There is no plausible reason for strikers to become wards of the state as food stamp recipients.55

Nevertheless, the committee voted against the proposed amendment by a seven to nine margin. The full Senate also rejected the amendment by a vote of 56 to 38 in the continued showdown between rural and urban industrial states.56
During 1979, another attempt to put a ban on food stamps for strikers was defeated on the Senate floor. But a substitute amendment passed, by 75 to 20, that called for strikers to meet the same eligibility requirements as other recipients, i.e., a restatement of the prior provisions. 57 Fifteen of the twenty-two Republican Senators voting for the amendment were from rural states and supported the provision because it did contain some other provisions to tighten the regulations. It also raised the spending ceiling and would thus increase the aggregate demand for farm products. 58

We can see that these persistent attacks on the issuance of food stamps to strikers is a central aspect of capital's attempt to strengthen the work requirement and continues to be one of the focal points of the ongoing struggle over the imposition of work. Consequently, the demand for tighter program regulations continues to get support from Conservative Republicans and Democrats from rural districts and states.

During the '60s and '70s college campuses were also a focal point of working class struggles against capital's control over society. As a result of the students protests, demonstrations, and dissent, some members of Congress attempted to undercut their power. One aspect of this struggle can be seen by capital's attempt to bring college students into the labor force. During 1968, an amendment was passed in the House by 150 to 134 to prohibit the use of food stamps by college students, if they were not eligible for participation
before entering college. But the amendment was rejected by the conference committee. 59 Students were exempted from the work requirements in the 1970 extension of the food stamp program that remained in effect until 1973, but as the economy moved into a deeper level of stagnation, Congressional conservatives attempted to tighten the work requirements again. An amendment was proposed in the House Agriculture Committee during 1973 to limit food stamp benefits to college students and persons described as the "voluntary poor," but it was defeated partially due to the influence of organized labor. 60 But as the recession deepened during 1974, the conservative argument for restricting college student participation in the food stamp program won the needed support. The House passed by a vote of 195 to 123 an amendment that rendered ineligible for food stamps college students who were claimed as tax dependents by their parents. 61 Forty-six of the sixty-eight swing votes by Democrats were from districts where the college enrollment was lower than the national average per district. The sponsor of this amendment stated that this provision was needed to reduce the "widespread" abuse of the program by thousands of non-needy middle and upper-middle class students. Nevertheless, a 1976 Government Accounting Office study carried out at six representative universities throughout the country indicated that only 3.76 percent of the students or 2,563 students out of the total sample population of 73,419 were receiving food stamps. 62
The Senate further tightened college student eligibility along with other requirements in 1976. In the Senate bill students were required to meet the work registration and related requirements during a break or vacation that lasts 30 days or more. An amendment was also introduced on the Senate floor in 1976 to remove college students from the program entirely, but it was defeated by a vote of 31 to 63. Thirteen of the sixteen Democrats voting for the amendment were from states with less than the national average number of college students per state. During 1977, another amendment was introduced to ban all college students from receiving food stamps, but it was rejected 26 to 63. Five of the seven Democrats voting for the bill were from states with a college student population lower than the national average number of students per state. The sponsor of the amendment, a former college president, claimed that food stamps allow students to postpone their ability to deal with reality and face up to responsibility. Opponents of the amendment pointed out that the actual number of college students participating in the program at that time was about 200,000 or 1.3 percent of all recipients. Nevertheless, an amendment was included in the 1977 Senate provisions that disqualified from the program college students over 18 claimed or eligible to be claimed as tax dependents on their parents who are not eligible for food stamps themselves. Thus we can see that capital has continually tried to attack college students along with other sectors of the working class in order to
reimpose a stronger work requirement and reestablish economic
growth and political stability based on work and rigid productivity
standards.

Numerous other legislative attacks were made on the food
stamp program during the late '60s in order to contain the expan-
sion of the program and reduce federal expenditures. In 1967,
for example, when Congress extended the food stamp program for two
years, it passed a provision prohibiting the use of Section 32 funds
for the program, i.e., the section of Public Law 74-320 that design-
nated 30 percent of the U. S. customs receipts from all sources
annually to be used by the Secretary of Agriculture for various pur-
poses, e.g., to subsidize domestic consumption. Consequently, now all
food stamp funds come out of general revenues. During 1969, the
Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee said, "Deadbeats who
can but won't work" should not receive food stamps. And the
Committee voted against proposals to provide free food stamps to the
neediest of the low income and unwaged workers.

Throughout the '70s there were various other legislative
attacks on the food stamp program. The Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973 allowed aged, blind and disabled persons
participating in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program to
receive food stamps only if their SSI payments were lower than what
they would have received through the food stamp and state welfare
program in 1973. This law also stated that payments in kind by an
employer to an employee should be counted as income for the purpose of determining food stamp eligibility if they were made in the form of housing and were valued at $25 or more a month. Thus the attacks by capital continue to focus on restricting transfer payments to low income and unwaged workers through various methods.

As the 1973-1974-1975 recession deepened, food stamp participation and expenditures exploded. One representative critical of the burgeoning program declared, "I would suggest...that we will probably have to rent the printing presses of The Washington Post in order to print more food stamps, because the government printing presses will not be able to print them fast enough." In response to this expansion of the program numerous Congressional conservatives introduced several unsuccessful bills to tighten the food stamp eligibility requirements. Those in the minority who voted against a countercyclical expansion of the program claimed that increased spending would increase the opportunity for fraud and abuse, invite litigation, and create an administrative nightmare. And as the supplemental appropriations bill reached the conference committee, some conferees suggested that restrictive procedures should be initiated to require food stamp participants to countersign the coupons at the time of food purchases in order to reduce black marketing of lost or stolen stamps. But this provision was not adopted.

During 1975, the Appropriations Committee responded to the publicity of widespread irregularities in the program by designating $100,000 of the fiscal 1976 funds to be used by the Department of Agriculture
to revise food stamp regulations "so as to minimize existing misuse and unwarranted expenditures." On the House floor an amendment was also introduced that would have prohibited the participation in the food stamp program of households whose aggregate annual income exceeded the poverty level, i.e., $4,050 for a family of four in 1975. This amendment was defeated by a vote of 159 to 230. Twenty of the sixty Democrats voting for this amendment were from rural districts with a higher percentage of blacks than the national level, a lower median income than the national median level, and a lower percentage of unemployment than the national level. Another fourteen of the Democrats voting for the amendment were from rural districts with a low percentage of blacks, but with a median income level lower than the national median. Thus these votes can be seen as a measure to weaken the power of low income and unwaged workers in those areas. Twelve of the thirty-one Republicans voting against the amendment were from urban districts with a lower than the national percentage of blacks, a higher median income level than the national median and a low percent of unemployed workers. Thus their vote can be understood from a philanthropic-guilt conscience perspective. Eleven of the Republicans voting against the amendment were from rural districts with a low level of black population and lower median income levels than the national median. Therefore, these Republican votes were in the interest of their constituency.
During 1976, after the food stamp recipient participation reached over 19 million the most massive legislative assault was launched on the program. The Senate passed a bill tightening eligibility, benefits, administrative procedures, and provided penalties for violations of the food stamp regulations. The bill limited participation to families with net incomes at or below the official poverty level ($5,496 for a household of four during April of 1976). The provisions also replaced the previously itemized deductions from gross income with a standard deduction. The bill also eliminated the automatic eligibility for food stamps by welfare recipients. It also disqualified any household that purposefully transferred ownership of property to meet the food stamp assets test. The eligibility of undocumented and temporary foreign workers was also eliminated. The bill instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to initiate research in order to establish a system to verify earnings of food stamp applicants and recipients. It further sanctioned the disqualification of households that refused to provide eligibility information. Provisions were also enacted that disqualified households for up to a year for fraudulent registration when found guilty in a court or after a hearing by a state welfare agency.

Other provisions in the Senate food stamp reform bill of 1976 further attacked this means of subsistence program for low income and unwaged workers. The bill changed the sliding scale of food stamp purchase requirements and stipulated that recipients
must spend 25 percent of their net income for their coupons. The bill also removed the provisions that required food stamp outreach programs to "insure" participation in the program. The bill also instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to implement national error tolerance level guidelines to increase quality control and administrative efficiency of the program. In addition, the bill required the Secretary to produce yearly evaluations of the program and annual reports to Congress. In order to reduce fraud, the bill authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to fund state agencies 75 percent of prosecution expenses against non-welfare families. It was estimated that these provisions would reduce program participation by 1.4 million persons and decrease federal expenditures by $241 million. The bill passed in the Senate by a vote of 52 to 22. It was made more acceptable to liberals and anti-hunger advocates by including provisions that were to increase program participation of low income and unwaged workers. Nevertheless, while the Senate bill passed, the House Agriculture Committee failed to get a stricter version of the bill on the floor before the 92nd Congress adjoned.

The Senate passed another food stamp bill in 1977. The previously mentioned 1976 provisions were included in the bill and some additional restrictions were provided. The bill ended the categorical eligibility of Supplemental Security Income recipients. It reinstated and revised the standard deduction from the 1976 level of $100 to $60. Administrative changes specified that the state
agencies were to be the main source of program control and accountability. The bill also authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to pressure state agencies through the use of court injunctions by the Attorney General, if the state agencies did not comply with their approved plan of operation or correct the irregularities within a designated time. Pressure was further placed on state agencies to correct fraudulently or negligently approved applications by requiring them to pay in full for those coupons issued to unqualified recipients. The bill also required the Secretary of Agriculture to withhold ten percent of a state's administrative funds if the state's program for reducing errors was not implemented. The bill included penalties for unauthorized use, transfer, alteration or possession of food stamp authorization cards or coupons. If the value of the illegally used cards or coupons was more than $100, then the penalty was to be a $10,000 fine and/or up to five years in prison. If the value of the illegally used cards or coupons was less than $100, then the penalty was set at $1,000, one year in prison or both. The Senate passed this bill by a vote of 63 to 8 and the House adopted the measures by a vote of 283 to 102. The bill was supported by opponents of the program because it tightened the regulations and was acceptable by the program advocates because it eliminated the purchase requirement.
The Food Stamp Act of 1977

We can see from the actions described above that the attack by the Carter Administration on the growth and cost of the food stamp program was taken up by the Congress and implemented into law. The attack was somewhat blunted by the food lobby groups, but while previous Congresses had been more successful in stopping Executive Branch attacks on the food programs, the members of the 95th Congress were not as easily influenced by food program advocate organizations. Consequently, the 1977 law that came out of the Administration's proposals reflected the general strategy of reduced government spending and the necessity of strengthening the work requirements for food program recipients. Because these changes represent the most far-reaching revision of the food stamp program since 1964 when the program was established on a permanent basis it is necessary to understand the broad basis of this attack.

The first general reform objective of the 1977 law is aimed at tightening food stamp program administration procedures in order to reduce fraud and abuse. This is accomplished by strengthening the work registration requirements so that food stamp recipients who are "able" to work are required to register, search, accept and continue to work or lose their eligibility. One pilot project is supposed to be set up in each state so that those participants who cannot find private sector jobs within 30 days would be required to accept public service jobs at the minimum wage paid in food stamps.
These work requirements are applicable to all adult members of the household and noncompliance is supposed to result in ineligibility for 60 days. To further discourage fraud, the 1977 law is designed to disqualify recipients for three months if they are found guilty of noncompliance and the State governments are funded with 75 percent of the cost for the investigation and prosecution of fraud. In order to maintain regulation compliance, recipients are also required to report all changes in any of their eligibility standards that affect their participation or benefit level. A provision has also been instituted that would render ineligible any applicant who transfers assets in order to meet the eligibility standards.

The second general reform objective of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 is outlined in provisions designed to eliminate the "non-needy" from the program. This is to be carried out by the implementation of net income limits that are reduced to the "official" poverty guidelines, e.g., for a family of four the acceptable income level was reduced from $6,804 to $5,850. And contrary to the Administration proposal the implementation of standard deductions did not go into effect. Nonetheless, the itemized deduction system was replaced with provisions that simplified the administration process. Households are now allowed to deduct up to $85 a month for the cost of the care of a dependent when the service is necessary to permit a household member to meet employment, training or educational commitments. The excess shelter cost deduction provision
also allows for the reduction of rent differentials. In the 1977 law eligible households are permitted to receive a deduction for the amount that their shelter costs exceed 50 percent of their income after all other deductions. The maximum excess shelter deduction is set at $75. Students are also targeted as "non-needy" and only those who are: (1) a tax dependent, (2) the child of parents eligible for food stamps, (3) working or registered for at least 20 hours a week, (4) the head of a household with at least one dependent or (5) exempt from work registration are eligible for food stamps. The level of household asset ownership is also strictly limited in order to keep the "non-needy" off food stamps.

The third general reform objective of the 1977 law is based on provisions that control the total projected food stamp program costs. By law the appropriations are not to exceed $5,847,600,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, $6,158,900,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, $6,188,600,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, and $6,235,900,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981 based on the then projected growth in the program and inflation. In any fiscal year, if the Secretary of Agriculture finds out that the number of participants increases enough with the given benefit levels intact so that it causes the overall cost to exceed these appropriation levels, then the Secretary of Agriculture is to direct the state agencies to reduce the benefits to be issued to the certified
households in order to meet the requirements of the designated appropriation levels. Other provisions that can be seen as moves to limit the cost of the food stamp program are an amendment that calls for the substitution of "thrifty food plan" for "nutritionally adequate diet" wherever it appears in the Food Stamp Act and provisions that call for the strict prohibition of the use of food stamps by "illegal" aliens.

The fourth general reform of the 1977 law is based on provisions designated to facilitate the participation of "needy" persons. This objective is to be achieved by the elimination of the purchase requirements, increased accessibility of certification and issuance offices and the availability of both the food stamp and food distribution programs to native American Indians. Although this objective seems to be the most advantageous for the low income and unwaged sector of the working class, it is severely limited by the provisions designed to limit program costs; i.e., when the level of participation increases the regulations are designed to pit recipients against one another since the appropriations are limited for any one fiscal year.76

The 1979 Food Stamp Program Cutback Proposals

Although the spending caps on the food stamp program were removed for fiscal year 1979 and seem certain to be removed for fiscal year 1980, the Carter Administration and some members of Congress have continued to attack program participation and spending. Some proposals that have been suggested to achieve these goals
are as follows: (1) changing from a semi-annual cost-of-food update of the participant payments to an annual update, thus forcing participants to accept losses in real income from inflation during the year between adjustments; (2) expanding the workfare projects to additional locations; (3) introducing a system to recoup benefits from individuals who participated in the food stamp program at one time but who have subsequently attained an income level that disqualifies them from continued program eligibility; (4) instructing the Department of Agriculture to use more stringent standards in the verification procedures at the local level; (5) sanctioning or demanding the states to recoup overpayments even if the overpayments were the result of state administrative errors; (6) financially penalizing states for "excessive" administrative errors, thus coercing them to tighten up their verification procedures; (7) eliminating numerous statutory outreach requirements; and (8) decreasing benefits for individuals who are participating in other federal food programs, e.g., School Lunch Program.  

Nevertheless, if we look at the various attempts by the functionaries of capital in the federal government to reduce food stamp participation and expenditures, e.g., funding impoundment, regional restructuring, inflation and regulation changes, then we see that their success is never assured. As we will see in the next chapter, the reason capital's attempts are thwarted is because of working class organizational strength that is built on past and present struggles.
CHAPTER IV

Low Income and Unwaged Workers' Struggles for Food Stamps During the '70s

In this chapter we will see that from a working class perspective the '70s has been another period of gain for the low income and unwaged sectors, i.e., they have limited the capitalist attack and increased their real income with respect to their food consumption. In order to understand the dynamics of this success by workers it is necessary to look at the various forms of struggle.

The predominant form of struggle to increase the amount of food stamps going to low income and unwaged workers during the '70s has been legal action complemented by the lobby efforts of the official organizations. For example, the Food Research and Action Center has demanded through legal action that the federal government enforce food stamp regulations favorable to workers, such as outreach programs, that were previously won as a result of their concrete struggles. Fraud during the certification procedures has also been a particularly successful extralegal form of struggle by individual workers who receive food stamp benefits although they are not legally eligible. Another factor that has significantly affected the level of participation and the amount of money spent on food stamps is the political recomposition between waged and unwaged workers that has occurred during the recession of December of 1969 to November of 1970 and the Great
Recession that started in November of 1973 and lasted until March 1975. Direct appropriation of food has also continued in the low income and unwaged workers' repertoire of strategies, but it has not been as extensive in the '70s.

Therefore, in general, we can see that if unemployment is the method that capital is using during the '70s to "teach a lesson to the protagonist of urban insurrection and of factory welfare insubordination" as suggested by Mantano, then the lesson has yet to be learned. The unemployment rate has continued to remain high throughout the '70s and the marginalization of various sectors of the labor force has also continued, but social welfare payments as a percentage of the national product has increased steadily since the early '60s. This unmanageability of the low income and unwaged sector of the working class can be seen by its ability to thwart and rollback the capitalist attack on the food stamp program during the '70s. Despite collective capital's attempts to reduce the number of persons in the program and the dollar value transferred, participation has increased 97 percent from 1970 to 1978 and the nominal dollar value paid out has increased by over 500 percent, while the real value has increased 233 percent during the same time period despite inflation (see Table 4.1 below).

Recessions and Food Stamps

While recessions in general slow the growth of demands by waged workers in the private sector of the economy, these
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment(^1)</th>
<th>Employed Part Time(^2)</th>
<th>Food Stamp Recipients</th>
<th>Food Distribution Recipients</th>
<th>FS and FD Recipients</th>
<th>Total FS and FD Amount Spent (1967 dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,714,000</td>
<td>3,142,000</td>
<td>49,640</td>
<td>4,446,000</td>
<td>4,495,640</td>
<td>157,717,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,911,000</td>
<td>2,661,000</td>
<td>142,817</td>
<td>6,604,714</td>
<td>6,747,531</td>
<td>266,735,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,070,000</td>
<td>2,620,000</td>
<td>225,602</td>
<td>6,297,541</td>
<td>6,523,143</td>
<td>245,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,786,000</td>
<td>2,455,000</td>
<td>355,816</td>
<td>5,544,003</td>
<td>5,910,819</td>
<td>245,419,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,366,000</td>
<td>2,209,000</td>
<td>424,652</td>
<td>5,317,653</td>
<td>5,742,305</td>
<td>275,942,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,875,000</td>
<td>1,960,000</td>
<td>864,344</td>
<td>4,458,816</td>
<td>5,323,120</td>
<td>200,880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2,975,000</td>
<td>2,163,000</td>
<td>1,447,097</td>
<td>3,503,023</td>
<td>4,950,120</td>
<td>206,603,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,817,000</td>
<td>1,970,000</td>
<td>2,209,964</td>
<td>3,236,876</td>
<td>5,446,840</td>
<td>285,728,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,032,000</td>
<td>2,056,000</td>
<td>2,878,113</td>
<td>3,610,702</td>
<td>6,488,815</td>
<td>416,358,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,088,000</td>
<td>2,443,000</td>
<td>4,340,030</td>
<td>3,811,961</td>
<td>8,151,991</td>
<td>729,639,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,993,000</td>
<td>2,675,000</td>
<td>9,367,908</td>
<td>8,755,814</td>
<td>13,123,722</td>
<td>1,562,665,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,840,000</td>
<td>2,624,000</td>
<td>11,109,074</td>
<td>3,437,697</td>
<td>14,546,771</td>
<td>1,700,639,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4,304,000</td>
<td>2,519,000</td>
<td>12,165,682</td>
<td>2,659,728</td>
<td>14,825,410</td>
<td>1,692,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,076,000</td>
<td>2,943,000</td>
<td>12,861,526</td>
<td>1,981,555</td>
<td>14,843,081</td>
<td>1,804,197,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,830,000</td>
<td>3,748,000</td>
<td>17,064,196</td>
<td>329,572</td>
<td>17,393,786</td>
<td>2,537,836,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7,288,000</td>
<td>3,540,000</td>
<td>17,981,717</td>
<td>79,746</td>
<td>18,061,463</td>
<td>2,967,464,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6,855,000</td>
<td>3,530,000</td>
<td>17,070,630</td>
<td>81,905</td>
<td>17,152,535</td>
<td>2,639,437,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6,047,000</td>
<td>16,100,000</td>
<td>89,773</td>
<td>16,189,773</td>
<td>2,434,499,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5,963,000</td>
<td>17,676,000</td>
<td>97,383</td>
<td>17,793,383</td>
<td>2,847,113,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>20,994,000</td>
<td>80,000(^3)</td>
<td>21,074,000</td>
<td>3,593,415,000(^3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Persons 16 years of age and over.

\(^2\)Includes persons who worked less than 35 hours during the survey week because of slack work, job changing during the week, material shortages, inability to find full-time work, etc. (persons 14 years and over for 1961-66, 16 years and over for 1967 forward).

\(^3\)Preliminary data.
strikes by capital definitely have served to increase the food
stamp benefits and level of participation of those in the low income
and unwaged sector of the working class (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2
below). In effect, the struggle circulated back from the waged
to the unwaged sector and the political recomposition of these
two sectors forced up the bonus value of food stamps throughout
this cycle of struggles.

By late 1969 there had not been a downturn in the economy
since Eisenhower's Administration. But during the second half
of the '60s the Keynesian productivity deal was shattered. From
1965 to 1969 output per hour of all persons in the private business
sector increased 9 percent, but unit labor costs in the private
business sector increased 19 percent during the same time period.²
And the entire social factory was in a state of crisis--welfare
payments were soaring and the "problem of dependency" continued
to grow, i.e., there was an increasing number of people receiving
transfer payments from the government. Consequently, when Nixon
came into office he returned to the recessionary strategy. During
1969, the money supply (M₁) was reduced by 3 percent in real terms
and federal government ran a budget surplus of $5.4 billion. The
result was the beginning of a recession during December of the
same year. While unemployment increased 2.8 to 4 million during
the recession nominal wages increased 6.6 percent and real wages
increased .7 percent.³ Thus the recession did not serve its purpose
in the private sector and because transfer payments are planned
Figure 4.1. Number of recipients—food stamp program—food distribution program.
Food Stamp (Bonus) in Nominal Terms

Food Stamp (Bonus) and Food Distribution in 1967 Dollars

Recessions
P = Peak
T = Trough

Figure 4.2. Expenditures in nominal and real terms—food stamp program—food distribution program.
to be countercyclical there is a problem with the recessionary strategy for capital in the low income and unwaged sector. Since the organizational and procedural apparatus for the food stamp program had already been set up to take care of the waged workers unemployed during a downturn, when these workers joined with the chronically low income and unwaged sector, it forced up the bonus benefits for all. This happened because when waged workers were unemployed, their struggles continued alongside the struggles of the unwaged workers, but now they demanded increased income from the government.

If we look at Table 4.2 below, we see that unemployment rose considerably during the 1969-70 recession and continued to rise or remained high for two more years. But the unemployment rate and the real bonus value per person also increased significantly during this cycle of struggles. This increase in participation in the food stamp program cannot be attributed to the decrease in the participation of the food distribution program, because while it was declining there was no large scale reduction. Moreover, those still in the food distribution program saw the per person benefits rise!

What was true for the nation as a whole was also true for individual cities. But more significant is the fact that while the number of participants fluctuated in various localities before, during and after the 1969-70 recession, the bonus value increased when the number of participants increased and remained high after
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Unemployed</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
<th>Number of Food Stamp Recipients</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
<th>Average Food Stamp Bonus Per Person, Per Year (Real)</th>
<th>Number of Food Distribution Recipients</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
<th>Average Food Distribution Value Per Person, Per Year (Real)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,832,000</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>3,222,212</td>
<td>$65.73</td>
<td>3,610,702</td>
<td>$56.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,088,000</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>6,457,342</td>
<td>+100%</td>
<td>73.91</td>
<td>3,811,961</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>65.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,993,000</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>10,548,660</td>
<td>+63%</td>
<td>122.03</td>
<td>3,755,814</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>72.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,840,000</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>11,594,091</td>
<td>+10%</td>
<td>125.00</td>
<td>3,437,697</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>72.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the number of participants fell off in some areas. In Seattle, for example, unemployment reached over 15 percent during the recession and the food stamp participation in that city was at 67,894 with the average bonus value per person per year at $95. By 1971, participation rose to 76,795 and the average bonus value per person per year had risen to $187. In 1972, when participation fell to 64,516, the average bonus value continued to rise and reached $193 per person per year, partially due to the automatic escalator. One reason why the program expanded in Seattle was due to the fact that the recession had left many formerly affluent aircraft production personnel temporarily out of work and since they needed what income they did have for paying off their debts (houses, cars, etc.), the food programs provided them with the necessities. Thus their accumulated power in the community was significant because of their high paying jobs. This high wage tied them into the debt structure of the community and allowed them a greater degree of bargaining power when they were in the unwaged position, e.g., local merchants extended credit since they did not want to see the unemployed workers default on their loans.

This situation, in which participation rose and benefits rose and remained high after the participation fell again, was a common phenomenon. It occurred in New York City, Birmingham, Mobile, Colorado Springs, Denver, Orlando, Gary, South Bend, Louisville, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Greenville (Mississippi), Omaha and Cincinnati. An even more common situation was that participation continued
to climb after the recession was over at the same time that the average bonus value per person steadily rose. This was true in Detroit, Chicago, Little Rock, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Macon, Savannah, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Cedar Rapids, Shreveport, New Orleans, Baltimore, Newark, Jersey City, Albuquerque, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Nashville, Memphis, and Houston.\textsuperscript{5}

Therefore, we can see that the recessionary strategy did not work in the private sector or with the low income and unwaged sectors of the working class. Consequently, on August 15, 1971, President Nixon changed strategies. He introduced wage and price controls to help "cool off" the economy and restore a profitable business climate, i.e., reduce consumption in relation to investment. Another part of Nixon's attack on the American working class on that date was to take the dollar off the gold standard. This effectively reduced the value of the dollar in relation to other currencies and therefore meant that American workers would have to work harder to receive the same imported consumption goods. Thus it was necessary to correct the first balance of trade deficit in over 25 years. Following this attack by collective capital at home was the increase in world energy prices, a result of the decision of producer nations but sanctioned by the Nixon regime. Therefore, we can see by the breadth of the attack that the crisis of the '70s is a historical benchmark for capital similar to the Great Depression. But August 15, 1971, only marks the beginning of the crisis for capital that is based on austerity as the keystone
of its strategy, because the Nixon controls—phases I through IV—were a failure. From 1971 through 1973 output per hour of all persons in the private business sector increased 5 percent while the unit labor cost in the private business sector increased nine percent. Thus collective capital returned to the recessionary strategy and this time Nixon did it with a vengeance.

The events of the Great Recession that began during November of 1973 and ended in March of 1975 were an extended and amplified replay of the 1969-70 recession. During the 1973-74-75 recession the number of persons participating in the food stamp program rose from under 13 million to over 19 million (an increase of over 6 million), while the yearly level of unemployment rose from 4.3 to 7.8 million persons (an increase of 3.5 million). In other words, at least 2.5 million of the increase in participation in the food stamp program was independent of the increase of the number of persons unemployed. Moreover, the bonus value issued by the government in real terms increased 81 percent during the recession (see Appendix II). Because of this increased participation in the program President Ford was forced to ask Congress to appropriate an additional $1 billion during 1975 for the food stamp program and the Department of Agriculture, under pressure from anti-hunger activists, increased the maximum income eligibility standards by five percent to cushion the effect of the recession. Much of the expansion of the food stamp program during the 1973-74-75 Great Recession can be attributed to the legal and lobby action by the
Food Research and Action Center along with other official working class organizations and individual fraudulent activities as we will see in later sections of this chapter.

**Workers' Struggles Rollback the Nixon Initiative**

But if the recessions were occasions for working class gains, the road to free lunches was not always smooth. Collective capital continued to launch numerous attacks on the federal food programs. Nevertheless, working class organizational strength dealt capital several cases of clear defeat.

During 1971, the Nixon Administration tried various times to cut the massive increases in participation and in funding of several of the federal food programs. In April, the Administration removed over three-hundred thousand welfare recipients from the food stamp program by juggling the eligibility requirements. But as a result of protest from large numbers of recipients, numerous hunger lobby groups and the members of Congress they influenced, Congress changed the regulations in July to automatically include everyone on welfare as eligible for food stamps. In May, in a direct attack on low income and unwaged women the Administration cut off the funds for a food program that distributed foodstuffs to pregnant women and nursing mothers and infants. But this action was also rescinded because of a deal between Congressmen, that were being pressured by anti-hunger lobby organizations, and the Administration that wanted to secure enough committee votes to...
confirm the appointment of Earl Butz as the new Secretary of Agri-
culture. In June, the Administration impounded the funds that
were promised to permit approximately one million inner city youths
to have food distributed at summer recreation programs. But a
few months later, after officials from Los Angeles, Detroit, San
Antonio and Newark protested to Congress and testified that the
cutbacks would contribute to the possible increase in tensions
in the urban ghettos where youth unemployment was high and a tra-
dition of violence was established, these funds were turned over
to the originally scheduled cities. In July, the Administration
reduced and eliminated the benefits for what it called the "upper-
income poor." But these funds were restored the following January
because of the National Council of Churches, the Catholic Charities
of New York, the United Neighborhood Houses, the New York Urban
Coalition and a group of twenty-eight senators who called for the
Department of Agriculture to change the regulations. In August,
the Administration cut back on free and reduced price lunch funds
available to the states. But with a majority of the states and a
large number of recipients affected, it was not difficult for the
hunger lobby groups to press the Senate to override the decision.8
Thus while the Nixon Administration tried numerous times to cut
back the food programs, the level of activism was too great on
the side of the working class and its representative organizations
for these actions to succeed.
Food Stamps as a Factor of the Refusal of Work

The source of the crisis for capital is the working class struggle against work. Workers are demanding a higher level of income independent of work. That is, the supply curve for labor is backward bending—beyond some level as the wage rate goes up workers want more time to enjoy their income. Since consumption has remained high either through high nominal wage increases or through the use of credit, capital cannot control the working class. This problem for capital is not limited to the private sector. Unwaged workers who receive their income from collective capital are also refusing to work. This is definitely the case with the food stamp program.

Even though a food stamp registration amendment that required all "able-bodied" recipients to accept employment was signed into law during 1970, the implementation of this provision did not force a large percentage of the food stamp recipients into accepting low wage employment. Some recipients were eliminated from the program because they accepted work and some had their food stamp allotments reduced because they accepted work. And others were removed from the food stamp program because they refused to accept work. Nevertheless, while we can see in Table 4.3 that the number of persons registered for work requirements rose from 439,547 in 1971-72 to about three million during fiscal year (FY) 1977, these numbers as a percent of total participation in the program started at 19 percent and went to 9 percent in FY 1973
Table 4.3
Food Stamp Program Work Registration Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Number of Persons Registered</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1971 through June 1973</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>439,547</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>8,565</td>
<td>626,411</td>
<td>14,011</td>
<td>1,024,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1973 through June 1973</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>1,054,891</td>
<td>16,347</td>
<td>608,023</td>
<td>2,019,490</td>
<td>47,312</td>
<td>3,360,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1973 through June 1974</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>1,333,791</td>
<td>15,090</td>
<td>596,446</td>
<td>1,717,772</td>
<td>40,006</td>
<td>2,941,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1974 through June 1975</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>2,575,819</td>
<td>18,841</td>
<td>888,103</td>
<td>2,216,141</td>
<td>59,870</td>
<td>5,076,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1975 through September 1976</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>3,842,027</td>
<td>31,168</td>
<td>1,560,547</td>
<td>43,974</td>
<td>3,497,397</td>
<td>82,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to 10 percent in FY 1974, 7 percent in FY 1975, 5 percent in FY 1976
and 6 percent in FY 1977. In money terms, the savings on the food
stamp budget as a result of this work program has been even more
of a failure, because it has not even reduced the expenditures by
as much as one percent in any year.

A 1978 report by the Comptroller of the U. S. showed that
from 1,061 cases randomly selected, 620 food stamp recipients were
required to register for work. Of these 620, only 233 were registered
at the local employment offices that were responsible for helping
them find jobs and only 3 persons had obtained jobs. Thus we can
see that as long as this sector of the working class receiving food
stamps can stay out of the labor market or take jobs in which little
or no work is done, then they continue to get income independent
of work. This is part of the political and economic price that
collective capital has to pay in order to maintain the present
income hierarchy.

Furthermore, as we saw in chapter three, although legislation
has been continually introduced to prohibit the use of food stamps
by strikers, it has not been enacted. Consequently, food stamps
continue to be used effectively to supplement strike funds and allow
these workers to refuse work under conditions deemed as unacceptable.
For example, the largest strike of 1970 was the United Auto Workers'
strike against General Motors. The strike involved over 400,000
workers and lasted long enough that in Pontiac, Michigan, city employees,
policemen and firemen were laid off due to the loss of revenue.
In Detroit, at one point hundreds of strikers jammed relief centers to apply for food stamps and became impatient over the paper work and delays. As the tension increased the strikers changed, "We want food, we want money." The demand for food assistance was so great in Detroit that the number of welfare workers was increased. 10

When the union was attacked for having their members apply for food stamps, the U.A.W. Director of Community Relations justified the action by pointing out that Congress appropriated billions to subsidize corporations, businessmen, farmers, etc. Therefore, he claimed that if the union was to be attacked then the attack should not be limited to it. 11

During the 113-day coal strike of 1978, the miners' main means of support were the union strike funds, the income of their working wives, the voluntary extension of credit by grocers and other merchants, and food stamps. But once the Taft-Hartley order was invoked and not complied with, then the strike was considered "illegal." Consequently, the distribution of food stamps was ordered to be ceased. Nonetheless, miners continued the strike for a while longer and received tons of donated food from the striking American Agriculture Movement. 12 Thus food stamps helped the miners while they continued to be issued. But the linkage of the coal workers' struggles to the farmers' struggles bypassed the mediation of state-issued food stamps and increased the miners' staying power.
Individual Acts of Counterfeiting, Direct Appropriation and Fraud in the Food Stamp Program

In the 1970s when the mass confrontations with the state characterized by the "riots" and the demonstrations of the 1960s have no longer been a major form of workers' struggles, many working-class activities have turned "underground" and have taken the form of struggles carried out by individuals or a few individuals working together. It is a covert response to a covert attack. Since inflation has become one of capital's major tools for reducing workers' access to commodities, now workers have begun to use whatever means available to increase their relative share of the social wealth, e.g., through individual acts of direct appropriation, counterfeiting, fraud, etc. Fraud in the food stamp program is one way workers have manipulated their linkage to food, i.e., workers in some cases have presented themselves as being lower on the wage/unwaged hierarchy than they are in order to be included in the target sector that "deserves" supplemental income.

Numerous forms of this type of struggle have been observed all over the nation. The Department of Agriculture's monitoring service, the Office of Inspector General, reported that over 85 percent of the 1,070 food stamp complaints in 1970 involved the illegal use of food stamps, e.g., fraud. In October of 1971, the Governor of Illinois reported that some $200,000 worth of food stamps given to striking Teamsters by the Department of Agriculture were obtained by "unqualified persons." Another $121,000 was
distributed under questionable circumstances. He asserted that the applicants gave false information in order to receive the benefits. It can be assumed that the food stamps were a factor in allowing the more than 35,000 Teamsters in the Chicago area to remain on strike longer and hold out for better benefits than other locals, since this group stayed out about two months longer than the other locals.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, we can see that if some workers were not able to receive food stamps legally, then many were willing to use extralegal means to obtain food.

A Department of Agriculture report on food stamp fraud in 1974 estimated that "errors and deceptions" cost the program about $740 million a year. It was also estimated that over-issuance cost the program $575 million over a six-month period beginning in January of 1974 and this amounted to giving the recipients 23.2 percent more assistance than they were legally entitled to by the regulations. Nine and a half percent of the food stamp recipients on public assistance received benefits for which they were unqualified and this cost the program an additional $165 million during the same time period.\textsuperscript{15} Another 1974 Department of Agriculture investigation that surveyed 25,585 households indicated that an amazing one-quarter of the low-income workers receiving food stamps had obtained them "improperly," i.e., fraudulently.\textsuperscript{16} During the last six months of 1974, a U.S.D.A. audit showed that 653,840 persons receiving food stamps were ineligible. This amounted to 4.3 percent of the
recipients and $80 million in benefits. A 1975 U.S.D.A. report showed that 8.8 percent of the food stamp recipients not on public assistance were ineligible for the food stamp program because of their income level. This reportedly cost the government some $160 million annually. Another U.S.D.A. study from January to June of 1976 indicated that $215 million in benefits were paid to ineligible people or persons who received more benefits than they were eligible for under the regulations. During July of 1977, a Government Accounting Office study indicated that $590 million in excess food stamp payments had been issued in a year's time and much of the overpayments were due to fraud. Therefore, the dollar value of food stamps paid to workers during this cycle of struggles because of fraud made an appreciable supplement to workers' income.

A 1975 U.S.D.A. study showed that most of the errors were made at the time of certification of the recipient. This study indicated that 45.5 percent of the errors were due to mistakes made by the agency, e.g., a policy incorrectly applied, failure to take proper action, arithmetic, transcription, etc. The amount of errors that were attributed to the recipient were 54.5 percent and resulted from incorrect or incomplete information and a change in circumstances that was not reported with respect to income, deductions, resources, household composition, work registration, arithmetic, etc. Of those cases reviewed 28.5 percent were in error. Those persons who were receiving food stamps although they were ineligible made up 17.5 percent, those eligible but being issued more than they were entitled
to made up 8.4 percent and those persons who were eligible but were receiving less than they were entitled to made up 2.6 percent (this does not include those not getting any food stamps).\textsuperscript{21}

While many workers were able to supplement their incomes through food stamp fraud, this was not without risk and some were prosecuted. In 1975, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) reported that it took legal action to collect benefits paid out to some 34,463 ineligible recipients. This amounted to $6.3 million in food stamps overissued. Claims were also reported to the FNS amounting to $800,500 involving some 2,983 recipients, although all of this was deemed as uncollectible.\textsuperscript{22} During March of 1977, a New York operator of a check cashing firm was found guilty of embezzling $1 million in food stamp funds and was sentenced to four years in jail and a $10,000 fine.\textsuperscript{23} In New Jersey during 1977, concern over an estimated 60,000 welfare and food stamp "cheats" that cost the state between $50 and $60 million a year led to the implementation of a new computer system that linked twenty-one counties in order to track down recipients that were registered for benefits in more than one county.\textsuperscript{24} Thus it appears that action is being taken to limit this form of struggle, but its success has been limited.

Because capital's attack during the '70s has been massive and against all sectors of the working class, the circulation of struggles between sectors of the working class has increased. In some instances the struggles of state workers have complemented the struggles of low-income and unwaged workers. This recomposition
of low income and unwaged workers and workers in food stamp offices is largely due to the fact that the state worker sector has also been on the offensive in order to increase their income. The U.S.D.A. statistics for FY 1974 and 1975 on certification and issuance office employee fraud indicated fifty-three instances of violations in nineteen states and the District of Columbia. Although the total amount of losses were not determined at that time, they were known to exceed $556,000.\textsuperscript{25} In one case of fraud by two welfare agency employees, the certifiers were being paid in stamps by ineligible workers for whom they had authorized under false names. The amount of kickbacks in stamps involved was estimated at $131,000.\textsuperscript{26} In another case of employee fraud, a certifier created authorization cards for real and fictitious addresses on his accomplice’s postal route and when the cards were mailed the postal carrier would appropriate them. The postal carrier would then sell the cards to a third person, who would then purchase food stamps fraudulently.\textsuperscript{27} Between 1970 and 1975, the Department of Agriculture charged seven states and the District of Columbia with gross negligence. The dollar losses to the federal government in these instances amounted to $1.7 million and were the result of such things as disregard of program regulation, failure to correct irregularities, inadequate program security, overissuance of bonus coupons and multiple certification and issuance errors.\textsuperscript{28}

Counterfeiting has also been a big operation in attempting to subvert the regulations of the food stamp program. The Secret
Service recovered $90,000 worth of counterfeit coupons during 1971.\textsuperscript{29} In one instance during March of 1971, the vice-president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters was arrested for having in his possession the plates and photographic negatives of food stamp coupons and was charged with conspiracy to counterfeit.\textsuperscript{30} In September of 1974, Secret Service agents confiscated $1 million worth of bogus food stamp coupons and arrested four "professional criminals" at the printing plant.\textsuperscript{31} Although the dollar value of counterfeit food stamp coupons is large, the volume of stamps actually put into circulation is estimated to be small by the Federal Reserve System. They assert that less than 1.5 percent of the total $2.3 million seized in FY 1975, or $29,190, were found in circulation.\textsuperscript{32}

The number of food stamps used as a result of direct appropriation from food stamp offices has been more successful for workers than counterfeiting and it involves both food stamp coupons and authorization cards. The U.S.D.A.'s Office of Inspector General reported that food stamp direct appropriation from local offices cost $872,000 during 1970 and $170,000 in 1971.\textsuperscript{33} In FY 1975, the Food and Nutrition Service reported sixty-two cases of direct appropriation of food stamps involving a total of $572,000.\textsuperscript{34} In October of 1976, the Department of Agriculture charged twelve persons in the federal district court of New York with defrauding the federal government of over $2 million by cashing unofficially obtained food stamps.\textsuperscript{35} Thus while some cases of direct appropriation were more
successful than others, it is apparent that in this period of crisis for capital some workers are willing to take the risk.

Another way that food stamp regulations were subverted for individual gain was through retailer and/or wholesaler violations. In some instances these actions helped mom and pop stores or individual capitalists and allowed low income and unwaged workers to obtain a greater variety of goods. Department of Agriculture investigations revealed that there were 1,145 retailer and/or wholesaler violations in 1974 and 1,452 in 1975. The most common type of violation was the sale of nonfood items such as soap, paper products and health and grooming aids. Less frequent but considered to be more immoral was the sale of alcoholic beverages for food stamps. There were also some cases reported of the exchange of food coupons for cash.36

Thus while the violations of the retailer or wholesaler meant increased sales, the use of food stamps for purposes other than they were originally intended meant that the recipient's coupons were as good as the universal equivalent and could be used to purchase anything available. In one instance, a grocer was caught exchanging marijuana for food stamps.37

Another form of the use of food stamps by individual capitalists for their own gain can be seen in the case of food stamp vendors. One method that vendors have been able to use the program funds for individual gain was by not turning the money received from food stamps immediately over to the Federal Reserve. This allowed the vendors to get free use of the food stamp money as capital for weeks
and months at a time. In January of 1976, government auditors and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents reported that there was a misappropriation or misuse or theft of some $8.7 million in federal funds paid by food stamp recipients to vendors of food stamps. But in July of that year legislation was passed that required vendors to deposit the food stamp money with the Federal Reserve Bank within a certain amount of time. The 1977 legislation that eliminated the purchase requirement for food stamps has also controlled this type of violation. Therefore, we can see that capital too has used the food stamp program for its own interests, but it has been easier to control these violations of the regulations than the use of food stamps for increased income by those who are either ineligible or get more stamps than the regulations allow.

**Legal Struggles for Food Stamps**

Legal action has been the major form of workers' demands for food stamps during this cycle of struggles. Consequently, in 1970 the Assistant Attorney General claimed that some federally paid lawyers were filing "politically motivated" lawsuits aimed at embarrassing the Nixon Administration. But this was not the major thrust of these struggles. The legal action that was being taken was an outgrowth of the struggles for food during the '60s and showed a continuity in content. These "official" working class organizations that filed the suits for increased food stamp spending and participation, such as the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC),
were formed as a result of the violent confrontations with the state. This was an institutionalization of the struggle or a change of form, but the thrust of the demands were the same, i.e., income independent of work for capital.

During January of 1970, approximately a hundred suits were filed against the Nixon Administration by Office of Economic Opportunity legal service programs. The largest number of suits, twenty-three, were aimed at forcing the federal government to implement food distribution and food stamp programs in areas where neither program was available to feed low income and unwaged workers. Slowly these legal actions were successful. During May of 1970, thirty-five counties in Kansas, Texas, Nebraska and Virginia got food stamp programs. In July another four counties in Kansas, Ohio and Wisconsin were added. It also loosened the participation requirements by allowing drug addicts and alcoholics to use food stamps to purchase meals from authorized nonprofit organizations. Nonetheless, by late 1974, some 800 counties did not have food stamp programs although most of them were served by the food distribution program. This contributed to the problem for workers that 30 million people were eligible for food benefits although even at the peak level of participation during the 1973-74-75 recession only some 19 million persons received food stamps.

While the lag of results following legal action has not been in most cases as short as those following the confrontation with the state and direct appropriation of the '60s, the accumulation
of suits has ultimately brought about the desired results. The suits filed to increase the level of participation nationally have been an important part of these struggles and they have increased the gross expenditures on food stamps also. During September of 1974, FRAC filed suits against New York state, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia charging violations of Congressional orders to enroll eligible persons in the food stamp program. FRAC charged that only 13.5 million persons were receiving food stamps while 37 million were eligible. On October 11, 1974, the U. S. District Court in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ordered the Department of Agriculture to: 1) review all state outreach plans, 2) assess the implementation of those state plans, 3) provide remedial action where necessary, and 4) insure participation through the informing of low income households and effective action in accordance with the Food Stamp Act of 1964.

Thus gains were being made in the struggles to increase participation, but it was a push and shove battle all of the way. For example, during May of 1975, the Department of Agriculture announced the implementation of new regulations to remove approximately five million persons from the food stamp program by changing the eligibility requirements. It was claimed that ten million participants would either be dropped or have their benefits reduced and five million of the lowest income recipients would have their
benefits increased. A few weeks later, FRAC, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, the American Jewish Commission, the National Association of Churches, the United Auto Workers, 26 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, three cities and some other groups filed suit to prevent the Department of Agriculture from implementing the regulations that would have cut approximately $1.2 billion out of the food stamp budget. Two days later the Federal District Judge temporarily blocked the Ford Administration from initiating the new regulations. In June the judge ordered an indefinite delay in the regulations since the "public interest clearly demands" that the cuts not be enacted. Later the judge refused a Ford Administration motion to dissolve the temporary injunction thus leading to a permanent injunction that could be appealed to a higher court and in the process omitting the trial stage.

During January of 1977, in New York the Community Action for Legal Services' Food Law Project did a cost-benefit analysis and estimated that a $3.7 million administrative outlay could bring approximately $306 million more in food stamp funds into the state and increase the number of eligible participants by 1.4 million. Although participation and the bonus value did increase in New York during the following year it was not as dramatic as they predicted.

Legal struggles were also used to clarify the meaning of the food stamp regulations and many of these suits resulted in meaningful gains for the working class with respect to participation and payments. In Anderson v. Butz the U. S. District Court held invalid U.S.D.A.
requirements that called for the inclusion of easily ascertainable
Department of Housing and Urban Development rent subsidy payments
as income to tenant beneficiaries for food stamp program purposes.
In *Knowles v. Butz* the court interpreted "one economic unit sharing
common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased
in common" as meaning that more than "one economic unit" could share
common living quarters, common cooking facilities and common food
purchasing practices although each "economic unit" could be treated
as a separate household for the purpose of determining food stamp
program eligibility, coupon allotments and purchase requirements. 48
Therefore, the court sanctioned communal or cooperative styles of
living arrangements. During October of 1977, a federal judge ruled
that Nixon Administration regulations concerning the emergency distribu-
tion of food stamps were illegal because they were too restrictive. 49
Thus we can easily see the beneficial effects of these law suits for
the low income and unwaged sector of the working class.

Some critics of the Ford Administration's 1974 plan to increase
the purchase price of food stamps charged that it was "senseless"
to raise the price of the coupons when food prices and unemployment
were increasing. But understood in class terms, the importance
capital placed on rupturing the wage floor and further weakening
the low income and unwaged sector of the working class gives us some
insight to the intensity of the struggles that had preceded and
precipitated the attack. In fact, the accumulated power of workers
prevented the Ford plan from being implemented. FRAC, the National
Welfare Rights Organization, the United Farm Workers of America, the Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now, the Children's Foundation in Washington and some other organizations filed suit in Washington, D. C., to block the price increase in the food stamp program. They charged that the increase in the purchase price misinterpreted the intent of the law and abused the discretion Congress had delegated the Secretary of Agriculture. By February 1975, the anti-hunger lobby organizations had applied enough pressure on the Congress so that legislation was passed that put a freeze on food stamp prices for the remainder of 1975. President Ford allowed the bill to become law without his signature and this rendered the judicial motion moot.

Legal action has not only protected the consumption level of food stamp recipients, but has also brought about the increase in participant consumption. In June of 1975, the U. S. Appeals Court ordered the Department of Agriculture to revise and increase food stamp benefits for 19.6 million participants. The court ruled that the then operative regulations did not insure that all of the recipients would receive a nutritionally adequate diet, because they were allotted according to a national average of incomes. Therefore, those areas of the country where food prices are higher got increases that reflected this differentiation. During November of 1975, FRAC filed a new suit in Federal District Court asserting that the food stamp allotments violated the law, because they did not provide enough of a bonus value for participating families to purchase a
nutritionally adequate diet. Although the courts did not move on this motion, the Congress appropriated $1.75 billion in supplemental funds for the food stamp program in December. Again during April of 1976, the Congress voted to appropriate $400 million in supplemental funds to the food stamp program in order to see the program through the fiscal year.

Legal action also proved to be an effective weapon for workers against the Ford Administration's attempts to impound funds. During May of 1975, several elderly citizens and groups representing them filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C., charging that the Ford Administration had impounded more than $400 million appropriated by Congress for the food programs. Although this particular suit was not successful, the Congress helped this sector out by approving a supplemental appropriation as mentioned in the adequate diet case above. In March of 1976, FRAC and the Children's Foundation filed a class action suit in the U. S. District Court in Washington, D. C., charging that the Department of Agriculture had illegally impounded $90 to $140 million in funds appropriated to feed pregnant women, nursing mothers and infants. (This is similar to the attack launched by President Nixon during 1971 that was defeated by lobby efforts and Congressional action.) The suit also contended that the Ford Administration had intentionally slowed the growth of the special supplemental food program that provided low income and unwaged pregnant women, new mothers and infants with vouchers redeemable for specific food needed for nutritional requirements.
In June, the federal judge ordered the Department of Agriculture to nearly double its spending on the special nutrition program for mothers and infant children, since the Ford Administration had acted "contrary to the congressional mandate." Thus we can see that legal action has been a very successful form of struggle for the low income and unwaged workers on a broad range of issues related to the federal food programs (see Appendix III).

**Lobby Efforts by Official Working Class Organizations**

Lobby efforts on the part of anti-hunger groups have always been important, but during the late '60s and throughout the '70s they have taken on added importance because the food stamp program has been under continual attack. The basic thrust of all anti-hunger groups (whether by unions, retired person groups, or low income advocates in general; see Appendices IV through XII for examples) has been to contain the attacks by capital, increase participation and benefit allotments. Some of the most valuable successes with respect to lobbying have been: 1) the maintenance of food stamps for strikers--discussed in Chapter 3; 2) the implementation of outreach programs--lobby efforts were complemented with legal action in this case; 3) cost of living adjustments--this provision was implemented in 1971 on an annual adjustment basis and changed in 1974 to a semi-annual adjustment; and 4) supplemental appropriations to meet the needs of larger than expected participation levels. With respect to supplemental appropriations, we can see in Table 4.4 that the '70s
Table 4.4
Food Stamp Program Appropriations--Reappropriation and Supplemental Appropriation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Funding</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Nominal</th>
<th>1967 Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>26,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reappropriation(^1)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reappropriation</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reappropriation</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>22,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>50,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>217,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>309,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>814,815</td>
<td>464,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1976(^2)</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>967,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1976(^2)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>110,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>374,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>264,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Appropriation</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>1,077,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Reappropriation of funds appropriated but unused in the prior fiscal year.

\(^2\) Transition quarter.

has been a period of attack by the low income and unwaged workers because of the numerous times that Congress has been forced to spend more money on the food stamp program than was initially projected. This is a dramatic contrast to the '60s when on several occasions funds were carried over from one fiscal year to the next because they went unspent during the year in which they were appropriated.

Direct Appropriation and Confrontations with the State During the '70s

Although the scale of confrontations with the state during this cycle of struggles does not compare quantitatively and qualitatively to those of the '60s, there were some isolated incidents in which low income and unwaged workers took their struggles to the street and used direct appropriation. During September of 1970, confrontations with the state and heavy direct appropriation occurred in East Los Angeles when a peaceful protest calling for the resistance to service in military action in Southeast Asia and social action at home turned into a violent confrontation between five hundred police and sheriff's deputies and several thousand Mexican-Americans. In February of 1971, there was another outburst of confrontations with the state and direct appropriation in the same area. These events occurred after a peaceful Chicano Moratorium rally. Seventy-five stores were subject to direct appropriation (and none were burned) by a crowd of 4,000 persons. The violence was not stopped until a thousand sheriff's deputies arrived on the scene. After these two confrontations with the state the
food stamp participation in the area increased from 271,086 to 617,647 in Los Angeles county and the bonus coupons increased from $17 to $96 million.

In May of 1971, in Brooklyn, New York, the Brownsville Community Council planned a peaceful protest against the recent cuts in the state welfare budget. The cuts would have decreased payments for public assistance, food stamps, Medicaid and education and narcotics treatment programs. When fires, direct appropriation and rock throwing ensued, the Community Council's role changed from mobilization to containment, because they did not support this form of struggle that had developed. Eighteen policemen and thirteen firemen were injured and the struggles for food circulated to struggles against hazardous work conditions by the firemen. The firemen proclaimed that they would no longer fight fires in confrontation areas unless "adequate" police protection was provided. This was due to the fact that when the firemen arrived to fight fires they were attacked by black and Puerto Rican youths who threw rocks and bottles. One community anti-poverty agency worker described the teenagers who appropriated commodities and burned the stores as "hungry and frustrated enough to charge a tank with their bare hands . . . they don't believe in the electoral process here. They say what's the use in voting? It won't change anything." During this time period bonus coupon allotments increased by $15 million in the county, while the participation level remained stable.
Direct appropriation and firebombing was carried out by gangs of black youths in Jacksonville, Florida, during June of 1971. Officials estimated the damage at $250,000 and the confrontations with the state were quelled after the state troopers, the Marine Patrol, the National Guard and local police intervened. During the next year a food stamp program was implemented in Duval County and the participation continued to increase for several years.

In August of 1971, the Adams County, Pennsylvania, Commissioner reported that they had been threatened with violence unless a federal food stamp program was implemented to feed 3,000 low income and unwaged workers in the community. Adams County was the only county in the state at the time that did not have either a food distribution program or a food stamp program. When the commissioners initially responded to the threat they said the issue was dead because of the unreasonable threat. The Department of Agriculture also refused to set up its own facilities in the county. But in September, the commissioners submitted to the pressure to various local groups and the press and implemented a food stamp program.

During August of 1973, 200 New York City teenagers armed with Molotov cocktails made an assault on a supermarket and there were confrontations with the police during the incident. Direct appropriation was the target of the action and it was successful.

But because the Great Recession of 1973-74-75 was only a few months
later, no increases in the food stamp program can directly be attributed to the confrontation with the state.

In Newark, New Jersey, during a Labor Day celebration in 1974, a gathering of 10,000 Puerto Ricans resisted police demands on vendor operations and began a major confrontation with the state that lasted for two days. Direct appropriation of food was carried out and the confrontations were ended after some 1,200 police patrolled the area.\textsuperscript{65} Within the next year participation in the food stamp program in Essex County increased by approximately 30,000 and the bonus value increased by over $11 million.

During July of 1975, the Detroit police and local blacks were involved in some limited confrontations that lasted for only one day. Isolated cases of direct appropriation occurred and participation in the food stamp program increased over the next year.\textsuperscript{66}

During July of 1977 in upstate New York lightning struck numerous power lines that transmitted power to the New York City metropolitan area. This caused an overload of the power stations that remained in operation and eventually led to a shutdown of all of the power sources going into the metropolitan area. The electrical blackout that ensued lasted 25 hours. The events that occurred in the low income areas were dubbed by some as "Black Christmas." Clothing, TV sets, jewelry, liquor, food, furniture and drugs were all on workers' shopping lists. A black police officer in Bedford-Stuyvesant explained the situation as "like a fever struck them. They were out there with trucks, vans, trailers, everything that
could roll." Once the direct appropriation was over firebombing began. Although the blackout improved workers' chances of success, some 3,500 persons were arrested. 67

In Baltimore during February of 1979, weather conditions led to a similar episode. Two feet of snow fell on the city in one night and this led to 1,400 incidents of direct appropriation. Food, furniture, liquor and household appliances were appropriated. There were 333 persons arrested on charges of suspected direct appropriation and 275 others were arrested for violating a ten-hour curfew. Over 100 state policemen were called in and the National Guard was used to remove the snow from the streets and roads. 68 During the next month food stamp participation in the area increased by over eight thousand persons and bonus benefits increased by over two-hundred thousand dollars.

Although the intensity of these actions and the extent of their circulation did not match the '60s, direct appropriation and confrontation with the state has remained in the working class's list of tactics during the 1970s. Capital has continued to respond in a similar manner in some instances by either introducing food stamp programs where they did not exist and increasing the participation and bonus value where programs were already in place.

The Circulation of Food Stamp Struggles to Puerto Rico

During 1975, we can see the introduction of food stamps into Puerto Rico and the beginning of what appeared to be the same
type of business strategy that was used in the continental United
States in the early '60s, i.e., the human capital strategy of investing
in human labor power on the expectation that a greater return in
output would be gained at some time in the future through increased
productivity. Another characterization of the implementation of
the program was made by the president of the Puerto Rican Independent
Party. He stated that the U. S. was introducing the food stamp
program in Puerto Rico as a "demagogic means to win approval of
the poor at the expense of the American taxpayers and to help
American companies keep paying low wages."69 This might have appeared
to have been the situation, but the fact is that many of the low
income and unwaged workers in Puerto Rico migrate back and forth
between San Juan and New York City and their experience in struggle
for government transfer payments also circulated in this manner.
This allowed these workers a better understanding of how to get
what they wanted from the state. By October of 1975, the food
stamp program served 71 percent of the 3.3 million U. S. citizens
on the island at a cost of $40 million a month.70 By July of 1979,
after the recession was over, the number of persons receiving food
stamps had decreased to 1.7 million, 1.5 million of whom were on
public assistance, but the bonus value issued per month had increased
to $62.5 million.
Working Class Counterattack to
the Food Stamp Act of 1977

Although the 1977 legislation was designed to limit the federal expenditures on the food stamp program, two features were retained in the regulations that are counterproductive to this goal. The cost of living allowance requires that the coupon value increase during periods of economic stagnation when capital is on the offensive in the private sector. By July of 1979, the Congress approved a supplemental $620 million for the food stamp budget of FY 1979 as a result of the intensive lobbying campaign by FRAC and a coalition of hunger lobby groups. 71 In January of 1980, the Department of Agriculture reported that 20.8 million persons were on food stamps, an all-time record. 72 It was estimated that an additional $2.5 billion is needed to allow the program to continue at full benefit and participation levels for FY 1980 and nearly $4 billion will be needed for FY 1981—a figure that will put the cost of the program at more than $10 billion a year and make the food stamp program the most expensive federal welfare program. 73 Thus the 1977 attack on the food stamp program budget was limited by the combination of previous struggles that led to the institution of an escalator clause in the program legislation and the lobby effort that led to the supplemental appropriations.

During the spring of 1980, last-minute efforts to balance the federal budget to pacify voters and inflation led the Carter Administration and some members of Congress to demand a change in
the cost of living adjustment of the food stamp program from every six months back to an annual basis, but it did not go into effect. Thus we can see that workers' struggles on their own and through their "official" organizations have thwarted and rolled back many of the capitalist attacks during the '70s. This is because the struggle continued in various forms after earlier efforts were effectively contained. Therefore, with each attack by collective capital, workers and their organizations must be prepared to thwart their initiatives. One example of this continuing struggle can be seen with respect to the workfare projects. During January of 1979, FRAC circulated mailings to food stamp advocates telling them to "hassle governmental units that were contemplating the initiation of workfare pilot projects." FRAC did this because of their concern over the efficacy of workfare projects and the effect that it would have on the low income and waged workers. As a result of this action the Community Service Administration, a major source of FRAC's funding, warned FRAC that the continuation of such tactics could jeopardize their continued support. The House Agriculture Committee also adopted an amendment that would bar such action by advocacy groups receiving grants from the Community Services Administration. This demonstrates another limitation on "official" organizations and reminds us that the struggles continue.
CHAPTER V

Conclusion and Implications:

"You Can Get it if You Really Want, But You Must Try"¹

Food is a central commodity in a society based on the social relations of capital, because it makes up a large portion of the workers' means of subsistence. Workers are concerned about the use of food—quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively workers want food to be abundant and available at low prices. Qualitatively workers are interested in a wide variety of food that is nutritious, attractive and tasty. Capital is only concerned about food in terms of its exchange value. Capital fights to keep the price high so that workers will have to work long and hard to acquire it. Whether the quality of the food is satisfactory to workers does not concern capital as long as it can be sold. Therefore, an analysis of the struggle over food is central to understanding the class character of society today. In this paper this author has focused on a limited part of this struggle, i.e., something of the history of workers' struggles in agriculture in the United States and more on the struggle of low income and unwaged workers for food. This author has looked at these struggles in relation to the strategies of private and collective capital. But because the social relations of capital are global, we must ultimately look at these struggles as only one part of workers' struggles internationally for a greater control over their means of subsistence. If we learn from our experiences here and gain strength as a class

211
because of them, then we can circulate these struggles to other sectors of the global working class. But in order to do this we must understand clearly the social relations involved and what particular forces and organizational forms have been useful in these specific situations. That is, we must understand the content and the form of the struggles. This global circulation of struggles is the only way that the working class as a whole can gain power in monumental portions. This is because the working class is only as strong as its weakest sector nationally, and globally as well.

As we have seen, agricultural workers' struggles on the supply side and industrial workers' struggles on the demand side have forced capital to increase the production of food in the United States. This has involved a tremendous increase in productivity in agriculture through the introduction of labor-saving technology and in the production of abundant supplies of relatively low-cost food. But the introduction of labor-saving technology has also led to the increase of unemployment. And this sector of unwaged workers has directed their struggles for income and food against collective capital, i.e., the government. As the productive capacity of our economy has increased over the last several decades, the content of workers' struggles has taken on the characteristic of being a struggle for income independent of work. Just as business tries to get the highest returns on its investment, workers also seek to get the greatest returns for their work, whether it be on the production line assembling autos or in the welfare line demanding
an income. Capitalists want to reproduce the social relations of work and workers' struggles in this period have tended to undermine those relations, i.e., workers have struggled to end the reproduction of social relations that maintain work as their main life activity. This can be seen in the struggle for food and food stamps. Agricultural workers demanded higher incomes and capital kicked them off the land and left them in an unwaged position. Capital wanted to put this sector of workers back to work in other low-paying jobs or leave them unemployed. But workers have refused to accept passively the undesirable, low-paying jobs and have instead demanded welfare and food stamps independent of work. Those workers who have received welfare and food stamps independent of work have realized some degree of self-valuation. These struggles have also brought about a process of de-structuring the state apparatus, because government expenditures have increased dramatically during this time period. Therefore, self-valuation is sabotage, because it undermines collective capital's ability to reproduce itself. As Negri notes,

"The refusal to work becomes the key for understanding self-valuation, at least in two fundamental senses, from which other radical consequences follow. It is the key to its content, if not the fundamental key to the process of proletarian self-valuation. And the refusal to work determines the criteria for measuring the results of the method of social transformation."²

We can evaluate the degree of success of these struggles by the aggregate and per capita levels of transfer payments to low income and unwaged workers.
But these struggles for income independent of work have disrupted the "incentive system" and have led to a counterattack by the government against social programs. As we have seen in this paper, capital has tried to reimpose work requirements as a condition for income. This is exemplified by the food stamp work registration requirements introduced in 1971, the attack on food stamps for strikers throughout the '70s, the 1975 attempt to increase food stamp purchase price requirements, the 1977 expenditure limitations on the food stamp program, the 1979 attempts to reduce the amount of deductions that food stamp recipients can use in order to qualify their income level for participation, and the 1980 proposals to change the cost of living adjustments from a six month to yearly basis.

What does this tell us about the economic system in general? The food stamp program is a prime example of how the contradictions of a developed capitalist economy manifest itself. This contradiction in the capitalist economy is probably best stated by the system's most famous critic, Karl Marx. He analyzed the internal contradictions of the capitalist economy as follows,

"Capital itself is a moving contradiction, (in) that it presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, as the sole measure and source of wealth . . . On the one side, then, it calls to life all the powers of science and of nature, wealth independent (relatively) of the labor time employed in it. On the other side, it wants to use labor time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already created value as value."
This is the contradiction behind the disarray of the production in agriculture in the United States. If farmers produce more, then the supply of food goes up and the price goes down and government then pays farmers to produce less. Competition for profit, predicated on a battle for greater control over workers, leads to increased mechanization and has created a situation in which less than four percent of the United States population are in agricultural production. Crop production is limited and sold abroad to keep prices up, and hunger is still prevalent in our society because it is politically necessary to impose work. If people were not forced to work, e.g., if food was free for everyone, they would have more time to develop their individualities and this would necessarily lead to a different economic and political system.

What does this imply for the future? If social change with respect to hunger is going to come, it will only be done through the action of workers. Those receiving food stamps will have to demand that their benefits should be increased or business will reduce them. Those not receiving benefits will have to demand participation or they will never be included. For example, the blacks during the '60s could not get their problems solved by working through the system, so they resorted to violence. The quelling of the confrontations distorted and kept off the national agenda the basic issues that would have had to be addressed in order to bring about equality of outcome for this sector of the working class. But the confrontations did lead to reform. Nonetheless, revolutionary
reform only comes about when troops are not used against a country's own citizens--or the troops refuse to act--or the troops are defeated!

What can we say about the forms of organization that have evolved out of workers' struggles for food stamps? It appears that there is no formula for what form an organization should take; rather each stage of struggle has its own appropriate forms of organization. Thus the lifetime and usefulness of any organizational structure seems to be limited by its ability to forward the aims of the struggle in any given situation. The wider the circulation, e.g., the numerous and widely dispersed confrontations with the state during the last '60s, and the greater degree of complementarity of struggles between sectors of the working class, e.g., the miners and farmers during 1978, the greater the likelihood for success. But we must remember that success in this case is not measured in terms of seizing the offices of the Department of Agriculture. Success has been and should continue to be measured in terms of the transfer of wealth (income, food, etc.) from capital to workers. In order for this process to continue and expand, we must look at the limitations on the present forms of organization. Throughout the post-1930 era, low income and unwaged workers' struggles for food have been aimed basically at the government. The government intervention for this sector of workers has been used as one factor in the attempted management of demand. The government has intervened with farmers to coordinate the production process, but this management of supply has not necessarily served consumers well. Thus for all workers
to assure themselves a nutritious, abundant and inexpensive source of food, we must have broader based organizations that attack the contradictions of production, processing and distribution. For example, the increased productivity in agriculture must be used for the benefit of the consumer as well as the producer. We must demand to reap the benefits of this increased productivity. We must link when possible the struggles for the increased consumption of nutritious food to those struggles demanding better working conditions for farm workers, e.g., food stamp recipients linked with the United Farm Workers, the American Agricultural Movement, Earth Work and the health food movement.

Another conclusion that we might draw from the struggles for food stamps in the United States is that there are some unique circumstances that surround its extraordinary expansion. For example, while the institutionalized struggles for food stamps during the '70s such as legal action and lobbying have been very successful, contrary to what Piven and Cloward have asserted, it is necessary to remember that these struggles have been different in some important ways from the struggles for welfare. Food stamp struggles are mediated demands for food, i.e., the stamps allow workers access to a specific type of commodity. This direct relation between workers' demands and a specific type of commodity has led to the support of the federal program by the producers of this type of commodity and the very influential farm lobby organization. (Some advocates of low income and unwaged workers promote the idea of "cashing-out"
food stamps, i.e., having the government give recipients cash instead of stamps, as a strategy to have a guaranteed income implemented. But I would argue that this would eliminate the support of farmers for additional transfer payments to low income and unwaged workers and in all probability weaken their position.) An added incentive for farmers in the U. S. to support the food stamp program is due to the fact that agriculture is so unusually productive. Another aspect of the food stamp program that has led to its rapid expansion is that it is available to all categories of workers in the low income and unwaged sector, whereas the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is mainly applicable to a smaller subsector of workers.

Therefore, all of these various forms of organization have been useful at different times in the past and can be used in the future in similar situations or modified to meet the changing circumstances. For example, the potential for food stamp program expansion was won during a period of mass confrontation and mobilization during the '60s and that expansion was realized during the '70s. But if capital successfully attacks the program during the '80s, then it is reasonable to assume that the low income and unwaged workers might return to the tactics of the '60s in order to reestablish their political power and economic support. With reference to this type of struggle, the President of the National Urban League said in December of 1978, "I do believe that all of the ingredients that brought about the urban unrest of the late 1960's are,
in fact, present in our society today." A recent study by the Rand Corporation points out that while the percent of people throughout the country living in poverty declined from 13.8 in 1970 to 11.8 in 1977, the portion of urban residents with poverty level incomes increased from 14.8 percent to 17.1 percent. These figures do not include the yet uncalculated numbers of undocumented workers from the Latin American countries. Therefore, we can see that the urban centers are again becoming an important terrain for workers' struggles. This situation is likely to intensify rather than be diffused, because many of the large metropolitan areas are facing budget cuts as a result of lost taxpayers at a time when the increasing number of low income and unwaged workers are going to be demanding more benefits and services from the local, state and federal government.

What sector of the working class has the greatest potential for successfully achieving support from government food programs? Although present legislation specifically prohibits the participation of undocumented workers in the food stamp program, this sector of the working class is growing in number and political strength daily. Latin-Americans are one of the largest minorities in the United States today and are expected to surpass the blacks in number by the end of the century. They work for very low wages in most cases, produce much of the food for the nation and reap few benefits from the social wealth of the United States economy. Thus it is only a matter of organization and political action that keeps them from
successfully moving on the system in a similar manner as the blacks.

In conclusion, welfare and food stamps should no longer have a "shameful" stigma attached to them, because they are a legitimate and seemingly irreversible form of income for that sector of the working class that cannot or refuses to enter the labor market. We must realize that our political and economic system is the creation of the thought and action of those who proceed us, but in no sense should we think of it as "natural," unalterable or as the final stage of civilization. Concurrently, to think of our alternatives in terms of Western and Eastern capitalism in their present configuration or in terms of prolonged austerity is nonsense, because the present crisis is a crisis of the system. During this historical crisis for capital, we are once again faced with the blaring contradictions of the system and we must organize to realize our demands that go beyond the capabilities of the present system. We are only limited in achieving the things that we want for ourselves by our own action and imagination.
APPENDIX I
Food Distribution Program 1960-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity in Pounds</th>
<th>Dollar Amount (nominal)</th>
<th>Dollar Amount (in 1967 dollars)</th>
<th>Average Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>525,923,000</td>
<td>49,410,000</td>
<td>67,511,000</td>
<td>3,872,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>855,521,000</td>
<td>139,988,000</td>
<td>157,289,000</td>
<td>4,446,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,377,026,000</td>
<td>226,910,000</td>
<td>252,122,000</td>
<td>6,604,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,246,009,000</td>
<td>204,391,000</td>
<td>224,605,000</td>
<td>6,297,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,140,437,000</td>
<td>197,144,000</td>
<td>214,286,000</td>
<td>5,544,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,140,487,000</td>
<td>226,883,000</td>
<td>241,364,000</td>
<td>5,317,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>854,927,000</td>
<td>134,060,000</td>
<td>135,414,000</td>
<td>4,458,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>705,090,000</td>
<td>101,053,000</td>
<td>101,053,000</td>
<td>3,503,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>723,224,000</td>
<td>124,016,000</td>
<td>119,246,000</td>
<td>3,236,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,064,786,000</td>
<td>224,939,000</td>
<td>206,366,000</td>
<td>3,610,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,196,086,782</td>
<td>289,423,044</td>
<td>251,672,000</td>
<td>3,811,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,338,625,000</td>
<td>321,197,000</td>
<td>272,200,000</td>
<td>3,755,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,236,180,000</td>
<td>311,508,000</td>
<td>251,216,000</td>
<td>3,437,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>981,561,000</td>
<td>254,705,000</td>
<td>180,641,000</td>
<td>2,659,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>600,395,205</td>
<td>204,504,903</td>
<td>126,237,000</td>
<td>1,981,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>158,358,705</td>
<td>55,713,256</td>
<td>31,836,000</td>
<td>329,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>108,117,993</td>
<td>44,606,501</td>
<td>24,644,000</td>
<td>79,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11,152,000</td>
<td>5,931,000</td>
<td>81,905</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>13,030,000</td>
<td>6,325,000</td>
<td>89,773</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>21,300,000</td>
<td>9,342,000</td>
<td>97,383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>22,000,000*</td>
<td>9,053,000*</td>
<td>76,722*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Preliminary Data
### APPENDIX II

**Food Stamp Program: Summary of Operations, Fiscal Years 1961-1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Net Openings</th>
<th>Net Closures</th>
<th>Projects in Program</th>
<th>States in Program</th>
<th>Persons Participating (Average)</th>
<th>Value of Coupons</th>
<th>Bonus in 1967 $s</th>
<th>Percent Decrease of Bonus Due to Inflation</th>
<th>Percentage Change of Bonus in Real Terms</th>
<th>Average Bonus Per Person Per Month Nominal</th>
<th>Average Bonus Per Person Per Month 1967 $s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49,640</td>
<td>$825,931</td>
<td>$381,008</td>
<td>428,000</td>
<td>+3,314</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>142,817</td>
<td>35,202,266</td>
<td>13,152,695</td>
<td>14,613,000</td>
<td>+40</td>
<td>+52</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>225,602</td>
<td>49,876,176</td>
<td>18,639,936</td>
<td>20,482,000</td>
<td>+69</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>366,816</td>
<td>73,485,497</td>
<td>28,643,982</td>
<td>31,133,000</td>
<td>+52</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>424,652</td>
<td>88,471,909</td>
<td>32,505,096</td>
<td>34,578,000</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>864,344</td>
<td>174,231,758</td>
<td>64,812,624</td>
<td>65,446,000</td>
<td>+89</td>
<td>+52</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,209,964</td>
<td>451,000,083</td>
<td>173,142,015</td>
<td>166,482,000</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>+58</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,878,113</td>
<td>503,351,143</td>
<td>228,818,622</td>
<td>209,992,000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>+26</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4,340,030</td>
<td>1,089,900,761</td>
<td>549,663,811</td>
<td>477,967,000</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>+127</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>9.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9,367,908</td>
<td>2,713,273,217</td>
<td>1,522,749,091</td>
<td>1,290,465,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>+170</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>11.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11,109,074</td>
<td>3,308,647,916</td>
<td>1,797,285,786</td>
<td>1,449,423,000</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12,165,682</td>
<td>3,883,952,103</td>
<td>2,131,404,604</td>
<td>1,511,634,000</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12,861,526</td>
<td>4,727,450,579</td>
<td>2,718,296,427</td>
<td>1,677,560,000</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>17.61</td>
<td>10.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17,064,196</td>
<td>7,265,641,706</td>
<td>4,385,501,248</td>
<td>2,506,060,000</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>+49</td>
<td>21.41</td>
<td>12.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17,981,717</td>
<td>8,554,498,626</td>
<td>5,326,505,192</td>
<td>2,942,820,000</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>24.12</td>
<td>13.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17,070,630</td>
<td>8,339,270,904</td>
<td>5,056,333,397</td>
<td>2,633,506,000</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16,100,000</td>
<td>8,200,000,000</td>
<td>5,100,000,000</td>
<td>2,428,571,000</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>15.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17,576,000</td>
<td>7,222,850,997</td>
<td>6,477,538,372</td>
<td>2,792,042,000</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>30.37</td>
<td>13.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20,994,000</td>
<td>8,698,932,000</td>
<td>3,579,601,000</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>41.43</td>
<td>17.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Includes the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
2Preliminary data.
APPENDIX III

Official Working Class Organizations Involved in Food Stamp Lawsuits

American Jewish Commission
Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now
Catholic Charities of New York
Children's Foundation in Washington
Columbia University Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Food Research and Action Center
National Association of Churches
National Council of Churches
New York Urban Coalition
State governments
United Auto Workers
United Farm Workers of America
United Neighborhood Houses
United States Conference of Mayors
APPENDIX IV

During 1969 the following organizations lobbied and testified in hearings before the U. S. Congress for the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials.

1) American Public Health Association
2) Catholic Charities
3) Food Stamp Advisory Committee--funded by: United Planning Organization; Change, Inc.; Senior Citizens Clearing House; Urban League; Friendship House; Health and Welfare Council; Neighborhood Center #2; Southwest House; Southeast House; Martin Luther King Center; Welfare Rights Alliance; Dairy Council; Department of Public Health; U.S.D.A.; Family and Child Services; Migrant Research Project; Neighborhood Legal Services; Giant Food Stores; Metropolitan Citizens Advisory Council. FSAC's offices in Washington.
4) Health and Welfare Council of the National Capital Area.
5) Homemaker Service of the National Capital Area, Inc.
6) National Council of Churches.
8) Society of St. Vincent de Paul Central Council.
9) Union of Hebrew Congregations.

APPENDIX V

During 1969 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the U. S. Senate for the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials supporting the expansion of the program.

1) American Dietetic Association.


3) Community Council of Atlanta Area, Atlanta, Georgia.

4) Food Stamp Advisory Committee of the District of Columbia.


7) National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition in the U. S., funded by: Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; National Council of Churches of Christ in America; Aaron E. Norman Fund; Joint Foundation Support, Inc.; The Metzenbaum Human Relations Fund; Dwayne Andreas; United Auto Workers; Field Foundation; Ford Foundation; Irwin-Sweeney Miller Foundation

8) National Council of Churches of Christ in the U. S. A.

9) Religious Action Center of the Synagogue Council of America.

10) Southern Committee on Political Ethics.

11) U. S. Catholic Conference.


APPENDIX VI

During 1973 the following organizations lobbied and testified before Congressional hearings for the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials supporting the program expansion.

1) Fairfax Community Action Program
2) Food Stamp Advisory Committee of Washington, D. C.
3) LOGOS Center, Inc., New York, New York
4) National Grange
5) National Sharecroppers Fund
7) SERA, New York, New York

APPENDIX VII

During 1974 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the Congress for the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups numerous city, state and national officials testified in support of the program.

1) AFL-CIO
2) Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers
3) Community Nutrition Service
4) International Ladies Garment Workers Union
5) National Council of Senior Citizens
6) National Farmers Union
7) United Auto Workers
8) United Mine Workers

APPENDIX VIII

During 1974 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the U. S. Senate to have the food stamp programs expanded. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials supporting the expansion of the program.

1) American Friends Service Committee, anti-hunger program, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
2) Blackfeet Commodity Program, Blackfeet Indian Reservation, Browning, Montana
3) Community Action Program, Papago Tribe of Arizona, Sells, Arizona
5) Denny Driscoll Boy's Home, Butte, Montana
6) National Congress of American Indians
7) Papago Tribe of Arizona, Sells, Arizona
8) Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Fort Yates, North Dakota
9) United Southeastern Tribes, Sarasota, Florida
10) United Tribes of North Dakota

APPENDIX IX

During 1975 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the Congress for the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups numerous city, state and national officials testified in support of the program.

1) Community Nutrition Institute, Washington, D. C.
2) Food Research and Action Center, New York, New York
3) New York State Alliance of Community Action Programs
4) Rural Coalition of Mississippi
5) Washington Metropolitan Food Stamp Coalition

APPENDIX X

During 1975 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the U. S. Senate to have the food stamp program expanded. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials supporting the expansion of the program. The elimination of the purchase requirement was one of the major objectives of this session of lobbying.

1) Action Alliance of Senior Citizens
2) American Association of Retired Persons
3) American Farm Bureau Federation
4) American National Red Cross
5) Baltimore Welfare Rights Organization, Baltimore, Maryland
6) Bread and Law Task Force, Burlington, Vermont
7) Bread for the World, New York, New York
8) Buffalo Hunger Task Force, Buffalo, New York
9) California Legal Rural Assistance Food Law Center, San Francisco, California
10) Children and Youth Development Center, Baltimore, Maryland
11) Children's Foundation
12) Commission on social action of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis
13) Committee for Economic Opportunity, Duchess County, New York
14) Community Affairs Committee, Operation New Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama
16) Community Service Society, New, York, New York
17) Cross Lines Cooperative Council, Inc., Kansas City, Kansas

18) District of Columbia Food Stamp Advisory Committee


20) Food Research and Action Center, New York, New York

21) Food Stamp Task Force, Community Action for Legal Services, New York, New York

22) Georgia Citizens Coalition on Hunger, Atlanta Organization of Churches, Business and Labor

23) Hunger, Poverty and Welfare Subcommittee, Operation New Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama

24) Hunger Task Force, Columbus, Ohio

25) Interreligious Taskforce on U. S. Food Policy

26) Maryland Food Committee, Baltimore, Maryland

27) Maryland Food Stamp Coalition, Baltimore, Maryland

28) Mayor's Task Force on Hunger and Malnutrition, Detroit, Michigan

29) Metropolitan Lutheran Ministry, Kansas City, Missouri

30) Mid-Hudson Valley Legal Services Project, Poughkeepsie, New York

31) Montgomery County Hunger Task Force, Bethesda, Maryland

32) National Association of Community Agencies Executive Directors Association, Long Branch, New Jersey

33) National Association of County Welfare Directors

34) National Caucus on the Black Aged, Inc.

35) National Child Nutrition Project, New Brunswick, New Jersey

36) National Council of Senior Citizens

37) National Organization for Women, Task Force on Women and Poverty

38) National Retired Teachers Association
39) National Urban League, Washington, D. C., Bureau

40) New York State Alliance of Community Action Programs, Hempstead, New York

41) Pennsylvania Welfare Rights Organization, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

42) Philadelphia Corporation for Aging, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


44) Rural Issues, Department of Social Development and Workd Peace, U. S. Catholic Conference, Kansas City, Kansas

45) Southeastern Vermont Community Action, Bellows Falls, Vermont

46) Vegetarian Times, Chicago, Illinois

47) Washington Metropolitan Food Stamp Coalition

---

APPENDIX XI

During 1976 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the Congress supporting the expansion of the food stamp program. In addition to these groups there were numerous city, state and national officials supporting the expansion of the program.

1) Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia
2) AFL-CIO
3) American Freedom from Hunger Foundation
4) Bread and Law Task Force, Montpelier, Vermont
5) Bread for the World, New York, New York
6) Brookings Institute
7) Central Kentucky Hunger Task Force
8) Chicago Metropolitan Food Stamp Coalition
9) Children's Foundation
10) Community Nutrition Institute, Washington, D. C.
11) Community Service Society, New York, New York
12) Council for Low Income Consumers, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
13) Council of State and Territorial Alcoholic Authorities, Inc.
14) Fair Food Stamp Coalition of Colorado
15) Food Emergency Action Development, Bridgeport, Connecticut
16) Florida Rural Legal Services
17) Food and Nutrition Council for Greater New York
18) Friendship Center, Helena, Montana
19) Health Services, Inc., Woonsocket, Rhode Island
20) Hunger Action Center, Washington
21) Interreligious Task Force on U. S. Food Policy
22) Kentucky Task Force on Hunger of the Kentucky Council of Churches
23) MANA, Nashville, Tennessee
24) Maryland Food Stamp Coalition
25) Mayor's Task Force on Hunger and Malnutrition, Detroit, Michigan
26) Michigan Legal Services, Food Litigation Project
27) Michigan Welfare Reform Coalition
28) Montana State Low Income Organization
29) Multi-County Community Development Corporation
30) National Association for Community Development
31) National Association of County Welfare Directors
32) National Association of Farmworkers Organization
33) National Association of Retail Grocers of the U. S.
34) National Association of Social Workers
35) National Child Nutrition Project, New Brunswick, New Jersey
36) National Conference of State Legislators
37) National Consumers Conference
38) National Council of Catholic Churches
39) National Council of Catholic Women
40) National Council of Senior Citizens
41) National Council on Aging
42) National Organization of Women
43) National Retired Teachers Association and American Association of Retired Persons
44) National Urban Coalition
45) National Urban League, Inc.
46) New York City Hunger Task Force
47) New York State Alliance of Community Action Programs, Inc.
48) North Carolina Coalition
49) Rockland Community Action Council, Inc.
50) Rutland (Vermont) Opportunity Council
51) Seattle (Washington) Welfare Council
52) Southeastern Vermont Community Action
53) Summerset-Sussex-Legal Services, New Jersey
54) Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis
55) United Auto Workers
56) United Peoples, Inc., Framingham, Massachusetts
57) United States Catholic Conference
58) United States National Student Association
59) Vermont Low-Income Advocacy Council
60) Vermont State Low Income Group
61) Virginia Coalition on Nutrition
62) Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan
63) Washington (D.C.) Food Stamp Advisory Committee
64) Waterbury (Connecticut) Food Stamp Coalition
65) Welfare Rights Organization, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
67) Women's National Democratic Club

68) World Hunger Year

APPENDIX XII

During 1977 the following organizations lobbied and testified before the Congress supporting the expansion of the food stamp program and the elimination of the purchase requirement. In addition to these groups numerous city, state and national officials supported the expansion of the program.

1) American Association of Retired Persons
2) American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
3) Bread and Law Task Force, Montpelier, Vermont
4) Children's Foundation, Washington, D. C.
5) Coalition of Northeastern Governors
6) Community Development Program, National Congress of American Indians
7) Community Service Society of New York
8) Farmworkers Corporation of New Jersey, Vineland, New Jersey
9) Food Law Center, California Rural Legal Assistance and the California Nutrition Action Committee
11) Food Research and Action Center
12) Gray Panthers, Washington, D. C.
13) Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
14) Inter-Faith Task Force on Welfare Members, Toledo, Ohio
15) League of Women Voters of the U. S.
16) Low-Income Group for Human Treatment, Missoula, Montana
18) Mississippi Hunger Coalition, Jackson, Mississippi
19) National Association of Farmworker Organizations, Washington, D. C.
20) National Association of Retail Grocers of U. S.
21) National Child Nutrition Project, New Brunswick, New Jersey
22) National Council of Senior Citizens, Washington, D. C.
23) National Tribal Chairmen's Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico
24) National Urban League
25) North Carolina Hunger Coalition, Charlotte, North Carolina
26) Salvation Army
27) Women's Lobby, Inc.

APPENDIX XIII

The following Johnson Administration internal documents support this author's argument that the implementation and expansion of federal food programs were a response to working class struggles. These documents demonstrate that political pressure from below induces government officials to respond. These documents were reproduced from original copies and reproductions at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library on the campus of The University of Texas at Austin. Collection and container references are listed on the documents in handwriting.
August 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Honorable Joe Califano
Special Assistant to the President

FROM: John A. Schnittker
Under Secretary of Agriculture

I am attaching the "shopping list" of programs administered by the Department of Agriculture which might be useful in helping stabilize the Los Angeles situation.

They are:

1. USDA food programs available to Los Angeles.

2. Extension education programs -- particularly home economics.

3. Forest Service programs, including regular forest work, special projects and Job Corps camps.

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano and Lee White

SUBJECT: Possible Los Angeles Emergency Program

We have worked with appropriate agency people on a restoration and job program for the Watts area, on the assumption that there will be no request for a disaster declaration (Governor Collins says this assumption is correct). We recommend the program outlined below. It could be announced at your press conference tomorrow. You have condemned the rioters. We think it appropriate that you help the victims and do what we can to remove some of the causes. This should be done in such a way as to avoid the appearance of rewarding the rioters and as to distinguish Los Angeles from other cities such as Chicago and Springfield.

Our recommendations focus on existing programs that can be speeded up without additional funds, but with some reprogramming.

I. Send a Federal Team to Los Angeles -- A high level coordinator, together with a small team of specialists should tie the program together. We recommend Jack Conway, who is familiar with the Los Angeles situation, holds a high level position and knows how to handle people. He should have at least one representative from HEW, Housing, Agriculture, Labor, perhaps SAA and Commerce.

II. Program Content -- The following have been selected from 20 to 30 agency proposals. Any or all of them could comprise the package.

A. OEO --

1. Grants of $5.5 million are immediately available for approval for the entire Los Angeles area for:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Civil Rights -- Mississippi

February 14, 1966

The situation demonstrated by the invasion of the Greenville Air Base a couple of weeks ago, is potentially explosive. As a result of mechanization and reduced cotton allotments, many thousands of poor Negro agricultural workers are losing their jobs and, in many instances, their homes as well. This has created acute discontent throughout the Delta region and is being exploited by leftist elements of the civil rights movement, particularly the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the Free Labor Movement, and the Delta ministry (the most stable of the three groups).

The problem is even more acute because of the unwillingness of the white community to attempt to deal with the problem even at the welfare level. The result has been inaction in private, local and state welfare programs and great delays in getting federal programs carried out by state officials.

I think it is essential that we deal with this problem expeditiously and directly through surplus food distribution, crash employment programs, and as many poverty programs as we can fund. If we do not do this, there is a real possibility that Mississippi will be the Selma, Alabama of 1966.

At my request, Secretary Freeman, Secretary Wirtz, Mr. Shriver and others, are currently engaged in efforts to get federal programs moving, and I believe this effort will be successful. The food program starts today and Secretary Wirtz

[Signature]

[Initials]
July 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: The President
The White House

FROM: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

SUBJECT: Detroit

USDA programs for Detroit are primarily food programs, but we can provide some job and reconstruction assistance.

1. This is the food situation:

A. Under available emergency authority USDA began July 26, to make available a $2 million inventory of primarily staple food commodities now on hand in Michigan. This is flour, canned meat, dried milk, raisins, etc. This is being provided to the Red Cross now for distribution to families and for mass feeding. Food stocks, which are stored only hours away in other States, or stocks now in transit, are being diverted to Detroit to meet needs. Army trucks will be used for this purpose, if necessary. This program will be needed for a week to 10 days, while food stores are repaired and restocked.

B. Arrangements have been made to provide food stamps to riot victims free of charge for the period of the emergency. The State and Federal governments have worked out procedures to share the cost of this program. Certification requirements will be eased during this period to insure that the program is effective immediately.
1. Action on food programs, including specifically:
   a. Food program in all 1,000 neediest counties which will have full participation of the year.

   b. Issuance of free food stamps to non-income and extremely low-income families; a scaling down of food stamp prices generally and on equitable distribution of amounts of food based on need rather than income.

   c. Emergency distribution of supplementary food in those counties among the 255 hunger counties cited by the Citizens Board of Inquiry, whose present food programs fail to reach substantial numbers of the year.

   d. This proposal is new. Of the 1,000 neediest counties, 331 were not covered by food programs last summer. Since then, all but 40 have agreed to begin programs or are making significant progress toward undertaking these programs. USDA has taken steps to begin direct operation of commodity distribution programs in the 60 remaining counties. OMB recently announced the allocation of an additional $90.4 m. for emergency food programs, many of which will go to the 1,000 neediest counties. Legislation not required.

   e. Cost of food stamps was reduced from 32 to 50c per person, with the maximum reduced from 4/12 to 2/12 for families of 5 or more in lowest income groups.

   f. First month's purchase requirement was reduced by half. Authorizing legislation and additional appropriations would be required for a free food stamp program.

   g. Original demand was that USDA institute programs in those of the 255 Citizens Crusade's 255 priority counties currently without program. USDA replied that of the 255, 156 had programs in operation, 25 were in planning stage, 6 requests were pending, and 30 remained unfulfilled. Of the 30, 22 will be committed to a program by July; 8 will be signed as soon as possible. The CEO Emergency Food program bypasses or supplements USDA programs in many of the 255 Citizens Crusade counties; this is directly responsive to the demand.
3. Double the request for and fight for appropriations for increased cooperatives among rural Mexican-American, Indian and Negro poor and establish a specific timetable and guidelines for establishing cooperatives among these groups.

4. Devise a plan to revise the present savings diversion policy and to provide more equitable distribution of funds to aid poor farmers.

RESPONSE

USDA outlined steps to be taken to help poor establish cooperatives. This included holding meetings in the 300 poorest counties by August 1 to determine ways farmers could use co-ops to increase income levels. The specific recommendation that appropriations for cooperatives be doubled is a more moderate demand than previously. Authorization for this program is contained in the COA Act.

This is a more moderate statement of the earlier demand that USDA abolish its annual savings diversion policy. USDA responded that it cannot abolish programs set by the Congress nor would it want to; that the real answer to problems of poverty and hunger lies in better opportunities for education, health, and jobs. Agriculture also pointed out that small (not necessarily poor) farmers are active participants in present programs.

COPY
Lyndon B. Johnson
2. The Department should prepare specific guidelines and a timetable for implementation to be agreed upon by Poor People's Campaign representatives for ending discrimination in key farm programs, particularly Stabilization and Conservation service, Farmers Home Administration and Federal Extension Service.

For Fiscal Year 1969
1. Request and strongly fight for appropriations under the Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution programs sufficient to provide food for the 10.7 million persons determined by the Department to have seriously inadequate diets.

2. Establish a continuing structure for involvement of the poor in planning and evaluating programs affecting them.
Mr. Gaither:

Jim Taylor (Carey's office) said they found out that the letter from Sec Freeman went out on Friday.

Olive Office of the President
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503

Subject: Agriculture's Response to the Poor People's Demands

We believe that Secretary Freeman's June 14, 1968 draft response to the demands of the Poor People's Campaign is generally responsive. There are, however, three points which could benefit from further elaboration:

--- The first item in the Agriculture draft omits the Poor People's request for programs 'which will have full participation of Poor People.' The Department could offer to discuss ways in which the poor might have some advisory voice in policy or program operations at the community level. This would be an important step toward meeting the Campaign's constant theme of the need for participation by the poor in Government programs.

--- With regard to the second item in the Agriculture draft, there remains a serious question on USDA's ability to provide free food stamps. While we are not in a position to argue the point on legal grounds, there are many who conclude that the Department now has this authority. On the face of it, the fact that the Food Stamp Act requires that participants be charged an amount "equal to the normal expenditures for food" would seem to mean that, if nothing is ordinarily spent on food, free stamps could be given. We are advised that Secretary Freeman is under the impression that the President is not sympathetic with the idea of free stamps. If this is not true, then we believe that Secretary Freeman should not back us into a position which would preclude free stamps later on.

--- The third point in Secretary Freeman's letter is not entirely responsive. The Poor People requested emergency distribution of supplementary food in counties cited by the Citizen Board of Inquiry, where present food programs fail to reach substantial numbers of the poor. Agriculture's answer is that there will soon be food assistance programs in all but eight of the 256 counties. They further reply that a further supplemental package for pre-schoolers is being developed for all counties. We assume that this means all 3,000 counties in the U.S. If so, it could involve considerable additional Section 32 costs. However, we
have no basis for making an estimate at this time. The Poor People's demand, however, seems to be directed at the fact that in many counties where food assistance programs presently exist, some poor are for one reason or another excluded from participation. The Agriculture draft does not directly address itself to this point, although the Department would probably argue that all of the changes presently contemplated will result in greater participation in present programs.

William B. Carey
Assistant Director
FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Joe Califano

You have received 104 telegrams from July 25 through noon today while the riots were going on. Excerpts from the more significant ones are attached.

Every telegram contains an endorsement of the poverty program.

The great majority do not specifically mention the riots; those which do call for a strengthening of the poverty program as the solution. Only a few mention the anti-riot bill, but those which do are all critical of it.

Several of the telegrams specifically state that they think you are being unfairly criticized by the Republicans. A very large number specifically regret Republican resistance to the poverty programs.

A good number of telegrams specifically support OEO as an organization. There also appear to be a considerable number of telegrams from OEO workers and self-declared poor people who urge that you continue your support of the poverty program.

An unusually large number (23) are from El Paso, Texas. The rest seem pretty well scattered around the country.

A list of 31 major organizations and prominent individuals who sent telegrams is attached.

Attachments
TELEGRAMS SUPPORTING POVERTY PROGRAM

B'nai B'rith Women
(135,000 members throughout the United States)
Delta Sigma Theta, Inc.
(International public service organization of 45,000 members)
National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.
(399 member houses in 93 cities in 30 states)
National Association of Social Workers
(46,000 professional social workers)
NEA
American Association of University Women
United Auto Workers - Western Region
(Union of 85,000 men and women in California)
United Mine Workers - District #6
AFL-CIO - Montana, Nebraska, Wyoming, Iowa, Arizona, Utah,
and North Dakota
American Baptist Convention
National Council of Jewish Women
Episcopal Diocese of New York
El Paso Diocesan Council of Catholic Women
Catholic Council on Working Life
Michigan Catholic Conference
Executive Council, Episcopal Church
Wisconsin Education Association
American Friends Service Committee
Medical Committee for Human Rights - Boston
Council for Spanish Speaking People
Young Democratic Clubs of Arkansas
Dore Schary, National Director, Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith
Philip Bernstein, Council of Jewish Federations
Mrs. Robert Claytor, President, National Board of YWCA
Father Robert Getz, Social Action Director, Catholic Diocese of
El Paso
EXCERPTS FROM TELEGRAMS

B'nai B'rith Women

"Firmly supports your efforts to attack the roots of poverty ... The measures you have proposed ... are the only preventative of the terrible riots.""

Delta Sigma Theta, Inc.

"Commend you on your steadfast effort to continue the Great Society program ... Urge you ... to press Congress for solution to (poverty) problem from which riots develop."

National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.

"Only sane response to problems which beset us is the rapid enactment of the whole range of programs ... your Administration has proposed."

American Baptist Convention

"Urge that (programs designed to meet the needs of cities and disadvantaged people) be increased and expanded to become the top priority of the Nation ... The current riots indicate (that) only by dealing with the underlying causes can peace and justice be brought to our land."

Medical Committee for Human Rights

"Urge you meet the grave national crisis by wide expansion of anti-poverty program."

Council for Spanish Speaking People

"Turmoil in many cities this summer proves the need for greater and more meaningful programs ... We know that present poverty projects have prevented even greater disturbances."

National Council of Jewish Women

"Concerned and disturbed by the failure of Congress to act positively to remedy the unspeakable conditions underlying the violence erupting in our cities today ... Urge that you continue to press Congress to support major programs to meet urban problems."
American Friends Service Committee

"Urge you to continue your efforts to convince the country and Congress that the crucial issues are jobs, housing, and education—not riots. The poverty program does not cause riots. The anti-riot bill cannot stop riots."

National Association of Social Workers

"Share your view that anti-social acts of a relatively few people must not be allowed to reverse the progress thus far made in combating poverty and other social ills ... Commend again the leadership you have provided in assuring equal rights and opportunities for all people. We urge that the signs of the times must not be read as a signal for social retreat but a dire summons to all, including our Government, for immediate, positive, broad action to destroy the roots of unrest and bitterness."

National Education Association

"We are appalled by the unwarranted, partisan attack on you by those who have opposed your efforts for the slum dwellers of this nation ... Thoughtful and decent Americans support wholeheartedly your social legislative program."

United Auto Workers - Western Region

"Disturbed by the attacks of Republican leader on you during the Detroit riots. The charges by Republican leaders were extremely hypocritical and irresponsible ... We offer our support in a real program to end riots and to provide each American with the opportunity to participate fully in the Great Society."

United Mine Workers - District 96

"The poor have gained tremendously by the anti-poverty program. We urge you to use your good office in the continuation and expansion of the OEO program."

American Association of University Women

"We firmly believe housing, education, poverty, and headstart programs can alleviate conditions which lead to riots and unrest. We urge you to press Congress for solutions to problems out of which riots develop."
HON ORVILLE FREEMAN, SECY OF AGRICULTURE
US DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

URGENTLY REQUEST YOU TO AUTHORIZE EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION OF
FOOD IN THE DETROIT AREA UNDER THE AUTHORITY PROVIDED BY SECTION
4(B) OF THE FOOD STAMP ACT OF 1964. "AN EMERGENCY SITUATION"
ALREADY EXISTS IN DETROIT AND IS BECOMING MOE SERIOUS. SINCE
FEDERAL FOOD IS NOW STOCKPILED IN THE DETROIT AREA AND THROUGHOUT
MICHIGAN WE WOULD HOPE THAT WITH YOUR AUTHORIZATION DISTRIBUTION
COULD BEGIN WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS.

PHILLIP A KART ROBERT P GRIFFIN WILLIAM S BROOKFIELD GARRY
BROWN ELFORD A CEDERBERG CHARLES E CHAMBERLAIN JOHN CONVERS
JR CHARLES C DIGGS JR JOHN D DINGELL MARVIN L ESCH GERALD R
FORD WILLIAM D FORD JAMES HARVEY JACK H MCDONALD LUCIEN N NEDZI
JAMES C O'HARA DONALD W RIEGEL PHILIP E RUPPE GUY A VANDER

1) Mr. McPherson
2) Mr. Levinson

Mr. Hopkins has seen.

July 28, 1967

Lyndon B. Johnson Library
Evaluation of Federal preparations for civil disorders

1. Introduction

I promised you by early May an evaluation of the readiness of Federal agencies to deal with problems of civil disorders this summer and recommendations for closing any gaps identified in this evaluation. The recent state of riots, following the assassination of Martin Luther King, put Federal systems for assistance to cities stricken by disorders to an earlier test than expected when we talked in early April. Thus, the evaluation I promised you has been overtaken by events, and it is a little premature to evaluate the performance of Federal agencies during the post-assassination riots, except in the most preliminary way. HEO, Justice, the District Government, and presumably other city governments are in the midst of appraising their performance and the performance of other Federal agencies, so that a good wrap-up evaluation will have to await the results of this work. Nevertheless, some preliminary reactions are possible, and the following is an effort to record some tentative thoughts on the subject.

In the few weeks prior to the King assassination, OCS and other Bureau staff had been briefed by Army, Justice, and the District Government on their preparations for civil disorders, so that we already had contacts with those agencies most intimately concerned with the Federal response. Following the outbreak of the recent riots, we discussed with the White House and Justice what role the Bureau should play in coordinating the response of Federal agencies.

For analytical purposes we divided the problem into three time phases: phase 1, the civil disorder proper, in which the principal Federal requirement is for assistance in restoring law and order, with technical assistance from Justice, and when necessary, Federal troops to supplement the National Guard, and in addition the provision of emergency food, shelter, and medical services from a variety of civil agencies; phase 2, the period of restoration of public services which might involve interim housing as opposed to temporary shelter, demolition of buildings gutted by fire, and repair of public facilities; and phase 3, the period of rebuilding both physically and socially the damaged ghetto area. We agreed that the phase 1 Federal response had been pretty well tested last year and that both Defense and Justice were fully capable of handling assistance in law enforcement without Bureau involvement. We also agreed that the USDA system for providing
emergency food supplies, the HUD system for making emergency shelter available, and the HHS-VA system for supplementing locally available medical services were adequate and could function without Bureau involvement. We decided that the phase 3 rebuilding effort could be eliminated from consideration, since as a matter of policy no special rewards for riot-torn cities ought to be provided, and thus Federal assistance would have to be provided under normal Federal programs. This left phase 2; and we agreed that the Bureau ought to be responsible for such coordination of Federal aid as was needed during the immediate post riot restoration period.

The following is an attempt to summarize as briefly as possible the experience in Phase 1 and Phase 2 from information currently available.

2. Phase 1: Restoration of Law and Order

Following Dr. King's assassination on April 4, civil disorders of varying degrees of intensity broke out in over 100 cities (Attachment B), with serious riots in perhaps a dozen cities depending on what measure of significance is used (Attachment A). The National Guard was called in to supplement local law enforcement agencies in 22 cities. Some Federal involvement was required in the form of a senior Justice Department coordinator in Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, Memphis, and Atlanta. Federal troops were required to supplement the efforts of the National Guard in Chicago, Washington, and Baltimore.

(a) Justice Department

The Attorney General had been designated by the President as his representative for requests for Federal assistance in law enforcement assistance in civil disorders. During the recent riots Ramsey Clark used his deputy, Warren Christopher, as his chief of staff for riot assistance operations, who in turn depended on the Assistant Attorneys General to act as the Attorney General's representative in particular cities during the worst of the disorder. Ramsey Clark himself went to Memphis and Atlanta; Warren Christopher went to Chicago; Fred Wisse was in Baltimore; Cyrus Vance was called in to assist Mayor Washington here in the District, and he was backed up by Steve Pollin.

A small operations center had been established earlier, drawing largely on existing Criminal Division staff, and with a young attorney who had worked with the Kermit Commission, Paul Bower, acting as Warren Christopher's aide-de-camp for this operation. The Justice Department is currently appraising the effectiveness of this operation, and according to Warren Christopher should have a report ready about the middle of May. In addition, Justice has entered into a contract with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to survey police departments in 10 cities on their experience during the riots. This report too should be ready about the middle of May, and Warren Christopher has promised us a copy of it.

We had very little opportunity to observe the Department of Justice operation during the height of the riots. We did have occasion to talk to
Warren Christopher in Chicago, to Fred Vinson in Baltimore, and to Paul Bocar in the operations center for trials on questions of fact. It is not possible from this limited contact to come away with anything more than a very limited impression, but that impression is that the Department of Justice is so thin at the top that virtually all other business came to a standstill while the senior partners in the law firm were occupied in a fight to restore law and order in a relatively few cities. It is pretty clear that the Justice Department has no staff to deal with emergencies of this sort, on a large scale. Since I think it would be dangerous to assume that we will not again have anything like the emergency we had in early April, I would urge that we take a long, hard, and sympathetic look at requirements for additional staffing in Justice for emergency law enforcement assistance. I believe we should also encourage the Department to be a good bit more insistent about its need and analytical in its approach to planning for such emergencies.

(b) Department of Defense

The picture in Defense is predictably very different from the Department of Justice. DOD, of course, long on both planning and reserves of manpower. As indicated in an earlier memo, the Army had been assigned responsibility for contingency planning, training, and logistics for both the National Guard and the provision of regular troops to supplement the Guard when necessary. From all accounts the performance of the National Guard was better by a considerable margin this year than last year.

Precedently the training programs and the supplemental logistics provided by the Army had something to do with this. Furthermore, the regular troops universally came off with high marks, as they did last year in Detroit.

Army is in the process of doing an after-action appraisal for Under Secretary McNiffert, which is supposed to be submitted to him about May 11. It will review performance and make recommendations on needs for additional training, logistics, and techniques both for the Army and the Guard. Apparently the operation center and the overall control mechanism, was judged to be inadequate, at least from an organizational point of view, since it is being elevated from a Brigadier General's command to a Lieutenant General's command, and will report directly to the Chief of Staff. OCS and the staff are going over to the Pentagon on Friday to get a briefing from Under Secretary McNiffert and the new Directorate on both past performance and future plans. Again our contacts were limited with the Army during the peak period of the riot, but our general impression is that by and large the military operation worked pretty smoothly. In any case, it did not suffer from lack of men and money.

(c) Other agencies

The major response from other Federal agencies during the riot period came from the Department of Agriculture, which made available food
supplies in Chicago, Baltimore, Washington, and Pittsburgh. These food supplies were distributed usually as they were in Detroit last year, through charitable institutions and voluntary agencies, largely to close the gap caused by the ample fact that grocery stores were closed during the riots. There seems to have been very little effort made to determine need. Food was virtually made available to people who asked for it. In general, the reactions I have heard have been favorable. The USDA system seems to work quickly and automatically.

Very limited medical services were provided on an emergency basis in a few hospitals operated by PHS and WA. The recent riots did not appear to have been sufficiently bloody to create a serious taxing of local hospital facilities. One could conceive of patterns of future violence which might require placing greater demand on Federal medical facilities, but there appears to be every reason to believe that they would respond as required.

HUD involvement during the emergency period by and large appears to have been limited to making available public housing units to riot refugees ahead of people on the waiting list, as well as certain housing facilities owned by FHA as a result of foreclosures. The almost universal target during the recent riots was white-owned businesses, and housing was destroyed only incidentally. The supply of emergency shelter available to riot victims seems to have been well in excess of the need.

Based on the prototype of Bill Cannon's mission to Detroit last year, there had been a tentative conclusion that the Budget Bureau ought to supply a man during any riot requiring major Federal help to coordinate civil assistance outside the area of law enforcement. Warren Christopher, from his experience in Detroit, was insistent that there was a need for this kind of input. However, partly because the record of the experience in Detroit was never clear as to how the Federal agencies had to be moved to act during the riot period proper and partly because we did not have enough people to provide a man for each of the cities that experienced a riot in early April, we concluded that the Budget Bureau role ought to be limited to Phase 2 (restoration activities), and as far as Phase 1 was concerned, it would be enough to let the Justice Department representative and perhaps the Mayor know what our telephone number was. We did the latter in Baltimore and Washington, and a variation of this in Kansas City, where we called the CUP Committee Chairman, and the truth of the matter is that we were never missed.

3. Phase 2. Restoration of public services

After some conversations between the Bureau of the Budget and the White House, Mr. Califano distributed a short memo to the heads of
Federal agencies indicating that the Bureau of the Budget would coordinate civil assistance programs to riot-stricken cities (Attachment D). This was interpreted, as indicated above, to be limited to Phase 2 activities. Sam Hughes chaired two meetings of representatives of the various Federal agencies and presented a talking paper providing guidelines for the Federal response to requests for assistance (Attachments 2 and 3). He advised that the Bureau of the Budget would coordinate and clear significant assistance requests related to riot damage or susceptible of being so interpreted, including dispatch of people from Washington. As indicated above, we also experimented with advising city authorities in Washington, Baltimore, and indirectly Kansas City, that the Bureau of the Budget was available to provide good offices in assuring an expeditious and sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance. Very little workload has resulted from this exercise, and most of the feedback from the cities has been more related to Phase 3 (reconstruction programs). A few clearances of Federal teams were provided.

There was a flurry of contacts with the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) and Califano's staff on replies to requests for disaster declarations. At one point, we drafted a reply for the President to such a request from Maryland's Governor Agnew, but the draft was never used. Instead, Governor Daniel wired and then called Governor Agnew. It is obvious that some clarification is needed as to what Federal agencies can and will do to assist in man-made disasters as opposed to natural disaster assistance under Public Law 875. There is rather widespread confusion on this point.

OCS did pull together an updated and more complete handbook of Federal assistance programs that are related to disorders and disasters. This handbook has been distributed on a very limited basis (inside and outside the Bureau (White House, Vice President's office, Justice, and OEP).

The principal benefit of the system established for coordination of Phase 2 activities seems to have been largely that an impression was created in the Federal community that in fact someone was at the helm from a policy point of view. This is no mean boon, and I would urge that in future emergencies we reproduce this system. It costs us very little, and I think it injects a kind of order which if we didn't do it, someone else would have to.

Conclusions

I repeat that it is premature to arrive at any definitive conclusions. These must await the results of the various evaluations which are now underway. In addition to those mentioned above, namely Justice and Defense, there is an in-depth evaluation of both local and Federal
assistance performance by the District Government, which also is due around the middle of May. Further, I propose to take a reading in Chicago, Kansas City, and Baltimore during the course of OCS trips to those cities during the next two or three weeks.

Thus at this time my preliminary conclusions are limited to the recommendation that we immediately give attention to how the Justice Department needs to be strengthened, both staff-wise and planning-wise, and the recommendation that we undertake in future emergencies the same Phase 2 coordination role we did in early April.

Attachments

cc: Mr. Hughes  
Mr. Parker  
Mr. Barrett  
Mr. Schnoor  
OCS Staff  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Young  
Mr. Pelager  
Mr. Carey  
Mr. Veatch  
Mr. Schwartz
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5:00 p.m., Thursday
May 23, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

I talked to Walter Fauntroy this morning about the poor people's campaign and about his comments yesterday concerning Secretary Freeman.

Fauntroy said they still do not have the poor people under control, but they expect to have them pretty much under control by the first part of next week. He said they had been sending the militant elements back home. However, he said some of those elements are indicating they will launch a "black people's march" on June 19, the same day as the solidarity march that SCLC is putting together.

Fauntroy said the only reason he made the comments yesterday about Freeman and the food program were to pre-empt more violent comments from others in the camp. He said the feeling was running strongly about the food program and the hunger situation in the camp. Fauntroy says he is trying to focus the poor people's march on three elements: hunger in America, your housing bill, and a public employment jobs program.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction

5) Political recomposition is "the level of unity and homogeneity that the working class reaches during a cycle of struggle in the process of going from one composition to another. Essentially, it involves the overthrow of capitalist divisions, the creation of new unities between different sectors of the class, and the expansion of the boundaries of what the 'working class' comes to include." Zerowork 1, p. 4.
6) Social wage is used to designate transfer payments from the government to low income and unwaged workers, but it is necessary to understand that this is also a political wage that is necessary to appease workers' struggles--struggles for more social wealth through less work.
Chapter I

3) ibid., p. xxix.
9) ibid., p. 176.
10) ibid., Chapter 4.
11) ibid., p. 41.

Although there was no cost-benefit analysis of a human capital strategy with respect to the elimination of malnutrition during the early '60s, in 1976 Economist Barry Popkin reported the gains to be approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Gain from higher mental performance by children in poverty (lifetime)</td>
<td>$ 6.4 billion</td>
<td>$ 19.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Gain from increase in worker productivity (lifetime)</td>
<td>$ 6.4 billion</td>
<td>$ 25.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Reduction in morbidity rate as it affects days lost from work</td>
<td>$200 million</td>
<td>$500 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
--Gain in years of productive life through reduction in premature deaths among infants and pregnant women (lifetime) $ 66 million $156 million


13) The Other America, p. xxiv, xxv, & xxvi.
16) ibid., p. 51.
17) ibid., p. 30.
23) ibid., p. 48.
27) ibid., p. 226.
29) Regulating the Poor, p. 263.
33) Button, James W., Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots, p. 16.
34) Ibid., p. 54.
35) ibid., pp. 69, 74.
36) ibid., p. 167.
37) ibid., p. 173.
38) ibid., p. 104.
39) See Zerowork 1 and Zerowork 2.
40) Cleaver, Harry. Reading Capital Politically, see the introduction.
42) Introduction, Zerowork 1, p. 4.
45) ibid., pp. 11, 12, 24.
Chapter II

Introduction

2) ibid., p. 183, Food Stamp Statistics.

Section I

3) ibid., pp. 179-184.
6) Ibid., February 26, 1931.
8) Federated Press, August 15, 1931, quoted in Hallgren.
10) Federated Press, April 1, 1932, quoted in Hallgren.
12) Federated Press, June 3, 1932, quoted in Hallgren.
13) ibid., August 2, 1932.
15) New York Evening Post, January 1, 1933, quoted in Hallgren.
16) Congressional Digest, Volume 43, number 6, June-July 1964, pp. 163, 166, 192.
20) Violence in America, pp. 258-264.
24) Congressional Digest, p. 163, 166, 192.
25) Governments can engineer a recession by slowing the growth of the money supply and reducing government spending. This leads to less growth in the economy in general and some people are usually unemployed because of it.

Section II

6) Ibid.
11) Cleaver, William, "Wildcats in the Appalachian Coal Fields."
16) What was labeled as "overproduction" was actually the lack of effective demand; i.e., the working class did not have money to pay for food. This is the other side of the capitalist crisis of the '30s. On the one hand, workers were thrown out of work in order to reduce wage demands. On the other hand, what had been produced could not be sold. Therefore, food was either appropriated by workers or given away by the government.


19) Ibid., February 1, 1933.


22) Hallgren, p. 159.

23) Ibid.


30) Ibid., p. 72.

31) Ibid., p. 35.


34) Ibid., pp. 241, 236. The wage increases in the urban manufacturing areas was less than in the rural areas.


36) Ibid., pp. 451, 452.


Section III

2) ibid., p. 219.
3) ibid., p. 223.
4) ibid., p. 224.
5) ibid., pp. 232-233.
7) ibid., p. 338.
9) ibid., p. 36.


16) Ibid., pp. 88-91.


19) Ibid.


21) Same as footnote 10.


27) ibid., p. 85.
36) ibid., November 11, 1967, p. 25, "NAACP to Give Food Aid to Negroes in Mississippi."
39) ibid., May 24, 1968, p. 30, "Mandatory Food Plans for Poor to Void State Options are Urged," by William M. Blair.
42) ibid., July 26, 1968 p. 39, "Chicago Negroes Invade a Market."
45) ibid., December 12, 1968, p. 29, "Food Stamp Plan too Liberalized."
46) The Unheavenly City Revisited, p. 226.
51) Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Part 7, p. 1581.
      Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 376.
58) ibid.
59) ibid.
64) Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, pp. 129-133, 261.

66) All of the information on the food distribution and food stamp program was obtained from the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.


Section IV

1) *Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders*, Part 12.
2) Ibid., Part 8, p. 1655.
3) Ibid., Part 8, p. 1645.
4) Ibid., Part 8, p. 1657.
5) Ibid., Part 8, p. 1655.
6) Ibid.
8) The Field Foundation is similar to many apparently generous foundations whose interests can also be seen from a human capital perspective. It is financed by the Marshall Field Department Store of Chicago and has funded voter education projects in the South and the Head Start Program. Nick Kotz has characterized the foundation's orientation by saying, "Thousands of dollars were contributed, on the theory that effective use of the political process is essential to solving problems of discrimination and poverty" (*Let Them Eat Promises*, p. 7). During April of 1967, Field Foundation doctors toured Mississippi to investigate the medical and food situation with children of poverty in that area.
(Footnote 8, continued)
With their discouraging findings in hand the doctors went to
Washington and approached the secretaries of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare; the Department of Agricul-
ture; and the Office of Economic Opportunity Director.
But in each case their information was met with discouraging
remarks. They then approached Senators Robert Kennedy and
Joseph Clark and received a promise for committee hearings
in July of 1967, i.e., during the time of heated confronta-
tions with the state. Later that year Senator Robert
Kennedy and the Senate Poverty Subcommittee toured Mississippi
and supported poverty and malnutrition as an important poli-
tical issue.
9) Let Them Eat Promises, pp. 7, 15, 72; Maximum Feasible
Misunderstanding, pp. 140-141; Poor People's Movements, p.
289.
10) Poor people's Movements, pp. 288-290; Piven and Cloward,
The Politics of Turmoil, New York: Vintage Books, 1975,
pp. 124, 121.
11) Poor People's Movements, Chapter 5.
12) Let Them Eat Promises, pp. 12-13, 17-18, 24, 43-44, 98-121,
13) ibid., p. 143.
14) ibid., p. 206.
15) Food Research and Action Center, Profile of the Federal
16) Poor People's Movements, Chapter 5.
Chapter III


6) ibid., September 4, 1968, p. 34, "Youth Alienation Attributed to TV."


12) Hunger USA Revisited, p. 10.


14) ibid.

23) ibid., December 1, 1969, p. 26, "McGovern Says Nixon Aims to Defeat Food Stamp Bill."
26) New Orleans Picayune, August 31, 1973, Section 2, p. 3, "No Food Stamps at Whitney Store."
28) ibid., February 13, 1974, p. 45, "McGovern Assails Plan to Phase out Food Assistance."

31) Ibid., April 9, 1977, pp. 645-647.


37) Ibid., 1978, p. 2545.

38) Ibid., 1968, pp. 72H-73H.

39) Ibid., p. 442.

40) Ibid., pp. 88H-89H.


42) Ibid., pp. 36H-37H.

43) Ibid., 1972, pp. 52H-53H.


45) Ibid.

46) Ibid.

47) Ibid.

48) Ibid., pp. 98H-99H, 83S.

49) Ibid., pp. 98H-99H.

50) Ibid., pp. 304-305.

51) Ibid., 1974, pp. 131, 725.

52) Ibid., pp. 70H-71H.

53) Ibid., 1976, pp. 613, 17S.


55) Ibid., p. 876.


57) Ibid., 1979, p. 1530.

58) Ibid., p. 1568.


60) Ibid., 1973, p. 304.

61) Ibid., 1974, pp. 123, 70H-71H.


64) Ibid., pp. 612, 185.

66) ibid., p. 1042.
68) ibid., p. 830/
70) ibid., 1975, p. 680.
71) ibid., p. 824.
72) ibid., p. 865.
73) ibid., pp. 867, 158H-159H.
74) ibid., 1976, pp. 205, 611-615.
Chapter IV

3) Ibid., pp. 239, 244.
16) Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1975, Section I, p. 41, "Food Stamp Cheating Reported."
19) Ibid., December 12, 1976.
21) U. S. Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Food Stamp Hearings, Pt. 2, November 17, 18, 19, 20, 1975, G.P.O., Washington, D.C.
22) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, September 1976, Washington, D.C., p. 496.
25) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, p. 495.
27) ibid., December 12, 1975, p. B-3, "2 Indicted in Fraud Scheme," by Timothy Robinson.
28) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, pp. 494-495.
32) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, p. 494.
34) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, p. 191.
35) New York Times, October 2, 1976, p. 29, "12 Charged with Food Stamp Fraud."
36) House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Food Stamp Program, pp. 530-531.
38) ibid., July 7, 1976, p. 24, "Ford Signs Bill to Curb Food Stamp Vendor Abuses."
40) ibid.
42) ibid., September 24, 1974, p. 26, "Suits in 17 States Charge Failures to Enlarge Food Stamp Program," by Peter Kihss.
43) U. S. Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Food Stamp Reform, Pt. 2.
44) ibid., May 5, 1976, p. 23, "Food Stamp Rules Tightened to Drop 5 Million Recipients."
45) ibid., May 27, 1976, p. 49, "26 States and 3 Cities Sue to Enjoin Food Stamp Cuts," by Nancy Hicks; ibid., May 29, 1976, p. 9, "Judge Blocks Rules Eliminating Some Recipients of Food Stamps."

46) Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1976, Section I, p. 2, "Judge Orders Indefinite Delay in Crackdown on Food Stamps;" ibid., July 31, 1976, Section IB, p. 17, "Judge Sticks to Ban on Food Stamp Cuts."


48) U. S. Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Food Stamp Reform, p. 1236.


52) ibid., June 13, 1975, p. 76, "Food Stamp Plan Held Inadequate," by Nancy Hicks.


55) ibid., April 29, 1976, p. 27, "More Food Stamp Aid Voted by Senate Panel."


57) ibid., March 4, 1976, p. 34, "Suit Says U. S. Holds up Funds to Feed Mothers and Children," by Nancy Hicks.

58) Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1976, Section I, p. 4, "Order Food-Aid Funds Doubled."


66) ibid., July 30, 1975, p. 68, "Detroit Police and Blacks Clash in Area Where Youth's Death Sparked Earlier Violence."


69) ibid., November 2, 1974, p. 36, "U. S. is Assailed by Puerto Rican," by Peter Kihss.

70) ibid., October 15, 1975, pp. 1, 86, "Puerto Rico Seeks Way Out as Economic Woes Mount."


Chapter V

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bologna, Sergio; Carpignano, Paolo; and Negri, Antonio, Crisi e Oragnizzazione Operaia, Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1974.


James, Selma, Sex, Race and Class, Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1975.


Government Publications


Journal Articles


Congressional Digest, Volume 43, No. 6, June-July 1964: 166, 192.


Linebaugh, Peter, and Ramirez, Bruno, "Crisis in the Auto Sector," Zerowork 1, 1975: 60-84.


Almanacs

Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, D. C.

1968: 442, 72H, 73H, 88H, 89H.
1969: 827, 830.
1971: 215, 216, 36H, 37H.
1972: 52H, 53H.
1974: 123, 131, 725, 70H-71H.
1975: 680, 824, 865, 867, 158H-159H.
1976: 205, 611-615, 17S, 18S.
1977: 457, 152H, 153H, 54S.
1978: 2545.
Magazines


Newspapers

Chicago Tribune, Chicago, Illinois:

"Food Stamp Cheating Reported," March 2, 1975: Section I; 41.


"Judge Sticks to Ban on Food Stamps Cuts," July 31, 1976; Section 1B, 17.


Dallas Times Herald, Dallas, Texas:


Detroit News, Detroit, Michigan:


"Johnson Sends 5,000 Troops to be Ready for Riot Duty,"


**Houston Chronicle**: Houston, Texas:


**Los Angeles Times**, Los Angeles, California:


**New Orleans Picayune**


"No Food Stamps at Whitney Store," August 31, 1973: Section 2,3.

**New York Times**, New York, New York:


"Army Troops in Capital as Negroes Riot; Guard Sent into Chicago, Detroit, Boston; Johnson Asks a Joint Session of Congress," by Ben A. Johnson, April 6, 1968: 1,22.

"Baltimore Negroes Continue Looting; Guard Sent to Cincinnati After 2 Die," by Roy Reed, April 9, 1968: 1,37.


"Firemen Say They'll Balk Without Protection in Riots," by Thomas A. Johnson, May 7, 1971: 1, 22.

"Five Thousand Troops are Flown to Chicago For Riot Duty," by Donald Johnson, April 7, 1968: 1, 63.


"Food Middleman's Margins Widening at Record Rate," November 14, 1974: 69.

"Food Stamp Diet Called Nutritious by U.S. Judge," December 1973: 34.

"Food Stamp Plan Held Inadequate," by Nancy Hicks, June 13, 1975: 76.

"Food Stamp Plan to Aid the Economy," January 23, 1977: 36.


"Food Stamp Price Freeze Voted by House, 274-28,; by Nancy Hicks, February 5, 1975: 1.


"Food Stamp Study Assays the Loss," by Nancy Hicks, September 12, 1975: 17.


"Ford Food Stamp Plan Assailed as Deficient For Diet of Elderly," by Nancy Hicks, November 4, 1975: 46.


"Four Years in Stamp Fraud," March 27, 1977: 23.


"'Guerrilla War' Urged in Harlem" by Junius Griffin, July 20, 1964: 16.

"Harlem is a Study in Contrast as Sun Rises on Scene of Riots," July 20, 1964: 16.

"Harlem Returning to Normal Routine. But Scars Remain," by C. Gerald Fraser, April 7, 1968: 1, 64.

"Harlem Youths Exhibit Loot; Taken to 'Get Back at Whitey','" by Thomas A. Johnson, April 8, 1968: 31.


"Humphrey Charges Television is a 'Catalyst Spurring Riots','" June 25, 1968: 83.


"Mandatory Food Plans for Poor to Void State Options are Urged," by William Blair, May 24, 1968: 30.


"NAACP to Give Food Aid to Negroes in Mississippi," November 11, 1967: 25.


"Night of Riots Began with Calm Rally," by Paul L. Montgomery, July 20, 1964: 1, 16.


"Pentagon Sets up Riot Control Unit," April 27, 1968: 35.


"Policemen Exhaust Their Ammunition in All Night Battle," by Francis X. Clines, July 20, 1964: 1, 16.

"President is Requesting Funds for Food Stamps, Schools Milk," by James Naughton, May 6, 1975: 8.

"President Signs Civil Rights Bill; Pleads for Calm," April 12, 1968: 1.

"President Won't Veto Food Stamp Bill," by Nancy Hicks, February 14, 1975: 12.


"Relative Calm is Restored to Riot Torn Areas Here," July 24, 1964: 1.


"Senate, 76-8, Votes Freeze in Price of Feed Stamps," by Nancy Hicks, January 6, 1975: 1.


"Seven Die as Fires and Looting Spread in Chicago Rioting," by Donald Janson, April 6, 1968: 1, 23.


"Suit Says U.S. Holds up Funds to Freed Mothers and Children," by Nancy Hicks, March 4, 1976: 34.

"Suit Today Will Seek to Force Freeman to Feed Starving," by Roy Reed, March 25, 1968: 47.


"Thirty Seized in Riots are Held for Trial," July 20, 1964: 16.


"Thousands Riot in Harlem Area; Scores are Hurt," by Paul L. Montgomery and Francis X. Clines, July 19, 1964: 1, 54.

"12 Charged with Food Stamp Fraud," October 12, 1976: 29.

"26 States and 3 Cities Sue to Enjoin Food Stamp Cuts," by Nancy Hicks, May 27, 1976: 49.

"Two Hundred Twenty Million Dollars to Aid the Hungry is Returned to Treasury Unused," by Joseph A. Loftus, April 24, 1968: 70.


"U. S. is Assailed by Puerto Rican," by Peter Kihss, November 2, 1974: 36.

"U. S. Needy Found Poorer, Hungrier Than 4 Years Ago,"

"U. S. Report Finds Excessive Issuing of Food Stamps,"

"U. S. Sued for Rise in Food for Poor," by Ben A. Franklin,

"U. S. to Distribute Food in Alabama," by William Blair,
March 30, 1968: 27.

"U. S. Troops Sent to Baltimore; Violence Eases in
Pittsburgh; Dr. King Mourned in the Nation," by
Roy Reed, April 8, 1968: 1, 31.

"Vigilantes in 11 Jersey Towns Give Police Unsolicited


"Violence Flares Again in Harlem, Restraint Urged,"
by R. W. Apple, Jr., July 20, 1964: 1, 16.


"Washington Turmoil Subsides; Hundreds Homeless, Eight

"Welfare Rolls Increased Sharply in September, Widening


"Wider Use Sought by State and City of U. S. Food Aid,"

"Youth Alienation Attributed to TV," September 4, 1968: 34.

*M^-Washing iH Post, Washington, D. C.:

"Capital Police Plan Hunger Army Escort," December 3,
1931: 1.

"Food Program Cuts Seen Inciting Ghettoes," June 26,

"Food Stamp Sentences Imposed," February 21, 1975: C-1.

"Garner is Elected Speaker as New Congress Convenes; Hunger Army Leaves Today," December 8, 1931: 1.

"Hunger Army of 1,570 Fed on Reaching City; To Seek Money Today," December 7, 1931: 1.


"Two Indicted in Fraud Scheme," by Timothy Robinson, December 12, 1975: B-3.

Record Album

VITA

Timothy Jay Reynolds was born in Sherman, Texas, on December 16, 1949, the son of Rapherd Ann Reynolds and Edgar Leon Reynolds. After completing his work at Sherman High School, Sherman, Texas, in 1968, he entered Grayson County College at Denison, Texas and in 1970, The University of Texas at Austin. During the summer of 1972 he attended The University of California at Berkeley. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from The University of Texas at Austin in January, 1974. During the following years he was employed as a math teacher in the Austin State School. In September, 1978, he entered The Graduate School of the University of Texas.

Permanent address: 1100 Idlewild Drive
Sherman, Texas 75090

This thesis was typed by Beverly Mae Davis