no social life; she can't go anywhere "because there's nothing left after the rent and food."[10]

Such a living standard is not limited to those on welfare. A number of unionized hospital workers on a strike picket line in New York were interviewed by a reporter. One woman with three children who was a unit clerk at Beth Israel Hospital took home $106 a week after taxes: "Thank God my kids are not steak eaters. I buy stew beef sometimes and chicken and canned corned beef." Along with some bacon and hamburger once a week, that was what her children had for meat. Another woman took home $107.50 after taxes, which she referred to as a "bean-diet" salary. "I make kidney beans with rice. That's got protein, and I give my son plenty of milk. . . . I make beans and potato salad or greens and fresh vegetables. I seldom buy meat at all." She pays $120 a month for a one-bedroom "hole in the wall" in Brooklyn. Another hospital worker said she had about given up trying to support her family on $108 a week after taxes, and was sending her year-old son south to live with her mother. "That way, I know he'll eat all right."[11]

These families had after-tax incomes of more than $5500 a year. The conditions for those even poorer were indicated by a recent study of low-income families commissioned by a Senate committee. It found families with little or no food in their homes and little or no money to buy any; families with nothing to eat but Wonder Bread and hog jowls, and families that had switched to dog food as their source of protein.[12]

All this was before the fall of 1974, when the economic crisis moved into an acute downward spiral. By January 1975, unemployment reached its highest level since the end of the Great Depression. Millions of people, already staggering under the impact of inflation, were hit by layoffs, furloughs and plant closings. Millions more saw their hours sharply reduced. The result was a massive shock to the living conditions of the employed and the unemployed alike.

It is frequently pointed out that the impact of unemployment has been considerably softened by social reforms instituted since the Great Depression. The most important of these is unemployment insurance. It indeed makes a substantial difference; as an Oswego, New York union official in the construction trades (most of whose members were unemployed) put it, "If it wasn't for unemployment insurance, I don't know how they would eat."[13]

However, the level of unemployment benefits is set to tide workers over between jobs, not to maintain them in extended unemployment; under the impact of inflation, it is hardly even

sufficient for that purpose. The average unemployment benefit is $65 a week, far less than half the average wage. Consider, for example, a worker recently laid off from a small auto parts plant in Detroit.[14] His take-home pay had been $125 a week; his unemployment benefits run $70 a week. After paying the rent on a five-room apartment and making payments on a stove, refrigerator and dinette set, there is $40 a week left to support a family of four. So far, the family has had to put off buying a new bed so that their young children can sleep separately; eat cheap greens and canned pork-and-beans in place of meat and ground beef instead of ham; and pass up a much-needed surgical operation for one family member. Despite these cutbacks, the future looks worse still: bills are piling up, savings have been exhausted and a company-paid health insurance plan is about to run out. The unemployment compensation itself will probably continue to be eroded by inflation—and it will not last forever. If mass unemployment persists, millions of workers may exhaust present benefits during the months ahead. If unemployment compensation provides a cushion, it is hardly a cushy one.

The other important new sources of income for the unemployed are employer-funded benefit programs established in union contracts. The most prominent of these is the United Auto Workers' Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB's), established some years ago as a union ploy to head off demands for a guaranteed annual wage in the auto industry. Combined with government unemployment benefits, SUB's bring the income of an unemployed worker with seniority at a major auto company up to 95 percent of regular pay.

Such a program makes good sense—why should workers be penalized for the failures of their employers? But only a small minority of workers are covered by such programs. A few industries provide benefits for unemployed workers, but the major auto companies are virtually the only ones who come near to providing a worker's regular income. Even the auto industry's SUB fund is rapidly running out of money; payments have already been cut for low-seniority workers and one company's sub fund went completely dry in 1975.

A substantial proportion of the unemployed receive neither employer nor government unemployment benefits of any kind. They include new entrants and reentrants into the labor force, discouraged workers who have given up looking for a job, workers in occupations not covered by such programs and those who have exhausted their benefits. Millions of them aren't even counted in the official unemployment statistics, making these figures deceptively low. For these unemployed, the problem will be to survive at all.

While much is made of the factors that soften the effects of economic contractions today, less attention has been paid to a number of "cushions" that existed in the 1930s but have now largely vanished. During the Great Depression, prices fell by an estimated one-third, easing substantially the impact of falling incomes. Food was plentiful and food prices were extremely low, helping to reduce the extent of downright hunger. Many workers still had relatives with farms, to which they could return while unemployed. The greater national and international interdependence of today's economy means that particular regions and industries are less likely to escape the economic contractions of the economy as a whole. Finally, the greater complexity of society now makes it more vulnerable to disaster when aspects of economic production break down. In the 1930s, many people could substitute simple for complex ways of life: they could burn wood instead of oil; cool with ice instead of refrigerators; buy food from nearby farmers rather than through complex national marketing chains. For most urban Americans, such expedients are simply not possible today. The result may well be that normal life will become impossible to continue long before impoverishment has reached the levels of the Great Depression.

PROFIT VS. NEED

Even in times of general prosperity, people suffer the consequences of a system of production directed to making profits for a minority, not to meeting the needs of the majority. Detroit auto companies are notorious for producing cars that will have to be replaced in a few short years, even though they could build cars that would last for hundreds of thousands of miles. This is so well known that it has even been given a name, "built-in obsolescence." Similarly, studies publicized recently have shown that many companies have reduced the nutritional value of their food products, notably breakfast cereals, to a minimum; they can be made and preserved more cheaply that way, and are therefore more profitable.

Seeking profits, businesses often try to manipulate needs, rather than meet them as they freely develop. A blatant example is the effort to create "needs" for products which people otherwise might not buy through high-pressure advertising. Businesses may even try to shape people's very lives: For example, a notoriously powerful "highway lobby" of auto, gas, rubber and highway construction companies has successfully promoted huge national expenditures for highway construction. The effect in practice has been to destroy

most public transportation through lack of available funds, making cars a necessity of life.

Many needs don't get met at all because it is not profitable to meet them. According to government estimates, the United States needs to build four million new housing units a year for the next ten years.

Housing Starts

Although unmet human needs increased, production to meet them fell. The annual rate for housing starts fell from 2.4 million in May 1973 to 880,000 in December 1974. By March 1975 U.S. industry was operating at less than 66 percent capacity, and more than 8 million workers were officially listed as unemployed. People needed homes and other products, but businesses found them unprofitable to produce.



Source: *New York Times*, June 19, 1974 and February 20, 1975. Statistics from U.S. Department of Commerce.

But it has only been constructing them at half that rate, at a time when millions of people are unable to find suitable housing. There are plenty of unemployed people willing to work making houses and housing materials—but they can't because it is not profitable for employers to hire them for that purpose. Similarly, many people have had to wait days or even months to get needed medical care. This situation continues, not because people don't want and need medical services, or because there is nobody to build the facilities or to train to use them, but because the necessary resources have gone

> In Springdale, Ark., Tyson Foods Inc., a major broiler producer, drowned 300,000 chicks and destroyed 800,000 eggs that would have hatched broilers, as the first steps in phasing out a facility until broiler production becomes profitable again.[17]

American farmers destroyed thousands of chickens and sharply reduced their production of beef in order to restrict supply and raise profits. As housing grew harder and harder for families to find, housing starts decreased from 2.4 million a year at the beginning of 1973 to 1.4 million in mid-1974, despite substantial unemployment in the construction industry. As energy shortages reached crisis proportions, domestic production of oil fell, and power companies sharply reduced their planned investment in expanded nuclear and conventional facilities.[18] As living standards fell and shortages prevailed for many products, millions of workers were laid off, instead of being able to produce the food, housing, energy and other products people so badly needed. In short, the organization of our economic system still makes it impossible for people to use the available resources to meet their needs.

During periods of economic expansion, the idea arises that economic crises and "hard times" are a thing of the past. During the expansion that followed the Great Depression of the 1930s, this idea was strengthened by the belief that the private economy could be controlled through limited government intervention. New government policies—the so-called "New Economics"—would prevent the swings between boom and depression that had marked the history of economies based on production for private profit. The core of the "New Economics" was the expansion of government spending, budget deficits and credit whenever recession threatened. These policies have been applied by every government administration since World War II, whether Republican or Democrat.

For a considerable period of time, these policies seemed to ward off economic contraction with some success. Unfortunately, however, the medicine began to reveal side effects which were not so benign. The first consequence was a tendency toward a stagnation of economic growth. In the past, depressions had served to create conditions for renewed expansion by squeezing out less competitive companies, enlarging more efficient ones, reducing claims on capital and cutting wages. While the "New Economics" succeeded in warding off depressions, it was unable to create the conditions for a classical business expansion. Government continued to grow, creating jobs for many of those who might otherwise be unemployed, but business itself could not achieve a steady expansion.

A second consequence of the "New Economics" was the rise of inflation. From the first, politically conservative economists had warned that budget deficits and other government attempts to stimulate the economy would lead to inflation. Whatever the validity of their arguments, their conclusion was evidently right, for every attempt to promote economic expansion through government stimulus has aggravated inflation. On the other hand, their proposals to abandon the "New Economics" have little better to offer; whenever government stimuli have been withdrawn, results have been rising unemployment and incipient recession.

The "New Economics," despite its claims, has not really found a way to overcome the historical processes of our economic system. No matter what "policy mix" has been applied, the American economy for the past decade has suffered continuously from unemployment or inflation or—increasingly—both at the same time. This last condition has even required the invention of new language—"inflationary depression" and "stagflation"—to describe it. Each attempt to stave off recession has aggravated inflation, and vice versa. The economic panacea, far from having cured the disease, has merely created a new set of symptoms. Doubt has finally set in about the belief that "every economic problem is amenable to solution if only the federal government will adopt the 'right' policy at the right time and execute it effectively."[19]

While our economic system continues to produce economic crises, the form they take today has changed as a result of increased government intervention. Inflation and shortages have joined unemployment and falling production as manifestations of the system's inability to adapt production to human needs. But most people rightly feel that the form "hard times" take matters less than the actual deterioration in their conditions of life. As an old-time radical tool and die maker told us:

> You do not need statistics to know what is happening in the economy. If you cannot afford to buy enough food, you will feel it in your stomach. If you cannot afford fuel and clothing, you will know what is going on in the economy because you will be cold.

WHO PAYS FOR THE SYSTEM'S FAILURES?

As long as the economy continues to expand, workers' conditions of life can improve at the same time that profits increase. But when economic expansion falters, different social groups come into conflict over who will bear the burden of the system's failures. Managers and owners try to restore profitability at the expense of

workers. And government policies that are officially issued for the good of "the economy," "the nation" and "the people" inevitably result in benefit to some and loss to others.

As the role of the government in the economy has increased, its policies have come more and more to affect how the fruits of production are divided. This does not mean that the government has a free hand to divide the benefits any way it wants to. If it pursued policies that did not assure a continued expansion of profits, the result would be a general economic and social collapse, threatening its own stability. Thus, regardless of what individuals or party may be in office, the government has consistently striven to maintain the profitability of the economy—at the expense of workers if necessary.

As a result, those who are hurt most by the failures of the economy are the members of the nonaffluent majority. Inflation, for example, whatever its other effects, has reduced the real wages of workers. This directly benefits employers: When prices rise faster than wages, income that would have gone to workers goes to business instead.

This evident fact has been obscured by a barrage of propaganda designed to persuade the public that rising wages are the cause of rising prices. The effectiveness of this seemingly plausible line of argument is indicated by a recent survey of union members: 61 percent of them believed that excess union demands are the major cause of inflation.[20] The truth is quite the opposite. Every general increase in labor costs in recent years has followed, rather than preceded, an increase in consumer prices. Wage increases have been the result of workers' efforts to catch up after their incomes had already been eroded by inflation. Nor could it easily be otherwise. All a businessman has to do to raise a price is to get up in the morning and make an announcement; barring price controls, it will take at most a few weeks to go into effect. Wage rates, on the other hand, are primarily determined by contracts in the unionized sector, which usually run for two or three years. As long as they accept such contracts, workers are bound to lag behind inflation; they can't even try to catch up until the contract expires. Even the minority of workers covered by cost-of-living escalator clauses—about one-third of unionized workers and fewer than 10 percent of all workers—receive their increases after, not before, the rise in consumer prices. The attempt to blame inflation on workers' wage increases is hardly more than a justification for those who want to increase profits by decreasing real wages.

Wage/price controls, applied off and on over the past few years, similarly held down workers' incomes. It is relatively easy to control

wages, since they are set by employers who generally have every interest in keeping them within official guidelines. But most experts on economic controls agree that it is almost impossible to police effectively the tens of thousands of constantly shifting prices in the economy. Companies have myriad techniques to raise prices by reducing discounts, cutting quality, selling on the black market, etc. Where there are flexible price controls instead of an absolute freeze, companies can generally present their cost and profit figures in ways that make price increases appear justified. And if all these techniques fail, they can withhold their products to create artificial shortages, thus pressuring the government to allow price increases—a tactic employed by both the gasoline and the beef industries during 1973. During the years when wages and prices were supposedly "controlled," wages in reality fell further and further behind prices. Nor was this result accidental; for as the *New York Times* reported when peacetime wage and price controls were first established in 1971, "the essential purpose of the whole complicated system of boards, commissions, and councils created to manage the drive against inflation" was to "tighten the knot on future wage settlements and increase pressure on unions to acquiesce in the arrangement."[21]

When employers are unable to expand their profits and therefore stop expanding production, it is working people who pay the highest price. Even in the relatively mild recession of 1961, the official unemployment rate was 10 percent for skilled workers, 12 percent for semiskilled workers and 20 percent for unskilled workers.[22] Unemployment also affects those who remain at work, eliminating overtime, cutting hours, putting a downward pressure on wages and forcing many people into low-paying, insecure employment. A severe depression can lead to misery on a colossal scale; even today, most people too young to remember it have heard stories about the terrors of the Great Depression and what it meant to those who lived through it.

Nearly a year ago, when this chapter was first being drafted, we wrote: "The social and political costs of recession and depression are so high that economic policy makers will no doubt seek to avoid them if at all possible. But as the amount of government spending and credit required to keep down unemployment grows greater and greater, and the rate of inflation consequently grows higher and higher, a point may well come when they find it necessary to choose between allowing recessionary pressures to take their disastrous course, or abandoning direction of the economy by private business."

Subsequent events indicate which choice they made.

HOW DO YOU FIGHT HARD TIMES?

Changing economic conditions exert profound though sometimes contradictory effects on the strategies people adopt for dealing with the problems of everyday life. When people expect general economic expansion, they may use strikes and other tactics to win a share of the benefit. (Strike waves for this purpose are common on the upswing of business cycles.) In general, however, steady economic growth makes it possible for people to achieve a rising standard of living using strategies of individual advancement—rising within a firm, looking for a better job, getting more education, moving to a different region or neighborhood. Only if high expectations for improvement are inadequately fulfilled are people likely to turn to more militant forms of action on a large scale during times of relative prosperity.

When "hard times" set in, real incomes decrease and unemployment rises. It becomes impossible for most people to continue living in the same way. At the very least, they have to restrict consumption, work longer hours or increase the number of breadwinners in the family. The rising threat of unemployment may lead people to avoid actions that might lose them their jobs. But such strategies can do little to arrest the deterioration of living standards most people experience at such times. Since a whole class of people are experiencing the same problems simultaneously, however, they often turn to strategies involving forms of collective action.

The effects of general economic conditions on people's feelings and action were evident during the period we worked on this book. At the end of 1972, the United States was just coming out of a period of considerable unemployment and relatively low inflation. With real wages rising somewhat and jobs scarce, strikes had been relatively few. In early 1973 there was a sharp increase in prices, especially for meat, followed by the massive consumer meat boycott.

That summer prices rose in all spheres. An organization of women workers in Chicago told us that its supporters—nonunionized office and store workers in the downtown Loop district—were falling further and further behind the cost of living, making pay increases the big issue for them. Industrial production was very high, however, and most of the industrial workers we talked with felt that with heavy overtime they were more or less keeping up with the cost of living. Indeed, one of the grievances we heard most widely expressed was compulsory overtime; there were many walkouts protesting this and it was the most talked-about issue in the auto negotiations that summer.

As the inflation rate continued to rise, it began cutting into living standards more and more. By early 1974, many people were finding themselves without money to pay their bills at the end of the month, and so had to cut back sharply on all family expenditures. The tone of discussions often changed to one of fear and anger. In Boston, we began hearing such comments as, "We ought to all go on strike, just to show them" and "If it gets so that you can't buy food, we'll just have to get down our guns and take it." The fuel shortages and fuel price increases greatly intensified this sentiment and led to massive strikes and highway blockades by the independent truck owner/operators. By the spring of 1974, we noticed a great increase of strikes; just driving around eastern Massachusetts, you would run into them frequently. By June, a nationwide strike wave was under way, with more strikes than at any time since 1946. Such a response was to be expected from the cumulative increase of prices over wages.

These various actions may well represent the beginning of an extended period of experimentation with a variety of collective strategies. Only through such experiments can people discover what forms are likely to be most effective. Some lessons are already evident, however.

It is often as consumers that people first experience and respond to "hard times"—witness the 1973 consumer meat boycott. Yet as that boycott showed, people really have only the most limited power in their role as consumers. They may be able to affect one or another company, but they have little control over the economy as a whole. Similarly, while the increasing number of people joining food co-ops and sharing living quarters may ease the hardship of falling incomes, their actions have little impact on general social conditions.

Where working people do have power is on the job. By halting production, they can force concessions from their employers. Thus it is natural that workers have turned to strikes on a massive scale to try to recoup what they have lost to inflation.

As we saw in Chapter 5, trade unions have been the main medium through which workers have negotiated for concessions from their employers. The strategy of trying to use the unions to cope with inflation has therefore been widespread.

One top union official reports that "workers are putting enormous pressure on their leaders to get more money."[23] The demand for cost-of-living escalators in contracts is particularly strong. Among nonunion workers, there has been a sudden interest in unionization. According to another union official, "there's greater interest in joining trade unions today than at any time since the Korean

war. . . . If this inflation keeps going the way it is, every worker in the U.S. will be in a trade union."[24]

But by and large, trade unionism has not been successful in combatting the decline in real earnings. Unionized workers, like others, have fallen further and further behind rising prices. Far from leading a fight to maintain workers' incomes, union leaders have generally done everything possible to limit "excessive rank-and-file demands." They have gone along with government wage controls, even though their members' real wages were shrinking month by month. (The reasons union officials act so differently from the interests of their members have been explored at length in Chapter 5.)

Even the minority of unions with cost-of-living escalators in their contracts do not fully protect their members from inflation, since the escalators almost never provide one hundred percent of the increase in the cost of living and often have ceilings. For example, in the forty-month electrical workers' contract with General Electric which expired in May 1973, workers received four cost-of-living increases totalling 24 cents an hour. But even before the end of the contract, union sources estimated that GE workers had lost an additional 29 cents an hour in real wages as a result of inflation.[25]

The average worker covered under the Steelworkers' contract signed in April 1974 will receive about an 80 percent recovery for rises in the cost of living—better than many.[26] If consumer prices continue to rise at the 10 percent rate prevailing when the contract was signed, workers covered by it will find their incomes down 6 percent when the contract ends three years hence. Yet the contract itself—and the union bureaucracy standing behind it—would prevent them from striking even to save their incomes from such a reduction.

Because of these failures, many workers have had to turn to strategies of collective action on the job that are independent of , or even in opposition to, the union officialdom. The most effective action against inflation in recent years was the 1970 strike wave, particularly the Teamsters' wildcat. The Teamsters union had negotiated a national contract which did not adequately compensate workers for the rapid inflation of the late 1960s. It was all set to be signed, when drivers in sixteen cities, mostly in the mid- and far-West, refused to go along and went out on a wildcat strike which the *New York Times* described as "a revolt against the national union leadership and a $1.10-an-hour raise that has been accepted in a national contract."[27] After a bitter twelve-week strike, in which the union tried to get the drivers back to work and the state of Ohio called up 4100 National Guardsmen to escort strikebreak-

ers, the strikers finally forced a wage increase two-thirds above that originally negotiated by their union—and far above federal wage guidelines. This set the pattern for substantial wage increases throughout industry, contributing to a brief respite from declining real wages during 1971 and 1972.

A more recent case was a spreading strike by government employees in Baltimore in July 1974. After six months of bargaining with the city, the garbage workers' union ratified a contract granting a 6 percent raise—far less than the increase in the cost of living. The garbage workers, whose take-home pay averaged about $90 a week, called a wildcat strike against the settlement. After they went out, the union leadership eventually endorsed the strike. Meanwhile, other groups of municipal workers joined the strike—jail guards, park employees, highway maintenance workers, keepers at the city zoo and, finally, about half of the police force. Amidst reports of burning and looting, the governor sent in state troopers to "maintain order" and serve as strikebreakers, while the courts threatened to jail strike leaders who ignored injunctions ordering the strikers back to work. The power of what had become virtually a general strike of municipal employees, however, quickly forced concessions. The city, which had absolutely refused any wage increases over 6 percent, agreed to raises averaging 19 percent over two years—just about enough for workers to keep up with inflation, instead of having a substantial cut in their real wages as the original settlement would have provided.[28]

The only way workers can keep from being left behind by inflation is to win wage increases that equal or exceed the increase in prices—and to win them as soon as prices rise if not before. If unions don't do this, workers can hardly accept their leadership unless they are also willing to accept a continuing decline in their standard of living. Thus it is not surprising that, as one union official pointed out recently, "a tremendously high number of proposed contracts are being turned down by union members these days."[29] The consequences are bound to be wildcat strikes and strikes which, while officially sanctioned by union leaders, are in practice opposed and even sabotaged by them.

Such actions outside official union structures require some kind of organization, if only an informal one. Sometimes this is provided by local union leaders or by a dissident caucus; these, however, remain separate from rank-and-file workers and subject to many of the same influences as the rest of the union leadership. For many contract rejections and wildcat strikes, the organization is created out of the informal, on-the-job organization of workers described in Chapter 4. For example, a Teamsters' contract rejection we know about

developed out of various informal discussions in which a number of drivers concluded the contract proposed by the union was unsatisfactory. They then "passed the word" about their conclusion. A consensus was thus built up—and generally accepted by those who had not even been given a chance to see the contract. The vote against it was overwhelming. We have already described a wildcat strike for pay and benefit increases conducted by similar informal groups of co-workers (see Seaway strike, page 75). Strikes conducted along such lines are likely to increase in the coming days.

A good deal can be won by such a strategy in a period of inflation, as the 1970 Teamsters' wildcat and other examples show. Workers may be able to keep up with price increases or even get ahead of them if they simply refuse to work when their real incomes decline, wage controls and contracts notwithstanding. But this strategy is likely to be less viable in times of severe economic crisis, particularly in a depression with high unemployment. Under such conditions, employers can offer little in the way of wage increases, since their profits are low or nonexistent; wage cuts may be their only way to stay in business. Strikes are risky because in periods of high unemployment employers can often fill strikers' jobs. As the economy passes into recession or worse, workers must turn to other types of action.

The only way working people can protect themselves from the worst effects of depression is through concerted mass resistance to every encroachment on their conditions of life. Wherever people face a common problem, they will have to take immediate direct action to combat it. No doubt a great variety of tactics will be applied, but their effectiveness will depend largely on the threat to the existing social order posed by masses of people who are impoverished and unemployed. To the extent that working people can wield that threat, they can force at least some concessions from those who control society's resources.

To do so effectively, struggles cannot remain limited to isolated groups; people will have to support each other's actions on the widest possible scale. In short, working people can only successfully fight the effects of hard times by creating a massive, continuing social movement through which they fight for the interests of all working people in every sphere of life.

People in groups which need to act together will have to use their imaginations to create tactics which can be effective in their particular situation. There are some lessons that can be learned, however, from the immediate and the more distant past.

When employers decide to reduce work, they develop a plan to do so in the way most advantageous to themselves. Workers and unions

have frequently tried to impose counterplans of their own. At the *Washington Star-News*, for example, management recently proposed to cut costs by eliminating 100 out of the 550 employees in the editorial and business departments. The union proposed that instead everyone work four days for four days' pay in exchange for a guarantee against layoffs. Workers supported the plan 9 to 1, and management accepted it. A committee reviews individual situations and allows a few workers to work full time in hardship cases. Similarly in the garment industry, the union has traditionally opposed layoffs and insisted that the available work be divided among all available workers. Workers can use strikes and other forms of direct action to demand an equitable distribution of work—or simply impose it by leaving work early, staying home on a regular schedule or systematically refusing overtime. They can also use forms of guerrilla resistance to ensure that as many workers as possible are necessary to perform the available work.

A method sometimes used to combat plant closings is the sit down strike or factory occupation. Since little economic pressure can be put on a company through the occupation of an unprofitable plant, the main purposes of such actions have usually been simply to protest the closings or to generate public pressure for measures to keep local employers in business. In 1974, for example, workers seized the Rheingold breweries in New York City when management decided to close them down. The occupation led to political intervention which successfully kept the company, something of a local institution, in business.

Such measures can only be effective in special situations. Usually workers have little power to ensure their employment when it is not profitable for employers. Government job expansions have rarely employed more than a small fraction of the unemployed. The unemployed and impoverished in past depressions have therefore turned to forms of direct action to meet their needs, often in cooperation with those still employed. During the early 1930s, for example, "Unemployed Councils" sprung up in dozens of cities around the country. A labor expert described them thus:

> The Unemployed Council is a democratic organ of the unemployed to secure by very practical means a control over their means of subsistence. . . . The Councils' weapon is democratic force of numbers and their functions are: to prevent evictions of the destitute, or if evicted, to bring pressure to bear on the Relief Commission to find a new home for the evicted family; if an unemployed worker has his gas or his water turned off because he can't pay for it, to investigate the case and demand their return from the proper authorities; to

tion to produce the things they need. Sometimes small groups of workers try to do this by themselves. In the 1930s, for example, thousands of unemployed coal miners dug their own mines on company property, used the coal for themselves or trucked it to the cities and sold it below the commercial rate. When company police tried to close their mines, the miners frequently defended themselves by force, usually with strong community support. In France in 1973, workers occupied a watch factory that management had planned to close and began producing watches under their own control, which they sold through workers' organizations throughout the country.

There are usually strong odds against such attempts by isolated groups of workers to take over workplaces and produce for themselves. They usually lack the resources to compete with giant corporations; they generally have to accept conditions as bad or worse than workers elsewhere; and they are not likely to be permitted to use privately owned productive property for long without being violently attacked. Such actions still leave the participants at the mercy of those who control the rest of society.

Though such isolated attempts by workers to produce for themselves are almost bound to fail, they point the way toward a genuine alternative to the minority control of society. If people are to avoid the terrible and unnecessary suffering that accompanied the last great depression, they will have to produce the things they need, even though such production is not profitable for the owners. To do so, the majority will have to take over the productive resources of society as a whole for their own use. Such a strategy may appear radical and impractical in normal times, but under depression conditions it may well be the only practical alternative to impoverishment and endless misery for the great majority. Whether to adopt such a strategy or accept their suffering passively will be up to that majority to decide.

8. ENVIRONMENT: NATURAL AND SOCIAL

THE QUALITY OF LIFE

It may seem that when you leave work you are entering a realm of freedom where you can live as you like, at least within the limits of your income. In reality, however, everyone lives in an environment which includes other people, the things they have produced and nature as people have transformed it.

Most people have little control over the environment in which they have to live. They don't decide the quality of the air they breathe or the water they drink; they have little choice in what they hear and see around them. Yet it is their own labor that shapes that environment. In Gary, Indiana, steelworkers run giant mills that pour smoke and poison into the air they breathe when they go home. In Albany, New York, construction workers tore down housing to build a downtown mall, driving thousands of people into already overcrowded slums, and a few, reportedly, into living in the streets and parks. In Detroit, auto workers wait restlessly, ensnarled in traffic jams caused by the cars they have built.

Because people do not control their cooperative activity at work, they cannot control the environment it shapes. They create that environment, but in the interest and under the orders of their employers. Wherever you go, your surroundings are shaped by the interaction of powerful business and governmental organizations that control other people's labor. This situation underlies the powerlessness that many people experience even off the job.

To a limited extent, people can select the surroundings in which they will live. If you are wealthy, you may be able to have your own estate and shape it to your personal desires; if you don't have to work, you can avoid environments you don't enjoy. But if you aren't rich, you have to live someplace you can afford; and if you have to work, you have to go where the jobs are. The result is that for most people the choice is limited. For instance, recent surveys indicate that

One of the widespread social myths that accompanied the post-World War II prosperity was that blue-collar industrial workers were becoming an ever-smaller and less significant part of the population.[22] Official statistics were widely quoted to show that America had changed from a nation of blue-collar goods producers to one of white-collar service producers. These figures reflected two important trends—the great decrease in the number of agricultural workers and the great influx of women into office, sales and service jobs. But among male workers, the proportion in blue-collar industrial work has remained impressively high. Here are the figures:

PERCENT OF BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS IN MALE LABOR FORCE

1930	45.25
1950	48.4
1972	47

There are, in fact, more blue collar workers today than at any time in American history.

With the current deterioration of wages and living standards, industrial workers are again becoming recognized as a group. Their strikes are part of the daily news. Politicians publicly court their vote. Popular music, especially the recently resurgent country music, speaks straightforwardly of the workingman. These phenomena reflect a new awareness that many blue-collar workers have of themselves. Where that awareness will lead, time will tell.

Minton Brooks/Liberation News Service

10. WHITE COLLAR

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the great majority of employees were manual wage workers. But with the growth of corporate business to gigantic size and the great expansion of record keeping and communications, there has been a tremendous expansion in low-level white-collar work, especially for women.

By far the fastest-growing group in the labor force has been clerical workers—they have increased from 3 percent in 1900 to 15 percent in 1960.[1] There were fifteen times as many secretaries, stenographers and typists in 1960 as in 1900.[2] Other swelling clerical occupations included bookkeepers, cashiers, office machine operators, bank tellers, ticket agents, telephone operators and shipping and receiving clerks. Similarly, the number of workers in finance, insurance and real estate has more than doubled since World War I, and the number of workers in trade has nearly tripled.[3] More than 30 percent of the manufacturing work force is now "white collar."[4]

At one time there was a great social gulf between "manual" workers in industry and "non-manual" workers in offices and stores. It was often assumed that this was the great division within society. In their classic study, *Middletown*, Robert and Helen Lynd found that the most important division within the population of the typical midwestern town whose life they examined was that between a "working class" who worked with things and a "business class" who dealt with people.[5] Every aspect of daily life, from where you lived to what time you got up in the morning, was determined by which of these two classes you belonged to—and there was no doubt in their minds that clerical and sales workers were on the "business class" side. Even today, the main division in government occupational statistics is between white-collar and blue-collar employees.

Today there is more difference within than between these categories. White-collar work has separated into two very different kinds of work. On the one hand, there is an elite of managers and professionals in business and government, drawing high salaries and generally commanding the labor of others. On the other, there is the great majority of clerical, sales and service workers whose incomes, working conditions and life prospects are far closer to those of blue-collar workers.

These two white-collar groups have been drawing apart in much the same way that journeymen and masters drew apart into workers and capitalists in the early nineteenth century. The result is to bring the lower-level white-collar workers ever closer to the position of industrial workers.

At one time, white-collar workers had higher incomes and far more job security than blue-collar workers. In 1929, for example, salaried employees earned 28 percent more than wage earners; in 1939 the figure was 30 percent. By 1944, however, wage earners were actually making more than salaried workers, and the two groups have been fairly close ever since.[6] White-collar workers once had substantial health, pension and vacation benefits, while blue-collar workers had few; today, blue-collar workers have almost caught up.[7]

White-collar workers were not subject to seasonal layoffs, and generally remained on payrolls even during the massive unemployment of the Great Depression. Today, layoffs of white-collar workers have become common, from either economic slowdowns or replacement by machine. In late 1973, for example, a Wall Street reporter described automation-related layoffs at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith and other brokerage houses in New York:

> Gone are the dozens of miniskirted young high school graduates who had flooded into Merrill's back offices in recent years to tend the clattering Teletype machines that once fed orders out. In their place sit a handful of seasoned employees, most of them middle-aged, quietly tending the computer outlets that allow each of them to do the work of two or three people.[8]

White-collar workers are often discharged with a callousness once reserved for their blue-collar counterparts. In late 1974, for example, the Macmillan Company, a big New York publisher, abruptly dismissed nearly one-sixth of its office employees, ranging from editors to maintenance staff, in response to poor business

conditions and a union organizing drive. Those dismissed received a letter which began:

> The corporation has adopted a plan for curtailment of certain business activities in whole or part; consolidation of certain departments and divisions; and overall reduction of work force. We regret that we must inform you that your services will not be required beyond the close of business today.[9]

Blue-collar workers have achieved more job security through unions, while white-collar workers, according to *Work in America*, are viewed by management as "expendable": "Because their productivity is hard to measure and their functions often non-essential, they are seen as the easiest place to 'cut fat' during low points in the business cycle." The report went so far as to claim that "today, low-level white-collar workers are more likely to be sacrificed for the sake of short-term profitability than are blue-collar workers."[10]

Finally, the educational advantage of white-collar workers has decreased greatly, because of the increasing educational levels among blue-collar workers. The median number of years of school for clerical and sales workers increased only from 12.4 in 1948 to 12.6 in 1969. For craftsmen and foremen, the increase was from 9.7 to 12.1, and for operatives from 9.1 to 11.1.[11] These figures mean that a typical clerical or sales worker had 2.7 years more education than a skilled industrial worker or foreman in 1948, but only half a year more today.

Office work itself has grown steadily more factorylike as it has expanded, although it generally remains cleaner, quieter, safer and less arduous than most blue-collar work. It is largely built around machines—typewriters, adding machines and, more recently, computers. Jobs have become increasingly specialized as the work has been divided among a larger number of workers. Time-and-motion studies have been applied to office workers as greater use of machines has made production more subject to measurement and regulation. Computers have done little to make most clerical jobs more interesting; punch cards hold little more inherent fascination than file drawers.

There remain significant cultural differences between white- and blue-collar workers. Indeed, they may be the most significant differences left. White- and blue-collar workers often hold different conceptions of "respectability" and desirable life styles. However, even this cultural division has grown less, as the lower white-collar work force has been recruited increasingly from blue- as well as

white-collar backgrounds.[12] Blacks have always been severely underrepresented among white-collar workers, but even this has begun to change; blacks increased from 5 percent of clerical workers in 1960 to 8 percent in 1970.[13]

White-collar workers have yet to reflect in action these changes in their conditions. Like impoverished aristocrats, many white-collar workers still cling to a degree of status based on the past, although it no longer corresponds to their real social position in the present. They often emphasize the status differences between themselves and blue-collar workers, and their closeness to management, even when this undermines their ability to struggle for their own interests. Their declining economic standing and their rapid approach to the position of blue-collar workers have even led at times to what one sociologist labelled "status panic."[14]

The white-collar workers' ties to management have also been maintained by a greater chance for advancement within the management hierarchy—at least for males—than that of blue-collar workers. Male clerical workers are about three times as likely to join management as their blue-collar counterparts.[15] To nurture such a carrot, as well as to keep clerical workers from completely goofing off, many business and government offices have an incredible proportion of supervisors—about one for every three-and-a-half workers.[16] Generally they are working supervisors who, while given responsibility for the work of others, must still continue to perform their own. While issues of favoritism in promotion have become a great source of resentment in many offices, the hope of "moving up into management" remains a potent lure for many white-collar workers. While most blue-collar workers think of themselves as holding jobs, many white-collar workers think in terms of having a career.

Although there have been many indications of growing white-collar discontent,[17] management has so far been able to defuse most of it. Office workers have raised to a high art the transformation of working time into reverie or socializing time, but they have frequently been less willing to stand up for their own interests than blue-collar workers. A young woman we talked with in Detroit who had worked in factories and now was working in the office at Chrysler summed up both the similarities and the differences this way:

> Of course, the people I work with now aren't as militant as the people on the line. For one thing, they come from the suburbs and think of themselves as a little more middle class—though

> everyone knows they're a worker in that they are working to fill someone else's pocket. For another, the conditions aren't quite as bad—it's in an office, the heat doesn't go up to 120 degrees, and the supervisors are a little more polite. Nobody likes the bosses, but they're not hated the way they are in the plants. Every once in a while a production worker shoots a foreman, but the people I work with aren't going to kill any bosses.

The current rapid rise in the cost of living may give a fatal blow to much of the passivity of low-level white-collar workers. While many blue-collar workers have won some degree of compensation for inflation through strikes, unions and cost-of-living escalators, unorganized white-collar workers have little protection beyond the beneficence of their employers. Continued inflation may well lead them to try strikes and organization on a wide scale. For example, in the summer of 1974, employees at Harper & Row conducted one of the first strikes in the history of the book publishing industry. Workers in the publishing industry are highly stratified, but under the pressure of inflation, Harper & Row employees from lower level editors to stock clerks united in an independent employees' organization and stuck together until the strike was won. Such action, should it become widespread, would do much to dissolve the remaining distinctions between the white- and blue-collar sectors of the working class.



Laurie Leifer/Liberation News Service

11. FROM SLAVE TO WORKER

The historical experience of Americans of African origin—forced immigration and slavery—was far different from the experience of those who came from Europe. Even after the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the position of black Americans was distinctive. As the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass, himself an ex-slave, pointed out:

> [Emancipation] left the freedman in a bad condition. It made him free and henceforth he must make his own way in the world. Yet he had none of the conditions of self-preservation or self-protection. He was free from the individual master, but the slave of society. He had neither money, property, nor friends. He was free from the old plantation, but he had nothing but the dusty road under his feet. . . . He was turned loose, naked, hungry, and destitute to the open sky.[1]

Blacks faced the same fundamental situation as white workers—separation from the means of producing what they needed to live—but in a far more extreme form. T. Thomas Fortune, a black editor, wrote in 1884:

> To tell a man he is free when he has neither money nor opportunity is to mock him. To tell him he has no master when he cannot live except by permission of the man who monopolizes all the land is to deal in the most tantalizing contradiction of terms.[2]

Fortune's emphasis on the land was appropriate. Because the South remained primarily agricultural, most of the former slaves had little choice but to work for those who owned the land. In the decades following the Civil War, three out of five black men were employed

in agriculture.[3] While their labor took various forms—sharecropping, tenant farming and wage labor—the reality was generally the same poverty and lack of freedom. W.E.B. DuBois, after the first serious sociological studies of the subject, concluded at the turn of the century that "the keynote of the Black Belt is debt. . . in the sense of continued inability of the mass of the population to make income cover expenses." His detailed statistical study of one county in Georgia found that with average agricultural conditions, "the majority of tenants end the year even or in debt, which means they work for board and clothes."[4] As late as the mid-1930s, an observer of an Alabama cotton county could write: "The plantation technique . . . has survived more or less despite the formal abolition of slavery."[5]

A large proportion of those not engaged in agriculture were concentrated in such largely rural work as lumbering, coal mining and railroading, with many workers shifting back and forth between those and farming. The small proportion who lived in cities worked in what came to be labelled as "Negro jobs," such as domestic and personal service, porters, draymen, laundresses and seamstresses. Black artisans—more common than white ones in the South before the Civil War—were increasingly excluded from the skilled trades. Blacks were excluded from the burgeoning textile industry, except for such jobs as sweeping and scrubbing.[6] In all areas, they were forced into the worst jobs and the worst living conditions.

Until World War I, blacks remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural South. But in 1915 there began the "great migration" which was eventually to lead to a complete transformation of blacks from predominantly southern rural farmers to predominantly northern urban workers. The initial trigger for this change came primarily from the labor shortage created in northern industry when European immigration was cut off by World War I. A government report, *Negro Migration in 1916–17*, found:

> Employment managers and the higher executives of Northern industry are sadly worried by their labor problems. They feel that things are going from bad to worse; that even wage increases can avail little. . . . The majority of executives interviewed were favorable to the experiment with Negro employment in the North, and were sympathetic to suggestions concerning selection, training, housing, and recreation for the newcomer.[7]

Railroad and steel companies sent labor agents south to offer jobs and transportation subsidies, while blacks already working in the North wrote home about the new chances for employment. A survey

of major Chicago employers of black workers found that "inability to obtain competent white workers was the reason given in practically every instance for the large number of Negroes employed since 1914."[8] Between 1910 and 1920, the black population of Chicago more than doubled; that of Detroit increased sevenfold. This mass migration, slowed by depressions and rapidly accelerated by wars and other industrial labor shortages, has continued through today.

The pull from the cities was reinforced by a push off the land. Cotton prices collapsed early in the Great Depression, average acreage was cut in half and landowners converted tenants to wage workers or dismissed them entirely in order to take advantage of New Deal agricultural subsidies. Between 1930 and 1940, the number of black farm operators and laborers decreased by one-third.[9] Forced migrations began again after World War II, when the introduction of tractors and herbicides changed cotton production from year-round to seasonal labor. During the 1950s, cotton harvesting was further mechanized, and black farm workers, left with no employment on the land, had little choice but to migrate to the city or to starve. A tenant farmer in Humphreys County, Mississippi, indicated why:

> There used to be a whole lot more people on the plantation than there are now. The machines started long back in '50. I believe it really started back in '53, '54. Then every year they begin to get more and more, more and more, and that begin to cut people down out of the pickin', you know. In other words, before that they were pickin' all the crop. Then after machines got in, they started pickin' ends, see. And so now, the biggest of 'em not pickin' none.[10]

Since 1940, four million blacks have left the land. Their largely forced migration forms the background for many of the racial problems of today's cities.

Within the cities, there developed a separate labor market for black workers, which remains today. Only certain industries and particular firms within those industries normally hire black workers. A survey sampling companies in Chicago, for example, found that seven out of ten small firms, one out of five medium-sized firms, and one in thirteen large firms did not hire nonwhites, even in the late 1960s.[11] These patterns are perpetuated not only by employer prejudice, but by the geographic concentration of blacks in ghetto areas, and by the fact that many companies fill jobs with the friends and relatives of their own workers.

Further, there usually exists a racial hierarchy within each com-

were created to justify inequality; an irrational amalgam of hate and fear was added, often as a means to rally all whites behind a racial domination that benefited the ruling white minority.

Once established, racial identification and the emotions that went with it—however irrational—tended to perpetuate themselves. Howard Kalado described to us the way such attitudes were adopted by those who grew up in his white neighborhood in Gary, Indiana:

> There is a deeply ingrained racism. I remember when I was young—every game was "catch a nigger"; if you smoked your cigarette funny you did it in a "nigger way"; everything was nigger this, nigger that.

Blacks have fought their oppression in many ways. Slave revolts began in the United States almost as soon as slavery—they could not be victorious only because slaves remained a minority, even in the South. Since emancipation, black strategies have reflected changing social conditions, different interests among blacks of different classes and varying responses among different groups of whites. Some strategies have involved alliances with the white upper classes; by such means, blacks at the turn of the century won financial support for black education and entry into many industries as strikebreakers. Some strategies have involved alliances with liberal whites to challenge discrimination through legal and political action; such were the civil rights movements of the 1950s and early '60s. Some attempted to build up the economic and social power of the black community itself through cooperatives, black businesses and nationalist organizations; this was the strategy of the massive movement led by Marcus Garvey after World War I, and of the "black power" movement of the late 1960s. Some involved using the mass power of black ghetto dwellers to disrupt urban life as a means of protesting their condition; the riots of the late sixties were largely such a protest. And some have involved cooperation with working-class whites against their employers and other shared enemies; the Populist movement at its peak in the late nineteenth century, the industrial union movements of the 1930s and a number of recent attempts at militant direct action at work exemplified this approach.

Antagonism between whites and blacks has often been exploited by employers to divide workers along race lines and prevent their recognition of common interests. As early as 1877, for example, a coal company imported four hundred black workers from Kentucky and West Virginia to break a strike by coal miners in Braidwood, Illinois.[15] In the great 1919 steel strike, the employers imported

30,000 to 40,000 black workers as strikebreakers. And in the 1930s, Henry Ford tried to use his black employees to organize a rival union to split the United Auto Workers. Hundreds of similar examples could be found before and since; use of black strikebreakers, in fact, became a standard element of employer strikebreaking strategy.

The reactions of white workers to the entry of black workers has been marked by two conflicting tendencies. Often white workers have seen the entry of blacks as a direct threat to their security and living standards, and have acted along racial lines to exclude blacks from their jobs and neighborhoods.

This reached its most organized form in the skilled craft unions, many of which to this day exclude all but a token number of black workers. It has also involved sporadic violence. During the peak migration periods of World Wars I and II, for example, dozens of blacks were shot and stoned to death by white crowds in such cities as Chicago, East St. Louis and Detroit. Desire to "get away from blacks" has been one, though by no means the basic, motivation for the migration of many whites to the suburbs. Steven Harper, who was working at a tool-making shop in the solidly white Detroit suburb of Warren, told us: "Everyone who's there is white, and they'd like to keep it that way out in Warren."

Yet there has also been a strong tendency in the opposite direction. As black workers became part of the general labor force, it became apparent to many workers that, whatever their personal racial feelings, they were cutting their own throats and playing into the hands of their employers if they allowed themselves to be divided along racial lines. The following atypical, but by no means unique, statement came from a business agent of the Carpenters and Joiners Union in Savannah, Georgia, in 1902:

> In Georgia they [Negroes] must be organized. I was born and raised among them; my father once owned some of them, and I know them. . . . We are always in competition with them. The contractors prefer them because they can get them cheap. . . . So I say we must organize them; for if we can afford to work all day on a scaffold beside them, then we can surely afford to meet them in the hall for an hour or so once in a while. . . . The mere fact that all of the boss builders in the South are advocating leaving the negroes out of the union is a good reason why we should organize them. . . . Let the good work go on, and let us hope for the day when there will be equal rights for all and special privileges to none. . . .[16]

The United Mine Workers and the industrial union movements of the 1930s and 1940s represented on a massive scale just this kind of

interracial cooperation along class lines. Even in the deep South, instances of such unity across race lines can be found from the New Orleans General Strike of 1892 to the Mississippi pulpwood cutters' strike of 1971.

In the social context of such movements, individual racial attitudes proved subject to change as well. A black woman named Sylvia Woods described one example from her experience as an assembly-line worker and union activist in a Chicago war plant during World War II. She told how another black woman's seniority rights entitled her to enter a department where no blacks had ever worked before:

> Selma was a fiery little thing and she was single minded that she would go in there. . . . They [white workers in the department] said that if Selma came in, they would walk out.

Sylvia and a white woman active in the union told them that if they walked out, their jobs would simply be filled:

> They stayed. Nobody left. About two weeks later, there was an opening for a steward and they nominated Selma to be steward. Selma was elected.

Sylvia Woods described one of the men in that department, whose job they had saved on another occasion:

> That guy changed and he worked for Selma. He became one of the best union members in the shop. We threw a party one night and he came—this southerner who didn't want a black to do anything—he brought his wife and children. We used to call him Tennessee. I danced with him that night. It was really something.

The conclusion she drew:

> You have to tell people things that they can see. Then they'll say, "Oh, I never thought of that" or "I have never seen it like that." I have seen it done. Like Tennessee. He hated black people. A poor sharecropper who only came up here to earn enough money to go back and buy the land he had been renting. After the plant closed he went back there with a different outlook on life. He danced with a black woman. He was elected steward and you just couldn't say anything to a black person. So, I have seen people change.[17]

The most impressive interracial cooperation we have found anywhere in America is that which has been created by black and white workers at work, especially in the day-to-day struggle with the employer.[18] Over and over in our discussions and interviews we heard the same pattern described to us: Individuals may harbor racist attitudes in private or away from work, but at work they treat each other as individuals, irrespective of race, and cooperate fully across race lines. A steelworker in Cleveland summed it up: "Cleveland is a racist city, but that doesn't impede cooperation at work." Perhaps the most striking statement of this pattern we heard was made by Jerry Sands, a black auto worker we talked with in Detroit. He worked at the Pontiac, Michigan, General Motors plant, a plant which is notorious for having been closed down by white workers when an anti-school-busing group put picket lines around the plant. He told us:

> Don't get me wrong; I'm not saying that race is not a factor—all you have to do is look at what's written on the walls in the bathroom to know it's there.[19] But it has no effect on how people act. Our plant is one-third black, one-third white and one-third Chicano, but when it comes to the way we organize ourselves on the job, everybody works together pretty well.

In most of these situations, people continued to socialize along racial lines. Jerry Sands told us, "Blacks eat with each other or with Chicanos." And a Detroit steelworker likewise reported that blacks tended to eat and socialize with blacks and whites with whites, although young blacks were friendly when he was with them. But everyone we talked with agreed that these divisions had little effect on action.

There seemed to be significant differences in racial attitudes among people of different ages. A Detroit steelworker told us: "Older white workers will make racist comments, but I never heard a younger white make one." Jerry Sands said: "The very old whites and the young ones are the least racist—the in-between age group is the worst." And an assembler at a factory in Cleveland told us:

> About 60 percent of those at my shop are black or third world people. Everyone gets along all right. The young guys socialize; it's considered square not to. Blacks and whites go to parties at each others' homes.

He also brought up a theme we ran into often:

> Whites admire the solidarity of blacks against the company. When I first started working here, I saw the black guys sitting down when they finished working, so I sat down too. A white kid came up to me and said, "Don't sit down, the boss will get on you." I said, "What do you mean, those guys are sitting down." He said, "Well, they're afraid to do anything to the blacks." So I said, "Shit, we should all sit down and let them be afraid of all of us."

Andrew Korenko expressed a similar admiration:

> They've got a good attitude toward the work—they just aren't very interested in it. They stick together better than the rest of the workers, and they get away with a lot more. The bosses are really scared of them. I never heard a boss yell at a black man. One guy came in six days out of the past two months and they still couldn't fire him.

"Why can't they?" we asked. "He's got too many friends," he replied.[20]

For most people, whether or not they act on the basis of race depends largely on the situation they are in and the people they are with. Racial identity is one of the frameworks within which people see themselves and others—but only one. When this racial framework is applied, it can lead to the most outrageous acts, ranging from lynching and murder to the subtlest humiliations. When the framework is not applied, people who might well be labelled "racist" in other contexts can treat people of different races as genuine friends, and cooperate with them in pursuit of common goals.[21] To the extent that people feel the need to stick together on the basis of their common interests as workers, they will find that the entire framework of racism is one of the obstacles they must—and can—overcome.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, many blacks turned to direct action on a massive scale to improve their social position. This action occurred at a time when most white workers experienced rising living standards and a relative satisfaction with the status quo. The result was that black militance was often viewed as a threat to the established well-being of the white majority. With the rise of widespread discontent in that same white majority, however, the relation between white and black could change radically. A renewed militance among blacks might well come to be seen by white workers not as a threat but as an ally in efforts to change a system from which they both suffer.

12. WOMEN AND WORK

The early American family, as we saw in Part I, was largely self-sufficient. Within it, work was usually divided by sex, with the particular tasks assigned men and women varying with traditions, conditions and the inclination of the particular family. Most often men did the field labor and building, whereas women tended cattle, gardened, doctored, cooked, kept house, cared for children and conducted such household industries as soapmaking, weaving, spinning, clothesmaking, dairy and other food processing—the list could go on and on.[1] Within such a family the ancient common-law assumptions that women were not independent individuals but rather subordinates to male authority met with little challenge. As Blackstone's authoritative *Commentaries* on the common law put it:

> The husband and the wife are one person. . . ; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated . . . into that of her husband.[2]

The transition from an economy of individual proprietors to one of employees affected women quite differently from men. The first factory workers, as we have seen, were young women who planned to work for a few years before getting married. Most women married late in their twenties, and it gradually became common for them first to go out to work—the majority in domestic service, factory work or teaching. By 1890 an estimated half of all women worked for pay outside the home for part of the eight to ten years between leaving school and getting married.[3]

Almost all women stopped working when they married. While reliable figures are hard to come by, Robert W. Smuts estimates that in 1890, only about 5 percent of all married women worked for money outside their homes.[4] The work required of most wives in the home remained great. Women gave birth to many more children than

today, and therefore spent much more time either pregnant or caring for their offspring. The social belief that "a woman's place is in the home," while no longer considered so applicable to unmarried women, continued to serve as a block to the employment of those who were married. If family income was too small for survival, women might sew or perform other work at home for an employer on a piece-rate basis. But only in cases where their husbands were unable to work because of illness, unemployment or alcoholism were married women likely to work outside the home. As late as 1940, only 15 percent of married women were in the labor force.[5] Raising children and keeping house remained the main labor for most women.

The picture began to change with World War II. The extraordinary shortage of labor led employers and the government to undertake a massive campaign to recruit women for work—even for jobs in heavy industry and other male preserves. Work suddenly became a mark of patriotism, not disgrace, even for married women. Just between 1940 and 1944, the percentage of wives in the labor force increased nearly 50 percent.[6] Massive daycare facilities were set up to allow mothers to work. Centuries of belief that "women's place is in the home" went by the boards in a few short months. Polls of women war workers at the beginning of the war indicated that 95 percent wanted to quit when the war was over, but a similar poll near the end of the war showed that two-thirds wanted to continue at work in permanent jobs.[7]

After the war, women were pushed out of many jobs by men returning from the military; many others voluntarily quit to start families they had delayed for the duration of the war. Magazines again began to extoll the virtues of women in the home. But a return to the prewar pattern proved not to be in the cards. By 1950 a higher proportion of wives were in the labor force than at the peak of the war in 1944, and the proportion has continued to rise steadily, until today almost half of all wives work during any given year—and the overwhelming majority work at some point during the course of their marriage.[8] This constitutes a dramatic change in the lives of women and the worlds of both work and family.

Several factors have contributed to this change. The ages at which women marry and have children have dropped by roughly seven years, and women have generally had fewer and fewer children, except for the "baby boom" decade following World War II. Since, on the average, women marry before they reach twenty-one and have their last child by the time they are thirty, they have many more years of reduced child-rearing responsibilities during which their children

are in school or grown up.[9] The advent of such new technologies as running water and central heating has lightened many traditional household tasks; backyard agriculture and kitchen industries have been taken over by commercial processing; and hospitals have replaced much home nursing. These developments made housekeeping potentially less time-consuming. The economy provided growing employment for women, particularly in low-level clerical occupations and part-time and semicasual jobs in retail stores and services. Under these conditions, older social beliefs about the proper place of married women in the home lingered, but had less and less effect on whether women actually worked. Today, about 60 percent of women work during the course of a year.[10]

The main reason women take jobs was put succinctly by the U.S. Department of Labor:

> Most women in the labor force work because they or their families need the money they can earn—some work to raise family living standards above the level of poverty or deprivation; others, to help meet rising costs of food, education for their children, medical care, and the like. The majority of women do not have the option of working solely for personal fulfillment.[11]

In 1970, barely one-third of all women in the labor force were married to husbands who made $7000 or more a year. The other two-thirds were either single, widowed, divorced or separated—usually supporting themselves and often children as well—or married to men who made less than $7000. These women were hardly working for "pin money." Their work was either an economic necessity for their survival, or the difference between a family life of deprivation and one of relative comfort.

Of course, dire necessity is not the only reason women want to work. A student at a Boston commuter college said: "I think both husband and wife should work so they can travel around some before they start having kids." But more typical was a licensed practical nurse in Cleveland who told us:

> Most of the nurses I work with are working simply because they have to. A large proportion of them have children but no husbands—they're divorced, they have illegitimate kids or they've lost their husbands. And most of the rest need the money almost as much.

Most married women, whether they work or not, have a full-time job at home as housekeepers and often childkeepers as well. A steelworker, describing the pressures that changing shifts at work put on families, said: "A lot of guys have traditional family lives where the wife stays at home most of the time. Taking care of the house almost has to be a full-time job for somebody when you're working this way." (Nonetheless, his own wife held down a full-time job herself in an auto plant on the far side of Cleveland.)

Many women find the boredom and social isolation of housework worse than having to take a job: "I just can't imagine sitting around home all the time knitting and doing nothing." We met Linda and her husband Larry, a pipefitter, when we camped one night in a parking lot next to their house in an aging suburb of Steubenville, Ohio. They were about thirty, and Linda told us she had two kids, one five, the other two. A few years before she had started studying to be a nurse, got trained as a lab technician and worked at the local hospital—until she got pregnant. When Tim said he was on a layoff, she said bitterly:

> I've been on a layoff too—for the last six years. I wish I could go back to work at the hospital, at least in the afternoon, but Larry here won't baby-sit for the kids. It gets on your nerves after a while, the little monsters. I go stir crazy sitting at home all day.

A young woman we met from Pittsburgh gave us a fairly typical account of what the women she worked with in a garment factory did with their children while they worked:

> Their kids either stayed with grandmother or other relations, or in either legal or illegal daycare. Often a neighbor took care of ten or twenty kids. The going rate was somewhere around $10 per week per kid, so that women with three kids were paying half their income for daycare.

After describing conditions in the factory that rivaled the horrors of a nineteenth-century sweatshop, she added: "When women told me they were working there to get out of the house, I figured things had to be pretty bad at home."

Women by no means enter the labor force on equal terms with men. From the beginning they have been concentrated in low-paying and insecure "women's jobs" and underrepresented or excluded altogether from those with better pay and job security. As early as 1829, a Boston newspaper editorialized:

> Custom and long habit have closed the doors of very many employments against the industry and perserverence of woman. She has been taught to deem so many occupations masculine, and made for men only that, excluded by a mistaken deference to the world's opinion from innumerable labors most happily adapted to her physical constitution, the competition for the few places left open to her has occasioned a reduction in the estimated value of her labor, until it has fallen below the minimum and is no longer adequate. . . .[12]

The job segregation of women was borne out by a government study of the payroll records of 150,000 employees made in 1885–86. It found only 800 instances where men and women were employed in the same job classification by the same employer, and in 600 of these, the men's wages were higher than women's by an average of one-third.[13] Nor has this segregation disappeared; recent research indicates that it has declined little since the turn of the century.[14]

In 1970, women who worked full time all year round made only 60 percent as much as men.[15] Far from getting better, this "income gap" has been growing worse—back in the mid-1950s, women earned 64 percent as much as men.[16] And in reality the "income gap" is far worse, since 60 percent of women workers were employed either part time or, even more commonly, only part of the year.

Part of the "income gap" is the result of employers simply paying women less than men for the same work. A Department of Labor study in 1963, when such discrimination was still legal, found many job orders even at public employment offices

> offering men higher wages or salaries than were offered to women for the same job. The orders covered a variety of occupations and industries. One offered $3,600 a year for a male clerk-typist and only $3,000 for a woman. Another, seeking an accounting clerk, quoted a rate of $1.80 for a man and $1.45 for a woman. Over one-half of the orders listed had wage differentials ranging from 11 to 25 percent of the men's rate.[17]

Even more significant than such unequal pay for equal work is the problem pointed out in the Boston editorial 145 years ago—the crowding of women into a few, low-paying occupations. Between 1947 and 1968, the number of women in the labor force increased by 75 percent, while the number of men increased only 16 percent.[18] Yet, as the National Manpower Council concluded:

> The growth in the employment of women appears to have been accomplished more through increased employment in occupations held by women and by the emergence of new "women's" occupations than through the entrance of women into occupations formerly considered exclusively male.[19]

The most important growth in women's employment has been in clerical work; since 1940, women have increased from one-half to three-fourths of all clerical workers.[20] Today, one-third of all women workers are clerical workers[21] and their earnings have declined dramatically relative to male clerical workers since World War II.[22] The next most important growth was in nonhousehold service work—one of the lowest paid of all job categories.[23] More than 70 percent of working women were employed in these two categories or in low-paying operative and sales occupations.[24] Women were severely underrepresented among the higher-paying professional, technical and managerial jobs, and barely 1 percent of women were craftsmen or foremen.[25] One woman, who had been working at low-paying garment and waitress jobs, described this exclusion to us as she experienced it. She loved carpentry and had tried over and over to find work as a carpenter; she had also tried to break into other skilled trades or some of the better-paying industrial jobs in the Pittsburgh area; in every case, she told us: "I ran into a stone wall."

Needless to say, employers do not willingly make available information which documents women's inferior jobs and pay. But as a result of a Pentagon Papers-style exploit on the part of an unknown office worker, we can see exactly what it meant at one company. In 1973, a group of women passed out leaflets protesting discrimination against women in the downtown Loop district in Chicago. A few days later, to their surprise, there arrived the entire salary list for the General Office of Kraft Foods, one of the companies they had leafletted—evidently passed on by a worker in the office. When the women made known the salary information, Kraft evidently panicked. We were told:

> The result was a massive security drive. Overtime was cancelled for secretaries. Four approvals were needed to get material out of the files. It probably put them months behind. In fact if that happened everywhere, the Loop might close down without our doing anything.

An analysis of the salary list showed the extremes the "earnings

gap'' could take: The 572 men employed at Kraft averaged $19,000 a year, while the 442 women averaged only $8000 a year. Women were severely underrepresented in professional positions and were paid less in most of them—even if they had been on the job a longer time. Women held 80 percent of the nonprofessional jobs—and earned $7400 a year compared with $12,300 for the men in such jobs. Some examples of job discrimination:

> DUPLICATING MACHINE OPERATOR
>
> Three women hired in 1971 make less than a man who started at the same time.
>
> INTERMEDIATE CLERK
>
> Two men hired since 1972 earn more than any of the women in this category even though 70 women have greater seniority.
>
> A man hired in 1973 makes an average of $3,000 more than any of the women hired that year (9 women).
>
> A man hired in 1972 makes an average of $2,500 more than any of the women hired that year (36 women).
>
> MAIL CLERK
>
> Of twelve employees in this category (three women and nine men), no women are senior mail clerks.[26]

Finally, women are concentrated in industries with small, competitive, marginal companies. Three-fifths of women work in the distribution of goods and services.[27] The 20 percent engaged in manufacturing are overrepresented in light industries such as apparel, textiles and food processing.[28] An analysis by Mary Stevenson of the University of Massachusetts at Boston indicates that about one-third of the ''wage gap'' for semiskilled occupations was due to the fact that

> men are in the more profitable and powerful industries. The labor market assigns women to those industries which are not capable of paying higher wages because of the economic environment in which they operate.[29]

There are a number of reasons women are concentrated in inferior jobs. One is sheer prejudice about their capacities. Another pilfered document which came into our possession by entirely illegitimate means indicates how strong the stereotypes about women remain. It is a section of the *Supervisor's Manual for State Employees of the State of Massachusetts,* dealing with ''Women in Government,'' in use at least until 1968. It was prepared by a professor at the Bureau of Business and Industrial Training at Northwestern University. Among the ''Facts'' it listed about women were:

> Finger dexterity far superior to man.
> Women 10 times more nervous than men.
> Women more patient in repetitive jobs.
> Well suited for work involving exactness.

The Manual gave this description of "The Female Mind":

> Women are identificationists.
> Women are subjective.
> Women are intuitive.
> Women indulge in fantasy.
> Women have fuller emotional lives than men.

It stated that the

> role of achievers still belongs to men. . . . Women as a rule don't seek job promotion—their emotions are secure in a limited job.

And perhaps most devastating of all:

> Women sometimes think Government and industry is silly.

With such attitudes prevalent, it is little wonder that women have found it necessary to protest male chauvinism.

A second reason for discrimination against women has been the policy of those professionals and skilled workers who can control their own labor markets. Doctors, lawyers and other predominantly male professionals have held the number of women allowed to practice to a minimum through control of professional education and training. Similarly, craft unions have excluded women almost entirely from skilled trades through closed shops and apprenticeship provisions, as part of their general policy of narrowing the competition for skilled jobs as much as possible. An attitude of male vanity and scorn for women has at times accompanied this approach.

Another reason women are excluded from better jobs is the work/life pattern most women share. Many young women enter the labor force at first for only a few years, then leave to marry or to have children. When they return to work, many still feel free to quit, believing their main responsibility is at home. This, combined with traditional prejudice, makes many employers reluctant to take on women, no matter how qualified they may be, for jobs involving extensive training or responsibility.

Employers are more than willing to perpetuate and exploit the casual character of the women's labor market. One "highly placed

executive in a mammoth insurance company," for example, told researchers from Columbia University that "tender-minded academics" were "downright naive" in their concern about worker turnover. It was his "informed opinion" that clerical personnel

> are easily trained for their jobs, that if they stayed on in large numbers they would become wage problems—we'd have to keep raising them or end up fighting with them; they would form unions and who knows what the hell else. It's better to hire girls who are too well educated to *stay* happy with the jobs we assign them to do. That way they get out before it's too late.[30]

Because of the discrimination against women in other spheres, those companies which do hire women find a tremendous labor surplus, and therefore are able to hold wages to a minimum—if one woman is dissatisfied with conditions, an employer can count on finding another who will put up with them. Substandard wages for women allow many marginal employers to survive and permit other employers to make extra profits.

From the point of view of business as a whole, those women who are not working constitute what a U.S. Labor Department publication calls a "labor force reserve."[31] The government's *Handbook on Women Workers* put it neatly: "Women 16 years of age and over who are not in the labor force make up a womanpower reserve—a potential source of additional workers who might be needed in an expanding economy or in time of national emergency."[32] In the meantime, this reserve of unemployed potential workers shows up in no unemployment statistics, receives no unemployment compensation, and doesn't walk the streets requesting or demanding jobs. It represents a hidden unemployment which holds down the wages of the employed without generating the social disruption that usually accompanies massive unemployment.

Women have long struggled against their subordinate position in the labor force and in society. They have conducted many of the most militant strikes in the history of the American labor movement. At the same time, they have had to organize to fight their subordination within male-dominated unions. In the first decades of the twentieth century, a strong feminist movement won the right to vote and an end to the legal inequalities under which "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended. . . ." During the late 1960s, a new woman's movement developed, attacking the unequal position of women in every sphere of life and trying to overcome the willingness of women to accept that position. The struggles of these

peting labor, by ensuring low wages for their own wives, daughters and mothers, and by undermining solidarity against the employer on the job. The assumption of many women that they are working only temporarily and therefore need not organize to fight back on the job guarantees inferior conditions for themselves and all women. Until people accept these realities, they will be victimized by them.

The Great Depression of the 1930s shattered such hopes at the same time that it destroyed living standards. The willingness to work and work hard became by no means a guarantee of survival, let alone well-being. Under these conditions, workers who might have been satisfied with quite modest living standards had to turn to dramatic forms of mass struggle—anti-eviction riots, sitdown strikes, mass picketing, general strikes—to win enough to live on and a faint hope of security. Those who lived through the thirties often retain a tradition of militance, combined with a preoccupation with job security and economic survival.

World War II marked the end of the Great Depression. For most people, despite long hours, rationing, shortages and the draft, it meant a great improvement in conditions of life. Moreover, there was a widespread sense that if everybody would pull together to win the war, they could hope for prosperity and improving conditions when it was over.

The decades following World War II were indeed marked by a substantial improvement in living conditions for most people. Rising wages, relatively full employment and an increasing proportion of working wives caused the real income of American families to increase by about one-third between 1946 and 1968.[1] Living standards rose even faster than real income, as consumer debt grew from $6 billion to $86 billion in the twenty years following World War II.[2] Work became far less seasonal, allowing steady employment to groups that before had been chronically unemployed. Seniority provisions and union grievance procedures likewise increased job security substantially. Social security, unemployment insurance, workman's compensation, pension plans and welfare programs created an at least partially guaranteed basis of survival for those who were not at work.

These conditions represented a tremendous contrast to the recent past. For a worker who had expected impoverishment and insecurity, life may well have turned out far better than expected. A study of auto workers who had moved to a San Jose suburb in the mid-1950s gave an apt description of the way many of them regarded their recent experience:

> Here I am the son of a sharecropper with a ninth-grade education and no really saleable skills, and look at me: I'm paying off a nice new home, have a good car (often two), my kids and my wife are decently dressed; she has a washing machine, I have some power tools; what more do I have a right to expect?[3]

auto plant in Detroit, added that young workers are much more likely to walk out over such issues as heat, speed-up and firings than are the older workers.

Another expression of new attitudes was the dramatic rise of absenteeism during the latter 1960s. A woman who had worked in a small auto parts plant in Detroit for twenty years, herself an old radical, told us:

> The present absenteeism represents something very different from past forms of resistance. In the past, workers have generally tried to make everyone act the same way, do the same things, out of a sense of fear. Today, there is no longer such a pressure for conformity among workers. Through absenteeism, the kids have won something that could potentially revolutionize life in the auto industry—part-time work. We know one kid, Steven, who works just Mondays and Fridays, and makes enough to get by.

Someone broke in to say, "Of course, he missed three days in the first four weeks—he just couldn't bring himself to get up that early in the morning." "Oh well," someone else chimed in, "I guess they'll just have to hire a part-time part-timer for the days when the part-timers don't come in."

Stories about absenteeism, whether real or apocryphal, were often told with glee. Perhaps the most widespread described a foreman asking a worker, "Joe, how come you're coming into work four days a week?" "Because I can't make a living in three," came the reply. We were told of a coal mine near Pittsburgh whose night shift was mostly younger workers. One night only eighteen of sixty workers on the shift showed up. The next day the boss called them in and dressed them down. When he threatened to fire them, they all broke into applause. Astounded, he asked why. "If you fire us, we'll all get $93 a week unemployment and won't have to work for forty-two weeks," came the reply.

Of course, the desires and life pattern of many people who grew up in the 1950s and '60s closely follow those of their parents' generation. We talked with a pipefitter in Wintersville, Ohio, a suburb of Steubensville, who was an extreme example. His father had been a pipefitter before him; at his death, he and his brothers had taken up the trade. When we asked him how he liked living in Wintersville, his only reply was, "Oh, yeah, there's plenty of work around here with the mills and all the industries in this area, and that's for me."

But in general, the differences among the different generations are

visible in almost any workplace; they were described to us over and over again. Andrew Korenko at Republic Steel in Cleveland told us:

> You can see very definite differences in attitude among age groups. You can see it both in the union officials and in the regular workers. The old timers—say over fifty-five—tend to be all right. The two grievers who are fifty-five and sixty are right on their job. The old guys are full of stories about the struggle to get the union in. They'll tell you the union isn't what it used to be, that people didn't used to put up with the kind of shit they do now. The guys, say, thirty-three to fifty-five are a whole different story. The ones that hold positions in the union are still under the influence of David McDonald. They'll actually talk about cotrusteeship.

He shook his head. We asked him why he thought they were that way.

> I've wondered about that myself. These were guys that came into the mills after World War II and the Korean War. They worked themselves up to the better jobs. A lot of them came up from the South; they started off poor and ended up pretty well set up. In their terms they were successful, and they were into that whole thing.

We asked about the younger people.

> Their attitude toward the job is all right. They don't think they're going any place. A few are taking positions in the union, but most of them don't have anything to do with it. Mostly they are into absenteeism. I'm a pretty regular worker myself—I must have missed a month in the past year or so.

During the 1960s, the shift in attitudes that began with young people caused some friction between generations—the notorious "generation gap." When young people with long hair, bandanas, patched blue jeans and a fondness for pot first began appearing at work, they were frequently met with disdain and contempt by the older workers. Similarly, an older woman who had been an auto worker for many years in Detroit told us that older workers resented the absenteeism of younger workers somewhat, seeing it as improper. "They'll ask, 'How can you possibly live?' " But in the past several years, the polarization between young and old at work seems to have softened considerably. Younger workers told us over and over again that the people over thirty with whom they worked were

stifling, self-denying and subject to authoritarian discipline as those in industrial production. (While the student movement of the 1960s raised issues that were varied and far-reaching, much of its impetus came from students' rejection of an education whose purpose they saw as processing them to be mere cogs within the social machine.) But by the beginning of the 1970s, it had become difficult for college graduates even to get "college jobs" at all. Among young people who received B.A. degrees in 1970 and 1971 and did not go on to graduate school, there was an 8.5 percent unemployment rate; for those who majored in the humanities, the rate was 13 percent. Of those working, 42 percent were in fields not directly related to their college major.[8] By 1973, a Boston newspaperman reported:

> Anyone travelling around the city daily will encounter cab drivers with law degrees, waitresses with graduate training in social work or special education, English Ph.D. candidates who moonlight as nannies or shoe salesmen.[9]

Under such circumstances, the slogan "for a good job, get a good education" rang somewhat hollow. As a student at the University of Massachusetts at Boston said:

> When I was a kid, everyone said, "Stay in school, stay in school," so I finished high school. I worked for a while, and they told me if I wanted to do anything I had to go to college. So here I am. I know if I ever get out of here, they're going to tell me to go to graduate school. And then I declare they'll tell me I need a Ph.D. And you know what: when I get that, I still won't be able to do what I want to do. It just seems like all my yeses, they've got a no to.

The general sense of social deterioration was aggravated by the Vietnam War. Like World War II, the Vietnam War left a powerful mark on those who experienced it, whether as GIs or at home. The ex-marine explained part of why the impact of the Vietnam War was so different from World War II:

> World War II was the focus of all life at home. You should see the ads in magazines like National Geographic to get a feel for the times. There's a GI in every ad, or else farmers on tractors with flags or pictures of Hitler being beaten over the head with a corn cob. A Bell and Howell ad said, we'll make cameras for you after the war, but now we're making bomb sights. The theme was we're all making a common sacrifice. Everyone

> I got out of the service in March. I was in 'Nam. They got all these programs to hire the vet—didn't do me much good. It took me two months to find this job.

Such experiences, combined with the traditions of resistance to military authority that developed during the course of the war, have helped to make veterans an unusually militant force when they returned to jobs back home. A steelworker in Gary reported:

> Vietnam vets won't take the shit the others do—they'll yell at the foremen and stuff like that.

An auto worker in Detroit confirmed this:

> A lot of the younger workers come out of the army, and they've had it with authority. They aren't willing to take any more shit.

The experience of the war has likewise weakened the reflex support for the state and its officials among the population as a whole, especially young people. According to surveys by pollster Daniel Yankelovich, the proportion of young workers who say they consider patriotism "a very important value" dropped from 60 percent in 1969 to 40 percent in 1974. An opinion survey by Daniel Starch in 1973 found that if Japan, Israel, Thailand, South Vietnam or Greece were "threatened by Communist invasion and takeover," a majority of Americans would be opposed to sending American troops. And willingness to serve in the military has dropped sharply. The veterans counselor quoted earlier told us:

> The army is having trouble recruiting because the whole attitude toward authority has changed. Many kids would rather wash car windows than go in the army—they figure at least you're free.

Most current members of the working class, whatever their race, sex or occupation, have shared two important historical experiences. First, they have shared the expanding aspirations that made a steady job and an adequate income no longer a sufficient definition of a good life. Second, they have shared the deterioration in real incomes and general social conditions of the past few years, which have made it harder and harder just to get by.

It is possible, though unlikely, that in the face of hard times the expanded aspirations that developed in the 1960s will simply fade away as unrealistic dreams from a happier era. Whether such desires

Scott Custin/Action

pathized with the resistance movement, and refused to suppress it when royal governors were foolhardy enough to muster them.[7] Local Sons of Liberty groups prepared to resist should the British army be turned against them. Groups in several states even formally agreed

> to march with the utmost dispatch, at their own proper costs and expense, on the first proper notice (which must be signified to them by at least six of the sons of liberty) with their whole force if required . . . to the relief of those that shall, are, or may be in danger from the stamp act.[8]

Despite its relative militance, the movement against the Stamp Act remained limited in its objectives. Except for the issue of "taxation without representation," British rule of the colonies was never questioned; even the agreement for military cooperation quoted above declared "most unshaken faith and true allegiance to his Majesty King George the Third."[9] Blame for the oppression of the colonies was invariably placed, not on the British king, Parliament or nation, but rather on their agents. When, under the pressure of the American resistance movement, the British Parliament revoked the Stamp Act less than two years after its passage, the Sons of Liberty movement felt it had accomplished its purpose and quickly dissolved.[10]

The British government, however, was still in a financial bind, and in 1767 replaced the Stamp Act with a new set of taxes on American imports. The colonists replied with a renewed boycott of all British goods, backed by a "Nonimportation Agreement." The Nonimportation Association which enforced it began as a peaceful and legal movement to demand a change in British law. Its objective was at first limited to repeal of the new taxes; the royal governor of Massachusetts reported in 1770: "In other matters which have no relation to this dispute between Kingdom and Colonies, Government retains its vigour and the administration of it is attended with no unusual difficulties."[11]

As time went on, however, the Nonimportation Associations found themselves forced to take more and more power over the actual running of American society, until they became virtual countergovernments. In New England, the Town Meeting served as a means for "uniting the whole body of the people"[12] into the movement. Elsewhere, mass meetings served the same purpose. In Charlestown, South Carolina, for example, what started as a series of meetings of artisans and others to urge participation in the boycott

developed into a "General Meeting of inhabitants" at the town "liberty tree," to discuss not only enforcement of the Nonimportation Agreement, but also "other Matters for the General Good."[13] Association committees held hearings, took testimony and examined the records of those suspected of violating the agreement, judged their guilt and imposed sanctions on violators, much like courts of law. Those found guilty were subjected to social ostracism, visits by angry crowds and, at times, tar-and-feathering. Public opinion seemed to treat the Nonimportation Agreement as more legitimate than the official government; one royal governor complained that tea smuggled from Holland could "lawfully be sold" in Boston, whereas it was considered "a high crime to sell any from England."[14]

Despite substantial concessions from Britain in 1770, colonial resistance continued to mount. Tactics remained much the same—harassment of British soldiers, attacks on customs ships, circumvention of British law. The grievances that precipitated action, however, were no longer seen as isolated incidents but rather as part of a general system of oppression. Blame for that oppression was no longer placed on the local agents of the British government, but successively on the cabinet, Parliament and, finally, on the king himself. At the same time, the ultimate objectives of the movement expanded. As the royal governor of Massachusetts later recalled, "At first . . . the supreme authority [of Parliament] seemed to be admitted, the cases of taxes only excepted; but the exceptions gradually extended from one case to another, until it included all cases whatsoever."[15]

The British government dispatched additional troops and passed a series of laws designed to coerce the colonists back into line. The result, however, was only to increase their felt need for unity in resistance. Divisions within local resistance movements melted away; as one contemporary put it, measures in support of the country's liberties were more important than previous personal political loyalties.[16] Intercolonial cooperation was established by means of Committees of Correspondence among the various colonial assemblies, initiated by a group of Virginians who, Thomas Jefferson recalled, "were all sensible that the most urgent of all measures [was] that of coming to an understanding with all the other colonies, to consider the British claims as a common cause of all, and to produce a unity of action. . . ."[17] A network of county and local Committees of Correspondence made it possible to spread information and plans for action with great speed through the entire population. In many localities, residents prepared for armed defense. In

1774, the Committees of Correspondence arranged for the various colonies to send representatives to a Continental Congress, which established a Continental Association against all commerce with Britain, and, while still not declaring America independent, made plans for armed resistance to British authority. The idea was widely expressed that "it is to ourselves we ought to trust, and not to the persons who may be in power on [the other] side of the water."[18]

The mass meetings and committees of the new Association began exercising government functions even more forcefully than the old. British attempts to repress the movement led to constant skirmishes, and finally to full-scale battles at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. The outbreak of war generated widespread support for a total break with Britain, as did the wide distribution of Thomas Paine's revolutionary pamphlet, *Common Sense*. The second Continental Congress in 1776 finally asserted American independence—something which had been far from the minds of those who started the resistance movement a decade earlier

The American Revolution did not just create a new, independent government on the pattern of the old, however. An observer in 1763, before the resistance movement began, noted that the American colonists were "no friends to republicanism," but loyal subjects of the king and the "most ardent lovers of that noble constitution of our mother country"—despite its monarchical and aristocratic elements.[19] When the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Sons of Liberty fearfully considered the possibility of independence in 1766, they assumed that it would imply "erecting an independent Monarchy here in America."[20] But seven years of disillusionment with the British king so shifted opinion, that by 1773, many Americans agreed that "kings have been a curse to this and every other country where they have gained a footing"; of all men, "kings . . . are the least to be trusted."[21] Instead of creating a new monarchy, the Americans, in effect, formalized the organs of their resistance movement as the new governing authority of society, thus creating a new social system based on majority rule. Town meetings and general assemblies of the population became the essential source of power and legitimacy. Committees elected by them became the local government. The insurgent assemblies and congresses to which they had sent delegates became the new governing organs of society. Thus a form of popular power from below came to replace, for a time, a system of separate authority from above.

Just as the needs of the American colonists conflicted with the interests of the British government, so today the needs of working

people are in conflict with the interests of those who control their labor. But just as the colonists required a decade of social conflict to develop the aim and capacity to replace their rulers, so today people are by no means likely to take over control of their society overnight. Only in the course of a protracted struggle are they likely to discover the need and possibility of doing so.

Of course, colonial society was far different from today's. As we have seen, the American people have been divided into a small group of managers and owners who control society, and a majority who work for them. Their work has become collective, not individual. In order to take control of their social conditions, they need not so much a different political authority, but a new way of organizing their productive activity. It is the control of society by a minority class, not the control of the state by a foreign power, that needs to be eliminated today. Yet the process by which this can be accomplished may well be similar in some respects to that of the first American Revolution.

As in colonial America, so today informal patterns of popular self-organization and resistance to authority are common features of everyday life. In the course of this book we have seen such patterns in many spheres of life. They are already often effective in opposing immediate grievances, but their power to deal with more fundamental problems is still extremely limited. Their participants usually accept the status quo in general, and do not see their resistance to particular acts of those in power as part of any larger movement, let alone a challenge to the existing organization of society.

When large numbers of people are affected by the same grievances, however, such action may spread on a wider social scale. The consumer meat boycotts, truckers' blockades and strike waves that developed in response to the inflation of the early 1970s illustrate the process by which tactics often used in isolated conflicts can come to be applied by millions of people who share common problems to which they can find no other solutions.

Such large actions over particular issues may successfully resist particular grievances, but they can do little to arrest the general deterioration of living conditions most people now face. The financially pressed British rulers were determined to raise money from the colonists in one way if not in another; similarly, those who control American society today are bound to continue trying to solve their problems by taking a larger share of what workers produce. If they can't do it one way, they will try to do it another.

The key to resisting their attempts is to make the strikes, blockades, street actions and other tactics already in use the tools of a concerted social movement, in which all the various actions of

working people to meet their needs are recognized as part of a common struggle. At first such a movement might well resemble the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, with people contesting the established authorities in every sphere of life, acting on their own initiative—but with an awareness that the struggles of each are the struggles of all, and that the fundamental interests of all working people are in conflict with those of the owners and managers. Creating such a movement is the key to resisting hard times today.

In order to become the instrument of all, such a movement would need to establish meetings, popular assemblies and action committees, not only in every community like the American colonists, but in every workplace, school, military unit and other social realm as well. These in turn would need to coordinate their actions with each other. We have already seen how even small-scale resistance actions tend to create a counterpower to management and other authorities. Such assemblies, in order to achieve their objectives, would have to take over much of the actual power in the spheres in which they function.

No doubt such a movement would start with limited objectives; it would aim only to redress particular grievances, not to eliminate the source of those grievances. There can be little doubt that people will be better able to resist the deterioration of their conditions through such a movement than without it, whether or not they aim for more fundamental social changes. But what they can achieve within the framework of the present organization of society, though important, is quite limited. As long as the power of the dominant minority remains intact, society will be run for the benefit of those few, with only occasional concessions to the population whose lives they control.

Such a movement, however, might well create the conditions for a direct challenge to minority power, much as the colonial movement against taxation became a direct challenge to British and monarchical authority. In the course of such movements, people can transform their assumptions about what is possible, necessary and desirable. When ruling groups long resist the actions people take to meet their needs, it becomes apparent that not one or another official, but a whole system of minority control is at fault. The development of assemblies and other organs of popular power creates an alternative means by which society can be organized. The ability of ordinary people to direct society themselves becomes increasingly apparent. The existence of a special, separate ruling authority comes to seem increasingly undesirable and unnecessary. Under such conditions, the objective of a popular resistance movement today

might widen, just as it did in the American Revolution, to aim for the creation of a new kind of society, based on the complete elimination of all kinds of minority power.

No doubt such a movement would meet serious attempts at repression from the owners, managers and their supporters; they would be unlikely to let their power slip away without a fight. Historically, American employers have used whatever means of violence were available to them to control their workers, including the police, military and private armed forces. While those who control society are themselves a small minority, they would be likely to use their control over these highly organized instruments of violence to threaten or attack those challenging their rule. Indeed, on January 26, 1975, the *New York Times* reported that all 7200 policemen in Los Angeles were being trained in "special crowd-control techniques to enable them to cope with any protests that might occur during the current recession," such as "labor strikes, student protests, and other demonstrations that might occur."

A unified movement of the entire working class would, however, have great power to forestall and disarm such attacks. It would include the overwhelming majority of the population, defending their own interests. They would be able, through strikes and other forms of direct action, to disrupt the processes from which the dominant classes draw their strength—the activity of workers. Those whose interests opposed them would be few in number. The military and police forces are themselves drawn from the working class; their willingness to risk their lives to fight against their own interests would not be unlimited. If the popular movement were sufficiently widespread, they might well refuse to suppress it; indeed, they might even join it, much as the militia did in colonial America.

Once such repressive forces were disbanded or disarmed, people would find themselves, their assemblies and other representative organs in control of society. They would thus already be organized in a manner which allowed them to begin coordinating their activity to meet their needs. Just as the American Revolution created organs of popular democracy which made kings and aristocrats unnecessary, so there would exist instruments of social organization making a special elite of managers and capitalists superfluous. Of course, nothing but people's own determination could prevent the establishment of some new minority power. But as long as the majority were determined to keep control of society in their own hands, they would possess the means to do so.

Whether such a transformation of society will indeed occur cannot

be foreseen, any more than the American Revolution could have been foretold a few years before it occurred. The future depends both on unpredictable events over which most people have little control, and on how people themselves choose to respond to those events. Only by eliminating the basic power relations of our society can people fully control their lives and meet their needs. Even if they do not succeed in doing so, however, their efforts will not be wasted: A concerted struggle for the interests of all working people is also the way to achieve the best conditions that can be won within the framework of the existing society.

For everyone whose life is unfree and whose needs are unmet because of minority control of productive activity, the time has come to turn the techniques of day-to-day resistance into a concerted struggle for direct majority control of every aspect of social life.

Throughout this book we have tried to show the essential features of our society which prevent people from directing their own activity to meeting their own needs. A successful struggle for the interests of all working people would require the elimination of those features. There is no plan which can be drawn up in advance for such a struggle. Real solutions to the problems people face depend not on any program that can be written down and put in a book, but on the real development of people's ability to get together and act cooperatively in their own interest. People can develop that ability only through a constant process of acting, evaluating the results and acting again on the basis of what they have learned.

That process has already begun in the various forms of direct resistance that are escalating today as social crisis deepens. The evaluation of those actions and the planning of future actions is a job for millions of people, in every realm of their lives. Our own evaluation of actions so far, and the analysis of society presented in this book, lead us to suggest that action—from the smallest-scale act of informal resistance to the greatest mass upheaval—be guided by the following principles:

DIRECT COOPERATION AMONG PEOPLE TO MEET THEIR OWN NEEDS

Wherever people experience a need or problem in common, it is only rational that they should get together to try to meet it. But as we have seen, many aspects of our society are organized in ways which prevent such cooperation. Instead of cooperating in their own

interest, people are supposed to follow the rules and orders established by their employers and other authorities. The power of those authorities rests largely on their ability to keep the people they rule apart.

We have seen many cases, however, where instead of following those rules and orders, people get together in their own interests, even when it brings them into conflict with the established authorities. People frequently cooperate in regulating the pace of work, getting free time on the job, limiting the authority of supervisors, raising incomes, protesting higher prices, preventing the fouling of their natural and social environment—the list could go on and on. These are actions which can and should be applied by any group of people who share a common problem. It is through such action that they can lay the groundwork for a more general resistance.

Such cooperative action rests on the understanding that individuals can meet their needs through joint action with others to reach common objectives which include their own. The development of that understanding is a social process; only when many individuals share it can it be effective.

The process of getting together generally develops within the social settings in which each of us live. If you shop, use a laundromat, send children to school or go yourself, you are put into relationships with the others who relate to these same facilities. If you go to work, you find yourself together regularly with a particular group of other workers. Most people know others in the neighborhood or building in which they live. Most people have a network of relatives and friends from past associations. Many belong to organizations, clubs, churches and other voluntary associations as well.

It is within these milieux that individual thoughts and feelings, when expressed by enough people, can come to be seen as shared sentiments. They are like melting pots in which what was individual may become social. Walking through a supermarket today, you may see even total strangers communicating to each other with gestures their exasperation at the latest price increases. Eavesdropping in diners and barrooms in early 1974, you could hear violent discussions of the fuel shortage among relatives and friends at table after table. At work, discussions both about the job and the rest of life go on, even when employers try to stamp them out.

Out of the shared sentiments of such milieux, people can begin to develop their ability to act together. The ways this can happen depend entirely on the concrete situation, on how people are feeling, on the immediate problems they face and on the means they have

available to act. Action may start as simply an informal agreement to follow certain common rules, such as not working beyond an agreed-to pace. Or it may take dramatic forms, like a strike or "the people out of doors." It may be preceded by a long, slow process, through which a number of individuals gradually discover or decide that they are all willing to act. Or that willingness may crystallize quite suddenly.

We had described to us a recent example of such a sudden crystallization at a nonunion print shop on the Massachusetts North Shore. Just before Christmas, everyone at work was bickering with each other, squabbling over tools, getting on each other's nerves, when suddenly the boss announced that their holidays would be cut in the next year's contract. The workers all stopped work, gathered and started talking. On the spot they decided to strike, left the plant, returned with picket signs and decided to organize themselves into a union.

Sometimes the initiative of a minority or even a single individual may trigger the cooperative action of many. A young worker at the Dodge Truck plant in Detroit described to us how he closed the entire plant one day:

> In late '72, the company was running sixty hours a week, week after week. It was an extremely uptight situation; the atmosphere was explosive. A short time before Christmas, everyone came in one Saturday with booze, got loaded and simply didn't work. The company was shrewd enough to realize that it had pushed things as far as it could, so it announced no Saturday work till after New Year. After a couple of months they started Saturdays again, though. So one night I got stoned, went over to the office of an underground newspaper and made up a leaflet saying, "What If Chrysler Called a Saturday and Nobody Came?" I went to work half an hour early the next day and taped it up all over and passed it out. Other guys I didn't even know taped it to the cars moving down the line and put it up in the bathrooms.
>
> Next Saturday, a large part of the work force didn't show up, and many of those who did hoped others wouldn't so they could go home. Chrysler tried to run the lines extremely slowly for four hours—they had to pay everyone who showed up for that much anyway—then sent everybody home. Of course it wasn't something you could repeat again.

Sometimes the trigger for cooperative action may be a particular act by those in authority. Many, perhaps most, wildcat strikes are caused by firings, rate changes and other management acts. Similar-

ly, the East Cambridge riots were directly provoked by the arrest and death of Larry Largey. Sometimes an idea that comes from outside the immediate milieu may be the stimulus for action. The idea of a consumer boycott of meat, for example, started with housewives in one community, but most people actually heard about the idea from the news media, and then decided to try it themselves.

Through the actual experiences of action, people can build up their capacity to cooperate. Coal miners, for example, have a strong tradition of solidarity and mutual support. An old IWW organizer with wide work experience told us:

> Direct action on the job has been most traditional among underground workers. If you're a miner, it's crazy to let some office two hundred miles away, or even a manager up on the surface, tell you whether it's safe to work. So underground miners have a tradition of acting on their own. If they're not sure what to do, sometimes they'll ask a more experienced miner whether it's safe or not. You can tell good solid rock by its ringing tone when you hit it. If it gives a dull thud, you don't want to work there whether the boss says it's all right or not.

Few groups of workers in recent years have used wildcat strikes so often or effectively as miners. Not only have they struck with great frequency over safety, job assignments and other immediate issues, but in 1969 coal miners in West Virginia used a twenty-three-day, state-wide wildcat strike to force the state legislature to pass a bill compensating victims of Black Lung disease.

Cooperation has become a habitual part of the way miners deal with a wide range of problems. During the 1974 gasoline shortage, the value of that habit was strikingly illustrated. Tens of millions of Americans, in the early part of that year, found themselves passing many hours every week looking for open gas stations and waiting in gas lines. The gas lines were a perfect symbol of the powerlessness of isolated individuals—hundreds of people, each in their own cars, strung out along the road, unable to do anything but wait as the time of their lives ticked by. Although millions of people were in exactly the same position all over the country; although the newspapers and TV reported daily on capped oil wells, tankers lined up with no storage facilities available to unload, and other evidence that the entire "shortage" was artificially created to increase the price of fuel; despite the frustration that broke out occasionally in fist fights and destruction of gas station property—despite all this, people remained locked in isolation and impotence. But the reaction of miners in West Virginia, with their established patterns of coopera-

tive action, was quite different. Tired of working all day underground, only to spend much of their remaining time looking for gas, a number of them talked about what to do and decided to stay away from work, declaring that they would strike until gasoline was made available. They went out with mobile pickets to other mines in the area and asked the miners to join the strike. In less than a week, 10,000 miners in West Virginia and many more in Virginia and Kentucky had joined the strike. The governor, much against his will, was forced to order an immediate increase in the allocation to the mining areas, and eventually to revise his gas rationing regulations entirely.

By taking cooperative action whenever the opportunity arises, people can build up patterns that make future cooperation easier to initiate and maintain. When such a way of acting becomes habitual, people can get together, organize themselves and fight for their own interests in whatever situation they find themselves. They can thereby not only begin to solve their immediate problems, but can also begin to lay the groundwork for their organized takeover of society.

UNIFICATION OF DIFFERENT GROUPS' STRUGGLES

Most cooperative action today remains the action of particular limited groups. When we went on the late-night talk show in Detroit, a young auto worker who called in put the problem perfectly. After proposing to disband the international union, he said:

> The people I work with can get together but maybe we don't understand the problems of someone up the line or in another part of the plant. But you'd still have to get together with people on a larger scale in the plant and with different plants. How can you do that? I don't know. I've been thinking a lot about it. Nobody wants to get together and organize anything after work or anything—everyone's dog tired after twelve hours. I don't know. I'm either going to start to organize or else I'm going to quit.

As long as action remains limited to small groups, its power remains limited as well. Only cooperation on a wide scale can overcome this weakness. Such cooperation depends on an appreciation of the common interests that people share, even when their immediate situations are not identical.

Development toward such wide-scale cooperation can already be seen at a number of points. One of the simplest, yet most significant, is the common refusal of workers to cross each other's picket lines, even for groups of workers and industries which seem totally unrelated. Such mutual support reflects a recognition that all working people are in the same basic predicament, and that they need each other's help in dealing with it.

We saw a small but particularly dramatic example of such mutual support during the wildcat occupation of the Mack Avenue Chrysler plant in Detroit by a group of workers protesting the firing of militants (see page 74). As we hung out at a gas station across the street, we heard a middle-aged white man in the clothes of a railroad worker talking with three black strikers whom he had evidently drawn over from the plant. He told them:

> Look, we've been told to bring stuff into the plant on the railroad spur that runs along the back. You guys haven't got a single picket up there, so we don't have any excuse for not bringing the stuff in. So if you want us to help out, why don't you put a picket line up on the tracks, just like you would for trucks.

He pointed out to them where they should place the pickets, and then disappeared again into the traffic of the city.

Mutual support may develop from smaller groups reaching out to each other. For example, workers on different shifts will often come to work a little early or leave a little late in order to socialize, exchange information and coordinate activity with members of other shifts. We asked a mechanic in a truck-building factory, whose work group had helped pull a number of plant-wide actions, how to get people organized in a plant beyond those who work directly side by side. He said:

> First of all, you have to want to do it—you have to realize that it's important. Then, you just make a point of trying to get to know people in different parts of the plant—like you would anyway, but a little more deliberately. Then when a situation arises where there's some kind of action to take, you make a point of spreading the word about it to the people you know, so that those channels get built up in a kind of organized way.

At times, informal networks of friends, acquaintances and family can be made channels for communication and cooperation among people who live and work in different places. During the 1973

consumer meat boycott, whole communities were rapidly mobilized, largely by the use of such networks.

Large-scale coordination by no means develops only from smaller groups reaching out to each other; it can just as well arise through a broader movement which stimulates various groups to participate in common actions. The 1973 meat boycott illustrated this kind of organization as well: Thousands of informal and occasionally formal groups sprang up in a few weeks, as housewives all over the country latched onto the idea of the protest and made it their own.

Imitation often plays an important role in spreading large-scale actions. In the nationwide postal wildcat in 1970, for example, postal workers all over took their lead from the strikers in New York City. The New York group maintained some contact by phone with other strikers; perhaps even more important was the news of their action coming over the radio and TV. At one point in the strike, representatives from many insurgent locals met in Washington to negotiate with the government and the leaders of their own union who were opposing the strike. In the years following the strike, local militants throughout the country have maintained an informal network for exchanging information and plans in their action against both the Post Office and the leadership of the postal unions.

Another interesting example was the organization of the strike by independent truckers against government fuel policy in early 1974. These truckers were owner/operators, somewhere between ordinary workers and self-employed small businessmen. Only a minority of them belonged to either the Teamsters Union or any of a number of small independent-operator associations. Often fiercely individualistic, they are a group whose action might seem almost impossible to coordinate. Yet they were able not only to organize their strike, but to virtually drive strikebreakers from the roads throughout more than forty states. Their organization was based on two resources—the truck-stop and the short-wave radio. Strikers in each area would gather at the truck-stops, discuss their next action, and take votes to establish their policy. Many of the truckers had short-wave radios in their rigs, with which they kept in touch when patrolling for strikebreakers. (As usual, news coverage also helped strikers in different parts of the country keep informed on each other's activities.) While a motley array of individuals and groups ranging from the governor of Pennsylvania to the head of a magazine for owner/operators to Frank Fitzsimmons of the Teamsters Union rushed to Washington claiming to "represent" the truckers in negotiations with the government, the drivers stayed in the truck-stops, waiting for the government—and their "representatives"—

to make them an acceptable offer. After long negotiations the government made an offer which the "representatives" accepted. But the drivers in the truck-stops discussed the proposal, decided it wouldn't solve their problem and would only increase inflation, and voted it down all over the country. They treated those claiming to represent them as, in effect, bargaining agents for the government. Only when they got a better offer did the drivers finally vote to go back to work.

At times, mutual support can spread to seemingly unrelated groups. For example, coal miners and laundry workers in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, several years ago staged sympathy strikes in support of hospital workers who were trying to organize a union.[22] Similarly, during the 1969 strike against General Electric, 1300 workers at United Shoe Machinery in Beverly, Massachusetts, struck for nineteen days so as not to produce parts for GE.[23] In Philadelphia in 1973, we saw large numbers of workers with a wide variety of occupations joining the picket lines of striking teachers. When the city government arrested and jailed eight hundred of the teachers, the unions of Philadelphia voted to call a general strike, which was only headed off when federal intervention brought a last-minute settlement.

Such cooperation holds the potential for overcoming the separation of isolated groups. Throughout its history, the tendency toward such solidarity has been one of the most important features of working-class life. Nonetheless it remains sporadic. Only by building it into a habitual pattern of mutual support can it become a reliable means for meeting the needs of all.

PEOPLE'S CONTROL OF THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONS

Any collective action involves some form of organization. Most organizations that exist today—unions, governments, associations of many kinds—are marked by a sharp distinction between leaders and officials on the one hand and rank-and-file members on the other. The officials may be elected, but they, not the rank and file, manage the affairs of the group.

Often such a division develops within organizations in which the ordinary participants originally held control. We have seen, for example, how many unions evolved from expressions of the direct cooperation of groups of workers to a bureaucratic apparatus through which top officials control them. Such organizations reflect not the power but the powerlessness of their members.

Throughout this book we have described actions which, in contrast, are initiated and directly controlled by those who participate in them. They have ranged from actions regulating the pace of work to wildcat strikes to boycotts to "the people out of doors." These actions contain the seeds of an alternative mode of organization, through which people can control their own cooperation.

That mode of organization may be embodied in many varying patterns. Some may be entirely informal, like the work groups we have seen engaging in resistance on the job. Others may be more formal, involving coordinating organs with elected representatives and a public visibility. Some may arise only for one occasion, like the informal group that pioneered street action in East Cambridge to protest the death of Larry Largey. Some may be sporadic, like the informal networks that often exist among militants in various parts of an industry, which only become active before and during wildcat strikes. Some may be continuous—many informal resistance groups at work, for example, go on year after year, even though individual participants may come and go.

The extent, permanence and formality of such organizations depend upon the tasks they have to perform. What they all have in common is that the ideas and plans have been discussed and agreed to by those who act. In that process, people take joint mental control of their activity and make it a tool for their own use.

Such mutual control of common activity can be a continuous process accompanying other activities, for people who are working or living side by side every day. In groups which are dispersed, or too large for such direct contact, it is more difficult to maintain a flow of information, ideas, sentiments and decisions. Often organization arises through one group's taking the initiative in action, while others simply coordinate through imitation, as in the case of the 1970 postal workers strike. More systematic organization may result when different groups send representatives to each other's discussions, or when a number of groups send members to meet to interchange ideas and coordinate plans on a larger scale.

Of course, such coordinating bodies can always become the starting point for the development of a new, centralized leadership separate from the other participants. Such a development can only be prevented if people keep their ability to discuss, decide and act for themselves, never giving it up to any separate power. This intention can be embodied in limitations on representatives. For example, the principle can be established that no representative or group of representatives holds any authority on its own; they are merely spokespeople for those they represent, and can be mandated,

rotated or recalled at the will of the group. Similarly, representative organs—strike committees, councils or whatever—can be allowed to serve only as coordinating bodies, with no means of their own to impose their will on those they represent, except through the action of the groups which make them up. Even such limitations, however, are no guarantee against the development of leaders and organs with their own power, unless those they represent keep alive their capacity to think and act for themselves.

Many people argue for a different approach to organization, one with strong leaders and far more centralized power. For example, a steelworker in Gary, active in union reform, told us:

> I think we need more leaders not less of them. Like this guy Bob where I work. Everybody listens to Bob. When there's a question about what to do, people go to him. He knows the situation; he's a fighter, but he knows when to fight and when to lay low. They know they can trust him. He's a committeeman, but he's not like the rest of them. Of course, you have to have a strong rank and file to serve as a check on the leaders. I wouldn't want to be in a leadership position myself without that.

Similarly an old-time militant in Detroit, active for many years in the reform caucus of the UAW, explained to us that he believed in trying to resurrect the union because "isolated struggles will always lose eventually against employers as powerful as the auto companies."

These arguments are based on a correct perception, but they draw the wrong conclusion. People need as much knowledge, understanding and unity as they can get. But they need to get them for themselves, for everyone, not for any special group of leaders or representatives. Such distinctions between "leaders" and other people reflect not people's strength but their weakness.

Of course, people are in fact different. Some will grasp problems more quickly than others; some will be more intrepid in action; some will be good at getting people together. Everyone has their own unique contribution to make to common struggles. If leadership implies not followership but rather initiative, insight, courage and the ability to get people together, then we do indeed need more leaders, not fewer of them. Indeed, an appropriate slogan would be the statement of a group of Wobblies in Everett, Washington: Asked who their leaders were, they replied: "We don't got no leaders—we're all leaders."[24]

Social groups are composed of particular individuals with particular interests. Whatever people may say in their speeches or proclaim

in their programs, they are likely, in the long run, to try to follow their own individual and group interests. When any group of officials or politicians becomes distinct from a body of people, it is likely to develop separate interests. They may claim to support the general interest, and they may indeed find it to their advantage to do so for a time. But when their interests change, they are entirely likely to follow them, even if it means "selling out" those whose support they have courted. Only by keeping control of their activity themselves can people make sure that it serves their own interests, not those of a new separate power.

EQUALITY WITHIN THE WORKING CLASS

Our society divides the working class into many groups, some with special privileges, others with special deprivations. It creates a hierarchy based on occupation, race, sex, religion, nationality, income and similar factors. Such inequality, in addition to its evident injustice, tends to divide people into competing groups, battling each other even when their long-range interests may be the same.

The very structure of a society where people have to compete for jobs, housing, education and other social resources tends to divide people into antagonistic groups. Under such conditions, many special groups have sought their own interests at the expense of others, thus further aggravating these divisions. Employers have often deliberately fostered divisions among workers as part of a strategy to "divide and rule."

There is no reason for people not to differ from each other as much as they like in taste or life style; toleration for such diversity is an important aspect of human freedom. But when inequalities among social groups result in deprivation or impede cooperation, they must be straightforwardly attacked.

As we have seen, job hierarchies with unequal pay and privileges are an important source of such divisions. They create privileged groups of workers who often side with the employer or at least "try not to rock the boat." At the same time, they create a group of workers who have little choice but to accept jobs at below-standard wages. They provide a carrot through which employers can manipulate the aspirations and behavior of those workers who hope for advancement.

Differences in income might make sense if the benefits went to those who performed the most undesirable jobs, but in reality the worst jobs are also usually the lowest paid. They also might make sense if those with the greatest needs—large families to support or

extra medical expenses, for example—received the highest incomes. But at present, some workers are likely to make more than others because of seniority with their employer, their sex, race or age, greater opportunities to go to school or learn skills, the economic strength of their employer and other factors that have little to do with either their sacrifices or their needs. Everyone makes the same essential sacrifice of the time of their lives when they go to work; unless they make some special additional sacrifice, or have special needs, there is no reason why all should not receive the same return for their labor.

Attacks on inequality on the job have taken various forms. Occasionally union locals have fought for and won pay equality for all of their members. For example, a woman who had worked in a factory which processed hamburgers and steaks told us that everyone from the butcher to the packer received the same wages. Similarly, it is common in Teamsters locals for the drivers, dispatchers and even the sweepers to get the same pay. In the early days of the CIO unions, many pushed for cents-per-hour rather than percentage wage increases, thus narrowing the ratios between different groups of workers with each wage increase. In the cases we have described of workers instituting job rotation, one of the main reasons for doing so has been to equalize the work, giving everyone a turn at the more and less desirable jobs. Many struggles by workers to get control over the job assignment process have been motivated by a desire to prevent it from being used as a means of favoring some individuals or groups over others

Racial, sexual and other forms of inequality pervade our society. As long as they exist, they not only perpetuate an injustice against their victims but also greatly weaken the ability of working people to cooperate in their own interest. Struggles against such forms of inequality, therefore, are in the interest of all working people, even if they may seem to threaten temporarily the advantages of the more privileged groups. Only through such struggles can the basis for true unity of interest and action be created.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT

Our society has centralized knowledge, planning and decision-making in the hands of a minority of managers and professionals. We have seen how employers took the skill and knowledge required to run the production process away from skilled workers and transferred it to the managerial cadre. A similar process occurred in many

other spheres of life, as human intelligence came to be regarded as the function of special "experts," rather than of people in general. As a result, much of people's lives has been reduced to following instructions, obeying orders and "doing what you're told."

Most people see little reason to read or think about society, beyond perhaps what they need to know to cast a ballot every couple of years. Managerial contempt for the role of workers' intelligence is summed up in the phrase "we're not paying you to think." The feeling that they don't know or understand enough to run society is one of the prime reasons people let leaders, officials and politicians direct their activities, even when these leaders are distrusted or despised.

As long as people have no responsibility for making decisions, there is little reason for them to study or think about production or society. But as soon as they begin trying to act on their own, the need for knowledge and thought becomes evident.

In the past, the working class has had strong intellectual traditions of its own. In the early 1800s, the shoemakers of Lynn, Massachusetts, regularly hired a boy to read to them while they worked.[25] Nearly a century later, the cigarmakers of New York listened to readings from the newspapers and even from Karl Marx's *Capital*. The Wobbly halls of the West in the early years of the twentieth century maintained heavily used libraries of books ranging from the novels of Jack London to works on sociology, economics, politics and history. Many an old-timer can tell of haunting the public library in search of answers during the Great Depression of the 1930s. This tradition was made vivid for us by the recollections of an old union and radical organizer from his childhood just before World War I:

> When I was a kid in Ohio, one of my favorite spots was the land along the B&O tracks, a lone spot outside the city about ten miles.
>
> This was a recognized hobo jungle. In the afternoon the hoboes would start jumping off the trains and wandering into this place. These men came from every spot in the U.S. and these men had been in every spot of the U.S. Represented every type of life in the U.S.; some men college graduates, some from factories, some workers in transit, unemployed, the regular migrant worker that goes from harvest to harvest, also workers that were no workers at all, had no intention of working, just rebelling against conditions that existed. It was amazing how much these men knew about life, because they had lived it. They didn't need it from a book. They knew about the conditions of the western wheat fields, they knew about the

> condition of the far west fruit farms. From these men I heard the names of Herbert Spencer, Nietzsche, Plato, Aristotle, Huxley, Marx, Schopenhauer and God knows whom else. Profound philosophical discussions. Theories of how to form society. These discussions I can never forget because the profundity of them was amazing. They could only come from one who had been everywhere, done everything. Could only come from the hobo family. This was sort of my early education.

The exclusion of workers from decision-making and the emphasis on formal education as the prerequisite for decision-making responsibility have created the idea that research, study and serious thought are something for students, experts and managers. But if working people are to take control of their own activity, they need the widest knowledge and the best thought they can muster. Any basic reorganization of society will require a ferment of social and political discussion like that which preceded the American Revolution.

The development of such knowledge and thought is a social process. People need to exchange ideas and information with each other in the freest possible way, drawing on the experiences of all. In fact, people discuss their lives and their society with each other all the time, at work and in the other milieux in which they live. Where thinking is seen not just as an abstract exercise, but as something that bears on important questions of what to do, discussions can become more focused and deliberate. They may result in decisions to get together to discuss, study or write about some particular question. Through such means, people can begin to recreate an independent, working-class intellectual culture. Brain-numbing hours of labor may make this difficult. But the alternative is to be in the position of sailors who dare not mutiny because the art of navigation has been kept a secret from them.[26]

MUTUAL CONTROL OF ALL PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY

In any society, people have to transform nature to meet their needs. In early America, as we have seen, this was done largely by individuals and families working with a relatively simple technology, producing primarily for their own personal consumption. With the development of transportation and machinery, production became ever more interdependent. Most work processes came to require the collaboration of many people, each performing different parts of the labor. Each such group produced only a narrow range of

products, and was dependent on other groups for things it needed. This division of labor is actually a gigantic network of cooperation, in which millions of people produce for the needs of all.

Unfortunately, however, this cooperation did not develop under the control of all; it was controlled by those who possessed the wealth to acquire the means of production and hire others. The result has been to put the cooperative activity of millions under the control of a small minority of owners and managers. Work, far from being an expression of people's own needs and desires, has become an expression of their submission to the interests and purposes of a special ruling minority.

Returning to a society based on private production by individuals or small groups working for themselves alone would hardly be a solution to this problem. Interdependence is inevitable, unless people choose to give up the use of modern technology and return to a society where each individual or group is limited to the things they themselves can produce—thereby generating suffering and want on a colossal scale.

Nor would it be a solution to replace those who now control production with some new centralized managerial authority, such as the state. Attempts to increase the power of government over the economy are a frequent response to difficulties in the capitalist system. Such attempts may come from many directions. Liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, has recently urged that substantial parts of the American economy be taken away from capitalist ownership and turned over to the government, while continuing to be managed by those who now run them. In times of crisis, employers themselves have turned to partial state control of the economy, as in the National Recovery Administration of the Great Depression, giving up some of their individual autonomy in order to retain their collective power. A prominent New York investment banker, for example, has recently called for a "new Reconstruction Finance Corporation" with far broader powers than that of the 1930s, which would invest public money in failing companies, spearhead development in energy and other spheres and perhaps even become the instrument of long-range federal economic planning.[27] Various left-wing political parties propose to carry out revolutions through which all production would be nationalized and controlled by the state. This type of society already exists in the various state-socialist countries, where a ruling bureaucracy, the Communist Party, governs through its control of the state, and directs the whole of a government-owned economy. All these approaches have in common an attempt to overcome the

irrationalities of the present system by establishing a strong central coordination of social production—while keeping control in the hands of a minority. Instead of working for private employers, people work for the state. But the productive wealth and the productive process of society—and therefore the conditions of people's lives—are still controlled by another social group. For most people, the realities of daily life are hardly changed.

Any system in which natural resources, labor and the products of past labor are controlled by a special group of people prevents other people from getting together to define and meet their mutual needs. Only when the majority take possession in common of the means of production and organize their own labor themselves can they assure their own well-being.

Such a reorganization of society must be the goal of any movement which aims to meet the needs of working people. Likewise, it is through such a movement that this goal can be achieved. It requires the creation of organs of popular power—direct assemblies of people in various spheres of life and delegate bodies representing them—through which people can take control of their activity away from those who now possess it, to exercise it themselves. It requires that they overcome whatever forces try to prevent their emancipation. Finally, it requires that they prevent any new system of minority control from developing in the place of the old one.

Such groups of individuals would have to cooperate in common action which they discussed, planned, determined and executed themselves. Different groups would have to coordinate their activities with each other on many different levels, from those working or living side by side, to society as a whole. People would have to work mutually to meet each other's needs—the common needs of society.

The organs of coordination at first might well be those created in the struggle for majority power. No doubt groups and their interconnections would evolve over time along with changing social capacities and desires. Only constant experimentation could determine how best to combine the benefits of large-scale planning with those of individual and small-group control of the immediate environment. Even such an approach could never completely eliminate conflict between various levels and groups—precisely because it could reflect so truly people's various needs and interests, which at times must come into conflict even in a context of equality and abundance.

If the rest of social life were left unchanged, the transfer of social power in itself would mean little. Its function is to make it possible

for people to overcome the barriers to a good life erected by our present system of minority rule. People would be able to make their work serve their own needs and desires as they defined them. No doubt a primary objective would be to provide for the well-being and security of all, particularly through an expansion of production in those areas where the old society most failed to meet people's needs, such as medical care and housing. Another might well be a new kind of planning, through which people would use their control of social activity to shape the entire social and natural environment to their needs and desires.

Such social reorganization would mean a complete transformation of work itself. People would no longer work as instruments of someone else's purposes, but set their purposes themselves. They would no longer work to make profits for the rich, but to meet their own needs. The authority of the employer would be gone; people would direct their own labor. The result would be a great expansion of the realm in which people could—indeed, would have to—exercise their freedom, creativity and intelligence.

Nonetheless, many jobs would at first remain unpleasant, boring, repetitive or dangerous. But those subjected to them would be in a position to eliminate unsafe and unpleasant conditions, while automating or reorganizing as much of the boring work as possible. The whole organization of work and technology as a means of controlling workers could be reversed; new engineering systems could be developed to facilitate workers' control of production. Finally, by eliminating the millions of jobs from plant guards to salesmen that produce nothing but waste or are necessary only for the old society, by including the unemployed and underemployed in useful work, and especially by a massive automating of production, people could reduce the part of their lives they spend providing the necessities to a fraction of what it is today.

Such a society would open possibilities for human development we can only dream about today. Liberated from drudgery and toil, people could use their capacity for creativity to its full extent, making possible an unprecedented blossoming of beauty and knowledge, while transforming daily life from a realm of monotony to one of free development. Freed from the constant insecurity about the future that haunts everyone today, daily life could lose much of its undercurrent of anxiety, making possible a kind of pleasure in living that most people now can experience only rarely. No longer forced to compete for the necessities of life, but rather having everything to gain from a spirit of cooperation, people would be able to reduce greatly the realm of interpersonal hostility and expand that of

interpersonal trust. No doubt problems and difficulties would always remain, but people would be in a position for the first time to bring the full capacities of humanity to bear in solving them.

The evolution of our society has already laid the basis for such a transformation. It has created an interdependence through which the needs of each can only be securely provided for by meeting the needs of all. Its great productive capacities have raised hopes for a life of pleasure and satisfying activity, only to dash them with the reality of want and toil. It has reduced those who own and manage the means of production to a small number, while forcing the overwhelming majority of the population to work for them. It has put in the hands of that majority the capacity to stop social production entirely, or to determine the way it proceeds. It has thereby given them the power to shape it to their will.

The time has come to use that power.

A FAREWELL: NO DRESS BEFORE THE IRON

Faced with the daily grind of a life largely sacrificed to the struggle to get by; opposed by the entire organized forces of the rich, the powerful and their supporters; buffeted by the chaos of a society controlled by others—it is no wonder that people despair that life could ever really change. And yet, ordinary people possess the greatest potential power in society. Their activity largely makes up society. All they need to do to reshape the world as they would like is to take mutual control of their own actions. The belief that they cannot do so, far from expressing what has to be, itself serves as a barrier to realizing what could be.

At the end of her haunting story, "I Stand Here Ironing," Tillie Olsen asks for her daughter:

> Help her to know—help make it so there is cause for her to know—that she is more than this dress on the ironing board, helpless before the iron.[28]

To be like that dress, a pure object of external forces, compelled to do whatever they command—a number, a thing—no human being should tolerate. We have tried throughout this book to show both the external forces that try to induce people to submit to the will and interest of others, and people's attempts to resist being reduced to passive objects. There is an old working-class saying: "It's a good life—if you don't weaken." We think "not to weaken" means not to surrender like the dress, not to accept whatever is imposed upon

you, but to fight for yourself, even when the odds are against you. Through such a fight, people can try to take the time of their lives away from those who now control it and use it for themselves. Just through that struggle itself, they can take over part of the control of their activity for themselves, and give themselves a chance to make their lives more interesting, creative, friendly and pleasurable. That is why we believe it may be possible to lead a good life, even given the forces against us—if we don't weaken.

Method of Wrapping an Apple



(a) Picking up the wrap.
(b) Picking up the apple.
(c) Throwing the apple into the wrap.
(d) Position of apple upon striking wrap.
(e) Wrapping process, first stage.
(f) Wrapping process, second stage.
(g) Apple held tightly in right hand, pressing apple against cup formed by left hand.
(h) Apple turned within cup formed by left hand, both wrists turning toward right.
(i) Hands turning over completely.
(j) Back of left hand upward, back of right hand downward.
(k) Apple ready for placing in box, right hand reaching for next apple.
(l) Placing wrapped apple in box.

A NOTE ON THE INTERVIEWS

In preparing this book, we talked at length with upwards of a hundred people about their lives, work, ideas and observations. All quotations, unless otherwise footnoted, come from these discussions.

We started with the idea that most people know a good deal about the social world in which they live; if they didn't, they wouldn't survive to tell about it. This doesn't mean that any individual's knowledge of his or her society is perfect; on the contrary, each of us has a view limited and distorted by our own circumscribed experience. That is why people need to learn from each other.

In our discussions, we were searching primarily for an understanding of the structure of everyday life—both the circumstances people face and what people do about them. We never considered ourselves to be studying the people we talked with, or surveying their opinions. Rather, we approached them as experts on the social worlds in which they lived and as colleagues in trying to make sense of our common situation.

In almost all cases, we told people straightforwardly that we were working on a book which dealt with what people like ourselves were thinking and doing about life and work. Most people we approached were more than willing to talk. "We want to be in the first chapter" was a frequent, smiling comment. We did not usually conduct formal interviews; mostly we had freewheeling discussions in which we asked a lot of questions, but felt free to put in our own two-cents worth as well.

We decided not to tape-record discussions, both to keep them informal and to allow discussion of sabotage and other subjects that cautious individuals would not want to put on tape. For the same reason we often changed names and identifying details in our accounts. The price of not taping discussions was to lose much of the spice and flavor of individual styles of language and storytelling,

which may well be the most impressive forms of popular art in our society. We tried to write up discussions as soon after they occurred as possible. Because there were two of us, we were usually able to check each other's memories for accuracy. We do not claim that quotes are word-for-word correct, but we think we have reproduced the content of what people told us with a good degree of accuracy. Our confidence in this was bolstered when a friend who had sat in on a several-hour discussion we had with six other people read our write-up of it and commented, "If they see this, they're going to think you smuggled a tape recorder in there."

While we tried to talk with people from a wide range of occupations, backgrounds, ages, ethnic roots and locations, we have not aimed for a "random sample." Nor do we pretend that those we talked with were "typical" workers or typical anything else—we think the very idea that anyone could be typical of a whole class is as insulting as it is ridiculous. If somebody else had asked the questions we did, if we had asked different questions or if we had approached people in a different way, the answers would no doubt have been different. Readers should bear in mind the words with which an old-timer taunted us: "There's no use asking people what they think; they'll tell you one thing today—tomorrow, they'll tell you something different." The statements we quote in this book—like all such materials—are only what particular people said at particular times in the context of particular discussions.[1] We have learned much from them, nonetheless, and we think others will as well.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

The conception of human thought and action sketched briefly here has been drawn from many sources. However, we have listed only those which were consulted specifically in the writing of this book.

George Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (New York: Norton, 1955), provides a useful model both for the ways individuals construct their understanding of the world and for the central role of expectation in that process. The first three chapters of the book are available in a paperback edition under the title *A Theory of Personality* (New York: Norton, 1963). Jean Piaget provides a useful developmental model for the interaction between a mental system and its environment. A good introduction to his work is Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper, *Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). We also found useful Jean Piaget, *Six Psychological Studies*, trans. Anita Tenzer and David Elkind (New York: Random House, 1967). Several essays about how people learn and change in Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), were very helpful, especially "The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication" and "Cybernetic Explanation." In thinking about the nature of human nature, we found Ernest G. Schactel, *Metamorphosis* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), particularly interesting.

We would like to stress, however, that in our view, no psychological theory can be applied directly to the explanation of social phenomena. Unfortunately, we found usable developmental social models hard to come by. Jean-Paul Sartre's later work provides an important analysis of social group formation. The first part of his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* has been translated into English

with the title *Search for a Method*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). The untranslated parts most relevant to the subject of this book have been carefully summarized in Wilfred Desan, *The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965). Another summary, with a greater focus on psychological issues, is R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, *Reason and Violence* (New York: Humanities Press, 1964). An important conception of the relation between the experience, ideas, expectations and action of social groups is presented in Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York: Collier Books, 1961). An attempt to view the relation of thought and action in the context of human evolution is Anton Pannekoek, *Anthropogenesis* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1953); although his archaeological data are somewhat dated, his ideas are still of interest. For a discussion of the background of many of these ideas in Hegel, Marx, existentialism and pragmatism, a good starting point is Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). We have also learned a great deal from Paul Mattick, *Marx and Keynes* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969) and Karl Korsch, *Karl Marx* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963). Alfred Chandler's business history, *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962), provides much food for thought about the relationship between social functions and their institutional manifestations.

1. Spendable weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers with three dependents who are on private nonagricultural payrolls in constant 1967 dollars. Calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, news release, 21 January 1976, and from the same agency's *Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1974* (Washington, D.C., 1974).
2. "Inflation: The Big Squeeze," *Newsweek*, 4 March 1974, pp. 58–62.
3. John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 477.
4. For a good discussion and critique of various stereotypes of the working class, see Robert Coles, "Understanding White Racists," *New York Review of Books*, 30 December 1971.
5. Thomas Paine, *Common Sense and The Crisis* (Garden City, N.Y.: Dolphin Books, 1960), p. 11.

CHAPTER 1

In this book we have only hinted at the great variety of actual work experience in different occupations and industries. We have tried

instead to focus on the essential elements most employment has in common. For a massive documentation of the diversity of work experiences, stressing the lack of personal fulfillment in most contemporary work, see Studs Terkel's collection of interviews, *Working* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

1. *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1960), which carefully compiles the most reliable available statistics from many sources, is able to give the hours of labor during the 1920s and '30s for workers in manufacturing only. During the boom years of the 1920s these hours were higher than today, but during the depression of the 1930s they were lower. The average weekly hours of production was 40.9 from 1926 to 1935 for workers in manufacturing (calculated from *Historical Statistics*, Series D 626–34, p. 92). The average weekly hours for manufacturing workers in April 1973, surprisingly enough, was 40.8 (*The American Almanac* [New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1973], p. 228). The great decrease in hours worked preceded 1925. There has been some decline more recently in the average hours worked by all workers, but it is largely concentrated in wholesale and retail trade and results in large part from the influx of part-time workers, predominantly women, into these occupations, not from a decrease in the hours of those already employed full time.

To estimate the time spent at work and in travel to and from the job by full-time workers, we used the figure for married men presented in Michael Young and Peter Willmott, *The Symmetrical Family* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), table p. 348, since most married men in the United States are full-time workers, whereas a large proportion of those in other sex/marital categories are not. The figures are for men aged 18 to 64 in U.S. cities.

2. Bertolt Brecht, "Song of the Invigorating Effect of Money," *Selected Poems*, trans. H. R. Hays (New York: Grove Press, 1959), pp. 83–5.

3. *Social Indicators, 1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973), chart 5/15, p. 164. While income statistics abound, reliable, updated information on the distribution of wealth is extremely difficult to come by.

4. The recent literature on job discontent and job enrichment is vast. A liberal, "humanitarian" approach marks *Work in America*, the Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, prepared under the auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, 1973). Also from the Upjohn Institute is a report on studies of job discontent, Harold L. Sheppard and Neil Q. Herrick, *Where Have All the Robots Gone?* (New York: The Free Press, 1972). *The Job Revolution*, by ex-*Fortune* editor Judson Gooding (New York: Walker, 1972), describes in inspirational tones the great gains in profits and productivity which await employers who fight employee boredom through job enrichment. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty of the Committee on Labor and Public

Welfare, *Hearings on Worker Alienation*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972, includes a range of statements on this subject. So also do a series of papers presented at the Symposium on Technology and the Humanization of Work at the 139th meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, 27 December 1971. Georges Friedmann, *The Anatomy of Work* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), indicates how little is really new in the so-called job revolution. A good article on efforts to involve workers in management and decision-making—one of the key elements of "job enrichment"—is Keith Dix, "Workers' Control or Control of Workers," *People's Appalachia* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 16–25. It sets such efforts in historical context and offers useful suggestions for workers whose employers are proposing to institute such programs.

5. *Boston Globe*, 8 September 1974.

6. "News from Senator Edward Brooke," advance for press release, 2 June 1974, "Remarks of Senator Edward Brooke at the Dedication of the Whittier Regional Technical School."

CHAPTER 2

1. Edward G. Wakefield, *England and America* (London: R. Bentley, 1833).

2. Ibid.

3. *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1960), Series A 34–50, p. 9, and Series A 95–122, p. 12.

4. For a summary of available information on the early urban working class see David Montgomery, "The Working Classes of the Pre-Industrial American City, 1780–1830," *Labor History* 9, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 3–22.

5. The classic account of the early development of wage labor remains Volume 1 of John R. Commons et al., *History of Labor in the United States*, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1966). A useful model for much of this process is developed in Sam Bass Warner Jr., *The Urban Wilderness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Much interesting material also appears in Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840–1860* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).

6. Ware, pp. xv-xvi.

7. Ibid, pp. 38–9.

8. Ibid, p. xv.

9. Ibid, p. 42.

10. Ibid, p. 28.

11. Ibid, p. x.

12. Ibid, pp. 58–9.

13. Ernest L. Bogart and Donald L. Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1942), p. 401.

14. Ibid.

15. Ware, p. 20

16. Ibid, p. 78.

17. Ibid, p. 77.
18. Taylor quoted in Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," *The Review of Radical Political Economics* 6, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 141–2.
19. Stone (see above note). An abridged version of this article is scheduled to appear in a forthcoming collection, *Root & Branch: The Rise of the Working Class* (New York: Fawcett, 1975). One of the authors had the opportunity to participate with Katherine Stone on much of the research for this study. For further information and references on the Homestead strike, see Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972), pp. 53–63.
20. J. H. Bridge, *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company* (New York: The Aldine Book Company, 1903), pp. 201–2, quoted in Stone, pp. 118–9.
21. John Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, vol. 3 of *The Pittsburgh Survey*, 6 vols., ed. Paul V. Kellogg (New York: Charities Publication Committee, Russell Sage Foundation, 1909–1914), p. 102, quoted in Stone, p. 119.
22. Frick to Carnegie, 31 October 1892, quoted in David Brody, *Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era* (New York: Harper & Row, Torchbook, 1969), p. 53.
23. For a fuller account of the Homestead Conflict, see Brecher, pp. 53–63.
24. A first-rate study of the rise of managerial structures in the context of the modern corporation is Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962). According to Chandler, overproduction was the main original stimulus to business combination. See p. 30.
25. Bogart and Kemmerer, p. 550.
26. Debates on wealth, income and stock distribution are controversial and confusing. However, the figures of Robert J. Lampman, *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922–1956* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), are widely accepted, even by such authorities as Herman P. Miller of the U.S. Census Bureau, who makes it his business in *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Crowell, 1971) to criticize many attempts to show statistically the inequality of American society. Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super-Rich* (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1968), amasses vast quantities of data on these questions from all sources. Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Praeger, 1962), although now somewhat out of date, puts such information in a useful perspective. Richard Parker, *The Myth of the Middle Class* (New York: Liveright, 1972) provides a more recent summary of data indicating the class divisions of American society.
27. Parker, p. 122.
28. Bogart and Kemmerer, p. 528.
29. An important discussion of the evolution of cooperation and division of labor in the early stages of capitalist society appears in Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), vol. 1, chs. 13 and 14.
30. Bogart and Kemmerer, p. 529.

CHAPTER 3

Material on the historical evolution of job structures is not abundant, to say the least. Most of what exists focuses on Taylorism and other aspects of "scientific management" (see Frederick Winslow Taylor, *Scientific Management, Comprising Shop Management, Principles of Scientific Management, Testimony before the Special House Committee* [New York: Harper, 1947]). A pioneer essay on the effects of "scientific management" on workers is Daniel Bell, "Work and Its Discontents," pp. 227–272 in *The End of Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1965). As David Montgomery (see below) has recently emphasized, the gaps between managerial ideologies and the actual practice at the point of production may be great.

Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," *The Review of Radical Political Economics* 6, no. 2 (Summer 1974), summarizes much of the information available on other industries as well. A number of papers by David Montgomery ("The 'New Unionism' and the Transformation of Workers' Consciousness in America," mimeographed; "Immigrant Workers and Scientific Management," prepared for the Immigrants in Industry Conference of the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library and the Balch Institute, November 2, 1973; and "Trade Union Practice and the Origins of Syndicalist Theory in the United States," mimeographed) break important new ground.

Theodore Caplow, *The Sociology of Work* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) summarizes a great deal of sociological research on the structure of work. Sigmund Nosaw and William H. Form, eds., *Man, Work and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), contains a fairly wide sample of essays on the sociology of occupations. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973) contains much interesting material on job structures, particularly in the steel industry. Volume 1, chapter 15, especially section 4, of Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), gives a useful analysis of the early development of the capitalist factory. For purposes of comparison, E.J. Hobsbawm, "Custom, Wages and Work-Load," in *Laboring Men* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor, 1967), pp. 405–35, is well worth reading.

This motley grab bag of sources indicates the extent to which this field is wide open for further research.

1. Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840–1860* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), p. 39.
2. Ibid, p. 40.
3. Ibid, p. 61.
4. For many additional examples of pre- and early-industrial work practices, see Herbert Gutman, "Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 1815–1919," *American Historical Review* 78 (June 1973): 531–88.
5. Andrew Ure, *The Philosophy of Manufactures* (London: C. Knight, 1835).
6. Ware, p. xiv.
7. Peter Herman, "In the Heart of the Heart of the Country," in *Root & Branch: The Rise of the Working Class* (New York: Fawcett, 1975).
8. Hollis Godfrey, "Training the Supervisory Work Force," *Minutes of the First Bi-Monthly Conference of the National Association of Employment Managers, 1919*, p. 25, quoted in Stone, p. 145.
9. John Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, vol. 3 of *The Pittsburgh Survey*, 6 vols., ed. Paul V. Kellogg (New York: Charities Publication Committee, Russell Sage Foundation, 1909–1914), p. 149, quoted in Stone, p. 146.
10. Taylor, p. 40, cited in David Montgomery, *What's Happening to the American Worker?*, an interesting pamphlet distributed by *Radical America* magazine.
11. *Iron Age*, 6 July 1905, p. 24, quoted in Stone, p. 146.
12. Ware, p. 120.
13. Ibid, pp. 121–2.
14. Karl Marx, *Capital* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 436.
15. Paul Douglas, *American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education* (New York: Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 1921), p. 116, cited in Stone, p. 165.
16. Henry Ford, *My Life and Work* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1922), pp. 81–2.
17. J. Stephen Jeans, ed., *American Industrial Conditions and Competition* (London: The British Iron Trade Association, 1902), p. 317, quoted in Stone, p. 125.
18. Douglas, p. 116, quoted in Stone, p. 165.
19. Meyer Bloomfield, *Labor and Compensation* (New York: Industrial Extension Institute, 1917), p. 295, quoted in Stone, p. 133.
20. Taylor, p. 168, quoted in Stone, pp. 127–8.
21. Bloomfield, p. 295, quoted in Stone, p. 133.
22. "Manifesto" calling for the formation of the IWW, in *Rebel Voices*, ed. Joyce L. Kornbluh (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 7. This book contains an important and entertaining wealth of material from the Industrial Workers of the World, including articles, poems, cartoons and songs.
23. *Iron Age*, 19 May 1910, p. 1190, quoted in Stone, pp. 129–30.

24. *Systems of Wage Payment* (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1930), p. 25.
25. Ibid, p. 118.
26. Jack Steiber, *The Steel Industry Wage Structure* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 226, quoted in Stone, p. 157.
27. We paraphrased this poem from one author's memory of a performance of *Brecht on Brecht* in Washington, D.C. several years ago. We are extremely indebted to Martin Esslin, a leading authority on Brecht, who identified our paraphrase as part of Brecht's *Deutsche Kriegsfibel (German War Primer)*, which appears in Bertolt Brecht, *Gesammelte Werke* (Suhrkamp, 1967), vol. IV of India paper edition, p. 638. We would also like to thank Mr. Esslin for supplying us the following literal translation of the original:

> General, your tank is a strong vehicle.
> It breaks down a forest and crushes a hundred people.
> But it has one fault: it needs a driver.
> General, your bombing plane is strong.
> It flies swifter than a storm and carries more than an elephant.
> But it has one fault: it needs a mechanic.
> General, Man is a useful creature. He can fly and he can kill.
> But he has one fault:
> He can think.

CHAPTER 4

Written materials on informal worker resistance in the workplace are scarce—there are few sociologists on the job. The papers by David Montgomery (cited in the general footnote to Chapter 3) contain considerable material on the history of job resistance. We also found valuable an unpublished paper on sabotage by Steven Sapolsky, "Puttin' on the Boss—Alienation and Sabotage in Rationalized Industry" (University of Pittsburgh, July 1971). Louis Adamic, *Dynamite* (New York: Chelsea House, facsimile of 1934 ed.), contains an autobiographical chapter on "Sabotage and 'Striking on the Job.'" The wonderful descriptions of this chapter belie its own conclusions. For control of working conditions by coal miners, see Carter Goodrich, *The Miner's Freedom: A Study of the Working Life in a Changing Industry* (Boston: Marshall Jones, 1925). To see how sabotage and "soldiering" looked to management, see Stanley B. Mathewson, *Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers* (New York: Viking Press, 1931). Alvin W. Gouldner, *Wildcat Strike* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), gives an interesting picture of the internal dynamics of a wildcat strike in the 1950s, set in the context of a less interesting "general theory of group tensions."

For radical perspectives sympathetic to informal worker resistance, see two pamphlets by Martin Glaberman, *Punching Out*

(Detroit: Our Times Publications, 1952) and *Be His Payment High or Low* (Detroit: Facing Reality Publishing Committee, 1966), and Charles Denby, *Workers Battle Automation* (Detroit: News and Letters, 1960) and Stanley Weir, "Rank-and-File Labor Rebellions Break Into the Open: The End of an Era," in *American Labor Radicalism*, edited by Staughton Lynd (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

Chapter 7 of Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972) also has a discussion of workers' resistance on the job and its significance, with further references. Our conception of the development of groups and their resistance has drawn heavily on the ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre.

1. *New York Times*, 29 January 1974.
2. Ibid, 3 April 1973.
3. Ibid, 13 April 1973.
4. Brecher, pp. 233–4.

CHAPTER 5

The relation between workers' own struggles and trade unions is dealt with throughout Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972). For a debate on this question, see David Montgomery, Martin Glaberman and Jeremy Brecher, "Symposium on Jeremy Brecher's *Strike!*" *Radical America* 7, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1973): 67–112. An interesting pamphlet by Richard Hyman, *Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism* (London: Pluto Press, 1971), presents a brief summary of the main trends in Marxist and academic sociological thinking about trade unionism. Unfortunately, like many studies of the subject, it has difficulty separating its thoughts about workers from its thoughts about unions.

1. Joel A. Forkosch, "The Negotiator's Art," *New York Times*, 22 April 1973.
2. William Serrin, *The Company and the Union* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 156–7.
3. A vivid analysis of the process by which union leadership becomes an agency for enforcing submission to legality and contracts is Antonio Gramsci, "Union and Councils – II," *L'Ordine Nuovo*, 12 June 1920, trans., *New Left Review*, no. 51 (Sept.-Oct. 1968): 39. An unpublished paper by Steven Sapolsky on the history of the Chicago labor movement, "Class-Conscious Belligerents – The Teamsters and the Class Struggle in

Chicago, 1901–1905" (University of Pittsburgh, August 1973), makes a strong *prima facie* case that American employers resisted unionization much more strongly than European employers, largely because the top union leaderships in America were often unable to discipline and control their own rank and file. For a classic interpretation of the bureaucratization process in general, see Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in *From Max Weber*, trans. and eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy, Oxford University Press, 1958).

4. Serrin, p. 212.
5. Summarized from Theodore Caplow, *Sociology of Work* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 207.
6. Brecher, p. 205.
7. Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd, eds., *Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 107–10. This collection of interviews and autobiographical writings contains rich and fascinating material on many aspects of working-class life throughout the twentieth century, as well as considerable information on union and radical movements.
8. Emma Rothschild, *Paradise Lost* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 133.
9. *Wall Street Journal*, 26 July 1973.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Quoted in Serrin, p. 170.
13. Wilfrid Sheed, "What Ever Happened to the Labor Movement?" *Atlantic* 232, no. 1 (July 1973): 44.
14. Forkosch, *New York Times*, 22 April 1973.
15. Serrin, p. 4.
16. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

In preparing this chapter, we found useful a pamphlet by Fredy Perlman, *The Reproduction of Daily Life* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Black and Red, 1969). An interesting attempt to summarize capitalist institutions is Louis M. Hacker, *American Capitalism: Its Promise and Accomplishment* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1957). We have learned much from Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), that has been useful for this chapter.

1. This view conflicts with a widely held theory that, with the rise of the large modern corporation, profits are no longer key because economic power no longer resides with capitalist owners, but has been taken over by the new corporate managers, who are—or can be made—responsible to the needs of society as a whole. Such theories fail to recognize that the accumulation of profits remains as much a necessity for the new corporate

manager as it was for the private capitalist—each business still has to expand its profits and capital if it wants to stay in business. Those which do not still lose out to the competition. While oligopoly and administered prices might weaken the force of such competition within a single industry in a single country for a limited period of time, recent experience has shown that interindustry and increased international competition has repeatedly smashed through such seemingly protected corporate environments, reestablishing the imperative to accumulate. In reality, top managers usually have substantial stockholdings in the corporations they manage, and their careers are evaluated by the profitability they achieve; their own interests therefore lie in increasing profits. Even were this not the case, stockholders would still be in a position to eliminate any corporate management which pursued objectives in conflict with profitability. For a documented and extended discussion of this question, see Michael Tanzer, *The Sick Society: An Economic Examination* (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), ch. 1.

CHAPTER 7

1. *New York Times*, 3 April 1973.
2. Ibid, 31 March 1973.
3. Ibid, 17 May 1973.
4. Ibid, 8 April 1973.
5. *Boston Globe*, 4 April 1973.
6. *New York Times*, 3 April 1973.
7. *The American Almanac* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1973), p. 11.
8. Rep. Henry Reuss, "Democrat's Critique of Nixonomics," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 July 1974, p. 11.
9. More serious for him—and for millions of others—were the effects of inflation on education. During the post-Depression decades, many parents who might never have finished high school themselves were able to send their children to college. Few factors added more to people's sense that their position in the world was rising. (In a certain sense, this was an illusion. The average amount of schooling possessed by adults increased by three-and-a-half years between 1940 and 1970 [*The American Almanac*, p. 111]. An individual thus had to get several years' more schooling than his parents just to stay in the same place in relation to those his own age.) Inflation has undermined that sense of advancement. By early 1972, the chancellor of the University of Maine reported that "middle-income Americans are being priced right out of higher education . . . .Americans in the income strata of $10,000 a year are finding it increasingly difficult to send their children to college" (*Boston Globe*, 6 March 1972). The letter carrier quoted in the text indicated what this meant for his family:

> My daughter loves school. She's a great student. She took a chemistry test with 125 questions and got 123 right, and the other two were just silly little mistakes. Of course she

> wants to go to college but to tell you the truth, I haven't got a dime. I work two jobs. I make around $14,000 a year and I can't save a thing. It used to be you could have a little luxury for that much money, but now it takes that much just to live. The only thing I'm hoping for is that when it comes time to send her to college the banks will have plenty of money to loan. Maybe if she can save up $1000 herself, I can borrow about $2500 a year, take out a new loan each time I pay an old one back. But you only make so much money; I'm not sure how I can pay the loans back. I'll tell you, if I hit that $50,000 lottery, I'd send her to one of those private colleges.

10. "Inflation: The Big Squeeze," *Newsweek*, 4 March 1974, p. 61.
11. *New York Times*, 11 November 1973.
12. Ibid, 20 June 1974.
13. *New York Times*, 1 February 1975.
14. *New York Times*, 16 February 1975 and 8 February 1975.
15. The explanation of business cycles is controversial, to say the least. John Maynard Keynes's classic explanation appears in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936). Unlike many of his followers, Keynes did not believe that this problem could, in the long run, be solved within the framework of private capitalism, and therefore advocated a "comprehensive socialization of investment."

Marx presents elements of an alternative explanation of these phenomena, based on a totally different general theory, in *Capital*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965). vol. 3, part 3. An important attempt to apply Marx's model to "post-Keynesian" capitalism is Paul Mattick, *Marx and Keynes* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969). An interesting view of the problems of the American economy in the late 1960s and early '70s is Michael Tanzer, *The Sick Society: An Economic Examination* (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

16. John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 477.
17. *Wall Street Journal*, 15 July 1974.
18. Much attempt has been made to blame the current economic crisis on the exhaustion of mineral and fossil energy reserves. Numerous studies show that reserves are sufficient for scores and often hundreds of years, but our economic system currently finds it unprofitable to extract them. Our "shortages" result from our social organization, not from an unbountiful earth.
19. "Slowdown: The Amber Lights Begin to Flash," *Citibank Monthly Economic Letter*, August 1973, p. 3.
20. Wilfrid Sheed, "What Ever Happened to the Labor Movement?" *Atlantic* 232, no. 1 (July 1973): 66.
21. *New York Times*, 7 November 1971.
22. Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 78.

technology factories, like the Route 128 electronic and engineering complex outside Boston, tend to be of moderate size.
12. Seymour Wolfbein, *Work in American Society* (Glenville, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1971), p. 70.
13. *New York Times*, 4 June 1974.
14. *Social Indicators, 1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973), table 8/13, p. 258.
15. Robert C. Joiner, "Trends in Homeownership and Rental Costs," *Monthly Labor Review* 93, no. 7 (July 1970): 30.
16. Ibid, p. 29.
17. *New York Times*, 27 May 1974.
18. Ibid, 11 June 1973.
19. Quoted in Fried, p. 41.
20. Ibid.
21. *New York Times*, 21 April 1974.
22. Ibid, 24 February 1974.
23. Ibid, 25 April 1974. It is significant that the difference in distance for central city dwellers (five miles) and suburbanites (six miles) is small. The movement of jobs to the urban rim means that for most people living in the city is not living substantially closer to the job.
24. Commoner, p. 169.
25. Dorothy Nelkin, "Massport vs. Community," *Society* 11, no. 4 (May-June 1974): 31. Our account of the East Boston conflict has been drawn largely from this study. See also her *Jetport: The Boston Airport Controversy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974).
26. In our account of the East Cambridge riots we have drawn on our own participation and interviews, news accounts and a taped radio broadcast on the subject, "A Hero for the Projects," from WBCN, Boston, generously supplied us by Andrew Kopkind.
27. *Boston Real Paper*, 1 November 1972.
28. *Boston Globe*, 26 October 1972.
29. *Boston Phoenix*, 31 October 1972.
30. *Boston Globe*, 29 November 1972.
31. William Simon, John H. Gagnon and Stephen A. Buff, "Son of Joe: Continuity and Change among White Working-Class Adolescents," manuscript prepared to appear in *The Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 1, no.1 (Winter 1972): 3.

PART III: INTRODUCTION

A massive and useful bibliography on the American working class and its historical roots can be found in Marc Fried, *The World of the Urban Working Class* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973). Fried's demarcation of the working class is similar to our own. An introductory discussion of the issues raised by

applying concepts of class to modern society is T. B. Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1968). An interesting and subtle approach to the nature of social class can be found in Karl Marx, *18th Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963). The social function of different conceptions of class is brought out in Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); this book can help increase one's awareness of the social issues and ideological presuppositions implicit in most discussions of class.

We have chosen to focus on broad social classes as the most important groups in our present society, and to define these classes in a particular way, because we found it the most useful way to think about three problems:

1. The overall process by which social wealth and power are produced and distributed.
2. The various opportunities people experience in daily life at work, at home and in between, as a result of their position in that process.
3. The process by which the differences in social position and life possibilities of different individuals can be overcome.

Other purposes could no doubt justify other definitions of class.

Social classes are notoriously hard to define. There is rarely a clear line separating one from another, and many individuals do not fall neatly into just one class. That does not make thinking about class position pointless; many kinds of classification suffer from the same problem, yet are still useful. For a discussion of this question as it applies to classification in a variety of scientific fields and the increasing recognition of "polythetic" forms of classification, in which no single uniform property is required to define a group, see Robert R. Sokal, "Classification: Purposes, Principles, Progress, Prospects," *Science* 185 (27 September 1974): 1115–23.

Several other difficulties in studying class require mention. Class categories are not static; class structures evolve. For this reason, they always include groups which are in transition from one category to another, and therefore have some of the characteristics of each.

An illustration of this is the problem of determining whether class is an individual or a family attribute, that is, whether the occupations of family members other than the head are to be taken into account in establishing class. This is the result of a particular historical situation, in which women are becoming increasingly inde-

pendent from fathers and husbands, but still remain subordinate to them in many respects.

A further difficulty is that many of the categories used in government and sociological studies—white- and blue-collar, professional, technical, kindred, etc.—cut across class lines. In one category you may find some of the highest-paid and most prestigious jobs in society alongside some of the lowest-paid and most menial. One result, pointed out by sociologist Christopher Jencks, is that income inequality is far greater within than between government occupational categories (Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality* [New York: Basic Books, 1972], p. 226). Whatever the purpose of this category selection, it gives the impression of a far greater equality among different segments of the population than actually exists, making it extremely hard to differentiate statistically among different social groups.

1. For a useful presentation of occupational data, see Seymour Wolfbein, *Work in American Society* (Glenville, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1971).

2. Herman P. Miller, *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Crowell, 1971), p. 212.

3. The strata that lie between capitalist and working classes are a good example of how historical development itself redefines the categories with which society must be understood. At an earlier stage of capitalist society, the miscellaneous social functions performed by intermediate groups could only be classified by the undescriptive phrase "middle class." With the development of a group of professional bureaucratized managers distinct from capitalists, and with the proletarianization of many formerly "middle-class" functions, it becomes possible to place most of the "intermediate strata" in the loose functional category of managers of the production and distribution of social wealth. Since the occupational structure of government and other nonprofit institutions has developed along the same general pattern as the private economy, employees in the "public sector" can be reasonably divided between the same managerial and working classes as those in the "private sector."

4. *The American Almanac* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1973), p. 324.

5. Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super-Rich* (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1968), p. 13.

6. Many members of this class use the term "middle class" to mean very much what we have used "working class" to mean. Which word people use has limited significance for revealing what the word actually means to them. As Richard Parker wrote in *The Myth of the Middle Class* (New York: Liveright, 1972): "The American middle class is synonomous with the word majority. To Americans, to be middle class is to stand literally in the middle, to be average, to be the typical man in the street, the Good Joe."

The interchangeability of the two terms was indicated by a policeman in a working-class suburb of Washington, D.C., who referred to "the middle-class folks, the working people," in an interview with Joseph Howell (*Hard Living on Clay Street* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973], p. 274). For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Bennett M. Berger, *Working-Class Suburb: A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), ch. 6. Berger quotes the revealing statement of a suburban auto worker: "Around here, the working class *is* the middle class" (p. 84). Berger concludes: "To be 'middle class,' then, probably means to them, not what sociologists mean by middle class, but rather *middle of the working class*" (p. 86).

7. The 75 percent of the population lowest in income receives less than one-half of the country's income; the other 25 percent receives the other half (see *The American Almanac*, table 529, p. 324). The figures are calculated by adding the two highest tenths and half the 8th tenth. The share going to the top quarter of the population is in reality probably even higher, since the income is certainly concentrated in the upper half of the 8th tenth.

Evidence indicates that the income gap between managerial and working classes is increasing. A study published by the Department of Labor found that between 1958 and 1970, the share of wage and salary income received by the highest-paid one-fifth of male workers increased from 38.2 percent to 40.6 percent, while the lowest one-fifth declined from 5.1 percent to 4.6 percent (Peter Henle, "Exploring the Distribution of Earned Income," pp. 16–27 in *Monthly Labor Review* 95, no. 12 [December 1972], and *New York Times*, 22 December 1972). S. M. Miller and Martha Bush, examining whites in the age group born between 1926 and 1935, report that the mean family income of blue-collar workers fell from 82.7 percent of professionals and managers in 1960 to 69.8 percent in 1970 ("Can Workers Transform Society?" in Sar A. Levitan, ed., *Blue-Collar Workers* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971], pp. 230–52).

8. "Current Labor Statistics," *Monthly Labor Review* 97, no. 3 (March 1974): 95.

9. Howell, p. 338.

10. *New York Times*, 2 July 1974. See also James N. Morgan et al., *Five Thousand American Families—Patterns of Economic Progress* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1974) and Michael C. Barth et al., *Toward an Effective Income Support System: Problems, Prospects and Choices* (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

CHAPTER 9

Considerable quantities of material from numerous sources on various aspects of the lives of industrial workers in America are put together in a somewhat dubious frame of reference in Arthur B.

See also the other papers presented at the Conference on Labor Market Stratification, Harvard University, March 16–17, 1973. Within economics, there is now considerable literature on "dual labor markets." See, for example, Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971).

15. For a fine portrait of contemporary mainstream and lower working-class life patterns, see Joseph T. Howell, *Hard Living on Clay Street* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973).

16. Ware, pp. 16–17.

17. Ibid, p. 13. It is hardly surprising that the same report estimated that the average length of life for the Irish in Boston was not over fourteen years (Ware, p. 14). Conditions of equal horror could be described in the South Bronx today, where dead bodies are gnawed by rats while they wait in the corridors of hospitals for medical personnel to discover that they have died.

18. For an insight into working class attitudes toward education in the 1920s, see Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), Part 3.

19. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), gives much useful information on the central role of ethnicity in dividing the working class, particularly within the unions.

20. For more information see Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972). For the development of a commitment to workers' control of production, see David Montgomery, "The 'New Unionism' and the Transformation of Workers' Consciousness in America, 1909–1922," mimeographed.

21. Brecher, p. 248.

22. One of the more statistically accurate presentations of the view that the importance of the industrial work force is declining can be found in Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

CHAPTER 10

The basic book on American white-collar workers remains C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). We have also drawn on two unpublished studies, Frederick D. Weil, "The Economic Class Position of Clerical Workers" (1973) and Frank Ackerman, "Employment of White-Collar Labor, 1910–1960" (1970).

1. Seymour Wolfbein, *Employment and Unemployment* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1967), p. 194.

2. Ibid, p. 195.

3. Ibid, p. 184.

4. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 133.

A great deal has been made of the fact that, according to government statistics, more workers are now employed in "service-producing" than in "goods-producing" sectors of the economy. Two important points need to be borne in mind in evaluating this statistic, however. First, the "decline" of the "goods-producing" sector is largely a result of the dramatic decline in agricultural workers. Second, more than three-fourths of the so-called service-producing jobs are actually in transportation, public utilities, trade, finance, insurance, real estate and government—hardly what we normally think of as "service."

The decline of "goods-producing" relative to "service-producing" employment is often explained as a shift in demand to services as basic needs are met by rising income levels. However, relative productivity and wage rates are an important part of the story. The relative decline in blue-collar employment is largely a result of labor-saving technology introduced in response to the relatively high wages of the predominantly male workers in that sector. If female "service-producing" workers achieved wage parity with male blue-collar workers tomorrow, it would unquestionably lead to a relative decrease in "service-producing" employment as some jobs became unprofitable to perform and others became cheaper to perform by machine.

Those who celebrate the increasing proportion of the labor force engaged in "service" as opposed to "goods" production should note that the expanding retail trade and service sectors of the economy are among the lowest paid and most backward. The number of workers in these two sectors has roughly tripled since World War I (Wolfbein, p. 184). The average hourly income in retail trade in 1967 was $2.01 before deductions. The average spendable income after taxes was $75 a week in retail and wholesale trade; $64 a week in building services, laundries and dry cleaners and $50 a week in hotels and motels (Richard Parker, *The Myth of the Middle Class* [New York: Liveright, 1972], pp. 148–9). A substantial proportion of workers in some of these categories work part time, which may bring down the weekly averages, but also indicates the marginal nature of many jobs in this allegedly humanizing "services" sector of the economy.

5. Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p. 22.

6. Weil, p. 17. The relatively low pay of clerical workers is not just a symptom of the concentration of women in clerical work. In 1971, the income of *male* clerical workers fell almost halfway between operatives and craftsmen and foremen (Weil, chart, p. 20). In 1939, male clerical workers earned 8 percent more than craftsmen and foremen; in 1971, 11 percent less (ibid). Male clerical workers in 1970 made less than 90 percent of the average income for all full-time workers (ibid, p. 55).

7. Weil, p. 34.

8. *New York Times*, 14 October 1973.
9. Ibid, 15 October 1974.
10. *Work in America*, the Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, prepared under the auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), p. 40.
11. Weil, p. 21.
12. Some "experts" on occupational statistics somewhat peculiarly interpret this transition from blue- to white-collar work as an expression of upward mobility.
13. Bell, p. 145.
14. Mills, p. 254.
15. Weil, p. 41.
16. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 301.
17. Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972), pp. 283–4.

CHAPTER 11

Much of the economic history of black workers is summarized in Harold M. Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the Political Economy of Racism," *Radical America* 5, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1971):1–46. A collection of documents on black resistance is Joanne Grant, *Black Protest: History, Documents and Analysis* (New York: Fawcett, 1968). A number of interesting papers appear in Julius Jacobson, ed., *The Negro and the American Labor Movement* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968). Other books we found of interest included the classic W. E. B. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1964) and his *Dusk of Dawn* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968); C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) and *Origins of the New South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972); and Robert L. Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1970).

1. Quoted in Ernest L. Bogart and Donald L. Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1942), pp. 489–90.
2. Jacobson, p. 36.
3. Harold M. Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor," p. 14.
4. Ibid, p. 13.

5. Charles Johnson, *The Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 210, quoted in Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor," p. 25.
6. Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor," p. 16.
7. Ibid, pp. 20–1.
8. Ibid, p. 20.
9. Ibid, p. 26.
10. Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 202.
11. Harold M. Baron and Bennett Hymer, "The Negro Worker in the Chicago Labor Market," in Jacobson, p. 262.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, p. 280.
14. *Boston Globe*, 6 January 1974.
15. Herbert G. Gutman, "*The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America*," in Jacobson, p. 49.
16. Ibid, pp. 119–20. This article contains many other interesting historical examples of cooperation between black and white workers.
17. Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd, eds., *Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 163–4.
18. For a thorough review of survey data on racism, strongly indicating that it is not primarily a phenomenon of the white working class, see Richard F. Hamilton, "Class and Race in the United States," in *The Revival of American Socialism*, ed. George Fischer, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
19. William Serrin, *The Company and the Union* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 235, reports that this plant "employed a crew of men to go into toilets to paint over racial slurs written on the walls."
20. For an account of a similar attitude among railroad workers in the early 1960s, see Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd, p. 240.
21. For a good discussion of this phenomenon in one neighborhood, see Joseph Howell, *Hard Living on Clay Street* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 350–1.

CHAPTER 12

A useful though somewhat dated introduction to the history of women's labor, originally published in 1959, is Robert W. Smuts, *Women and Work in America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Schocken, 1971). A more general account of women's changing social roles is William H. Chafe, *The American Woman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle* (New York: Atheneum, 1972), presents a history of the women's rights movement in the United States. A good analysis of factors affecting

and technical workers; in 1968, only 39 percent (*Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 94).
16. *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 94.
17. Esther Peterson, "Working Women," in *The Woman in America*, ed. Robert Jay Lifton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 163–4.
18. *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 15.
19. Stevenson, "Women's Wages," pp. 83–96.
20. *Handbook of Women Workers*, p. 94.
21. Ibid, p. 92.
22. Stevenson, unpublished study, computed from *Current Population Reports*, Consumer Income Series no. 69 (April 1970): 60.
23. *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 92.
24. Calculated from *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 92.
25. Ibid.
26. *Women Employed Investigation of Kraft Foods* (Chicago: Women Employed, May 1973), pp. 4–5.
27. *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 111.
28. Ibid, pp. 109–13.
29. Stevenson, "Women's Wages," pp. 83–96.
30. Ivar Berg, *Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 105–6. Among books on "manpower," this one is striking for its mordant humor and tendency to penetrate myths and stereotypes, giving some sense of how things really work.
31. *Background Facts on Women Workers* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, n.d.), p. 1.
32. *Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 84.
33. *Supervisor's Manual for State Employees*, developed by the Bureau of Personnel and Standardization, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pp. 167–72.
34. The proportion of women in heavy industry has gradually increased over the past twenty-five years (*Handbook on Women Workers*, p. 113), and we found that women were coming into many previously all-male plants and jobs, often in response to government pressure on employers.

CHAPTER 13

The central role of shared experience and a cultural recognition of that shared experience in the process of class formation is eloquently emphasized in E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1966). For a view complementary to our own, though with differences of emphasis, see Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). In our thinking about the life experiences of various generations, we have drawn on the masses of data analyzed by Joseph Eyer, "Living Conditions in the U.S.," in *Root &*

Branch: The Rise of the Working Class (New York: Fawcett, 1975), and in a wide-ranging series of unpublished studies by Joseph Eyer and Ingrid Waldron.

1. Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 211.
2. Eli Ginzberg, "The Long View," in *Blue-Collar Workers*, ed. Sar A. Levitan (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 29.
3. Bennett M. Berger, *Working-Class Suburb: A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). This short book contains much interesting information and insight about the American working class in the 1950s.
4. Harvey Swados, *A Radical at Large* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), p. 64. Swados's comment is particularly significant in that it comes in the midst of an essay devoted to debunking the "Myth of the Happy Worker." Swados perceptively concluded this passage, "but only for that long."
5. Levitan, p. 206.
6. This shift shows up sharply in a series of surveys taken by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., during the 1960s and 1970s. See Daniel Yankelovich, *Changing Youth Values in the '70s* (New York: John D. Rockefeller III Fund, 1974).
7. Certain trends in the growth patterns of the American population have aggravated the problems faced by young people starting work today. As with the economic trends, these population trends favored the generation which started work during the 1950s and early 1960s, and created disadvantages for those who entered during the later 1960s and the 1970s.

During the depression decade of the 1930s, most people had many fewer children than either before or since. The small generation born during the 1930s entered the work force during the 1940s and '50s. This age group's chances of finding secure, well-paid jobs were improved because its members were relatively few. Consequently, this generation has experienced one of the lowest unemployment rates and one of the steadiest improvements in income of any in American history.

After World War II, however, there was a dramatic change in the number of children families wanted and had. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the average number of births per married woman had declined until it reached about 2.5. But among women born in the 1930s, the number rose to about 3.5. The result was the much discussed "baby boom"—a tremendous increase in the number of people born in the two decades following World War II.

In the course of time, these people began to reach job-seeking age. According to *Youth: Transition to Adulthood*, the Report of the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1973), from which the statistics used in this note are drawn, the number of people 14–24 increased from 26.7 million

in 1960 to 40.5 million in 1970—an increase of more than 50 percent in one decade. The following table shows the effects of this change on the size of generations:

Year	*Population 14–24 years old*
1940	26.3 million
1950	24.2 million
1960	26.7 million
1970	40.5 million

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the increasing number of young people was clearly contributing to a relative deterioration of their economic position. Between 1967 and 1971 the median weekly earnings of men 16 to 24 fell about 12 percent compared to those 25 and over.

However, the greatest impact of the "baby boom generation" on the workplace has yet to be felt. As the report cited above pointed out in 1973:

> The crest of the wave has only now begun to reach the full-time, education-completed labor market and will be inundating it in the years to come. Until now, much of this wave has been deflected and delayed by an increase in the number of youths staying on within the educational system and an increase in the duration of their stay there. For example, while the population of 16- to 19-year-olds increased between 1957 and 1970 by 6 million, the "not enrolled in school" labor force component of this age group increased by only 0.6 million. Similarly, in the 20–24 age group, which increased by 6.5 million between 1960 and 1970, the "not enrolled" labor force increased by only 2 million in the same period.

Thus, these two age groups together increased by 12.5 million, all but 2.6 million of whom remained in school. It is the remaining 9.9 million increase which is now flooding into the labor market, contributing to the elevated unemployment rates of the late 1970s.

8. *New York Times*, 8 January 1973.
9. *Boston Globe*, 30 May 1973.

PART IV

Materials we consulted bearing on the creation of a society based neither on private nor state control of the production process include Anton Pannekoek, "Workers Councils," in *Root & Branch: The Rise of the Working Class* (New York: Fawcett, 1975); Paul Mattick, "Workers' Control," in *The New Left*, ed. Priscilla Long (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969); Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread* (New York: New York University Press, 1972); Paul Goodman and

2. Maier, p. 6.
3. Ibid, p. 7.
4. Ibid, p. 52.
5. Ibid, pp. 54–5.
6. Ibid, p. 84.
7. Ibid, p. 92.
8. Ibid, p. 94.
9. Ibid, p. 104.
10. Ibid, p. 111.
11. Ibid, p. 134.
12. Ibid, p. 118.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid, p. 137.
15. Gipson, p. 201.
16. Maier, p. 222.
17. Gipson, p. 209.
18. Maier, p. 243.
19. Ibid, p. 288.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, p. 291.
22. David Montgomery, *What's Happening to the American Worker?* (pamphlet distributed by *Radical America*), p. 8.
23. Ibid, p. 20.
24. Joyce L. Kornbluh, ed., *Rebel Voices* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 204.
25. Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840–1860* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).
26. We have borrowed this phrase from Daniel Cohn-Bendit.
27. Felix G. Rohatyn, "A New R.F.C. is Proposed for Business," *New York Times*, Business Section, 1 December 1974. (Mr. Rohatyn is a partner in Lazard Frères and Co.)
28. Tillie Olsen, "I Stand Here Ironing," *Tell Me a Riddle* (New York: J.J. Lippincott, 1961), p. 89.

A NOTE ON THE INTERVIEWS

1. For a provocative and important discussion concerning the multiple conceptions people often hold of social reality, and the dependence of conceptions expressed upon social context, see Robert R. Jay, "Conception and Actuality," in *Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), ch. 2. We also benefited from an unpublished paper on "Anthropologist's Accounts of Informant's Accounts" by Nancy B. Jay.

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INDEX

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