

COMMITTEE FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

In this issue of the CAFA Newsletter we continue our practice of beginning with an essay on the general situation of academic freedom in Africa. Silvia Federici's "The Economic Roots of the Repression of Academic Freedom in Africa" is a assessment of the two major theories claiming to account for the increasing repression of academic freedom in Africa in the 1980s.

This essay is followed by a number of reports from the academic freedom "front." The last is a protest against the "Boren Bill," a piece of legislation passed in the U.S. Congress in 1992 that allocates funds for U.S. academics and students to study and research in Africa (and other "Third World" venues) on the condition that they report to U.S. military authorities.

In the middle are two pieces dealing with the action of African university teachers and students in Kenya and Nigeria to preserve and enlarge their academic freedom. The first is a precis of a history of recent academic freedom struggles in the Uni-

versity of Nairobi excerpted from the Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, "A Haven of Repression." The second is an update on the situation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in Nigeria since the end of its relatively successful strike in the summer and fall of 1992.

This issue therefore highlights a new era of threats to African universities and to the intellectual independence of African academics emanating from the World Bank and the U.S. government. It also shows continuing evidence of the tremendous powers of resistance to these threats rooted in Africa academics and students. But they need our help. We, as North American academics, are in a good position offer it by protesting the effort of the U.S. government and agencies like the World Bank to force African intellectuals into having only one viable career option: to be a cadre of neoliberal bureaucrats recolonizing Africa.

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The Economic Roots of the Repression of Academic Freedom in Africa

Despite the publicity that in recent years has been given to the disastrous state of African education, following the application of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) to the education sector, it is far from being recognized that SAP is today the major threat to academic freedom in Africa. Indeed, the harsh measures by which SAPs have been applied on the campuses, have not generated an outcry in international circles, and the African students and teachers, who had been prosecuted for opposing these measures, have so far received little support from their colleagues abroad. Yet their protest is crucial to Africa's future. For SAP is the means by which Africans are denied the right to education, in conformity with a strategy that wants Africans to participate in the world economy only as providers of cheap labor, and to be unable to exercise their right to self-determination.

This thesis stands in sharp contrast to the position promoted by the World Bank, and propagated by the much of the press in the United States and Europe, which either ignores the responsibility of SAP for the present deterioration of academic freedom in Africa, or presents the economic liberalization which SAP entails as being in contradiction with the abuses perpetrated by the governments that have adopted this program. (Meldrum: 64). This thesis is also in contrast to the now current theory that the deterioration of academic freedom in Africa stems from the autocratic nature of the African state, the conflictual relation between state and "civil society," and the state direct control of academic institu-

tions. (MacGregor :40).

This view, however, is misleading on many grounds. First because it appeals to cultural factors (the alleged lack of democratic traditions in Africa) at the expense of economic policies, which are the main determinants of governmental behavior. Second, it ignores that the African state is no longer the main player in the academic as well as in the economic scene. Last but not least it fails to acknowledge that behind the so-called relation between "the state and civil society" is the reproduction of labor, which is the process we have to examine in order to understand the roots of the conflict that is now endemic in many African campuses, and why the introduction of economic liberalization in academia has been accompanied by the escalation of repression.

As is well known, the IMF/World Bank-inspired SAPs demand that the state cease subsidizing higher (and to a lesser extent secondary) education and therefore cease pursuing the task it had taken on at independence, when the expansion of education was demanded by all social forces as a crucial condition of social and economic progress. (Carnoy and Samoff) This policy has now come under attack by world agencies, in numerous reports, as essentially faulty and in need of massive retrenchment. Yet, it must be admitted that in the performance of this task the African state scored its major achievement. For in the space of a few decades, with a tempo some have defined as unprecedented (Jahoda: 161), despite the difficulties the African economies faced, it created a mass education system, assuring Africans a presence on the international intellectual scene in every

field.

Quantitatively and qualitatively the African educational system undoubtedly fell short of expectations and by the end of the 1980s, the participation of Africans in higher education remained one of the lowest in the world (UNDP: 155). However, by the 1970s the gap was beginning to shrink, as Africa had the fastest growing rate of investment in education world-wide; and if the expansion rate that characterized the post-independence years had continued, Africans could have entered the 21st century in a position not too disadvantageous compared to that of other students in the rest of the planet.

An equally important development was the democratization of academic life prompted by the growing political force of student organizations. By the 1970s, they increasingly joined with other popular organizations (e.g. the labor unions), to demand from the state more accountability, a more equitable distribution of national resources and grass-roots participation, and better educational services (e.g., in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya). Why then does the World Bank so totally reject the educational results of the post-colonial period and where does it locate the "failures"?

We cannot answer these question purely remaining within the educational sphere. For the implementation of World Bank-inspired SAPs in the education sector is not an ad hoc measure devised to ride a period of crisis, nor a tool for efficiently boosting the impact of the current system, as the rhetoric that surrounds it would have us believe. Rather SAP adjusts academia to the prospected manpower needs of African economies, in a context where the latter are being demoted to the lowest echelon of the international division of labor. One reason for this demotion is undoubtedly the profit crisis of the 1970s, when investments in Africa scored the lowest rate of returns world-wide, and the belief that no significant improvement in the productivity of African labor will materialize, short of a full reorganization of the process of social reproduction: land tenure rights, family relations, child raising practices and fertility rates. (World Bank (c);

Lesthaeghe). As the obstacles to a higher return on investments appear imposing, a consensus has developed in international business circles that Africa has entered a period of historic retrenchment, whose end is nowhere insight, given the present competition for capital among many, similarly "adjusted" regions of the globe, and the ease with which foreign investors can now move across countries and continents.

It is in this context that the provision of SAP for higher education must be evaluated. SAP is shaped by the conviction that for a period, whose temporal contours remain undefined, few Africans will be in need of university degree; for as long as an environment more congenial to the needs of investment is generated, Africa must remain a region from which wealth is exported, and with the wealth also the manpower it could have employed. This program, however, cannot be implemented without the destruction of the higher education system, and the power which the campuses represent. This is a major objective of SAP.

SAP in fact is putting an end not only to free education, but to higher education as such, thus representing, from a human capital perspective, a key step towards the devaluation of African labor.

That the objective of SAP is to drastically downsize the higher education system has often been indirectly admitted. World Bank reports have repeatedly stressed that Africa's higher education system suffers from "excessive demand" and is "over-extended"; a claim which signals what Caffentzis has defined as a "will to academic exterminism" (CAFA Newsletter 2). For in a continent where on an average, only 0.8 population has access to a tertiary degree, the participation to higher education is the lowest in the world, and only 80 academic institutions are in existence, barely twice the number of the universities in New York State, any cut inflicted to the academic system is a sentence to extinction. (UNDP; World Bank (a), (b), (c)).

Officially, however, SAP is justified as a means to provide a more equitable and effi-

cient allocation of resources. For the World Bank argues that too many funds have been allocated to the universities, diverting precious resources away from the bolstering of primary education, and that the new measures will not affect enrollment, since mechanisms are in place (loans and credit schemes) ensuring that students, by mobilizing private resources, can continue to finance their studies. We are told, moreover, that introducing "cost sharing" and "user's fees" will allow for a better student selection, and that making students responsible for the financing of their studies will guarantee that only those genuinely capable and motivated will pursue a university degree.

Such arguments however are disingenuous. For they presume a prosperous population, which has available untapped financial resources; not a continent, such as Africa today, where the combined effect of the World Bank's "recovery program" has already produced widespread unemployment and placed even the most basic necessities, adequate food, housing, transport and health care are out of reach of the majority. This disregard for the financial state of African population appears all the more peculiar, since in the studies the World Bank has made in recent years, a doomsday economic scenario is evoked, picturing Africa as a continent of "diminishing resources", that is frozen in a state of chronic poverty, where the first mandate of educational policy is not to raise excessive expectations (which indicate it does not believe its recovery packet). (World Bank (c)) But if the economic situation in Africa points to a prolonged regime of austerity, such as to preclude the state from disbursing the funds needed to guarantee that knowledge is not a privilege but a right, how will the population acquire the same funds? How will a population that is demonetized and can barely can feed itself, find the resources to pay for university tuitions, accommodations, food, transport, educational materials, or to qualify for bank loans? Such has been the pauperization of the majority of Africans that even in elementary school, which have remained free or have introduced relatively modest fees, (c200, in

Ghana, one day of work at the minimum wage). (Kraus : 31) Enrollment in Ghana, the IMF and World Bank's "success story," has dropped for the first time since independence (Noss: 40), indicating that many parents find it difficult even to meet its cost, or have lost hope that an elementary school diploma may be of any use.

These considerations suggest that the rhetoric of efficiency and improvement by which SAP is promoted in academia hides the reality of educational retrenchment; and that the proposed alternative financing mechanisms are actually tools for the phasing out of unwanted students and academic staff. Other factors confirm that demise of higher education is at the core of the SAP's agenda.

First is the collapse of academic institutions in the aftermath of its adoption. This phenomenon is by now too familiar to Africanists to need rehearsing — we all have seen or heard of the collapsing building, overcrowded hostel rooms, the lack of educational materials, the frozen below subsistence faculty wages, the unprecedented brain drain. What needs to be stressed, however, is that these processes bring about a devaluation of African institutions, and their academic personnel, which will have irreparable consequences on their ability to function, and international prestige.

That universities are to be marginalized as centers of learning, or in many countries allowed to die of economic asphyxiation is further demonstrated by World Bank's "African Capacity Building Initiative," which proposes the formation of regional centers, under the direct sponsorship and control of external donors, which will perform that task of preparing state personnel, which in the past was the role of academia (World Bank (d)). More specifically the function of these centers is to "capture the elite," that is, to train a cadre of technocrats — economists and policy analysts — identified with the goals of international capital, and thus to be capable to act as a transmission belt between the circle of international finance and power and the African state. The function of the graduates of the Capacity Building institutions will be to make sure that

Africans do not have a free hands in the shaping of their societies, that they cannot be autonomous in the production of knowledge, but instead enter the new century politically and economically recolonized.

Already the replacement of Africans with expatriate personnel is visible in every sphere (including the military, as we see in Somalia). While thousands of intellectuals have been forced to migrate abroad, and transfer the investment made in their education to the institutions of the industrialized countries, Africa, according to UNDP, is now receiving more advice pro-capita than any continent: "the IMF, multilateral financial institutions, UN system of agencies, and bilateral donors are deeply involved in the formulation of (its) economic policy." (UNDP: 40).

In this context we can understand why SAP must come accompanied by so much repression. For SAP cannot be implemented unless the power of African students and teachers, beginning with their power to enforce a better education and be participants in the shaping of their societies is undermined. This must be stressed in the face of the now frequent claim that the economic liberalization SAP entails sparks the winds of democracy, and opens the space for "popular participation." (Bratton).

In reality, not only was SAP adopted without a process of academic or popular consultation, but its application has involved the persecution and muzzling of one of the most important political forces in Africa. In response to stiff protest, student and faculty unions have been outlawed, thousands of students have been rusticated, scores, together with members of the faculty, have been jailed, universities have been closed for prolonged periods of time; and everywhere, in the aftermath of SAP, the state has centralized its power and extended its direct control over the university system (for Ghana see Kraus: 35). An outstanding example of this process is the Zimbabwean government legislation of 1991, which gave authority to the Vice Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe to expel students

and to fire faculty without due process and appeal (students boycotted classes to protest the new laws in June 1991). But, as Andrew Meldrum has pointed out: "The extension of state control over the university of Zimbabwe is not an isolated incident in Africa; in fact it is part of a pattern that is all too familiar throughout the continent." (Meldrum: 64).

The violations of academic rights carried on in the implementation of SAP are not the only examples of academic rights abuses in Africa; yet in many ways they are the most worrisome. For as long as SAP is the future of African education and economic policy, any process of democratization, in and out of academia, is bound to remain a formal exercise. No academic or political rights are possible without social rights. Today there is great interest among world agencies to keep these spheres separate and believe that human rights can be made available even in countries where social rights (i.e., the rights to adequate food, health, and education) are virtually nonexistent. As the UNDP Report of 1992 puts it, "Countries do not have to censor the press or torture prisoners just because they are poor," which in the context of my paper would mean that no government has to jail or rusticate students because it can no longer subsidize their studies. (UNDP: 29) This, however, presumes that the new generations of Africans will accept their marginalization, that is, they will accept to be turned into cultural illiterates, from the point of view of international standards, without protesting, and it overlooks the fact that the denial of education is already a denial of a human right and of academic freedom.

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1975 After the assassination of J.M. Kariuki, a popular critic of the government and a member of parliament, UON students took to the streets to protest "the government's ambivalence in responding to the murder." The government reacted violently to these protests. Many students were beaten up and several were raped by security forces. UON was closed. "[These events] marked a turning point in the relations between the government and the university community."

1978 Daniel Arap Moi becomes president. The Nairobi University Students Organization (NUSO) is perscribed. "Public speeches at the university had to be cleared by the Special Branch (intelligence police) who also attended any lectures held."

1980 The Academic Staff Union was banned in 1980.

1981 After student disturbances prompted by inadequate library conditions and the barring of outside speakers, lecturers regarded as critical of the government were deprived of their passports.

1982: before the August coup attempt "Several staff members of the university were arrested after being accused by Moi of 'teaching subversive literature aimed at creating disorder in the country.' Though no evidence of their 'crime' was produced by the state, Willy Mutunga, Edward Oyugi, Alamin Mazrui, Kamoui Wachira, and Mukaru Ng'ang'a were detained without trial for varying periods of time."

1982: after the August coup attempt Tito Adungosi, the Chairman of the Student Organization of Nairobi University (SONU), was jailed for sedition after university students celebrated the coup attempt. (Adungosi died in prison in December 1988 under mysterious circumstances. No inquest

was held.) "Sixty-seven other students were held from August till February 1983, when they were granted presidential clemency, except for six students who were jailed for sedition." University was closed for fourteen months until October 1983.

1985 At a prayer meeting organized to protest the expulsions without reason of several students, students were surrounded by armed police and were savagely beaten. One student died and over sixty-five students were injured. Nineteen students were arrested, tortured and jailed in connection with these peaceful protests.

1986-1988 The Mwakenya saga resulted in the jailing or detention of several students and staff of UON. "Mwakenya, and underground movement opposed to the government, periodically released anonymous pamphlets detailing alleged abuses. Hundreds of Kenyans were arrested for allegedly supporting the movement, and over 70 people were convicted in quick afternoon trials where all confessed to the charges against them. Claims of torture were ignored by the magistrates. Those strong enough to resist the torture were detained without trial." According to Ng'ang'a Thiong'o, those arrested were subjected to serious torture and were offered four "options" by the police: (1) confess to the alleged crime and receive a jail term; (2) be detained without trial at the president's pleasure; (3) be tortured to death; or (4) be charged with treason and sentence to hang.

1987 In November SONU was invited to participate in an international students conference in Cuba. The government, however, refused to issue a passport to the SONU chairman, Wafula Buke, who protested the decision. "In a night attack, heavily armed police arrested student leaders from the university residences, provoking protests from the general student body.

Kenya: Haven of Repression

On November 16, 1992 the Kenya Human Rights Commission released "Haven of Repression: A Report on the University of Nairobi and Academic Freedom in Kenya." It is a important document and deserves widespread attention. Since, however, "Haven of Repression" is over 18 pages long, we have decided to publish some excerpts from it as well as a chronology of events relating to the repression of academic freedom at the University culled from the report. All quotations are from the report.

Chronology

1969 The process of transforming the University College of Nairobi which was a part

of the then University of East Africa into the University of Nairobi was reaching conclusion. But in January of that year Oginga Odinga, president of the opposition Kenya Peoples Union was prevented from giving a public lecture at the university. Students boycotted lectures in protest and the university was closed.

1970 The University of Nairobi (UON) was officially inaugurated.

1972 The student newspaper *University Platform* was banned and its editors were arrested after criticizing the ruling party KANU.

The police violently put down the protests and over forty students were arrested. SONU was banned, and Buke jailed for five years after being held for two weeks incommunicado."

1990 Students were sent home on "early vacation" on July 14 following nation-wide demonstrations demanding multi-party politics. University officials were apparently fearful that the students would join the demonstrations. In November, students of the Faculty of Arts were sent home for two months after protesting a delay in refunding money due to them by the university.

1991 After much official harassment, students began to agitate to reform their own university-wide organization. A group of law students lead by Francis Kajwang formed an interim committee to revive SONU as SONU 92. UON was closed in July and all students were expelled for nine months following protests over the manner the government was introducing cost sharing.

1992 Elections for SONU 92 positions were held in May but within a short time the leadership was in trouble with the authorities for organizing demonstrations and meetings that protested government actions and demanding the restructuring of the university. For example, they demanded the depolitization of the offices of the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor as well as the removal of specific persons like the head of the Student Welfare Association who they claimed was unqualified. In response, UON was closed once again, SONU 92 was banned and on August 28 many of the officials of SONU 92 were ordered to appear before a Disciplinary Committee. They were charged with participating in a press conference, calling for the removal of the university officials, organizing a procession against political violence and distributing leaflets in support

of SONU 92. The students were denied legal representation despite a university regulation explicitly allowing for such representation. The students walked out of the meeting and filed suit for a judicial review of the above regulation. The suit is still pending (as of November 1992). In conjunction with the SONU 92 matter a number of selective closings of particular faculties occurred. Thus, on April 2 the students of the Faculty of Commerce were sent home for over a month while on July 30 students from the Faculties of Law, Arts, Architecture and Design, Engineering and Science were sent home for more than a month. The latter students return on September 2 but were again sent home as university authorities claimed that the students were planning and unlawful meeting.

The combination of university closures (a total of six since 1990) along with a tremendous increase in the size of the university without a concomitant increase in teaching staff and facilities has led to a crisis in the quality of university education in Kenya. What follows is the concluding part of "Haven of Repression" which deals with the Kenya Human Rights Commission's recommendations and comments on the role of the international community:

Recommendations

It is clear that the freedom of association, conscience, thought and propagation of ideas at the University of Nairobi is in serious jeopardy. Continued government interference and abuse has made a mockery of the autonomy and quality of the university. The major loser in this is not the students nor the academic staff. The general society suffers most when the quality of graduates can not be guaranteed. Further, the future political and economic development of the country is put at risk especially when we consider the fact that the majority of people in Kenya

are illiterate.

The Kenya Human Rights Commission therefore recommends the following:

—there should be no interference by the state and the university administration in student affairs. Students should be permitted to organize into bodies that will represent their interests and articulate any views they may have;

—the university administration should stop perceiving students as children and engage them in serious dialogue with a view to improving the quality of education. Students should be represented in all the organs of administration;

—the government must cease its persistent interference in university affairs. The deploying of riot and regular police to meetings at the university is unnecessary and a waste of scarce resources;

—the university administration must realize that students and staff are entitled to the rights and freedoms provided in the Constitution and international human rights laws ratified by Kenya, and should not operate like a private members' club;

—the university must exercise its discretion in closing the university more judiciously than at present. Most of the violent confrontations arise when the police are sent to quell even the most peaceful of protests;

—hiring and promotion of academic staff should be on merit and academic production and not on political considerations.

Role of International Community

The international community must realize that any assistance earmarked for the university in the present circumstances is not of much use. The university has a key posi-

tion in insuring the future development of Kenya, but the current trends mitigate against its effectiveness. Consequently, we recommend that donors insist on the implementation of the above recommendations before disbursing any assistance to the universities in Kenya. The linking of aid to political and economic conditionalities must extend to the university system in Kenya."

The Kenya Human Rights Commission is an independent and non-partisan advocacy group that monitors human rights in Kenya. It is based in the United States of America and Kenya. The Board is comprised of Makau wa Mutua—chairman (based in the U.S.), Willy Mutunga—vice-chairman (Kenya), Maina Kiai—executive director (Kenya), Peter Kareithi (U.S.), Alamin Mazrui (U.S.), and Njeri Kabeberi (Kenya). "Haven of Repression" was written by Maina Kiai. For more information contact Maina Kiai, P.O. Box 55235, Nairobi Kenya, Tel: 254/2-746236, 751865; or Makau Mutua, 34 Johnson Avenue, Medford, MA 02155, Tel: 617/483-3234.

WAYS TO HELP CAFA

- Become a member or a sponsor (membership is \$25 a year);
- Establish a chapter of CAFA at your institution;
- Contribute to our newsletter;
- Gather, circulate, publish relevant information in academic and non-academic journals, newsletters, student papers;
- Organize workshops;
- Help make CAFA visible at academic conferences.

Nigeria Update

The confrontation between Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the government is not over yet according to *The African Guardian* (January 11, 1993). A statement by Atahiru Jega head of ASUU warned that the suspended industrial action by the university teachers could be resumed, since the provisions agreed last September 1992 in the negotiations between the Federal Government and the university teachers unions have not been fully implemented.

In addition to wage increases, the agreement signed on September 3 stipulated a number of provisions including:

- the establishment of a education fund to be financed by a 5% pre-tax-profit contribution by commercial and industrial companies;
- lifting the ban on ASUU;
- implementing new conditions of service;
- greater autonomy and academic freedom for universities and their faculty;
- setting up a task force to implement the agreement. (*Newswatch*, January 11, 1993)

However, as of March 1, 1993, ASUU has not been unbanned, and several state universities have failed to implement the wage increases that were agreed upon, and are asking to be allowed to comply with the provisions only up to 50%. *The African Guardian* (January 11, 1993) notes, "The failure to implement the restoration grant for teaching and research facilities is the most apparent source of fresh hostilities." In his press conference Jega criticized not only the snail's pace at which the agreement is being implemented but he accuses the government of misinterpreting and subverting the spirit of some important provisions of the agreement.

Meanwhile the Nigerian government been sending out very ambivalent signals concerning education and the university system:

- The 1993 Federal Budget has devoted special emphasis to education and, perhaps in response to the ASUU strike, is giving it greater sectoral allocation than in previous years. In fact, "for the first time, education receives more money than defense." (*West Africa*, February 8, 1993)

- Many universities—including the University of Calabar, Bayero University, the University of Jos and Ogun State Polytechnic—are increasing their tuition fees for certain categories of student, especially those doing post-graduate and diploma courses. Some students, for example, at the University of Lagos are facing increases of up to 300%.

- Decree 9 of 1993 has been promulgated that makes it legal for those wishing to do so to establish private universities and other institutions of higher institutions. It nullifies Decree 19 of 1984 which had declared private universities illegal.

- The Babangida government put the following conditionality on the lifting of the ban on ASUU and NANS: "they will give up their confrontational stance, language of threats, showdown and challenge to the authority of the government." (*West Africa*, March 1, 1993)

The CIA, the Military and African Education The Implications of the Boren Bill

We are reprinting the following appeal from the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) concerning the "Boren Bill" and we urge our readers to respond to its call:

**The National Security Education Act of 1991:
Shall we open the door to links between the CIA, Department of Defense and Africa Scholars?**

As many Africa scholars are only now recognizing, a major new initiative has been launched to link the area studies community with defense and intelligence agencies. Late in 1991 the National Security Education Act was signed by President Bush. Known as the "Boren Bill" after its sponsor Senator Boren, the Act established a \$150 million trust fund drawn from the Department of Defense and CIA budgets. Interest from this fund is to support undergraduate study abroad, graduate research fellowships, and institutional support for international studies programs. Students must repay their grants or work either in a related educational field or in a federal agency, with particular encouragement being given to employment in national security agencies. The program is to be administered by the Defense Intelligence College of the Department of Defense. An advisory board, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, includes the Secretaries of Education, State, Commerce; the Directors of the CIA and USIA; and four presidential nominees. The effect of the Boren Bill is quite clear: it will draw the scholarly community into new relationships with intelligence and military agencies.

Many students of Africa have long opposed such attempts to link the scholarly community with national security agencies. Many of us recall well the disastrous effects for academics of such linkages during the Vietnam era, including Project Camelot in Latin America, and the lengthy record in Africa of U.S. CIA and military interventions supporting repressive rulers and working against legitimate and elected leaders. Given the end of the Cold War, it is especially inappropriate to give the intelligence community substantial influence over the direction and priorities of international studies.

Funding from such sources will threaten the openness of scholarly inquiry and publication, the physical safety of scholars and students overseas, and cooperation between African and U.S. scholars. This cooperation has been possible because of the firm stance many Africa scholars, programs and centers have taken against liaison with defense and intelligence agencies. This includes the commitment since 1982 of the African Studies Association, the Association of African Studies Programs, and the major African studies center directors not to accept defense and intelligence funding of African Studies, and the recent statement by the Presidents of the African Studies Association, the Latin American Studies Association, and the Middle East Studies Association against links with national security agencies.

In order to broaden this opposition and make it more public, the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS) proposes to publish a public statement signed by members of the Africa scholarly community, in opposition to this new attempt to

link scholars with intelligence and military agencies. Printed below is a short statement to be published in the Chronicle of Higher Education and/or Black Issues in Higher Education (depending of the level of contribution). It will also be sent to all members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

We encourage all students faculty and professionals associated with Africa studies

to sign it. Institutional affiliation will be listed only for identification purposes. Contributions to cover publication costs, at a suggested level of \$10 or more per signature (\$5 for students/low income) are welcomed but not mandatory. Signed copies of the statement, checks (made out of "ACAS"), and requests for further information should be sent to ACAS, PO Box 11694, Berkeley CA 994701-2694.

The statement reads as follows:

.....

The CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Study of Africa

We scholars of Africa call upon our colleagues to reject the National Security Education Act of 1991. The Act supports undergraduate study abroad, graduate research fellowships, and international studies programs. Students must repay their grants or work either in a related education field or in a federal agency, with emphasis on national security employment. The program is to be administered by the Defense Intelligence College of the Department of Defense, and overseen by an Advisory Board chaired by the Secretary of Defense and includes among others the Director of the CIA.

We have long argued for expanded funding for African studies. Despite Africa's importance to the U.S. and especially to people of African descent, African studies has received minimal funding by comparison to other world areas. However, this Act provides defense and intelligence agencies with influence on the direction and priorities of international studies. The disastrous effects of earlier links between scholars and national security agencies and the lengthy record of the CIA and military interventions in Africa are well established.

Funding from national security agencies threatens the openness of scholarly inquiry and publication, the physical safety of scholars and students overseas, and cooperation between African and U.S. scholars. Many area studies associations, Africa scholars, programs and centers have therefore opposed such funding.

For all these reasons, we call on

*our colleagues to express their opposition to NSEA 1991 as formulated and to all proposals for links with and funding from military and intelligence agencies, and

*the Congress to ensure the integrity of African studies by appropriating increased funding through civilian agencies.

Signature

Printed Name

Institution

Address:_____