

Beyond the New Left (PART 2 - II)

In Search of a Radical Base in Japan

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This is the second half of Part 2 of our evaluation of the Japanese New Left, which follows in detail the upsurge of the people's movement from the end of the 60s to the beginning of the 70s.

5 Culmination and Impasse

The New Left movement reached its peak in 1968-69. With the anti-imperialist street fights and campus revolts as its two major thrusts, the New Left drew more and more people into struggle despite the arrest and injury by police of thousands of participants. Throughout 1968, the movement was in its ascendant phase, and street fights converged with the campus revolt in a mass confrontation with state power. Politically, the movement as a whole was oriented against the Japan-U.S. security treaty whose first term was to expire in 1970 (though it was renewable automatically in the absence of action by either party). Born in the 1960 anti-treaty struggle, the New Left was determined to carry out a decisive struggle against the pact, which it saw as the key element of Japanese imperialism. Under that treaty Japan was seen to be helping the United States in its criminal war against the Vietnamese people.

The "riot" at Shinjuku on October 21, 1968 represented a synthesis of the post-Haneda New Left party-led political struggle and Zenkyoto social struggle. That night, the New Left political parties, Zenkyoto masses, Hansen workers, Beheiren, and tens of thousands of unorganized citizens collaborated, turning Shinjuku into a "liberated zone."

Shinjuku is an extremely active, prosperous amusement district in Tokyo. It was discovered, however, that National Railway tanker trains passed through Shinjuku, carrying jet fuel for the U.S. military planes supplying weapons and

soldiers to the Vietnam front. By focusing on the jet fuel transport through Shinjuku, the New Left wanted to dramatize the presence of a bloody but unseen war in the midst of "peaceful" Japan. For the New Left political groups, this was an occasion to demonstrate their street combat capabilities. The Shinjuku "riot," announced ahead of time, attracted a huge crowd. Earlier in the day, Sohyo and other maincurrent progressive forces called for action, and more than 300,000 demonstrating at 520 places across the country. University students also went on strike. In the evening, 1,500 party units launched actions inside the Shinjuku station. They occupied the platforms and halted all railway services, stranding U.S. tank trains at other stations. A few thousand police attacked them, but Zenkyoto and Hansen joined force and fought back by hurling stones and fire bombs. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered, and, as at Oji, police charged into them at random and the snowballing crowd fought back. People occupied the plaza in front of the station; excited speakers climbed up elevated structures in the plaza to address the applauding crowds as student combat units repeated charges into the police. Small circles of passers-by formed spontaneously everywhere, discussing issues in tear gas mist. People would disperse as the police troops charged but gathered again, hurling stones as the police retreated. The entire area was impossible for the police to control. Traffic signals were off, but demonstrators assured traffic control. The people who occupied Shinjuku and fought police were not mobs. There was no looting of shops. Nor was there any inter-fighting. The atmosphere was liberating. People felt Shinjuku now belonged to them. Past midnight, the government decided to invoke the riot clause of the Criminal Law and arrested 450 people at random, most of whom had no political affiliation.

In the meantime, the confrontation at Todai was coming to a head. Todai and Nichidai students in November held a joint demonstration inside Todai that drew 10,000 students, but acting

president Kato, on his initiative, gathered non-Zenkyoto (mostly Minsei) students and signed a modernization agreement to settle the dispute. This was a prelude to the introduction of police forces to crush the Zenkyoto physically. Panicked at the prospect of having to cancel the 1969 April entrance exam, the Todai bureaucracy and the government opted for a rough, quick solution. Kato declared a "state of emergency" on January 4, and the Todai Zenkyoto began preparing for the final confrontation by fortifying the barricades and closing the whole campus to outsiders. Mao's motto, "Revolts have reasons" was put up at the entrance to the university. All New Left political groups except Kakumaru¹ mobilized to defend the barricades. On January 18, 8,500 fully-armed riot police, with helicopters, bulldozers, armored cars, and other novel equipment designed specifically to fight the New Left, arrived. An 80-man sniper team was among them. The contest resembled a battle against a medieval castle. The Zenkyoto put up its last resistance by hurling stones and fire bombs down on the siege forces, but the police went from one building after another destroying barricades. The battle was fierce and all-consuming. The scene was televised live throughout the country, focusing the nation's attention on the "Todai citadel." The main tower defended jointly by all New Left parties and Todai Zenkyoto was taken only in the evening of the second day. The "Voice of the Liberated Auditorium," the students' broadcast station set up atop the tower, radioed its final message: "The struggle is not over."

The struggle was not over. The impact of the Todai battle was ponderous and unleashed the Zenkyoto movement like a tidal wave all over the country. In January 1969, 15 universities were occupied by Zenkyoto students, but the number surpassed 70 in February. Kyoto University (Kyodai), another prestigious state university in west Japan, also became involved. The New Left as a socio-political force grew into a formidable power, representing the revolt of an entire generation of young people who questioned the values of capitalist society. Senior high school students began to stand up, following the Zenkyoto model. They studied the writings of Karl Marx, Che Guevara, and other revolutionary literature, joined street fights and defied the regimented school system. All New Left parties organized highschool wings, and spontaneous groups were also formed, putting out numerous pamphlets, posters, and leaflets. The Beheiren student arm expanded fast in the midst of the Zenkyoto movement, rallying "non-sect" militants. Beheiren itself grew into a nationwide network with community- and school-based



Thousands of students occupy Tokyo University, December 1968.

groups in cities and towns across the country. Young Beheireners initiated a "folk guerilla" movement. They composed and sang satirical protest songs of the Bob Dylan type, and small groups would appear during street fights, appealing to the crowd and inviting them to join the action. These groups sang regularly in the vast crowded underground concourse of Shinjuku station, and people would crowd around them and sing together until the whole crowd turned into a spontaneous political rally, with everyone chanting slogans and demonstrating. As this happening became known, people would come to Shinjuku to join it, and every day several thousands would hold a singing protest demonstration. It was extremely difficult for the police to intervene as the underground plaza was congested, but they dared come to disperse the singing crowd. The people simply moved while singing and mocking the riot police. The police did not know how to deal with this singing "guerilla" force. The whole plaza became a sort of liberated space, where Zenkyoto and other groups appeared every day with their pamphlets. This movement lasted until the police arrested the singers and posted hundreds of policemen to make all passers-by keep walking.

On the labor front, the Hansen extended its influence during this period. The Todai struggle had a great impact on many young workers, but in the workplace, the core of the Japanese bourgeois society, the ruling structure prevented young workers from revolting on a mass scale. In December 1968, the JSP decided to purge the Hansen and in early 1969, Sohyo "froze" the Hansen activities. Hansen forces divided quickly into New Left party-aligned groups, and many of Hansen workers were mobilized as part of party action units. In the street, Hansen workers fought courageously, many were arrested and dismissed from their jobs. The Hansen's street struggles were not easily "recycled" into workplace struggles.

despite the efforts of most of the political groups. Nevertheless, the Hansen resistance laid the basis for the subsequent development of militant trade union tendencies. We shall deal with this area separately.

6 Okinawa Deal and Government Offensive

Here we need to take a look at the Japanese government's strategic goals. The United States, on the defensive in Vietnam, following the Tet offensive in February 1968 and faced with a deteriorating dollar, was pressuring Japan, its trusted "free world" Asian ally, to increase its contribution to maintaining the status quo in Asia. Prime Minister Sato, with the expanding Japanese economy with increasing stakes in the Asian status quo, was anxious to enhance Japan's political and military role in America's anti-Communist Asia strategy. (The Japanese government never suspected that Washington was preparing a historic rapprochement with China.) The political and military schemes of both sides converged on Okinawa. To the United States, Okinawa was a pivotal military outpost vital to its war effort in Vietnam war and a key control point for the military situation in Asia (a U.S. "stepping stone" as the Pentagon called it). For Japan, Okinawa was a territory lost through its defeat in the last war. The 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty severed the Okinawan islands from Japan and placed them under U.S. military administration. Building a huge nuclear arsenal and other military installations there, the United States ruled one million Okinawans by military decree.

The position of the Okinawan people was delicate. Okinawa had been conquered militarily


by the Meiji government, which annexed this kingdom in 1879 making it an internal colony. During World War II, Okinawa was the only territory belonging to the Japanese archipelago where major land battles were fought with the United States. The battles of Okinawa caused the death of 200,000 Okinawan civilians. After the defeat, the Japanese government readily turned the Okinawan people over to U.S. military rule. But despite the repeated hardships Okinawan people suffered at the hand of Japanese imperialism, they preferred reversion to Japan over stern U.S. military rule, hoping that Japan's postwar "Peace Constitution" would get rid of U.S. bases on the islands. In 1960, the Okinawans, opposed to U.S. rule and the heavy presence of U.S. bases, launched a movement urging reversion to Japan, and a broad-based militant council was set up for that purpose.

The return-to-Japan movement coupled with anti-base campaigns intensified as Okinawan bases were used to launch B-52 bomber attacks on Vietnam. In the first election to be held for chief administrator under U.S. rule in 1968, the anti-base, anti-security treaty and pro-reversion candidate Yara Choby, backed by teachers and U.S. base workers' unions, won a landslide victory. Before the conclusion of the 1960 security treaty, Washington had pressured Tokyo to take over some of the strategic military functions assured by U.S. bases in Okinawa and thereby assume a broader and heavier responsibility in the Asian anti-Communist strategy. At that time, Japan hesitated and the reversion of Okinawa did not materialize. With a strong Okinawan people's reversion movement, the United States found it far more useful to have Japan to deal with the recalcitrant anti-war movement on Okinawa. Moreover, the policy would better serve Washington's strategic aim of winning a deeper strategic commitment of Tokyo, the aim Washington failed to attain in the 1960 treaty deal because of Japanese hesitation.

For the Sato government, the reversion of Okinawa had three meanings. First, the Prime Minister could boast that he had achieved a historic feat by securing the return of a lost territory. "Without getting back Okinawa, we cannot terminate the post-war period," he said. Secondly, by becoming a more "responsible ally" of the United States through the reversion, Japan can bring its role and position in the U.S. imperial setup to a level commensurate with its economic strength. Third, Sato could appease the Okinawan people and reintegrate Okinawa into the Japanese state again as an internal colony.

The interests of Washington and Tokyo coincided, and negotiations were begun over the heads of the Okinawan people. If arranged according to

Okinawa Day, April 1969. Rioters use the rails to free from police.



the wishes of the two imperialisms, the reversion would mean a crucial de facto revision in the 1960 Security Treaty: it would expand the military role of Japan beyond the levels authorized in 1960.

Such an arrangement obviously ran counter to Okinawan people's genuine desire for peace. So Sato promised that after reincorporation, Okinawa would be treated like other parts of Japan as far as military bases were concerned. For Sato this simply meant that after reversion, the prior consultation accord with the United States on the introduction of nuclear weapons would apply to Okinawa too.

The maincurrent progressive forces were trapped. Enthusiastic about Okinawa's reversion, they did not question the fundamental premises underlying this deal, but indulged instead in sterile discussions of whether Washington was returning Okinawa without nuclear arsenals. Neither the JSP nor the JCP questioned whether this deal respected or ignored Okinawans' right to self-determination. Nor did they suspect that the deal would mean the virtual revision of the 1960 security treaty and a deeper commitment to America's Asia strategy. For them, the anti-treaty struggle was slated for June 1970, the end of the 1960 pact's first term. No one in the established Left warned that ambitious Japanese imperialism might use the Okinawa deal to further its own expansionist goals.

For Sato, it was nonetheless a grave moment. Asking for reversion of Okinawa was a strategic decision, and any blunders would cost him his political life. In this crucial moment, he also had to deal with the turbulent domestic situation created by the New Left. To secure its rear while negotiating the fate of Okinawa, the Sato regime decided to declare all-out war on Japanese insurgents prior to his scheduled meeting with Richard Nixon in November 1969, where basic arrangements on the Okinawa issue were to be made.

The government set out to meet this goal by (1) beefing up the riot police so they could defeat the New Left in the street, (2) wiping out the Zenkyoto movement, (3) isolating the New Left from the masses, (4) segregating the New Left from the established Left, (5) organizing conservative social forces to positively combat the New Left, and (6) establishing a comprehensive police and civil intelligence network throughout the entire society.

The first confrontation on the Okinawa issue came on April 28, 1969, Okinawa Day, held to commemorate the separation of Okinawa from Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. That day, the JSP-Sohyo bloc and the JCP mobilized 100,000 people, including a large contingent from Okinawa, in a mass rally in Tokyo. Preparing for

the rally, Sohyo had decided to expel the Hansen workers, and the demonstration was an uninspired and orderly procession, much to the disappointment of the Okinawan participants.

On that occasion, 29 New Left organizations including eight political parties and Todai, Nichidai, and other Zenkyotos, issued a joint political statement pointing to the danger of the Okinawa deal and urging people to rise up to oppose it. Twenty thousand students, workers, high school students and citizens, in several groups, launched actions in downtown Tokyo including Ginza, creating a riotous situation that involved thousands of passers-by. The leftwing of the Bund and other groups intended to use that day to strengthen their "armed struggle." They attempted a sortie from a dental university a kilometer from the seat of government offices, but were unsuccessful. The university was besieged by 2,000 police, and only 100 out of several hundreds were able to reach the main battlefield. This failure was traumatic for those Bundists who dreamed of revolution through military victory over riot police.

Out of the reflection of this experience, a faction later known as the Red Army would emerge. That day, the government invoked the notorious Anti-Subversive Activities Law against five Bund and Chukaku leaders. Passed in 1952, the law is the only legislation in postwar Japan giving the government the power to ban revolutionary organizations. In the still turbulent and riotous situation that prevailed in the country, Chukaku, typically, prided itself on having "forced the government" to invoke that sheer counter-revolutionary law. The logic was that through this law, the last resort of the reactionary system, revolution was confronting head-on the concentrated forces of counter-revolution. Whether this logic had any objective validity will be discussed later, but it is a fact that April 28 marked the beginning of a full-scale counter-offensive of the regime against the New Left.

The government now set about subduing insurgent students all over the country. It prepared new emergency legislation dealing with university management that authorized the government to shut down universities should their functions remain paralysed by student power for long. The law took effect in August, and a police offensive against the occupied campuses was launched. Zenkyoto students fought back well, but Hiroshima University fell on August 17 and Waseda University on September 3. Chuo and Meiji universities were also lost. Zenkyotos across the country had to unite in the face of this offensive. On September 5, 26,000 students gathered Tokyo's Hibiya outdoor theater, proclaiming

establishment of the National Zenkyoto, representing Zenkyotos at 178 universities. Todai Zenkyoto's Yamamoto was chosen chairperson and Nichidai's Akita vice-chairperson. The rally decided to mobilize Zenkyoto's full force to fight Premier Sato's planned visit to Washington in November and to win the anti-treaty and Okinawa struggle. It called on students to reoccupy all the universities and to smash the new university legislation. The spirit of the meeting was high, and speeches by Yamamoto and others were fiery, but the lack of real direction and loss of prospects were felt by everyone present. How to go beyond campus occupations? What to do with the campuses recaptured by the police and turned over to law-and-order forces? Can Todai be reoccupied? Nobody dared answer. The only emphasis — also the consensus — was that all the Zenkyoto forces should fight in the street on the Okinawa treaty issue. But here, too, state power learned important lessons from its bitter experience with the New Left, and built the riot police into a formidable semi-military force. Nobody denied the importance of street fights, but these alone did not look like a promising path to victory. Symbolically, the Red Army, organized by the leftwing of Bund after the April 28 incident, made its first debut at this first national Zenkyoto rally.² In a small tight propaganda unit, it told the people that the time of quasi-armed struggle in the street had been over and that if they wanted to go further a fully armed insurrection was the only answer. The Red Army saw the National Zenkyoto as a deceptive vehicle

National Zenkyoto is established, September 1969.



taking people nowhere and felt it should be "smashed." The political atmosphere was still charged, and people were prepared to fight on, but there was no longer the same vigor and hope that had permeated the ranks of fighting people a year earlier.

Nor was the National Zenkyoto organized in true Zenkyoto fashion. It was set up, directed, and presided over practically by eight New Left political parties,³ which had entered into an alliance. In other words, the National Zenkyoto was organized vertically, and the parties substituted themselves for mass leadership, a practice that had been jealously guarded against by Zenkyoto masses on campuses. The eight parties, with their different policies and motivations, formed the secretariat of the National Zenkyoto. Decisions could only be reached by compromise among the top party leaderships and the masses were not consulted. The National Zenkyoto therefore did not symbolize the convergence of the Zenkyoto movement but rather signaled its death. After the founding rally, the Zenkyoto students in Kyoto-Osaka area put up their last resistance to police attacks. The Kyodai citadel was taken by siege, as Todai had been, on September 20. With the last major resistance of 5,000 Nichidai students at the end of September, the campus-based national Zenkyoto movement was wiped out. At many universities, including Tohoku University, the police stationed officers in each classroom, instituting virtual martial law on the campuses. In less than a year, the National Zenkyoto would disintegrate.

State power was on the offensive, trying to clear the ground for the major deal on Okinawa, and all the New Left forces mobilized at full strength mainly by escalating street fights, but, in some cases, attempting to organize workshop level actions through Hansen and other militant workers. Chukaku was the party that carried the street battle line to its logical extreme by setting "annihilation" of the riot police as its goal. The class situation, Chukaku argued, could be turned into a pre-revolutionary situation, and the October-November struggle was a preliminary stage to it. Only when workers organized politically and militarily had smashed the riot police, could an opening be cut leading to the French May-type situation, Chukaku reasoned. Thus, Chukaku thoroughly organized its worker contingents into military units. Others parties differed from Chukaku, but all New Left political groups agreed to muster their full strength to carry out this struggle at all costs.

Major confrontations occurred on October 21, November 5, 13, and 16-17. The New Left political groups had their respective tactical and



Shinjuku Station, central Tokyo, October 1968. Crowds halt rail transportation of jet fuel for U.S. Vietnam offensives.

geographical goals during the October 21 action, but generally, they intended to march on the downtown government offices (where legal demonstrations were not permitted) by defeating police cordons in the way. Because the inter-party relationships were already tense, no general plan was made. But simultaneous actions at different places were expected to confuse and frustrate the police planning.

That day, however, the government first used its new tactic of isolating the demonstrators. Unorganized masses siding with the New Left was the government nightmare. The government was determined to preclude this possibility. All downtown business offices, shops, and restaurants had been visited by police officers the previous day and told that "extremists" (Kageki-ha) were planning to throw in fire bombs to cause disturbances. They urged all shops and offices to close down the next day. This scare-campaign was effective. When New Left fighting units managed to arrive downtown in the afternoon, the whole area had been a ghost town populated only by police. There were no crowds. Even so, fierce clashes occurred there. In the evening, a few hundred Chukaku workers' units fought and defeated police near Shinjuku, controlling the area for two hours. ML League units also fought with Chukaku nearby. Earlier in the day, Bund units approaching center city fought with the police near Kanda on the edge of downtown area, Kaiho, Front, and the Proletarian Student League reached Ginza and engaged police there. These were all armed units. Beheiren and its student arm gathered 20,000, thousands of whom threw up barricades in the street and resisted police with stones. A few hundred Hansen workers not organized into party units also held a rally and tried to proceed to the Prime Minister's office but were stopped on the way. That day 21 police boxes were burned down, but more than 1,200 demonstrators were arrested.

The established Left also launched protest actions in October, and on November 13, Sohyo called a work stoppage involving 840,000 workers. That day, in Osaka, Kasuya Takayuki, a student from Okayama University, was beaten to death by riot police in a clash with police following the Osaka Sohyo workers' rally. On November 15, 25,000 people from all New Left parties, Beheiren and Hansen held a protest rally in Tokyo. The showdown came on November 15-17. Sato was leaving for the United States on the morning of November 17, and people again wanted to stop him at Haneda airport.

By that time, however, the government's scare tactics designed to isolate "extremists" from the rest of society had escalated. Not only were people told not to gather at confrontations, but they were instructed to fight "extremists" themselves. To encourage them to do so, police mobilized the conservative community networks connected with the police and fire-stations. In the communities near Haneda airport, the police told community bosses to organize their people into "self-defense corps to inform on and capture stragglers from extremist combat units. To the surprise of many, the JCP supported this move. Prior to Sato's departure, its daily newspaper Akahata proudly reported how the party's local units had collaborated in the fight against extremists by removing gravel heaps that might be used by them as weapons. The confrontation unfolded in an artificially created atmosphere of fear.

Again the struggle focused on approaching Haneda. But this time the Sato government staked its political fate on Washington visit and victory over the New Left. The prestige of the police also rode on the outcome. The 10,000 police guarded the airport water-tight and threw up thick cordons to stop the demonstrators near Kamata station, three kilometers from the airport. Bloody clashes began at about 4 p.m. around

Kamata station and lasted until the dawn of Nov. 17. Every ruse imaginable was used to carry in fire bombs including the use of a fake postal delivery van. All trains were cancelled once the skirmish started, and late-comers had to fight, put up barricades, and exchange stones for tear gas canisters simply in order to penetrate the Kamata area. Near Kamata are residential areas with small alleys and lanes, each of which turned into a battlefield. Despite differences in views, all party units fought basically alike. The para-military New Left units mobilized that day were estimated at 12,000 or more, including 5,000 for Chukaku, 1,500 for the Bund, 1,000 for the ML League, 500 for the Front-CWP, 500 for Kaiho, and 1,000 for Kakumaru. Beheiren earlier in the day organized a large protest rally of 15,000, and dispersing quickly, some thousands went to Kamata and joined the struggle.

The struggle continued throughout the night. Police-organized civil defense corps worked in some areas where isolated fighters were beaten up by local people and handed over to police. In other areas, local people were sympathetic and offered asylum to stragglers. That night, 2,000 people were arrested. Including those arrested on October 21, a total of 3,400 activists were caught by police. Of these, 1,000 were industrial workers and 2,000 students. Despite this sacrifice, especially that of the worker contingents organized through years of patient effort, revolutionary New Left parties failed to achieve a breakthrough. Sato departed on Nov. 17 and issued a joint communique with Richard Nixon which not only finalized the Okinawa reversion but declared that the security of south Korea, with its dictatorial, starkly anti-Communist regime of Park Chung Hee to be essential to Japan's own security. The communique proved the New Left's contention that the Okinawa deal would mean an increased role for Japanese imperialism in America's Asia strategy and, on that score, Japan's own domination of south Korea. The New Left could not compliment itself on this insight, however, for despite its acuity, New Left forces failed to stop the ominous deal. New Left political parties in fact exerted full strength, physical and moral, in street fighting, the most typical form of New Left action that only two years before had shocked the nation and released the energies of the masses. But now street fights were diked and contained. On the other hand, the radical social struggle of students seeking to change their social relationships and overcome the organizing principles of bourgeois society through direct, immediate, self-actuating intervention on the campuses was deadlocked and defeated. There was a prevailing sense of defeat, and from the autumn of 1969, the New Left

forces embarked on their troubled paths toward fundamental social change. How successful or unsuccessful such efforts have been, what lessons can be drawn, what effects, both positive and negative, the New Left had on the mass struggle in later years, and the present configuration of Japanese people's movement in terms of the rebuilding of a radical mass base will be the topic of Part III of this essay.

Notes:

1. Kakumaru, who placed more emphasis on organizational effort and criticized the other political parties of the New Left for pursuing the radicalization of the mass struggle itself as its objective, abandoned the struggle to defend the barricades of Todai just before the attack by the police on January 18, (though they were responsible for defending one University building). The other parties and Zenkyoto groups denounced Kakumaru as a "deserter under fire" and the split gradually widened between Kakumaru and the other New Left groups in each campus. Kakumaru also did not participate in the formation of National Zenkyoto, criticizing it as "petit-bourgeois radicalism," and insisted on unification of the mass struggle and building up the party.
2. The leftist faction of the Bund, who perceived the defeat of the Todai struggle and the Okinawa Day struggle from a military viewpoint, formed the Red Army in August 1969 and issued the "Declaration of War" on September 3. They declared their transition from an "armed struggle for self-defence" to one "for attack". This meant they were to move on from spontaneous militant action in the streets and campuses armed with sticks, stones and molotov cocktails to a prepared struggle with trained forces armed with guns or bombs.
The Declaration reflected the sentiment of the Chicago declaration of October 11, "Bring the War Home! All Power to the People" by the SDS of the United States and of the guerrilla struggles in Vietnam, Latin America and Palestine.
They considered the struggle against Prime Minister Sato's visit to the United States as a preliminary insurrection which would lead to a world revolutionary war. They subsequently began launching attacks on police stations on October 21, as part of the struggle for international anti-war day. 53 of them were arrested. They had been training up in the mountains with an aim to occupy the Prime Minister's residence. Their challenge failed before it even really got started.
In 1970 a group of them hijacked a JAL flight and flew to north Korea. Another group joined the Palestinian struggle - all part of a plan to establish international bases. It was the group that joined the Palestinians that later formed the Japanese Red Army. The ones that stayed in Japan formed the United Red Army with the JCP-Revolutionary Left.
3. The Eight political parties who comprised the National Zenkyoto are as follows. Chukaku, Bund, the Socialist Youth League (Kaiho Hantei Gakuhyo), the ML League, the Fourth International, the Socialist Workers League (Kyogakudo), the Communist Workers Party (Progakudo) and the United Socialist League (Front). Refer to the chart on page 32, AMPO Vol. 17, No.2.