GETTING IT WRONG

First, the apologies! Our last issue proved so popular that it sold-out before we could finish sending off the bundles to comrades taking extra copies for street selling. Sorry if you didn’t get yours. we’ll try to do better this time. Meanwhile, we are upping our print run to meet the increased demand. Growling excuses, also, to those readers awaiting BLACK PAPERS No1 – STEFANO DELLE CHIAIE, advertised in A36 for October publication. Unforeseen production delays have meant that the book will not now be out before the New Year. But readers who have already sent in their orders will be the first to receive their copies, hot off the press.

GETTING IT RIGHT

This issue of ANARCHY reflects our continuing evolution as a magazine since the change-over in Editorial Collectives noted in A35. We are still finding our feet and trying out different formulas to arrive at a good balance of material. From now on, ‘News’ will not appear as a separate section of the magazine. Common sense dictates that, whilst coming out (in theory) as a ‘Quarterly’, it is more efficient for us to tackle interesting news items in greater depth as Features, and to leave the job of straight reporting to the (fortnightly) BLACK FLAG NEWS BULLETIN. News material received by us will now, therefore, be passed on to BLACK FLAG on a regular basis.

GETTING IT GOING

ANARCHY intends to be taken seriously — by our friends, as well as our enemies — and to show that the often vaunted ‘propaganda by deed’ actually means setting an example of how Anarchists can do something worthwhile, and doing it properly. We believe it is time ANARCHY made people sit up and take notice.

A small group of imaginative, determined, individuals who are highly motivated can invariably achieve an influence far in excess of their numbers. But to reach our stated aim of “a revolutionary struggle with the most Libertarian character possible”, we also have to see ourselves in a wider perspective. Being a ‘Vanguard’ is not our style. We seek only to act as a catalyst within the class struggle wing of the anarchist movement. Ultimately, the pace of events will require such activist elements as exist to come together as a more organised Revolutionary Fraction (though not necessarily one organisation), rooted in the anarchist movement but not restricted to it. It is our hope to take ANARCHY beyond the narrow confines of the anarchist ghetto and reach a wider audience. The need exists already for a more outward looking anarchist presence in Britain; only the wherewithal is still elusive.

Successful activity proceeds from the specific to the general, and not the other way about. It is self-defeating to speak in terms of ‘the movement’ (still less ‘the masses’) without paying due regard to the nuts and bolts of activity. We believe no one group or organisation has a monopoly on the truth when it comes to advancing the cause of revolution. Useless arguments, dressed-up as ‘points of principal’, should not be allowed to get in the way of mutual understanding and united action. We appeal to all serious comrades to overcome this poisonous tussle for the first place in the queue for Utopia, and to put their energies instead into practical activity aimed at hotting-up the class war, and (this time) making sure we win.

ANARCHY COLLECTIVE.
ANARCHY
Box A, 84b Whitechapel High St., London E17QX, England Issue 37

Anarchy Magazine No. 37 (2nd Series) – Winter 1983/4

Published by:
Anarchy Collective,
Box A, 84b Whitechapel High Street,
London E1 7QX, England.

Typset by:
Anarchy Collective (Provisional Wing)

Design & Layout by:
Anarchy Collective.

Printed by:
Dark Horse Press.

Distribution by:
UK Bookshops from ‘A’ Distribution,
C/O 84b Whitechapel High Street,
London E1 7QX. Overseas Bookshops & Bundles from ‘A’ Distribution or direct from Anarchy.

Subscriptions (4 issues):
(UK) Individuals – £2.50
Libraries & Organisations – £5.50
(Overseas) Individuals – £3.00
Libraries & Organisations – £6.00

Please make all cheques payable to Anarchy Magazine in £ sterling.

FEATURES


JUST ANOTHER WEAPON: Ronan Bennett looks at the use of 'Supergrass' informers as a weapon of counter-insurgency in the war in the north of Ireland.

THE ‘DRABBITT’ EFFECT & Social Control: Trevor M. Artingstoll advances some perceptive comments on how the State keeps its head when everyone else loses theirs.

AUGUSTIN SOUCHY INTERVIEWED: We reprint Der Spiegel’s interview with this veteran German Anarchist on the occasion of the publication of his autobiography Listen Anarchist!

WACL: Henrich Kruger examines the activities and top-level international connections of the World Anti-Communist League.

BOOKS

SNIPER

LETTERS

Aerobics? No, he's just practising kicking down doors.
THE SAS MEN RETURN

SMILEY'S PEOPLE

In the Middle East history has a habit of repeating itself — under different political colours. A case in point is the secret involvement of the British SAS in North Yemen involving an ultra-clandestine mercenary operation between 1963-1967, and their secret (unpublished) return to the same country last year. During 1963-1967 the SAS were fighting alongside a Royalist movement in a civil war against the Republican regime (backed by Egypt and Russia). Last year the SAS returned (1) in response to "...secret cables to Bonn, Paris, Washington and London" sent by North Yemeni President Colonel Saleh "calling for serious help to stop...an imminent communist takeover bid". (2) The mission of the SAS took the form of giving Yemeni troops a crash course in counter-insurgency.

Twenty-one years ago North Yemen was ruled by a cruel despotic King (Imam) and South Yemen was under British rule. The Imam died in September, 1962, and his son, the Crown Prince al-Badr was deposed in a coup led by Colonel al-Sallal which was backed by Egypt. Al-Sallal broadcast that al-Badr had been killed during the coup, and declared Yemen to be a Republic, and also against British rule in South Yemen. The British government and British officials in South Yemen (Aden) were most concerned, because, in their view "...what happens in the Yemen is of vital importance to Britain and our interests in Aden and the Persian Gulf...the whole of Arabia, from where we get our oil". (3) Back in London the British government hardly knew what was going on as a result of conflicting reports: some reports stated that al-Badr was still alive and had a following, others that he was dead.

"MI6 linkman" Colonel David Smiley (centre) with Royalist Prime Minister Amir el Hassan and bodyguard.

The American government wanted to recognise the Republican regime and press the British government to do the same. "Many of us in the Government" said Conservative Minister Julian Amery "had doubts whether this was good advice. Colonel MacLean also had the grates doubts. There were reports, but they were not all well confirmed, of resistance in the Yemen". (4) Shortly after the coup MacLean and Amery met at Amery's residence in Eaton Square, London. (5) They were soon to find themselves working together, as they had done before, prior to — in connection with the joint CIA/British Intelligence operation Climb in Albania, beginning in 1949. (6)

Amery and MacLean "discussed the situation" (7) in Yemen, and eventually MacLean decided that he would go there to Yemen and assess the situation "with no support from any official agency...at his own expense". (6) However, MacLean did not have to dig too deeply into his pockets if at all because he flew by an RAF plane from Northolt (9) to Jordan, where he saw King Hussein; both were "old friends" (10) and were concerned about the situation. After their discussion MacLean flew (the plane had been held an hour or so for him, including passengers) to Saudi Arabia and saw King Saud who was "highly concerned". (11) His next flight took him to Aden. In Aden he went to Government House and saw the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Aden, Sir Charles Johnston, and his A.D.C. flight Lt. A. Boyle — all of whom wanted "Aden to protect its
back (from North Yemen)”. (12) It was decided that it was best for someone to spy out the situation in North Yemen - being MacLean. The Sherif of Beihan, Saleh bin Hussein, invited to dinner at Government House, "interceded", (13) and MacLean subsequently passed through Beihan territory in South Yemen (on the border between North and South Yemen) into North Yemen.

He then travelled by truck right across East Yemen then up to Najran in Saudi Arabia. When he arrived back in Aden he sent out a telegram via Johnston to Amery (14) in London reporting that "...at least half the country was in Royalist hands and that it would be a disaster if (the government) recognised the Republic...". (15) MacLean's report came under the heading of Intelligence information. Upon arriving in London all information for MI6 when it arrives "is first filtered to disguise sources and is then passed on in raw form to the relevant section" (16) "and also to the intelligence group in the Cabinet Office, which processes it before reporting its assessment to the Joint Intelligence Committee" (17) (J.I.C.). The assessment of the J.I.C. is reported to the Cabinet's most sensitive committee, the Overseas and Defence Committee. "Membership is a closed secret..." (18) When asked who attended, Amery replied "that's a secret", but it is known that Defence Committee including "the Foreign Office (MI6), Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of Defence members, and the Prime Minister". The P.M. chairs the Committee which also includes "...the most senior and trusted members of the other Cabinet and Ministerial Committees". (19) MacLean's information arrived at the Defence Committee just three days prior to a Cabinet meeting with the recognition of the Republican regime on the agenda. The Defence Committee decided not to recognise the new regime, and likewise advised the Cabinet. The Cabinet's subsequent announcement against recognition "was not liked by the American government!". (20) (The American government recognised the Republican regime in December 1962).

MacLean journeyed to North Yemen several more times, when he saw Imam al-Badr who certainly was not dead. Officially MacLean was a journalist and he propagated for the Royalists:... "(The Royalist organisation) has grown steadily in strength and cohesion until, today, it is stronger and better organised than at any time, since the coup d'etat. The Royalists now control at least half of the country and have support of the majority of the Yemeni's five million inhabitants, almost all of whom have come to hate the Egyptians...President Nasser invaded the Yemen as a first step to extend his influence into Saudi Arabia. He wished to destroy the monarchy in Saudi Arabia and chase the British out of Aden. For he coveted the oil wealth of Arabia and the Gulf. The Russians approved as they felt it would weaken the ties between the Middle East and the West. They are now building a large new airfield just north of Sana which will give them direct air, transit facilities to Africa". (21)

Following one visit the idea of a mercenary operation materialised. Various people and organisations dropped broad "hints" that something needed to be done. MacLean and Amery totally agreed: something had to be done. Colonel David Stirling (a descendant of Sir William Stirling, 9th Baronet and Founder of the SAS during WW II) and MI6 man Nicolas Elliott*, with whom Stirling was "well acquainted" in 1962/3 also agreed that something needed to be done. That "something" was a highly clandestine mercenary operation involving ex and serving members of the SAS, and British Intelligence operatives. MacLean canvassed the Cabinet. Not all the members agreed, with the exception of Julain Amery, Peter Thorneycroft, Hugh Fraser and Duncan-Sandys who "factly" (22) sanctioned mercenary involvement. Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home "fully supported" the idea. (23)

* Elliott was MI6 Station Chief, in Beirut in 1960 and "ran" Kim Philby.

It was to Elliott that Philby confessed in January, 1963 and described his role and operations in the Middle East for the KGB. Recent evidence has emerged that Philby was involved in the 1963 coup in North Yemen. To be published in "Philby The Hidden Years", by Morris Riley.

Colonel David Stirling (above). Colonel James Johnson (below).
Next Stirling arranged a lunch with Colonel Brian Franks, Honorary Colonel of the SAS. (28) (Franks was no stranger to British Intelligence or Intelligence linked operations, as for part of operation Climber in Albania he had trained counter-revolutionaries at a special school near Berchtesgaden in 1949), (29) Franks recommended Colonel James Johnson, formerly of 21 SAS. In fact Franks saw Johnson at Johnson’s residence, Slaone Avenue, Chelsea, London, one evening and asked him if he would “organise a mercenary operation in North Yemen” for the Royalists against the Republicans. Johnson agreed, (30) and next met Ahmed al-Shami, the Imam’s Foreign Minister at dinner in London, when Ahmed al-Shami asked for help and convinced Johnson that he had the necessary funds to mount a cadre of British officers as advisors. The following day Johnson met Abdel Kerim el Wazir, Royalist Minister of the Interior who told Johnson that the first priority should be to destroy a force of MIG aircraft on the southern runway of Sana airport. El-Wazir immediately authorised “a large expenditure of money” (31)

Thereupon Johnson looked for competent ex-SAS officers. His first choice was Major John Cooper, who as Corporal Cooper had been Stirling’s driver during WW II; he had also seen active service in Oman during the Green Mountain revolt. (32) Two other ex-SAS officers were recruited. However, they were short of Arabic speaking recruits. Cooper and Johnson flew to Paris in order to find Arabic speaking mercenaries (who had fought in Algeria). In Paris they met Prince Michel de Bourbon-Parme — “a resourceful operator” (33) who found three highly competent French ex-officers for Johnson.

Amir Mohammed ibn Hussein (left), Commander of the 1st Army, which included all Royalist Forces in eastern Yemen and the Jauf; and Amir Abdullah ibn Hassan (right), Commander of Royalist Forces in the Khowlan. He was assassinated in July 1969.

Stirling was also involved in terms of visiting the Middle East and seeing people. On Friday evening 12th April (1963) at Government House, Aden, he saw Sir Kennedy Trevasakis (who had succeeded Sir Charles Johnston), Sherif Hussain and Boyle. They all met again “a few days later” (34) and discussed the current situation. Back in London it took Johnson “a few weeks” (35) to form the first mercenary team of six men. The men, including Cooper, flew from Bittern to Whitsun to Bahrain. At the Speedbird Hotel Stirling briefed Cooper. (36) From Bahrain the team flew to Aden and entered without any problems. Officially they should have been stopped at customs in Aden (or Bahrain) because Duncan-Sandys the Commonwealth Secretary, issued a veto, supposedly putting a stop to the whole operation. Conveniently, the team were actually in the air before the veto became effective. According to the press “How they got past the security in Aden remains a mystery...” (37) There was no mystery; the “veto” was in fact a F.R. political ploy, in order to absolve the government from any responsibility for the operation. In Aden the six mercenaries found their movements trouble-free from any official hindrance. Government House was used as a ‘safe house’ courtesy of the Governor’s ADC, Boyle. (38) From Aden they moved to anoth-
A — To establish and maintain a regular supply of arms and ammunition to the Royalist forces in the field.

This must be done by:

(1) Parachutage or, if this is impossible/or the political situation changes;

(2) Oeerror delivery from Saudi Arabia, the Yemen coast or Beihan.

B — To deny the Hodeida road to the Egyptians and assist the Royalists in other acts of sabotage which may periodically seem desirable.

C — To help the Royalists with skilled advice and practical assistance whenever it is sought". (53)

Within a month or so the operation was really underway. However, within several months the operation was "blown" and reported upon in the British media, to a minor degree, but not all of the names of mercenaries/operatives were revealed, nor were British Government and Intelligence links revealed. On 1st May, 1964 the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram published letters said to have been intercepted near the Yemen border with Beihan State. The letters were between Boyle and Cooper concerning sabotage operations, "Experience in demolition and small arms"; letter dated 4th November, 1963 from Boyle to Cooper; and dropping arms to Royalists by parachute, "The arms suppliers would ship direct", letter dated 29th November, 1963 to Cooper. (54) The letters were "admitted to be genuine by a British Government spokesman". (54) Once again questions were asked in the House of Commons.

Q.3 Mr. Marsh asked the Prime Minister, in view of his expressed policy of non-interference in the Yemen, who authorised the former aide-de-camp to the British High Commissioner in Aden to become actively involved, while holding that office, with an organisation led by British nationals which was supplying men and military materials to the Yemen Royalist forces; and why such activities were not reported to Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: No one gave any such authorisation. Both the present High Commissioner and his predecessor have assured my right hon. Friend that they were not aware that the person in question was involved in any way.

Mr. Marsh: Is the Prime Minister seriously telling the House that people as well known as Colonel David Stirling, Major Cooper and the High Commissioner's own A.D.C. could, in an area as dangerous as this, engage in activities on this scale without anyone noticing it? Has the Prime Minister read the recent book by Sir Charles Johnston, the former High Commissioner, which makes it very clear that if he did not know what was going on he had a pretty good idea.

The Prime Minister: No. The hon. Gentleman has no right to make that kind of insinuation. Both Sir Charles Johnston and the High Commissioner have assured me that they had no idea at all that Mr. Boyle was engaged in these activities, and I must take their word for it — and I do. (56)

The P.M.'s "denial was widely disbelieved, especially as Boyle later appeared in the Imam's camp as a military adviser..." (57) The Parliamentary exchanges raise some interesting questions: the P.M.'s "expressed policy of non-interference in the Yemen" was totally at variance with the fact that he had fully supported (and sanctioned) the idea of the clandestine operation.

For Johnston and Trevaskis not to have known about Boyle's activities, would have required:

1) For Stirling, MacLean and the Sherif of Beihan not to have told them anything;

2) For Boyle not to have said anything;

3) To have been away, or not aware that Government House was being used as a 'safe-house'.

Whilst ADC to Johnston and Trevaskis, Boyle was also an RAF officer. Son of Marshal of the RAF Sir Dermot Boyle, young Boyle became a F1t. Lt., before he retired from the RAF in January 1964. His covert role in the operation, 'safe-houses', etc. put him in a position much suited to British Intelligence. In fact, Boyle was seconded by M16 to work with Johnson and Stirling. But, "it was entirely unclear whether he was intended to assist or to provide an official eye to monitor Johnson's activities". (58) Intelligence operatives also became involved when "coopted to help out with radiological problems". The Yemen operation "was the focus of a fierce dispute within (British Intelligence); many senior officers wanted the Government to call a halt to it, but they apparently lost their battle". (59) M16 were not too happy about the other Yemen operation where "$30 million, to be exact (was) laundered through the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (and) ostensibly paid into the South Arabian Federal Treasury, then handed out to tribal rulers on both sides of the border". (60)

The operation continued: Colonel de C Smiley arrived in Yemen in June of that year (with MacLean, having been contacted by MacLean in May (61)) ostensibly as a "journalist" — "a journalist's cover (gave) respectability to my trip" (62) for the Daily Telegraph.

Smiley had been invited by (Saudi Arabian) Prince Feisal, through MacLean, to do a thorough reconnaissance of the Royalist-held areas, and to write an appreciation of the situation giving recommendations as to what help the Royalists needed in men and supplies — this he first did in June 1963. Feisal seemed pleased with Smiley's report, and personally asked him to complete several more, when he suggested the use of European mercenaries as instructors in weapons and demolitions, mine-laying, as radio operators and as medical orderlies.

Eventually, as the mercenary operation expanded and grew into a size where it needed one man to command and coordinate activities, Smiley was asked by Ahmed el Shami and Amir Sultan, the Saudie Minister of Defence, to take command of the mercenaries. This was agreed by Johnson: and Smiley commanded the mercenaries until he left Yemen in 1967.

In the meantime, the Royalist-Republican civil war was carried on. Both sides made gains and losses in terms of territory. Initially, Egyptian troops had been thought by the Republicans and Cairo, in the form of 11,000 men, to be able to advance from Hodeida to Sanan on the latter of 14 days, and win (they had told the CIA the same). (63) This never happened because of the terrible terrain (no paved roads) and Royalist opposition. Even though the Royalist army was outnumbered by Egyptian and Republican troops, the mercy-trained (plus actual
serving members of the SAS (64) Royalist were, by 1967, able
to hold 68,000 Egyptian troops in a stalemate situation. At one
point during that year Royalist troops ringed Sana, and could
have taken the capital.

Across the Saudi Arabia, Johnson (he and his team had moved
from the HQ in Aden) saw the head of Saudi Intelligence and
explained: “We can win — what do you want us to do go ahead
or withdraw”. However, Saudi Arabia did not want the mercer-
enary-backed Royalists to win because the Saudi Government
feared reprisals in terms of attacks by the Egyptian Air Force,
for which the Saudis were not matched. Such attacks would
have targeted main Saudi towns and cities. Jeddah had “previ-
ously been overthrown as a warning”. (65) The Egyptian
Ambassador was in contact with the Saudi Government and
cautioned: “You (Saudi-backed Royalists and mercenaries)
had moved to there, tut, tut, tut, if you move further, we
could retaliate...”. “So” according to Johnson “things never
went too far, although we could have taken Sana”.

The Saudi Government were even willing to offer one million
dollars (in a suitcase) to Nasser to induce Nasser to withdraw
Egyptian troops from North Yemen. (66) This bribe, according
to certain quarters, may well have been accepted by Nasser,
(who accepted money from Saudi Arabia, America and Russia)
in 1968, at a time when Smiley paid a visit to Yemen in March
“on an assignment... (he is) not prepared to discuss”.

The withdrawal of such troops could have aided Egypt beca-
use the troops would have been useful during the 1967 war
involving Egypt and Israel. As it was the 68,000 troops when
required by Egypt were tied down in North Yemen — Israeli
involvement in the mercenary operation had really paid divi-
dends. After the 1967 war, Egyptian troops were indeed
withdrawn, and eventually a government emerged in Yemen
comprised of both Republicans and Royalists.

History in North Yemen during the last two decades, as
described for the first time in this article, shows how the British
public were not allowed to be cognizant about what was hap-
pening in North Yemen on their behalf. Publicly (67) Prime
Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home (68) professed a policy of
“non-involvement in the civil war in the Yemen”. Yet at the
same time he had fully supported the operation, and was fol-
lowing ex-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s attempt, executed
by Julian Amery and a clutch of his old Albanian cronies, to
fight the good fight in Yemen”. (69) This attempt included the
involvement of British Intelligence and the SAS plus key figures
who had previously been employed in Intelligence operations.

Even though the British public did not know what was going
on in Yemen, the CIA had a good idea. President Kennedy
telephoned 10 Downing Street during the third week of No-
ember, 1963 for an angry and critical “scrambler” conversation
with Douglas-Home and asked whether Sir Alec was really
aware of the extent of the mercenary operation as reported to
the CIA and whether the British Government was involved. Sir
Alec promised to make enquiries. “But don’t ring me back
tomorrow”, said the President, “I shall be in Dallas, Texas”. (70)
“The assassination of President Kennedy on November
22nd had the incidental effect of ending an awkward dialogue
between the White House and 10 Downing Street about the
Yemen war”. (71)

Morris Riley

---

THE SAS MEN RETURN

FOOTNOTES

* July 1983 letter, op.cit.
1. Information to the author from Mr. J. Adams, Foreign Manager,
2. Peter Wilsher, “A Hot Spot may be the Next Hotspot”, The Sunday
Times, 22nd May, 1982.

3: Colonel Neil MacLean, “The War in the Yemen”, Royal Central
4. Julian Amery, as chairman, at a lecture given at the R.U.S.I. called
“The War in the Yemen” by Colonel Neil MacLean, 20th October,
1965.
5. Information from Colonel MacLean to the author.
6. See Anthony Verrier, “Through the Looking Glass”, Jonathan Cape,
7. Information from Julian Amery to the author.
8. Cf. supra No.4.
9. Information from Colonel David Stirling to the author.
10. Information from Colonel MacLean to the author.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. Cf. supra No.4.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Cf. supra No.7.
22. Cf. supra No.10.
23. Information from Colonel James Johnson to the author. “For years
Colonel Johnson had been dodging interviewers trying to obtain the
inside on British secret operations in the Middle East”, The Daily
Telegraph, 4th February, 1970.
1974, p.149.
27. Ibid. p.112.
p.123.
30. Information from Colonel Johnson to the author.
31. Cf. supra No.28.
33. Cf. supra No.28.
34. Cf. supra No.9.
35. Cf. supra No.30.
36. Cf. supra No.9.
37. Cf. supra No.28.
38. Cf. supra No.25.
40. Cf. supra No.30.
41. Cf. supra No.9.
42. Cf. supra No.30.
43. Ibid.
44. Cf. supra No.28.
45. Cf. supra No. 28.
46. Cf. supra No.9.
49. Cf. supra No.47.
50. Cf. supra No. 30.
51. Cf. supra, No.9.
52. Ibid.
53. Cf. supra No.28.
54. (a) Cf. supra No.9.
57. Cf. supra No.55, p.127.
59. Cf. supra No.25.
63. Cf. supra No.30.
65. Cf. supra No.30.
66. Ibid.
67. Cf. supra No.56, p.268.
68. The ex-Prime Minister The Right Honourable, The Lord Home of The Hirsel, K.C. did not want to be interviewed. "The more I think about it, the less I can find to contribute on the Yemen, so you miss nothing!" Letter to the author, November 24th, 1982.
Other notables involved had "lapse" of memory:
"I regret that I cannot assist you..." A.A. Boyle, Letter dated 9th December, 1981.
"...I have little or no knowledge about events in North Yemen" - Lord Duncan-Sandys. Letter dated 3rd December, 1981. The author replied and asked about:
"1) The overall impression you gained when you visited North Yemen with Colonel MacLean in April, 1967;
2) The encouragement/assistance - in 1962-67 - you gave to Colonel MacLean". He replied "I understand that you will yourself be shortly seeing Colonel MacLean. He will, I am sure, be better able than I to give you the information you require". Reply dated 6th January, 1982.
Just Another Weapon

There is an underground passage which links Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast with the Central Criminal Court. Every morning prisoners are taken in handcuffs by a large escort of prison officers along this crumbling, dank tunnel. The tunnel has been in use since 1970 but in recent months it has carried a hugely increased volume of traffic. The number of men appearing in the Belfast Central Criminal Court on “terrorist” charges has increased because of the government decision at the end of 1982 to implement its supergrass strategy.

Government and police spokesmen claim that by using supergrasses they have been able to deal severe blows to the operational capacity of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Some have gone further and stated that supergrasses have brought “the end in sight” – a phrase not heard since the early 1970s when Unionist politicians and senior army officers sought to bolster morale and fend off attacks on their apparent inability to deal with republican resistance. It is true that supergrasses have supplied a new confidence for the army and police. Unionist politicians, the maverick Paisley apart, have staunchly defended the use of supergrasses and smugly contemplate the defeat of republicanism.

Meanwhile the government and Northern Ireland Office have been at pains to assure liberal opinion that the supergrass strategy implies no threat to civil liberties and that the objectivity and impartiality of the law survives as before. Some less squeamish Unionist politicians have dismissed talk about the possible dangers of using supergrasses. What does it matter, they reason, that the innocent suffer with the guilty as long as the problem is solved? However, signs are growing that the confidence of the Northern Ireland Office and the Unionists in their weapon is misplaced, that the IRA and INLA will survive the informers, and that supergrasses offer no real chances of a victory for the government over republican resistance. There is also evidence that a growing number of more liberal politicians and lawyers are becoming increasingly restive about the use of supergrasses.

Christopher Black

The first supergrass in Ireland was Christopher Black. Arrested by police at an IRA checkpoint in 1982 Black was successfully “turned” by his interrogators and agreed to give evidence in court against 38 men and women accused of IRA-linked offences ranging from membership of an illegal organisation to murder. From the beginning the defendants and their lawyers argued that the evidence of Black was inadmissible as it had been obtained by inducement. The police agreed that Black had been given immunity from prosecution and had been promised a new life “anywhere in the world”. The police and the DPP denied that any financial inducements were held out to Black but, earlier James Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, had told a press conference that informers “would be taken care of”. Defence lawyers were quick to point out the difference between “taking care of” informers and giving them money might not be that great, and in any case there was evidence from defendants that they themselves had been offered large sums, anything from £10,000 to £50,000, on condition that they would give evidence in court. In addition informers who retracted their statements revealed that they had been promised money once the trial was over.

The Christopher Black trial began on Thursday January 13th this year. 35 of the 38 men and women on trial received hefty sentences; 22 received a total of 4,000 years, the majority on the uncorroborated testimony of Black. One man produced 30 alibi witnesses to prove that Black was lying. Despite the fact
that Black’s testimony was the sole evidence against this man he received a 20 year sentence.

Green Light to the RUC

Flushed with success the RUC was given the green light by the Northern Ireland Office to intensify its supergrass strategy. More arrests followed. Several more informers were recruited. The new informers were, however, of a completely different type. In the case of Black the police and the DPP could argue that the usual safeguards governing the admissibility of supergrass evidence had not been breached. The most important rule is that murderers should under no circumstances be offered deals.

But this is precisely what happened next. Harry Kirkpatrick, a former member of the INLA, was convicted in 1982 of five murders. Shortly after his conviction tentative negotiations were begun by the police to persuade him to give evidence against several men alleged to be leading members of the INLA. The police were desperate for Kirkpatrick’s assistance after the collapse of earlier attempts to indict these men. In return for giving evidence in court Kirkpatrick was offered early release. This has been confirmed by Kirkpatrick’s mother who visited her son in jail and was told by him that he expected to be released after five years.

Among those named by Kirkpatrick is former chairman of the Irish Republican Socialist Party in Belfast, Jimmy Brown. Brown maintains that the police’s determination to destroy the IRSP led them to recruit Kirkpatrick. He dismisses Kirkpatrick’s evidence as a complete fabrication and cites the occasions when he himself was approached by police and offered £80,000 if he would implicate people the police named to him. Brown and others have steadfastly maintained that supergrasses have been implicating as many people as possible, partly to increase their own value to the police, and partly on the initiative of the police.

Nor has Kirkpatrick been the only informer to have been offered a deal despite the fact that he has been involved in murders. Clifford McKeown was given immunity for his part in a murder. McKeown later retracted his statements and declared to the press that the decision to give him immunity had been taken at a meeting attended by representatives of the RUC, the government and the judiciary. It seems clear that the decision to ignore the usual guidelines surrounding the use of informers originated at high government level. Jimmy Brown and other defendants have been quick to accuse the government and police of a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.

Grassing for God

Another self-confessed murderer turned informer is Kevin McGrady, a 27 year-old Belfast man. McGrady fled abroad in 1978 and after undergoing a religious conversion in Amsterdam at the hands of a shady US-based religious sect called Youth with a Mission that specialises in handling “converted terrorists”, he returned to Belfast in 1982 and surrendered to the RUC. Allegations have been made in court that this organisation has strong links with the CIA. McGrady is currently giving his evidence in No.2 court at the Central Criminal Court. In passing he has mentioned how God talks to him. He is more reticent about the deals he has been offered by the police in return for his testimony but evidence suggests that he has been granted the usual release after five years promised to convicted murderers who co-operate.

An even shadier character is Jimmy Grimley. Grimley is giving evidence against more than 20 men accused of being members of the INLA and of a variety of offences ranging from murder to causing explosions. Since cross-examination of Grimley began it has been revealed that:

1. Grimley was recruited as a police informer in late 1979.
2. He had received money from the police over the years in return for information.
3. He had organised in early 1980 an INLA unit in Craigavon, a town which had no history of INLA activity.

4. He had recruited several people for this INLA unit, including a 17-year-old boy whom he then ordered to commit a robbery.

5. He was discharged from the British army after medical reports had revealed him to be "a psychopathic personality, schizophrenic and emotionally unstable".

Despite all this, those accused by Grimley seem set to be convicted and receive substantial jail sentences.

**No End in Sight**

So far 350 people have been charged or sentenced on the word of men who have a vested interest in their conviction. Yet despite this, there is no evidence to suggest that the defeat of the IRA and INLA is in sight. On the contrary, attacks on the army and police continue. On 15th October for example, one soldier was killed and another injured during an ambush in Derry. More importantly, the nationalist community has been further alienated from the government by what they see as the manifest injustice of the supergrass trials. Informers may succeed in locking up some of the most active republicans — though these with the breakout of 38 men in September, in the most spectacular way* that even in the H-Blocks they have resources the police cannot contain — but the price paid by the government will be a heavy one. It is more likely that the IRA and INLA will suffer temporary setbacks but will evolve their own tactics to overcome the threats posed by informers. In the meantime they can count on the continued support of a population angered and embittered by the latest government strategy of repression.

It is clear that the use of informers is a legal expedient designed by the government to fill a gap in its security policy. In order to crush republican resistance in the early 1970s the government resorted to internment without trial. In 1976 the then Labour government found the continued use of internment a political embarrassment and abandoned it. The void was then filled by torture at the Castlebregagh Interrogation Centre. As a result of the investigations of Amnesty International and other bodies the English Judge Bennett (no relation) was appointed to head a commission to investigate torture allegations at Castlebridge. As a result of his findings new safeguards were imposed and the number of "confessions" declined dramatically. The Northern Ireland Office and the police had to come up with a new solution. Supergrass appeared eminently suitable, having proved their worth in England in dealing with professional armed robbers. What the NIO failed to realise is that using supergrass in Ireland, where the community has an already heightened sense of its own repression, would lead to totally different results.

**Just Another Weapon**

In England supergrass have fallen into disuse as a result of the unwillingness of juries to convict and the growing appreciation by some of the legal profession that the dangers inherent in using informers outweigh the advantages. Liberal opinion has been slow to take note of recent developments in Ireland but in the last few months there have been signs that liberal lawyers are beginning to voice their concern. Deputations from the USA and France and observers from England are a regular sight in the Belfast courts. In particular they express disquiet over the absence of juries (in England judges are obliged to warn the jury of the dangers of informers evidence but in Ireland they simply warn themselves), the fact that uncorroborated testimony from an informer is sufficient to convict men of the most serious offences, and over the case-hardening of judges.

But while liberal lawyers fret over the morality of using tainted evidence republicans describe the supergrass as the logical extension of the policy of repression in Ireland. Legal developments, seen in this context, fit well with the view of the utility of the law as expressed by General Frank Kitson, British counter insurgency expert:

"The Law should be used as just another weapon in the government arsenal and in this case becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public. The activities of the legal services have to be tied into the war effort in as discreet a way as possible."

*(Low Intensity Operations)*

Rohan Bennet

**AFTERWORD**: The trial starring 'born-again' grass Kevin McGrady as chief prosecution witness ended on 26th October. McGrady's evidence was accepted by the Chief Justice, Lord Lowry, even though he strongly attacked his general credibility as a witness. Seven men were convicted as a result: one to a life sentence, a second to 12 years, and the rest to terms up to eight years.

In the Grimley trial, sentences totalling 51 years were dished out to eight men. Three others, including a woman, received suspended sentences. The court was told the whole sordid story of Grimley's life as petty thief, sex offender and police spy. The Guardian noted:

"As a police spy he made up stories for his Special Branch handlers, receiving £25 a time for his troubles. Heading an INLA "active service unit" in the Craigavon area, he appears to have operated as something of an agent provocauteur with police knowledge and connivance."

"... eventually pulled out of the field by his Special Branch controllers to go into the witness box, Grimley was granted immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony — immunity he will still enjoy although his testimony has been shown to be a tissue of lies."

ANARCHY COLLECTIVE
The State is that institution within fixed geographical borders which monopolises all techniques of social control including repression of tendencies and acts it views as undesirable. Little of it is located in the government, it is far larger in scope than government and much, much more powerful.

Isolating State elements is then, a task of isolating social control elements with a certain geographical area. Some elements are obvious: police; soldiery. Less obvious but even more important as a formative are: Education ministry; mass media including T.V. and the major publishing houses.

Since my thesis is that the State is an organic whole with society, and not an exorcism upon it, the State must obey the Law of organisms. This is that the whole must reflect every part of the organism and every part must give evidence of the whole that makes it a part.

In an average school, for example, the structure of the State is clearly present in embryo. The social control apparatus is the inner sanctum and out-of-group administrators (Head/Deputy head, and the rest of the teaching staff); the cutting edges of the State, the police, are of course, the prefects; Society is made up of pupils.

With this in mind it is amusing to witness debates often heated, on the topic of State education and whether what is taught in the schools is State propaganda or not. It is propaganda, of course, but it is the mere fact of going to school, of spending formative years in such a skillfully designed straitjacket, which is the deepest, strongest technique of social control. One could learn nothing there yet still satisfy the State.

Beyond the public sector the State's macrocosmic influence is detected in each microcosm of the private sector. The external confrontation between State and Society is reflected darkly in that between Management and Labour. Again, individuals in each element are victims of it, deluded by it, not manipulators of it. That is, there is no conspiracy by Management against Labour and vice versa. Merely accepting the confrontation position ensures that the appropriate behaviour and attitude manifest. Thus, working men accept that they are working men and demand the right to work. They react indignantly to anarchist arguments that they should, instead, demand the right to idleness. "Free bread and no work" is a perfectly reasonable request in a computerised machine-dominated economy, but it is regarded as obscene by 99% of working people. This is an aspect of social control; this really is brainwashing.

On the side of Management there are aspects of social control, too. Yer average Top Manager faced with a wilful, malicious, mutinous determination not to perform a certain reasonable task by a violent section of the workforce (i.e. a strike) now finds no buttons connected to the police or to military H.Q. They used to be there but the State disconnected them long ago. Instead, he becomes a Marxist and sends for the union negotiating team.

Marxist? A Top Manager? Well, you see, Marxism can be summed up in a single sentence known by heart to every successful Top Manager, even if he keeps his knowledge to himself. "The contradiction of Capitalism is that the Capitalist must gain the co-operation of the workers he is screwing". So, the union negotiators are sent for to regain this co-operation. Always temporary, note, because it is contradictory.

Naturally, prevention is better than cure. Better not to have a strike than to settle one expensively. The very latest method of social control used by the State on Society is the social welfare system. Its shadow too is darkly reflected in the factories and offices of Mammon: Organisational Development: the industrial wing of the State's social welfare system: the Fascist Red Cross! The practitioners of OD are not capitalist tools, of course. They do much good work among the walking wounded of industrial relationships scarred by the original Mammon/Labour social control technique. But willy nilly they are like those prison doctors who assiduously nursed ailing convicts back to health so that they could be hanged. Co-operation of workers regained? Let screwing re-commence!

In the religious field the same microcosmic confrontation is darkly reflected. "Darkly" is stressed because it is a reflection difficult to see, as is one's image in a mirror in a moonlit room. Clergy and laity argue the toss about abortion, nuclear first strikes and euthanasia in a most intense, responsible way. How indignant they become when anarchists suggest that religious duties and obligations are merely institutionalised superstitions left over from pre-industrial tribal society. Social control gained by spreading superstition is an ancient technique. Luckily it is beginning to show its age; only 16% of Britons attend churches. But my point is that the superstitious contribute the bound sacrifice of their powers of reason and
common sense as willingly as their priests prey on them. (Sorry about that !).

The whole mass media scene is a relatively new, powerful technique of social control. Millions of people freely watch TV, listen to radio, choose and read books and newspapers. Every subject under the sun is discussed therein. Important, powerful people are grilled by highly trained interviewers and their views and mistakes mercilessly dissected before the population nightly. What could be more democratic ? Where is there any element of social control in such free activities ?

Well, you see, you have to sit down to watch or to read. Sit down! My dog parks his bum on this command and I use the loss of mobility he suffers to train him : my way ! I act ! you watch !

Thus TV trains us, often at deep subliminal levels, to accept: monogamy; wide differences in social status; huge differences in income; confinement of healthy animals, humans, to cages for twenty years at a time; mutual mutilation of young men at periodic intervals in wars.

"But I know these are evils " I hear someone say. To which I reply, "Why don’t you get mad, then ? If I open my fly and piss in the middle of Tesco most of you seeing me would go out of your minds with outrage. But seeing loads of Arab kids shot to death on TV merely makes you switch over to ‘Coronation Street’. That harmless passive reaction to manifest evil is socially controlled ! ”

From here on, if I do not part company with Anarchism, I separate myself from the views of many anarchist comrades. For I have stated at the outset that the State is organically related to Society. That organism is the very condition of its powerful penetration of every corner of men’s life space. I say it is a wrong conception of the State to define it as an oppressive group of individuals (The Establishment ? The Boss-class ? The oligarchic plutocrats ? ) controlling from the outside a society it dominates.

Such a view leads to paranoid searches for these hidden individuals. When they are not found ( they cannot be found) a typical paranoid syndrome develops : how clever they are to remain so cunningly concealed; how diabolically clever; how diabolical ! The Devil rules Head Office O.K !

For those real-politik types tettering on the edges of Wet Socialism (Social Democracy) I sharpen up the point and apply it to the industrial economy. If Labour elements destroy Management in a single night they would recreate it within a week. Look at Russia ! If Management literally enslave Labour it would have the powerful Unions Back in a trice. Slaves can bite and co-operation is the name of the industrial game. At heart yer average Top Union Official stands a little to the Right of Maggie, and Management knows it ! No one is more repressively authoritarian than a bunch of politically ignorant, leaderless workers recreating society along the only lines they know : Management v. Labour with the State as the ref. It is a truism at the Home Office that even with that clone of a State-Society complex a maximum security jail can only run with the co-operation of its society, its prisoners ! If unionism had not already existed Top Management would have been forced to invent it.

The State is, actually, the persona of Society, its mask. Masks are always protective, defensive, indicating a felt anxiety by the wearer. But masks are not always good masks; they are not always a good defensive idea, either. The wearer(s) can hide from reality behind it. The mask may give it exactly the wrong impression to those it is meant to influence.

Between States, a good example exists in the nuclear confrontation of the Super-States. America wears a John Wayne “True Grit” mask. Russia (and God knows a less harmless people never stalked the earth or how could Authoritarian Communism persist there so long ? ) huddles apprehensively behind its “Ivan the Terrible” mask. Both personas are giving out madly wrong signals to the peoples facing them, whilst