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

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BRIAN Mc GRAIL

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Contents

The fifth issue of Common Sense will appear in June 1988.

Notes for contributors: send articles in clean typscript, single-space or space-and-a-half (not double-space). Leave wide margin on both sides, and wide gaps at top and bottom of each page.

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Announcement: Common Sense will have a fund raising Benefit Concert on April the 27th 1988 at the Cafe Royal, Edinburgh. Watch out for further information.

Tiger illustrations by Michael Gunn

THE AIMS OF COMMON SENSE

Common Sense aims to challenge the division of labour in contemporary society according to which theoretical discussion is monopolised by universities and confined to the pages of trade-journals read by professional and academic elites. It is run on a co-operative basis and reproduces articles submitted to it in typescript form.

The term "common sense" signifies: (i) shared or public sense and (ii) the interplay of differing perspectives and views. These meanings imply one another; both are undermined to the extent that a social division of labour prevails. For theory, the undermining of common sense means that philosophy becomes separated from empirical enquiry, to the impoverishment of both. The arid abstraction of analytical philosophy and the plodding boredom of positivism are the complementary results. For practice, the undermining of common sense means that political action is denied space for self-reflection and so goes forward in terms which confirm the social status quo. Common sense admits of no fixed definition. No less elusive than it is intelligible, it exists only where criticism and self-criticism are the order of the theoretical and political day. A continuing development of critical theory is the only brief which the journal Common Sense holds.



TEACHING POLITICS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST GERMAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

HANS KASTENDIEK

It should be fair to say that in most analyses of political science, teaching is regarded as a function **of** the discipline, as one of its 'manifestations'. Sometimes teaching is taken as an indicator of developmental trends, sometimes it is included into development reports or statements on 'the state of the art' just to get 'the full picture'. Thus, teaching is ascribed a secondary status both in general substantiations of the discipline and in day-to-day professional performance. Leaving out the latter abuse, my point of concern in this paper is the function teaching has had **for** the foundation and the development of political science. To sharpen the point and to formulate my main thesis: Political science, at least in the case of West Germany, was **founded** to perform a specific teaching function and became **established** because of the expectations linked to its teaching capacity. There are some indications that the present status of West German political science within the system of higher and academic education might be **threatened/reduced** because it is notably its teaching function which has come under attack (under the present conditions of fiscal crisis, increasing academic unemployment, and resurgent resentments about the social use of social sciences).

The Emergence of West German Political Science as a Discipline of Academic Teaching

Like political sciences in other countries the West German discipline has often been at pains to map out and to define its field of topical responsibility and analytical competence vis-a-vis its academic neighbours and competitors. But without neglecting these efforts and endeavours we may say that neither the foundation nor the progression of West German political science were decided and promoted on these grounds of argument. The discipline got its thrust and motive power as an educational 'movement', and it was the teaching argument which paved the discipline's way and provided it with academic citizenship. West German political science was developed as a discipline of academic teaching, and it developed its research capacity from the institutional basis designed for teaching purposes. Academisation was, in the first instance, the building-up of full study schemes; in the second instance, however, the discipline became 'academised' in the sense of transformation to a discipline which strives for scientification. It was only in the seventies that academisation in the second sense became a dominant motif. Whether this was a consequence of West German political science approaching the status of 'a mature discipline' or a departure from its original teaching objectives is a point to be discussed later. In any case, by devaluing its teaching role the discipline lost the driving force of its development. In retrospect, this

was a crucial shift. Today, West Germany political science might have to face a major set-back as an academic discipline because it became questioned as a discipline of academic teaching. This rough account should not be read, however, as if this course of events has mainly resulted from the discipline's 'own faults'. The scope for deliberate orientation and reorientation was, from the beginning in the late forties, very much determined by external conditions.

The institutionalisation of West German political science as a university discipline was a result of the deep ruptures of German politics and society, and the course of the discipline has been largely shaped by the development of West German socio-politics since 1945. The call for a genuine political science to be introduced into the academic system was, firstly, a response to the failure of the First Republic (1919-1933), to the perversion of German politics and society during the 'Third Reich' (1933-1945), and to the breakdown of the German state in 1945. Secondly, the discipline's foundation was claimed to be a vital contribution to building up a truly democratic order. Both the retrospective and the prospective lines of argument were directly applied to the political-academic field: for the proponents of a new political science discipline, the German academic system in general and the social and political sciences in particular had been co-responsible for the German catastrophies and thus could not be trusted to be promoters of democratic change. Very clearly, the plans and demands to create a new and special 'science of politics' were advanced as a major contribution to a necessary reform of the academic system. The problem was not if and how 'politics' could be a matter of academic concern; the objective was to guarantee a **responsible** and **competent** concern with 'politics' and to secure that academia would not hinder or even counteract democratic development again. From the very beginning the attempts to establish the new discipline were staged as a deliberate challenge to the existing academic disciplines. Self-confidently, political science was conceived of as being, of having to be, an oppositional discipline and not just another complementation to an expanding circle of political and social sciences.

This self-confidence rooted in several convictions and was supported by several factors. The founders and promoters were convinced that to build up the **discipline** did not mean to introduce a new **science** still to be substantiated. For substantiation they referred to occidental and European as well as German traditions of political analysis, to the development of academic political studies in other countries, notably the United States, and especially to advances in the conceptualisation and theorisation of politics achieved in Germany until 1933 and continued, under the conditions of emigration, by German scholars who, in many cases, were able to contribute substantially to the progression of political science abroad. Reference to political science abroad played a dominant role but, in the view of the proponents, the argument that the West German discipline could build on outstanding former works of German scholars was even more important. The fact that many of these scholars had been, in the German academic community until 1933, in a rather peripheral position, and all the more the fact that many of them finally were forced into emigration, without any remarkable resistance by the universities, strengthened political science promoters after 1945 in their conviction that the foundation of the discipline would be much more an **institutional reform** of faculties and universities than merely an academic event of theoretical discourse and progress. At the same time, this reform was seen as a precondition of breaking the established rules, conventions and informal networks which had dominated recruitment and promotion until 1933/45 and did not cease thereafter. Also in **personnel** terms, the new political science discipline was to be an alternative! (And, in fact, the discipline's staff since the late 1940s can hardly be blamed

for the NS - personnel continuities from 1933/45 which occured heavily in many other disciplines, to some extent even in sociology which, like political science, claimed to be a distinct 'discipline of and for democracy' after 1945).

Initially, the efforts for building up a special political science were favoured by the socio-political and educational-political constellations of that time but very soon the emerging discipline had to face serious obstacles. The academic proponents were supported by political forces from the West German parties, notably the Social Democrats, and from the Western occupation authorities, especially the Americans. This 'coalition' combined the objectives of German promoters of a special political science with American notions of 're-education', the latter to be seen in the context of initiatives and activities in the politico-cultural field like the UNESCO-conference of 1950 on 'Contemporary Political Science'. Although this 'coalition' was able to push forward its case it proved also to be a limited alliance, a 'coalition' only in some points. Neither in the arena of West German party politics nor in Western occupation policy programmes did the university system become a subject of rigorous reform measures. On the one hand, the struggle for a new political science was backed, on the other hand and at the same time the universities which only changed by adaptation to the new socio-political situation were not touched in their traditional and principal structures. Vis-a-vis the universities and their disciplines political science still had to struggle for recognition.

In contrast to later talk to the effect that the new discipline's foundation had occured parallel to the foundation of the Federal Republic (which was formally constituted in 1949) its emergence was a laborious process. West German political science was not introduced into the academic system by or as a result of a clear-cut decision - it had to be developed and established step by step. Evidently, the most significant steps were achieved on the terrain of academic teaching. Two lines of development have to be discerned: the introduction of new chairs for politics at university level and the foundaton of academies (or colleges) for politics outside and below the academic status of universities. Some of the new chairs were decided already in the late forties when there was much concern to induce universities to develop programmes for a more comprehensive civic education. Initially, the proponents of a political science claimed 'politics' should become a compulsory element in the study course of each student whatever his or her main subjects. At least, 'politics' should be assigned a prominent role in all sorts of a 'studium generale', widely discussed in the immediate postwar years. In many cases, however, it took several years to get the new chair-holders appointed. As time passed by, the general motivation of universities to promote a 'studium generale' also had calmed down. Political science at universities now had to (and could) wholly concentrate on the development of its still rudimentary institutional shape. For substantiation of this objective, however, the major non-university academy for politics, the **Hochschule fur Politik** at Berlin, should prove to be the pace-maker. It was its integration into Free University of Berlin which finally established West German political science as an academic discipline of equal rank to other social and political sciences.

The German Academy for Politics which was re-founded in 1948 and started its work early in 1949 began as an institution for what might be called higher adult education, however on the basis of a regular study scheme (full studentship required participation in lectures/classes on every working-day's evening during four semiannual terms, leading to a diploma examination). But what had started as an offer for further education soon developed into a truly academic institution: by stages the study scheme was extended to 4 years, and the examination provisions subsequently were

adapted to university standards; consequently the Academy's graduates became accepted by the Free University as doctoral students. When, in 1959, the Academy was transformed into an institute at this university, it not only could add a fully-fledged study scheme to the latter but also could provide the emerging discipline of political science with a standard model of an academic teaching programme and a shining example for academic recognition.

To some extent, the Berlin institute's departure from further education and the academisation of its study scheme were due to a propensity, both of staff and students, to gain a university-like status in the first place, then a university status, for themselves. But the course of events also followed from deliberate policies to promote the establishment of the discipline within the university system. The founders of the Berlin Academy had been most vigorously engaged in the propagation of a new 'science of politics' and played a dominant role in the foundation of the Association for the Science of Politics in 1951 and in the activities of this organisation which later was called German Association of Political Science. For them, and also for other proponents, it was quite clear that the new discipline, apart from its contributions to the 'studium generale', had to constitute itself via the development of comprehensive teaching programmes and examination schemes.

The 'founding fathers' (there were no 'founding mothers') soon recognised that the general educational thrust of the new discipline had to be complemented by, if not changed towards, specific references to the training aspect of the teaching programmes, ie to the employment prospects of future graduates. This would not have been such a problem if graduates had been anticipated merely to add new positions to the labour market, eg as party and trade union functionaries or as teachers in adult education, or to add new qualifications to professions which traditionally do not have a structured profile in terms of recruitment like journalism. In these cases, training could be expected to occur mainly 'on the job'. And there was no problem with regard to those students (notably in the discipline's early years) who studied the subject for further education, to complement their professional knowledge for jobs already taken. In fact, for these professions and cases, a comprehensive teaching programme would have sufficed even if it did not develop towards university standards. But, as mentioned earlier, the intentions of the new discipline were much more ambitious. In particular, political science graduates should contribute to breaking the traditional predominance of jurists in the upper ranks of the German civil service, an objective to transform the 'legalistic' attitude patterns of state bureaucracy and to dissolve the traditional power of the jurist profession in German society and politics in general. As this profession had been, on the whole, rather conservative, if not reactionary, to break the 'jurist's monopoly' was a concern which had clear political motives and was expressed quite explicitly. Similar criticisms and objectives were advanced with regard to the professions of school teachers, especially Gymnasium teachers (secondary schools, similar to the British grammar schools). At best, teaching politics had been neglected, but far too often it had been misguided. Participation of the new discipline in teachers' training schemes would be indispensable.

In both cases, political science was fighting on two fronts, against the vocational professions and against the academic disciplines in charge of the training of these professions. In the first case, political science lost. Surely, it did not break the 'jurist's monopoly' in public administration: on the contrary, the percentage of eg Berlin graduates appointed to civil service posts, declined steadily in the 1950s. And those who succeeded in entering the civil service mostly did so not via normal recruitment procedures. At the end of the fifties the German Association for Political

Science became tired to press this case. However, later on, some of the federal states offered economists, sociologists and political scientists special training programmes to make them 'compatible' with civil service (jurists') jobs. But the number of entrants has always been rather small. In the second case, with regard to teachers' training, the record of political science was, at least for some time, much brighter. Already in the fifties, in some of the federal states, political science was granted co-responsibility for the training of Gymnasium teachers, ie for those teacher students who wanted to obtain the faculty for teaching social studies/civic education/politics or whatever the term in the respective federal state. After some struggles with other teachers' professions (history, geography, sociology), not to forget with state ministers for education and cultural affairs, political science was finally accepted as a teachers' training discipline during the late sixties (I shall return to this later).

Thus, in the fifties and early sixties, the emerging discipline had invested much energy in its establishment as a discipline of academic teaching. Its claims were permanently insistently challenged by the established disciplines, and by preference they did so in terms of academic conventions that each new discipline had to legitimise its case by giving evidence on 'its (specific) object and its (specific) method(s)'. The most prominent answer on this was, at that time, the conception of political science as a 'synoptic science' which would have to integrate political analyses so far dispersed in a range of academic disciplines. But it did not convince the sceptics from other disciplines. Neither did it provide political science with a sufficient basis of common understanding and identification. This did not prevent political science from emerging in the fifties and from flourishing in the sixties and, notably, in the seventies. Clearly, the new discipline had achieved its substantiation not in terms of academic conventions, mentioned above, but in terms of an 'actually existing discipline of academic teaching'. It had been the academisation of study schemes by which the discipline had gained academic recognition. It did not achieve all its objectives, eg breaking the 'jurists' monopoly', but these objectives had been a driving force to developing a genuine teaching programme.

The academisation paid off in the sixties and seventies, but it also had its price. The new discipline became caught by the course of socio-political events already since the forties and became change **itself**, by losing much of its original impetus to perform as an 'oppositional discipline' within academia and as a 'discipline of democratic control' vis-a-vis socio-political restoration. This combination and mutual reinforcement of socio-political adaptation and academisation contributed to the recognition success of the new discipline in the late fifties and early sixties.

Problems of an Expanding Discipline of Academic Teaching

In quantitative terms, the development of West German political science from 1960 onwards is a story of outstanding success. Student numbers exploded: from 300 in 1960 they climbed to roughly 1500 and 3500 in 1965 and 1970, reached about 8000 between 1975 and 1980, and again increased significantly until 1985, now up to 13000. As a result, not only the total number of professorships heavily increased between 1967 and 1985 but also the number of political science departments or institutes. Political science had become an essential part of West German universities. From the middle of the sixties onwards, the 'out-put' of graduates reached numbers which surely would have been unbelievable a few years ago. Although graduates in political science could not rely on clear labour market and recruitment patterns, they seemed rather well equipped to get into adequate employment.

At that time, West Germany (like other countries) experienced an era of politicisation ie of increasing political mobilisation and participation. Simultaneously (in coincidence with that point) social sciences, generally, could win considerable public interest and became increasingly acknowledged by social and political institutions and organisations. For political science these observations were reinforced by the extension of social studies in school education and by its subsequent recognition as a discipline of teachers training in this field. Political science, it seemed, was paving its way to become a discipline which could offer its graduates an extending range of job perspectives, and the expansion of its staff would secure a training scheme which would be based on a comprehensive qualification **in political science** but not on special training programmes for specific job orientations. It was up to the students to organise their personal course of studies and contacts with chosen employment fields, with the exception of teacher students who had to follow the guide-lines of fairly structured study, training and examination schemes.

[Here I should add that West German students, in general and especially in the social sciences and the arts, are **not** guided, tutored, helped and 'controlled' like students in many other countries. From the first term onwards, they have to be 'responsible for themselves'; until their examinations they enjoy (and suffer from) 'academic freedom'. Mostly, eg there are no courses organised like classes or so. Students, at least in the subjects mentioned, have to design **their** programme for each term and the programme of **their** study as a whole - and to find out themselves how many years they shall be (can afford to be) students. The same procedure for the next stage, for postgraduate studies!]

At the beginning of the sixties, a 'Memorandum on the State of Sociology and Political Science' had argued that political science, after its re-introduction into the university system, had reached a phase in which it could and should concentrate on its inner consolidation and secure conditions for its full development. The rapid expansion of that decade seemed to promote this objective. The 'second generation' of chair-holders, in contrast to the 'founding fathers', had been trained **as** political scientists, a kind of 'professionalisation' which surely contributed to the shift from the teaching of politics to the training in political science that became strengthened in the sixties.

The academisation of the study organisation of the fifties now became complemented by a gradual academisation of the subject-matter. Thus, it was no accident that discussions on the object and the methods as well as on the purpose and the functions of political science intensified. In the first place, discussions seemed to follow the lines prepared in the preceeding fifteen years. But very soon, they became changed considerably - by the socio-political and politico-cultural transitions, if not ruptures, of the late sixties and early seventies.

Although, it would be rather misleading to pay all the attention to the concussions the discipline experienced in that period by the students movement and by the re-emergence of marxist oriented social science approaches, notably these two events have to be emphasised in the context of this paper. For many political scientists it was a rather painful experience that their discipline and also they themselves had become addressees of students' criticisms. For the former, the foundation and progression of political science were still regarded as achievements of practical reform of West German academic organisation and performance, and many of them showed quite conflicting reactions and attitudes to the student movement, vacillating between sympathy for many of its concerns and contra-positions. For political science members of the student movement, however,

it was the actual performance of the discipline as a whole which came under attack. Many students as well as younger assistants and assistant professors (in British terms: lecturers and senior lectures, however with contracts strictly limited to five or six years) turned towards critical theory (Frankfurt School) and marxist theory. As, from the early seventies onwards, the number of appointments in these staff categories was largely extended to cope with the series of student waves which reached universities (and political science), also the personnel preconditions for a partial thematic and theoretical reorientation of the teaching programme improved because many of the appointees had been shaped by the protests movement. These changes, at least in some of the institutes of political science, only to a small degree had been initiated from within the discipline; they originated from other disciplines and/or from the political unrest in the discipline's environment. But when introduced into political science they caused alarm, inside and outside the discipline.

Because of similar changes in other disciplines the measures for university reform which had been a political answer to the student protests but which also had facilitated the changes mentioned became reconsidered as soon as they had been implemented, and the initial and partial toleration of these changes was quickly revoked, also in political science. After a liberal professor of the 'second generation' had conceded that some criticism of students and leftist members of the profession should be acknowledged as reasonable and understandable, one of the 'grand old men' of West German political science attacked him publicly of having neglected, especially with regard to the discipline's new responsibility for the training of teacher students, that under the impact of marxists political science departments were in danger of becoming real centres of an epidemic.

Students, however, did not fear 'infection'. In spite of the clashes within the profession of West German political science and in spite of the general 'identity crisis' which marked the discipline's internal situation all over the seventies, student numbers continued to climb. Whatever the uncertainties on 'the object and the method' - the discipline continued to be rather productive, in terms of teaching **and** research. Student numbers increased steadily up to the early eighties and so did the numbers of graduations. Also the opportunity to qualify for teaching jobs was well accepted by students. As I see it, the expansion of personnel numbers in the seventies **and** the competitive climate, so to speak the positive side of internal clashes, were two sources of occasionally rather exciting progress in the research field. The other side of the coin, however, has been an increasing specialisation, if not disintegration, of the discipline which seems to develop towards a conglomerate of sub-disciplines and working-fields, the particularisation of policy- and politics-studies being one of the urgent new problems. These developments, in turn, may have contributed to the calming down of open polarisation, but surely there is still a latent conflict constellation.

The shift from internal (and external) polarisation to a more or less 'peaceful co-existence' might be welcomed as an emerging pluralism or as a growing tolerance within the academic profession of political science but this would be a perception of a rather 'aseptic' kind. Apart from the fact that this shift has resulted from massive political-administrative interventions as well as from internal policies of 'containment' there were other prices to be paid. The discipline, according to my impression, has lost its driving force again. There might be a parallel situation to the period from the forties to the mid-sixties. In the course of that period political science (however risky it is to talk of the discipline as a whole) had gradually abandoned its initial objectives and became domesticated both in political and academic terms. It was only the socio-political and

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politico-cultural changes since the late sixties which gave a fresh impetus when political science had to face new problem constellations in socio-politics and was confronted with students and young lecturers who questioned the discipline's performance. Admittedly, occasionally the turbulences of that time were rather hair-raising but they were also 'modes of innovation'. Within a few years, in some places at least, West German political science had changed a lot. In the following process of their implementation, however, especially in the course of their introduction to institutional patterns and formal procedures many of these changes became either blocked or distorted, not just because of 'counter-action' but also because of their own contradictions. Thus, not only external pressures, but also internal intricacies stired up new conflicts which seemed to have exhausted both the 'innovators' and their academic opponents, ie the discipline as a whole. As a result, political science became domesticated again.

This general argument can be 'nicely' demonstrated, I think, in the field of study reforms. Again, I may refer especially to the department at Berlin which is a significant though not a representative case. At this department, already in 1968, the first major reform model was developed in response to the students protest movement **and** in accordance with the body of students, and here study reform had been a major theme of the debates on the performance of political science, ie one of the main fields in which general disputes got a concrete shape. It would take a paper of its own to describe the course and the implications of this study reform in adequate detail. What is important here is that the reform started with an explicit politico-academic statement on the purpose of (teaching and studying) political science and ended with a study scheme which is rather formal ie rather indecisive in substantial terms. Although committed 'to elaborate on the pre-conditions for an extension of freedom and self-determination in all spheres of society' (statutes as confirmed, in 1968, by nearly all members of the department which then still was an institute of Free University) staff members and students could not transform this objective into the study scheme, because of external pressures and internal divisions. Even more, the codified teaching programmes avoided any thematic specifications. Partly, this was a deliberate departure from former regulations which had fixed a rather closed programme for students in their first and second year as well as for the compulsory half-time examination. But also it was a mechanism to evade internal conflicts and external interventions. All this, however, coincided with a general shift in attitudes: from subject matters to methods and theories, from teaching and learning facts to problematisation. For different reasons, 'former political science' became regarded as insufficient both by scientist oriented and marxist oriented staff members and students. As a result, the teaching schemes as well as the examinations schemes predominantly emphasised the claim that students had to acquire methodical, analytical and theoretical skills; the subject-matters, however, which might be indispensable for a study of politics became handled in a fairly general way, by reference to very broadly defined problem fields. I should add, at once, that - for the third and fourth year of study - the teaching programme includes specialisation courses on more concrete topics as well as project courses related to potential employment fields, and I should also add that the study scheme on the whole delivers a framework for orientation both for teaching and studying. The study scheme at Berlin should be one of, if not the, most developed in West German political science but as such it also demonstrates very clearly the general features mentioned above, especially the shift towards an academisation of teaching in the sense of theorisation and scientification which cannot conceal the lack of substantial agreement on the purpose and objectives of the discipline.

This is, of course, a point which has been stated for most phases of West

German political science, and in each phase there have been warnings that the discipline might be at stake. So far, this has always been proved to be a dramatisation. In recent years however, there has been developing a growing concern that this time things may turn to the negative. To be sure: in terms of students numbers the discipline has expanded steadily up until 1985/86. Numbers of **first term** students, however, decreased considerably from 1983/84 to 1985/86. It is difficult to assess whether this, finally, reflects a remarkable deterioration of employment chances for graduates which can be traced back to the seventies, already because graduates from other disciplines are facing the same problem. But this deterioration has added to external suspicions on the performance of social sciences in general and political science in particular. Also in West Germany, under conditions of fiscal crisis, increasing unemployment and conservative change, the climate for social sciences has become fairly rough. Denounced, eg as being nothing but 'discussion sciences' (a leading West German Christian Democrat), they already lost some ground to other disciplines, notably to natural and technical sciences. Even more, political science is also in danger of losing ground to another 'discussion science': in the field of teacher training, ie in the only field where political science could offer its graduates access to a structured labour market. Apart from generally high numbers of unemployed teachers (which have lead to an immense reduction of first term students) political science is confronted with attempts of being played off against other disciplines responsible for social studies as a school-subject, notably against history and geography.

The problem is that political science is at pains to respond to these challenges in a coordinated, self-confident and convincing way. This has become quite obvious in a recent and surely ongoing debate if, now and how far as well as to what purpose the discipline should engage in changes towards a 'professionalisation' of its teaching programmes in the sense of developing study schemes which are oriented on certain problem and employment fields (ie accept responsibility and claim capability for the training of students in a more direct job perspective). So far, the debate has not reached any clear conclusions which could claim to constitute a broader consensus within the academic profession of political science.

Concluding Remarks

Academic conventions define, as we know, science mainly as the collection and production of systematised and theorised knowledge, define the genesis of new disciplines as a process and then as the result of topical differentiation and analytical specialisation, and define progression of science or of a discipline in terms of methodical and theoretical progress. By this perception of science and scientific development academia, of course, declares itself to be a societal instance of refined distinction. As could be seen in this paper, even emerging disciplines which initially challenged these conventions and perceptions have been endangered, in their strife for academisation, to become 'truly academic'. There has been a very strong bias to analyse and discus political science predominantly

- as a set of theories and concepts
- as a body of knowledge and understanding
- as a discipline responsible for the analysis of a distinctive field of societal organisation

and, needless to say, in all this the discipline was propagated mainly as a research enterprise.

My argument is not at all to deny reflection and analysis on these points,

be it in epistemological and/or normative terms. What I am pleading for, is at least the same emphasis on socio-political analyses on academic development, in our case: of (West German) political science. It makes a difference whether we define a discipline in terms of academic conventions mentioned above, or whether we define a discipline in terms of a branch within the academic system and as an institution within societal organisation, ie whether we define political science as a social arrangement serving social needs, being paid by social revenues, depending on social and political developments, and being an addressee of social and political demands (and pressures).

For studies on the discipline of political science in the second way my paper suggests that we should very much be concerned with investigations into its emergence and development as a discipline of academic teaching. The relationship between socio-political and political science developments, I would assume, has been most concrete, in this respect.

Note: A fuller version of this paper, incorporating references and detailed statistical data, is available from H Kastendiek, Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh, 31 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JT.

Further Reading

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A Conversation on Cajun Music - Kim Tebble and Kenneth Brady

Ken: Where does the word Cajun originate and what is its meaning?

Kim: The word Cajun is a corruption of the word Arcadian which was originally a Greek word meaning paradise which was used in Greece for a place called Arcadia and the original French settlers in Canada used the word to describe the place they live which is now called Nova Scotia. And when the English expelled the French settlers from Canada in an extremely appalling way, they adopted the name Acadian to describe themselves when they re-settled in Louisianna and that became contracted to Cajun.

Ken: That has pre-empted my next question really which was, where geographically does Cajun music stem from? Does it mainly stem from French Louisianna?

Kim: Yes it does stem from French Louisianna but obviously it had influences from seventeenth century France via Nova Scotia or what was then called Acadia and very, very strong influences of South America and black music, also German, Bohemian, Texas, Mexican music.

Ken: What would you say was the main origin? If you had to pick one?

Kim: It depends what sort of Cajun music you're talking about. If you're talking about Cajun folk music - folk ballads then the strongest influence is undoubtedly French - seventeenth century France. If you're talking about Cajun blues music - Zydeco - then the strongest influence is probably rhythm and blues. If you're talking about Cajun country music the strongest influence is probably the front music that was actually invented in Louisianna after the settlement, which would be mainly two-step and waltz derived, the waltzes coming originally from - a lot of them from Polish tunes like the Mazurkas which were also in three time.

Ken: So historically now, if you had to actually place a date, I know it might be quite difficult to do this, but I mean if you actually had to say this is where Cajun music actually originated at such-and-such a time, such-and-such a place, what would date would you say?

Kim: I would have to qualify my answer to that because the Cajun people when they first settled in Louisianna three hundred years ago had to re-invent their own music, they were in such a state of downtroddenness that though they remembered their folk music they really did invent music themselves, they invented Cajun music for themselves initially. It wasn't really derived from French-Canadian music. When you hear French-Canadian music now you can hear it's very different, and of course they were living alongside black people who were also

speaking the same language and playing the same instruments, in very much the same sort of economic bracket - although obviously whites weren't of slave status.

Ken: This leads on to another question basically, which is how really does Cajun music distinguish itself from more mainstream American folk music, i.e. country and western and blue grass?

Kim: I wrote down an interesting thing once in a fiddle book, talking about the different styles of old timy fiddle in America and it made the point that when you get a fiddling contest - sorry a fiddling convention - so to speak - a festival - where fiddlers get together to exchange tunes and take part in competitions, they will learn from each other and adapt their tunes only if, or rather converse to that, they will not adapt their tunes if the singing on the tune is not in their own language. So someone generally who speaks English will not learn a tune that is played by someone who sings in French during that number. And since a lot of Cajun tunes are sung in French that would sort of prove the point that Cajun tunes were not generally learnt by non-Cajun people. So the distinctive features that grew up initially long before the accordion came along, when the fiddle was really the main instrument, would not have been passed on to other groups of different ethnic origin. So the distinguishing features would have been kept quite easily.

Ken: There is mainly a sort of geographical, cultural difference with the musical form as well, obviously it has developed ...

Kim: There are stylisations within the music which I could enumerate.

Ken: Yes. What about one basic one which would be quite easy to pick up on, for example, between Cajun and its musical forms specifically, and country and western or blue grass?

Kim: Um ... Well, for example, country and western and blue grass, blue grass particularly, generally have even numbers of bars; Cajun music quite often has uneven numbers of bars and even half-bars, and also there are quite a lot of tunes that I've come across of Cajun music which don't take chord structures very easily, or when they do take chord structures they change. So for example, you might have a fiddle duet from very early years of this century being played on two fiddles, and a guitarist might be really hard put to find what chords go to it just because the tonality of the tune is ... doesn't really take guitar-type chords. It hasn't evolved with a chordal instrument accompanying it, whereas both blue grass and country and western specifically evolved - country and western particularly - from a guitar-accompanied music.

Ken: This is obviously why country and western and blue grass are easier to interpret because you know what's coming next. Whereas with Cajun music it does tend to have an element of surprise, especially rhythmically. This is obviously the reason why, because of the way in which it has originated.

Kim: Yeah. I would say so. And also the very heavy black influence as well which has always been present where one of the greatest points of black music seems to me to be the tension between what is expected and what happens.

Ken: Now this is interesting because obviously the black Cajun musical form is often referred to as Zydeco . Would you actually say that Cajun music incorporated Zydeco and Cajun culture into one unit? I know that in a lot of instances, for example, black musicians usually play separately. But there are occasions when there is a sort of mixture of musicians getting together. And this is one of the good things about Cajun culture, wouldn't you say that?

Kim: I don't think there are that many instances where black and white musicians play together in Louisianna, but I hope to be pleasantly surprised when I go there in the summer, but I'm not sure that I will be.

Ken: So there's an element of doubt in that one really?

Kim: Not much of an element of doubt. I'm pretty sure that it's very heavily segregated.

Ken: Right. Now let's take it beyond - just briefly - beyond the music for a minute. Do you think that again culturally the reason why Cajun music is distinctive is because of the nature of the oppression, for example, that the people have experienced? Both black and white.

Kim: I'm not really qualified to say, I'm just an observer of the form. I've participated only in as much as it influences me and I imitate it.

Ken: Fine. Now what specifically interested you initially about Cajun music?

Kim: The singing.

Ken: Because of its vocalisation, its harmony?

Kim: No not its harmony. Its rhythmical quality and its tonal quality. The rhythmical quality - I was initially very taken with the way the songline didn't end at the end of the count of bars, so to speak. The vocal line would overlap over the end of the melodic line. It would sound as if it had a bit extra on it, and that bit extra would contain a very high degree of raw passion so to speak. Though I didn't know what it was musically at the time.

Ken: It was an intuitive attraction because of that?

Kim: Yes.

Ken: Good. Finally, could you give some examples in your opinion, of the better and worse exponents of the Cajun musical form at the moment?

Kim: Well I wouldn't want to give the worse examples except as far as to say that I wouldn't make any comment about bands that play Cajun music and don't come from Louisianna. It's entirely their affair how they choose to imitate the music. There are bands in existence that say they come from Louisianna and don't, just American, quite popular. And in fact I don't think they do say they come from Louisianna, I think they are just promoted by people who haven't taken the time to work out exactly where in America they come from. They assume they come from Louisianna because they are American and play Cajun music. There are a few bands about who are very popular who don't come from Louisianna and play Cajun music. But amongst the Louisianna Cajun bands I think I would have to give a list of about half a dozen that are my favourites, starting from the most famous perhaps: Clifton Chenier, the black piano accordion player who is definitely a great favourite of mine; and there is equally famous on the white side, the fiddle player Dewey Balfa, who is consistently highly inventive and interesting. Also at the more famous end of the

list, the black fiddle player Canray Fontenot who is quite an old man now and he seems to be one of the few Cajun fiddlers who can still make the old time crying sound on the fiddle.

Ken: Can I just interject here - Canray Fontenot - an interesting feature of how he started playing, from my point of view, is that he made his fiddle out of a cigar box, which I think is pretty amazing that he could actually get a sound out of it but anyway - Who else?

Kim: Well I think one of my favourite accordion players is Austin Pitre, who is now no longer alive. I very much liked his playing. And also from way back in the 'twenties I enjoy listening to Amadee Ardoin who was the first black man to play Cajun music on record. And he is of course long since dead. And I very much like Joel Sonnier's accordion playing and singing; and of course Nathan Abshire. The list is pretty long but I think there are two people who - talking about musicians who I know you can hear of an evening in Louisianna at the moment - there is Hector Duhon and Octa Clark who definitely have taken up their instruments again. Two old men who are playing regularly, and they have a very characteristic, homely sound that I very much like, more a living room sound than a dance band sound, although they do play in a dance band situation as well. And also Buckwheat.

And I think also, when I think about Cajun music, having seen The Big Easy recently and one or two other documentaries and having been in touch with what is going on there, there are lots of young musicians, possibly who play much better than the older musicians - maybe not better but a different way -

Ken: Livelier perhaps?

Kim: I may see some of this happening when I'm over there.

Paul Smart

MILL AND MARX: INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE ROADS TO FREEDOM; A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPARATIVE CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION

What follows may appear at first to be the basis for a wildly ambitious project, or even an act of extreme folly; to compare Mill and Marx as equally committed champions of liberty. 'To compare the incomparable surely must be doomed', comes the incredulous reply. But I want to assert right from the beginning that there is a genuine point of comparison which is worth pursuing, and that to find it it is essential to clear away the obstructive undergrowth of partial and partisan attitudes that have served to obscure our view and return to the original statements of intention of the two authors. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome the barriers of a century of polemic, which has done much to create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding, if we are to obtain a more authentic picture of two views of freedom and the alternative programmes for its attainment. So, while I am prepared to accept that with regard to the procedures applied to the study of the human condition there are considerable differences between Mill and Marx, I nevertheless believe that both were inspired by the need to establish a society in which individuals could consciously realise through creative self-determination their potential as humans. In other words it was the pursuit of a particular kind of freedom which both defined the single purpose of the projects of Mill and Marx, underpinned the direction of their theoretical and practical politics, and was the ultimate justification behind their programmes for the transformation of society. In adopting this perspective I thereby reject as being misguided those accounts that have attempted to place each thinker within a particular category or tradition which relegates their commitment to freedom to the status of a secondary consideration. Such a relegation has been made by a number of supporters and critics of each thinker who, through this move, have only contributed to the general confusion which characterizes many of the assessments of the merits and problems associated with modern-day liberalism and marxism. This is not to say that there have not been some who recognised that the true worth of Mill and Marx lies in their prescriptions for freedom. But such a conclusion is usually reached by those who wish to discredit the objectives of the opposition, whose claims for their own preferred thinker can be encapsulated in such statements as: 'Mill's theory of liberty reminds us of the dangers which accompany the socialism of a revolutionary, marxian persuasion.' Or: 'Marx's theory of alienation exposes the true nature of Mill's political economy as nothing more than an apology for laissez-faire capitalism.' That these views prevail is reason enough to proceed from a different and, as I shall claim, a more 'authentic' starting position. I do not, then, see Mill as a 'social democrat', or the champion of the common good, or the promoter of the merits of free competition; neither do I view Marx as a utopian communist, the believer in the inevitability of history, or the scientific determinist <u>par excellence</u>. All of these interpretations may well have an element of truth about them, they may reveal particular facets of their intellectual lineage, but to claim that each is the

fundamental basis for an appreciation of the true intention of each thinker is to commit a grave and misleading error. Mill was no mere social reformer who pursued the common good in the interests of general utility, equally Marx cannot be treated as just another proselytizer of the impersonal dilectic. What really defined the development of their respective systems was their commitment to human emancipation, not the negative freedom of the limited exercise of individual choice in present circumstances, but a self-motivated process of personal liberation exercised in a community of mutually recognitive and interdependent agents.

Therefore the primary aim of this proposed study is to compare the theories of liberty - and the means of achieving it - articulated by the originators of political philosophies which played a principle role in the construction of the two competing ideologies of the late twentieth century - liberalism and communism. To claim that both systems were originally motivated by the cause of freedom is in itself a challenge to the conclusions reached by contemporary proponents of each about the intentions of the other. To go on to suggest that both may have something to learn from the other is, in the eyes of some, the equivalent of commiting intellectual suicide; for the history of recent debate on freedom in political philosophy is one characterized by competition, the scoring of points in the contest of who can most adequately defend a conception of freedom derived from the closed system of one of the opposing monoliths from the attacks of the other. Each side continues to strengthen its own defences against the attacks of the opposition, repairing and re-inforcing their respective positions in response to previous advances, digging-in more securely, whilst rendering the ground between the redoubts uninhabitable. There is a plethora of works which begin their defence of a particular notion of freedom, and subsequently underpin their whole analysis, with an identification of the 'enemy' and a rebuttal of its counter-claims, i.e. those who base their arguments for freedom on rights based (whatever their origin) notions of personal autonomy nearly always proceed from a presupposition that marxism both attacks rights talk and has none of its own, as if such an absense negates any effective contribution by marxism to the debate on freedom. Nozick, Rawls, and Dworkin, to name a few, all show evidence of such a prejudicial procedure. Macpherson, Althusser, and Lichtheim, amongst many others all insist that there is nothing to learn from the liberal heritage with regard to self-determination and the kinds of societal restraints that may inhibit its development, in fact, liberal political theory is invariably dismissed as being nothing more than an apologetic for capitalism.

Such intellectual conflict, it should be remembered, must also be considered in its historical context. The practical counterpart to the exchange of theoretical brickbats has been an international climate dominated by the overt and covert clash of the two ideological titans, each employing slogans acredited to the 'authors' of the irreconcilable systems to provide the philosophical legitimation for intervention and destabilization.

In response to such an apparently irreversable stalemate, I

make no claims for exposing Mill as a closet communist, or of discovering a libertarian Marx! Neither do I want to suggest that either Mill or Marx seriously considered, or incorporated into their own systems, the insights of the other. In the case of the latter the little attention that he did pay to his liberal contemporary was usually contained within the general criticisms of classical political economy. Beyond this there is the occasional grudging acceptance that Mill was perhaps a cut above the coterie of apologists for nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism. With the former the problem of assessing the impact of an opposing world system is made an unsolvable one because of the complete ignorance Mill had of his London neighbour. However, it is interesting to note that Mill did have a number of associates, particularly from the nascent labour movement, who were linked with the organizations of the 'International' and other campaigns concerned with the promotion of working people's interests. Mill was therefore familiar with the arguments of some of the factions of the revolutionary left, and made several contributions to the debates about the efficacy of insurrection, consistently warning against any such rash misjudgements. But we should not dwell on questions of whether Mill unknowingly brushed shoulders with Marx in any of the debating halls of London, although a full length comparative study of their involvement in the British labour movement would be of considerable interest to the movement's political historians.

What is of importance, and of greater relevance, to the intended comparison, are the uses made by each thinker of the intellectual and circumstantial raw material at their disposal in the furtherance of liberty. It soon becomes apparent that both Mill and Marx were employing, admittedly with widely differing implications, similar sources of inspiration in pursuit of a common cause, freedom. They developed methodologies and epistemologies in response to their perception that the ideas of their precursors were inadequate in the face of new circumstances. It may be suggested, with understandable justification, that this is no different from any other political theorist worth their salt. Who hasn't modified and amended their intellectual inheritance? But I return to my original point of departure: these two luminaries from a century of individuals of impressive intellectual stature are unique, in that they are today percieved by many theoretricians and practioners as being responsible for - perhaps more arguably so in the case of Mill - the two Weltanschauungen which more than any other have shaped the practical and theoretical agenda of modern day politics. Also, it needs to be remembered that both saw themselves as 'scientists' of social relations; we only have to look at A System of Logic and Capital to realise that their authors were not interested in constructing yet more idealist moral prescriptions, or purely descriptive, subjective, or normative critiques of a corrupt world. The sciences they elaborated sought to reveal the dialetic of change. For Mill it was Saint-Simon who had identified history as a dynamic process, the developments of which could be explained through the study of the interplay between critical and harmonious eras. Mill was under no illusion that he was living in a time of social calm; he revelled in the challenge to deduce order from the intellectual and social crisis of mid-nineteenth century

Europe, attempting, via a constant process of eclectic synthesis, to combine the half-truths of competing doctrines in the hope of transcending their divisions. Of course, for Marx the writings of Hegel, stripped of their idealism and distilled down to their rational core, were the basis of the former's method, which when complemented with the materialism of the French socialists - Saint-Simonians amongst them - and British political economy, resulted in the materialist conception of history. Both accordingly believed in the irrevocable tendency of societies to progress, especially their own society; capitalism was, so far, the highest point of human development, and despite its inadequacies, it provided the potential for attaining both material abundance and a more equitable distribution of the social product, which, for both of them, were necessary prerequisites for human freedom. In other words, each of them believed that the continued economic and intellectual progress of human society was symptomatic of the more general and profound movement towards freedom, moreover it was a movement which could be understood 'scientifically', and could therefore be consciously controlled.

The observation, that for Mill and Marx capitalism was the apogee, to date, of humanity's advance, makes the comparison even more intriguing, in the sense that both writers were observing and absorbing exactly the same physical evidence from a time of great economic, social and political change. They had each witnessed the infancy and adolescence of the industrial revolution and they had watched its development to what they believed was its maturity in Britain. Each had also witnessed and recognised the importance of the political repercussions and the social dislocations which had accompanied the drive for economic advancement. In response to these epoch making developments each of them emphasised the necessity of constructing theories of political economy, providing both an explanation of the basis of capitalism and an examination of its historical and progressive nature. In both cases the intention was not merely to describe prevailing socio-economic relations, but to change them. To this end, each saw their own insights as contributing to the pursuit of change and as providing the theoretical basis of practical action. They responded to the impoverishment of the majority of the population - a condition generated, they both believed by the industrialization of society - by actively supporting campaigns for various causes, such as the reduction of the working day, the abolition of child labour, and the improvement of working conditions. Such activity was consistent with the shared belief that without an adequately structured, supportive and co-ordinated economic sphere, emancipation for the generality would be impossible. They also participated in oppositional and extra-parliamentary (as well as intra-parliamentary, in Mill's case) political movements, pursuing radical political objectives. Both recoginised and actively campaigned in support of the demand for universal franchise, not merely as an end in itself, but as part of the basis for the organization of the disadvantaged. While at the same time each attacked the archaic institutions of political authority and the traditional elites that manipulated them for their own ends.

However, the securing of political and social objectives on their own would not, they believed, guarantee emancipation.

Mill and Marx recognised that without changes in the organisation of the relations of production and the alteration of the criteria of distribution, individual liberty for the majority and social freedom would remain unfulfilled. But we must avoid the temptation of stretching this similarity too far. Of course, we should not need reminding that the methods each thinker believed would, through their practical application, secure these necessary restructurings differed considerably. Mill went no further than to encourage experimentation in various forms of production, particularly welcoming the initiatives of those workers who set up co-operatives, while remaining opposed to the predominance of monopolies, and antithetical to the widely disproportionate distribution of wealth. Competition may have been central to his political economy, but only if it promoted efficiency and progress, avoided injustice, and secured for as many as possible the chance for self-development. Marx viewed all such economic and social reform as inadequate and ineffective in the face of all-pervading competition and the pursuit of profit. For as long as the predominant relation between individuals remained one of antagonism between capitalist and labour, self-determination was an impossibility. Only the revolutionary transformation of capitalism could overcome the unfreedom of alienation, and establish the conditions for social emancipation. So, despite their proximity, both spatially and intellectually, in spite of their common distaste for the consequences of rapacious materialism and of egotistical competition, and regardless of their acceptance of the need for a unity of theory and action, each proposed widely differing means based on apparently incompatible methods and sciences. What, then, is there left to compare? The short answer is the validity of their prescriptions. In other words the strength of their theories of freedom, which should consider both the plausibility of their claims about the capacities individuals possess for self-determination, and the viability of their schemes for achieving the stipulated end.

Therefore, what underpins my comparison is the assumption that both thinkers developed views of freedom which, in terms of the image of what an emancipated existance might look like, are remarkably similiar. In other words, the ends to which they were both committed are difficult to tell apart, to the extent that there are passages in the works of each which are almost interchangeable, where the projections of a community of creatively self-determining, mutually recognitive agents share key features. For example, each conceived of the human being as an agent capable of self-motivated emancipation, and that only the individual who voluntarily participated in the development of their own capacities could be said to be free. What is more, the process of individual self-determination could only be fully and successfully pursued in an environment comprised of like-minded individuals. Freedom, therefore, is both an individual and a social process of conscious creative activity, which relies upon the recognition by each of the other's ability to pursue conscious self-improvement, and hence rests on the assumption that freedom for individuals and society is the result of both semi-autonomous and collective action. The private and the public spheres are thus transformed, while the false dichotomy between negative and positive liberty is transcended. However, although the ends

may appear similar, the means which are recommended to achieve them, and the methods on which they are founded, appear irreconcilable. And here, I believe, lies the real importance of a comparison, for if we can show that one system provides more adequate means than the other with regard to the achievement of the stipulated end, and that one set of means is more consistent than the other in remaining true to the intentions enshrined in the shared image of the future, then the superior system can be recommended as the preferable approach to achieving the common end. But if this form of straightforward selection cannot be achieved, and I believe that this is quite possibly the case, the comparison still remains valid because, as I wish to point out, it is the case that each system provides certain theoretical insights which in combination with one another may more successfully guarantee freedom in its broadest sense.

Hence my intention, in the light of the observations made above, is to examine what are usually perceived to be competing notions of freedom in the context of the overarching social theories from which they spring. This was the procedure adopted by both thinkers; they cautioned against the tendency to isolate aspects of their thought, whether textual or conceptual, from the general systems which gave them meaning. In following such advice, the abiding strengths, as well as the nagging weaknesses, can be more fully understood and appreciated. Admittedly, this is the prevailing method of analysis practiced in most contemporary investigations of various issues and problems associated with the ideas of Mill and Marx. But such a sound approach rarely extends to the critical appraisals proffered by exponents of one system when attempting to disassemble and devalue the the ideas of the other. This is true of many liberal and marxist scholars who sadly reveal an incomplete understanding of the methodologies of the 'opposition' whose views they try to debunk. In an effort to side-step such pitfalls, I would want to avoid the tendency of treating particular works of each author as discrete and self-sustaining moments of their intellectual output, just as I believe that one should not attempt to elevate one book to a position of pre-eminence over others. Both these errors inhibit a full appreciation of the importance and intention of particular works, whether they be considered seminal or second-rate, so that contributions such as On Liberty and the first volume of Capital are often taken as the definitive statements of their respective authors, when in fact each are most definitely only one aspect of systems of thought which are constructed from inter-determinate elements. With these thoughts in mind, I assume that, for example, Mill's evaluation of an individual's fitness to participate and to hold positions of responsibility in politics (as outlined in Representative Government), can only be fully appreciated if we have a good idea of his qualitative distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' forms of character (made in A System of Logic and Utilitarianism). The same goes for Marx when, for example, we need to delve into the density of the Grundrisse and its examination of the nature of 'categories', in order to make more sense of the cryptic notes on justice that appear in his polemical Critique of the Gotha Programme. Unless such methodical precautions are made, mistakes and misjudgments are all the more likely, contemporary examples of which abound.

Therefore, in the pursuit of greater coherency, not only should Mill's and Marx's analysis of what constitutes individual and social freedom be considered, but also the methodologies and epistemologies which underpin their theories of liberty. I assume, then, that we cannot detach the conclusions from the method, for in the method lies the clue to a full appreciation of what each writer saw as the ability individuals have to consciously change their environment in the pursuiance of self-development. There can be little doubt that without their exacting methods, neither Marx nor Mill could have produced such enduring and alluring conceptions of emancipation. However, it must be admitted that witnin their respective 'scientific' examinations of human character lie problems which go some way towards explaining the shortcomings of their proposals concerning liberation. So, before anything else, there is a need to focus on the theories of human nature propounded by each thinker.

Some of the tensions which I believe exist in the two theories of human nature stem from the eclectic character of the theories' origins. This is perhaps more apparent in the case of Mill, but has also given rise to disagreements concerning the true intentions of Marx. In both cases, the outcome of the intellectual synthesis attempted by each thinker resulted in the emphasis of particular aspects of human character at the expense of others. This invariably had effects on their critiques of alternative theories of freedom, leading them to dismiss, or ignore altogether, details of opposing views that did not appear to conform to their own conclusions. Such intransigence, I would want to suggest, only served to compound the problems implicit in their own explanations of the human condition, problems which have all too easily been incorporated into the ideas of comtemporary protagonists. So even if we can dismiss a number of the inadequacies commonly associated with Mill and Marx by having a working knowledge of their epistemologies, this does not account for all their shortcomings. I wish to claim that as a result of their methodological origins as applied to their theories of human nature, the theories of liberation championed by Mill and Marx are in places flawed, and that consequently the political repercussions of these theories are in part and to different degrees, suspect.

In turning first to Mill, I would want to prove that the origins of his amibiguous and equivocal attitude towards the relationship between the capacity for self-improvement and the prospects for general emancipation, lie in his unsatisfactory approach to the compatibalist dilemma: how can we overcome the dead hand of determinism that accompanies a necessitarian epistemology without sacrificing our scientific empiricism to intuitionism and idealist metaphysics? Or to put it another way, is it possible to accommodate a concept of free will within a materialist account of human psychology? Mill's anguished attempt to achieve such a consiliance leads him to make conclusions concerning the ability of individuals to emancipate themselves that have a direct bearing on his proposals for social reform in general. In short, Mill was bridled by his continued faith in the explanatory efficacy of utilitarian individualism, but compromised its call for equality by suggesting that although all had a capacity for

self-culture, only a minority, for the forseeable future, would be able to exercise it to the best of their ability. The practical consequences of this position are exposed in in Mill's defence of freedom. More on this later.

With regard to Marx, the major problem that needs to be addressed is whether he escaped completely from the clutches of the universalist and teleological account of human nature which accompanied German idealism. Part of the solution, I believe, can be found in an adequate account of the development of Marx's own critique of hegelian metaphysics. This would include an assessment of the success of his incorporation of the concept 'species being' into his materialist method, and whether such a concept is incompatible with Marx's professed intention to reject any notion of a permanent aspect to human nature. If individuals are nothing more than a reflection of the ensemble of social relations then in what ways can they be alienated, and what are they alienated from? If it is from their species being, then does this imply a marxian paradigm of what emancipated existence should be, or a projection of a genuinely human way of life? In a sense this is a similar dilemma to that faced by Mill. How can one account for the capacity to engage in self-determination within a scientific materialism, particularly a materialism which claims that the dynamic which propels history has hitherto been an inevitable and uncontrollable dialectic? What I want to maintain is that Marx's understanding of species being is quite distinct from his rejection of human nature. The latter, he believed, implied ageless character traits, such as self-interest or social sympathy, which lead to bogus universalistic claims being made for what were in reality particular and contingent theories of freedom and equality. The former, however, made no such assumptions, claiming, rather, that human agents were distinct by nature of their ability to consciously recreate and develop the means of their own existance. But I believe a tension remains, even if we accept the open-ended consequence of species being, between Marx's claim for the individual's capacity for freedom and his recognition of the impact of impersonal historical forces on social relations.

In other words, the atomism of classical utilitarianism and the holism of hegelian metaphysics, although significantly modified by their inheritors, continued to weigh upon their conclusions in ways that were not entirely propitious. But are these faults fundamental and irreversible? Can the theories be salvaged and the prescriptions sympathetically reconsidered? Or do the intentions of the authors remain at variance with the implications of their analyses?

In an attempt to answer these questions, it is necessary to follow through the concrete implications of each thinker's analysis of human nature via an appraisal of their respective views on the condition of the individual in contemporary society and the various proposals that are made by each concerning the transformation of both social relations and the individual. In adopting such an approach I would want to suggest the following:

1) that the method and the science of human nature employed by Mill were inadequate for the task they were supposed to

perform; rather than providing him with a sound theoretical basis for the universal emancipation of society as expressed in the early sections of On Liberty, they lead him to make recommendations which are inegalitarian and, in some cases, elitist. The evidence for this charge lies in Book Six of A System of Logic, where Mill works out the theoretical basis for a theory of liberty, and in the essay Utilitarianism, in which superior forms of human existence are recommended. The practical implications of these conclusions are clearly discernable in his works on government, education, and the economy, where prefered character traits and the fortunate individuals who possess them are elevated to positions of real influence, at the expense of the generality, who, for the foreseeable future, will be encouraged to respect and defer to their intellectual and political superiors. So, although the vision of an emancipated existance inspired Mill to write with conviction in On Liberty about the restrictions which inhibit the majority from pursuing virtuous lives, elsewhere the hard material evidence qualified his epistemological hypotheses and tempered his enthusiasm and his optimism, leading him to tone down his egalitarian tendencies, compromising them with arguments for elitist solutions such as the recommendation for a 'clerisy'.

2) In turning to Marx, I would concentrate on his critique of what he took to be the liberal theory and practice of freedom and equality, along with his examination of the post-capitalist alternative that he believed emerges from it. This certainly went some of the way towards exposing the contradictions of prevailing arguments which accepted the predominant laws of production as the universal basis for establishing the realm of freedom. Mill, with reservations, would have counted himself amongst those who adopted such a position, therefore it can be claimed, with some force, that Marx's criticisms apply to him. But in response it could be said that Marx's revolutionary alternative reinforces the importance of Mill's observations concerning the tendency of numerical majorities to suppress those who do not conform to their perception of the general interest. Or, to put the problem in the form of a question, is the individual sufficiently protected in Marx's system against the possibility of transgressions committed by the collective? Is the baby thrown out with the bath water? Does Marx dismiss all rights talk too lightly when disassembling and rejecting its bourgeois apparition as nothing more than legitimating slogans? Marx's response to these doubts can be found in works which represent the culmination of his porject, the Grundrisse and Capital. It is here where the conception of alienation is fully incorporated within political economy, allowing Marx to articulate a theory of freedom which insists that any universal rights claim only serves to limit liberty on the basis of a priori assumptions concerning the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, assumptions that are reflective of contingent duties, morals and obligations contiguous with prevailing social relations. But as with the supposed tension in his theory of human nature, doubts persist with the regard to the extent of Marx's awareness of the possible dangers to individual freedom posed by the dictatorship of the proletariat. These doubts are only reinforced by Marx's infamous reticence on the organization of post-revolutionary society.

Unfortunately, these perceived inadequacies are often used by critics from opposing camps to dismiss the entire contribution made by each thinker. But surely the more constructive procedure would be to recognise the positive contribution made by each system to the pursuit of freedom, and subsequently engage in a critical reappraisal of those aspects of each system which do not withstand the test of close scrutiny. This is the advantage of a comparison; we can assess both systems and their intrinsic value while at the same time conducting an open ended dialogue between the two. What would be the possible results of such a dialogue? Firstly, I think it would reveal a remarkable similarity between the projections offered by Mill and Marx of what a fully emnancipated existance may well look like: a society of free, consciously creative, mutually recognitive and interdependent self-determining agents. Secondly, the examination of the widely differing methodologies and epistemologies employed by each thinker, would expose the varying degrees of their effectiveness in promoting the achievement of the common end. The individualism of Mill's utilitarian compatibilism is most certainly bedevilled by normative assumptions concerning the agent's capacity for and ability to achieve freedom which weaken considerably his claims for scientific neutrality and in fact indirectly impose a revised idealist morality. Whereas Marx's method, based as it is on a concept of humanity as a species which distinguishes itself by virtue of its ability to conscoiusly recreate its material existance, rejects, rather too recklessly it might be claimed, evaluative prescriptions and universal moral claims. The result of such a non-ethical approach is an open-ended or 'extensive' view of freedom, which seeks to overcome the traditional dichotomy of theory and practice by urging revolutionary praxis. Therefore, for Marx self-emancipation was direct and immediate participation in the collective process of social transformation. But for Mill the initial modification of the circumstances conducive to liberty would be the responsibility of those of confirmed virtue. The generality would be, for some time to come, inadequately equipped for such a task and should be encouraged to defer in favour of those already enlightened in the 'science' and 'art' of the general good.

So although the idea of freedom and the activity of liberty may well be shared by both thinkers, the routes taken in pursuit of the end are widely divergent, to the extent that one approach may well be more consistent than the other when attention is turned to the adequacy of the means proposed for achieving emancipation. Or to put this problem another way, I believe that the genuineness of each thinker's commitment to universal and individual freedom can be guaged by their willingness to consider seriously qualifications to their overall strategies, qualifications which may well compromise the freedom of the many, while at the same time enhancing the liberty of the few. Such qualifications, I would want to maintain, would reveal a reluctance to accept the unpredictable consequences of universal emancipation and a tendency to resort to paternalistic and undemocratic remedies. Mill is inflicted with this dilemma; for him the problem appears in two distinct, though interelated guises: 1) how can we restrict the damage wrought by the uncultivated generality's misuse of liberty

without denying them the educative and emancipating benefits of a representative democracy? And, 2) how can the services of the enlightened be secured for the benefit of the community without estranging the majority from the processes of political authority? For Marx such a dilemma is symptomatic of the problem faced by all political philosophers who are not prepared to accept the practical, contradictory consequences of their most cherished hypothoses. But Marx is himself open to the charge of blind optimism on those rare occasions when he turns to the capacity of the oppressed to engage successfully in revolutionary activity, paying little attention either to the effects of political, social and economic turmoil on the impoverished and the dispossessed, or to the basis of resolving conflicts of interest in a post-capitalist world. So although Marx's commitment to universal freedom may indeed be more genuine than Mill's more reserved conclusions, perhaps the latter's reservation is his greatest strength, and the former's "heroic silence" his most notable weakness.

And the purpose of all this? Although the prevailing mood remains one of mutual misunderstanding and hence mistrust, there is a small but growing field of research which is attempting to reassess, in an open and comparative fashion the intellectual legacy of liberalism and marxism. This has taken two general forms: one has been the incorporation into re-evaluations of the contemporary worth of each 'classical' theory of aspects usually associated with its opposite number; the second has attempted to develop a synthesis of the two systems, combining the strengths and jettisoning the weaknesses. This proposed project would hopefully indicate why the second trend is misguided and ultimately unsuccessful, and why the first is far more rewarding as a procedure for testing the validity of the claims and counter-claims made by each system and for pursuing the goal of freedom as self-determination in a world of mutual recognition and co-operative interdependency.

Guy Woodall

Absolute Truth

Hegel is known as a philosopher who believes in the idea of truth, even Absolute Truth (as if truth could be relative). For many englishmen this is enough to condemn him. Reacting perhaps to the overly simplistic views of utilitarian and contractarian thought, which equate truth with perfectly logical deductions from indisputable premises, they feel that is is wiser not to look for absolute truth at all. For them the value of the study of philosophy is taken to lie in training us in such things as clear analytical thinking and precise use of language, and it is not regarded as a means in itself of creating or revealing any absolute truth.

Such a view removes philosophy a long way from its classical and etymological meaning, the love of true knowledge, and it becomes questionable (and very often is questioned) whether it retains a valid purpose. No doubt it is right to reject the rationalist idea that there is a truth which is absolute because it is indisputable, but it is not clear that this is the only possible meaning of absolute truth in philosophy, and Hegel's absolute is in fact of a quite different nature. Further, while it is relatively clear what, say, Descartes or Hobbes take to be indisputably true, it is rather less obvious what Hegel thinks the truth is.

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that scholars not only disagree about what Hegel means by terms such as "the Absolute", "the True", "Absolute Knowledge", ans so on, but also give conflicting accounts of what in more concrete terms Hegel takes to be true. For liberal minds the idea of absolute truth is unpalatable enough without there also being several conflicting versions of it. Yet it is argued by writers such as Alexandre Kojève that Hegel's Absolute is the same as the absolute freedom of the individual subject which is the premise - in rationalist style - of existentialist thought (1); while commentators like Karl Popper find that Hegel is an "essentialist" in just the same way as Plato or Aristotle, and holds that the truth is to be found in an independent and preordained world of ideal form (2). In the one case the free individual is the sole arbiter of truth, and anything is free to be true, even unfreedom, so long as it is freely chosen. In the other the truth is a substantial entity in its own right, and though an individual may within limits discover it, his opinion and knowledge have no bearing on the truth itself.

In fact, for Hegel neither view is exactly false, though both are one-sided, which amounts to the same thing. Indeed, everything depends on reconciling two such views, which he came across in his day in the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling respectively. "In my view", he wrote in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, "which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject" (3).

I do not intend to justify this view here by exposing Hegel's system. Instead I want only to discuss some points relating to the basic structure of the Phenomenlogy. In particular, I want to argue that it may be understood as an attempt to revise the basic doctrine of Plato's Republic - the true as substance - to accomodate the principle of subjective freedom - the true as subject. So far as is possible I want to avoid discussing specific arguments in the Phenomenology, since these tend to be negative criticisms of certain positions, and I want to concentrate on what Hegel thinks is positively true. The Phenomenology is too often understood only in terms of the criticisms it offers of other schools of thought, while the positive truth which it seeks to express is overlooked or misunderstood - a fact which is doubly damaging because it is impossible to understand the principle of "determinate negation" which is the core of Hegel's method in the Phenomenology without understanding the positive truth which he is seeking to express.

The classical view adopted by Plato distinguishes between the changing and therefore illusary world of appearances and the static world of forms which alone is real and true. Everyday aquaintance with the world of appearance is, roughly speaking, what we call opinion. Philosophy seeks to transform this opinion into knowledge, not, as in the browbeating style of modern thought, by giving very sound reasons for opinions, but rather by seeking to grasp the formal essence which is the truth of any appearance.

Plate gives the example of beauty (4). Everyone has an opinion of beauty, in so far as they recognise and broadly agree that certain objects are beautiful. True knowledge of beauty, however, is not an aquaintance with beautiful things, but knowledge of the form or idea of beauty itself. How, then, can this be achieved? If I try to describe beauty, I am immediately back in the world of changing appearances, and reducing ideal beauty to its manifestations. If, for example, I say that beauty is what is aesthetically pleasurable then all I have done is to reduce beauty to a modification of pleasure. In principle, I could substitute the term "aesthetically pleasurable" wherever I find the term "beautiful", and dispense with the idea of beauty altogether. Plato's view, however, is that beauty itself does exist, and cannot be explained away in this manner. Nevertheless, if the appearances of beauty are not beauty itself, there is no other way that beauty can appear, so that knowledge of beauty must somehow come through aquaintance with beautiful things.

What is needed, then, is some way of recognising the principle of beauty in beautiful things. This generates a difficulty known as the "eristic paradox", which Plato discusses especially in the Meno. If I do not know what beauty is, how can I recognise it? If I do, why should I be looking for it? Plato's answer, which leads into the myth of the immortality of the soul, is that knowledge is not strictly speaking something we acquire, but the recollection of what we already know, but have forgotten. "Seeking and learning", he says, "are in fact nothing but recollection" (5).

Hegel shares this view, though he also develops and alters it; and he presents each stage of the argument of the Phenomenology as a move from certainty, whichis equivalent to right opinion in Plato, to true knowledge. He describes the whole process as recollection, and says that true knowledge of Spirit is achieved when we have not only isolated each of its essential moments, but also gathered together or re-collected (er-innern) them so that we intuit the entir

"gallery of images" (6) of Spirit as a single idea. If knowledge of the absolute is the result of the book, the absolute is itself a presupposition. Philosophy, he commented in an early work, "presupposes the absolute itself: this is the goal that is sought. It is already there; how else could it be sought?" (7). To do philosophy at all, in Hegel's interpretation, requires an act of faith. It is necessary to believe in the absolute before it is possible to achieve knowledge of it. Contrary to a common view, faith is not opposed to knowledge, and there is an element of faith in truth. As Hegel remarked in another early work, "in philosophical intercourse "truth" deserves to be used, not of empirical fact, but solely of the certainty of the eternal, and "faith" has indeed been generally so used" (8). Truth, in the Hegelian view, is the explicit awareness of what is already implicitly felt, understood to be the case. Like a succesful psychoanalysis, a succesful reading of the Phenomenology should end with the realisation "but I have known this all along!".

In the Republic, Plato set out to discover the true essence of the idea of justice. This is one dimension of the good, the essential nature of which is the highest object of knowledge; and indeed Plato proposes the basic doctrine that justice in the individual is a balance between the three component parts of the soul, and justice in the state is a balance between the cardinal virtues. The parts of the soul are desire, spiritedness, and reason, and the cardinal virtues are wisdom, courage, discipline, and justice itself. There is, we may note, no particular connection between the views Plato rejects and those he accepts, and if his readers accepted his views, it must have been simply because they agreed that they seemed to be true, that one could not imagine a just individual who did not have desire, spirit, and reason in some kind of harmonious proportion, and so on.

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel repeadly criticises Plato's Republic for failing to accomodate the principle of "subjective freedom" or "the freedom of the individual" (9). His criticisms are similar to those of contemporary writers who accuse Plato of totalitarianism, though since Hegel thinks that subjective freedom is absent from the whole Greek world, not just Plato's thought, he would regard the totalitarian charge as anachronistic. At every level of the Phenomenology a similar criticism is implied. In an early essay on Natural Law Hegel had rather unsuccessfully tried to apply platonic ideas directly to the modern world (10). In the Phenomenology he adjusts and redefines the same ideas in order to make them compatible with the freedom of the individual. Indeed, the concept of Spirit is little more than the concept of justice modified to accomodate the idea of individual freedom. In the platonic view, it is enough that here be justice, and it is not necessarly that this be known by the citizens, with the exception in theory of the philosopher-king of the ideal republic. For Hegel it is essential to the idea of justice that it must be known and self-consciously realised by the citizens. And, as M.D.Foster puts it, "this difference can be expressed properly by saying that the essence of both polis and soul is not in reality from at all, but Spirit, and their virtue or perfection not Dikaisune (justice) but freedom" (11).

The essence of soul, or what Hegel later calls subjectivie spirit, must likewise be altered, and where Plato talks of desire,

spiritedness, and reason, Hegel talks of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. While the elements of the platonic soul are conceived of as component parts, that is, as discrete and independent entities, the moments of subjective spirit are essentially related to each other. Thus, "Consciousness has in general three phases, according to the diversity of the object. It (the object) is namely either the object standing in opposition to the Ego, or it is the Ego itself, or something objective which belongs likewise equally to the Ego, Thought. These moments are not taken up empirically from without, but are moments of cosciousness itself. Hence it is

(1) Consciousness in general
(2) Self-consciousness
(3) Reason" (12).

The first phase, consciousness, is in fact rather a long way removed from Plato's desire, because here Hegel has altered Plato's view substantially as well as formally. He does not see desire as a distinct element of the soul, and makes it instead a moment of self-consciousness. It is possible to argue that this gives a more satisfactory picture than Plato's, since it makes possible a better correlation between the cardinal virtues and the elements of the soul. With Plato's scheme, while it is fairly clear that courage is the virtue of spiritedness and self-discipline the virtue of reason, wisdom does not unambiguously belong to any element of the soul, while the element of desire, and the productive class which corresponds to it, are without virtue. In Hegel's picture, desire and productive work achieve some virtue as dimensions of self-consciousness, while wisdom has its place as the virtue of consciousness.

The second phase, self-consciousness, describes more or less exactly the spirited element of the platonic soul. Its virtue, Thumos or courage, is that which impells us to do things which cannot be understood simply as a result of desire. For Plato, this is simply part of human nature: good men, who strive to be virtuous, will be spirited and courageous. For Hegel it is the result specifically of the innate need of self-consciousness for recognition, which is in a certain sense the driving force behind all civilised activity and "the basis of all virtues, of love, honour, friendship, bravery, all self-sacrifice, all fame, etc" (13). We should note here the curious juxtaposition of freedom and necessity which is so characteristic of Hegel's thought: it is because self-consciousness, as a pure relation to itself, is free from any ouside being, that it is constrained of necessity to be courageous.

The third phase of subjective spirit, though it is also called reason, is subtly different from reason in Plato. Plato may not regard reason exactly as a faculty of thought, as Kant does, but he nevertheless has a rather narrow view of reason, seeing it as a style of thinking which is perfected in the philosopher's dialectic, whose purpose is to achieve knowledge of the forms. Hegel's definition of reason as the attitude of self-consciousness to the objective world, which attitude may be described in a word as "interested", in contrast to the disinterested attitude of consciousness, is broader. it understands reason not so much as a tool or style of thought, which we may or may not use, but as an essential characteristic of free men. Again, because spirit is free, it is in its nature to have a relationship with the world, and it is therefore constrained of necessity to be rational, and indeed to exhibit each of the nine major characteristics of reason which Hegel examines in the relevant chapter of the Phenomenology.

Since this must be a very short essay I will not follow this comparision with Plato any further, especially since when we get to what Hegel later called objective spirit the picture becomes rather more complicated. I will only mention - since I set out to say something about the positive truth expressed in Hegel's writing - that Hegel takes spirit as a whole to be exhausted in twelve essential moments, namely sense-certainty, perception, understanding, desire, self-consciousness recognitive, free self-consciousness, observing reason, active rational self-consciousness, real individuality, ethical order, culture, and morality. A true knowledge of spirit must not only be aquainted with these parts, but must also intuit them as a unitary whole. From the point of view of consciousness, or immediately, this intuition of the absolute is religion; and self conscious knowledge of the same thing is philosophy. Christianity tends to emphasise the unitary aspect of spirit, whereas pagan religions tend to emphasise the parts, which are represented as deities. The Olympian pantheon is as good an example as any, and there are plenty of others.

The Phenomenology sets out to achieve self-conscious knowledge of the truth which is expressed in religion - which, incidentally, is not the same as replacing religion with philosophy, any more than platonic philosophy replaces the world of appearance with the world of forms. In any case, for both Plato and Hegel, truth is infinite, and one can therefore never hope to have perfect knowledge of it. Like a lover, the truth always holds something back. The best we can hope for is a deep aquaintance, and religion is just as valid a way of achieving this as philosophy.

The important thing, for Hegel, is to demonstrate the existence of the absolute, and hence the validity of the philosophical - and indeed the religious - standpoint. Here his approach differs in one very important respect from Plato's. I have already mentioned more than once that while Plato regards the world of form as independently real in its own right, Hegel takes the view that what is real and true must appear in an individual form. "Appearance itself", he said in one of his Berlin lectures on aesthetics, "is essential to essence"(14). For Plato, to whom individual freedom is a matter of no consequence, it is enough for the philosopher to seek to uncover the hidden world of essence for his own benefit. For Hegel, precisely because he insists that spirit is above all free, it is necessary to demonstrate as a necessity that the essence of spirit should be present in any individual, however naive or unphilosophical. Clearly this represents a major revision of the classical theory of form, and we may say that the hegelian "Idea" is distinguished from platonic ideal form precisely in that it must necessarily exist in a concrete individual form; or, as some commentators have put it, while Plato's dialectic exists in thought only, Hegel's is itself not only very real, but all reality.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel sets out to demonstrate this to a "natural consciousness" which qua consciousness is predisposed to believe the contrary, that is, that reality is a world of independent and unrelated things, where there is no truth beyond the simple sensation of objects, no absolute, and no mystery which philosophy might help to unravel. He proposes to take this consciousness and, using its own ideas and criterea, to demonstrate that what it takes to be a new object it has simply "come across" is in truth something which has produced itself. If natural con-

sciousness, with some help from the "phenomenal knowledge" of the philosopher, realises this, then it sees that the new object it found was something which already existed implicitly in its own self, and which it has not so much produced out of thin air, as "discovered" or better still "realized". In this case it has what Hegel says is properly called experience, and which can lead ultimately to experience of the absolute itself. I want to conclude now by mentioning two important points which should be kept in mind in connection with the idea of experience and the closely related idea of "determinate negation".

Firstly, it is often objected against Hegel that he tries in the Phenomenology to produce a new object or point of view out of nothing more than criticism of an old one. This is apparently incomprehensible. As Hypolite put it, "If we assume a term A, can its negation, not -A, engender a new term B? It seems not" (15). But, as Hypolite goes on to point out, this is not quite what Hegel is trying to do. He certainly does criticise each view he presents in the Phenomenology quite mercilessly, but, properly understood, he is only criticising the view which says "this standpoint alone is true". If Hegel is right, and that only spirit is true, then it must be possible to demonstrate to a natural consciousness which takes such a view that, whether it likes it or not, the whole of spirit is in fact present in its own thought.

Seen from this point view, experience is really little more than platonic recollection. However, if this is true, it is also true that the Phenomenology contains a moment which is the exact opposite of recollection or Erinnerung, namley Entäusserung, that is, objectification, externalisation, or alienation, and which is entirely absent from platonic thought. The second point, then, is that just because Hegel addresses his argument to natural consciousness, whose thoughts appear to it in the alien form of objective things, the recollection of the Phenomenology is not so much an abstract and philosophical one, as the gathering together of real ideas which have a concrete individual existence as the ideas of natural consciousness. There is no need for this in Plato's thought because for him truth has no innate need to appear, and true knowledge leaves the world of appearance behind. Contrary to a common misconception, this is not Hegel's view at all. Natural consciousness is not left behind at the end of the Phenomenology, or superseded by philosophical contemplation; on the contrary, it is always an essential moment of phenomenal knowledge. Throughout the Phenomenology, though perhaps not in other works, Hegel sticks firmly to the unplatonic view that all knowledge is consciousness.

The Hegelian doctrine, then, can be summarised as platonism adjusted rather substantially in order to make room for the subjective freedom of the individual. The perfection of man, in modern view, is no longer to be the substance of a form, but to be the subject of an activity. This does not by any means mean the activities he can choose are unlimited. His substance remains more or less unchanged. All that has changed is that because he is free, it is essential, that is, necessary, that he should actively realise his substantial potential, and it is just this necessity which Hegel attempts to demonstrate in the Phenomenology.

Notes:

1) Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, New York 1969.

2) Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, (2 vols) Routledge, London 1966.

3) G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1977 p.10.

4) Plato, Republic, 478-9 Stephanus.

5) Plato, Meno, in Protagoras and Meno, Penguin, London 1956, p.130.

6) Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 492.

7) Hegel, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, quoted in W. Kaufmann, Hegel, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, London 1965, p.75.

8) Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Cerf and Harris, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1977, p. 124.

9) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 44, 124, 133, 195, 280.

10) Hegel, Natural Law, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, esp. pp. 93-105.

11) M.D. Foster, Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935, p.40.

12) Hegel Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (otherwise known as the Propadeutic), in Jacob Lowenberg, Hegel Selections, New York, 1929, p. 70.

13) Ibid., p. 78.

14) Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 8.

15) J. Hyppolite, The Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Cherniak and Heckmann, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1974, o. 15.

'RECOGNITION' IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

RICHARD GUNN

Famously, Hegelian thought points in diametrically opposed directions. On the basis of, especially, Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1st edn. 1817) and his Philosophy of Right (1821), "Right" Hegelianism articulates idealist and conservative themes. By contrast "Left" Hegelianism , drawing especially on the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), discerns a critical and revolutionary stratum in Hegel's thought. Not merely Marx, but the major mid-nineteenth century anarchist theorists without exception (Bakunin, Proudhon, Edgar Bauer, Stirner) were either Hegelians or wrote subject to Hegel's influence at some period of their lives. The present article contends that this resulted from more than the prestige of Hegelianism at the time when marxist and anarchist theorising took shape. By means of an exploration of the Hegelian concept of 'recognition [Anerkennung]' - rightly foregrounded in Kojeve's Hegel-interpretation of the 1930s - it seeks to establish that Marx, together with the anarchists, built on lines of argument which Hegel's work does genuinely contain.

1. The Concept of Recognition

As a first approach, two senses of the term 'recognition' may be distinguished. We recognise something cognitively when conditions of, say, proximity and visibility allow us to identify it. The assumption made in such cases is that it is what it is independently of the identification which (accurately or inaccurately) we make. By contrast, we identify something constitutively when what it is depends on the recognition of it which we afford, or supply. For example, a monarch counts as a monarch only if he or she is recognised (or acknowledged) as a monarch by others besides him or herself. As this example suggests, the primary application of the concept of constitutive recognition is in the field of social relations.

It is the constitutive sense of 'recognition' which is important for Hegel. Quite generally, in Hegel's view, what or who someone is depends on the recognition of them which others afford. As I am recognised, so I am. 'A self-consciousness [an individual human subject] exists for a self-consciousness [ie for an other self-consciousness]. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness ... Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and

by the fact that, it so exists for another' that is, it exists only in being recognised' (177-8).[1] In this way Hegelian subjectivity, unlike for example Cartesian subjectivity, is through and through "public" (ie plural, intersubjective, social). If the Cartesian story of the generation of self-conscious subjectivity goes forward monologically and in solitude, the equivalent Hegelian story - namely, the Master-Slave dialectic - is one wherein more than a single subject is involved. For Hegel, the notions of recognition qua constitutive and of public selfhood go hand in hand.[2]

The Hegelian theme of recognition is linked with the theme of freedom, which latter is understood by Hegel in the sense of self-determination. Freedom is linked with recognition since, if selfhood is intrinsically public, it is only as recognised and recognising that free subjectivity can obtain. And, conversely, recognition is linked with freedom since recognition counts as such only if it is - only if it is recognised as being - freely given, ie, the outcome of a free (a self-determining) act. This same condition must apply to the recognition which thus recognises recognition. An act of recognition reaches its completion only when it itself receives recognition, and when the recognition which recognises it receives recognition (as having been freely given) in its turn. It follows that recognition has an inherently symmetrical and dialogical character as Hegel indicates when he speaks of individuals who 'recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another' (184; cf 182). It also follows that what is thus symmetrically recognised is the freedom (the self-determination) of the individuals concerned.

The freedom/recognition connection will be further discussed below. Here, its importance is that it allows us to state more precisely what the notion of recognition qua constitutive involves. To say, as was said earlier, that "as I am recognised, so I am" is in one respect misleading since such a formulation might suggest that individuals are in a sheerly deterministic sense products of the intersubjective and social relations in which they stand. On the one hand, the theme of freedom would be eclipsed. On the other hand, the dialogical character of recognition would evaporate since the capacity of individuals to speak back - with, to be sure, no guarantee of effectiveness - against recognitive imputations would be denied. I suggest that a formulation which keeps both freedom and a dialogical mode of theorising in play is the following: the constitutive force of recognition means that, both for myself and for others, everything which I am is at issue, wholly and without remainder, in social and intersubjective life. Association with others entails risk since, of course, self-definition (the definition of myself stemming from self-determination) and other-definition (the definition of myself stemming from others recognition of me) may or may not be one and the same. This risk, however, is ineluctible - solitude is no escape from it - since it is 'only in being recognised' that human and thereby free selfhood exists at all.

2. Recognition and Spirit

Hegel understands social formations ("societies", for example ancient Greece or Rome or modern Europe) as, in effect, distinctive shapes or patterns of recognition. In them, recognition goes forward in socially and historically specific ways. He tells the story of the successive patterns of recognition which have characterised European history in the Phenomenology's sixth chapter, headed 'spirit [Geist]'.

Quite commonly, Hegelian 'spirit' is understood by commentators as a single, unitary subject - a "grand totaliser", in Sartre's expression - progressively realising its purposes in history and modelled on Christianity's monological and solitary God. The only passage in the

Phenomenology which comes close to defining 'spirit', however, tells a very different story. The passage is the continuation of the one, already cited, which introduces the "public" or intersubjective character of self-consciousness. Having signalled the idea of intersubjectivity, Hegel at once adds: 'With this, we already have before us the concept [which here means merely the broad general notion] of spirit' (177). He goes on to tell us 'what spirit is'. 'What spirit is' turns out to be intersubjectivity, or in other words recognitive existence itself: we 'experience' what spirit is when we experience an 'I that is We' and a 'We that is I' (loc cit; note the theme of dialogical symmetry once more). Thus, far from connoting a single and unitary subject, Hegelian 'spirit' is irreducibly plural and intersubjective (no less, for example, than is the category of 'action' in the writings of Arendt).[3] A "one-person spirit", just like a "one-person ethos" or a "one-person conversation", is a contradiction in terms. And if this is so, then the idealist elision of 'spirit' with 'God' - an elision which the later Hegel appears himself to favour - is demonstrably untenable. The way opens for a reading of Hegel along "Left" Hegelian lines.

Spirit is recognitive existence; history is the story of successive patterns of recognition; hence it is intelligible that 'spirit' should be the title of the chapter in which Hegel's historical story unfolds. To the broad outline of this story I now turn.

3. Recognition and History

Among patterns of recognition, three can be schematically distinguished. Recognition may be 'one-sided and unequal' (191), as in the pattern of recognition obtaining between Master and Slave; recognition may be misrecognition; or recognition may be mutual recognition. If, following Kojeve, we construe the fight which results in the relation of Mastery and Slavery as history's founding event, we can say: history starts with one-sided and unequal recognition; history throughout its course is characterised by misrecognition; and history ends once mutual recognition obtains. Mutually recognitive existence, discussed by Hegel in the section of the chapter on spirit headed 'morality', is accordingly post-historical existence. History ends with mutual recognition because Hegelian history is the story of freedom (the story of the various alienated and self-contradictory ways in which freedom has been projected and resumed) and because, as will be seen, it is only with mutual recognition that uncontradicted - i.e. non-alienated - freedom comes into its own.

To say that history is the story of freedom and that it is the story of successive patterns of recognition is to say (in virtue of the freedom/recognition connection emphasised above) one and the same thing. Freedom and recognition are, for Hegel, one another's mediation or mode of existence.[4] Until the end of history, this mediation is contradictory or antagonistic: one-sided recognition and misrecognition are freedom existing in the mode of its denial and vice versa. Thus, historical existence is characterised by a contradiction between freedom and recognition, which is also a contradiction within each of freedom and recognition at the same time. Freedom recognitively denied or misrecognized is freedom-contradicted: the constitutive forces of freedom qua self-determination and of recognition (which however, as one another's mediation, only exist through each other) here stand reciprocally opposed. Freedom is here contradicted rather than extinguished - it exists in the mode of unfreedom but exists all the same - because, as we have seen, any act of recognition is completed only when it is freely recognized: thus even misrecognition summons the freedom which, simultaneously, it denies. Conversely, recognition which is not a recognition of freedom is recognition-contradicted: this is so for the reason just given, viz., that a

recognitive denial of freedom projects the removal of recognition's own condition of existence but also (because it is recognition which projects the denial) at the same time summons - or keeps alive the issue of - the freedom in which this condition consists. Thus recognition, like freedom, is contradicted (it exists self-contradictorily) but not expunged. All this is entailed by saying that, throughout history, freedom and recognition mediate one another but that this mediation has an antagonistic form.

(The conceptual pattern just indicated - whereby a contradiction between two terms is a contradiction within each of the terms concerned as well - is a recurrent one in Hegel's work. It obtains wherever both of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the terms are one another's mode of existence, or mediation, and (b) the mediation is antagonistic, in the sense that each term exists as the other in the mode of being denied. Diagrammatically, and taking the example - discussed below - of the contradictory relationship between universality and particularity obtaining in the historical epoch Hegel terms 'culture', the form of such a contradiction can be set out as follows:



Hegel comes close to inscribing this pattern of contradiction in the ontology of action itself: 'Action divides [spirit]...into substance [i.e. a social world], and [individual] consciousness of the substance; and divides the substance as well as consciousness' (444). Note, in passing that the same pattern of contradiction obtains as between - and thence within - capital and labour as discussed by Marx: the diagram given in R Gunn 'Notes on "Class"' Common Sense No 2 is, in effect, an informal version of the diagram presented above.)

To proceed: the movement of the contradiction between (and thence within each of) freedom and recognition - the dynamic which flows from its inherent instability - is the movement of Hegelian history itself: patterns of recognition, which are self-contradictory modes of existence of freedom, rise and fall. The "work" of history is the work of reproducing and resolving (or recomposing and decomposing) the contradiction; the eventual removal of the contradiction, at the end of history, is thus a movement of the contradiction as well. Later, we shall see what follows when this removal has been achieved. We shall learn that it is neither the reassuring harmony of classical humanism nor, as Kojeve at one time imagined,[5] the flat monochrome of a merely "natural" world. For the present - so far, that is, as history rather than post-history is concerned - I confine myself to an interpretive proposal: when, at the start of the chapter on spirit, Hegel tells us that a social world 'is not a dead essence, but is actual and alive' (439) this should in no way be taken as referring to the activities

of an (idealist) global historical subject or "grand totaliser". Rather, it is to the (self-)contradictory play of freedom/recognition that Hegel here alludes.[6]

A further interpretive proposal can be entered. If Hegelian history is the story of freedom, then (especially if 'freedom' is understood to mean self-determination) determinism can form no part of the Phenomenology's historical account. For example no 'cunning of reason' - as championed by the later Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History and there juxtaposed against the theme of freedom in the crudest fashion - can be operative. Each historical action and transition must be 'undeducible' (Kojeve) even if it is phenomenologically and hermeneutically intelligible that it should have been thus and not otherwise that action occurred. The Phenomenology's phenomenological claim therefore comes down to this: in the history we know, and at whose end we stand, freedom as a value was as a matter of fact (freely) resumed, in various however self-contradictory fashions, at each "crisis" or turning-point in the freedom/recognition play. It was to keep thus alive the theme of freedom that, in the foregoing, I referred to Hegelian history as a story. The notion of a narrative allows for the idea of a connected sense without cancelling the freedom (the capacity to choose "otherwise" rather than "thus") of the agents whose story it is. And it allows, too, for the idea of a unitary sense - as in "history is the story of freedom" - without reverting to global subjectivity since many protagonists may be active in a coherent tale. The sixth chapter of the Phenomenology, that is, tells a story which is 'necessary' only in the sense that, without it (or at least without some version of it), we ourselves would have been other than we are.

Space forbids entering into anything like adequate detail regarding the glories which this sixth chapter, on spirit, contains. It deals with misrecognition (starting with the pattern of recognition displayed in the ancient polis), with the transition from misrecognition to mutual recognition and (in the section headed 'morality') with mutual recognition itself. The event which Hegel depicts as effecting the transition from misrecognition to mutual recognition is the French Revolution. If mutually recognitive existence is post-historical existence then it follows that, for Hegel, just as the Master-Slave fight begins history the French Revolution (582-95) is the event with which history ends. The French Revolutionary journees are, in effect, history's last days. Opening as it does on to the terrain of mutual recognition, we shall see that the French Revolution appears in the Phenomenology as an event of literaly an apocalyptic kind.

4. One-sided and unequal recognition

In place of a blow-by-blow commentary on Hegelian history, I shall present some all too schematic observations on the three generic patterns of recognition distinguished above. The notion of one-sided and unequal recognition need be discussed only briefly. The Master, in Hegel's presentation, receives recognition of his freedom from the Slave; since he in turn does not accord recognition of freedom to the Slave, however, it is doubtful what (if anything) the Slave's recognition of the Master is able to count for in the Master's eyes. To be sure, the Master recognises the Slave as a Slave, which is to say that he recognises him in the mode of 'thinghood' (189; cf Aristotle's charcterisation of a slave as a "living tool"). To be recognised, even constitutively, in the mode of thinghood is not literally to become a thing (things cannot "speak back", however ineffectively; nor can they submit to and endorse their thinglike status) but, nonetheless, to be afforded recognition by one who in ones own eyes counts as a thing is to be afforded a recognition which, again in ones own eyes, counts for naught.

It counts for naught because the Slve's recognition of the Master goes unrecognised, as does the Slave's recognition of the Master's recognition of the Slave as Slave. One-sided and unequal recognition is thus a pattern of recognition which is self-contradictory and contains the conditions for its own transcendence. Absent from it is the symmetry - the dialogical and reciprocal acknowledgement of freedoms - which we have seen the notion of recognition to involve. Notice that this does not mean that, for Hegel, one-sided and unequal recognition cannot exist. Hegel imposes no idealist requirement to the effect that something which contradicts itself is debarred from the world. Moreover the overcoming of an "existing" contradiction is not the frictionless unfolding of a conceptual logic but rather an historical work which goes forward in practical and social terms.

5. Misrecognition

'Misrecognition' is not a term employed in the Phenomenology; I contend that, nonetheless, it captures accurately enough what is common to the various socially specific patterns of recogntion (other than one-sided and unequal recognition) which have obtained throughout the span of historical time. Misrecognition is distinct from one-sided and unequal recognition in that it allows for symmetry and reciprocity - and thus for "equality", in its bourgeois meaning - in recognition's play. But misrecognition is not mutual recognition since it is not yet a (symmetrical) recognition of freedoms. It is freedom that is misrecognised, and thereby contradicted; and, as above argued, this amounts to a contradicition within recognition itself. Misrecogntion is alienated and alienating recognition, since if (a) I exist as a free and self-determining being; if (b) my freedom is recognitively denied or bypassed rather than acknowledged; and if (c) this misrecognition of my freedom is constitutive then, qua misrecognised, I exist self-antagonistically and as other than I am.

Hegel discusses misrecognition in terms of the categories of 'universality' and 'particularity', on which a good deal of the argument in the chapter on spirit turns. Universality refers to that which is common to a number of individuals alike, differences between them notwithstanding. (By extension, universality refers also to social relations since one and the same complex of social relations may relate, ie recognitively constitute, individuals who differ among themselves). Particularity, on the other hand, refers to that concerning individuals which is peculiar and unique to each (not merely personal attributes, but each individual's irreducibly "first person" experience of their world).

Alienation obtains when universality and particularity are severed from one another, or stand dichotomously opposed, for then each individual is divided within and against him or herself. Each aspect of the individual - taking the individual, as Hegel does, as a "totality" - then exists as other than itself: the very division of the individual into discrete "aspects", it may be added, entails this alienating result. Furthermore, self-division (such as obtains when universal aspects of the individual are severed from particular aspects) entails an alienation of freedom inasmuch as self-determination for its part entails "totalisation": only if as a whole I determine myself as a whole can it be said that, indeed, I am self-determining and that what I determine is, without surplus or remainder, myself. To be recognised in terms of a universality that is severed from particularity and vice versa is thus to be misrecognised. (It is for ones freedom, qua self-determination, to be misrecognised). And, conversely, all the forms of misrecognition discussed by Hegel are ones wherein a severance of universality from particularity is involved.

It follows that alienation is overcome - uncontradicted freedom is achieved - only when universality and particularity are related non-dichotomously, or in other words totalised: then and only then does individuality in its full Hegelian sense[7] of non-alienated existence (which is to say: uncontradicted self-determination) obtain. Misrecognition is alienating. Only mutual recognition - as will be argued - synthesises universality with particularity and thereby, surmounting alienation, allows freedom to come into its recognitive own.

To appreciate the social purchase of the categories 'universality' and 'particularity' some historical detail from the chapter on spirit must be introduced. In the ancient polis, according to Hegel, only universal definitions of the individual - as for example "woman", "man", "citizen" - are in recognitive play: 'self-consciousness has not received its due as a particular individuality' (464). The famous "harmony" of the polis, celebrated by Hegel himself in his pre-Phenomenology writings,[8] depends on particularity having not yet made its appearance (its constitutive appearance) in recognitive terms. When it does make its appearance, as in Sophocles' Antigone[9] - the example chosen in the Phenomenology - or in the figure of Socrates[10] the pattern of recognition constitutive of the polis is undermined. Roman law represents an attempt to establish a universal definition of the individual which at the same time acknowledges the rights and duties of the individual as particular, but here too (although particularity now gains putative acknowledgement) universality remains severed from particularity since, for example, to be legally acknowledged as a "proprietor" means that the kind and amount of property which, as a particular individual, one posesses is left out of recognitive account (480). The legal "person" is 'self-consciousness as the sheer empty unit of the person' (loc cit). In Rome, the alienating severance of universality from particularity is felt alienation since, there, particularity has been recognitively thematised and its synthesis with universality was to have been achieved. In the Christian world - the lengthy epoch which Hegel terms 'culture [Bildung]' and to which only the French Revolution puts an end - the non-alienating unity of particular 'self' and universal 'essence' is despaired of in this world (the world of 'actual [or practical and social] consciousness') and is by way of compensation placed in a 'beyond' of 'pure consciousness', ie, in the heaven towards which Christianity directs its dreams (485). The world of culture, divided into "this" world and a "beyond" or in other words into the here-and-now and the hereafter of the 'Unhappy Consciousness', is thus 'not merely a world, but a world that is double, divided and self-opposed' (486). Alientión is intensified rather than cancelled. Only with the French Revolution is freedom torn from the skies and practically and politically instantiated: as Hegel puts it, summoning the terminology of apocalypse, come the French Revolution 'heaven is transplanted to earth below' (581).

Hegel's terminology may be unfamiliar and his historical periodisation unusual, but what has just been said regarding Greece and Rome draws his discourse on to familiar ground. For it is clear enough that by recognition according to universal definitions ("man", "woman", legal "person", etc) he means recognition which goes forward in terms of role-prescriptions. moreover it is also clear that he regards role-prescriptions or -definitions as, so to say, institutionally located. In the polis the city or public realm (governmed by 'human law') is the site and source of the role-definition "man" or (ancient Athenian) "citizen"; the household or private realm (governed by 'divine law') is the site and source of "woman". (Antigone comes to grief because, in her case, the requirements from each realm conflict and overlap). In Rome, the locus of the role-definition "person" is the legal system itself. In the realm of 'culture', matters become a degree more complex. Hegel tells us that culture, in its this-

worldly (practical and social) aspect, involves the existence of 'spiritual masses' (492): by spiritual - social or recognitive - masses he means social institutions and, turning to the early-modern period of history, the examples of spiritual masses which he offers are State and Civil Society or, as he terms them, 'state power' and 'wealth' (494). No role-definitions are explicitly ascribed to these, but it is by no means stretching a point to add (modern) "citizen" and "bourgeois" to the list of role-prescriptions which the chapter on spirit presents. Thus, on the one hand, for Hegel role-definitions entail institutions. And his point is a valid one, since without so-to-speak the inertial weight or momentum of institutions nothing (no "authority") would channel the flow of recognition; any role-definition would be continually at issue; which is to say that, like an authority which was permanently in question, it would be no role-definition at all. Conversely, institutions entail role-definitions since without the role-prescription involved in a "social division of labour" it is difficult to see how institutions could exist.[11]

Approaching, as Hegel does, the question of role-definitions via the categories of universal and particular allows us to draw a sufficiently dramatic inference; the directness with which it can be drawn allows us to construe it as Hegel's own. Wherever recognition takes the form of role-definitions, as according to Hegel it has done throughout history, alienation is to be found. The point stands quite regardless of the content of the role-definitions themselves. Recognized as the bearer of this or that role, I am afforded recognition only insofar as my actions are those which conform to my role-defined station and its duties: actions which call in question or place at issue my role-definition (or definitions) fall outwith recognition's pale. In other words, my 'essence' - what I am as man or woman or bourgeois or citizen - is recognitively inscribed prior to any self-determining action which I may perform. For Hegel, as for all theorists of self-determining freedom, 'actuality' or action (cf. Sartre's "existence") is and must be ontologically prior to any specification of essence (cf. 439); where recognition in terms of role-definitions goes forward, the self-determining action in which (ontologically) I consist gains no recognitive acknowledgement because this ontological ordering is reversed. I am then alienated because I am recognitively constituted as other than (qua self-determining) I am. It may of course be the case that my self-definition and my role-definition are coincident, but if so it is as a result of social happenstance; my independence remains a dependent independence, which is to say that it is contradicted at source. Further: even a self-chosen role (and a role which is afforded recognition only if freely chosen) is alienating since, once it has been chosen, an essence is inscribed prior to the actuality in which freedom consists. Were this not the case, the role would have to be lived as continually in question and, as just suggested, this would be tantamount to making it no role at all.

That, regardless of their content, role-definitions ('universal' definitions) are per se alienating can also be established thus: any such definition, by recognizing only my universaslity, severs universality from particularity and so divides me within and against myself. (It should already be clear that Hegel is concerned with the fate of non-recognized particularity: a concern he shares with the Adorno of Negative Dialectics and the early Bataille.) Now, it may be granted that if recognition goes forward solely in terms of universality then I am alienated; and yet it may be felt that the line of argument just sketched moves forward too fast. For (save in ancient Greece, as portrayed by Hegel) it is surely seldom - if ever - the case that recognition is afforded solely in universal and role-definitional terms. The 'particular' dimensions of my being may be - and, commonly, they are - recognized alongside the universal (role-bearing) dimensions: I may be recognized as, for example, not merely a bourgeois but

as a bourgeois who is miserly or greedy or generous as the case may be. However, whether I am (whether I am recognized as being) miserly or generous in no way follows from the definition of me as bourgeois. Conversely, it is neither in miserliness nor generosity that my recognitive being as "bourgeois" consists (cf. Marx's comment on individuals as 'bearers' of class relations in the first Preface to Capital I). Thus, even where recognition in terms of role-definitions does not deny my particularity outright, it acknowledges particularity only as added to, or as juxtaposed against, universality. Even in this most favourable case, therefore, I remain alienated in the sense of being - of being recognitively constituted as - divided in and against myself.

Here again the argument may seem to move forward too quickly. The phrase "divided in and against myself" may seem overly strong, and the imputation of alienation consequently fallacious, since, after all, no contradiction obtains between my being as bourgeois and my being as greedy or generous as my character and circumstances dictate. Division in oneself, it might be argued, is not yet (or not necessarily) division against oneself at the same time.

However, where two aspects of my being are merely added to or juxtaposed against one another, this is not yet sufficient to bring the unity of my being - to be sure, a unity of unity and difference (167) - into recognitive play. And, as suggested earlier, it is the unity of my being which is important for the notion of my freedom, in the sense of self-determination. (Thus I am misrecognized, or alienated, where my unity with myself is not a recognitive theme.) As self-determining, I exist as totalisation, i.e., not merely as "this and that" but as "this through that" and "that through this". Only if 'the whole man moves together' (Schiller) can it be said both that I am the being which effects the determining and that what is thus determined is myself: substractions or surpluses on either side contradict what Hegel terms the 'absolute unrest of pure self-movement' (163) or, in other words, self-determination's flow. Thus self-determination entails totalisation, and totalisation for its part entails not an external relation (an additive relation, however non-contradictory) between discrete parts of aspects but on the contrary an internal relation between moments each of which is the mode of existence of the other moments to which it is linked. If this is so, then my being as self-determining comes (constitutively) into focus only if I am recognized as universal qua particular and particular qua universal: that is, if my particularity and universality stand forth, recognitively, as reciprocally mediating and as the mode in which one another obtain. And this condition is not met when recognition of my universality is afforded in terms of role-definitions and when recognition of my particularity goes forward (if at all) only in terms which stand discretely and separately over on their own side. (The condition is met only with mutual recognition.) Thus, even where misrecognition does not deny my particularity outright, it recognitively constitutes me as divided not merely within myself but as against myself as well; it recognizes me as other than, qua self-determining, I am; and so the imputation of alienation stands.

So too does the inference that recognition in terms of role-definitions is alienating, not merely in virtue of the role-definitions' specific content, but as such and per se. If, as argued earlier, role-definitions and social institutions entail one another, then we can conclude further: social institutions are in their nature alienating, whatever their character or content may be. Certainly the Hegel of the Phenomenology treats those social institutions which he terms 'spiritual masses' as alienating. Our conclusion (Hegel's conclusion) must be that all social institutions whatever count as 'spiritual masses' in the sense ascribed by the

Phenomenology to that term.

6. An excursus and a critique

If the direct implication of the argument of the chapter on spirit is that all role-definitions and all social institutions ('spiritual masses') are alienating then the inference is inescapable: Hegel is an anarchist, and if he denied that he was so then he misunderstood his own thought. Bakunin, Stirner, etc., in turning to Hegel build on something that is really there. Bruno Bauer's 'esoteric' Hegel, counterposed to the 'exoteric' upholder of political orthodoxy,[12] is Hegel simpliciter: no other Hegel merits the name. This conclusion follows from an argument which has moved through the sequence: recognition; universal and particular; role-definitions. Only if this sequence is followed does the supreme challenge of the Phenomenology stand forth.

It is illuminating, here, to turn briefly from Hegel to Marx. The Marx of the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and 'On the Jewish Question' in effect replays Hegel's critique of spiritual masses against both the later Hegel and against modern society as a whole. Spiritual masses are alienating because they stand over against us and yet define (recognitively and constitutively) what, as bearers of role-definitions, we are. Hegel compares them to the 'natural' elemental masses of 'air, water, fire and earth' (492) and the point of this comparison is to underscore their alienating implication: they confront us as no less fixed and given than does nature itself. Only when self-consciousness 'no longer places its [social] world and its ground outside of itself' (442), only when it acknowledges no 'valid external world' (594), is alienation overcome. So too for Marx: Civil Society and the State are, as distinct but interdependent spiritual masses, two sides of the same alienating coin, and in their attendant role-prescriptions (respectively, "man" and "citizen") estrangement is inscribed. What lies ahead of this estrangement is for Marx, as for Hegel, mutual recognition[13] and the Marxian emancipated individual who is 'as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations'[14] is precisely an individual (a synthesis of particularity and universality) in the Hegelian sense. All of Marx's works, Capital included, can be understood as a critique of the spiritual masses which still, presently, obtain. Seen thus, there is but a single point - "only" a single point - on which Marx departs from the Hegel of the Phenomenology. For Hegel, the French Revolution demolishes alienation while the examples of spiritual masses and role-definitions which Marx employs in 'On the Jewish Question' are drawn precisely from the constitutions of the French Revolutionary years. Far from transcending alienation, Marx is signalling, the French Revolution gave the era of spiritual masses - the era of 'culture' and hence of history - a new lease of alienating/alienated and thereby murderous life.

From the excursus to the critique: Marx, as just indicated, directs his criticism not merely against existing reality but against the later (Berlin) Hegel in whom he believes this reality to find a theorisation (a theoretical mediation) in which its character is faithfully expressed. In other words, he plays off the Hegel of the Phenomenology - the critic of spiritual masses which, as social institutions, are per se alienating - against the Hegel of the Philosophy of Right. Certainly it is not merely the later Hegel who considers that a regimen of non-alienating social institutions can be found: the second half of Hegel's Natural Law essay is, for example, devoted to a search along just these lines; so too is his System der Sittlichkeit (1802-3). But it is in the Philosophy of Right (1821) that this direction of Hegelian research is rewarded with an answer which is allegedly favourable and, moreover, definitive: whereas the Phenomenology castigates the

spiritual masses of 'state power' and 'wealth', or State and Civil Society, as institutions of estrangement, the Philosophy of Right champions State, Civil Society and the Family as precisely the institutions by means of which alienation can (at last!) be overcome.

The question thus arises of whether the State and Civil Society of the Philosophy of Right differ in a significant way - in virtue of which they may be non-alienating - from the State and Civil Society of the Phenomenology. If they do not, then the Philosophy of Right's claim (at paras. 146-7) that the 'laws and ethical powers' of the social order it defends are 'on the one hand an object over against the subject' while 'on the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject' amounts to a proposal that the circle be regarded as squared. So too must the Philosophy of Right's further claim (at para. 258) that its State unites 'objective' (or universal) and 'subjective' (or particular) freedom.

Certainly, the State and Civil Society criticised as alienating in the Phenomenology are those of Europe's ancien regime whereas those defended as non-alienating in the Philosophy of Right belong in the post-French Revolutionary world. (Whether the Hegel of 1821 still regards the post-French Revolutionary world as post-historical is another affair.) Certainly, too, and this is surely a connected point, the Philosophy of Right (at para. 145) stresses the 'rationality' of the social order it sets forth. But if it is this rationality which is to make the crucial difference then Hegel's argument is weak. If freedom consists in self-determination then the terms of rationality - the criteria and categories in virtue of which it counts as rationality - must be construed as at issue in the play of self-determining action itself. The more the Philosophy of Right emphasises its institutions as in themselves rational (the tighter, so to say, the screw of a pre-given reason is turned), the more freedom is not actualised but on the contrary contradicted and eclipsed. To be sure, the 'rationality' on which the Philosophy of Right's discourse turns is not an "abstract ought" but a rationality which Hegel claims to be already extant in his own, contemporary, world. But still it remains a rationality prescribed in advance of the actions of any particular individual. One sign of this is the highly etiolated public sphere Hegel allows for. Another is Hegel's discussion of 'the right of the subjective will...that whatever it is to recognize as valid shall be seen by it as good' (Philosophy of Right para.132): this 'right' sounds like a promising acknowledgement of self-determination, but it transpires that what Hegel means is not that laws be placed at issue before recognition construed constitutively but rather that those living in his state have the right to know what the laws are. In effect, we have the right (freely) to agree but not to disagree (which places an emphatic question-mark against the claim that subjective and objective freedoms are reconciled). In sum, "essence" is once more inscribed prior to action or "actuality" - it is as citizens, who accept already the duties of political obligation, that we are acknowledged as competent to act - and so the ontological ordering consonant with freedom qua self-determination is undermined.

I contend (but cannot argue for the point here) that a detailed examination of the Philosophy of Right's institutional contents bears out the line of criticism just sketched. Throughout the work, a mood of bureaucratic caution prevails.[15] Marx's 1843 critique of the 1821 Hegel stands (and my remarks have only restated Marx's argument in more general terms). Moreover my criticism (like Marx's) is to the effect that the later Hegel's 'on the one hand...on the other' does indeed turn out to be a matter of circle-squaring when approached in the light of the accounts of social institutions, 'spiritual masses' and role-definitions which the Phenomenology implies or contains. Nor should this be surprising. If

social institutions (at least insofar as they enshrine role-definitions) are as such alienating, then any institutional "authority" is alienating quite regardless of its particular content and quite regardless of the rationality with which, in the context of a particular theoretical presentation, it is blessed. All this being so, I conclude that the Hegel of the Phenomenology is the earliest and perhaps most trenchant critic of the Hegel of the Philosophy of Right. The 'esoteric' Hegel of the Left Hegelians is Hegel simpliciter, if it is permissible to signal with an author's name the most compelling strata of argument in his work.

7. Hegel in Paris

It is the French Revolution which effects the transition from history to post-history, or from misrecognition to mutual recognition. Before turning to the latter, I offer a reading of what Hegel says regarding the transition itself. Hegel's account of the Revolution (582-95) is perhaps the starkest and most challenging passage which the Phenomenology of Spirit contains.

Hegel's account deals exclusively with the period between the execution of Louis XVI ('absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world...': 585) and Thermidor, i.e., with the period of crowd activity par excellence. The first Revolutionary image Hegel sets before us is that of the insurrectionary crowd itself. Only in the crowd as a "group-in-fusion" (Sartre) is it the case that 'each [individual], undivided from the whole, always does everything, and what appears as done by the whole is the direct and conscious deed of each' (584). In molten and unstructured crowd-activity, that is, mutual recognition - the 'I that is We and We that is I' - for the first time dawns. If only because the activity of crowds has commonly been disparaged as hysteria and mass-irrationalism and because, even by favourable and "Left" Hegelian commentators,[16] Hegel has all-too-commonly been read as sharing in this disparagement, it is important to understand in precise terms what the insurrectionary appearance of mutual recognition involves. Not a trace of liberal outrage attaches to Hegel's portrayal of the French Revolution's anarchic 'absolute freedom'; in the Phenomenology at least, his concern is neither to endorse nor to deplore the Revolution but (phenomenologically) to expose himself and his readers to the recognitive challenge which Revolutionary freedom entails. 'Absolute' freedom is, in Hegel's terminology, free freedom, i.e. uncontradicted freedom. In the section of the Phenomenology which deals with the French Revolution (headed 'Absolute Freedom and Terror') we hear this freedom's voice.

If in the crowd 'each...does everything', this does not mean that what everyone does is the same. (Therefore one version of the view of crowd-participant as unreflective conformist disappears.) Hegel's concern is solely with the pattern of recognition - as opposed to the content of the action, on which imputations of "sameness" depend - that crowd-action involves. The declaration 'each...does everything' connotes not sameness but a non-dichotomous relation of universality to particularity: as it were, no "social" division of labour obtains any longer (there are no role-definitions) but a fluid and shifting "technical" division of labour can, as of course it must do, remain in play. Insurgent crowd activity abolishes role-definitions together with the spiritual masses in which role-definitions are inscribed (584-5). The condition for such an abolition was an ancien regime in which each social institution and role-definition was its own opposite[17] and in which the consequent alienation had hollowed out social structures as mice hollow out cheese.

The recognitive pattern wherein 'each...does everything' forms so-to-say the

base line for Hegel's account of the Revolutionary events. We hear nothing of the constitutional dreams of, for example, Girondin lawyers; revolutionary action (crowd action) is, in Hegel's presentation of it, its own point. As long as 'each' continues to do 'everything' the intersecting themes of uncontradicted ('absolute') freedom and of mutual recognition remain in play. Hegel's account of the Revolutionary events turns on the question: by what means can the mutually recognitive statute wherein 'each...does everying' maintain itself in being? From his earlier discussion it follows that it can maintain itself only on condition that no new role-definitions or social institutions are emergent. An organised freedom - the freedom championed in the Philosophy of Right, for example - would be freedom-contradicted, i.e., a renewal of history and alienation and an existing contradiction in terms.

Hegel expresses this condition by saying that Revolutionary freedom 'can accomplish neither a positive work nor a deed' (589). The 'work' he has in mind is that of constitution-building which would indeed (but here the problem of "squaring the circle" resurfaces) make of freedom an 'enduring being' (588). A constitution would renew a "social division of labour", as for example between legislature and executive and between rulers and ruled. The state as a 'spiritual mass' would come into its own once more.

The 'deed' Hegel has in mind is, perhaps, that of revolutionary war. To accomplish such a deed, freedom must 'put at its head an individual self-consciousness' (589) which would institute the role-definitions of - the social division of labour as between - leader and led. The options of a 'work' and a 'deed' being thus excluded, there remains, says Hegel, only a single self-consistent course of Revolutionary action. There is left for freedom 'only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction' (loc. cit.). Having already demolished the world of spiritual masses, Revolution turns its violence upon itself (590). And so the Terror begins.

Here especially it is needful to set all considerations or moral outrage out of court. We can do so by recollecting that as long as 'each...does everything' the severance of universality from particularity is transcended and mutual recognition obtains. Hegel's account shows that the Terror allows universality to exist qua particularity and vice versa; the Terror is a self-consistent option for mutually recognitive freedom; in short, in Hegel's presentation, and however ephemerally, the Terror succeeds.

Everything turns on seeing that it is as a pattern of recognition that the Terror makes its appearance in the argument about freedom which the Phenomenology carries through. Here is Hegel at his most discomfiting and challenging, and here too is the darkest outreach of the 'Golgotha' which Hegel reports as the site not merely of his own thinking but of truth. By showing that the violence of the Terror can sustain freedom, Hegel breaks forever with the idealism and wish-fulfillment which insists a priori that the boundaries of ethical and ontological distinctions must coincide. Here, too, he breaks with his own (roughly "constitutionalist") personal political convictions, as well as those of his commentators who insist that, by recourse to Terror, freedom is not sustained in being but destroyed.

This teaching cuts deep. By numerous political theorists - for example Arendt[18] - violence and politics (or "recognition") are declared mutually exclusive opposites. For Hegel, politics and recognition on the contrary result from violence (the violence of the Master-Slave fight at the start of history: a useful comparison with later theory is Freud's Totem and Taboo) and mutual recognition which can be sustained through violence (the revolutionary violence of the Terror with which history ends). Hegel himself insists on this parallel between his story's opening- and end-points

(cf. his reference to 'individuals who have felt the fear of death, of their absolute Master': 593, in relation to 194). Like Arendt, he construes Revolution as a 'new beginning'[19] in which the question of political origins is at stake. Whether or not mutually recognitive freedom can only sustain itself through violence is, of course, a quite separate matter; and nothing Hegel says in his account of Revolutionary action allows us to infer what his response to a question along these lines might be.

In what way does the Terror succeed? The violence of the Terror sustains mutually recognitive freedom in being by serving as what Sartre, in his roughly parallel account of the French Revolution, terms a 'practical bond'.[20] (Contrast Arendt's account of violence as never communicative but sheerly instrumental, an account which makes it easier for her to see moral and ontological boundaries as coincident.) 'Each' continues to do 'everything', and the universality and particularity of each individual continue in their totalised/totalising relation, on condition that as the Terror unfolds there exist neither "victims" nor "executioners" (as role-definitions constitutive of a renewed political and social division of labour) but only victim-executioners linked merely by a "technical" division of labour (it doesn't matter who plays which part) and between the universal and particular modes of whose being nothing but the guillotine blade intervenes. The executioner must annihilate himself in the victim, and the victim must annihilate himself through the executioner: in each other's eyes, both victim and executioner must recognize not merely an other but themselves. Where this is so, universality (the guillotine's levelling blade) does not impinge on particularity (the particular individuality of the victim) externally, as for example in instances of state-terror or war. What obtains, rather, is a mutually recognitive interplay of universality and particularity themselves. As it were, the Terror succeeds on condition that it remains a participatory terror wherein neither externally supplied patients (as in state-terror) nor externally imposing agents (as in "terrorism") are involved.

Underscoring the Terroristic synthesis of universal and particular, Hegel permits himself one of his rare black jokes: by means of Revolutionary decapitation, 'pure thought' (the head, i.e. the universal) and 'pure matter' (the body, i.e. the particular) are 'confronted with the absolute transition of the one into the other as a present actuality' (592). He also permits himself the no-less-dark reflection that death by Terror is 'a death...which has no inner significance' (590): where states as universals massacre individuals as particulars it becomes urgent that we rescue the names of the annihilated from oblivion,[21] but where 'each' terroristically 'does everything', so that the hand which releases the blade is in recognitive terms the victim's own, it literally does not matter who lives and who dies. It matters no more than it matters which of two friends sacrifices himself for the other, although here it is not friendship but fear of death which keeps mutual recognition in play. Participatory action sustained through fear which this same activity generates: such is the challenge which, according to Hegel, French Revolutionary absolute freedom presents.

To be sure Hegel also reports that the statute of Terror is one wherein freedom 'divides itself into extremes equally abstract', viz., the extremes of 'inflexible cold universality' (the blade) and of the 'atomism' of particular self-consciousness (590). This may make it sound as though universality were once more juxtaposed against particularity, the former confronting the latter as an external impingement. However, precisely because the relationship between the two is here 'unmediated' (loc. cit.) by any spiritual mass or institutional "third term", each can be the mediation (the mode of existence) of each other and their totalisation can remain in recognitive play. Precisely as driven to these 'extremes', the unity can be

maintained. Another consideration points in the same direction: were universality and particularity to be dichotomously separate, this separation would require institutional embodiment. The state would have to stand over against its terrorised citizens. But, in the 'tumult' (594) of the Revolution, all is molten; government counts merely as 'the victorious faction' (591) and so is without legitimacy; the incandescence of anarchy precludes institutional inertia, and nothing but fast-shifting day-to-day happenstance determines on which side of the guillotine I stand. The sheer pace of events (the swift rise and fall of factions) prevents the ossification into roles on which a separation of universality from particularity, and thereby an undermining of Revolutionary mutual recognition, must needs turn.

All this said, however, the Terror's success can be at best ephemeral. The very absence of institutional and role-prescriptive inertia, which allows it to sustain freedom, places freedom as a temporally 'enduring' being beyond the Terror's reach. Following the execution of Robespierre, 'the organisation of spiritual masses to which the plurality of individual consciousnessses are assigned...takes shape once more' (593). Hegel gives no indication of whether he laments or lauds this outcome; nor does he indicate whether we should see these renewed spiritual masses as connoting a fresh alienation (as it were, a fresh unleashing of history within what promised to be post-historical time) or as somehow non-alienating and compatible with an acknowledgement of freedom. (In the latter case, the passage just cited - together with the closing lines of Phenomenology 12 - is the sole place in the Phenomenology of Spirit where something like the approach taken in the Philosophy of Right is as much as sketched.) Perhaps, as Hyppolite suggests,[22] it is the Napoleonic reordering of Europe that he has in mind. At any event, the argument presented in section 5 of the present paper allows us to disregard these uncertainties. For the implications of that argument were that spiritual masses and their attendant role-definitions are per se alienating, and that an organised freedom is a contradicted freedom or in other words an existing contradiction in terms. A "pessimistic" reading of the passage just cited - the renewed spiritual masses connote renewed alienation - is thus the reading which is suggested by the Phenomenology's internal logic, whatever may have been Hegel's own personal or private estimation of the political transition he reports.

Indeed, on this score, Hegel seems to agree. For his last paragraph on the French Revolution (595) strikes an elegaic note: absolute freedom, we there learn, leaves the 'self-destroying actuality' of France and passes over into 'another land', viz. Germany, which is a land of 'unactuality' and of 'thought'. It is the German philosophers, then, who are seen as the French Revolution's authentic heirs. It therefore appears that the circle of mutual recognition, once wide enough to encompass the crowds who filled the streets of Revolutionary Paris, has narrowed so as to include only the audience of intellectuals (the republic of letters) to which the Phenomenology is addressed. The situation here outlined by Hegel, and courageously faced, is one with which subsequent Left Hegelianism has been painfully familiar. Perhaps in 1806 Hegel still hoped that a Napoleonic victory over Prussia would reunite revolutionary theory and practice, but historical hindsight throws into relief, for us, the less optimistic possibility at which this closing passage hints. With the defeat of revolution (with the renewed triumph of history over post-history) mutual recognition can exist, at most, on the margins and in the interstices of a once-more alienated social life.

8. Mutual recognition

In the section of the chapter on spirit (headed 'morality') which follows the section on the French Revolution, Hegel hopes against hope and thinks against the doubts concerning post-Revolutionary developments which we have just seen to beset his thought. That is, he explores the consequences of mutual recognition's having been the pattern of recognition which the Revolution indeed introduced. The section on 'morality' (596-671) charts the intellectual configurations of his contemporary Germany as ones wherein the shape of a recognition that is mutual and thereby post-historical can be traced.

I shall concentrate on the fundamental idea of mutual recognition rather than on the cultural detail which Hegel supplies. In the section on 'morality', Hegel analyses in turn the pathos of objectivist, Kantian, duty-based morality (from which the section as a whole derives its name), of subjectivist conscience-based ethics, of the Romantic 'beautiful soul' (Hölderlin?) and of the judgemental (philistine) moralism associated with what he terms the 'hard heart'. Generalising from his discussion, all that need be here noted is that the vice common to all of the standpoints just mentioned is their privatism, i.e., their conception of the individual (in abstraction from any recognitive involvement) as a self-sufficient basis for ethical and aesthetic views. And Hegel's insight is, on this score, a powerful one. Regression into privatised selfhood ("narcissism") has some claim to being the characteristic pathology of mutual recognition since, in the absence of a 'valid external world' of role-prescribing spiritual masses, absorbtion in self is one tempting way of making one's world secure. If privatism is the characteristic pathology of mutual recognition, however, mutual recognition is itself, for Hegel, the means (the "therapy") whereby this pathology may be overcome. But if mutual recognition is the source as well as the solution of privatism, no such overcoming can be definitive or once-and-for-all. Seeing this brings before us a point which will concern us again shortly: mutual recognition exists solely as the overcoming of threats to it which it itself summons; therefore, mutual recognition is no inert statute or "condition" but exists only insofar as it is continually re-projected and re-made.

The fundamental idea of mutual recognition is as follows: recognition which is mutual is "freedom-uncontradicted" and "recognition-uncontradicted" at the same time; and it is the one because, and insofar as, it is the other. It is recognition's sole "adequate", or self-consistent, form. (This is why, earlier, formulations more specifically pertaining to mutual recognition - an 'I that is We and We that is I', and the remark concerning individuals who 'recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another' - did duty for the concept of recognition itself.) Mutual recognition is symmetrical recognition; so too was misrecognition.[23] But in addition mutual recognition is a symmetrical recognition of freedoms, and so allows freedom to come into its recognitive own. That which was misrecognized, and therefore recognitively denied, was freedom; that which is mutually recognized, and therefore recognitively constituted and affirmed, is freedom. If history is the story of freedom then it ends with mutual recognition, since only then is uncontradicted freedom achieved. If history is the story of recognition then it ends with freedom, since only then can uncontradicted recognition come about. The contradiction within freedom and within recognition disappears along with the contradiction between freedom and recognition, so that (in the form of mutual recognition) freedom and recognition obtain as one another's mode of existence at the same time, and by the same token, as they each obtain on their own terms. History as the "movement" of the freedom/recognition contradiction reaches its completion once, with specifically mutual recognition, this contradiction is

resolved. Then "freedom-uncontradicted" and "recognition-uncontradicted" are the joint and reciprocally mediating order of the recognitive day.

That uncontradicted recognition is possible only in the guise of uncontradicted freedom follows from the circumstance, emphasised already, that recognition counts as such only when freely proferred. That uncontradicted recognition is possible only in the guise of a symmetrical acknowledgement of uncontradicted freedoms follows from recognition's dialogical character: I can recognize your freedom only if you freely recognize (and if I freely recognize that you freely recognize) the recognition of you which I afford.

That uncontradicted freedom is possible only in the guise of uncontradicted (and moreover symmetrical) recognition follows from a line of argument which can be sketched as follows. Of all conceptions of freedom, freedom understood as self-determination seems least of all to be compatible with intersubjectivity: if I determine myself, how can others count for more than (potential) obstacles on self-determination's path? In order for self-determination and intersubjectivity to be compatible, it needs to be shown how we can be free not merely - as on liberal theory - in spite of, but rather through, others. Others must be seen not as barriers to self-determination (so that I am free to the extent that I am remote from them) but as self-determination's means. Only the notion of mutual recognition shows how I can be free through others, and how by means of association with others my freedom is not diminished but increased. It shows this in virtue of what I have termed recognition's constitutive force. Only if 'each' acknowledges (constitutes) 'everyone's' freedom can each be free through everyone and vice versa. Anything less than a recognition of everyone's freedom would leave, as it were, some obstactles to self-determination still remaining (and an obstacle to self-determination is a contradiction of self-determination [24]). Anything less than a symmetrical acknowledgement of freedoms would contradict recognition and thereby recognition's constitutivity. And anything less than a symmetrical acknowledgement of freedoms would turn freedom from a recognitively thematized "figure" into a devalued and contradicted "ground".

Freedom summons mutuality since, if I am to be free through others, all must be acknowledged as free. Conversely, recognition summons a reciprocal acknowledgement of freedoms since, otherwise, it can exist only in a contradictory form. Mutual recognition is the sole point at which the converging lines of freedom and recognition are able, compatibly with both, to intersect.

If I can be free only through others - the human condition of intersubjectivity being inescapable, and self-consciousness existing 'only in being recognized' - then it may seem that, from the standpoint of self-determination, others can figure only as instruments or impediments to the uncontradicted freedom which individuals seek. Max Stirner's 'association of egoists'[25] is in effect a polity of mutual recognition construed in just these instrumentalist terms. However, the problem here posed leads us to the first version of the paradox in which (as will be seen) mutual recognition consists. To recognize others only as means to one's freedom is to recognize them not as subjects but as objects; it is to renew the statute of 'thinghood' which clung to recognition that was one-sided and unequal, or of quasi-thinghood (cf. note 23) which was entailed by misrecognition's prescription of an essence standing prior to any self-determining act. (That Stirner's instrumentalist approach to the recognition of one's freedom renews the standpoint of misrecognition is, I take it, the point of Marx's lengthy polemic in The German Ideology to the effect that Stirner's instrumentalism or utilitarianism merely reproduces

the values of the bourgeois world, i.e. the world wherein - cf. note 23 once more - misrecognition is the order of the day.) Thus, if my recognition of others is confined to seeing them as means whereby my freedom can be constituted, those others become in terms of my recognition of them incompetent to recognize and thus constitute my freedom for its part. Since they are no longer recognized by me as free I can no longer be free through them; and so my projection of freedom contradicts itself. In short I have to acknowledge others as in their own right free (I have to acknowledge them not as objects but as subjects) in order for them to be "means" to my own freedom. To put the point instrumentally: I have to aim to miss the target of my freedom before I can hit it. In phenomenological terms: I can be free - free through others - only on condition that I am willing to throw my own freedom to the recognitive winds.

The fundamental source of mutual recognition's paradox is that, if I am free through others, then my freedom depends on as many others as there are individuals with whom I am recognitively engaged.[26] Inasmuch as others' recognition of my freedom is constitutive of my freedom, I am free not contradictarily but absolutely; but the condition of this non-contradicted freedom is the movement of a contradiction; and it is in this movement that the play of mutual recognition consists. In short, mutual recognition is the continual decompositon/recomposition of its own contradiction. Nothing here is stable, and mutually recognitive (absolute) freedom obtains only on condition that this contradiction is not denied - as in both classical, harmonious humanism and Kojeve's scenario of the renaturalisation of human existence at the end of history[27] - but on the contrary embraced and affirmed. Once again, everything is driven to what Hegel terms 'extremes'.

To see how this is so, let us return to the theme of the relation of universality to particularity. In section 6, it was stressed that a non-contradicted freedom involves not merely the addition but the totalisation of universal and particular diumensions of individuals' existence; universality and particularity must be one another's mediation, or mode of existence; the individual - to be an 'individual' in the full Hegelian sense - must be universal qua particular and particular qua universal. This totalisation is achieved where mutual recognition obtains: there, 'universal essence' and 'exclusive [particular] individuality' each exist in and through the other as the 'opposite' of itself (670). It is achieved since (a) where mutual recognition obtains that which individuals are acknowledged as having in common with each other is sheerly their freedom; and since (b) their freedom - unlike any role-definition - consists no less sheerly in the particular actions they perform. Point (b) holds because freedom is understood as self-determination: I determine myself in and through the entirety of my particular and concrete acts. (For the same reason, recognition of freedom is not recognition of something "abstract". Here, everything resembling a bourgeois or formal conception of freedom is to be set aside. To acknowledge an individual's freedom is to thematize, recognitively, the particular actions and projects on which the individual in question is embarked.) Points (a) and (b), together, entail totalisation since the individual is then recognized, or constituted, as universal qua particular (freedom as a universal is recognized as existing in and through actions as particular) and vice-versa (it is in the medium of freedom that particular actions are recognized to exist). Thus, the alienations of historical existence are overcome.

But at what cost? Firstly, at the cost of the instability and insecurity which - as has been argued - the annulling of spiritual masses and role-definitions, or in other words institutional inertia and authority, entails. Mutual recognition does not lessen, but on the contrary intensifies, the "risk" (cf. section 1) and fearfulness which inheres in association with

others per se. Mutually recognitive freedom is inherently an unstructured freedom (inasmuch as spiritual masses and role-definitions are discounted). Thereby, it is an excoriated freedom as well. This is because nothing - no institutional "third term" - mediates between mutually recognitive freedoms and softens their contact: the freedoms of mutually recognitive agents just are, directly, each other's mode of existence, so that each such agent is not merely at issue (wholly and without remainder) in the play of recognition but is (again, wholly and without remainder) recognitively placed at issue. All that he or she is is thematized as being at issue, both by others and by the individual him or herself. Role-definitions, for all the misrecognition they entail, could blur the harshness of the contradiction (which may in a given case be only potential but which, as a potential, is ineluctible) between self-definition and other-definition: this point is stressed by twentieth-century conceptions of a public realm - those of Hannah Arendt and Richard Sennett, for example - which defend the notions of codes of civility, or of a common 'world', in interactive life. Role-definitions can effect this because roles are also "masks" (Personae) which allow their bearers to hedge their recognitive bets and hold aspects of their being back from recognition's play. In the absence of such comforts, to repeat, not merely is everything about everyone recognitively at issue (so much follows from Hegel's conception of self-consciousness existing 'only in being recognized'); additionally, the circumstance that this is so is thrown into recognitive relief. A common 'world', or in other words a 'valid external world' which could prechannel recognition into authoritative configurations and which could serve as a shared touchstone to which interacting individuals might refer, is just what the play of mutual recognition excludes. The (Revolutionary) demolition of such a 'world', and of the role-definitions inhering in it, was required to effect the transition from a misrecognitive to a mutually recognitive terrain. Everything that we have said demonstrates that the renewal of such a world, of role-definitions and of social institutions, would bring with it a regression from post-history to history (Hegel makes this point at 594): radical insecurity is the sole statute under which mutual recognition can come into being, and through which it can sustain itself.

This same point can be made, and moreover intensified, in terms of the dialectic of universal and particular. Universality no longer stands over against particularity, as in social relations which are ossified as institutions with their attendant role-prescriptions, but on the contrary exists in, and as, the interactions of the particulars (the particular individuals) themselves. No longer does universality as it were "hold the ring" or, in other words, pre-define the limits of recognitively acknowledged actions or events. If particularity is raised to the level of universality, so also does the converse of this proposition hold. And now the intensification: each particular individual is acknowledged (as particular) in his or her universal freedom; but to acknowledge an individual's freedom is to acknowledge inter alia that individual's freedom to sever mutually recognitive relations and to break recognitive ranks. (If I am acknowledged as being here freely, then by the same token I am acknowledged as being free to depart.) Inasmuch as it is the freedom of the individual which is acknowledged, mutual recognition does not merely connote and entail the danger of "dispersal", i.e. of its own undermining,[28] but additionally, and actively, summons and thematizes this danger and throws it into relief. (Notice that the danger is not merely a danger to mutual recognition but to freedom, since it is only through others that, in the sense of self-determination, I can be free: we now begin to see what the above-mentioned paradox of mutual recognition involves.) In short, mutual recognition exists by calling itself in question and placing itself at issue. It presses itself to extremes, (to its own "extremity") and can exist only by means of this "extremism" since otherwise the freedom of those

who are mutually recognitive would be demarcated, contradicted and eclipsed. The universality of mutual recognition exists at the mercy of its particularity, and moreover as explicitly placed thus at its mercy; mutual recognition exists only at its own mercy; and only under this condition can the totalisation of universality and particularity be achieved.

It follows that it can never be achieved once-and-for-all or definitively. To the insecurity of individuals within a mutually recognitive polity we have to add the instability of this polity itself. This instability, like this insecurity, is actively summoned by the play of recognition. To recognize freedom is to recognize freedom-to-disperse, and as a limiting case dispersal (the severance of recognitive bonds) takes the form of violence. In this way the possibility of violence - of violent recourse - is a theme in the consciousness of those engaged in a self-consistent mutually recognitive play. On the terrain of mutual recognition, the troubling spectre of the freedom/violence association addressed by Hegel in his passage on the Terror still stalks.

Thus the Hegel of the Phenomenology forces upon us a political choice. Put simply, it is the choice between freedom and security. Generally speaking, the history of political thought has treated these values as compatible or at least as admitting of resolution in the form of compromise: theories of "political obligation" are the example which springs most readily to mind. The Phenomenology breaks with this tradition, although the Philosophy of Right - with its proposal for an "organised freedom" - belongs within it. That reflection on the instability of mutually recognitive freedom should have led Hegel to attempt the organisation (the institutionalisation) of freedom as an 'enduring being' is intelligible; nonetheless, from the circumstance that the writing of the Philosophy of Right is intelligible, it can in no way be concluded either that the Philosophy of Right's attempt to organise freedom ('on the one hand...on the other') is successful or that the author of such an attempt remains open to the challenge freedom presents.

If we must choose between freedom and security, why should we choose freedom? Implicitly, the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology supplies the answer: we should choose freedom because at each historical turning-point or "crisis" freedom is the value which has been resumed; because our history (the history which has produced us and at whose end we stand) is the story of freedom; because what counts as "human" has been established through this history: and because, accordingly, to abnegate freedom or to subordinate freedom to any other value whatever is to abnegate "humanity" at the same time. This argument, to which in a sense everything in the Phenomenology is directed, does not prove that we should prefer freedom; rather it informs us of the cost involved (namely, the cost of denying "humanity") in preferring anything else. The argument is in this regard an indirect one, and only this kind of indirect argument for freedom can be self-consistent since any other kind would constrain, by logically binding us to freedom, the freedom it was supposed to defend.

On the basis of all this, we can turn to Hegel's account, in the section on 'morality', of the movement of the contradiction in which, I have claimed, mutual recognition consists. The most intense version of mutual recognition's contradiction, or paradox, is that recognition which is mutual throws into relief freedom, while (for its part) a self-consistent freedom includes freedom to sever mutually recognitive bonds. That is, mutual recognition actively summons the possibility of its own extinction. Unless it summons it, it can obtain no longer; for then something which falls short of freedom is acknowledged. Mutual recognition can exist, therefore, only as radical instability (and insecurity) and as at issue before itself. Can

mutual recognition be recomposed out of the contradiction which threatens to decompose it? Since the contradiction cannot be abolished without abolishing mutual recognition, can the contradiction be made to "move" rather than sheerly and destructively "explode"? We have seen that Terror is one solution to this problem (and cf. Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason on the 'pledged group'): however ephemerally, from the standpoint of mutual recognition the Terror succeeds. It turns the violence which (as a limiting case) mutual recognition summons into a means whereby mutual recognition is sustained. Is any other solution conceivable? It is this question which, in the section on 'morality' (from 648 onwards), is addressed.

Mutual recognition is threatened (it threatens itself) with dispersal. In Hegel's presentation, the danger of dispersal commences with what can be called "internal emigration" or in other words with the possibility of acting towards recognitive others in bad faith. Realistically, Hegel treats the possibility of bad faith as an inescapable part of what the human condition involves. To identify any action involves identifying its aim or intention or purpose, but in a recognitive ("public") context an action is always 'placed [hinstellt]' before (or in front of) other individuals; thereby it is 'displaced [verstellt]' at the same time, since from a perception of the action itself it can never be a certainty that it is in fact designed to serve the purpose which it overtly proclaims (648). On the one side the possibility of acting in bad faith; on the other side suspicion that in any given case bad faith is not merely possible but actual: it is from this suspicion - from the suspicious percipients of an action - rather than from any actual bad faith on the part of an agent that, according to Hegel, "internal emigration" starts. The danger of dispersal results not from individuals in fact acting in bad faith but from anxiety on the part of others that they may be doing so; that is, and ironically, it starts not from those who are willing to sever recognitive relations but from those who seek precisely to defend recognition's cause. There is, here, a Revolutionary parallel. During the times of Revolution, says Hegel, 'being suspected...has the significance and effect of being guilty' (591). Each Revolutionary individual, qua particular, counted as 'suspect' inasmuch as he or she, in his or her particularity, constituted a threat to revolutionary solidarity (to the universality of freedom) and as a locus at which the ranks of the revolutionaries might start to break. Each individual constituted a threat along these lines since it was to him or her as a particular that freedom (and hence also the freedom to break ranks) as a universal was acknowledged to pertain. In effect, Phenomenology 648 tells us that a similar "drama or suspicion" is played out wherever and whenever mutual recognition exists. The very particularity of individuals is, for the same reason as in the context of Revolution, suspect; and it is in the minds of individuals who thus mistrust particularity, and who side with the interests of the universal (or of mutually recognitive freedom per se) that an internal emigration threatening to lead to the external emigration of dispersal comes into play. A renewed severance of universality from particularity looms as possible. The Revolution responded, successfully, to the possibility of such a renewed severance with the Terror. In the same exigency, are there other resources upon which mutual recognition can call?

The consciousness which adopts, censoriously and anxiously, the standpoint of the universal as against suspect particularity is referred to by Hegel as the 'hard heart' (667). Judgementally, the hard heart counterposes itself (as good, i.e. as sheerly universal and public spirited and as devoted to the maintenance of mutually recognitive relations) to individuality (as evil, i.e. as particular and as just for that reason suspect and allegedly guilty of bad faith). Thereby the hard heart, with a perfect dialectical irony, contradicts its intentions and severs recognitive relations on its own

behalf. The heard heart is complicit in the "internal emigration" which I termed privatism: from it, rather than from the particular self-consciousness of which it is suspicious, the dispersal of the mutually recognitive community threatens to begin.

It can re-establish mutualy recognitive relations only by extending what Hegel calls 'forgiveness' (670) to the self-consciousness whose particularity it had castigated hitherto. And according to Hegel even the 'hard heart' can extend forgiveness since, throughout the drama of suspicion, the principle of mutual recognition (however much it was "in crisis") has remained in play. Thus: mutual recognition is the therapy (the solvent) of mutual recognition's own problems; however, no solution to them can be definitive since the hard heart's forgiveness merely restores the mutually recognitive status quo ante and thus renews the conditions for the drama of suspicion to begin again. Therefore the contradiction inscribed in mutual recognition does not (or not necessarily) destroy mutual recognition; but neither is it once and for all expunged. Rather, the play of mutual recognition just is the movement - the continual decomposition and recomposition - of this contradiction; through this movement, universality emerges in and through the particularity (the suspect particularity) at whose mercy it exists. Conversely, particularity emerges (it gains recognition) from the universality of the self-consciousness which forgives. From this it follows that, as noted earlier, mutual recognition is no fixed or inert condition but exists only insofar as - through 'forgiveness' - it is continually reprojected and remade. If mutual recognition exists only as the movement of its own contradiction, then the play of mutual recognition just is the drama of suspicion and 'forgiveness' is Hegel's name for the continual projection and reprojection of mutual recognition itself.

But here a final problem surfaces. From the Terror to forgiveness: it may seem that, in this transition, humanist warmth and sentiment, or indeed even theological warmth and sentiment, does duty for phenomenological rigour in Hegel's work. In this connection two points should be noted. The first is ad hominem: unless some version of Hegel's 'forgiveness' scenario is accepted the only option for freedom is Terror, so that the argument of whoever declares against the sentiment of forgiveness and recoils from Terror destroys itself. As so often, an argument against Hegel (if successful) cuts the ground from under the objector's own feet.

The second point is substantive. The 'forgiveness' which Hegel invokes is not at all one which, like God's, continues to uphold the norms against which alleged sinning has occurred. It is not a forgiveness which, sentimentally and sanctimoniously, "lets someone off" while retaining its own judgemental position, and standards, as intact. Rather, it is a forgiveness which re-establishes - or reprojects - mutual recognition precisely because it 'renounces' (670) the sheerly universalistic standpoint from which its judgement was previously made. Recognizing the other, it acknowledges that self and other stand upon common ground. In this sense, mutually recognitive forgiveness is a passing "beyond good and evil", i.e., beyond "good" universality and "bad" particularity as dichotomously opposed. Put otherwise: Hegelian forgiveness is 'transgression' and 'expenditure' in precisely the senses which Bataille attaches to these terms.[29] Forgiveness is the moment of self-loss (which is also mutually recognitive self-recovery) wherein self-consciousness, in the same movement as it sustains itself, throws everything that it is to the winds. In the forgiveness signalled in the Phenomenology, the paradox and contradiction of mutual recognition are inscribed, intensified (or overdetermined) and at the same time ephemerally resolved. And their mode of resolution summons their recomposition: they are resolved only in the movement which summons them and which calls for their resolution once again. On this score, as in

everything pertaining to mutual recognition, no resolutions are definitive and no guarantees can ever be made.

9. A postscript: epistemology and apocalypse

In the foregoing, it is solely the "practical", or socio-political, implications of the concept of recognition that I have discussed. But Hegelian recognition carries "theoretical", or epistemological, implications too. No extended discussion of these latter can be attempted here; I confine myself to some brief indications, in order to round out the picture which the present paper contains.

Toni Negri refers in passing to 'Hegel's most valuable contribution - his synthesis of theory and practice';[30] and indeed, almost forty years before the 'Theses on Feuerbach', Hegel announces the thesis of a unity (an internal relation) between theory which is true and practice which is free. This thesis is the central message of the Phenomenology's final chapter, headed 'absolute knowledge'. There, Hegel affirms that the 'content' of his book is in the last instance 'freedom', namely the freedom of the 'self-alienating self', and adds that the 'pure movement of this alienation' - i.e. the movement of the contradiction we have labelled "freedom-contradicted" - 'constitutes the necessity of the content' (805). 'Necessity' refers to scientificity (cf. 88) and thence to truth. The later Hegel, although in fact his philosophical procedure shifts away from a theory/practice unity, enunciates the thesis of such a unity even more clearly: 'The truth, as Christ said, makes spirit free; freedom makes it true' (Encyclopaedia para.382 Zusatz).

More specifically, Hegel - at least in 1806-7 - understands the unity of true theory and free practice as a unity of phenomenological theory (cf.804, closing lines) and mutually recognitive practice. (That mutually recognitive practice is, uniquely, free practice is the argument the present paper has attempted to reconstruct.) That phenomenological theory is internally linked to mutually recognitive practice is easy enough to see: roughly, any phenomenological claim enters an appeal to the effect that "It's like this, isn't it?" and thus seeks for validation through recognition by others who are recognized (whose experience, which they are invited to consult, counts as non-alienated and "non-pathological") in their turn. Freedom, i.e. mutually recongitive freedom, is thus the necessary and sufficient condition of epistemological competence. Hegelian phenomenology is thereby, in contrast for example to Husserl's phenomenology, a dialogical - a "conversationally based" - phenomenology through and through; and this leads the Hegel of the Phenomenology towards something very close to a "consensus" theory of truth. If 'the true is the whole'[20], this 'whole' includes the practice of a mutually recognitive polity itself. Only on a basis of mutual recognition can authentic conversation - a conversation able to reach binding agreement across categorial boundaries - phenomenologically proceed.

Conversely, mutually recognitive practice is internally linked to specifically phenomenological theory because to recognize others is to recognize their experiences (the categories and criteria which are constitutive of their experiential worlds) as well. So to say, the conversation which occurs amongst those who are mutually recognitive - the conversation, that is, by which the "drama of suspicion" is played out - goes forward in a phenomenological mode. This is not to say that there is automatic or guaranteed agreement as to categories and truth-criteria amongst the mutually recognitive conversationalists: if such agreement obtained, the drama of suspicion would be redundant. It is, however, to say

that, on a terrain of mutual recognition, agreement can be reached even amongst those operating with differing truth-criteria because (as mutually recognitive) they can acknowledge that they are talking in however different terms about the same experiential thing. Mutually recognitive conversation is phenomenological; and, on a terrain of mutual recognition (and there alone), phenomenological claims can be redeemed. In sum, the drama of suspicion and mutually recognitive (phenomenological) conversation are one and the same.

The far-reaching implications of the epistemological theses just sketched cannot, here, be entered into. But in closing we can note what they mean for Hegel's reflexivity, i.e., for the self-understanding which pervades the Phenomenology and which controls what it says. In the first place, it means that Hegelian reflexivity is practical reflexivity:[31] if phenomenological truth presupposes mutually recognitive freedom, and if the story of Hegelian history ends with mutual recognition, then the author of the Phenomenology understands himself to be situated within (or rather, at the end of) the practical and historical story he himself tells. In fact Hegel himself says so, therefore making it once and for all clear that (in the Phenomenology at any rate) he endorses the thesis of an end of history:[32] 'until spirit has...completed itself as world-spirit [i.e. until it has completed itself historically], it cannot reach its completion as self-conscious [i.e. truthfully self-aware] spirit' (802). In the second place, it tells us that the audience to whom the Phenomenology is addressed is an audience of individuals amongst whom mutual recognition obtains; it is they who are expected to recognize their own freedom in Hegel's phenomenological mirror and thereby redeem the truth-claims which in the course of the Phenomenology are raised; it is they who, thus recognizing themselves and so extending recognition to the Phenomenology's author, will find the Phenomenology's discourse 'exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and appropriated by all'(13). To an audience of free individuals Hegel addresses his phenomenological (dialogical, recognitive) appeal.

The 'truth', says Hegel, referring to his own truth, prevails 'when its time has come'; it 'never appears prematurely, nor finds a public not ripe to receive it' (71). This reads teleologically, as though truth itself somehow governed the course of historical events. On the basis of the above, however, a very different reading can be proposed. The 'public' able to 'receive' truth are a mutually recognitive (a post-historical) public, and what Hegel is telling us is that, since true theory presupposes and is linked to mutually recognitive practice, a truth appearing other than on such a terrain - appearing, as it were, historically rather than post-historically - is a contradiction in terms. The 'appearance' of truth - and, for Hegel, truth consists in and is nothing apart from its appearing or appearance[33] - has therefore preconditions not merely of a theoretical but a practical kind. The 'time' of truth is the time of post-historical existence, i.e., the time wherein mutual recognition obtains.

All of this shows in what sense Hegel is an apocalyptic writer. Etymologically, 'apocalypse' signifies dis-covery or uncovering; an apocalyptic event ends history, and what is revealed or discovered in and through such an event is the meaning (the "plot") of the story in which this event and this discovery form the final term. Thus the apocalyptic writer understands him or herself to be situated in - or, rather, at the end of - the story which he/she tells.

And just this is the conceptual framework of the Phenomenology. The French Revolution is, for Hegel, quite literally an apocalpse not merely because it transplants the 'heaven' of uncontradicted freedom to 'earth below', but because it inaugurates a terrain of mutual recognition on which, uniquely,

'truth' can appear and the "discovery" of history's meaning (its meaning as a story of freedom) can occur. Ending history, the French Revolution is the apocalyptic event which raises philosophy as 'love of knowing' into 'actual knowing' (5) and thus makes possible the phenomenological 'science' which Hegel writes. In 1807, Hegel informs his readers that, following the French Revolution, he and they inhabit a 'new world' (11).

We can be still more precise. Extremely schematicaly, two traditions of apocalyptic theorising can be distinguished. "Right" apocalypses are written generally to flatter authority, for example by informing some ruler that his or her rule will endure till the end of time. "Left" apocalypses by contrast construe the apocalyuptic event as revolution and post-apocalyptic (post-historical) existence as a condition of emancipation from all authoritative constraints. It is in this latter, antinomian, tradition of apocalypse that the Hegel of the present paper - the Hegel of the Phenomenology - belongs. Not only is his apocalypse revolutionary; his 'new world', in which truth ("discovery") and uncontradicted freedom make their conjoint apopearance, is one where anarchy is the only rule. And if this rule is broken and, as the necessarily unstructured character of mutually recognitive existence seems to make all too likely, if post-history reverts to history, then not merely freedom but truth as well enter once again into eclipse. The pessimistic overtones of Hegel's final paragraph on the French Revolution call in question not just a particular interpretation of European history but the "scientificity" of the Phenomenology itself. Arguably, it is for this reason that the later Hegel - the Hegel of the Encyclopaedia, for example - severs the theory/practice relation and philosophises once again in a traditional form. Thus to accede in a reversion to history is not, however, the only possible response. An alternative response is to wager one's own truth-claims on an apocalypse still to come in and through which these same claims stand to be redeemed; to theorise thus is to theorise under the sign of counterfactuality and in a proleptic mode. Down the ages, all the apocalypticists for whom the apocalpyse lay in the future (even if they believed themselves to be living on its very eve) so theorised: in effect, their writings reveal a coming revelation whose content, alone, could redeem the truth-claims they themselves raise. That is, their works anticipate what those same works foretell. And this proleptic path is also the one followed by Left Hegelianism after Hegel: it is taken at the moment when Cieskowski announces a philosophy open to the praxis of the future[34] and when, in their different fashions, Marx and the anarchists renew the discourse of the Phenomenology and wager upon the mutual recognition which Hegel, with however little assurance, believed to be the order of his own day.

Appendix. In case my ascription of an anarchist stratum of thought to Hegel should seem extravagant, consider the following (from 'The Earliest System-Programme' of 1796): 'The idea of mankind [being] premised - I shall prove that it gives us no idea of the state, since the state is a mechanical thing, any more than it gives us the idea of a machine. Only something that is an objective of freedom is called an idea. So we must go even beyond the state! - for every state must treat free men as cogs in a machine and this it ought not to do; so it must stop...At the same time I shall lay down principles for a history of mankind, and strip the whole wretched human work of state, constitution, government, legal system - naked to the skin...Then first awaits us equal development of all powers, of what is peculiar to each and what is common to all'[35] - in short, mutual recognition.

Only quite recently has Hegel-scholarship admitted the 'System-Programme' -

which exists in Hegel's own handwriting - into the corpus of Hegel's authentic works; and even then - inasmuch as it treats the state per se as 'mechanical' - it is generally seen as atypical and as standing to one side of the main development of Hegel's thought. The contention of the present paper is, in effect, that the 'System-Programme' is absolutely central to the development of Hegelian theorising at its compelling and authentic best.

NOTES

1. Unreferenced numbers in round brackets correspond to the numbered paragraphs in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A V Millar (Oxford University Press 1977). It is Miller, not Hegel, who supplies the numbering. Occasionally, I alter slightly the translation Miller provides.

2. This public conception of selfhood goes together, in Hegel, with some highly prescient (and Wittgensteinian) remarks on language (e.g. 508, 652-3). The same conception of language - possibly mediated to Marx via Feuerbach - reappears in Marx/Engels The German Ideology (Lawrence & Wishart 1966) pp.42, 503 and also elsewhere in Marx's work. If passages such as these remind us of the Philosophical Investigations it may be worth bearing in mind that Roy Pascal, first English translator of The German Ideology, was a Cambridge friend of Wittgenstein's in the 1930s. No doubt it is excessive to see, here, a series of direct historical links.

3. Cf. H Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958) ch.5.

4. On mediation as 'mode of existence' see R Gunn 'Marxism and Mediation' Common Sense No. 2 (1987).

5. See note 27, below.

6. The term 'actual [wirklich]' in Hegel always connotes something practical: 'What is actual can act [Was wirklich ist, kann wirken]' (G W F Hegel, Science of Logic, Allen and Unwin/Humanities Press 1969, p.546). (The pun as between "actuality" and "action", that is, works in German as well as English.) Cf. Marx's reference to 'actual, active men [wirlichen, wirkenden Menschen]' in The German Ideology. The practical 'life' in which social worlds consist is of course, for Marx, class struggle: here there is not a break with, but a further specification of, Hegel's thought.

7. In Hegelian terminology, individuality is the totalisation of universal and particular (e.g. Science of Logic, p.612).

8. E.g. G W F Hegel Early Theological Writings (University of Pennsylvania Press 1971) p.154.

9. Antigone does not, according to Sophocles and Hegel, choose as a particular individual to bury her brother contrary to Creon's edict (thereby obeying the 'divine law' of the household, the sphere of women, and disobeying the 'human law' of the city, the sphere of men). Rather her consciousness, as a "woman", knows always-already 'what it

has to do' (465). There is no issue of choice for her, for she is unaware of her particularity. But her situation, and action, throw the issue of choice (and thereby of particularity, since it is on individuals as particulars that issues of choice impinge) into relief for others, i.e. for the audience - composed of, possibly, several thousand Athenians - who watched Sophocles' play.

10. In Hegel's lectures on The Philosophy of History (Dover Books 1956, pp 269-70), Socrates plays a role comparable to that of Antigone in the Phenomenology.

11. Arguably, the utopia of Fourier is one premised on social institutions which entail not a social but only a technical division of labour - and hence no role-definitions. Whether such social institutions are possible, and whether they still count as "social institutions", I do not discuss here. Throughout history, social institutions and role-definitions have been coterminous, and the only historical possibility of a society containing social institutions without role-definitions would seem to be that of a society whose members no longer counted as in any sense individuals, i.e., a society functioning as a dystopian machine.

12. Cf. Bauer as excerpted in L S Stepelevich The Young Hegelians: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press 1983) pp. 177-86.

13. Cf. the closing lines of Part I of Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' and the Communist Manifesto's invocation of a society wherein the free development of each goes together with the free development of all.

14. Marx, Grundrisse (Penguin Books 1973), p 409.

15. Just one instance of this caution may be cited. Elections to the Lower House of the Philosophy of Right's bicameral legislature are conducted through the 'corporations' into which the 'business class' are organised; selection of office-holders in the corporations themselves (who will presumably preside over elections to the legislature) 'will generally be effected by a mixture of popular election [by the corporation-members] ... and ratification by higher authority' (Philosophy of Right para. 288). This 'higher authority' seemingly consists of the 'universal class' of civil service bureaucrats, who will therefore be in an unparallelled position to oversee - however indirectly - and guide into "responsible" channels elections to the legislature itself. It is difficult to see how Hegel, or indeed anyone at all, could take seriously a proposal of this bureaucratically footling kind.

16. E.g. J Hyppolite Studies on Marx and Hegel (Heinemann 1969) pp.54-7; R Plant, Hegel (Allen and Unwin 1973) p 73.

17. This brings out the continuity of the Hegelian apocalyptic story. Pre-Revolutionary spiritual masses, 'state power' and 'wealth' or State and Civil Society, are respectively universal and particular and thereby, again respectively, 'good' and 'bad'. The State counts as 'good' because citizenship is devoted to universal and public-spirited ends, Civil Society as 'bad' because there it is their own particular advantage that "bourgeois" or market-competitive individuals seek. But the State becomes particular and 'bad' through corruption; and Civil Society contains, unconsciously, a moment of universality and 'goodness' through the operation of the market's invisible hand. Thus

everything comes to exist as its own opposite (Phenomenology 494 ff.). - It can be noted that, if role-definitions are per se alienating, they become doubly alienating when, through this alienation, they no longer supply even the reliably "fixed" and stable conceptions of self-identity upon which misrecognized individuality depends.

18. H Arendt, Crises in the Republic (Penguin Books 1973) p. 123.

19. H Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin Books 1973).

20. J-P Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason (New Left Books 1976), pp.430 ff.

21. A moving example is the list of the names of (some) of those who died in Stalin's state-terror given in Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge (Spokesman Books 1972).

22. Hyppolite, op. cit. p 59.

23. Bourgeois recognition, we might say, is symmetrical - as when exchangers on a market 'recognize each other as proprietors' (Marx, Capital, Vol I, Penguin Books 1976, p 178) - but is alienated inasmuch as it is recognition in terms of role-definitions rather than of freedom. Despite Hegel's reading of the French ("bourgeois") Revolution as ending history, it follows, post-historical existence (inasmuch as it is mutually recognitive) is post-bourgeois as well. Note that misrecognition, since it prescribes an 'essence' or role-definition prior to self-determining 'actuality', partakes at least to a certain degree of the 'thinghood' inscribed in one-sided and unequal recognition. This latter should perhaps, accordingly, be seen as a limiting case of misrecognition rather than a species of recognition in its own right. If 'thinghood' is the mode in which the Slave is recognized by the Master, what might be called "quasi-thinghood" is the mode in which misrecognition goes forward despite the symmetry it displays.

24. Self-determining being exists through itself, but if such being confronts obstacles then (at most) it exists not through its self-determination but merely as it determines itself to be. Its independence in this case is a dependent independence, i.e., an independence by grace of its world.

25. M Stirner, The Ego and His Own (Fifield & Walker 1915); the most important section is excerpted in Stepelevich, op. cit. pp. 335-53.

26. In the context of "civic humanism" a parallel point is stressed by J G A Pocock in his The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton University Press 1975), pp. 75, 157.

27. A Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Basic Books 1969) pp 158-9, note 6. Subsequently - influenced perhaps by Bataille, who attended his lectures: see G Bataille's 'Lettre a X [Kojeve]' in his Oeuvres Completes 5 - Kojeve revised this conception of post-historical existence, premising it not on renaturalisation but on the play of a recognition which is purely formal (as in the Japanese 'ceremony of tea') and in which nothing is at stake (op. cit. pp 159-62). This latter conception of post-history still differs markedly from the one advanced in the present paper. As will I hope become clear, where mutual recognition obtains literally everything is at issue and perhaps more vividly than ever before. (Despite this, it should be apparent that my reading of Hegel remains governed, throughout, by Kojeve's

path-breaking and still seminal work.)

28. Again in the context of civic humanism (see note 26, above), the danger of "dispersal" is addressed in Machiavelli's Discourses I, 57. In more recent times, perhaps the most brilliant discussion of the issue is the passage on the 'pledged group' in Sartre's Critique.

29. G Bataille, 'The Notion of Expenditure' in his Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-39 (Manchester University Press 1985); Eroticism (Marion Boyars 1987) Part I, ch 5.

30. A Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, (Bergin and Garvey 1984), ch 1.

31. On practical reflexivity see R Gunn, 'Practical Reflexivity in Marx' Common Sense No 1 (1987).

32. That Hegel believes in no such thing as an end of history is affirmed, against this evidence, by W Kaufmann (Hegel, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1966) and by D Forbes in his Introduction to G W F Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction (Cambridge University Press 1975).

33. 'Truth would not be truth if it did not show itself and appear, if it were not truth for someone and for itself, as well as for the spirit in general too': G W F Hegel, Introduction to 'Aesthetics' (Clarendon Press 1979), p 8.

34. Stepelevich, op. cit, p 77.

35. The text of the 'Earliest System-Programme' is given in H S Harris Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight (Clarendon Press 1982) pp 510-12

Diaspora

The Maffia are organized
As organized as the tories
John Barker is on the run
Being lost for just one pun

Cosa nostra is in our backyard
Cavendish and Wright have
Flown the gaff
And Reagan is running numbers
Komitet and Malta using the
coruption

Here is to the Culdees
They are mute and
Cannot count
Heredom

We are all called Arthur
No more Merlin
Since Castellammarese
The "local Chinese"

Are concocting a meal
For the hungary dispossessed
the modern inhabitants
Of Heredom

There are cards
Only two
And my partner
Has drawn one

There are many chapters
Of Angils with oily mechanical horses
Who drinkin in saloons scream
Of honour and smouldering parts

East and West they appear incohortant
Till if they think they are needed
And an Alchemyste calls the
Pearl of Great Price

And disappears out of Shot
Of the TANKTANK battle
In historic George Square
Where the reds Shone

Tears of glass 5 in 1 5 in##
And today we consider
The MANI in the first day of the neb
Anno Mundi Habitati, tatie^

Thatcher is not a person o' stature
She's chasin' after the slidry ba'
Persons dinnae play fi'ba'
They are parasites in the terraces

Befuckle the "holy beagles"
that "houghmagandie pack"

Mark Kingwell

Just War Theory

Societies have long felt a need to justify theoretically an activity that appears to come naturally, the waging of war on enemies. In this bare sense, where the only object is to distinguish legitimate killing from illegitimate killing - to separate the category of war from those of murder or massacre - theories attempting to justify war appear from antiquity. In its more traditional sense, however, "just war theory" is a Christian notion advanced comprehensively no earlier than Saint Augustine (A.D. 354-430), refined by Saint Thomas Aquinas - like so much else in Christian philosophy - in the thirteenth century, and passed down with various, sometimes extensive, modifications to the present day. Despite challenges to its legitimacy, just war theory remains robust and hotly debated among contemporary philosphers, political theorists and experts on international relations.

The doctrine has its theoretical origins in two judgments forced on early Christian thinkers. First, war could not consciously be avoided if one was to uphold the interests of Christian society and, indeed, the will of God himself. In other words, strict or absolutist pacifism was indefensible in Christian ethics because it made no provision for either legitimate self-defence - a matter of simple prudence - or justifiable holy war - a more serious matter of defending the faith against infidel challenge. The second judgment, however, is more to the point: while war was necessary, only necessary wars were ethically justifiable. And to be justifiable a war had to be both legitimate and limited, thus giving rise to the two sets of conditions commonly used in just war theory: jus ad bellum conditions (the right to go to war, limitation on the end of war) and jus in bello conditions (the right to wage war in a particular manner, limitations on the means employed in war).

In advanced formulations of the theory it is common to find four conditions under the jus ad bellum heading: just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, and last resort. The onus of proof lies on those seeking to wage a war, who thus have to demonstrate that: (a) they are fighting with good cause, in self-defence after harm done by another or in real anticipation of such harm; (b) the war is being fought for a morally salutary reason, such as national liberation or destruction of tyranny, and not for revenge or bare political motive; (c) the war has been declared by a body genuinely acting in the interest of the people fighting it; and (d) all other avenues of conflict-resolution, including diplomacy and conciliation, have been tried and failed before war is attempted. Under jus in bello three conditions are usually found: discrimination, proportionality, and pacta sunt seruanda. Here the warring nation must prove that: (a) its soldiers will discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, between battling and pillaging, during the war; (b) it will only use those means absolutely indispensable to the aim of winning

the war; and (c) it will respect and love the enemy in pursuing the goals of war.

As with many ends-means dichotomies, the ad bellum-in bello split is more complicated than it at first appears. The early Christian philosophers felt that only one set of conditions should be used in justifying wars, and they typically concentrate on jus ad bellum conditions. Only one side could be justified in fighting a war so it was imperative that the Christian forces proved themselves to be in the right. Limited by technology and, more often than is acknowledged, by Christian feeling, limitations on conduct within war were less of an issue. Under the influence of later international jurists such as Grotius, Suarez and Vitoria, whose intellectual property just war theory became, post-medieval conceptions of justifying war swung more towards jus in bello conditions. This reflected a certain moral sophistication, recognizing both that there was no genuine way of adjudicating between justifications for going to war - each side will have its reasons, incomprehensible to the other - and that war still needed to be limited. International law could have something to say about what happened on the battlefield, even if it could not pronounce on the national policy that brought the armies there.

In our century, especially since 1945, the situation is beset by more serious difficulties. First, there is a strong school of political realist thought that insists ethics and international relations have no viable interrelation and that, consequently, ethical theories such as the just war doctine are only mistakenly applied to war. Second, with the advent of "total war" and wars of genocide, the distinctions drawn by just war theory appear to lose their impact. A conception of war as total - a vague extrapolation of the realism found in Hobbes, Machiavelli, Clausewitz - refuses to countenance the notions of limitation or justification; moreover, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, essential and non-essential targets, are nullified. The only justification for war is prudence or likely political gain - and justifying any means, via raison d'etat thinking or, in more modern language, via "defending the interests of national security". A third challenge has to do with changes in the technological nature of war. If war means - or would mean - nuclear war, any justification for engaging in it must include an argument that nuclear weapons will be used with discrimination, proportionality and due regard for the human dignity of the enemy.

Some thinkers have attempted to provide this argument, but with limited success. The technological challenges to meeting the jus in bello conditions have been with us since at least the eighteenth century, but find their inevitable culmination in the weapons of mass destruction dominating modern conceptions of war. This difficulty leads some thinkers to argue that going to war can no longer be justified ethically because it always risks inviting use of indefensibly destructive weapons. Two further responses are then available: a nation either renounces war as an instrument of policy altogether, or it institutionalizes the mutual impossibility of war in a fear-based doctrine such as nuclear deterrence. In the latter option, the unjustifiability of nuclear war is

acknowledged by the unusual step of making that war, should it happen, inherently unlimited.

The argument then becomes whether this policy is more or less dangerous than a strategy which, using just war principles, attempts to limit the extent of a possible nuclear war. Such thinking is evident in the U.S. policy move from simple deterrence to "flexible response" strategic deterrence. The move has positive and negative effects. Positively, it reintroduces the notions of ethics and justifiability into a sphere which had attempted to leave them behind. It argues that a limited nuclear war would be better than an all-out nuclear war, and so it is reasonable to prepare plans for waging such a limited war with discrimination and proportonlity. The negative side is that this sort of thinking may actually make nuclear war more likely, since strategic theorists go about preparing for a war which they believe can then be fought legitimately and won justly. Pacifist critics warn that such thinking is in fact mental preparation for war, employing just war principles to justify - and thus make more acceptable mentally - a war that cannot possibly be justified. Realist critics argue either that, in principle, the theory of just war is misapplied to any modern war; or, in particular, that applying it to nuclear war undermines credible deterrence by increasing the likelihood - and thus the fear - of a first-strike gamble.

The limitationists are caught between the extremes, arguing that conceiving theoretical limitations on nuclear war is both necessary and ethically important. It is wrong to discard theories of war limitation, especially the just war theory, on either absolute pacifist or absolute realist grounds. For one thing, there is no other coherent theory of war limitation in the Western philosophical tradition. Acknowledging that war has not, in fact, become impossible, and not wishing to endorse total war either, the theory retains its usefulness. No war is better than any war, but limited war is also better than total war. Moreover, the negative judgment of the theory - jus contra bellum - should not be ignored. Many prominent thinkers retain the conventions of just war theory in order to demonstrate the indefensibility of any projected nuclear war, or of any unlimited nuclear war. No conventions of international law currently encode this judgment, but they may yet do so.

Further reading:

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York, Basic Books 1977

Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War, Oxford, Martin Robertson 1982

Cohen, Nagel, Scanlon, eds., War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1974

THE TALE OF A TIGER

A Comic Monologue by Dario Fo

Dario Fo

THE TALE OF A TIGER

INTRODUCTION

The first part of tonight's show has a positive theme. It's a hopeful piece, just at a time when negativity and a general collapse of ideals seem to be the dominant forces in our everyday lives. It's called "The Tale of a Tiger", and the message in it is conveyed by allegory.

In fact the first time I performed this piece was right here in Florence, and for me that night was sort of try-out. On that particular evening, the audience's involvement in the piece proved very important to me. They gave me a number of clear and precise pointers which enabled me to see where the weak points were and which sections needed to be cut or altered.

So, this enabled me to trim the story down. At first it ran for a quarter of an hour. Now, after a process of polishing, correcting, cutting, tightening up, the piece runs to 45 minutes! I'm not joking. In theatre, tightening a piece up doesn't necessarily mean shredding it into little bits.

I first heard this story told — actually, performed, rather than told — 4 years ago, in China. To be precise, in Shanghai. In that period, there were many stories like this being told in China.

Leaving aside the official theatre, the most lively form of theatre was a theatre completely unknown to passing tourists: the popular theatre — fringe theatre, I suppose you could call it — which was a real hothouse of imagination, creativity and irony.

I doubt that nowadays this story is still performed in public in the way that I saw it told, before an audience of thousands of people, men, women, children.... in a park.... in the Shanghai countryside.

The storyteller told his tale in the dialect of the Shanghai countryside, a dialect which is spoken by a minority. A minority of around 60 million inhabitants! In China 60 million really is a minority, when you think that around half a billion people speak the national language.

Now, the vowel sounds and the consonants which this peasant-actor was producing in his dialect fascinated me: his sounds and vocal tonalities had little relation with the spoken Chinese that I had encountered up until then. His language was broader, the sounds were harder, with a tendency to slide into deep, throaty rambling phrasings which, for me, brought to mind the "keenings" of the peasants of the Po Valley and the dialect stories of the mountains and upper valleys of Lombardy. In other words, I was on familiar territory.

And when, in addition to the sounds, I saw this extraordinary travelling player using hand gestures, arm movements, and moving his whole body as an accompaniment and counterpoint to the sounds (roars, silence, words....), the words at first coming thick and fast and then more leisurely, and then silence — in short, true pantomime — I realised that I was face to face with a theatre of great importance. And the principal player in this piece was a she-tiger, a tigress.

The Tigress was the leading lady, and her supporting cast were a tiger cub and a soldier. Unfortunately, I had some difficulties in getting the story explained to me. You see, our interpreter was from Peking, and didn't understand a word of the local dialect!

Luckily, we were able to find a local person who spoke the national language well, and so we were able to get a complete translation of the piece. That is the translation which I shall now perform for you. I had already heard of the theme of this piece, from Ms Colotti-Pischel, a notable researcher and analyst of Chinese politics and culture. But from her I knew only the broad outlines. I did not know the entire story, as I was to discover it in Shanghai.

This is the story of a soldier. It is the soldier himself who speaks, through the performer. He tells about his experiences in the army.... coming down from the Manchuria border at the start of Mao's Long March.

As I am sure you know, the army in question was made up of the Fourth Army, the Seventh Army, and several regiments of the Eighth. They came down in their thousands, from the North of China, down towards Canton, covering thousands of miles on their march.

They reach Canton, and move on to Shanghai. Then they turn off towards the West, and cross the whole of China from East to West, to arrive at the foothills of the Himalayas. They have to cross the Himalayas, in order to reach the Green Sea, the famous green-blue desert that runs along the Mongolian border, and then head north again, so that they can finally muster their forces to embark on the Chinese Revolution.

However, our soldier is not destined to reach the Green Sea: he is wounded by a bullet fired by the soldiers of Chiang Kai Shek, as the marchers are in the process of crossing the Himalayas. He is badly wounded. His wound begins to putrefy. Gangrene sets in, and the poor soldier is about to die. He is suffering. His comrades know that he is unlikely to survive more than another couple of days.

One of the soldiers, a comrade from his own village, suggests that he should shoot him, in order to put him out of his terrible agony. But our soldier turns down his offer: "I'm going to fight to live", he shouts. Here lies the first allegory: resist, fight on, even in the face of death.

He insists that his comrades leave him there. He asks them to leave him a gun, a blanket and a bit of rice. He's left on his own. He falls asleep. But as they say, it never rains but it pours. He is suddenly awakened by a crash of thunder: a tremendous storm breaks all around him. An avalanche of water falls from the skies, and a raging river roars up at his feet.

On all fours, with agonising efforts, he succeeds in scrambling up one of the mountain ridges. He reaches a kind of plateau. He swims across a raging torrent, in order to reach an enormous cave which he sees on the other side of the stream, up in the rockface. Finally, safe and sound in the cave, he meets.... the tigress.

The tigress. And her tiger cub. In China, the she-tiger has a very specific allegorical reference: you say that a woman, or a man, or a nation "has the tigress" when they *make a stand*, at a time when most people are running away, giving up, taking to their heels, ditching the struggle, copping out, in short, coming to the point where they run down both themselves, and everything in sight.

People are said to "have the tigress" when they don't do this, when they hold firm, when they *resist*. And the peasants of Shanghai have another saying: they take their resistance so far as to even hold burning embers in the palm of their hands — so that when those who had panicked and fled later pluck up courage and return, they find someone there, someone who has kept the embers burning, so that they can begin to organise again and rejoin the struggle.

The tiger also has another allegorical meaning — and this is perhaps the most important. A person "has the tiger" when they never delegate anything to anyone else, when they never expect other people to solve their problems for them — even when the person to whom those problems might be delegated is the most valued of leaders, a leader who has shown his capacities on countless occasions, perhaps the most honest and trusted of Party secretaries... No! Never! People who "have the tiger" are those who undertake to be inside the situation, to play their parts, to monitor and watch, to be present and responsible to the ultimate degree. Not out of any sense of suspicion, but in order to avoid that blind fidelity which is a cancer, a stupid and negative element of the class struggle, the enemy of both reason and revolution.

That, then, is the allegory of the tiger. I am now going to tell this story... in Chinese... because I have discovered that this particular Chinese dialect is fairly simple and easy for people to understand, since a lot of the words it uses are very onomatopoeic... and also the story is full of incidents which can be conveyed very adequately by gesture... All I need do is disguise the words by adding here and there a word or two of our own dialect — the dialect of the Po Valley — and you will be absolutely amazed to discover that you understand virtually everything I say. You will imagine that the story is being told in the dialect of the peasants of the Veneto, of Lombardy, of Emilia and Piedmont... but in fact it will be pure Chinese!

The wonder of theatre! Let's begin.

The Tale of a Tiger

The soldier speaks:

When we came down from Manchuria with the Fourth Army, the Eighth Army and virtually the whole of the Seventh Army, there were thousands and thousands of us, shuffling along, moving by day and by night. We marched, loaded with packs and baggage. We were dirty and we were tired. And we pressed on, and our horses couldn't stand the pace, and the horses died, and we used to eat them, and we used to eat the donkeys too, when they died, and we used to eat dogs, and, when we ran out of anything else to eat, we also used to eat cats, lizards and rats! You can imagine the dysentery afterwards! We had the shits so bad that along that road, I'd say that for centuries to come you'll find the tallest, greenest grass of anywhere in the world!

Some of us were dying, because Chiang Kai Shek's soldiers, the white bandits, were shooting at us.... from all sides.... every day.... We were caught in a trap.... we'd find them lying in wait for us in the villages, and they'd poison the well-water, and we were dying, dying, dying.

Well, we got to Shanghai, and we continued out the other side. Before long we saw the enormous Himalaya Mountains in front of us. And our leaders told us: "Stop here. There might be an ambush here.... Up the mountainside, there might be some of Chiang Kai Shek's white bandits, waiting to ambush us as we go up the gorge. So, all of you in the rearguard, climb up, and guard our rear while we're going through."

So, we scrambled up, right up to the top of the ridge, so as to make sure that nobody up there started shooting up our backsides! And our comrades marched, and marched and marched, filing past, and we cheered them on:

"Don't worry, we're here. We'll look after you.... Move along, move along, move along!"

It took almost a whole day for all the soldiers to pass. Finally it was our turn to go up the gorge. We come down from our look-outs.

"But now who's going to guard *our* rears?"

We came down from our sentry-posts, very nervous. We took a careful look down the valley floor. Then, all of a sudden, just as we were entering the mouth of the gorge, those bandits suddenly popped out, up above, and started shooting at us: Blim, blam, blam....! I saw two big rocks. I dived in between them, under cover, and started shooting: blam! I looked out.... and realised that my left leg was still sticking out from behind the rock.

"Hell, let's hope they don't notice my leg."

BLAM!

"Nyaaah!" They noticed! I copped a bullet right in the leg.... The bullet went in one side and out the other. It grazed one testicle, almost hit the second, and if I'd had a third one, it would have blown it to hell! Ooouch, the pain!

"Oh hell," I said, "They've hit the bone!" But no, the bone was untouched.

"They've hit the artery.... " But no, the blood's not spurting.

I grabbed my leg and squeezed and squeezed and stopped the blood running. Then I got up and tried to carry on. Gently, gently. But then, two days later I started to get a fever, a fever that set my heart pounding so hard that I could feel it down in my big toe: boom, boom, boom. My knee puffed up like a balloon, and I had a big swelling here in my groin. "It's gangrene! Damn and damn again, it's gangrene!"

The putrefying flesh began to give off a bad smell all around me, and my comrades told me: "Hey, do you think you could keep back a bit; you stink pretty bad, you know...."

They cut two long, thick bamboo canes, maybe 8 or 10 metres long. Two of my comrades decided to march, one in front of the other, holding the bamboo canes on their shoulders, while I went between the two of them, with the poles supporting my armpits, so

that I could walk, without putting too much weight on my leg. They marched with their faces turned away, and their noses blocked so as not to smell the stench.

One night, we were within reach of what they call the "Great Green Sea", and all night I'd been screaming, swearing and shouting for my mother. In the morning, one of the soldiers, my comrade, who is as dear to me as my brother, pulled out an enormous pistol. He pointed it here. (*He points to his forehead*): "You're in too much pain, it's too much to see you suffering like this, let me do it.... just one bullet, and it'll all be over."

"Thank you for your solidarity and your understanding," I said. "I realise that it's said with the best of intentions, but I think we'll leave that for another time. Don't go worrying yourself. I'll kill myself, myself, when the time comes. I want to fight, fight to live! Go ahead, leave me, because I can see that you can't go on carrying me like this. Go on, go on! Just leave me a gun, a blanket and a a bit of rice in a mess tin!"

And so off they went. They left me. And as they struggled through the mud of that "green sea", I began to shout after them:

"Hey, comrades, comrades.... Hell....! Don't tell my mother that I died putrefied. Tell her that it was a bullet, and that I was laughing when it hit me! Ha, ha! Hey!"

But they didn't turn round. They pretended that they hadn't heard me, so that they wouldn't have to turn round and let me see. And I knew the reason: their faces were all streaked with tears....

I dropped to the ground. I wrapped myself in the blanket, and I fell asleep.

I don't know why, but as I slept, I had a nightmare. I dreamt that the sky was full of clouds, and they suddenly split open, and a great sea of water came gushing down. Whoomf! A huge, frightening crash of thunder! I woke up. It really was a sea! I was in the middle of a storm, and all the rivers and streams were breaking their banks, and flooding the valley. The water was rising fast: splish, splash, splish.... And before I knew it, it was up to my knees.

"Hell, instead of dying from gangrene, I'm going to end up drownded!"

Slowly, slowly, slowly, I clambered up a steep slope covered in scree. I had to hang on to branches with my teeth, just to get a hold. I broke all my nails. Once I was up on the ridge, I started running, dragging my useless leg behind me, so as to get across the

plateau. I dived into a raging stream, and swam and swam till I reached the other side. I clambered up the bank, and all of a sudden, right in front of me.... Hey! A big cave! A cavern. I threw myself inside:

"Saved! I'm not going to die drowned.... I'm going to die of gangrene!"

I look around. It's dark. My eyes get used to the dark.... and I see bones, a carcase of an animal that has been eaten, an enormous carcase.... an excessive carcase!

"But what kind of animal eats like this?! Let's hope it's moved out.... and taken its family with it! Let's hope they've all drowned in the flood!"

Anyway, I go to the back of the cave.... I lay down on the ground. Once again, I start to feel my heart beating, boom, boom, throbbing right down in my big toe.

"I'm dying, I'm dying, I'm dying, I'm going to die."

All of a sudden, I see a shadow in the cave entrance. A figure, picked out against the light. An enormous head. What a head! Two yellow eyes, with two black stripes for pupils.... eyes as big as lanterns. What an enormous beast! A tiger!! A tigress the size of an elephant! Oh hell!

In her mouth she's got a tiger cub. Its belly is all swollen up with water. It looks like a sausage, like a little football. She tosses it onto the cave floor.... Thud.... She starts pressing with her paw.... on its belly.... Water comes out.... Schplock.... from its mouth: it's stone dead, drowned.

There's another tiger cub too, wobbling around its mother's legs, looking like it's got a melon in its belly. This one is dragging a bellyful of water too. The tigress raises her head. She takes a sniff: sniff, sniff.... Sniffing the air in the cave....

"Hell, if she likes high meat, I'm done for!"

She fixes on me.... she comes towards me.... Here she comes.... That head, getting bigger, and bigger.... ! I feel my hair beginning to stand on end, so stiff that it makes a noise....! Creeeak.... Then my other hairs start bristling too.... in my ears, in my nose.... and other hairs as well! A brush!

"She's coming, she's coming, here she is.... next to me.... She sniffs me all over."

"Roooar!"

And off she went, slinking off to the back of the cave, where she lay down. Then she grabbed her son, the cub, and pulled him against her belly. I looked: her teats were full of milk, almost full to bursting, because it must have been days and days that nobody had sucked milk from them, with all that water flooding down outside. In addition to which, one of her children, the other tiger cub, was dead, drowned.... So, the mother shoved the little one's head next to her teat and said:

"Roooar!"

And the tiger cub:

"Rooar!"

"Roooar!"

"Roooar!"

"Rooar!"

"Roooar!"

A family row! That poor kid of a tiger cub was right: he was like a little barrel, filled to the brim with water.... what do you expect.... ? Anyway, the tiger cub ran off to the back of the cave.... and started making a fuss.

"Rooar!"

The tigress is furious! She gets up, turns round, and fixes her beady eye.... on me! On me??!! Oh hell, she gets angry at her son, and then she comes to take it out one me?! What's it got to do with me? Hey, now look, I'm not even one of the family! Creeeak! Creeeak! (*He imitates the sound of his hairs standing on end again*) The brush!

She comes over to me, with her great big headlamp eyes. She turns sideways on, and, smack! I get a teat in my face.

"But what kind of way is this to kill people, hitting them with your tit?"

She turns her head to look at me, and says:

"Rooar!"

As if to say: "Suck!"

With two fingers I take her nipple, and go to put it in my mouth.

"Thank you. If it makes you any happier..." (*He mimes taking a little sip from the tit*)

I should never have done it! She turned round, with a mean look

on her face:

"Rooar!"

God help anyone who spurns the hospitality of lady tigers! They go wild! Animals, they are! So I took her tit and... schloop, schloop, schloop... (*He mimes drinking fast and greedily from her teat*) Marvellous! Tiger milk... marvellous! A bit bitter, but, my dear boy... so creamy: it went slithering down, and rolled around in my empty stomach... Slither, slither, slither. Then it found my first intestine... Splosh: it spread through all my other empty intestines... Fifteen days that I hadn't eaten. Schloop, schloop, schloop. The milk swilled around and began to revitalise my intestine! Then, when I finished, schloop, schloop, schloop, I folded it neatly away. (*He mimes the action of tucking up the empty teat, like a salt wrapper*)

"Thank you."

She takes a step forward, wham: another tit! It's incredible how many teats tigers have got! A battery of tits — a tittery! I began sucking, first one, then the next, then the next. I kept wanting to spit a bit of the milk out... but she was always stood there, watching me, keeping an eye on me...

I thought to myself, if I spit out so much as one drop of her milk, she's going to eat me whole. So I didn't even stop for breath: schloop, schloop, schloop! I sucked, and sucked. The milk went down, and I began to feel suffocated: splish, splash, splosh, I could hear the milk going down, even into the veins in my leg. And maybe it was just my imagination, but I thought that I felt my heart beginning to beat a bit less strongly. And I felt the milk going into my lungs too. I had milk everywhere.

Then I finished, and, wham: the tigress turned round. Oh what...?! Another tittery! I felt as if I was in a factory, on the assembly line. My belly was getting fuller and fuller, more and more swollen. I was in such a state, squatting there, with my swollen belly, that I felt like a Buddha. Burp, burp, burp... repeater-action burps. And I had my buttocks clenched tighter than a duck's arse in water!

"If I get dysentery from this milk, I'll end up shitting myself, and then she's going to get angry... she'll grab me, dunk me in the milk like I was a biscuit dunked in a cup of coffee, and she'll eat me whole!"

I sucked, I sucked, and by the end, suckety-suck, my friend, I was engulfed, flooded, drunk with milk. I was just about out for

the count. I could feel milk coming out of my ears, and my nose. I was gurgling inside! Splutter, I could hardly breathe... Splutter!"

At the end of the sitting, the tigress gave me a big lick, running her tongue from my chin to my forehead: schlooop! My eyebrows moved up a full inch — I looked like a mandarin. Then she went slinking off to the back of the cave... she lay down on the ground, and fell asleep... The cub was already asleep. And I, filled to bursting, just sat there. (*He sits in a Buddha-like position*)

"If I so much as move even my eyes, I'm going to burst: schplumpf!"

■

I don't remember how or when, but I fell asleep, calm and peaceful as a baby. In the morning I woke up. I'd already emptied out a bit.... I don't know what happened, but the ground was all soaked in milk....

I look round for the tigress. She's not there. Neither is the cub. They've gone off... Maybe they've gone out for a piss. I wait for a while... I was worried. Every time I heard a noise outside, I was scared that maybe some wild animal was coming to pay a visit. Some wild animal, which would come into the cave. I could hardly say:

"I'm sorry, the lady of the house isn't in. She's gone out. Could you come back later? Maybe you'd like to leave a message... "

I worried and waited. Finally, that evening, the tigress returned. All smooth and slinky. Her nipples were a bit swollen again with milk, but not like the day before, when they were almost bursting: this time they were about half full, just about right, and behind her came the tiger cub. No sooner had the tigress entered the cave than she gives a sniff. She takes a look around, sees me, and says:

"Roooar."

As if to say: "What? You still here?"

And the tiger cub passes comment too:

"Roooar."

And off they went to the back of the cave. The tigress lay down. By now, the cub's belly was a little less swollen with water, but every now and then: Buurp! He vomited up a drop or two, and then laid himself down next to his mum. His mum gently took hold of his head, and pushed it close to her teat:

"Roooar!" (*He mimes the tiger-cub refusing to drink*)

The tigress:

"Roooar!"

"Roooar!"

The tiger cub went scuttling off. He'd had enough of liquid refreshment! (*He mimes the tigress turning and looking at the soldier. And the soldier, resignedly, goes over to drink his milk*)

"Schloop, schloop, schloop". What a life! And while I was sucking on her teats, all of a sudden she began licking my wound:

"Oh hell, she's trying me for taste! If she decides she likes me, while I'm sucking on her at one end, she'll be eating me from the other!"

But no, she was licking. Licking. She was seeing to my wound.

She started sucking out all the poison in the swelling. Screeek... Splosh! She spat it out! She spat it all out! Bliyaah! Hell, what a splendid tiger! She was spreading her saliva, that special tiger saliva, all over the wound. And all of a sudden I remembered that tiger balm is a wonderful, miraculous healing agent, a medicine. I remembered that when I was a kid, in my village, we used to have little old men coming round, folk doctors, medicine men, who would turn up with little pots full of tiger balm. And they'd go round saying:

"Come on, ladies! Can't you produce milk? Then smear your breasts with this balm, and presto! You'll get two big breasts, full to bursting! And you old folk, are your teeth falling out? One smear over the gums... and your teeth will stay put like fangs! Any of you got boils, warts, scabs... an infection? One drop, and away they go! Cures every illness!

It's true, that balm really was miraculous! And it really was tiger balm, it wasn't a trick. They went looking for it themselves. Just think of the courage of those old fellows, those doctors; off they went, all by themselves, to take tigers' saliva, from inside the tiger's mouth, while she was sleeping, with her mouth wide open. Schplook...! Schplook! (*He mimes rapidly gathering the saliva*) And off they went. You could always recognise one of these doctors, because they usually had one arm slightly shorter than the other! (*He mimes a person with one arm shorter than the other*) Industrial injuries!

Anyway, maybe it was my imagination, but, as she was licking and sucking at me, I felt my blood thinning out all over again, and my

big toe began to feel like it felt before, and my knee began to loosen up... My knee was moving! Hell, this is the life! I was so happy that I began to sing while I was sucking: whistling and blowing. Oh what a mistake! Instead of sucking on her teat, I blew into it: whoosh... whoosh... whoosh, a balloon as big as this! (*He mimes quickly deflating the teat before the tigress notices*) ...All gone! And the tigress was happy as anything, with a face like this: (*He mimes the tigress's expression of satisfaction*) She gave me the usual lick, and off to the back of the cave. Now, I should mention that while the mother was licking me, the tiger cub was there, looking on, very curious. And when his mother had finished, he came over to me, with his little tongue hanging out, as if to say:

"Can I have a lick too?"

Tiger cubs are like children. Everything that they see their mothers do, they want to do too.

"You want a lick? Well, watch out for those little itsy-bitsy sharp teeth of yours." (*He threatens the tiger cub with his fist*) "Watch out that you don't bite me, eh!

So he came over to me... Tickle, tickle... tickle... He gave me a lick with that little tongue of his, which tickled like anything. Then, after a bit: Oooch! A bite! He had his testicles right there, close to me. Bam! (*He mimes giving a punch*) A right-hander! Screeech! Like a scalded cat! The cub began running round the cave wall, like a trick motor cyclist at a circus!

One should always ensure respect from tigers, starting when they're young!

And in fact, from that moment on, my friend, every time the cub came close to me, he didn't just walk by. Oh no, he was very careful! He walked by like this. (*With his arms and legs rigid, moving one in front of the other alternately, he mimes the tiger walking sideways-on, careful to keep a safe distance, and covering himself from any further blows to the testicles*)

So, the tigress was asleep. The tiger cub fell asleep too, and I followed soon after. That night, I slept a deep, deep sleep. I wasn't in pain any more. I dreamed that I was at home, with my wife, dancing, and with my mother, singing. In the morning, when I woke, there was no sign either of the tigress or of her cub. They'd already gone out.

"But what kind of family is this? They don't stay at home for a moment! And now who's going to look after my wound? Those two are capable of staying out and about for days on end".

I waited. Night came. Still they didn't return.

"What kind of mother do you call that? A child as young as that, and she's taking him out, walking the streets all night! What's going to become of him when he grows up?! He'll be a little animal!"

The following day, they returned, at dawn. At dawn! Just like that, as if nothing had happened. The tigress had an enormous animal in her mouth. I don't know what it was. A huge goat that she'd killed, about the size of a cow... with huge great horns! The tiger came into the cave: slam, she tossed it to the ground. The cub parades in front of me, and says:

"Rooar!"

As if to say: "It was me that killed it!" (*He shows his fist threateningly, and mimes the reaction of the tiger cub, who is terrified and starts walking sideways-on*)

Anyway, let's get back to the goat. The tigress whips out a huge claw. She tosses the goat on its back, with its feet up in the air. Scritch... a deep gash. Scriitch again. She tears open its whole stomach, its belly. She pulls out its innards, all its intestines, its heart, its spleen... Scriitch... scratch... she scrapes it clean as a whistle... and the tiger cub... plip, plop... leapt right inside! And the tigress... a flaming fury! Rooar!"

You see, you should never climb into a tiger's lunch... They get very upset!

Then the tigress buried her whole head in the animal's belly, in the empty stomach... And the tiger cub was in there too... What a terrible din... ! Yum... Yum... Slurp.... Scrick... Enough to burst your eardrums!

Within an hour they had eaten everything in sight! All the bones gnawed clean. All that was left was part of the animal's rear end — its tail, its thigh, its knee, and the great big hoof at the end. The tigress turned round and said:

"Roooar."

As if to say: "Are you hungry?"

She picked up the leg, and tossed it over in my direction:

"Rooar..."

As if to say: "Try this little snack." (*He mimes being unable to handle the situation*)

"Yuk... ! Me, eat that?! But that stuff's tough as old boots. I

don't have teeth like yours... Look at it! It's so hard, it's more like leather! And what about all that fat, with the hide... all these lumps of gristle... Now, if we had a fire here, so that we could put it on to roast for a couple of hours... ! Hell, a fire! That's right, the flood has washed down a whole lot of roots and stumps.

So, I went out, since I was already able to walk again, even though I was still limping a bit: I went out in front of the cave, where there were some tree stumps and trunks. I started dragging some good big bits inside, and then some branches, and then I made a pile about so-high. Then I took some dry grass, and some leaves that were lying around. Then I put the two horns in the shape of a cross, along with another couple of bones, at the other end, and between them I put the goat-leg, spit-style. Then I went out looking for some round stones, sulphur stones, which make sparks when you knock them against each other. I found two good big ones, and started to rub them together.

Scritch... scritch... (*He mimes rubbing the two stones together*) Hopla! A shower of sparks... Tigers are scared of fire. Ha! I hear the tiger at the back of the cave:

"Roooar!" (*He mimes bristling menacingly*)

"Well, what's up? You've eaten your dirty disgusting meat, haven't you? All raw and dripping with blood? Well, if you don't mind, I prefer mine cooked. So scram!" (*He mimes the tigress, cowering, frightened*)

One should always get the upper hand over the female of the species! Even if she is wild! So I sat myself down with my two stones.. Scritch... Scritch... Hopla... Fire! The fire caught the grass, then the leaves, and the flames started rising: niiice... ! And all the fat began to roast, and the melted fat went down into the fire... And a thick cloud of black smoke rose to the cave roof... and drifted towards the back of the cave. And as the cloud of smoke reached the tiger, she went:

"Atchoo!" (*A roar which suggests a sneeze*)

"Is the smoke bothering you? Well scram, then! And you, Tiggles!" (*He threatens the tiger cub with his fist, and mimes the frightened cub walking out, sideways on*) "Out!"

And I roast and roast and baste and baste and turn and turn. Schloop... Screeek... Pssss... But then I think it doesn't quite smell right.

"If only I could find something to flavour this meat with!"

Hey, that's right! Outside I remember seeing some wild garlic.

I go out. In the clearing there, yes, right in front of the cave... I pick a good handful of wild garlic. Scrick... Then I see a green shoot — I pull it up:

"Wild onion!"

And I find some hot peppers... I take a flake of bone. I make some cuts in the thigh, and I stuff the cloves of garlic inside, together with the onion, and the peppers. Then I go looking for some salt, because sometimes you find rock salt in caves. I find saltpetre.

"Well, that will have to do, although saltpetre's a bit bitter sometimes. What's more, there's the problem that it might explode with the fire. But never mind, I'll just have to watch out."

I stuff some pieces of saltpetre into the cuts. And in fact, after a while, the flames... Blim... blam... crackle... And the tigress:

"Roooar." (*He mimes the tigress getting frightened*)

"This is men's business! Get out, out of my kitchen!"

Round and round and round goes the meat... By now it's giving off a lovely clean smoke. And what an aroma! After an hour, my friend, the smell that came off that meat was divine.

"Haha, what a meal!"

Screeek: I pull off a strip of meat. (*He mimes tasting it*) Schloop, schloop.

"Hey, that's good!"

It's been years and years since I last ate as well as this. It's really tasty, delicate, sweet.

I looked round, and there was the tiger cub... He had just come in. And he stood there, licking his whiskers.

"Oh I see... so you want a taste too? But you're not going to like this stuff. Do you really want some? Look. (*He mimes cutting a piece of meat and throwing it to the tiger, who gulps it down*) Hopla!"

The tiger cub had a taste, swallowed it, and then said:

"Roooar."

"Was that good? Do you like it... ? You bad-mannered thing!! Here, take this, hopla!" (*Again he mimes cutting off some meat and throwing it, and the tiger cub stuffing it down*)

"Roooar... Swallow... Yum... Oooh... !"

"Thank you, thank you... Yes, all my own cooking. Would you like some more? Watch out, because if your mother finds out that you've been eating this stuff... !"

I cut off a nice piece of fillet:

"I'll keep this bit for myself, but I'm going to leave the rest, because there's too much for me. Here you are, you can have the leg." (*He mimes throwing the goat's leg to the tiger cub*)

Blam... He got it full in the face, and it sent him flying. He picked it up, and started dragging it around, like a drunkard. Then his mother turned up: what a row!

"Roooar... What are you eating there... that disgusting burnt meat? Come here, give it here... Roooar."

"Roooar. Oooh. Rooar."

A piece of the meat happens to end up in the mother's mouth. She swallows it. She likes it. "Roooar... Yum... Rooar!" said the mother.

"Roooar... Yum!" answered the tiger cub. (*He mimes the mother and the cub fighting over the meat*) A quarrel!!

"Screek... Schloop... Nyum..."

I ask you! The bone! Stripped bare! Then the tigress turns towards me, and says:

"Roooar, isn't there any more?"

"Hey, this is mine!" (*Pointing to the piece of meat that he had cut off shortly before*)

As I was eating, the tigress came close to me... I thought that she wanted to eat my meat, but instead she was coming over to lick my wound to make it better. What a marvellous person! She licked me, and then she went over to her part of the cave. She sprawled out on the ground. Her kid was already asleep, and I soon fell asleep myself.

When I woke up in the morning, the tigers had already gone out. This was getting to be a habit! I waited all day, and there was still no sign of them. They didn't even turn up for supper. I was getting a bit nervous! The day after, they still hadn't come back!

"Who's going to lick me? Who's going to look after my wound? You can't go off leaving people alone at home like this!"

They finally turned up three days later.

"Now I'm going to have a showdown!"

Instead I stood there, struck speechless: the tigress came in, and in her mouth she had a whole animal, double the size of the last one! A wild bison, or something... I don't know what it was! And the tiger cub was helping her to carry it, too. Both of them came into the cave... Whoomf, sideways on... as if drunk with the effort... Whoomf... they came over to me. Thud... (*He mimes the tigers putting the dead animal in front of him.*)

The tigress says:

"Pant... Pant... " (*He imitates the panting of the tigress*) And then:

"Roooar."

As if to say: "Cook that!"

(*He makes as if to tear his hair, in desperation*) What a terrible thing! You should never let tigers develop bad habits!

"But, excuse me, tiger, I'm afraid you've misunderstood. You don't think that I'm going to stand here, getting scorched, slaving over a hot stove, while you go out enjoying yourself, eh? What do you think I've become? A housewife?!" (*He mimes the tiger rearing up as if to attack him*)

"Roooar!"

"Stop! Hey, hey... Hey! At least we can talk about it, can't we? What's the matter, don't we talk about things any more? Let's have a bit of dialectics... ! Alright, alright... Hey... ! Don't get all worked up about it! Alright, I'll be the cook... I'll do the cooking. But you're going to have to go and get the wood."

"Roooar?" (*He mimes the tigress pretending not to understand*)

"Don't play dumb with me. You know what wood is, don't you! Look, come outside here. You see those things sticking up? That's wood. Bring all those bits in here. "

She had indeed understood. She set to straight away, gathering wood, all the stumps and trunks, going to and fro, so that after an hour, the cave was half full.

"And hey, you, tiger cub! A lovely life, eh? With your hands in your pockets?" (*Turning to the audience*)

He really did have his hands in his pockets! He had his claws tucked in, and, arms akimbo, he was standing with his paws on two black tiger stripes, one here and one here. (*He puts his hands on his hips*) Just as if he had his hands in his pockets!

"Come on! Work! I'll tell you what you're going to have to do: onion, wild garlic, wild pepper, everything wild."

"Roooar??"

"You don't know what I'm talking about? Alright then, I'll show you. Look, over there, that is onion, and this is a pepper."

The poor thing spent ages going to and fro, with his mouth full of garlic, pepper and onions... Ha... ! And after two or three days, his breath smelt so overpowering that you couldn't get near him. What a stink!

And there I was, all day long, over the fire, roasting. I was getting burnt to a frazzle... My knees singed, my testicles shrivelled. I had my face all scorched; my eyes were watering; my hair was scorched too, red in front and white behind! After all, I could hardly cook with my backside, could I! What a life! And the tigers — they would eat, then go for a piss, and then come back to sleep. I ask you: what kind of a life was that?!

■

Anyway, one night when I was feeling scorched all over, I told myself:

"That's enough... ! I've had enough. I'm leaving."

While the two of them were sleeping, fed to bursting, half drunk with food, which I had done on purpose, I crept off on all fours towards the cave exit. I was just about to go out, I was almost out... when the tiger cub woke up and started yelling:

"Roooar... Mummy, he's running away!"

Rotten little spy of a tiger cub! One of these days I'm going to tear your balls off with my bare hands, roast them and serve them up to your mum for dinner!"

But it's raining! All of a sudden, it started to rain. I remembered that tigers have this terrible fear of water. So I dived out of the cave and began running down the side of the mountain towards the river... I hurled myself into the river... and started swimming... swimming... swimming! The tigers came to the mouth of the cave:

"Roooar!"

And I answered:

"Roooar!" (*He transforms the mimed action of swimming into a two-finger gesture*)

I reached the other bank of the river. I started running. I walked for days, weeks, a month, two months... I don't remember how long I walked. I found not one house or hut, not a single village. I was in forest all the time. Finally, I ended up on a little hill, looking out, down into the valley below. It was farmland. I saw houses down there, a village... A village! With a village square, where there were women, children and men!

"Hey... People!"

I ran tumbling down the hillside.

"I'm safe, people! I'm alive! I'm a soldier of the Fourth Army, that's what I am... "

No sooner did they see me arrive than they began shouting:

"It's death! A ghost!"

And they all ran off into their little houses. And they locked themselves in, barring and chaining their doors.

"But why... what do you mean, a ghost... No, people...!"

I passed in front of a glass window, and happened to catch sight of my reflection. I scared myself silly: my hair was all white and standing on end. My face was all scorched, red and black. My eyes looked like burning coals! I really did look like death! I ran to a fountain, and jumped in... I washed myself; I rubbed myself down with sand, all over. Then I came out, all clean.

"People, come out! Touch me... I'm a real man. Flesh and blood. Warm... Come and feel me... I'm not a ghost."

They came out, a bit scared at first. Some of the men, some of the women, and the children, touched me...

And as they touched me, I told my story: (*He runs through his story again, very fast, semi-grammelot*)

"I'm in the Fourth Army. I've come down from Manchuria. They shot me up in the Himalayas. They got me in the leg, and grazed my first testicle, my second testicle, and if I'd had a third they would have blown it clean away... Then, three days, gangrene... He points the pistol at me: "Thanks, save it for another time". Boom. I fell asleep. Boom, it's raining, and water, water. Boom, I'm in a cave, and a tigress turns up... . drowned tiger cub... And she came towards me. All my hairs stood on end... A brush! Ha!

Breast-feeding. And I suck, suck, just to keep her happy, and

she turns round, and there's another tittery... ! Then the other one comes over: blam! A punch in the testicles... And then, the next time: whoomf, a huge animal. And I roast, roast, red in front, white behind! Wham! Mummy, he's running away! I'll pull your bollocks off, you! Roooar! And that's how I got away!"

While I was telling my story, they stood there, giving each other meaningful looks. They said:

"Poor fellow, he's brain's gone for a walk... He must have had a terrible fright, the poor devil's gone mad... "

And I replied:

"Don't you believe me?"

"But yes, yes, of course we do. It's normal to drink milk from tigers' teats... Everyone drinks milk from tigers' teats! Round these parts there are people who have grown up drinking milk from tigers. Every now and then you see them going off. "Where are you going?" "To drink milk from a tiger's tits". Not to mention cooked meat! Oh... How they love it! Oh yes, tigers are real gluttons for their cooked meat!! In fact, we've set up a canteen, specially for tigers... They come down, specially, every week, so as to eat with us!"

I got the impression that they were taking the mickey, a bit.

At that moment, we heard a tiger, roaring: "Rooar". A mighty roar! Up on the mountainside you could see the profile of two tigers. The tigress, and the tiger cub. The tiger cub by now was almost as big as his mother. Months had gone by... Just imagine it, after so much time, they had managed to find me! It must have been the stink that I left in my wake... !

"Roooar."

All the people of the village started shouting and screaming:

"Help! The tigers!"

And there they went, running off into their houses and bolting themselves in.

"Stop, don't run away... Those are my friends. Those are the ones I told you about. The tiger cub and the tigress that suckled me. Come out, don't be afraid."

Both the tigers came down. Pad... pad... pad... And when they were twenty yards away, the mother tigress started her row with me! What a row!

"Roooar! There's a fine reward, after everything I've done for you, after I saved your life. Roooar. And I even licked you! Roooar. Which is something that I wouldn't even have done for my own man... for one of my own family... Roooar. And you walked out and left me. Roooar. And you taught us how to eat cooked meat, so that now every time... Roooar... that we eat raw meat, we want to throw up... and we get dysentery... and we're sick for weeks... Rooar!"

And to this, I replied:

"Roooar. Well, so what? Don't forget that I saved you too, by drinking your milk, because otherwise you would have burst... Roooar! And what about when I stood there, cooking and slaving, with my balls getting all scorched and dried up, eh? Roooar! And you, there, behave yourself, because, even if you are grown up now... " (*He threatens the tiger cub with his fist*)

Then, you know how these things are, when a family loves each other... We made our peace. I gave her a little tickle under the chin... The tigress gave me a lick... and the tiger cub gave me his paw... And I gave him a wallop... And I pulled his mother's tail a bit... And then I gave her a whack on the tits, which she likes... and a kick in the bollocks for the tiger cub, and he was pleased too. (*Turning to the people locked in their houses*) Alright! Row's over. We've made peace again... Don't be afraid, don't be afraid!" (*To the tigers*)

"Hey, you'd better keep all your teeth in, like this. Ummm. (*He completely covers his own teeth with his lips*) Don't let them see them. Ummm. And keep your claws in your paws. Hide your claws, under your armpits... Walk on your elbows, like this." (*He indicates how*)

The people began to come out... A couple of them stroked the tigress's head...

"Oh, isn't she lovely... !" "Ooochy coochy coochy... And look at the little one... Coochy-coo... "

Endless lickings, little tickles, head-scratchings, and for the tiger cub too. Then the children, four of the children, got up on the tigress's back. The four of them got up there, and, schloop, schloop, schloop... the tigress walked too and fro, like a horse. Then she lay down, and stretched out. Then four other young lads grabbed the tiger cub's tail, and started dragging him off. (*He mimes the tiger cub being dragged backwards, and trying to stop himself by digging his claws into the ground*)

"Roooar."

And I was there, walking behind, to keep an eye on him. (*Waving his fist*) Because tigers have long memories!

Then they began to play, rolling around and doing somersaults. You should have seen them: they played all day, with the women, and with the children, and with the dogs, and with the cats, although every now and then one of the cats disappeared, but nobody noticed, because there were so many of them anyway!

■

One day, while they were there romping around, we heard the voice of one of the peasants, a little old fellow, coming down from the mountains, yelling:

"Help, people, help! The white bandits have arrived at my village! They're killing all our horses, they're killing our cows. They're carrying off our pigs... and they're carrying off our women too. Come and help us... bring your rifles... "

And the people replied:

"But we haven't got any rifles!"

"But we do have the tigers!" said I.

So we take the tigers... Plod... plod... plod... scramble... scramble... We go up the hill, and we go down the other side, to the other village. There were the soldiers of Chiang Kai Shek, shooting, stealing, looting and killing.

"The tigers!"

"Roooar!"

The minute they saw these two beasts and heard them roaring, the soldiers of Chiang Kai Shek dropped their trousers, shat on their shoes... and off they ran!

And from that day on, every time that Chiang Kai Shek's men arrived in one of the nearby villages, they used to come and call us:

"The tigers!"

And off we'd go. Sometimes they used to turn up from two different places at the same time. They wanted us all over the region. They even used to come and book us a week in advance. One time, twelve villages turned up all at once... What were we going to do?

"We've only got two tigers... We can't be everywhere at once... What are we going to do?"

"Fake ones! We'll make fake tigers!" I said.

"What do you mean, fake?"

"Simple. We've got the model here. Well, we make heads out of a mixture of glue and paper, papier mache. We make a mask. We make holes for the eyes, just the same as the tiger and the tiger cub, and then we make a hinged jaw. One person goes inside, like this, in the head, and goes: Squink... squink... squink... moving their arms... Then another one gets in behind the first one, and then a third one, behind, with his arm out behind, to be the tail, like this. Then, to end up with, we need a piece of cloth to go over the top, a yellow cloth. All yellow, with black stripes. And we'd better make sure to cover their legs, because six legs for one tiger is a bit excessive. Then we're going to have to roar. So, now we're going to have roaring lessons. Let's have you, over here. All those who are going to be fake tigers, over here. We're going to start lessons, and the tigers will be our teachers. Come on. Let's hear how well you can roar!!

"Roar!" There you are. Now, you, repeat. (*He turns to one of the peasants*)

"Rooar!"

"Again."

"Rooar."

"Louder. Listen to the tiger cub."

"Roooar!"

"Again."

"Roooar."

"Again. Louder!"

"Roooar."

"In chorus!" (*He begins conducting like the conductor of an orchestra*) "Rooooarrr!"

All day long there was such a racket in the village, that a poor old man who was passing by, a traveller, was found stone dead, behind a wall. He died from fright. (*He mimes someone frozen stiff, like a statue*)

But this time, when Chiang Kai Shek's soldiers came back again, they saw, they heard, and they screamed:

"The tigers!!!"

"Roooarrr!"

Off they ran, and they didn't stop till they got to the sea. And then, one of the Party's political commissars came to see us, and applauded us, and said:

"Well done, well done! This invention of the tiger is extraordinary. The people has a degree of inventiveness and imagination, a creativity that you'll not find anywhere else in the world. Well done! Well done! However, from now on, you really can't keep the tigers with you. You're going to have to send them back to the forest, as they were before."

"But why? We like our tigers... we're friends... we're comrades... They protect us, and there's no need... "

"We cannot allow it. Tigers are anarchistically inclined. They lack dialectics. We cannot assign a role in the Party to tigers, and if they have no place in the Party, then they have no place at the base either. They have no dialectics. Obey the Party. Take the tigers back to the forest."

So we agreed:

"Ok, then, we'll take them back to the forest."

But we didn't. Instead, we put them in a chicken coop. We took out the chickens, and put the tigers in instead. The tigers on the chickens' perch, like this... (*He mimes tigers swinging to and fro on a perch*) And when the Party bureaucrats came by, we had already taught the tigers what they had to do:

"Cock a doodle doo!" (*He imitates the crowing of a cockerel*)

The Party bureaucrat took one look, scratched his head, and said: "Obviously a tiger cock", and away he went.

And just as well that we had kept the tigers, because, a short while after, the Japanese arrived! Thousands of them, little fellows, really mean, with bandy legs, their bums trailing along the ground, with great big swords and enormous long rifles. With white flags, with a red circle in the middle, on their rifles, and another flag on their helmets, and another flag up their bums, with another red circle and the rays of the rising sun!

"The tigers!!!"

"Rooarr!!!"

They chucked the flags from their rifles, and they chucked the flags from their helmets! All that was left was the one up their bums. Zoom... whoosh... they ran off, like a load of chickens!

This time a new Party leader turned up, and he told us:

"Well done, you did well to disobey that other Party commissar, the last time, because, apart from anything else, he was a revisionist, a counter-revolutionary. You did well... ! You must always keep the tigers present, when the enemy is around. But as from now on, you won't need them any more. The enemy has gone... Take the tigers back into the forest now!"

"What, again?"

"Obey the Party!"

"Is this because of the dialectics?"

"Yes indeed!"

"Alright, fair enough!

But we didn't. We still kept them in their chicken coop. And just as well, because once again Chiang Kai Shek's men turned up, armed by the Americans: with their artillery and their tanks. They came pouring down. Thousands, thousands of them.

"The tigers!!!"

"Roooarr!"

And off they ran, like the wind! We chased them off to the other side of the sea. And now there were no more enemies. No more at all. And once again all the party leaders arrived. All the leadership, with their flags in their hands... And the flags were waving... and they were applauding us! The fellows from the Party, and those from the Army. And the higher coordinating intermediary cadres. And the higher, higher intermediary central coordinating cadres. All of them, applauding and shouting:

"Well done! Well done! Well done! You were right to disobey. The tiger must always remain with the people, because it is part of the people, an invention of the people. The tiger will always be of the people... In a museum... No. In a zoo... It can live there!"

"What do you mean, in a zoo?"

"Obey! You don't need them now, any more. There's no need for the tigress now, because we don't have any more enemies. There's just the People, the Party, and the Army. And the People and the Party and the Army are one and the same thing. Naturally, we have a leadership, because if you don't have a leadership, you don't have a head, and if there's no head, then one is missing that dimension of expressive dialectic which determines a line of conduct which naturally begins from the top, but then develops at the base, where it gathers and debates the propositions put forward by

the top, not as an inequality of power, but as a sort of series of determinate and invariate equations, because they are applied in a factive coordinative horizontal mode — which is also vertical — of those actions which are posed in the positions taken up in the theses, and which are then developed from the base, in order to return from the base to the leadership, but as between the base and the leadership there is always a positive and reciprocal relationship of democracy... ."

"THE TIIIIGERS!" (*He mimes the people attacking the Party leaders*)

"Aaaaaaargh!"

THE END

Edinburgh Archive and Information Exchange Project

We have recently begun to compile an archive of documents (newspaper and journal cuttings, letters, circulars, leaflets, posters, papers, articles etc.) on the currently proposed social legislation and the opposition to it. The archive is concerned with the following areas : housing, the poll tax, social security and employment legislation, trade unions, women, race and immigration, labour markets and unemployment, training and education. At present there are about five people involved, and the project is currently set to run (at present on an unfunded basis) until April 1988. As our ability to collect and compile information on these areas is limited by the contacts and information sources we have as well as the lack of funds, we are interested in any relevant material of any sort available that you could tell us about/send to us. We are producing an index of interested individuals and campaining groups and hope to produce publicity concerning meetings, conferences, demonstrations etc. in a regular bulletin. The archive has now been in existence for about two months and consists of roughly 1000 indexed items, and is available for consultation and contributions.

CONSULTATION. At present the archive has a temporary site within Edinburgh University Politics Department. Consultation here is by appointment only,and is available each Tuesday from 10am until 12 noon. A further consultation session will take place each Thursday afternoon from 2pm until 4.30pm at Edinburgh Unemployed Workers Centre. During these times workers for the archive may be contacted at the numbers below. Outside these times appoointments may be arranged by phoning Ewan Davidson on 667 6645. We should stress that this number is only available for incoming calls.

CHARGES. As the project is currently unfunded, we may have to charge for use of the archive. The rates are designed to cover costs of mailing, photocopying and office materials and will be conditional on ability to pay. We have not yet been able to finalize charges but more details will be obtainable from the archive workers.

POSTAL ENQUIRIES. We are also able to respond to postal enquiries for materials, by mailing copies of our index, and photocopies of requested items. However we must charge for costs, as yet to be decided.

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SAVE NEWBATTLE ABBEY COLLEGE

SCOTLAND'S *ONLY* ADULT RESIDENTIAL COLLEGE

We the undersigned wish to protest at the proposed closure of Newbattle Abbey College, Scotland's only Adult Residential College, announced by Malcolm Riffkind, the Secretary of State for Scotland in a letter on 10th December 1987.

We hereby call for the withdrawal of this notice of closure and seek the continued funding of such an important NATIONAL educational asset.

We would also appreciate any donation to the NEWBATTLE FIGHTING FUND; send to The Treasurer, Mr. S. Mair, Newbattle Fighting Fond, Newbattle Abbey College, Dalkeith, Midlothian EH22 3LL.

NAME	ADDRESS	DONATION