Marxist Humanist Reader

Edited by Jean Debor

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Preface

This reader was compiled due to my growing interest in the many Heterodox Marxisms and the influences of the Open Marxist tradition. This compilation of texts is not all the texts on Marxist Humanism but is instead to serve as an introduction for people who are interested in this diverse tradition. For people interested in further reading there includes Raya Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today* and *The Marxist-Humanist Theory of State-Capitalism*, C.L.R. James' The Black Jacobins, James and Dunayevskaya's *State Capitalism and World Revolution*, Erich Fromm's *Sane Society*, and Kevin B. Anderson's *Marx at the Margins*. The majority of the texts included in this collection were sourced from marxists.org and you can find further on Marxist Humanism there as well. For any questions or suggestions you can email me at debordianjean@gmail.com or message me on twitter, @gothicdebord.

Raya Dunayevskaya

From Marx to Marxist-Humanism

Catching "the quintessential importance and continuity of philosophic moments," from Marx to Marxist-Humanism, was the concern of Raya Dunayevskaya when she addressed her colleagues in News and Letters Committees in 1969. In the talk she discussed "philosophic as well as practical responsibilities" of Marxist-Humanists. At that time, she was in the process of writing PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION, later published in 1973. The lecture, not yet in THE RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA COLLECTION, contains one of the first known references to "the philosophic moment" of Marxist-Humanism. This same phrase she used in 1987 when stating that her 1953 Letters on Hegel's Absolutes were the "philosophic moment" of Marxist-Humanism (see "Presentation of the Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy" in THE POWER OF NEGATIVITY (Lexington Books: Lantham, Md., 2002.) Her shortened title for the talk was "Philosophy and Leadership."

I. Historic-Philosophic

Let us go back to the beginnings of the history of Marxism, its philosophic origins, and see why there was only one founder--MARX ONLY, NOT MARX AND ENGELS, but Marx alone. It has nothing to do with the idiocies of the state-capitalist age and the "cult of personality." The anti-cultists are invariably the ones who start out with being for "collective" leadership--that's how Stalin started his campaign against Trotsky. Trotsky, in turn, fell into Stalin's trap of talking quantitatively about one versus many and vice-versa, instead of catching the PHILOSOPHIC MOMENT when a whole epoch is SUMMED UP so totally that it has in it all the TENDENCIES that will keep developing its contradictions, and, out of them, its new leaps forward.

Thus it was in 1844, when Marx first established the new Humanism. So it has remained--and will remain until we have done away, root and branch, with ALL ramifications of exploitative capitalism. We all, beginning with Engels, are FOLLOWERS. (I don't, as you know, very often agree with Jean-Paul Sartre, but he did

catch what is meant by philosophic moment, how rare these creations are, when he said that from the start of modern philosophy, that is, the start of capitalism, from the 17th century and Descartes to the 19th century and Marx, there were only three periods for nearly three centuries: Descartes-Locke, Kant-Hegel, and Marx.)

Again, when we say there was only one, not only do we mean philosophic moment, and not "personality," but we are aware that there were hundreds--and sometimes, at the revolutionary moment of transformation, millions--of talented, creative human beings.

The important thing is to catch the question of SUMMATION. Summation means so total a conclusion of what is happening in this epoch, that it includes the tendencies for the future, i.e., anticipates what will happen when it does get transformed into actual revolution.

And yet there is only one person who does the summing up. It sounds especially shocking when that refers to the truth that it was only Marx, not Marx and Engels. How could it possibly be just one, when these two men were both breaking with bourgeois thought--in economics Engels, in fact, was the "superior," knew more--and no philosophy known as Marxism had yet been evolved. No greater friendship exists in intellectual history, and at no time was Engels separated from Marx. What Marx had left for him to edit--Volumes II and III of CAPITAL--couldn't have been done by any other, and without Engels we would have been deprived of Marx's greatest heritage.

And yet--and yet--because he was the talented co-leader but follower, not originator, it was precisely Engels who, in "rewriting" the 1844 critique of Feuerbach into his 1888 LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, laid the basis for the Second International's mechanistic materialism. (We cannot go into this here, and I have heretofore not even mentioned it because the "learned" who have discovered the differences between Marx and Engels MISUSE them for their own purposes. [This is true for] none more so than Sartre, who had the audacity to attribute "today's Marxists"--that is to say, Communist perverters with whom he collaborated all too easily--to, as he put it, "that unfortunate meeting of Marx with Engels in 1844." All that concerns us here is to catch the quintessential importance and CONTINUITY of the philosophic moments.)

II. The Theoretic-American—Leon Trotsky—Is Not The Historic-Philosophic Continuator of Marx And Lenin

The whole point, insofar as our age in our pragmatic America is concerned, is that the Humanism which Marx laid down as THE foundation of Materialism, Historical Materialism, is the Humanism which we singled out THEORETICALLY, PHILOSOPHICALLY, in the mid-1950s. The fact that the East European proletariat, in a full revolution [in Hungary in 1956], and the American proletariat, in its battles with Automation, were both doing IN PRACTICE what we were doing in theory, is no accident. What we were doing had been done by none other, and made it necessary to break not only with Stalinism and Trotskyism, but also with those with whom on the economic-political plane, we were as one--the state-capitalist tendency.

In a word, the theory of state-capitalism without the Marxist-Humanist philosophy, like materialism without dialectics, ENDS BOTH IN VULGAR MATERIALISM AND PURELY NEGATIVE OPPOSITION TO THE BOURGEOISIE WITHOUT THE LIVE REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECT TO DO THE REORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY. Organizationally the state-capitalist tendency, as we all know, was broken up in a most unprincipled manner, verging not only and not merely on cliquism but actual betrayal [by C.L.R. James and Grace Lee in 1955]. It was ONLY AFTER that that we could spell out the Absolute Idea--the unity of theory and practice, the movement from practice--as Black production worker (as well as white, at first) as editor, as columnists, as the new voices to be heard above the din of the glib, and which we spelled out in our Constitution as worker, youth, women, and that extra dimension of Black as color ....

And I'm sorry to have to add that if Engels had published Marx's 1844 MANUSCRIPTS instead of bringing it "up to date" and "simplifying" or "popularizing" dialectics (we all loved his LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY; whole generations were raised on this one booklet) we would have had a foundation with which to fight Kautsky and Plekhanov. Instead, the heritage was left to Kautsky. All the rest of the story of the collapse of the Second International and Lenin's need to return to Hegel for himself need not be gone into here. But let us not forget that it took a revolution as great as the Russian, with scholars as great and persistent as Ryazanov, to pry those manuscripts from those vaults. AND IN OUR AGE

IT TOOK AS GREAT A REVOLUTION AS THE HUNGARIAN TO MAKE THAT HUMANISM LIVE.

The fact that the transition point from Lenin--Trotsky--was not the philosophic point of continuity is what makes it so difficult. The fact of the Second International's betrayal [in 1914] was easy to see. But with Lenin and Trotsky--because Trotsky did not betray, he was always a great revolutionary--the philosophic void is not easy to comprehend. Trotsky's position was "Yes, I had differences with Lenin. But the fact that Lenin and I were on the same side of the barricades in 1917 ERASED all differences between us." No, it didn't. The revolution proved that Trotsky was a very great revolutionary, and DESPITE the fact that he had not reorganized his philosophic conceptions as had Lenin, he was on the right side of the barricades. We now know that it was sufficient only because Lenin was there and Lenin had made a philosophic break with his past.

I wasn't aware of Lenin's PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS when I was Trotsky's secretary in 1937, and didn't know that Trotsky had not committed himself on the PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS. There was no discussion between us on that question.

Now, for you to grasp how serious it is, and how important it is for us to see that Trotsky wasn't the philosophic continuator, AS WE ARE, means to see that Lenin himself left us a dual heritage. In other words, his philosophic notebooks were private. If you read IMPERIALISM alone, it wouldn't mean anything--he had just found the latest stage of capitalism. In fact, that's what the bourgeoisie always tells you, that all he did was steal from J.A. Hobson's latest figures, and then he made some concrete conclusions about what the proletariat would do about it. You would have seen the transformation into opposition in IMPERIALISM that became his new category. But what would result from the opposite? THE NEW UNIVERSAL, the Subject, "to a man"? You have to read STATE AND REVOLUTION to see that. [Dunayevskaya's critiques of Lenin's thought can be read in THE POWER OF NEGATIVITY.--Ed.]

When you catch the economic moment of break, and the economic new stage in the world development, THAT'S ONLY THE BEGINNING. You can't do without that beginning, BUT IT'S A BEGINNING ONLY. It just won't do, unless you get the positive, the negative, the new universal--and through the dialectic as well as through the actual movement of history. So we had 1915-1917. Lenin operated on the basis of his great new discovery, but he kept these PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS "private," unpublished. In

other words, he gave us the RESULTS. We must begin anew--and show the PROCESS so everyone, "to a man" will have the dialectic as unity of theory and practice. This is the new. This is what no one caught, though the state-capitalist tendency at least tried. With the outbreak of World War II, it was clear that Trotskyism, as opposed to Stalinism, also didn't answer the problem. We were back again in a war. But we had nothing that Lenin had when the war broke out and he was betrayed. We had no one who had gone back to Hegel, who had gone back to Marx, and forward with these philosophic foundations to the new.

The first thing that evolved was the state-capitalist theory. We said that we had reached a new stage, not just monopoly, but a world state-capitalist stage; Stalinism was but the Russian name for it. But the real question was: What is the role of labor? How could such a thing happen? Not only how could a workers' state get transformed into its opposite, but how could it be that a revolutionary leader who opposed Stalin, who stood for world revolution, "permanent revolution," nevertheless did not grasp the philosophic moment both of transformation into opposite and the new CONCRETE UNIVERSAL--the Subject for total resolution of differences? [See THE MARXIST-HUMANIST THEORY OF STATE-CAPITALISM, News and Letters: Chicago, 1991--Ed.]

Seeing the error does not mean you see the new concrete universal. In part, it is because the proletariat had not yet shown it from below. In part, it is because you as theoretician had not worked out the break. So, as state-capitalists, we saw the error of Trotskyism, the NEED for new beginnings. When we finally started as an independent grouping--not just as a tendency remaining as parasites within Trotskyism, but responsible to the public, the proletarian public--with CORRESPONDENCE, the world confronted also the death of Stalin [in 1953]. The proletariat, in East Germany specifically, did have an answer, an affirmative answer, to the question: Can man win freedom under totalitarianism? And it is within that same crucial three months intervening between the death of Stalin and the East German revolt that I first wrote those letters on the Absolute Idea, and discovered the movement FROM PRACTICE some six weeks before the revolt [of June 17, 1953] actually broke out. I believe that Johnson [C.L.R. James] did understand what, PHILOSOPHICALLY, that meant, and began at once to conspire to break with me, to break the organization from England whither he had departed. Grace [Lee Boggs], with her usual hyperboles, did say that my

letters on the Absolute Idea were the equivalent of Lenin's PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS--but then he got her back into line precisely because we had not built leadership on philosophic foundations.

Along with our establishing NEWS & LETTERS, and working out MARXISM AND FREEDOM, we took great trouble to see that we were not known by a "name"--Trotskyite, Johnsonite, or, for that matter, Johnson-Forestite--but by that philosophic moment, Marxist-Humanist. The unique, the new, the philosophic moment, expressed itself in the Black dimension of editor of NEWS & LETTERS [Charles Denby was the editor from its founding to 1983.--Ed.] as well as Marxist-Humanism as philosophy; in CONCRETIZATION of that philosophy as FORCES OF REVOLUTION--proletariat, national minorities, youth, women, the "outside" in "Readers' Views," as well as in every facet; the INTERNATIONALIZATION of these forces of revolution by the tours (and the editions of MARXISM AND FREEDOM as well as current articles) not merely to Europe but to Africa and Asia; and the manner in which this was reflected in the leadership, and in the ranks, in relations with other organizations.

Marx's Humanism Today

It was during the decade of the First International (1864-74) – a decade that saw both the Civil War in America and the Paris Commune – that Marx restructured[1] the many drafts of *Capital* and published the first two editions of Volume I.

Capital sets forth a new concept of theory, a new dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and a shift of emphasis from the idea of history as the history of theory to the idea of history as the history of production. It signifies Marx's "return" to his own philosophic humanism after more than a decade of concentration on economics and empiric studies of the class struggles of his day. Not surprisingly, this return is on a more concrete level, which, rather than diminishing Marx's original humanist concepts, deepens them.

This is obvious in the section "The Working Day," which Marx first decided to write in 1866 under the impact of the mass movement for the shortening of the working day

following the conclusion of the Civil War in the United States. It is obvious in "The Fetishism of Commodities," which Marx informs us he changed "in a significant manner"[2] after the Paris Commune. It is obvious in the original categories he created for his economic analysis and the creative practice of the Hegelian dialectic.

Humanism gives Marx's magnum opus its force and direction. Yet most Western scholars of Marxism are content either to leave the relationship between the now famous *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*[3] and *Capital* implicit, or to make the continuity explicit only insofar as the ethical foundations of Marxism are concerned.[4]

This leaves the door wide open for those who wish to transform Marx's humanism, both as philosophy and as historic fact, into an abstract which would cover up concrete economic exploitation, actual lack of political freedom, and the need to abolish the conditions preventing "realization" of Marx's philosophy, i.e., the reunification of mental and manual abilities in the individual himself, the "all-rounded" individual who is the body and soul of Marx's humanism.

The 1844 *Manuscripts* didn't just "pave the way" for "scientific socialism." Humanism wasn't just a stage Marx "passed through" on his voyage of discovery to "scientific economics" or "real revolutionary politics." Humanist philosophy is the very foundation of the integral unity of Marxian theory, which cannot be fragmented into "economics," "politics," "sociology," much less identified with the Stalinist monolithic creation, held onto so firmly by Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.

Of all the editions of *Capital*, from its first publication in 1867 until the last before Marx died in 1883, the French edition (1872-75) alone contained the changes that had, as Marx put it in the Afterword, "scientific value independent of the original."

The revolutionary action of the Parisian masses in "storming the heavens"[5] and taking destiny into their own hands clarified for Marx the two most fundamental theoretical problems: the accumulation of capital, and the fetishism of commodities. Just as his analysis of the struggles to shorten the working day became pivotal to the structure of *Capital*, so these additions became crucial for its spirit, i.e., for the future inherent in the present.

The changes were of two kinds. One was tantamount to a prediction of what we today call state capitalism – the ultimate development of the law of concentration and centralization of capital "in the hands of one single capitalist, or those of one single corporation" [MCIK, p. 688, MCIF, p. 779]. The second was the illumination of the fetishism of commodities inherent in the value-form as emanating from "the form itself" [MCIK p. 82, MCIF, p. 164]. Marx concluded that only *freely*associated labor can abrogate the law of value; ONLY "freely associated men" [MCIK p. 92, MCIF, p. 173] can strip the fetishism from commodities.

At this moment in history, when established state powers claim "to practice" or to base themselves on Marxism, it is essential to re-establish what Marx himself meant by practice. It was freedom. The notion of freedom, always Marx's point of departure and of return, is concretized through a most painstaking and original analysis of the "inexorable laws" of capitalist development. This discloses *how* the proletariat, as "substance" (or mere object of an exploitative society) becomes "subject," i.e., revolts against the conditions of alienated labor, *thereby* achieving "the negation of the negation," or self-emancipation.

In a word, *Capital* is the culmination of the 25 years of labor that began when Marx, in 1843, first broke with bourgeois society and melded what he considered its highest achievements in thought – English political economy, French revolutionary doctrine, Hegelian philosophy – into a theory of liberation, a new philosophy of human activity which he called "a thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism."

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956[6] transformed Marx's humanism from an academic debate to a question of life and death. Interest in it intensified the following year when the "100 Flowers" blossomed briefly in China before the totalitarian state caused them to wither abruptly.[7] From 1958 to 1961 the African revolutions gave proof of a new, third world whose underlying philosophy, again, was humanism.[8]

The Cold War and McCarthyism helped keep the United States isolated from the West European rediscovery of Marx's 1844 Humanist Essays in the mid-1940s and early 1950s. Now, however, Americans have an opportunity to make up in comprehensiveness of discussion what was lost in the belated start.[9]

The Freedom Now movement of the Negroes, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 1962 missile crisis over Cuba, which made real the nuclear threat, have helped rekindle the debate.

In his own way, the scholar too must grapple with the inner identity of the Marxian economic, political, sociological, scientific, and philosophic categories. It was the late, non-Marxist, anti-Hegelian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, who pinpointed Marx's genius as "the IDEA of theory," the transformation of "historic narrative into historic raisonné." [10]

Elsewhere[12] I have made a detailed analysis of all four volumes of *Capital* and their relationship to the 1844 *Manuscripts*. Here space considerations limit me to the two basic theories — the Marxian analysis of value and the fetishism of commodities — which are, in reality, the single' decisive, unified theory of alienation, or historical materialism, dialectically understood.

Marx's discovery that 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness" [13] was no departure from either his own theory of alienated labor or the theory of alienation as the central core of the Hegelian dialectic. But Marx's precise analysis of the actual labor process under capitalism is more concrete, alive shattering — and, of course, revolutionary — than any stage of alienation in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*. In true Hegelian fashion Marx focuses on creativity, but, unlike Hegel, he bases it on the actual process of production. There, facing not just an idea but a *human being* who has ideas, Marx develops his earlier concept of the worker's "quest for universality." [14] The "new passions and new forces" he now sees are born not only to overthrow the old order, but to construct a new one, "a society in which the full and free development of every individual is the ruling principle." [15]

So organically related are the economic, political, and philosophic concepts in *Capital* that when, in 1943,[16] the Russian theoreticians first openly broke with the Marxian analysis of value, they had to deny the dialectic structure of *Capital* and ask that, in "teaching" it, Chapter I be omitted. It does not speak highly of "Western" philosophy that it never saw the philosophic implications in this economic debate, and therefore also failed to discern the reason why the theoretical magazine of Soviet Marxism (*Under*

the Banner of Marxism), which had carried on the tradition of Marx's dialectic philosophy, ceased its publication. Thereafter, without further ado or any reference to any previous interpretation of Marxian economics, the revision of the Marxian analysis of value became the standard Communist analysis. The wholeness of Marxian theory has always been the *bête noire* of established Marxism. It took the collapse of the Second International and a break with his own philosophic past to make Lenin, at the end of 1914, fully grasp the organic connection of Marxian economics with Hegelian philosophy. And from then on he became uncompromising in his criticism of all Marxists, himself included. In one of his "aphorisms" he wrote, "It is impossible fully to grasp Marx's *Capital,* and especially the first chapter, if you have not studied and understood the *whole* of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past half century has understood Marx!"

There is no more remarkable piece of analysis in the annals of political economy — and no more Hegelian kind of writing in Marx's "early Hegelian period" — than the final section of Chapter I of *Capital,* entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities." There philosophy and economics are connected with history as integrally as content and form are welded together in a great work of literature. By the time Marx introduced further changes into the French edition, after the Paris Commune, those fifteen pages were as tightly drawn as the strings of a violin. We must remember that Marx considered the greatest achievement of the Commune to be "its own working existence." The *totality* of the reorganization of society by the Communards gave Marx a new insight into the whole question of the *form* of value, not only as it was historically determined, but also as it conditioned bourgeois thought in turn. Under capitalistic conditions of production, philosophy had been reduced to an ideology, i.e., false consciousness. The categories of thought proper to capitalistic production were uncritically accepted by all, including even Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the authors of the epoch-making discovery that labor was the source of all value. This is why, despite their discovery, they could not dissolve the fetishism of commodities. Classical political economy, concludes Marx, met its historic barrier here.

The commodity form of the products of labor became a fetish because of the perverse relationship of subject to object — of living labor to dead capital. Relations between men appear as the relation between things because in our alienated society that is all "they really are." [17] Dead capital is the master of living labor. The fetishism of commodities

is the opiate that, to use a Hegelian expression, passes itself off as "the very *nature* of the mind" [18] to all *except* the proletariat who daily suffer from the domination of dead labor, the stranglehold of the machine. Therefore, concludes Marx' no one can strip the fetishism from the commodities *except freely associated labor*. Obviously the Russian theoreticians, in 1943, were determined that no one should.

The necessary ideology to cover up the exploitation of the laborer did not change its essence when it changed its form from the private to the state capitalism that calls itself Communism. Nor has the ideological rift between China and Russia undermined the exploitative relationship in either land. Were Marx to return to earth, he would have no difficulty whatever in recognizing in its new form — the State Plan and its fetishism — the state capitalist development he predicted as the ultimate effect of the inexorable laws of capitalist development. Our generation should understand better than any previous generation that it is not a question of nationalized vs. private property. It is a question of freedom. Wherever and whenever freedom was limited, Marx struck out against the barrier, in practice and in theory. Thus, when classical political economists spoke of "free labor," by which they meant wage labor, Marx wrote caustically: "For them there was history, but history is no more."

It should be obvious that Marxs primary theory of value, or "abstract," "value-producing" labor, is a theory of alienated labor. In the humanist essays Marx explained why he analyzed economic facts "in conceptual terms as *alienated labor*. ... How does it happen, we may ask, that man *alienates his labor?* How is this alienation founded in the nature of human development? We have already done much to solve the problem insofar as we have *transformed* the question concerning the *origin of private property* into a question about the relation between *alienated labor* and the process of development of mankind. For in speaking of private property one believes oneself to be dealing with something external to mankind. But in speaking of labor one deals directly with mankind itself. This new formulation of the problem already contains its solution." [19]

By the time he completed *Capital,* however, Marx felt the need to create economic categories to analyze the alien character of labor under capitalism both as an activity in the factory and as a commodity in the market where alone rule Freedom' Equality, Property and Bentham." [20]Marx created special economic categories not only to

expound his theory of value and surplus-value, but also to show how degraded human relations were at the point of production itself. By splitting the category of labor into labor as activity and labor power as a commodity — as if the laborer could indeed disjoint his hands from his body and have them retain their function — Marx was able to show that, since labor power cannot be so disembodied, it is the laborer himself who enters the factory. And in the factory, continues Marx, the laborer's ability becomes a mere appendage to a machine and his concrete labor is reduced to a mass of congealed, abstract labor.

Now there is, of course, no such creature as an "abstract laborer"; one is a miner or a tailor or a steelworker or a baker. Nevertheless, the *perverse* nature of capitalist production is such that man is not master of the machine; the machine is master of the man. By the instrumentality of the machine, which "expresses" itself in the ticking of a factory clock, a man's skill becomes unimportant so long as he produces a given quantity of products in a given time. Labor time is the handmaiden of the machine which accomplishes the fantastic transformation of all concrete labors into one abstract mass.

Marx considered his analysis of concrete and abstract labor his original contribution to political economy, "the pivot on which a clear comprehension of political economy turns." [21] In the process of his analysis of the capitalist's "werewolf hunger for surplus labor" as "a live monster that is fruitful and multiplies," [22] Marx creates two other new categories: constant *capital* (machines) and variable *capital* (wage labor). All labor, paid or unpaid, he insists, is *forced* labor. And this labor is so alien an activity that it has itself become a *form of capital.*

The precision, as well as originality, of this description of alienated labor is not, of course, merely a category of the "deductive Hegelian dialectic." It is a category of the dialectic *empiricism* of Marx re-creating an altogether new level of truth. Only politically motivated, self-induced blindness can, when reading Marx's pages upon pages on the labor process under capitalism, conclude either that the mature Marx departed from his theory of alienated labor, or that alienated labor is a "leftover" from Marx's "left Hegelian days" before he worked his way out of "Hegelian gibberish" into "scientific materialism." At the same time, because Marx's economic categories have so incontrovertible a class character, it is impossible to denude them of their class content. Although some of today's near — Marxists loudly proclaim the "neutralization" of these categories, they apply them *to capitalism and to capitalism only*. Because the Marxian

law of value is the supreme manifestation of capitalism, not even Stalin — at least not for very nearly two decades after he already had total power, the State Plan, and the monolithic party dared admit its operation in Russia since he claimed the land was "socialist." It was only in the midst of a world war that the Russian theoreticians openly broke with the Marxian concept; in practice, of course, the ruling bureaucracy had long since followed an exploitative course.

In 1947 Andrei Zhdanov dramatically (or at least loudly) demanded that "the philosophical workers" replace the Hegelian dialectic with "a new dialectical law": criticism and self-criticism. By 1955 the critique of Marxian concepts concerned his humanism. V. A. Karpushin wrote in "Marx's Working Out of the Materialist Dialectics in the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts in the Year 1844": "Marx was the first philosopher who went beyond the confines of philosophy and from the point of view of practical life and practical needs of the proletariat analyzed the basic question of philosophy as a truly scientific method of revolutionary change and knowledge of the actual world." [23]

The Russian Communists were not, however, about to favor "revolutionary change" where "revolutionary change" meant *their* downfall. Therefore, when the Hungarian Revolution tried the following year to transform reality by *realizing* philosophy, that is to say, by making freedom from Russian Communism a reality, the debate ended in machine-gun fire. Thus the violation of the *logos* of Marxian theory was followed by the destruction of liberty itself.

Soon after, the Russian theoreticians unloosed an unbridled, vitriolic attack on all opponents of *established* Communism, whom they gratuitously labeled "revisionists." Unfortunately, too many Western scholars accepted the term and referred to the ruling Communists as the "dogmatists," despite such wild gyrations and "flexibility" as, on the eve of World War II, the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the united front between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek; and, more recently, the rift between Russia and China. At the same time, the single grain of truth in the duality of Lenin's philosophic legacy — between the vulgarly materialistic *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and the creative dialectics of his *Philosophic Notebooks* — has provided a field day for the innate anti-Leninism of "the West." Elsewhere[24] I have analyzed "Mao's Thought," which is supposed to have made "original contributions to Marxism," especially his *On Practice,* and *On Contradiction,* as they relate to his rise in power. Here I must limit myself to the

fact that the humanist debate was in danger both of becoming a purely academic question, and of being separated from the "political" debates on "revisionism." Fortunately Marxism does not exist only in books, nor is it the possession only of state powers. It is in the daily lives of working people trying to reconstruct society on new beginnings.

The liberation from Western imperialism, not only in Africa but in Latin America (Fidel Castro too first called his revolution "humanist"), unfurled a humanist banner. Thereupon the Russian Communist line changed. Where, at first, it was claimed that Leninism needed no sort of humanization, nor any of the reforms proposed by the proponents of "humanist socialism," the claim now became that the Soviets were the rightful inheritors of "militant humanism." Thus M. B. Mitin, who has the august title of Chairman of the Board of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, stated that Khrushchev's Report to the Twenty-first Congress of the Russian Communist Party was "the magnificent and noble conception of Marxist-Leninist socialist humanism." [25] And in 1963, at the thirteenth International Congress of Philosophy, held in Mexico, it was the Soviet delegation that entitled one of its reports "humanism in the Contemporary World." [26] Thus, curiously, Western intellectuals can thank the Russian Communists for throwing the ball back to them; once again, we are on the track of discussing humanism.

Let us not debase freedom of thought to the point where it is no more than the other side of the coin of thought control. One look at our institutionalized studies on "Marxist Leninism" as the "know your enemy" type of course will show that, in methodology, these are no different from what is being taught under established Communism, although they are supposed to teach "opposite principles." The point is this: unless freedom of thought means an underlying philosophy for the realization of the forward movement of humanity, thought, at least in the Hegelian sense, cannot be called "an Idea." Precisely because, to Hegel, "only that which is an object of freedom can be called an Idea," even his Absolutes breathed the earthy air of freedom. Our age can do no less. It is true that the Marxian dialectic is not only political or historical, but also cognitive. However, to claim that Marx's concept of the class struggle is a "myth" and his "glorification" of the proletariat only "the end product of his philosophy of alienation" [27] flies in the face of theory and of fact. In this respect, George Lichtheim's criticism

that such an American analysis is "a sort of intellectual counterpart to the late Mr. Dulles's weekly sermon on the evils of communism " [28] has validity.

Marx's humanism was neither a rejection of idealism nor an acceptance of materialism, but the truth of both, and therefore a new unity. Marx's "collectivism" has, as its very soul, the individualistic element. That is why the young Marx felt compelled to separate himself from the "quite vulgar and unthinking communism which completely negates the personality of man." Because alienated labor was the essence of *all* that was perverse in capitalism, private or state, "organized" or "anarchic," Marx concluded his 1844 attack on capitalism with the statement that "communism, as such, is not the goal of human development, the form of human society." Freedom meant more, a great deal more, than the abolition of private property. Marx considered the abolition of private property to be only "the first transcendence." Full freedom demanded a second transcendence. Four years after these humanist essays were written Marx published the historic *Communist Manifesto*. *His* basic philosophy was not changed by the new terminology. On the contrary. On the eve of the 1848 revolutions, the Manifesto proclaimed: "The freedom of the individual is the basis of the freedom of all." At the end of his life the concept remained unchanged. His magnum opus, like his life's activity, never deviated from the concept that only "the development of human power, which is its own end" is the true "realm of freedom." [29] Again, our age should understand better than any other the reasons for the young Marx's insistence that the abolition of private property is only the first transcendence. "Not until the transcendence of this mediation, which is nevertheless a necessary presupposition, does there arise positive Humanism, beginning from itself."

"Positive Humanism" begins "from itself' when mental and manual labor are reunited in what Marx calls the "all-rounded" individual. Surely our nuclear age should be oppressively aware that the division between mental and manual labor, which has been the underlying principle of all class societies, has reached such monstrous proportions under capitalism that live antagonisms characterize not only production, but science itself. Marx anticipated the impasse of modern science when he wrote in 1844: "To have one basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a lie." We have been living this lie for one hundred and twenty years. The result is that the very survival of civilization as we have known it is at stake.

The task that confronts our age, it appears to this writer, is, first, to recognize that there is a movement from practice — from the actual struggles of the day — to theory; and, second, to work out the method whereby the movement *from theory* can meet it. A new relationship of theory to practice, a new appreciation of "Subject," of live human beings struggling to reconstruct society, is essential. The challenge of our times is not to science or machines, but to men. The totality of the world crisis demands a new unity of theory and practice, a new relationship of workers and intellectuals. The search for a total philosophy has been disclosed dramatically by the new, third world of underdeveloped countries. But there are also evidences of this search in the struggles for freedom from totalitarian regimes, and in the West. To discern this mass search for a total philosophy it is necessary only to shed the stubbornest of all philosophies — the concept of "the backwardness of the masses" — and *listen* to *their* thoughts, as they battle automation, fight for the end of discrimination, or demand freedom *now*. Far from being intellectual abdication, this is the beginning of a new stage of cognition. This new stage in the self-liberation of the intellectual from dogmatism can begin only when, as Hegel put it, the intellectual feels the "compulsion of thought to proceed to ... concrete truths."

The espousal of *partiynost* (party principle) as a philosophic principle is another manifestation of the dogma of "the backwardness of the masses," by which intellectuals in state-capitalist societies rationalize their contention that the masses must be ordered about, managed, "led." Like the ideologists in the West, they forget all too easily that revolutions do not arise in the fullness of time to establish a party machine, but to reconstruct society on a human foundation. just as *partiynost*, or monolithism, in politics throttles revolution instead of releasing the creative energy of new millions, so *partiynost* in philosophy stifles thought instead of giving it a new dimension. This is not an academic question for either the East or the West. Marxism is either a theory of liberation or it is nothing. In thought, as in life, it lays the basis for achieving a new *human* dimension, without which no society is truly viable. As a Marxist humanist, this appears to me the whole truth of Marx's humanism, both as philosophy and as reality.

Notes

1. In his Preface to Volume II of Marx's *Capital*(Kerr edition), Friedrich Engels lists the original manuscripts in such a way that the pagination tells the story of the restructuring. For my analysis of this, see pages 87-91 of *Marxism and Freedom* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958, 1964). – RD

2. See Marx's Afterword to the French edition of *Capital*, in *Capital*, Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

3. Marx's 1844 *Manuscripts* are now available in several English translations, including one issued in Moscow, but the one more readily available here is by T. B. Bottomore, and is included in *Marx's Concept of Man* by Erich Fromm. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961) Outside of the essay on "Alienated Labor," I am, however, using my own translation and therefore not paginating the references. – RD

4. See *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism* by Eugene Kamenka. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). – RD

5. *The Civil War in France*, by Karl Marx, is widely available in many languages both as a separate pamphlet and in Marx's *Selected Works* and *Collected Works*. – RD

6. For Dunayevskaya's writings on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, see "Spontaneity of Action and Organization of Thought: In Memoriam to the Hungarian Revolution," Political Letter of Sept. 17, 1961, in *The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, 2954-2956. See also chapter 18 of *Marxism and Freedom*, "Two Kinds of Subjectivity."

7. The indispensable book for the English reader is *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* by Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). The voices of revolt in China should then be compared with those in Eastern Europe. By now the books, not to mention pamphlets and articles, on the Hungarian Revolution are legion. A few which I consider important for tracing the role that Marx's humanism played are the following: *Imre Nagy on Communism*(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); François Fejtö, *Behind the Rape of Hungary*(New York: David McKay Company, 1957); *The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book* edited by Melvin J. Lasky (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); *Bitter Harvest*, edited by Edmund O. Stillman with Introduction by François Bondy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959). For eyewitness reports, and especially those relating to the

Workers' Councils, the issues of *The Review* (periodical published by the Imre Nagy Institute, Brussels) is quintessential. Some reports also appeared in the magazine *East Europe*, which did a competent job on Poland, especially in the publication of the debate on Marx's humanism between the leading philosophers in Poland, Adam Schaff and Leszek Kolakowski. Both of these philosophers are also translated in the collection entitled *Revisionism*, edited by Leopold Labedz (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). – RD

8. *African Socialism* by Léopold Sédar Senghor (New York: American Society of African Culture, 1959); Sekou Toure's "Africa's Path in History" was excerpted for the English reader in *Africa South*, April-June 1960, Capetown; now available only abroad. See also my *Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions* (American, 1958, and English, 1961, [1984,] editions available at *News & Letters*, Detroit, Michigan [Chicago, Illinois]. – RD

9. I do not mean to say that I accept the West European intellectual's attitude on either the question of the degree of belatedness, or the low level of discussion in the United States. Four or five years before Europe's first rediscovery of Marx's early essays, when Europe was under the heel of fascism, Herbert Marcuse dealt with them in his *Reason and Revolution*. It is true that this was based on the German text of the essays, that no English translation was available, and that the discussion of Professor Marcuse's seminal work was limited to small groups. It is also true that I had great difficulty in convincing either commercial publishers or university presses that they ought to publish Marx's humanist essays or Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*. I succeeded in getting both these writings published only by including them as appendices to my *Marxism and Freedom*(1958). Even then they did not become available to a mass audience. It was not until 1961, when Erich Fromm included a translation of the 1844 *Manuscripts* in *Marx's Concept of Man*, that Marx's humanism reached a mass audience in the United States, and received widespread attention in American journals. Nevertheless, I see no substantive reason for the intellectual arrogance of the European Marxologists since, in Europe as in the United States, it was only after the Hungarian Revolution that the discussion of humanism reached the level of either concreteness or urgency. When I refer to the belatedness of the discussion, I have in mind the long period between the time the 1844 *Manuscripts* were first published by the Marx-Engels Institute in Russia, in 1927, under the editorship of Ryazanov, and the time they received general attention. – RD

10. *A History of Economic Analysis* by Joseph Schumpeter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). – RD

11 *A History of Economic Analysis* by Joseph Schumpeter (Oxford University Press, 1954).

12 *Marxism and Freedom*. See especially Chs. V through VIII.

13 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chas. H. Kerr), p. 11.

14 *Poverty of Philosophy* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr), p. 157.

15 *Capital* (Kerr ed.), Vol. I, p. 649.

16 *Pod Znamenem Marxizma*. (*Under the Banner of* Marxism), Nos. *7-8/1943*. The crucial article on the law of value from this issue was translated by me under the title, "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union." Along with my commentary, "A New Revision of Marxian Economics," the article was published in The *American Economic Review* (September 1944). The controversy around it, in which Professors Oscar Lange, Leon Rogin, and Paul A. Baran participated in the pages of the journal, lasted for a year, at the end of which (September 1945) my rejoinder, "Revision or Reaffirmation of Marxism?" was published.

17 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. *84*.

18 See Hegel on "The Third Attitude to Objectivity": "Mat I discover in my consciousness is thus exaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all and even passed off for the very nature of the mind" (Hegel's Logic, first Wallace translation, Oxford University Press, 1892).

19 See "Alienated Labor" in *Marx's Concept of Man* by Erich Fromm, pp. 103, 108.

20 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 195.

21 Ibid., p. 48.

22 Ibid., p. 217.>

23 *Voprosy Filosofii* (*Questions of Philosophy*), No. 3/1955.>

24 See the new chapter, "The Challenge of Mao Tse-tung" in the paperback edition of Marxism and Freedom (New York: Twayne, 1964). For an analysis of a similar perversion of Lenin's partisanship in philosophy into Stalin's monolithic "party-ness in philosophy," see the well-documented and perceptive analysis Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-1932 by David Joravsky (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

25 *Pravda*, Feb. 6, 1959. The English translation used here appears in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 3, 1959.

26 The report of this conference by M. B. Mitin appears in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 11/1953. For a different report of the same conference see *Studies in Soviet Thought*, No. 4/1963 (Fribourg, Switzerland).

27 *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* by Robert Tucker (Cambridge University Press, 1961).

28 George Lichtheim's "*Western Marxist Literature 1953-1963"* appears in Survey, No. 50, January 1964.

29 *Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 954-55.

C.L.R. James

Dialectical Materialism & the Fate of Humanity

Mankind has obviously reached the end of something. The crisis is absolute. Bourgeois civilisation is falling apart, and even while it collapses, devotes its main energies to the preparation of further holocausts. Not remote states on the periphery but regimes contending for world power achieve the most advanced stages of barbarism known to history. What civilised states have ever approached Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia in official lies, official murder and the systematic brutalisation and corruption of their population? Only a shallow empiricism can fail to see that such monstrous societies are not the product of a national peculiarity (the German character) or a system of government ("communism") but are part and parcel of our civilisation. Everything that has appeared in these monstrous societies is endemic in every contemporary nation. Millions in the United States know that Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia will have nothing to teach the American bourgeoisie when it finds itself threatened by the revolutionary American workers seeking the complete expression of democracy which is socialism. The dream of progress has become the fear of progress. Men shrink with terror at the hint of scientific discoveries. If it were known tomorrow that the crown of human technical achievement, the processes of manufacturing atomic energy, had been lost beyond recovery, this scientific disaster would be hailed as the greatest good fortune of decades.

But the seal of the bankruptcy of bourgeois civilisation is the bankruptcy of its thought. Its intellectuals run to and fro squealing like hens in a barnyard when a plane passes overhead. Not a single philosopher or publicist has any light to throw on a crisis in which the fate not of a civilisation but of civilisation itself is involved. The Keynesian theories are now part of the history of economics. The ridiculous "four freedoms" of the late President Roosevelt take their place with the Three Principles of Sun Yat-Sen (the father-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek), the thousand years of Hitler's Reich and the "socialism in a single country" of Stalin. The chattering of Sidney Hook and Harold Laski is stunned into silence by the immensity of their own inadequacies. Thought has abdicated. The world is rudderless. All illusions have been destroyed. "Man is at last

compelled to face with sober sense his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." And in face of this the bourgeoisie has nothing to say.

The method of thinking is rooted in society. Bourgeois thought has collapsed because bourgeois society has collapsed. We have learnt by hard necessity the truth of the following dictum of Trotsky:

> "Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradictions, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks." (Trotsky, In Defence of Marxism)

Hegel defines the principle of Contradiction as follows:

> "Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity." (Science of Logic, Vol. 2, p. 67)

The first thing to note is that Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:

> "With regard to the assertion that contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement."

We here meet one of the most important principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he ridiculed the idea of having to "prove" the labour theory of value. If the labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from, what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory. Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof.

To ask for some proof of the laws, as Burnham implied, or to prove them "wrong" as Sidney Hook tried to do, this is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the universe; this no Marxist ever did. The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution.

So convinced a Marxist as Trotsky reminded the revolutionaries in 1939 that Marxists were not fatalists.

> "If", said he, "the international proletariat, as a result of the experience of our entire epoch and the current new war, proves incapable of becoming the master of society, this would signify the foundering of all hope for a socialist revolution, for it is impossible to expect any other more favourable condition for it."

The Marxian expectation of socialism arising from the contradictions of capitalism would have proved itself to be utopia.

The law of contradiction is what for the moment we can call a "hypothesis" for the grouping of empirical facts. All men use hypotheses for the grouping of facts. That is what logic consists of. The bourgeois hypotheses are for the most part unconscious. They are the inevitability of bourgeois society, natural division of labour, more particularly of men into capitalists and workers, constantly expanding technical progress, constantly expanding production, constantly expanding democracy, constantly rising culture. But during the last thirty years, these have crumbled to dust in their hands. They have no hypotheses they can believe in and that is why they cannot think. Historical facts, large and small, continuously deliver shattering blows at the foundation of their logical system. Nothing remains for them but the logic of the machine gun, and the crude empiricism of police violence.

Quite different is the mode of thought of Marxism. It understands its own logical laws. For Marxists, the fundamental logical law is the contradictory nature of all phenomena and first of all human society. The dialectic teaches that in all forms of society we have known, the increasing development of material wealth brings with it the increasing degradation of the large mass of humanity. Capitalism, being the greatest

wealth-producing system so far known, has carried its contradictions to a pitch never known before. Thus it is that the moment when the world system of capitalism has demonstrated the greatest productive powers in history is exactly the period when barbarism threatens to engulf the whole of society. The anti-dialecticians stand absolutely dumbfounded before the spectacle of the mastery of nature for human advancement and the degradation of human nature by this very mastery. The greater the means of transport, the less men are allowed to travel. The greater the means of communication, the less men freely interchange ideas. The greater the possibilities of living, the more men live in terror of mass annihilation. The bourgeoisie cannot admit this, for to admit it is themselves to sanction the end of the bourgeois civilisation.

Hence the complete paralysis of bourgeois thought. Yet never was thought of a fundamental character so necessary to mankind. As our political tendency has recently written:

It is precisely the character of our age and the maturity of humanity that obliterates the opposition between theory and practice, between the intellectual preoccupations of the “educated” and of the masses. All the great philosophical concepts, from the nature of the physical universe (atomic energy) through the structure and function of productive systems (free enterprise, “socialism”, or “communism”), the nature of government (the state versus the individual), to the destiny of man (can mankind survive?), these are no longer “theory”, but are in the market-place, tied together so that they cannot be separated, matters on which the daily lives of millions upon millions depend. (The Invading Socialist Society)

Never were such universal questions asked by the whole of the civilised world. Never have such inadequate answers been given. All that the bourgeoisie can answer is the purely technical question of the manufacture of atomic energy, and it wishes that it could not.

Now it is precisely because this contradiction of society has reached its farthest point in Stalinist Russia that the dialectical materialist analysis of Russia is the most important key to the perspective of world civilisation.

The second law of dialectical materialism is the change of quantity into quality. At a certain stage a developing contradiction, so to speak, explodes, and both the elements of

contradiction are thereby altered. In the history of society these explosions are known as revolution. All the economic, social and political tendencies of the age find a point of completion which becomes the starting-point of new tendencies. The Russian revolution is one such explosion. But the examination of the Russian revolution involves both the laws of development through contradictions and the change of quantity into quality.

Let us examine the Russian revolution in some of its most important features, such as would be agreed upon by most observers, excepting the diehard reactionaries.

The revolution was the greatest outburst of social energy and creativity that we have yet seen. Previously the French revolution had astonished mankind by the rapidity and grandeur of its achievements. So much so that to this day 14 July 1789 is the date in all probability most widely known among the great majority of mankind. But the Russian revolution exceeded the French. A combination of workers and peasants, the lowest classes of mankind, tore up an established government by the roots and accomplished the greatest social overturn in history. Starting from nothing, they created a new state, created an army of millions, defended the new regime against famine, blockade and wars of intervention on all fronts. They reorganised the economy. They made Russia a modern state. They passed and tried honestly to carry out a series of laws on popular education, equality of women, repudiation of religious superstition, sexual sanity, workers' control of production, all of which constituted the greatest potential democracy and enlightenment that the world had ever seen. They organised a world-wide Communist International devoted to the achievement of the same ideals in the entire world. The gradual decline and final failure are treated in the text. But the accomplishments are history, imperishable and of permanent significance for mankind. Taken in its entirety the heroic period of the Russian revolution is the most glorious episode in human history.

Lenin, the leader of the revolution, claimed always that one of the greatest achievements was the establishment of a new type of democracy, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which was able to unloose the creative energies of the great masses of the people. Their mere administration of the state in his opinion would make the further existence of capitalism impossible. This administration by the masses is "not yet" socialism, but it is no longer capitalism. "It is a tremendous step towards socialism, a step from which, if complete democracy is retained, no

backward step towards capitalism would be possible without the most atrocious violence perpetrated upon the masses". (The Threatening Catastrophe) Capital, in the form of state capital, once more rules in Russia. Democracy has not been retained. But this has been done only at the cost of the condition foreseen by Lenin. The most atrocious violence has been perpetrated upon the masses of the people. Thus, the Russian revolution, as it has developed and declined, shows us the two most violent extremes that we have known in history. It is only dialectical materialism that can unite these extremes in logical and intelligible connection. It is the creative power, the democratic desires, the expansion of human personality, the record of achievement that was the Russian revolution. It is these which have called forth the violence, the atrocities, the state organised as Murder Incorporated. Only such violence could have repressed such democracy.

One can see the glint in the eye of the enemy of the proletarian revolution. Without perspective, himself, intellectually helpless before the contemporary barbarism, indulging in nonsensical opposites like Yogis and Commissars, or searching diligently in his own writhing insides for the solution to the problems of the world, he hastens to use the fact of the Russian degeneration as an unanswerable argument against the ideas of Bolshevism. Patience, my friend, patience.

"Bolshevism", says Trotsky, "is above all a philosophy of history and a political conception." Without the philosophy, the political conception falls to the ground. We have to get to the philosophy step by step. We have arrived at this much. The atrocious violence and crimes which now distinguish the state of Stalin are the necessary and inevitable response to the revolutionary fervour and democratic organisation and expression of the Russian people. Not the Russian people in general, however, but the Russian people as they had developed and expressed themselves in the socialist revolution of 1917. This is not merely a Russian phenomenon. The Russian revolution is a climax to a series of revolutions which have moved according to certain laws. Briefly: The British revolution in the seventeenth century embraced only small sections of the population – some revolutionary bourgeois, petty-bourgeois farmers and yeomen and a small number of artisans, and others in the few and small towns. They could not create the new but they could destroy the old. The work of the revolution having been accomplished, the counter-revolution, heir to the new social order, established itself by a mere invitation to Charles II to return. A handful of people only were punished. With

the development of economy and its socialisation, i.e. the increasing inter-relation of all classes in production, the French revolution embraces the great mass of the nation. The revolution destroys feudalism and establishes the modern state.

Its basic work accomplished, “order” must be restored to society by the counter-revolution, the heirs to the new regime, but this time there are millions of aroused people. It is the great body of the nation which is to be disciplined. No mild return of royalty, no forgiveness, no mutual amnesty. Only the military police-dictatorship of Napoleon can hold this country down. The contradiction between the revolution and the counter-revolution has sharpened.

Society established itself on new foundations. But the contradiction between the classes grows. If the revolution in Russia was the broadest and deepest development of the revolution of the seventeenth century, the Stalinist regime is the similar development of the counter-revolution. The German revolution of 1918 did not overthrow bourgeois property. But the German proletariat, infinitely larger and more highly developed than the Russian, had a long history of democratic achievement and organisation behind it. After the revolution, its organisation continued and expanded. That is why the Nazi counter-revolution was as brutal as it was. But if the German proletariat in 1918 had established a Soviet state embracing workers, agricultural proletarians and semi-proletarians, the lower ranks of the petty-bourgeoisie and the sympathetic intelligentsia, then logically speaking one of two things would have happened. Either the new democratic formation would have gone on from strength to strength awakening the deepest reserves of social power and aspirations of the already highly-developed German people and spreading throughout Europe; either this or something else. The atrocities and the violence which would have been needed to suppress a successful German proletarian revolution and the response it would have awakened in the German and other European peoples would have exceeded the crimes of Hitler as much as Hitler exceeded the crimes of Napoleon.

The pervading barbarism of the Stalinist regime, therefore, is not to be attributed to this or that weakness in the theory of “communism”, or some partial aspect of the Stalinist state. Stage by stage, we have seen the revolution and the counter-revolution develop in Europe over the centuries. At each new stage of development, both the revolution and the counter-revolution assume a new quality with the new quality of the

social development. Precisely because the Russian revolution assumed a new quality in attempting to establish a universal democracy, the Russian counter-revolution assumes a new quality of universal barbarism in the sense that it embraces all aspects of the Russian state.

At this stage, to try to separate progressive aspects from so comprehensive and all-pervading an enemy of human development as is the Stalinist state, is to strike down the dialectical method at the root. Hegel understood the limits within which one could designate a corruption as partial:

The Reformation resulted from the corruption of the Church. That corruption was not an accidental phenomenon; it is not the mere abuse of power and domination. A corrupt state of things is very frequently represented as an “abuse” ; it is taken for granted that the foundation was good – the system, the institution itself faultless – but that the passion, the subjective interest, in short the arbitrary volition of men has made use of that which in itself was good to further its own selfish ends, and that all that is required to be done is to remove these adventitious elements. On this showing the institute in question escapes obloquy, and the evil that disfigures it appears something foreign to it. But when accidental abuse of a good thing really occurs it is limited to particularity. A great and general corruption affecting a body of such large and comprehensive scope as a Church is quite another thing. ... The corruption of the Church was a native growth. (Philosophy of History)

The Russian revolution is the completion of a historical process, the development of class society. Its relation to past revolution can be illuminated by the laws of changes of quantity into quality. The British revolution, although it pointed the road for the rest of Europe, was only to a subordinate degree of international significance. The French revolution shook the whole of Europe to its foundations and established the logical lines along which revolution and counter-revolution would struggle in Europe for the succeeding century. It is in the very nature of modern society and the Russian revolution that Russia today is symbolical of the whole fate of modern civilisation. There is no further stage. Either the revolution succeeds in encompassing the whole of the world or the whole of the world collapses in counter-revolution and barbarism. The whole path of Western civilisation for two thousand years has reached an ultimate stage in Russia. There is no by-pass. There is no third alternative.

Therefore, as dialectical materialists, we do not bewail nor do we underestimate or in any way attempt to minimise the monstrous character of the Stalinist regime. We repudiate utterly any idea that what is there has any socialist character whatever. But we draw from it for Russia itself and for the whole world an ultimate, a universal conclusion. The barbarism is not to come. It is there.

In our previously quoted pamphlet, we have written:

> The unending murders, the destruction of peoples, the bestial passions, the sadism, the cruelties and the lusts, all the manifestations of barbarism of the last thirty years are unparalleled in history. But this barbarism exists only because nothing else can suppress the readiness for sacrifice, the democratic instincts and creative power of the great masses of the people.

Those are the two forces in conflict. The philosophy of history which is Bolshevism bases itself upon the destruction of the barbarism by the inevitable triumph of the socialist revolution. There are even revolutionaries who deny this. For them it is not scientific to believe in inevitability. Such a belief implies that dialectic is a religion or mysticism. For them the correct scientific attitude is to reserve judgement. Yet these very ones turn out to be the mystics and the practitioners of an ill-concealed religiosity.

If they recognise the bankruptcy of bourgeois democracy, if they accept the need for universality in the masses, if they recognise that barbarism is the only force that can suppress this need, then to refuse to accept the inevitability of socialism leaves only one of two choices. Either the inevitability of barbarism, that is to say, the acceptance of the principle of inevitability which they have just rejected or the hope, the faith, the belief that history will offer some way out of the impasse. This is the denial of a philosophy of history, that is to say, the denial of a method of thought, for which the only name is irrationalism or mysticism.

The deniers of the inevitability of socialism can be routed both historically and logically.

Marx developed his philosophical doctrines in the years which preceded the 1848 revolutions. The revolution was obviously on the way. Yet society was dominated by the

experience of the great French revolution which had achieved such miracles but had failed to achieve universality (liberty, equality and fraternity), and despite all its sacrifices and bloodshed, had ended in the triumph of the counter-revolution. The experience of 1830 had only multiplied both the fears and the hopes which had been engendered by the colossal experience of the French revolution. In this period, so similar to ours, philosophy came out of the study, particularly in Germany, and attempted to give some answers to the problems that were shaking society.

The utopian socialists of all stripes were distinguished precisely by this, that they argued interminably about the possibility as opposed to the inevitability of the socialist revolution. They were tortured by these doubts because, after the experience of the French revolution and its obvious failure to relieve the conditions of the great masses of the people, they themselves had lost faith in the inevitability of socialism. Which is only another way of saying the inevitability of the achievement by the people of complete self-expression, complete democracy, socialism. In so far as their beliefs were the result of theoretical speculation, they had, in the words of Marx, lost the capacity to draw from the experience of man's past in order to establish perspectives for man's future.

The result was a complete chaos, disorder, confusion in their own thoughts with an absolute inability to meet the challenge of the approaching revolution. It was into this ulcer that Marx drove the knife of scientific socialism. Bolshevism is a philosophy of history. Marx first clarified himself philosophically. As he wrote to Ruge in 1843:

> Almost greater than the outer obstacles appear in the inner difficulties. For although there is no doubt about the "whence", there prevails the more confusion about the "whither". Not only has a general anarchy broken out among the reformers; each of them also must himself confess that he has no exact conception of what ought to be. Precisely in this is the advantage of the new movement, that we do not anticipate the new world dogmatically but intend to find the new in the criticism of the old world. Up to now the philosophers have had the solution of all riddles lying in their desks and the dumb exoteric world had only to gape in order for the ready-baked pies of wisdom to fly into their mouths. Philosophy has become worldly, and the most decisive proof of this is that philosophic consciousness has been drawn into the anguish of the struggle not only superficially but thoroughly. If the construction of the future and the preparation for all time is not our affair, it is all the more certain what we have to complete at present, i.e.,

> the most relentless criticism of all existing things, relentless both in the sense that the criticism fears no results and even less fears conflicts with the existing powers.

We face the same situation today in the radical and revolutionary movement. In 1947, however, not only is philosophy worldly. In the face of the universal character of the crisis, the world is driven to become philosophical. It is compelled to examine in their nature and in the totality of their relations (that is to say, philosophically), economics, politics, science and even the very nature of the universe and society. All agitation about the possibility of barbarism, third alternatives, the mysticism of the inevitability of socialism, these are no more than what they were in Marx's day, only infinitely more so: terror before the destructive contradictions of modern society, doubts of the capacity of the proletariat to resolve them. This amounts to no more than a defence of bourgeois society in so far as bourgeois society still can provide thinkers with freedom enough to substitute the analysis of their own thoughts for a positive intervention in the chaos of society.

So far historically. Logically, the inevitability of socialism is the absolute reverse of religion or mysticism. It is a consciously constructed necessity of thought. As we have quoted in the article on Historical Retrogression, Hegel recognised that without holding fast in thought to your ultimate goal, it is impossible to think properly.

> To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition: also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these. (Logic, Vol. II, p. 476)

Precisely because they held fast to the presupposition of the inevitability of bourgeois society, the bourgeois thinkers in the early days of capitalism made their tremendous contributions to the science of human thought. Even without philosophical perspective, the bourgeoisie at least has one reality, maintenance of power against the workers and rival bourgeoisies. But without presupposing the inevitability of socialism, that is to say, without thinking always in terms of the victory of the masses, thinking among those hostile to bourgeois society must become a form of scholasticism and gnosticism, self-agitation and caprice.

Over a hundred years ago, Hegel said that the simplest reflection will show the necessity of holding fast the positive in the negative, the presupposition in the result, the affirmation that is contained in every negation, the future that is in the present. It is one of the signs of the advanced stage of human development that this is not longer a mere philosophical but a concrete question. To anyone that does not accept bourgeois society, the simplest reflection shows that it is impossible not only to think but to take any kind of sustained positive action in the world today unless one postulates the complete victory of the great masses of the people. What is this but the exemplification in life of the logical theory, the inevitability of socialism? The Stalinist state, the Nazi state, and in their varying degrees all states today, based upon property and privilege, are the negation of the complete democracy of the people. It is this state which is to be destroyed, that is to say, it is this state which is to be negated by the proletarian revolution. Thus, the inevitability of socialism is the inevitability of the negation of the negation, the third and most important law of the dialectic. I have said earlier that the laws of the dialectic are "hypotheses".

Any Deweyite pragmatist who is rubbing his hands with joy at this "reasonable" Marxism is in for rude disillusionment. "Dialectics", said Lenin, "is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism." So far I have been dealing with it as a theory of knowledge, as a mode of thought, examining more or less empirically contemporary society and the Russian revolution, and showing how by means of the dialectical approach, some order, some perspective, some understanding come out of them, showing equally why the bourgeoisie can make no sense of anything except to hold on to power.

But Marx's hypotheses were not hypotheses in general. They were not empirically arrived at, tentatively used, discarded if not satisfactory, experimental or instrumentalist. They were logical abstractions organised according to the method of Hegel and reflecting the movement of human society. This is no simple matter. But it has remained obscured and neglected too long.

The dialectic is a theory of knowledge, but precisely for that reason, it is a theory of the nature of man. Hegel and Marxism did not first arrive at a theory of knowledge which they applied to nature and society. They arrived at a theory of knowledge from their examination of men in society. Their first question was: What is man? What is the

truth about him? Where has he come from and where is he going? They answered that question first because they knew that without any answer to that general question, they could not think about particular questions.

Both Hegel and Marx in their different ways believed that man is destined for freedom and happiness. They did not wish this (or they did, that does not matter). They came to this conclusion by examining man's history as a totality. Man for Marx was not Christian man nor the man of the French revolution (nor Stalin's bloodstained secret police). The concept of man was a constantly developing idea which was headed for some sort of completeness. When Marx said that with the achievement of the socialist revolution the "real" history of humanity will begin, he was not being rhetorical or inspiring (or optimistic). He was being strictly and soberly scientific.

The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth.

Thus Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind; Marx worked on the same principles. The essential nature of man was becoming clear only as it approached its completeness in bourgeois society. It is in bourgeois society that we could see what man really is. And it is "only at the end" of bourgeois society that we can see what man is in very truth. Thus it is in the contemporary barbarism that can be seen most clearly what is the "real" nature of humanity. The need and desire for socialism, for complete democracy, for complete freedom, that is the "real" nature of man. It is this which explains his past. But it could be expressed within the concrete circumstances of past ages only to the degree that objective circumstances allowed. Did man, therefore, suffer through all those centuries to produce completed man? The defenders of bourgeois society are ready to defend and rage over all these unjustified sufferings of past mankind in their die-hard opposition to the proletarian revolution which will relieve present mankind. They will get nothing to comfort themselves with. "The truth is the whole." All the various stages constitute the nature of man. Continues Hegel:

> "And just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject or self-becoming, self-development."

Man is the subject, that which is developing itself. The subject becomes more and more real, and therefore the truth about man becomes deeper and wider, more universal, more complex, more concrete. Complete universality, complete democracy in the sense that every man is able to do what every other man does, this is the ultimate stage. The Russian revolution was an imperfect, limited, handicapped but nevertheless decisive step in this direction. The nature of man, therefore, becomes the search for this completeness and the overcoming of the obstacles which stood and stand in its way. Past history therefore becomes intelligible and what is more important, the road to the solution of the overwhelming problems to the present day becomes open.

If today we say that now we know what is the "real" man, it is because we see him as a totality, as the result of his whole past. But from there we make another step. The terrible crisis of civilisation is the result of the fact that man is at last real, he has become himself, completely developed. But the old type of world which developed him cannot contain him. He must burst through it. That world was a world in which he was subjected to nature. It was in the subjection of nature that he fully realised himself, a continuous negation of the obstacles which impeded his development. That being accomplished, his real history will begin. He negates all that has previously impeded him, i.e. negated him, in the full realisation of his inherent nature. Socialism is the negation of all previous negations. It is obvious that these are large conceptions. But the death of a world civilisation is not a small thing.

The conception being stated, it is now necessary not to prove it (only life can do that) but to show where it came from.

Western civilisation, and therefore, the Hegelian dialectic begins with Christianity. It was Christianity which established universality in its most abstract form, that very universality which we are now seeing concretely striving for expression in the proletariat all over the contemporary world. The very early or "primitive" Christians attempted a universality that was extremely concrete, commonalty of goods and absolute equality. But it soon collapsed. The abstract universality was established by that historical Christianity which superseded the Roman Empire. Christianity united all men, before birth, in the universality of original sin, and after death, in the possibility of universal redemption in heaven. Thus it carefully avoided a concrete universality. It was the religion of the millions who had been released from slavery by the collapse of the Roman

Empire. The narrow straitened circumstances of their material lives were compensated for by the subjective conception of an after-life in which all their material needs would be satisfied or, better still, there would be no need for material satisfactions at all. But, extreme abstraction though it was, man is for the first time established as universal man. Hegel expresses the idea in all its fullness in the Philosophy of History:

> Man, finite when regarded for himself, is yet at the same time the Image of God and a fountain of infinity in himself. He is the object of his own existence – has in himself an infinite value, an external destiny. Consequently, he has his true home in a supersensuous world – an infinite subjectivity, gained only by a rupture with mere natural existence and violation, and by his labour to break their power from within.... These conditions are not yet a concrete order, but simply the first abstract principles, which are won by the instrumentality of the Christian religion for the secular state. First, under Christianity slavery is impossible; for man as man – in the abstract essence of his nature – is contemplated in God; each unit of mankind is an object of the grace of God and of the Divine purpose; "God will have all men to be saved." Utterly excluding all speciality, therefore, man, in and for himself – in his simple quality of man – has infinite value; and this infinite value abolishes, ipso facto, all particularity attaching to birth or country.

This is what Hegel calls an abstract universal. The history of humanity is no more than this abstract universal becoming concrete.

International socialism is the concrete embodiment of the abstract principle of Christianity. And Christianity appeared and international socialism is now appearing because they are of the very nature of man. To call the recognition of this teleology and religion is a sign of the greatest ignorance, or, is not ignorance, but a determination at all costs to defend bourgeois society against the philosophy of Bolshevism today so as not to have to defend it against the revolutionary masses tomorrow. To have been Christian and to be socialist is an expression of the need for concrete universality which is not so much in as of the very nature of man.

And dialectic bases itself upon this precisely because it is not religious and not teleological. If this, scientifically speaking, is not the nature of man, then what do the opponents of dialectic offer instead? Either man has expressed these desires and these aims by accident, i.e. they have no significance whatever, for he might have expressed entirely different aims and had entirely different needs, and may do so tomorrow. Or

these needs and aims are not the nature of man but came from some outside agency or God.

It is only in the sense described above that dialectic speaks of freedom and happiness being the purpose of man's existence. Purpose, not in the religious sense, but in the sense that if we examine man's history through the centuries he has sought these aims. It is difficult therefore to say what other purpose his existence has, and the anti-dialectician is left with the alternative that man's life has no purpose at all, which is only another way of accommodating one's self to the existing society, bourgeois society.

The logical principle of universality contains within it a logical contradiction, the contradiction of abstract and concrete. This logical contradiction is a direct reflection of the objective circumstances in which the men of early Christianity lived. Their physical and material circumstances were on the lowest possible level. And therefore, to make their existence a totality, they had to fill it out with this tremendous abstraction. Thus is established the basic logical contradiction in the universal between concrete and abstract, between objective and subjective, between real and ideal, between content and form. But both together form a whole and have no meaning apart from each other. They are opposites but interpenetrated. To Christian man, the conception of heaven was real and necessary, an integral part of his existence in the objective world. Those who accuse dialectics of being a religion understand neither dialectics nor religion. The history of man is his effort to make the abstract universal concrete. He constantly seeks to destroy, to move aside, that is to say, to negate what impedes his movement towards freedom and happiness. Man is the subject of history. "(The) subject, (man) is pure and simple negativity." This is a cardinal principle of the dialectical movement. The process is molecular, day by day never resting, continuous. But at a certain stage, the continuity is interrupted. The molecular changes achieve a universality and explode into a new quality, a revolutionary change.

Previous to the revolutionary explosion, the aims of the struggle can be posed in partial terms, possibility. It is the impossibility of continuing to do this that interrupts the continuity.

The revolution, precisely because it is a revolution, demands all things for all men. It is an attempt to leap from the realm of objective necessity to the realm of objective freedom.

But in the limited objective circumstances to which the low level of productivity has confined society, what is demanded by, of and for all men, only some men can have. The concrete universality, therefore, becomes the property of some men, a class. They are therefore compelled to use objective violence against those excluded and to substitute an abstract universality for the concrete universality of which the mass has been deprived. But the absence of concrete universality from the whole also limits the universality of the few. Their own concrete universality therefore begins to be limited and its limitations substituted for by abstractions. This is the Hegelian process of "mediation". The new state established after the revolution, the ideology which accompanies it, are a form of mediation between abstract and concrete, ideal and real, etc.

The mediation usually assumes the form of the state power, and the specific ideological combinations of abstract and concrete to bind the new relations are developed by the philosophy of the age. A new equilibrium in the process of the development of man has been established. At a later stage, the same developing process will be repeated in the attempt to negate the actual stage of man previously established. There will be the mass revolution for undifferentiated universality, the class differentiation in its realisation, the splitting of the nation into opposing factors, and the attempt to realise in ideology the reconciliation of the opposing factors. Man is not only what he does but what he thinks and what he aims at. But this can only be judged by the concrete, what actually takes place. The truth is always concrete. But it is the concrete viewed in the light of the whole.

In the decisive page of the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel writes:

> "As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which (process) in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of the opposition of factors it entails. ... It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning, it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves."

Marx is expressing concretely just this concentrated Hegelian generalisation when he says:

> For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form, it will give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, merely because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only in so far as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class. ... Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, in return for which the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, aims at a more decided and radical negation of the previous conditions of society than could all previous classes which sought to rule. [German Ideology]

This organisation of historical development did not fall from the sky. It is the result of the concept of the dialectic worked out by Hegel and without the dialectic it could not be done at all. It is this Hegel that Burnham calls the "arch-muddler" of human thought. It is from the examination of this process, the developing conflicts between abstract and concrete, subjective and objective, the abstract universal assuming a certain content which becomes concentrated in a special form, the form gradually becoming infused with a new content until it can contain it no longer and explodes, it is from the examination of all this in society and nature but particularly in its ideological reflection in philosophy that Hegel works out the significance of categories and the movement of his Logic. Just as Marx's economic categories were in reality social categories, just in the same way the logical categories, contradictions, etc., of Hegel were a reflection of social categories and social movement. Hegel, and for very good reasons of his time, led his Logic into an impossible and fantastic idealism about world-spirit, etc. But the basis of his work was solidly materialistic. He himself explains that:

> The community of principle which really links together individuals of the same class and in virtue of which they are similarly related to other existences, assumes a form in human consciousness; and that form is the thought or idea which summarily

> comprehends the constituents of generic character. Every universal in thought has a corresponding generic principle in Reality, to which it gives intellectual expression or form. (The Philosophy of History)

Marx and Engels knew this. They could carry over the Hegelian dialectic into a materialistic form because it had been derived originally not from religion but from a study of the stages of man in nature and society and the reflection of these stages in human thought. The dialectic of negativity, the negation of the negation, the inevitability of socialism are a culmination in logical thought of social processes that have now culminated in contemporary society. You look in vain in writings of Hook, Professor of Philosophy at New York University and Burnham, a member of the same faculty, for the slightest understanding of this.

The beginning of this process for the modern world is Christianity and the beginning "presupposes its end as its purpose". For Hegel, these stages are the work of the universal spirit.

Marx here is his diametrical opposite. Marx is a dialectical materialist. For him, and right from the very start, these concrete revolutionary stages are the work of the great masses of the people forever seeking the concretion of universality as the development of the productive forces creates the objective circumstances and the subjective desires which move them.

Hegel could see the abstract universal, the relation between abstract and concrete in historical Christianity and the developing relation in human history. Marx saw that, but because he was closer to the end, he could see more of the "real" man. Because he had seen the revolutionary proletariat, he was able to complete the dialectical analysis of previous stages by the recognition of the role of the revolutionary masses.

These appear at the very beginning of history.

In his introduction to Class Struggles in France, Engels writes:

> "This party of revolt, of those known by the name of Christian, was also strongly represented in the army; whole legions were Christian. When they were ordered to attend the sacrificial ceremonies of the pagan established church, in order to do the honours there, the rebel soldiers had the audacity to stick peculiar emblems – a cross –

> on their helmets in protest. Even the wonted barrack cruelties of their superior officers were fruitless. The Emperor Diocletian could no longer quietly look on while order, obedience and discipline in his army were being undermined. He intervened energetically, while there was still time. He passed an anti-Socialist, I should say anti-Christian, law. The meetings of the rebels were forbidden, their meeting halls were closed or even pulled down, the Christian badges, crosses, etc., were like the red handkerchiefs in Saxony, prohibited. Christians were declared incapable of holding offices in the state, they were not to be allowed even to become corporals. Since there were not available at that time judges so well trained in "respect of persons" as Herr von Koller's anti-revolt bill assumes, the Christians were forbidden out of hand to seek justice before court. This exceptional law was also without effect. The Christians tore it down from the walls with scorn; they are even supposed to have burnt the Emperor's palace in Nicomedia over his head. Then the latter revenged himself by the great persecution of Christians in the year 303, according to our chronology. It was the last of its kind. And it was so effective that seventeen years later the army consisted overwhelmingly of Christians, and the succeeding autocrat of the whole Roman Empire, Constantine, called the Great by the priests, proclaimed Christianity as the state religion."

The Christian revolutionaries, however, were not struggling to establish the medieval papacy. The medieval papacy was a mediation to which the ruling forces of society rallied in order to strangle the quest for universality of the Christian masses. In one sense the papacy merely continued the Roman Imperium, and, in Hobbes's phrase, was indeed "no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof".

But it was much more than that. Primitive Christianity had begun as a mass revolt that had sought to establish the community of men upon earth. By the time of Gregory the Great, when the papacy began to take over the functions of the declined and fallen Roman Empire, the papacy was beginning its career as a combination of the Empire and the tremendous impact of the mass revolution. It was the ghost of the Roman empire and living symbol of Christ on Earth. Heaven was too abstract to satisfy completely the masses of the people. The Church guaranteed them, in return for obedience, the happy future life. But it also took care of the life on earth, and performed the functions of teacher, protector and provider for the poor and sick and needy. It mediated between society and heaven and between the secular rulers of society and the masses. It succoured the poor and was a centre of learning and the improvement of agriculture. In

the method by which it was established, in its mediation, of contending classes and its manipulation of concrete abstract, the medieval papacy, as the culmination of the Christian revolution, contains in embryo all the development to the modern age. The dialectical materialist method, the product of a stage nearer to the end, is infinitely superior to Hegel's dialectic. Constantly, contemporary events throw a penetrating light into the past and thereby illuminate the future. It is, for example, the concrete history of the last thirty years of proletarian revolutions that for the first time makes it possible to grasp fully the meaning of Renaissance. But the dialectical materialist study of the Renaissance drives the last nail in the coffin of those who hesitate before the conception of the negation of the negation, the inevitability of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The leading ideological characteristic of the early Renaissance can be usefully designated by the popular term "humanism". The medieval towns produced a brilliant civilisation. With the growth of wealth, chiefly a result of commercial capitalism, there arise classes of men whom the early Christian contradiction between objective and subjective, abstract and concrete, is no longer tenable. It is not merely a question of objective wealth. The idea of universality becomes more concrete because of the

> "energetic position which man is sensible of occupying in his subjective power over outward and material things in the natural world, in which he feels himself free and so gains for himself an absolute right." (Hegel, Philosophy of History)

The papacy is itself mediated. It became humanised, i.e. more completely secular, and thus took the road to its own ruin. St. Thomas Aquinas had already begun the rationalisaton of faith, making it reasonable by a brilliant and profound misuse of the writings of Aristotle. Dante, whom Engels calls one of the first modern men, though profoundly religious, wished to substitute Emperor for Pope. The national monarchy begins to substitute for the papal authority.

So far so good. But, and here the Marxist dialectic sharply departs from the Hegelian, the new universal was established and took its form by such violent revolutions of the European proletariat as Europe did not see again until the period which opened in 1917. It is only recently that bourgeois historians have begun to recognise these. The historians of the socialist society will in time make of this one of the great chapters of human history.

As always in critical periods, there were a series of peasant revolutions in Europe throughout the fourteenth century. They were of tremendous range and power, some of them semi-socialistic. But they were not decisive. The decisive revolutions were revolutions of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie of the towns. If the phrase had not already been appropriated by Marxists for the revolution of the socialist proletariat, it would be perfectly correct to say that within the various municipalities the workers aimed at, consciously, and in some few cases actually achieved, the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the last half of the fourteenth century, these revolutions swept from one end of Europe to another.

In Salonika, the sailors and the artisans ruled the rich, the landowners, the commercial magnates and the clergy for ten years. In Italy, the struggle between the "fat" and the "thin". In Bologna, in Genoa, in Sienna, the masses sought to obtain absolute mastery of municipal power. In Florence, under the leadership of Michel Lando, they organised the celebrated revolt of the Ciompi and established the dictatorship of the proletariat whom they called "God's people".

Rome and other towns saw similar battles. But it was in the Lowlands, in towns of Ghent, Ypres, and Bruges that the workers made the most desperate efforts to establish their own dictatorship. Revolutionary history badly needs a study of the incidents which centre around the van Artevelde family. Over and over again during a period of decades, the workers rose. More than once they established their dictatorship, they proclaimed an equality of fortunes and the suppression of all authority except the authority of people who live by manual labour. They repeatedly defeated the flower of feudal chivalry. It is reported that in Ghent, the workers went so far as to plan the complete extermination of the bourgeoisie and the nobles with the exception of children of six years of age. In the German towns of Cologne, Strasbourg, Aix-la-Chapelle, Lubeck, Stettin and many others, in Barcelona, Valencia, and the other towns in Spain, the same desperate battles took place.

The working class and its allies closest to it fought for fifty years all over Europe to establish proletarian democracy. Why they failed to achieve substantial successes was due not only to the low level of production but the fact that they fought only as members of isolated municipalities. Some of them indeed aimed boldly at an international proletarian revolution. But their time was not yet.

Let Boissonade, a bourgeois historian, speak in the concluding paragraph of his Life and Work in Medieval Europe. The reader should read carefully and note particularly the words we have underlined [<3m>Proofreader's Note: In the current version these underlinings are missing.]:

For the first time the masses, ceasing to be mere herds without rights or thoughts of their own, became associations of freemen, proud of their independence, conscious of the value and dignity of their labour, fitted by their intelligent activity to collaborate in all spheres, political, economic, and social, in the tasks which the aristocrats believed themselves alone able to fulfil. Not only was the power of production multiplied a hundredfold by their efforts, but society was regenerated by the incessant influx of new and vigorous blood. Social selection was henceforth better assured. It was thanks to the devotion and spirit of these medieval masses that the nations became conscious of themselves, for it was they who brought about the triumph of national patriotism, just as their local patriotism had burned for town or village in the past. The martyrdom of a peasant girl from the marshes of Lorraine saved the first of the great nations, France, which had become the most brilliant home of civilisation in the Middle Ages. They gave to the modern states their first armies, which were superior to those of feudal chivalry. Above all, it was they who prepared the advent of democracy and bequeathed to the labouring masses the instruments of their power, the principles of freedom and of association. Labour, of old despised and depreciated, became a power of incomparable force in the world, and its social value became increasingly recognised. It is from the Middle Ages that this capital evolution takes its date, and it is this which makes this period, so often misunderstood, and so full of a confused but singularly powerful activity, the most important in the universal history of the labour before the great changes witnessed by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This was the working class five hundred years ago. They were not proletarians in the modern sense. They were, for the most part, free workers in the guilds. They did not function within the socialised organisation of modern labour. But note, Messrs. anti-dialecticians and anti-Marxists, that these workers, five hundred years ago, all over Europe, believed that they were "fitted by their intelligent activity to collaborate in all spheres, political, economic and social in the tasks which the aristocrats believed themselves alone able to fulfil". That is what the millions of proletarians all over the world today believe. They will fight for it. We believe they will succeed. You believe

what? Their ancestors of five hundred years ago were not as developed as are the workers of today. But they fought for complete equality, for complete democracy, for universality. They failed, but they established the foundations of what we know as liberalism. Some of you still live on it, thin fare though it has become. The bourgeoisie had the feudal lords, in terror of these workers, rallied behind the absolute monarchy and the national state. Both humanism and the national state of the absolute monarchy were mediations of the mass proletarian desire for universality no longer in heaven but on earth. Humanism was the substitution of a liberal culture for the rich in place of the complete self-expression desired by the workers; the national state, disciplining the church, supplemented the concrete objective protection of wealth by abstract subjective claims of being the arbiter of justice, the guardian of law and order, and the protector of all the people. The contradictions, the antagonisms in the quest for universality had grown sharper than ever.

So, Messrs. doubters and sceptics and sneerers at dialectic, you will begin to see perhaps that what dialecticians believe in is not the result of religion. We have a certain conception of the nature of man based on history. When Marx and Engels wrote about the proletarian revolution in connection with the negation of the negation, when they wrote that in the present stage of society, man would either achieve this revolution or society would tear itself to pieces, they were being guided not by the dislocations of Marx's "psyche" as Edmund Wilson thinks or by any Hegelian triads or historical religiosity, as is the opinion of Burnham and Hook. It was a logical deduction from the experience of history. The struggle of the masses for universality did not begin yesterday. An intellectual like Dewey believes that men's quest is the quest for certainty. The intellectual believes that all men are intellectuals. That is wrong. Men seek not intellectual certainty. The quest is the mass quest for universality in action and in life. It is the moving force of history. And history has reached a climax because this quest has reached a climax.

Space compels rapid compression of the next great stages in the process of social development – the Protestant reformation and the French revolution. Rising capitalism expropriated the agricultural labourer and in the creation of wage-labour threw the masses further back from universality than they had ever been. Humanism had dragged universality from heaven down to earth and had by that made the contradiction between real and ideal an intolerable antagonism. The new proletariat could not play any great

part in the struggles of the Protestant reformation, as the mature workers of the medieval towns had done. Hence the classes which took the lead were the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. Let us concentrate on one outstanding and familiar example, the English revolution.

The Puritans give us the key to the understanding of the whole period in the light of the struggle for democracy. The revolution of Dewey had shattered forever the claims of the Pope as mediator between God and man. It placed the responsibility for the individual's moral salvation squarely on the individual man. As Hegel put it:

> "This is the essence of the Reformation: Man is in his very nature destined to be free", and in his own peculiar but profound manner he sums up modern history. "Time, since that epoch, has had no other work to do than the formal imbuing of the world with this principle, in bringing the Reconciliation implicit (in Christianity) into objective and explicit realisation."

If you stand it on its head, and say that the objective development of man in society has been the various stages through which various classes have sought to realise the freedom implicit in Christianity, a great truth will have been grasped.

But the mass of men do not think, and certainly do not act according to those terms. The Puritans of town and country, petty-bourgeois, and semi-proletarian, shut off from freedom by the state, attempted to establish democracy in religion. The sects each attempted to form a social community in which the individual would exercise the new freedom, unlimited except by the equal freedom of other men. James I of England did not misunderstand them one bit. He knew what their anti-Ecclesiasticism meant. To all their arguments for religious freedom he invariably croaked in reply, "No Bishop, no King." Their weakness was a social weakness, the lack of organisation which reflected the scattered character of their labour. But when the big bourgeoisie and some liberal aristocrats started the revolution, and the small farmers and small masters of the towns organised in the army, the Puritans showed what social passions were hidden behind their psalm-singing. In 1646, tired of the vacillations of their bourgeois and aristocratic leaders, they seized the person of the King and held him as a hostage. They then began negotiations with Cromwell and in the twin documents, the agreement of the People and the Heads of the Proposals, they put forward a programme for such a parliamentary democracy as was not even put forward in England until the Chartist movement two

hundred years later. They put it forward to Cromwell; and in the discussion with Cromwell and his brother-in-law, Ireton, they raised the property question as a barrier to democracy in the most plain-spoken manner. These were not the Levellers, and the Diggers, who were the extreme left. These were the main body of the army. They were suppressed by a combination of fraud and force, but Cromwell, striking to the left, was compelled to strike at the right also. Charles I was executed and the monarchy was destroyed. In the familiar phrase, it was not monarchy but royalty which returned at the restoration. Monarchy in Britain was gone forever, destroyed by the religious democrats. They held power for eleven years, but as always, and particularly in this case, they were too few to represent the nation and the old process of mediation once more took place. They had cleared the way for capitalism, and nowhere was the antagonism sharper between developing capitalism and the masses of the nation than in England.

The history of the French revolution is familiar to all Marxists and the conclusions for our main argument are therefore easy to draw.

The intervention of the masses, its range and power, the social desires, the capacity for achievement and sacrifice, revealed itself to an educated Europe which had not dreamt that the shabby exterior of workers and peasants and the common people hid such colossal energies and such social needs. The quest for universality was no longer a secret. Liberty, equality and fraternity were the slogans of the revolution. If the Reformation had sought to establish a “democratic” freedom of religion, the French revolution attempted to establish a social freedom of political democracy. If out of the individual’s responsibility for his own salvation, there had leapt democracy, out of his political freedom, there leapt communism. Robespierre’s dictatorship was an attempt to establish the reign of virtue. But the French masses, not only Babeuf, saw and were ready for what was needed, drastic regulation and even confiscation of the property of the rich. The modern problem was posed. But it was the old problem in a new and more aggravated, a more contradictory form.

When the French revolution was over and men had time to think, it was seen that the revolution of reason and the mighty struggle for liberty, equality and fraternity had left men farther apart than ever before. Behind the formal equality before the law, capitalist production was accumulating wealth at one pole and misery, subordination and degradation at the other on a scale hitherto unknown. The universality of men, honour,

loyalty, humanism, liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, these were as abstract to the mass of men as the heaven of the early Popes. These ideals had a certain existence among the ruling classes, but thinking man could see that the needs and deprivations of the excluded mass reached with devastating effect upon the humanity of the rulers. The masses had tried to make a state a popular state. The result had been the creation of a monster such as had never been seen before and far surpassed in range and power the state of absolute monarchy. It was in the throes of this contradiction which was shaking all Europe that Hegel, the culmination of the German classical philosophers, set himself to study the problem of human destiny and elaborated a theory of knowledge. Hegel recognised what men were striving for and he recognised that the French revolution was a climax in this struggle.

Hegel understood Adam Smith and Ricardo. He understood the fragmentation and dehumanisation of man in the process of capitalist production. Many of Marx's most famous pages in Capital have as their direct origins some of Hegel's descriptions of the workers in capitalist industry. This was, for Hegel, the final insuperable barrier to any community of association among men. Hence universality for the mass of men was impossible. By means of his dialectical method he drew the necessary conclusions. We who live toward the end in the epoch of Hitler and Stalin can understand Hegel's conclusions better than most men of previous generations, with the exception of Marx.

Universality for the mass of men was impossible. Only the state, said Hegel, could embody universality for the community. But, in particular, the state was a defence against the revolutionary masses.

Hegel had seen them and their activities in European history and now the French Revolution had shown that nothing could ever come of it. So it had been and it would ever be. At each stage, a few chosen individuals represented the abstract spirit of mankind. Universality had to be restricted to these. This was the basis of Hegel's idealism. But with the clear insight of a great scholar of both past and contemporary history, and by his mastery of his method, he analysed and drew his analysis to its conclusion. The state would have to organise production. The chaos of capitalist production would have to be disciplined by organising the separate industries into corporations. The state would be the state of the corporations. Universality being impossible to all men, the state bureaucracy would embody universality and represent

the community. Hegel did not know the modern proletariat. He operated therefore on the basis of the inevitability of proletarian subordination. But grant him that premise and his dialectical method shows that he made an astonishing anticipation in thought of the inevitable end of bourgeois society – the totalitarian state. Hegel must not be misjudged. He wrote and propounded in the name of freedom and Reason. But those who today sneer at him and his dialectics are not fit even to wipe the dust off his books. To this day, except for the writings of the great Marxists, no single writer since the French revolution has so much to say that is indispensable to modern thought and particularly modern politics.

This is where Marx began. It was as impossible to go any farther along the road of Hegel as it is impossible to go farther than the totalitarian state of contemporary history. Beyond both lies only decay.

Marx had to abandon the quest for universality or find a new basis for it.

A long line of European thinkers, Ricardo, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Feuerbach, and the classical economists, the ferment in Europe which preceded the revolutionary outburst in 1848, and, what Hegel had never seen, the emergence of the proletariat as an organised social force – these gave to Marx, already a master of Hegel's system, the impetus to the new system.

Men had sought universality in heaven, in the freedom of religion, in the freedom of politics. Politics had failed. Neither Hegel nor Marx ever had any illusions about bourgeois democracy as a solution to the unquenchable desires and aspirations of men.

Nothing is more indicative of the philosophical character of Marxism and its organic continuity of the tradition of the great philosophers of Europe than the method by which Marx dismissed democratic politics. For Marx bourgeois democratic politics was a fraud, but like all the great panaceas from Christianity on, it was an expression of the perennial need historically conditioned. The productive process of capitalism denied any real community to men. And democratic politics, like religion, was a form of mediation by which men gained the illusion that they were all members of one social community, an illusion of universality. How not to remember Hitler's insistence that his tyrannical regime represented the folk community. The more the Nazi regime deprived the masses of all human rights, the more imperative it was to substitute an abstraction

of abstractions to create the totality of existence, a sense of universality, without which men cannot live.

Marx reversed Hegel at all points. It was not an intellectual construction. Men were doing it and had been doing it all around him for years.

Hegel saw objective history as the successive manifestation of a world spirit. Marx placed the objective movement in the process of production. Hegel had been driven to see the perpetual quest for universality as necessarily confined to the process of knowledge. Marx reversed this and rooted the quest for universality in the need for the free and full development of all the inherent and acquired characteristics of the individual in productive and intellectual labour. Hegel had made the motive force of history the work of a few gifted individuals in whom was concentrated the social movement. Marx propounded the view that it was only when the ideas seized hold of the masses that the process of history moved. Hegel dreaded the revolt of the modern mass. Marx made the modern proletarian revolution the motive force of modern history.

Hegel placed the future guardianship of society in the hands of the bureaucracy. Marx saw future society as headed for ruin except under the rulership of the proletariat and the vanishing distinction between intellectual and manual labour.

That was the conflict. That is the conflict today. The proletariat, said Marx, is revolutionary or it is nothing. The proletariat, he said, will conquer or society will destroy itself. The bureaucracy as conceived by Hegel he subjected to a merciless analysis. Let the reader think of Hitlerite Germany and Stalinist Russia and see how profound, how realistic, how anticipatory of the absolute crisis was the battle between the last of the great bourgeois philosophers and the first philosopher of the proletarian revolution. The smug anti-dialecticians have not yet caught up with this conflict between the masters of dialectic over a hundred years ago.

Hegel's conception of history is nothing other than the speculative expression of the Christian-German dogma of the opposition of spirit and manner, God and the world. This opposition expresses itself within history, within the human world itself, as a few chosen individuals, active spirits, confronting the rest of humanity, the spiritless mass matter. Hegel's conception of history presupposes an abstract or absolute spirit which develops itself so that humanity is only a mass bearing this spirit unconsciously or

consciously. Within the empirical exoteric history, he sees a speculative esoteric history. The history of mankind is transformed into the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, beyond actual men.

Parallel with this Hegelian doctrine, there was developed in France the theory of the doctrinaires proclaiming the sovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people, in order to exclude the masses and rule alone. The result is that if the activity of the actual masses is nothing more than the activity of a mass of human individuals, the abstract universality, reason, spirit, possesses abstract expression exhausted in a few individuals. It depends upon the position and the strength of imagination of each individual whether he will pass as representative of "spirit".(Marx, The Holy Family)

Hegel had observed the unconscious development of the process of mediation. The bureaucracy of his corporate state was a conscious final mediation. Marx, in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right took up the challenge. The passage which follows might have been strange or difficult twenty years ago, not today. The reader must remember that both Hegel and Marx had common pre-suppositions – the recognition of the quest for universality, the recognition that the French revolution had brought the perpetual mediation of the growing contradictions to some final stage. The essence of the passage is that while Hegel believed that the bureaucracy can and must be a mediation for universality, Marx shows that the contradiction between objective and subjective, between ideal and real, concrete and abstract, has now reached such a stage, that the universality of the bureaucracy can have no reality. The quest for universality, embodied in the masses, constituting the great mass of the nation, forbids any mediation. The bureaucracy is compelled to become objectively the embodiment of the crassest materialism and subjectively, in its words, the embodiment of the crassest hypocrisy.

Here is the passage with certain words emphasised:

> The state formalism which the bureaucracy is, is the state as formalism and as such formalism Hegel has described it. Since this state formalism is constituted as actual power and its own material content becomes itself, it is self-understood that the bureaucracy is a network of practical illusions or the illusion of the state. The bureaucratic spirit is a thoroughly Jesuitical theological spirit. The bureaucrats are the Jesuits and theologians of the state. The bureaucracy is the republique prêtre. [Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right]

Since the bureaucracy is essentially the state as formalism, it is this also in its purpose. Thus the actual purpose of the state appears to the bureaucracy as a purpose against the state. The spirit of the bureaucracy is the formal spirit of the state. It makes therefore the formal spirit of the state or the actual emptiness of spirit of the state into a categorical imperative. The bureaucracy thus is driven to the final end and purpose of the state. Since the bureaucracy makes its formal purpose into its content, it gets into conflicts everywhere with the real purposes. It is therefore necessary to substitute the form for the content, the content for the form. The purposes of the state are transformed into administrative ones or the administrative purpose into state purposes. The bureaucracy is a circle out of which no one can get. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The apex entrusts to the lower circles insight into particular things, and the lower circles entrust to the apex insights into the universal and thus they mutually interchange.

The bureaucracy is the imaginary state besides the real state, the spiritualism of the state. Everything therefore has a double meaning, a real one and a bureaucratic one, as knowledge is double, real knowledge and bureaucratic (also the will). The real essence is handled according to its bureaucratic essence, according to its other worldly spiritual essence. The bureaucracy has the essence of the state, the spiritual essence of society in its possession, it is its private property. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery, guarded internally through the hierarchy, externally as the closed corporation. The apparent spirit of the state, the opinion of the state, appears therefore to the bureaucracy as a treason to its mysteries. Authority is therefore the principle of its knowledge, and deifying of authority is its principle. Within itself, however, spiritualism becomes a crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, of belief in authority, the mechanism of fixed formal behaviour, fixed principles, observations, traditions. As for the individual bureaucrat, the purpose of the state becomes a private purpose, a hunt for higher posts, for careers. First, he regards real life as material, for the spirit of this life has its exclusive existence in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy must therefore proceed to make living as material as possible. Secondly, it is material for itself, i.e. so far as it becomes an object of bureaucratic handling, for its spirit is prescribed to it, its purpose lies outside of it, its existence is the existence of administration. The state exists henceforth only as fixed spirits of various offices, whose connection is subordination and passive obedience. Actual science appears as without content, actual life is as dead, for the imaginary knowing and imaginary living pass as

the essence. The bureaucrat must therefore believe Jesuitically with the actual state, be this Jesuitism now conscious, or unconscious. It is, however, necessary that as soon as his opposite is knowing, he also achieve self-consciousness and purposeful Jesuitism.

That is the political anatomy of the Stalinist bureaucracy. In the review After Ten Years, I could touch only briefly (such are the trials of political minorities) upon the dehumanisation of the Russian bureaucracy itself. The Russian bureaucracy, as the Nazi bureaucracy in its time, represents essentially the opposition to the universality of the people in every single sphere of life. As the same article says:

In socialist society or in a society transitional to socialism, politics, science, art, literature, education all become truly social. The individual is able to exercise his gifts to the highest capacity, to become truly universal, because of the essentially collective life of the society in which he lives. Look at Stalinist society. No individual is more "political" than the individual in Stalinist society.

Nowhere are art, literature, education, science, so integrated with "society". This is the appearance. In reality, never before has there been such a prostitution of all these things for the corruption and suppression of the direct producer, with the resulting degradation of the producers and managers alike.

Hitler called his state the truest democracy, his community was the folk community of the whole nation. His regime was "socialism". The Stalinist regime goes farther. The state possesses all the virtues.

The internationalist conception of the human welfare is maintained through the connection with the corrupt and depraved communist parties and the constant appeal to the masses of the world. The state guarantees a "genuine" democracy, a "genuine" freedom of speech. Science, art and literature, like production, exist only to serve all the people. The state only administers the property which is the possession of all the people. Liberty, equality (within reason) and fraternity, honour, loyalty, chivalry, geniality, are the possession of all the people (except the Trotskyists). The leader is the leader because he possesses all these qualities to a superlative degree. Any oppositionist to the slightest of these claims becomes immediately an enemy devoid of all these virtues and fit only

for extermination. The totality of the abstraction is to be explained only by the totality of the deprivation. Today this state is not only confined to Russia as an isolated phenomenon. It is spreading. Trotsky taught that the growth of the Stalinist state was due to the struggle over consumption. We cannot accept this at all. The Stalinist state is the completest expression of the class state – not the distorted beginning of something new but the culmination, the final form of the old. To believe that this state has roots only in consumption and not in the whole productive system is to saddle the concepts of Marxian socialism with a burden which they cannot indefinitely carry. The Stalinist state is a class state, a culmination of the old, not in any shape or form the beginning, however distorted, of the new.

Of precisely the same genre are the abstractions of the bourgeois democracies, different not in quality but only in the degree. Phrases like the "century of the common man" and the "four freedoms" are abstractions to satisfy the suppression of objective needs. The League of Nations of 1919 becomes the United Nations of 1947. The more concrete the negation of the need, the more abstract, empty and flamboyant becomes the subjective mediation.

There is a school of Marxists today who preach the ridiculous doctrine that in Russia today politics governs production. In reality, production governs politics. In appearance, the state takes hold of capital. In reality, capital takes hold of the state, and upon the mediation of the antagonisms of social and political life is superimposed and the antagonisms of capitalist production itself. In its most developed form, it is state capital.

It is this modern state, the negation of universality for so many millions, which is to be negated. The negation of this is the negation of the negation. The agent of this negation is the revolutionary proletariat. When the modern millions take hold of this state, they negate the root of their degradation, production itself, for to control the state of state capitalism is to control production itself. At this moment, the state begins to wither away.

I can sum up best by a quotation from an article I wrote in New International of June 1944:

> But the outstanding feature of the contemporary world is that the principles for which Christianity stood in its best days are now regarded as matters of life and death by the

> average worker. This is no accident at all though we can only state the facts here. European civilisation must become a unity? Hundreds of millions of European workers know that this must be achieved or the continent will perish. Equality of nations? That, too, the great masses of Europe passionately desire, not as an ideal but to be able to live in peace. A central government to represent the interests of all? As late as 1935, Lord Cecil could get eleven million votes in a plebiscite in Britain supporting the idea of a League of Nations. And when workers say a League of Nations and collective security they mean it. And that early attempt to succour the poor, to help the afflicted, to teach the ignorant? The great mass of the workers in European countries conceive of Labour Parties as doing just that, within the conditions of the modern world.

Our anti-dialecticians believe the negation of negation and the inevitability of socialism are religion. But when one attempts to penetrate into their philosophy of history, one increasingly meets a vacuum or the most arbitrary combinations of historical phenomena, tied together by bits of string, by subjective analysis and a crude determinism which even sometimes has the presumption to call itself Marxism. For us there is no philosophy of history without Marxism, and there can be no Marxism without the dialectic. In the article quoted above, I continued:

> He who would exhibit the Marxist method must grasp the full significance of that early uprising of the masses when Christianity proclaimed its message. We must watch not only the primitiveness and simplicity of its aims but their comprehensive scope. Then by slow degrees, through the centuries, we see one part of the aim becoming concrete for one section of the population, and then another part for another section. Ideas arise from concrete conditions to become partially embodied in social classes and give rise to further interrelations between the spiral of real and ideal, content and form. This is the dialectic to which Marx gave a firm materialistic basis in the developing process of production. As society develops, the possibilities for individual development of man become greater and greater, but the conflict of classes becomes sharper and sharper. We stand today at an extreme state of these interrelated phenomena of social development. When a modern worker demands the right of free speech, the right of free press, of free assembly, continuous employment, social insurance, the best medical attention, the best education, he demands in reality the “social republic”. Spinoza and Kant would stand aghast at what the average worker takes for granted today. But he does not demand them as an individual or in the primitive manner the early Christian did. In America, for instance, there are some thirteen million workers organised for nothing else but the preservation and extension of these values. These are the values of modern

> civilisation. They are embodied in the very web and texture of the lives of the masses of the people. Never were such precious values so resolutely held as necessary to complete living by so substantial and so powerful a section of society. Socialism means simply the complete expansion and fulfillment of these values in the life of the individual. This can only be attained by the most merciless struggle of the whole class against its capitalist masters. The realisation of this necessity is the final prelude to full self-consciousness.

You still believe, gentlemen, that these ideas and conclusions are the result of a dialectical religion? Go your way. God be with you. Amen.

Bolshevism is above all a philosophy of life and a political conception. The political conception is the organised preparation for the proletarian revolution. Lenin was the originator of Bolshevism, the Marxism of our time. The world was to be saved by reason, but reason lay not in the heads of philosophers and intellectuals but in the actions of the masses. The world as we know it, under the control of its present masters, is unreasonable, chaotic, lacking in energy and creative force, gangrenous, barbarism. For Lenin, reason, order, historical creativeness, lay precisely in the forces which would destroy the old world. This is how he saw the councils of the workers, the soviets, and the revolutionary actions of the masses in 1905:

> The old power, as a dictatorship of the minority, could maintain itself only by the aid of police stratagems, only by preventing and diverting the masses from participating in the government, from controlling the government. The old power persistently distrusted the masses, feared the light, maintained itself by means of deception. The new power, as a dictatorship of the overwhelming majority, could and did maintain itself only by winning the confidence of the great masses, only by drawing, in the freest, broadest, and most energetic manner, all the masses into the work of government. Nothing hidden, nothing secret, no regulations, no formalities. You are a working man? You wish to fight to liberate Russia from a handful of police thugs? Then you are our comrade. Choose your delegate at once, immediately. Choose as you think best. We shall willingly and gladly accept him as a full member of our Soviet of Workers' Deputies, of our Peasants' Committee, of our Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, etc., etc. It is a power that is open to all, that does everything in sight of the masses, that is accessible to the masses, that springs directly from the masses; it is the direct organ of the masses and their will. Such was the

> new power, or rather its embryo, for the victory of the old power very soon trampled upon the tender shoots of this new plant. (Selected Works, vol. VII, pp. 252–3)

There are innumerable people opposed to bourgeois society, as they think, but who fear the uprising of the proletarian masses from that passive obedience, which is precisely the basis of bourgeois society. They want socialism but want to be sure of order, system, reason. Lenin had a different conception of where order was to be sought:

> When the history of humanity moves forward at the speed of a locomotive (the petty-bourgeois intellectual) calls it a "whirlwind", a "deluge", the "disappearance" of all "principles and ideas". When history moves at the speed of a horse and cart he calls it reason, system. Then the masses themselves, with all their virgin primitiveness, their simple, rough determination, begin to make history to apply "principles and theories" directly and immediately, the bourgeoisie takes fright and wails that "reason is thrust into the background". (Is not the very opposite the case, you philistine heroes? Is it not precisely in such moments of history that the reason of the masses is displayed rather than the reason of single individuals? Is it not precisely at such times that reason of the masses becomes a living, active force, and not an armchair force?) When direct action by the masses is crushed by shootings, executions, floggings, unemployment and famine, when the bugs of professorial science, subsidised by Dubasov, crawl out of the cracks and begin to speak on behalf of the people, in the name of the masses, and sell and betray the interests of the latter to a privileged few – the knights of philistinism imagine that an epoch of peace and calm progress has set in, that "the turn of sense and reason has now come again. (Lenin, Selected Works, vol. VII, pp. 260–1)

The bourgeois world is rejected completely. Only what destroys it is reasonable. But the reason of the masses was not merely destructive. It was destructive of the bourgeois world. But it was itself a "mighty creative force".

> The point is that it is precisely the revolutionary periods that are distinguished for their greater breadth, greater wealth, greater intelligence, greater and more systematic activity, greater audacity and vividness of historical creativeness compared with periods of philistine, Cadet, reformist progress. But Mr Blank and Co. picture it the other way about. They pass off poverty as historical-creative wealth. They regard the inactivity of the suppressed, downtrodden masses as the triumph of the systematic activity of the bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie. They shout about the disappearance of sense and reason, when the picking to pieces of parliamentary bills by all sorts of bureaucrats and liberal "penny-a-liners" gives way to a period of direct political activity by the "common

> people", who in their simple way directly and immediately destroy the organs of oppression of the people, seize power, appropriate for themselves what was considered to be the property of all sorts of plunderers of the people in a word, precisely when the sense and reason of millions of downtrodden people is awakening, not only for reading books, but for action, for living human action, for historical creativeness. (Lenin, Selected Works, vol. VII, pp. 261–2)

This is creative reason during the revolution and this is creative reason after the revolution. Readers of the following articles in this pamphlet and of the documents of our tendency will know that for us the economic planning of the new society must be the result of the same creativeness and energy of the masses expressed through their soviets, their councils, their party or parties. As we have shown in our pamphlet this was Lenin's conception. For us therefore, once the masses in Russia were totally subordinated to the bureaucracy, then capital as an economic force resumed sway, and objective economic law reasserted itself. The proletarians of the fourteenth century failed, but the masses today begin from a society in which the socialisation of the labour process is the dominant feature of the economy. The education, the training, the discipline, the social awareness, the material and spiritual needs of the great millions have reached astonishing proportions. These are the new economic forces. They are worldwide. If the earlier revolutions were outstanding peaks in a world in which the periphery was large, backward and stagnant, it is not so today. Disparate as are the economic levels of the United States and China, the world is today one system and a social unit. The need for universality of the individual man is only part of the need for universality in the world at large;

> "only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the 'propertyless' mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones."

Thus Marx in The German Ideology, in 1846. Today we are at the end.

It would be a grave mistake not to attempt to show, however briefly, the theoretical link between these concepts and the practical activity of building a revolutionary organisation. The dialectician is often seriously thrown back by the fact that the great masses of the workers do not seem to think in a way that corresponds to these ideas. He

should remember that the number who thought of socialist revolution in Russia in February 1917 was pitifully few. There was not one single republican in France on 14 July 1789. How many of the Founding Fathers advocated independence in 1776? The anticipations of these ideas accumulate and then under suitable conditions explode into a new quality.

But with the masses the matter goes even deeper. They do not think as intellectuals do and this intellectuals must understand. In one of his most remarkable pages Lenin confesses that at a critical moment of the Russian revolution he was performing the most critical of all tasks, evaluating the events of July in order to change the policy and organisation of the Bolshevik Party. He was living with a working-class family. The hostess placed bread on the table. "Look," says the host, "what fine bread. 'They' dare not give us bad bread now. And we had almost forgotten that good bread could be had in Petrograd." Let Lenin himself continue:

> I was amazed at this class evaluation of the July days. My mind had been revolving around the political significance of the event, weighing its importance in relation to the general course of events, analysing the situation that had given rise to this zigzag of history and the situation it would create. And debating how we must alter our slogans and party apparatus in order to adapt them to the changed situation. As for bread, I, who had never experienced want, never gave it a thought. Bread to me seemed a matter of course, a by-product, as it were, of the work of a writer. Fundamentally, the mind approaches the class struggle for bread by a political analysis and an extraordinarily complicated and involved path.
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> But this representative of the oppressed class, although one of the better-paid and well-educated workers, took the bull by the horns with that astonishing simplicity and bluntness, with that firm resolution and amazingly clear insight, which is as remote from your intellectual as the stars in the sky. (Lenin, Selected Works, vol. VI, pp. 280–81)

The key phrase in this passage is "although one of the better-paid and well-educated workers". Better paid and well-educated workers are very often corrupted by bourgeois education. It is the great millions, very often unorganised in unions but "disciplined, and united and organised by the very mechanism of capitalist production" itself that constitute the most heroic, the most self-sacrificing battalions of the new social order. They do not approach great questions by a complicated and involved path "as intellectuals do. Their most effective method of expression is action, corresponding to

the astonishing simplicity, bluntness ... firm resolution and amazingly clear insight" of their speech when they do speak. For long years they appear entirely subordinated to bourgeois ideas and the place bourgeois society has reserved for them. But they have their own ideas and in the continuous crisis and catastrophic decline of society, they have in recent decades repeatedly entered upon the field of history with world-shaking effects. Since 1917, no lasting victory has been theirs but the future is with them or there is no future.

Revolutionary politics consists of a conscious relating of the needs of the objective situation to the state of development of the masses. But decisive always is the objective situation, the world of today, and a superficial conception of the stage of development of the masses can be a terrible trap for the unwary. The objective conditions of our world demand universal solutions. It is absolutely impossible to propose a proletarian programme to counter the imperialism of the "Marshall Plan" without counterposing an international plan of socialist economic construction. That is the world in which we live.

In Europe, adequate wages, stable prices, food, housing and heating are no longer partial questions. Any reasonable satisfaction of the needs of the people demands a total reorganisation of the economy, a plan for continental rehabilitation, and close association with the economic power of the United States. Peace is indivisible. The need for universality stretches out from the hearth to the whole world.

But the same need exists intensively. It is the crime of capitalism that it uses men only partially. Labour bureaucracies which call on men only for votes or sending telegrams, are only partially mobilising vast stores of creative energy which are crying for release. Bankrupt economies which cannot mobilise the universal contained in modern man are doomed to remain bankrupt. That and nothing else but that can rebuild the vast wreck which is the modern world. Objectively and subjectively the solution of the crisis demands a total mobilisation of all forces in society. Partial solutions only create further disorders in the economy; partial demands, as such, because they are abstractions from the reality, lead only to disappointment; partial demands by leaders on the workers fail to mobilise their energies and leave them with a sense of frustration and hopelessness. Thus not only the concept but the need for universality reigns throughout all phases of society.

This was the constant theme of Trotsky before he was murdered in 1940. In previous periods the socialists fought for partial demands and held before the masses the social revolution as a distant goal. Today those days are over. The revolutionaries hold always before the masses the concept of the proletarian revolution but do not neglect to snatch this and that partial demand to better the position of the toilers and mobilise them for the final struggle.

This only is reason. The modern intellectual, once he breaks with bourgeois conceptions, finds a vast new world of ideas open before him. But he can pursue and present these ideas in their inner essence only with the inevitable universality of the revolutionary proletariat in mind. Without this there is no dialectic, and without dialectic, thought soon bogs down in the chaotic disintegration of the modern world. Quite different is it with the dialectical materialist. In his boldest flights, he is conscious that he will not exceed the real history of humanity which is being prepared by the revolutionary masses.

Herbert Marcuse

An Essay on Liberation

Preface

The growing opposition to the global dominion of corporate capitalism is confronted by the sustained power of this dominion: its economic and military hold in the four continents, its neocolonial empire, and, most important, its unshaken capacity to subject the majority of the underlying population to its overwhelming productivity and force. This global power keeps the socialist orbit on the defensive, all too costly not only in terms of military expenditures but also in the perpetuation of a repressive bureaucracy. The development of socialism thus continues to be deflected from its original goals, and the competitive coexistence with the West generates values and aspirations for which the American standard of living serves as a model.

Now, however, this threatening homogeneity has been loosening up, and an alternative is beginning to break into the repressive continuum. This alternative is not so much a different road to socialism as an emergence of different goals and values, different aspirations in the men and women who resist and deny the massive exploitative power of corporate capitalism even in its most comfortable and liberal realizations. The Great Refusal takes a variety of forms.

In Vietnam, in Cuba, in China, a revolution is being defended and driven forward which struggles to eschew the bureaucratic administration of socialism. The guerrilla forces in Latin America seem to be animated by that same subversive impulse: liberation. At the same time, the apparently impregnable economic fortress of corporate capitalism shows signs of mounting strain: it seems that even the United States cannot indefinitely deliver

its goods – guns and butter, napalm and color TV, The ghetto populations may well become the first mass basis of revolt (though not of revolution). The student opposition is spreading in the old socialist as well as capitalist countries. In France, it has for the first time challenged the full force of the regime and recaptured, for a short moment, the libertarian power of the red and the black flags; moreover, it has demonstrated the prospects for an enlarged basis. The temporary suppression of the rebellion will not reverse the trend.

None of these forces is the alternative. However, they outline, in very different dimensions, the limits of the established societies, of their power of containment. When these limits are reached, the Establishment may initiate a new order of totalitarian suppression. But beyond these limits, there is also the space, both physical and mental, for building a realm of freedom which is not that of the present: liberation also from the liberties of exploitative order – a liberation which must precede the construction of a free society, one which necessitates an historical break with the past and the present.

It would be irresponsible to overrate the present chances of these forces (this essay will stress the obstacles and "delays"), but the facts are there, facts which are not only the symbols but also the embodiments of hope. They confront the critical theory of society with the task of reexamining the prospects for the emergence of a socialist society qualitatively different from existing societies, the task of redefining socialism and its preconditions.

In the following chapters, I attempt to develop some ideas first submitted in Eros and Civilization and in One-Dimensional Man, then further discussed in "Repressive Tolerance" and in lectures delivered in recent years, mostly to student audiences in the United States and in Europe. This essay was written before the events of May and June 1968 in France. I have merely added some footnotes in the way of documentation. The coincidence between some of the ideas suggested in my essay, and those formulated by the young militants was to me striking. The radical utopian character of their demands far surpasses the hypotheses of my essay; and yet, these demands were developed and

formulated in the course of action itself; they are expressions of concrete political practice. The militants have invalidated the concept of "utopia" – they have denounced a vicious ideology. No matter whether their action was a revolt or an abortive revolution, it is a turning point. In proclaiming the "permanent challenge" (*la contestation permanente*), the "permanent education," the Great Refusal, they recognize the mark of social repression, even in the most sublime manifestations of traditional culture, even in the most spectacular manifestations of technical progress. They have again raised a specter (and this time a specter which haunts not only the bourgeoisie but all exploitative bureaucracies) : the specter of a revolution which subordinates the development of productive forces and higher standards of living to the requirements of creating solidarity for the human species, for abolishing poverty and misery beyond all national frontiers and spheres of interest, for the attainment of peace. In one word: they have taken the idea of revolution out of the continuum of repression and placed it into its authentic dimension: that of liberation.

The young militants know or sense that what is at stake is simply their life, the life of human beings which has become a plaything in the hands of politicians and managers and generals. The rebels want to take it out of these hands and make it worth living; they realize that this is still possible today, and that the attainment of this goal necessitates a struggle which can no longer be contained by the rules and regulations of a pseudo-democracy in a Free Orwellian World. To them I dedicate this essay.

Introduction

Up to now, it has been one of the principal tenets of the critical theory of society (and particularly Marxian theory) to refrain from what might be reasonably called utopian speculation. Social theory is supposed to analyze existing societies in the light of their own functions and capabilities and to identify demonstrable tendencies (if any) which might lead beyond the existing state of affairs. By logical inference from the prevailing conditions and institutions, critical theory may also be able to determine the basic institutional changes which are the prerequisites for the transition to a higher stage of development:

"higher" in the sense of a more rational and equitable use of resources, minimization of destructive conflicts, and enlargement of the realm of freedom. But beyond these limits, critical theory did not venture for fear of losing its scientific character.

I believe that this restrictive conception must be revised, and that the revision is suggested, and even necessitated, by the actual evolution of contemporary societies. The dynamic of their productivity deprives "utopia" of its traditional unreal content: what is denounced as "utopian" is no longer that which has "no place" and cannot have any place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established societies.

Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of advanced capitalism and socialism: the rational utilization of these forces on a global scale would terminate poverty and scarcity within a very foreseeable future. But we know now that neither their rational use nor – and this is decisive – their collective control by the "immediate producers" (the workers) would by itself eliminate domination and exploitation: a bureaucratic welfare state would still be a state of repression which would continue even into the "second phase of socialism," when each is to receive "according to his needs."

What is now at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the question is no longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs without hurting others, but rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself, without reproducing, through his aspirations and satisfactions, his dependence on an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, perpetuates his servitude? The advent of a free society would be characterized by the fact that the growth of well-being turns into an essentially new quality of life. This qualitative change must occur in the needs, in the infrastructure of man (itself a dimension of the infrastructure of society): the new direction, the new institutions and relationships of production, must express the ascent of needs and satisfactions very different from and even antagonistic to those prevalent in the exploitative societies. Such a change would

constitute the instinctual basis for freedom which the long history of class society has blocked. Freedom would become the environment of an organism which is no longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances required for well-being under domination, no longer capable of tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life. The rebellion would then have taken root in the very nature, the "biology" of the individual; and on these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the objectives and the strategy of the political struggle, in which alone the concrete goals of liberation can be determined.

Is such a change in the "nature" of man conceivable? I believe so, because technical progress has reached a stage in which reality no longer need be defined by the debilitating competition for social survival and advancement. The more these technical capacities outgrow the framework of exploitation within which they continue to be confined and abused, the more they propel the drives and aspirations of men to a point at which the necessities of life cease to demand the aggressive performances of "earning a living," and the "non-necessary" becomes a vital need. This proposition, which is central in Marxian theory, is familiar enough, and the managers and publicists of corporate capitalism are well aware of its meaning; they are prepared to "contain" its dangerous consequences. The radical opposition also is aware of these prospects, but the critical theory which is to guide political practice still lags behind. Marx and Engels refrained from developing concrete concepts of the possible forms of freedom in a socialist society; today, such restraint no longer seems justified. The growth of the productive forces suggests possibilities of human liberty very different from, and beyond those envisaged at the earlier stage. Moreover, these real possibilities suggest that the gap which separates a free society from the existing societies would be wider and deeper precisely to the degree to which the repressive power and productivity of the latter shape man and his environment in their image and interest.

For the world of human freedom cannot be built by the established societies, no matter how much they may streamline and rationalize their dominion. Their class structure, and the perfected controls required to sustain it, generate needs, satisfactions, and values

which reproduce the servitude of the human existence. This "voluntary" servitude (voluntary inasmuch as it is introjected into the individuals) , which justifies the benevolent masters, can be broken only through a political practice which reaches the roots of containment and contentment in the infrastructure of man, a political practice of methodical disengagement from and refusal of the Establishment, aiming at a radical transvaluation of values. Such a practice involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may become receptive to the potential forms of a non-aggressive, non-exploitative world.

No matter how remote from these notions the rebellion may be, no matter how destructive and self-destructive it may appear, no matter how great the distance between the middle-class revolt in the metropoles and the life-and-death struggle of the wretched of the earth – common to them is the depth of the Refusal. It makes them reject the rules of the game that is rigged against them, the ancient strategy of patience and persuasion, the reliance on the Good Will in the Establishment, its false and immoral comforts, its cruel affluence.

1 – A Biological Foundation for Socialism?

In the affluent society, capitalism comes into its Own. The two mainsprings of its dynamic – the escalation of commodity production and productive exploitation – join and permeate all dimensions of private and public existence. The available material and intellectual resources (the potential of liberation) have so much outgrown the established institutions that only the systematic increase in waste, destruction, and management keeps the system going. The opposition which escapes suppression by the police, the courts, the representatives of the people, and the people themselves, finds expression in the diffused rebellion among the youth and the intelligentsia, and in the daily struggle of the persecuted minorities. The armed class struggle is waged outside: by the wretched of the earth who fight the affluent monster.

The critical analysis of this society calls for new categories: moral, political, aesthetic. I shall try to develop them in the course of the discussion. The category of obscenity will serve as an introduction.

This society is obscene in producing and indecently exposing a stifling abundance of wares while depriving its victims abroad of the necessities of life; obscene in stuffing itself and its garbage cans while poisoning and burning the scarce foodstuffs in the fields of its aggression; obscene in the words and smiles of its politicians and entertainers; in its prayers, in its ignorance, and in the wisdom of its kept intellectuals.

Obscenity is a moral concept in the verbal arsenal of the Establishment, which abuses the term by applying it, not to expressions of its own morality but to those of another. Obscene is not the picture of a naked woman who exposes her pubic hair but that of a fully clad general who exposes his medals rewarded in a war of aggression; obscene is not the ritual of the Hippies but the declaration of a high dignitary of the Church that war is necessary for peace. Linguistic therapy – that is, the effort to free words (and thereby concepts) from the all but total distortion of their meanings by the Establishment – demands the transfer of moral standards (and of their validation) from the Establishment to the revolt against it. Similarly, the sociological and political vocabulary must be radically reshaped: it must be stripped of its false neutrality; it must be methodically and provocatively "moralized" in terms of the Refusal. Morality is not necessarily and not primarily ideological. In the face of an amoral society, it becomes a political weapon, an effective force which drives people to burn their draft cards, to ridicule national leaders, to demonstrate in the streets, and to unfold signs saying, "Thou shalt not kill," in the nation's churches.

The reaction to obscenity is shame, usually interpreted as the physiological manifestation of the sense of guilt accompanying the transgression of a taboo. The obscene exposures of the affluent society normally provoke neither shame nor a sense of guilt, although this society violates some of the most fundamental moral taboos of civilization.

The term obscenity belongs to the sexual sphere; shame and the sense of guilt arise in the Oedipal situation. If in this respect social morality is rooted in sexual morality, then the shamelessness of the affluent society and its effective repression of the sense of guilt would indicate a decline of shame and guilt feeling in the sexual sphere. And indeed, the exposure of the (for all practical purposes) naked body is permitted and even encouraged, and the taboos on pre- and extramarital, intercourse are considerably relaxed. Thus we are faced with the contradiction that the liberalization of sexuality provides an instinctual basis for the repressive and aggressive power of the affluent society.

This contradiction can be resolved if we understand that the liberalization of the Establishment's own morality takes place within the framework of effective controls; kept within this framework, the liberalization strengthens the cohesion of the whole. The relaxation of taboos alleviates the sense of guilt and binds (though with considerable ambivalence) the "free" individuals libidinally to the institutionalized fathers. They are powerful but also tolerant fathers, whose management of the nation and its economy delivers and protects the liberties of the citizens. On the other hand, if the violation of taboos transcends the sexual sphere and leads to refusal and rebellion, the sense of guilt is not alleviated and repressed but rather transferred: not we, but the fathers, are guilty; they are not tolerant but false; they want to redeem their own guilt by making us, the sons, guilty; they have created a world of hypocrisy and violence in which we do not wish to live. Instinctual revolt turns into political rebellion, and against this union, the Establishment mobilizes its full force.

This union provokes such a response because it reveals the prospective scope of social change at this stage of development, the extent to which the radical political practice involves a cultural subversion. The refusal with which the opposition confronts the existing society is affirmative in that it envisages a new culture which fulfills the humanistic promises betrayed by the old culture. Political radicalism thus implies moral radicalism: the emergence of a morality which might precondition man for freedom. This radicalism activates the elementary, organic foundation of morality in the human being. Prior to all

ethical behavior in accordance with specific social standards, prior to all ideological expression, morality is a “disposition” of the organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve “ever greater unities” of life. We would then have, this side of all “values,” an instinctual foundation for solidarity among human beings – a solidarity which has been effectively repressed in line with the requirements of class society but which now appears as a precondition for liberation.

To the degree to which this foundation is itself historical and the malleability of “human nature” reaches into the depth of man’s instinctual structure, changes in morality may “sink down” into the “biological"[1] dimension and modify organic behavior. Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of social behavior, it is not only introjected – it also operates as a norm of “organic” behavior: the organism receives and reacts to certain stimuli and “ignores” and repels others in accord with the introjected morality, which is thus promoting or impeding the function of the organism as a living cell in the respective society. In this way, a society constantly re-creates, this side of consciousness and ideology, patterns of behavior and aspiration as part of the “nature” of its people, and unless the revolt reaches into this “second” nature, into these ingrown patterns, social change will remain “incomplete,” even self-defeating.

The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one’s own destruction, has become a “biological” need in the sense just defined. The second nature of man thus militates against any change that would disrupt and perhaps even abolish this dependence of man on a market ever more densely filled with merchandise – abolish his existence as a consumer consuming himself in buying and selling. The needs generated by this system are thus eminently stabilizing, conservative needs: the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure.

The market has always been one of exploitation and thereby of domination, insuring the class structure of society. However, the productive process of advanced capitalism has altered the form of domination: the technological veil covers the brute presence and the operation of the class interest in the merchandise. Is it still necessary to state that not technology, not technique, not the machine are the engines of repression, but the presence, in them, of the masters who determine their number, their life span, their power, their place in life, and the need for them? Is it still necessary to repeat that science and technology are the great vehicles of liberation, and that it is only their use and restriction in the repressive society which makes them into vehicles of domination?

Not the automobile is repressive, not the television set is repressive, not the household gadgets are repressive, but the automobile, the television, the gadgets which, produced in accordance with the requirements of profitable exchange, have become part and parcel of the people's own existence, own "actualization." Thus they have to buy part and parcel of their own existence on the market; this existence is the realization of capital. The naked class interest builds the unsafe and obsolescent automobiles, and through them promotes destructive energy; the class interest employs the mass media for the advertising of violence and stupidity, for the creation of captive audiences. In doing so, the masters only obey the demand of the public, of the masses; the famous law of supply and demand establishes the harmony between the rulers and the ruled. This harmony is indeed pre-established to the degree to which the masters have created the public which asks for their wares, and asks for them more insistently if it can release, in and through the wares, its frustration and the aggressiveness resulting from this frustration. Self-determination, the autonomy of the individual, asserts itself in the right to race his automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his opinion, no matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be. Organized capitalism has sublimated and turned to socially productive use frustration and primary aggressiveness on an unprecedented scale – unprecedented not in terms of the quantity of violence but rather in terms of its capacity to produce long-range contentment and satisfaction, to reproduce the "voluntary

servitude." To be sure, frustration, unhappiness, and sickness remain the basis of this sublimation, but the productivity and the brute power of the system still keep the basis well under control. The achievements justify the system of domination. The established values become the people's own values: adaptation turns into spontaneity, autonomy; and the choice between social necessities appears as freedom. In this sense, the continuing exploitation is not only hidden behind the technological veil, but actually "transfigured." The capitalist production relations are responsible not only for the servitude and toil but also for the greater happiness and fun available to the majority of the population – and they deliver more goods than before.

Neither its vastly increased capacity to produce the commodities of satisfaction nor the peaceful management of class conflicts rendered possible by this capacity cancels the essential features of capitalism, namely, the private appropriation of surplus value (steered but not abolished by government intervention) and its realization in the corporate interest. Capitalism reproduces itself by transforming itself, and this transformation is mainly in the improvement of exploitation. Do exploitation and domination cease to be what they are and what they do to man if they are no longer suffered, if they are "compensated" by previously unknown comforts? Does labor cease to be debilitating if mental energy increasingly replaces physical energy in producing the goods and services which sustain a system that makes hell of large areas of the globe? An affirmative answer would justify any form of oppression which keeps the populace calm and content; while a negative answer would deprive the individual of being the judge of his own happiness.

The notion that happiness is an objective condition which demands more than subjective feelings has been effectively obscured; its validity depends on the real solidarity of the species "man," which a society divided into antagonistic classes and nations cannot achieve. As long as this is the history of mankind, the "state of nature," no matter how refined, prevails: a civilized *helium omnium contra omnes*, in which the happiness of the ones must coexist with the suffering of the others. The First International was the last attempt to realize the solidarity of the species by grounding it in that social class in which

the subjective and objective interest, the particular and the universal, coincided (the International is the late concretization of the abstract philosophical concept of "man as man," human being, "Gattungswesen," which plays such a decisive role in Marx' and Engels' early writings). Then, the Spanish civil war aroused this solidarity, which is the driving power of liberation, in the unforgettable, hopeless fight of a tiny minority against the combined forces of fascist and liberal capitalism. Here, in the international brigades which, with their poor weapons, withstood overwhelming technical superiority, was the union of young intellectuals and workers – the union which has become the desperate goal of today's radical opposition.

Attainment of this goal is thwarted by the integration of the organized (and not only the organized) laboring class into the system of advanced capitalism. Under its impact, the distinction between the real and the immediate interest of the exploited has collapsed. This distinction, far from being an abstract idea, was guiding the strategy of the Marxist movements; it expressed the necessity transcending the economic struggle of the laboring classes, to extend wage demands and demands for the improvement of working conditions to the political arena, to drive the class struggle to the point at which the system itself would be at stake, to make foreign as well as domestic policy, the national as well as the class interest, the target of this struggle. The real interest, the attainment of conditions in which man could shape his own life, was that of no longer subordinating his life to the requirements of profitable production, to an apparatus controlled by forces beyond his control. And the attainment of such conditions meant the abolition of capitalism.

It is not simply the higher standard of living, the illusory bridging of the consumer gap between the rulers and the ruled, which has obscured the distinction between the real and the immediate interest of the ruled. Marxian theory soon recognized that impoverishment does not necessarily provide the soil for revolution, that a highly developed consciousness and imagination may generate a vital need for radical change in advanced material conditions. The power of corporate capitalism has stifled the emergence of such a consciousness and imagination; its mass media have adjusted the rational and emotional

faculties to its market and its policies and steered them to defense of its dominion. The narrowing of the consumption gap has rendered possible the mental and instinctual coordination of the laboring classes: the majority of organized labor shares the stabilizing, counterrevolutionary needs of the middle classes, as evidenced by their behavior as consumers of the material and cultural merchandise, by their emotional revulsion against the nonconformist intelligentsia. Conversely, where the consumer gap is still wide, where the capitalist culture has not yet reached into every house or hut, the system of stabilizing needs has its limits; the glaring contrast between the privileged class and the exploited leads to a radicalization of the underprivileged. This is the case of the ghetto population and the unemployed in the United States; this is also the case of the laboring classes in the more backward capitalist countries.[2]

By virtue of its basic position in the production process, by virtue of its numerical weight and the weight of exploitation, the working class is still the historical agent of revolution; by virtue of its sharing the stabilizing needs of the system, it has become a conservative, even counterrevolutionary force. Objectively, "in-itself," labor still is the potentially revolutionary class; subjectively, "for-itself," it is not. This theoretical conception has concrete significance in the prevailing situation, in which the working class may help to circumscribe the scope and the targets of political practice.

In the advanced capitalist countries, the radicalization of the working classes is counteracted by a socially engineered arrest of consciousness, and by the development and satisfaction of needs which perpetuate the servitude of the exploited. A vested interest in the existing system is thus fostered in the instinctual structure of the exploited, and the rupture with the continuum of repression a necessary precondition of liberation – does not occur. It follows that the radical change which is to transform the existing society into a free society must reach into a dimension of the human existence hardly considered in Marxian theory – the -biological- dimension in which the vital, imperative needs and satisfactions of man assert themselves. Inasmuch as these needs and satisfactions

reproduce a life in servitude, liberation presupposes changes in this biological dimension, that is to say, different instinctual needs, different reactions of the body as well as the mind.

The qualitative difference between the existing societies and a free society affects all needs and satisfactions beyond the animal level, that is to say, all those which are essential to the human species, man as rational animal. All these needs and satisfactions are permeated with the exigencies of profit and exploitation. The entire realm of competitive performances and standardized fun, all the symbols of status, prestige, power, of advertised virility and charm, of commercialized beauty – this entire realm kills in its citizens the very disposition, the organs, for the alternative: freedom without exploitation.

Triumph and end of introjection: the stage where the people cannot reject the system of domination without rejecting themselves, their own repressive instinctual needs and values. We would have to conclude that liberation would mean subversion against the will and against the prevailing interests of the great majority of the people. In this false identification of social and individual needs, in this deep-rooted, "organic" adaptation of the people to a terrible but profitably functioning society, lie the limits of democratic persuasion and evolution. On the overcoming of these limits depends the establishment of democracy.[3]

It is precisely this excessive adaptability of the human organism which propels the perpetuation and extension of the commodity form and, with it, the perpetuation and extension of the social controls over behavior and satisfaction.

> *The ever-increasing complexity of the social structure will make some form of regimentation unavoidable, freedom and privacy may come to constitute antisocial luxuries and their attainment to involve real hardships. In consequence, there may emerge by selection a stock of human beings suited genetically to accept as a matter of course a regimented and sheltered way of life in a teeming and polluted world, from which all wilderness and fantasy of nature will have disappeared. The domesticated farm animal*

and the laboratory rodent on a controlled regimen in a controlled environment will then become true models for the study of man.

Thus, it is apparent that food, natural resources, supplies of power, and other elements involved in the operation of the body machine and of the individual establishment are not the only factors to be considered in determining the optimum number of people that can live on earth. Just as important for maintaining the human qualities of life is an environment in which it is possible to satisfy the longing for quiet, privacy, independence, initiative, and some open space...[4]

Capitalist progress thus not only reduces the environment of freedom, the "open space" of the human existence, but also the 'longing," the need for such an environment. And in doing so, quantitative progress militates against qualitative change even if the institutional barriers against radical education and action are surmounted. This is the vicious circle: the rupture with the self-propelling conservative continuum of needs must precede the revolution which is to usher in a free society, but such rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution – a revolution which would be driven by the vital need to be freed from the administered comforts and the destructive productivity of the exploitative society, freed from smooth heteronomy, a revolution which, by virtue of this "biological" foundation, would have the chance of turning quantitative technical progress into qualitatively different ways of life – precisely because it would be a revolution occurring at a high level of material and intellectual development, one which would enable man to conquer scarcity and poverty. If this idea of a radical transformation is to be more than idle speculation, it must have an objective foundation in the production process of advanced industrial society,[5] in its technical capabilities and their use.

For freedom indeed depends largely on technical progress, on the advancement of science. But this fact easily obscures the essential precondition: in order to become vehicles of freedom, science and technology would have to change their present direction and goals; they would have to be reconstructed in accord with a new sensibility – the

demands of the life instincts. Then one could speak of a technology of liberation, product of a scientific imagination free to project and design the forms of a human universe without exploitation and toil. But this *gaya scienza* is conceivable only after the historical break in the continuum of domination as expressive of the needs of a new type of man.[6]

The idea of a new type of man as the member (though not as the builder) of a socialist society appears in Marx and Engels in the concept of the "all-round individual," free to engage in the most varying activities. In the socialist society corresponding to this idea, the free development of individual faculties would replace the subjection of the individual to the division of labor. But no matter what activities the all-round individual would choose, they would be activities which are bound to lose the quality of freedom if exercised "en masse" – and they would be "en masse," for even the most authentic socialist society would inherit the population growth and the mass basis of advanced capitalism. The early Marxian example of the free individuals alternating between hunting, fishing, criticizing, and so on, had a joking-ironical sound from the beginning, indicative of the impossibility anticipating the ways in which liberated human beings would use their freedom. However, the embarrassingly ridiculous sound may also indicate the degree to which this vision has become obsolete and pertains to a stage of the development of the productive forces which has been surpassed. The later Marxian concept implies the continued separation between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, between labor and leisure – not only in time, but also in such a manner that the same subject lives a different life in the two realms. According to this Marxian conception, the realm of necessity would continue under socialism to such an extent that real human freedom would prevail only outside the entire sphere of socially necessary labor. Marx rejects the idea that work can ever become play.[7] Alienation would be reduced with the progressive reduction of the working day, but the latter would remain a day of unfreedom, rational but not free. However, the development of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organization suggests the possibility of freedom within the realm of necessity. The quantitative reduction of necessary labor could

turn into quality (freedom), not in proportion to the reduction but rather to the transformation of the working day, a transformation in which the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist progress would be abolished. But the construction of such a society presupposes a type of man with a different sensitivity as well as consciousness: men who would speak a different language, have different gestures, follow different impulses; men who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness. Such an instinctual transformation is conceivable as a factor of social change only if it enters the social division of labor, the production relations themselves. They would be shaped by men and women who have the good conscience of being human, tender, sensuous, who are no longer ashamed of themselves – for -the token of freedom attained, that is, no longer being ashamed of ourselves" (Nietzsche, *Die Frohliche Wissenschaft*, Book III, 275). The imagination of such men and women would fashion their reason and tend to make the process of production a process of creation. This is the utopian concept of socialism which envisages the ingression of freedom into the realm of necessity, and the union between causality by necessity and causality by freedom. The first would mean passing from Marx to Fourier; the second from realism to surrealism.[8]

A utopian conception? It has been the great, real, transcending force, the "*idée neuve*," in the first powerful rebellion against the whole of the existing society, the rebellion for the total transvaluation of values, for qualitatively different ways of life: the May rebellion in France. The graffiti of the "*jeunesse en colère*" joined Karl Marx and Andre Breton; the slogan "*l'imagination au pouvoir*" went well with "*les comités (soviets) partout*"; the piano with the jazz player stood well between the barricades; the red flag well fitted the statue of the author of *Les Miserables*; and striking students in Toulouse demanded the revival of the language of the Troubadours, the Albigensians. The new sensibility has become a political force. It crosses the frontier between the capitalist and the communist orbit ; it is contagious because the atmosphere, the climate of the established societies, carries the virus.

2 – The New Sensibility

The new Sensibility has become a political factor. This event, which may well indicate a turning point in the evolution of contemporary societies, demands that critical theory incorporate the new dimension into its concepts, project its implications for the possible construction of a free society. Such a society presupposes throughout the achievements of the existing societies, especially their scientific and technical achievements. Released from their service in the cause of exploitation, they could be mobilized for the global elimination of poverty and toil. True, this redirection of the intellectual and material production already presupposes the revolution in the capitalist world; the theoretical projection seems to be fatally premature – were it not for the fact that the awareness of the transcendent possibilities of freedom must become a driving power in the consciousness and the imagination which prepare the soil for this revolution. The latter will be essentially different, and effective, precisely to the degree to which it is carried forward by this power.

The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and misery and would shape the further evolution of the "standard of living." The life instincts would find rational expression (sublimation) in planning the distribution of the socially necessary labor time within and among the various branches of production, thus setting priorities of goals and choices: not only what to produce but also the "form" of the product. The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a science and technology free to discover and realize the possibilities of things and men in the protection and gratification of life, playing with the potentialities of form and matter for the attainment of this goal. Technique would then tend to become art, and art would tend to form reality: the opposition between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated. Emergence of a new Reality Principle: under which a new sensibility and a desublimated scientific intelligence would combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos.

The term “aesthetic,” in its dual connotation of “pertaining to the senses” and “pertaining to art,” may serve to designate the quality of the productive-creative process in an environment of freedom. Technique, assuming the features of art, would translate subjective sensibility into objective form, into reality. This would be the sensibility of men and women who do not have to be ashamed of themselves anymore because they have overcome their sense of guilt: they have learned not to identify themselves with the false fathers who have built and tolerated and forgotten the Auschwitzs and Vietnams of history, the torture chambers of all the secular and ecclesiastical inquisitions and interrogations, the ghettos and the monumental temples of the corporations, and who have worshiped the higher culture of this reality. If and when men and women act and think free from this identification, they will have broken the chain which linked the fathers and the sons from generation to generation. They will not have redeemed the crimes against humanity, but they will have become free to stop them and to prevent their recommencement. Chance of reaching the point of no return to the past: if and when the causes are eliminated which have made the history of mankind the history of domination and servitude. These causes are economic-political, but since they have shaped the very instincts and needs of men, no economic and political changes will bring this historical continuum to a stop unless they are carried through by men who are physiologically and psychologically able to experience things, and each other, outside the context of violence and exploitation.

The new sensibility has become, by this very token, praxis: it emerges in the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle is waged for essentially new ways and forms of life: negation of the entire Establishment, its morality, culture; affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.

The aesthetic as the possible Form of a free society appears at that stage of development where the intellectual and material resources for the conquest of scarcity are available, where previously progressive repression turns into regressive suppression, where the

higher culture in which the aesthetic values (and the aesthetic truth) had been monopolized and segregated from the reality collapses and dissolves in desublimated, "lower," and destructive forms, where the hatred of the young bursts into laughter and song, mixing the barricade and the dance floor, love play and heroism. And the young also attack the *esprit de serieux* in the socialist camp: miniskirts against the apparatchiks, rock 'n' roll against Soviet Realism. The insistence that a socialist society can and ought to be light, pretty, playful, that these qualities are essential elements of freedom, the faith in the rationality of the imagination, the demand for a new morality and culture – does this great anti-authoritarian rebellion indicate a new dimension and direction of radical change, the appearance of new agents of radical change, and a new vision of socialism in its qualitative difference from the established societies? Is there anything in the aesthetic dimension which has an essential affinity with freedom not only in its sublimated cultural (artistic) but also in its desublimated political, existential form, so that the aesthetic can become a *gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft*: factor in the technique of production, horizon under which the material and intellectual needs develop?

Throughout the centuries, the analysis of the aesthetic dimension focused on the idea of the beautiful. Does this idea express the aesthetic ethos which provides the common denominator of the aesthetic and the political?

As desired object, the beautiful pertains to the domain of the primary instincts, Eros and Thanatos. The mythos links the adversaries: pleasure and terror. Beauty has the power to check aggression: it forbids and immobilizes the aggressor. The beautiful Medusa petrifies him who confronts her. "Poseidon, the god with azure locks, slept with her in a soft meadow on a bed with springtime flowers."[9] She is slain by Perseus, and from her truncated body springs the winged horse Pegasus, symbol of poetic imagination. Kinship of the beautiful, the divine, the poetic, but also kinship of the beautiful and unsublimated joy. Subsequently, the classical aesthetic, while insisting on the harmonious union of sensuousness, imagination, and reason in the beautiful, equally insisted on the objective

(ontological) character of the beautiful, as the Form in which man and nature come into their own: fulfillment. Kant asks whether there is not a hidden connection between Beauty and Perfection (*Vollkommenheit*),[10] and Nietzsche notes: "the Beautiful as the mirror (*Spiegelung*) of the Logical, i.e., the laws of logic are the object of the laws of the Beautiful."[11] For the artist, the beautiful is mastery of the opposites "without tension, so that violence is no longer needed...." The beautiful has the "biological value" of that which is "useful, beneficial, enhancing life" (*Lebensteigernd*)."[12]

By virtue of these qualities, the aesthetic dimension can serve as a sort of gauge for a free society. A universe of human relationships no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation or terror, demands a sensitivity freed from the repressive satisfactions of the unfree societies; a sensitivity receptive to forms and modes of reality which thus far have been projected only by the aesthetic imagination. For the aesthetic needs have their own social content: they are the claims of the human organism, mind and body, for a dimension of fulfillment which can be created only in the struggle against the institutions which, by their very functioning, deny and violate these claims. The radical social content of the aesthetic needs becomes evident as the demand for their most elementary satisfaction is translated into group action on an enlarged scale. From the harmless drive for better zoning regulations and a modicum of protection from noise and dirt to the pressure for closing of whole city areas to automobiles, prohibition of transistor radios in all public places, decommercialization of nature, total urban reconstruction, control of the birth rate – such action would become increasingly subversive of the institutions of capitalism and of their morality. The quantity of such reforms would turn into the quality of radical change to the degree to which they would critically weaken the economic, political, and cultural pressure and power groups which have a vested interest in preserving the environment and ecology of profitable merchandising.

The aesthetic morality is the opposite of puritanism. It does not insist on a daily bath or shower for people whose cleaning practices involve systematic torture, slaughtering, poisoning; nor does it insist on clean clothes for men who are professionally engaged in dirty deals. But it does insist on cleaning the earth from the very material garbage produced by the spirit of capitalism, and from this spirit itself. And it insists on freedom as a biological necessity: being physically incapable of tolerating any repression other than that required for the protection and amelioration of life.

When Kant, in his third Critique, all but obliterated the frontiers between sensibility and imagination, he recognized the extent to which the senses are "productive," creative – the extent to which they have a share in producing the images of freedom. For its part, the imagination depends on the senses which provide the experiential material out of which the imagination creates its realm of freedom, by transforming the objects and relationships which have been the data of the senses and which have been formed by the senses. The freedom of the imagination is thus restrained by the order of the sensibility, not only by its pure forms (space and time), but also by its empirical content which, as the object-world to be transcended, remains a determining factor in the transcendence. Whatever beautiful or sublime, pleasurable or terrifying forms of reality the imagination may project, they are "derived" from sensuous experience. However, the freedom of the imagination is restrained not only by the sensibility, but also, at the other pole of the organic structure, by the rational faculty of man, his reason. The most daring images of a new world, of new ways of life, are still guided by concepts, and by a logic elaborated in the development of thought, transmitted from generation to generation. On both sides, that of the sensibility and that of reason, history enters into the projects of the imagination, for the world of the senses is a historical world, and reason is the conceptual mastery and interpretation of the historical world.

The order and organization of class society, which have shaped the sensibility and the reason of man, have also shaped the freedom of the imagination. It had its controlled play in the sciences, pure and applied, and its autonomous play in poetry, fiction, the arts.

Between the dictates of instrumentalist reason on the one hand and a sense experience mutilated by the realizations of this reason on the other, the power of the imagination was repressed ; it was free to become practical, i.e., to transform reality only within the general framework of repression; beyond these limits, the practice of the imagination was violation of taboos of social morality, was perversion and subversion. In the great historical revolutions, the imagination was, for a short period, released and free to enter into the projects of a new social morality and of new institutions of freedom; then it was sacrificed to the requirements of effective reason.

If now, in the rebellion of the young intelligentsia, the right and the truth of the imagination become the demands of political action, if surrealistic forms of protest and refusal spread throughout the movement, this apparently insignificant development may indicate a fundamental change in the situation. The political protest, assuming a total character, reaches into a dimension which, as aesthetic dimension, has been essentially apolitical. And the political protest activates in this dimension precisely the foundational, organic elements: the human sensibility which rebels against the dictates of repressive reason, and, in doing so, invokes the sensuous power of the imagination. The political action which insists on a new morality and a new sensibility as preconditions and results of social change occurs at a point at which the repressive rationality that has brought about the achievements of industrial society becomes utterly regressive – rational only in its efficiency to "contain" liberation. Beyond the limits (and beyond the power) of repressive reason now appears the prospect for a new relationship between sensibility and reason, namely, the harmony between sensibility and a radical consciousness: rational faculties capable of projecting and defining the objective (material) conditions of freedom, its real limits and chances. But instead of being shaped and permeated by the rationality of domination, the sensibility would be guided by the imagination, mediating between the rational faculties and the sensuous needs. The great conception which animates Kant's critical philosophy shatters the philosophical framework in which he kept it. The imagination, unifying sensibility and reason, becomes "productive" as it becomes practical:

a guiding force in the reconstruction of reality – reconstruction with the help of a *gaya scienza*, a science and technology released from their service to destruction and exploitation, and thus free for the liberating exigencies of the imagination. The rational transformation of the world could then lead to a reality formed by the aesthetic sensibility of man. Such a world could (in a literal sense!) embody, incorporate, the human faculties and desires to such an extent that they appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom. Andre Breton has made this idea the center of surrealist thought: his concept of the *hasard objectif* designates the nodal point at which the two chains of causation meet and bring about the event.[13]

The aesthetic universe is the Lebenswelt on which the needs and faculties of freedom depend for their liberation. They cannot develop in an environment shaped by and for aggressive impulses, nor can they be envisaged as the mere effect of a new set of social institutions. They can emerge only in the collective practice of creating an environment: level by level, step by step – in the material and intellectual production, an environment in which the non-aggressive, erotic, receptive faculties of man, in harmony with the consciousness of freedom, strive for the pacification of man and nature. In the reconstruction of society for the attainment of this goal, reality altogether would assume a Form expressive of the new goal. The essentially aesthetic quality of this Form would make it a work of art, but inasmuch as the Form is to emerge in the social process of production, art would have changed its traditional locus and function in society: it would have become a productive force in the material as well as cultural transformation. And as such force, art would be an integral factor in shaping the quality and the "appearance" of things, in shaping the reality, the way of life. This would mean the *Aufhebung* of art: end of the segregation of the aesthetic from the real, but also end of the commercial unification of business and beauty, exploitation and pleasure. Art would recapture some of its more primitive "technical" connotations: as the art of preparing (cooking!), cultivating, growing things, giving them a form which neither violates their matter nor the sensitivity – ascent

of Form as one of the necessities of being, universal beyond all subjective varieties of taste, affinity, etc. According to Kant, there are pure forms of sensibility a priori, common to all human beings. Only space and time? Or is there perhaps also a more material constitutive form, such as the primary distinction between beautiful and ugly, good and bad[14] – prior to all rationalization and ideology,. a distinction made by the senses (productive in their receptivity), distinguishing that which violates sensibility from that which gratifies it? In which case the vast varieties of taste, affinity, predilection would be the differentiation of an "original" basic form of sensibility, sense experience, on which modeling, restraining, and repressing forces would operate in accord with the respective individual and social situation.

The new sensibility and the new consciousness which are to project and guide such reconstruction demand a new language to define and communicate the new "values" (language in the wider sense which includes words, images, gestures, tones). It has been said that the degree to which a revolution is developing qualitatively different social conditions and relationships may perhaps be indicated by the development of a different language: the rupture with the continuum of domination must also be a rupture with the vocabulary of domination. The surrealist thesis, according to which the poet is the total nonconformist, finds in the poetic language the semantic elements of the revolution.

> *Car le poète... ne peut plus être reconnu comme tel s'il ne s'oppose par un non-conformisme total au monde où il vit. Il se dresse contre tous, y compris les révolutionnaires qui, se plaçant sur le terrain de la seule politique, arbitrairement isolée par-là de Ensemble du mouvement culturel – préconisent la soumission de la culture a l'accomplissement de la révolution sociale.*[15]

The surrealist thesis does not abandon the materialistic premises but it protests against the isolation of the material from the cultural development, which leads to a submission of the latter to the former and thus to a reduction (if not denial) of the libertarian possibilities of the revolution. Prior to their incorporation into the material development, these

possibilities are “sur-realistic”: they belong to the poetic imagination, formed and expressed in the poetic language. It is not, it cannot be, an instrumentalist language, not an instrument of revolution.

It seems that the poems and the songs of protest and liberation are always too late or too early: memory or dream.

Their time is not the present; they preserve their truth in their hope, in their refusal of the actual. The distance between the universe of poetry and that of politics is so great, the mediations which validate the poetic truth and the rationality of imagination are so complex, that any shortcut between the two realities seems fatal to poetry. There is no way in which we can envisage a historical change in the relation between the cultural and the revolutionary movement which could bridge the gap between the everyday and the poetic language and abrogate the dominance of the former. The latter seems to draw all its power and all its truth from its otherness, its transcendence.

And yet, the radical denial of the Establishment and the communication of the new consciousness depend more and more fatefully on a language of their own as all communication is monopolized and validated by the one-dimensional society. To be sure, the language of denial has, in its “material,” always been the same as the language of affirmation; the linguistic continuity reasserted itself after every revolution. Perhaps necessarily so, because through all revolutions, the continuity of domination has been sustained. But in the past, the language of indictment and liberation, though it shared its vocabulary with the masters and their retainers, had found its own meaning and validation in actual revolutionary struggles which eventually changed the established societies. The familiar (used and abused) vocabulary of freedom, justice, and equality could thus obtain not only new meaning but also new reality the reality which emerged in the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries and led to less restricted forms of freedom, justice, and equality.

Today, the rupture with the linguistic universe of the Establishment is more radical: in the most militant areas of protest, it amounts to a methodical reversal of meaning. It is a familiar phenomenon that sub-cultural groups develop their own language, taking the harmless words of everyday communication out of their context and using them for designating objects or activities tabooed by the Establishment. This is the Hippie subculture: "trip," "grass," "pot," "acid," and so on. But a far more subversive universe of discourse announces itself in the language of black militants. Here is a systematic linguistic rebellion, which smashes the ideological context in which the words are employed and defined, and places them into the opposite context – negation of the established one.[16] Thus, the blacks "take over" some of the most sublime and sublimated concepts of Western civilization, desublimate them, and redefine them. For example, the -soul" (in its essence lily-white ever since Plato), the traditional seat of everything that is truly human in man, tender, deep, immortal – the word which has become embarrassing, corny, false in the established universe of discourse, has been desublimated and in this transsubstantiation, migrated to the Negro culture: they are soul brothers; the soul is black, violent, orgiastic; it is no longer in Beethoven, Schubert, but in the blues, in jazz, in rock 'n' roll, in -soul food." Similarly, the militant slogan "black is beautiful" redefines another central concept of the traditional culture by reversing its symbolic value and associating it with the anti-color of darkness, tabooed magic, the uncanny. The ingression of the aesthetic into the political also appears at the other pole of the rebellion against the society of affluent capitalism, among the nonconformist youth. Here, too, the reversal of meaning, driven to the point of open contradiction: giving flowers to the police, "flower power" – the redefinition and very negation of the sense of "power"; the erotic belligerency in the songs of protest; the sensuousness of long hair, of the body unsoiled by plastic cleanliness.

These political manifestations of a new sensibility indicate the depth of the rebellion, of the rupture with the continuum of repression. They bear witness to the power of the society in shaping the whole of experience, the whole metabolism between the organism and its environment. Beyond the physiological level, the exigencies of sensibility develop as

historical ones: the objects which the senses confront and apprehend are the products of a specific stage of civilization and of a specific society, and the senses in turn are geared to their objects. This historical interrelation affects even the primary sensations: an established society imposes upon all its members the same medium of perception; and through all the differences of individual and class perspectives, horizons, backgrounds, society provides the same general universe of experience. Consequently, the rupture with the continuum of aggression and exploitation would also break with the sensibility geared to this universe. Today's rebels want to see, hear, feel new things in a new way: they link liberation with the dissolution of ordinary and orderly perception. The "trip" involves the dissolution of the ego shaped by the established society – an artificial and short-lived dissolution. But the artificial and "private" liberation anticipates, in a distorted manner, an exigency of the social liberation: the revolution must be at the same time a revolution in perception which will accompany the material and intellectual reconstruction of society, creating the new aesthetic environment.

Awareness of the need for such a revolution in perception, for a new sensorium, is perhaps the kernel of truth in the psychedelic search. But it is vitiated when its narcotic character brings temporary release not only from the reason and rationality of the established system but also from that other rationality which is to change the established system, when sensibility is freed not only from the exigencies of the existing order but also from those of liberation. Intentionally non-committed, the withdrawal creates its artificial paradises within the society from which it withdrew. They thus remain subject to the law of this society, which punishes the inefficient performances. In contrast, the radical transformation of society implies the union of the new sensibility with a new rationality. The imagination becomes productive if it becomes the mediator between sensibility on the one hand, and theoretical as well as practical reason on the other, and in this harmony of faculties (in which Kant saw the token of freedom) guides the reconstruction of society. Such a union has been the distinguishing feature of art, but its realization has been stopped at the point at which it would have become incompatible with the basic institutions and

social relationships. The material culture, the reality, continued to lag behind the progress of reason and imagination and to condemn much of these faculties to irreality, fantasy, fiction. Art could not become a technique in reconstructing reality; the sensibility remained repressed, and the experience mutilated. But the revolt against repressive reason which released the chained power of the aesthetic in the new sensibility has also radicalized it in art: the value and function of art are undergoing essential changes. They affect the affirmative character of art (by virtue of which art has the power of reconciliation with the status quo), and the degree of sublimation (which militated against the realization of the truth, of the cognitive force of art). The protest against these features of art spreads through the entire universe of art prior to the First World War and continues with increased intensity: it gives voice and image to the negative power of art, and to the tendencies toward a desublimation of culture.

The emergence of contemporary art (I shall use "art" throughout as including the visual arts as well as literature and music) means more than the traditional replacement of one style by another. Non-objective, abstract painting and sculpture, stream-of-consciousness and formalist literature, twelve-tone composition, blues and jazz: these are not merely new modes of perception reorienting and intensifying the old ones; they rather dissolve the very structure of perception in order to make room – for what? The new object of art is not yet "given," but the familiar object has become impossible, false. From illusion, imitation, harmony to reality – but the reality is not yet "given"; it is not the one which is the object of "realism." Reality has to be discovered and projected. The senses must learn not to see things anymore in the medium of that law and order which has formed them; the bad functionalism which organizes our sensibility must be smashed.

From the beginning, the new art insists on its radical autonomy in tension or conflict with the development of the Bolshevik Revolution and the revolutionary movements activated by it. Art remains alien to the revolutionary praxis by virtue of the artist's commitment to Form: Form as art's own reality, as *die Sache selbst*. The Russian "formalist" B. Eikhenbaum insists:

> *La notion de forme a obtenu un sens nouveau, elle n'est plus une enveloppe, mais une intégrité dynamique et concrète qui a un contenu en elle-même, hors de toute corrélation.*[17]

Form is the achievement of the artistic perception which breaks the unconscious and "false" "automatism," the unquestioned familiarity which operates in every practice, including the revolutionary practice – an automatism of immediate experience, but a socially engineered experience which militates against the liberation of sensibility. The artistic perception is supposed to shatter this immediacy which, in truth, is a historical product: the medium of experience imposed by the established society but coagulating into a self-sufficient, closed, "automatic" system:

> *Ainsi la vie disparaît, se transformant en un rien. L'automatisation avale les objets, les habits, les meubles, la femme et la peur de la guerre*[18]

If this deadly system of life is to be changed without being replaced by another deadly one, men must learn to develop the new sensibility of life of their own life and that of things:

> *Et voilà que pour rendre la sensation de la vie, pour sentir les objets, pour éprouver que la pierre est de pierre, existe ce que l'on appelle l'art. Le but de Fart, c'est de donner une sensation de l'objet comme vision et non pas comme reconnaissance; le procède de Fart est le procède de singularisation des objets et le procède qui consiste à obscurcir la forme, à augmenter la difficulté et la durée de la perception. L'acte de perception en art est une fin en soi et doit être prolonge ; l'art est un moyen d'éprouver le devenir de l'objet; ce qui est déjà 'devenu', n'importe pas pour l'art.*[19]

I have referred to the Formalists because it seems characteristic that the transformative element in art is emphasized by a school which insists on the artistic perception as end-in-itself, on the Form as Content. It is precisely the Form by virtue of which art transcends the given reality, works in the established reality against the established reality;

and this transcendent element is inherent in art, in the artistic dimension. Art alters experience by reconstructing the objects of experience reconstructing them in word, tone, image. Why? Evidently, the "language" of art must communicate a truth, an objectivity which is not accessible to ordinary language and ordinary experience. This exigency explodes in the situation of contemporary art.

The radical character, the "violence" of this reconstruction in contemporary art seems to indicate that it does not rebel against one style or another but against "style" itself, against the art-form of art, against the traditional "meaning" of art.

The great artistic rebellion in the period of the first World War gives the signal.

> *Wir setzen grossen Jahrhunderten ein Nein entgegen ... (Wir) gehen, zur spottischen Verwunderung unserer Mitwelt, einen Seitenweg, der kaum ein Weg zu sein scheint, und sagen: Dies ist die Hauptstrasse der Menschheitsentwicklung.*[20]

The fight is against the "*Illusionistische Kunst Europas*":[21] art must no longer be illusory because its relation to reality has changed: the latter has become susceptible to, even dependent on, the transforming function of art. The revolutions and the defeated and betrayed revolutions which occurred in the wake of the war denounced a reality which had made art an illusion, and inasmuch as art has been an illusion (*schäner Schein*), the new art proclaims itself as anti-art. Moreover, the illusory art incorporated the established ideas of possession (*Besitzvorstellungen*) naïvely into its forms of representation: it did not question the object-character (die *Dinglichkeiten*) of the world as subject to man. Art must break with this reification: it must become *gemalte oder modellierte Erkenntniskritik*, based on a new optic replacing the Newtonian optic, and this art would correspond to a "type of man who is not like us."[22]

Since then, the eruption of anti-art in art has manifested itself in many familiar forms: destruction of syntax, fragmentation of words and sentences, explosive use of ordinary

language, compositions without score, sonatas for anything. And yet, this entire de-formation is Form: anti-art has remained art, supplied, purchased, and contemplated as art.

The wild revolt of art has remained a short-lived shock, quickly absorbed in the art gallery, within the four walls, in the concert hall, by the market, and adorning the plazas and lobbies of the prospering business establishments. Transforming the intent of art is self-defeating – a self-defeat built into the very structure of art. No matter how affirmative, "realistic" the oeuvre may be, the artist has given it a form which is not part of the reality he presents and in which he works. The oeuvre is unreal precisely inasmuch as it is art: the novel is not a newspaper story, the still life not alive, and even in pop art the real tin can is not in the supermarket. The very Form of art contradicts the effort to do away with the segregation of art to a "second reality," to translate the truth of the productive imagination into the first reality.

The Form of art: we must once again glance at the philosophical tradition which has focused the analysis of art on the concept of the "beautiful" (in spite of the fact that so much of art is obviously not beautiful!). The beautiful has been interpreted as ethical and cognitive "value": the *kalokagathon*; the beautiful as sensuous appearance of the Idea; the Way of Truth passes through the realm of the Beautiful. What is meant by these metaphors?

The root of the aesthetic is in sensibility. What is beautiful is first sensuous: it appeals to the senses; it is pleasurable, object of unsublimated drives. However, the beautiful seems to occupy a position halfway between sublimated and unsublimated objectives. Beauty is not an essential, "organic" feature of the immediate sex-object (it may even deter the unsublimated drive!), while, at the other extreme, a mathematical theorem can be called "beautiful" only in a highly abstract, figurative sense. It seems that the various connotations of beauty converge in the idea of Form.

In the aesthetic Form, the content (matter) is assembled, defined, and arranged to obtain a condition in which the immediate, unmastered forces of the matter, of the "material," are mastered, "ordered." Form is the negation, the mastery of disorder, violence, suffering, even when it presents disorder, violence, suffering. This triumph of art is achieved by subjecting the content to the aesthetic order, which is autonomous in its exigencies. The work of art sets its own limits and ends, it is *sinngebend* in relating the elements to each other according to its own law: the "form" of the tragedy, novel, sonata, picture . . . The content is thereby transformed: it obtains a meaning (sense) which transcends the elements of the content, and this transcending order is the appearance of the beautiful as the truth of art. The way in which the tragedy narrates the fate of Oedipus and the city, in which it orders the sequence of events, gives word to the unsaid and to the unspeakable – the "Form" of the tragedy terminates the horror with the end of the play – it brings the destruction to a standstill, it makes the blind seeing, the intolerable tolerable and understandable, it subordinates the wrong, the contingent, the evil, to "poetic justice." The phrase is indicative of the internal ambivalence of art: to indict that which is, and to "cancel" the indictment in the aesthetic form, redeeming the suffering, the crime. This "redeeming," reconciling power seems inherent in art, by virtue of its being art, by virtue of its form-giving power.

The redeeming, reconciling power of art adheres even to the most radical manifestations of non-illusory art and anti-art. They are still oeuvres: paintings, sculptures, compositions, poems, and as such they have their own form and with it their own order: their own frame (though it may be invisible), their own space, their own beginning, and their own end. The aesthetic necessity of art supersedes the terrible necessity of reality, sublimates its pain and pleasure; the blind suffering and cruelty of nature (and of the "nature" of man) assume meaning and end – "poetic justice." The horror of the crucifixion is purified by the beautiful face of Jesus dominating the beautiful composition, the horror of politics by the beautiful verse of Racine, the horror of farewell forever by the *Lied von der Erde*. And in this aesthetic universe, joy and fulfillment find their proper place alongside pain and death

– everything is in order again. The indictment is canceled, and even defiance, insult, and derision – the extreme artistic negation of art – succumb to this order.

With this restoration of order, the Form indeed achieves a *katharsis* – the terror and the pleasure of reality are purified. But the achievement is illusory, false, fictitious: it remains within the dimension of art, a work of art; in reality, fear and frustration go on unabated (as they do, after the brief *katharsis*, in the psyche). This is perhaps the most telling expression of the contradiction, the self-defeat, built into art: the pacifying conquest of matter, the transfiguration of the object remain unreal – just as the revolution in perception remains unreal. And this vicarious character of art has, time and again, given rise to the question as to the justification of art: was the Parthenon worth the sufferings of a single slave? Is it possible to write poetry after Auschwitz? The question has been countered: when the horror of reality tends to become total and blocks political action, where else than in the radical imagination, as refusal of reality, can the rebellion, and its uncompromised goals, be remembered? But today, are the images and their realization still the domain of "illusory" art?

We suggested the historical possibility of conditions in which the aesthetic could become a *gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft* and as such could lead to the "end" of art through its realization. Today, the outline of such conditions appears only in the negativity of the advanced industrial societies. They are societies whose capabilities defy the imagination. No matter what sensibility art may wish to develop, no matter what Faun it may wish to give to things, to life, no matter what vision it may wish to communicate – a radical change of experience is within the technical reaches of powers whose terrible imagination organizes the world in their own image and perpetuates, ever bigger and better, the mutilated experience.

However, the productive forces, chained in the infrastructure of these societies, counteract this negativity in progress. To be sure, the libertarian possibilities of technology and science are effectively contained within the framework of the given reality: the

calculated projection and engineering of human behavior, the frivolous invention of waste and luxurious junk, the experimentation with the limits of endurance and destruction are tokens of the mastery of necessity in the interest of exploitation – which indicate nevertheless progress in the mastery of necessity. Released from the bondage to exploitation, the imagination, sustained by the achievements of science, could turn its productive power to the radical reconstruction of experience and the universe of experience. In this reconstruction, the historical *topos* of the aesthetic would change: it would find expression in the transformation of the *Lebenswelt* – society as a work of art. This "utopian" goal depends (as every stage in the development of freedom did) on a revolution at the attainable level of liberation. In other words: the transformation is conceivable only as the way in which free men (or rather men in the practice of freeing themselves) shape their life in solidarity, and build an environment in which the struggle for existence loses its ugly and aggressive features. The Form of freedom is not merely self-determination and self-realization, but rather the determination and realization of goals which enhance, protect, and unite life on earth. And this autonomy would find expression not only in the mode of production and production relations but also in the individual relations among men, in their language and in their silence, in their gestures and their looks, in their sensitivity, in their love and hate. The beautiful would be an essential quality of their freedom.

But today's rebels against the established culture also rebel against the beautiful in this culture, against its all too sublimated, segregated, orderly, harmonizing forms. Their libertarian aspirations appear as the negation of the traditional culture: as a methodical desublimation. Perhaps its strongest impetus comes from social groups which thus far have remained outside the entire realm of the higher culture, outside its affirmative, sublimating, and justifying magic – human beings who have lived in the shadow of this culture, the victims of the power structure which has been the basis of this culture. They now oppose to the "music of the spheres" which was the most sublime achievement of this culture their own music, with all the defiance, and the hatred, and the joy of rebellious

victims, defining their own humanity against the definitions of the masters. The black music, invading the white culture, is the terrifying realization of "*O Freunde, nicht these Tone!"* – the refusal now hits the chorus which sings the Ode to Joy, the song which is invalidated in the culture that sings it. Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus knows it: "I want to revoke the Ninth Symphony." In the subversive, dissonant, crying and shouting rhythm, born in the "dark continent" and in the "deep South" of slavery and deprivation, the oppressed revoke the Ninth Symphony and give art a desublimated, sensuous form of frightening immediacy, moving, electrifying the body, and the soul materialized in the body. Black music is originally music of the oppressed, illuminating the extent to which the higher culture and its sublime sublimations, its beauty, have been class-based. The affinity between black music (and its *avant-gardistic* white development) and the political rebellion against the "affluent society" bears witness to the increasing desublimation of culture.

It is still the simple, elementary negation, the antithesis: position of the immediate denial. This desublimation leaves the traditional culture, the illusionist art behind unmastered: their truth and their claims remain valid next to and together with the rebellion, within the same given society. The rebellious music, literature, art are thus easily absorbed and shaped by the market – rendered harmless. In order to come into their own, they would have to abandon the direct appeal, the raw immediacy of their presentation, which invokes, in the protest, the familiar universe of politics and business, and with it the helpless familiarity of frustration and temporary release from frustration. Was it not precisely the rupture with this familiarity which was the methodical goal of radical art? The abrogation of the Estrangement Effect (which, to a considerable extent, was also operative in the great illusionist art) defeats the radicalism of today's art. Thus, the "living theater" founders to the degree to which it is living, to which we immediately identify ourselves with the actors, experience our familiar sympathies, empathies, antipathies. The theater does not transcend this familiarity, this "*dejâ vu*" – it strengthens it. Just like the more and

more organized “happenings,” like the ever more marketable pop art, this ambiance creates a deceptive “community” within the society.

The conquest of this immediate familiarity, the “mediations” which would make the many forms of rebellious art a liberating force on the societal scale (that is to say, a subverting force) are yet to be attained. They would reside in modes of work and pleasure, of thought and behavior, in a technology and in a natural environment which express the aesthetic ethos of socialism. Then, art may have lost its privileged, and segregated, dominion over the imagination, the beautiful, the dream. This may be the future, but the future ingresses into the present: in its negativity, the desublimating art and anti-art of today “anticipate” a stage where society’s capacity to produce may be akin to the creative capacity of art, and the construction of the world of art akin to the reconstruction of the real world – union of liberating art and liberating technology.[23] By virtue of this anticipation, the disorderly, uncivil, farcical, artistic desublimation of culture constitutes an essential element of radical politics: of the subverting forces in transition.

3 – Subverting Forces – in Transition

The notion of “aesthetic form” as the Form of a free society would indeed mean reversing the development of socialism from scientific to utopian unless we can point to certain tendencies in the infrastructure of advanced industrial society which may give this notion a realistic content. We have repeatedly referred to such tendencies: first of all the growing technological character of the process of production, with the reduction of the required physical energy and its replacement by mental energy – dematerialization of labor. At the same time, an increasingly automated machine system, no longer used as the system of exploitation, would allow that “distantiation” of the laborer from the instruments of production which Marx foresaw at the end of capitalism: the workers would cease to be the “principal agents” of material production, and become its “supervisors and regulators” – the emergence of a free subject within the realm of necessity. Already today, the achievements of science and technology permit the play of the productive imagination:

experimentation with the possibilities of form and matter hitherto enclosed in the density of unmastered nature; the technical transformation of nature tends to make things lighter, easier, prettier – the loosening up of reification. The material becomes increasingly susceptible and subject to aesthetic forms, which enhance its exchange value (the artistic, modernistic banks, office buildings, kitchens, salesrooms, and salespeople, etc.). And within the framework of capitalism, the tremendous growth in the productivity of labor enforces the ever-enlarged production of "luxuries": wasteful in the armament industry, and in the marketing of gadgets, devices, trimmings, status symbols.

This same trend of production and consumption, which makes for the affluence and attraction of advanced capitalism, makes for the perpetuation of the struggle for existence, for the increasing necessity to produce and consume the non-necessary: the growth of the so-called "discretionary income" in the United States indicates the extent to which income earned is spent on other than "basic needs." Former luxuries become basic needs, a normal development which, under corporate capitalism, extends the competitive business of living to newly created needs and satisfactions. The fantastic output of all sorts of things and services defies the imagination, while restricting and distorting it in the commodity form, through which capitalist production enlarges its hold over human existence. And yet, precisely through the spread of this commodity form, the repressive social morality which sustains the system is being weakened. The obvious contradiction between the liberating possibilities of the technological transformation of the world, the light and free life on the one hand and the intensification of the struggle for existence on the other, generates among the underlying population that diffused aggressiveness which, unless steered to hate and fight the alleged national enemy, hits upon any suitable target: white or black, native or foreigner, Jew or Christian, rich or poor.

This is the aggressiveness of those with the mutilated experience, with the false consciousness and the false needs, the victims of repression who, for their living, depend on the repressive society and repress the alternative. Their violence is that of the

Establishment and takes as targets figures which, rightly or wrongly, seem to be different, and to represent an alternative.

But while the image of the libertarian potential of advanced industrial society is repressed (and hated) by the managers of repression and their consumers, it motivates the radical opposition and gives it its strange unorthodox character. Very different from the revolution at previous stages of history, this opposition is directed against the totality of a well-functioning, prosperous society – a protest against its Form – the commodity form of men and things, against the imposition of false values and a false morality. This new consciousness and the instinctual rebellion isolate such opposition from the masses and from the majority of organized labor, the integrated majority, and make for the concentration of radical politics in active minorities, mainly among the young middle-class intelligentsia, and among the ghetto populations. Here, prior to all political strategy and organization, liberation becomes a vital, "biological" need.

It is of course nonsense to say that middle-class opposition is replacing the proletariat as the revolutionary class, and that the *Lumpenproletariat* is becoming a radical political force. What is happening is the formation of still relatively small and weakly organized (often disorganized) groups which, by virtue of their consciousness and their needs, function as potential catalysts of rebellion within the majorities to which, by their class origin, they belong. In this sense, the militant intelligentsia has indeed cut itself loose from the middle classes, and the ghetto population from the organized working class. But by that token they do not think and act in a vacuum: their consciousness and their goals make them representatives of the very real common interest of the oppressed. As against the rule of class and national interests which suppress this common interest, the revolt against the old societies is truly international: emergence of a new, spontaneous solidarity. This struggle is a far cry from the ideal of humanism and *humanitas*; it is the struggle for life – life not as masters and not as slaves, but as men and women.

For Marxian theory, the location (or rather contraction) of the opposition in certain middle-class strata and in the ghetto population appears as an intolerable deviation – as does the emphasis on biological and aesthetic needs: regression to bourgeois or, even worse, aristocratic, ideologies. But, in the advanced monopoly-capitalist countries, the displacement of the opposition (from the organized industrial working classes to militant minorities) is caused by the internal development of the society; and the theoretical "deviation" only reflects this development. What appears as a surface phenomenon is indicative of basic tendencies which suggest not only different prospects of change, but also a depth and extent of change far beyond the expectations of traditional socialist theory. Under this aspect, the displacement of the negating forces from their traditional base among the underlying population, rather than being a sign of the weakness of the opposition against the integrating power of advanced capitalism, may well be the slow formation of a new base, bringing to the fore the new historical Subject of change, responding to the new objective conditions, with qualitatively different needs and aspirations. And on this base (probably intermittent and preliminary) goals and strategies take shape which reexamine the concepts of democratic-parliamentary as well as of revolutionary transformation.

The modifications in the structure of capitalism alter the basis for the development and organization of potentially revolutionary forces. Where the traditional laboring classes cease to be the "gravediggers" of capitalism, this function remains, as it were, suspended, and the political efforts toward change remain "tentative," preparatory not only in a temporal but also in a structural sense. This means that the "addressees" as well as the immediate goals and occasions of action will he determined by the shifting situation rather than by a theoretically well-founded and elaborated strategy. This determinism, direct consequence of the strength of the system and the diffusion of the opposition, also implies a shift of emphasis toward "subjective factors": the development of awareness and needs assumes primary importance. Under total capitalist administration and introjection, the social determination of consciousness is all but complete and immediate: direct

implantation of the latter into the former. Under these circumstances, radical change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the new Subject. Historically, it is again the period of enlightenment prior to material change – a period of education, but education which turns into praxis: demonstration, confrontation, rebellion.

The radical transformation of a social system still depends on the class which constitutes the human base of the process of production. In the advanced capitalist countries, this is the industrial working class. The changes in the composition of this class, and the extent of its integration into the system alter, not the potential but the actual political role of labor. Revolutionary class "in-itself" but not "for-itself," objectively but not subjectively, its radicalization will depend on catalysts outside its ranks. The development of a radical political consciousness among the masses is conceivable only if and when the economic stability and the social cohesion of the system begin to weaken. It was the traditional role of the Marxist-Leninist party to prepare the ground for this development. The stabilizing and integrating power of advanced capitalism, and the requirements of "peaceful coexistence," forced this party to "parliamentarize" itself, to integrate itself into the bourgeois-democratic process, and to concentrate on economic demands, thereby inhibiting rather than promoting the growth of a radical political consciousness. Where the latter broke through the party and trade union apparatus, it happened under the impact of "outside" forces – mainly from among the intelligentsia; the apparatus only followed suit when the movement gained momentum, and in order to regain control of it.

No matter how rational this strategy may be, no matter how sensible the desperate effort to preserve strength in the face of the sustained power of corporate capitalism, the strategy testifies to the "passivity" of the industrial working classes, to the degree of their integration it testifies to the facts which the official theory so vehemently denies. Under the conditions of integration, the new political consciousness of the vital need for radical change emerges among social groups which, on objective grounds, are (relatively) free from the integrating, conservative interests and aspirations, free for the radical

transvaluation of values. Without losing its historical role as the basic force of transformation, the working class, in the period of stabilization, assumes a stabilizing, conservative function; and the catalysts of transformation operate "from without."

This tendency is strengthened by the changing composition of the working class. The declining proportion of blue collar labor, the increasing number and importance of white collar employees, technicians, engineers, and specialists, divides the class. This means that precisely those strata of the working class which bore, and still bear, the brunt of brute exploitation will perform a gradually diminishing function in the process of production. The intelligentsia obtains an increasingly decisive role in this process – an instrumentalist intelligentsia, but intelligentsia nevertheless. This "new working class," by virtue of its position, could disrupt, reorganize, and redirect the mode and relationships of production. However, they have neither the interest nor the vital need to do so: they are well integrated and well rewarded.[24] To be sure, monopolistic competition and the race for intensifying the productivity of labor may enforce technological changes which may come into conflict with still prevailing policies and forms of private capitalist enterprise, and these changes may then lead to a technocratic reorganization of large sectors of the society (even of its culture and ideology). But it is not clear why they would lead to an abolition of the capitalist system, of the subjugation of the underlying population to the apparatus of profitable production for particular interests. Such a qualitative change would presuppose the control and redirection of the productive apparatus by groups with needs and goals very different from those of the technocrats.[25] Technocracy, no matter how "pure," sustains and streamlines the continuum of domination. This fatal link can be cut only by a revolution which makes technology and technique subservient to the needs and goals of free men: in this sense, and in this sense only, it would be a revolution against technocracy.

Such a revolution is not on the agenda. In the domain of corporate capitalism, the two historical factors of transformation, the subjective and objective, do not coincide: they are prevalent in different and even antagonistic groups. The objective factor, i.e., the human

base of the process of production which reproduces the established society, exists in the industrial working class, the human source and reservoir of exploitation; the subjective factor, i.e., the political consciousness exists among the nonconformist young intelligentsia; and the vital need for change is the very life of the ghetto population; and of the "underprivileged" sections of the laboring classes in backward capitalist countries. The two historical factors do coincide in large areas of the Third World, where the National Liberation Fronts and the guerrillas fight with the support and participation of the class which is the base of the process of production, namely, the predominantly agrarian and the emerging industrial proletariat.

The constellation which prevails in the metropoles of capitalism, namely, the objective necessity of radical change, and the paralysis of the masses, seems typical of a non-revolutionary but pre-revolutionary situation. The transition from the former to the latter presupposes a critical weakening of the global economy of capitalism, and the intensification and extension of the political work: radical enlightenment. It is precisely the preparatory character of this work which gives it its historical significance: to develop, in the exploited, the consciousness (and the unconscious) which would loosen the hold of enslaving needs over their existence – the needs which perpetuate their dependence on the system of exploitation. Without this rupture, which can only be the result of political education in action, even the most elemental, the most immediate force of rebellion may be defeated, or become the mass basis of counterrevolution.

The ghetto population of the United States constitutes such a force. Confined to small areas of living and dying, it can be more easily organized and directed. Moreover, located in the core cities of the country, the ghettos form natural geographical centers from which the struggle can be mounted against targets of vital economic and political importance; in this respect, the ghettos can be compared with the *faubourgs* of Paris in the eighteenth century, and their location makes for spreading and "contagious" upheavals. Cruel and indifferent privation is now met with increasing resistance, but its still largely unpolitical character facilitates suppression and diversion. The racial conflict still separates the

ghettos from the allies outside. While it is true that the white man is guilty, it is equally true that white men are rebels and radicals. However, the fact is that monopolistic imperialism validates the racist thesis: it subjects ever more nonwhite populations to the brutal power of its bombs, poisons, and moneys; thus making even the exploited white population in the metropoles partners and beneficiaries of the global crime. Class conflicts are being superseded or blotted out by race conflicts: color lines become economic and political realities – a development rooted in the dynamic of late imperialism and its struggle for new methods of internal and external colonization.

The long-range power of the black rebellion is further threatened by the deep division within this class (the rise of a Negro bourgeoisie), and by its marginal (in terms of the capitalist system) social function. The majority of the black population does not occupy a decisive position in the process of production, and the white organizations of labor have not exactly gone out of their way to change this situation. In the cynical terms of the system, a large part of this population is "expendable," that is to say, it makes no essential contribution to the productivity of the system. Consequently, the powers that be may not hesitate to apply extreme measures of suppression if the movement becomes dangerous. The fact is that, at present in the United States, the black population appears as the "most natural" force of rebellion.

Its distance from the young middle-class opposition is formidable in every respect. The common ground: the total rejection of the existing society, of its entire value system, is obscured by the obvious class difference – just as, within the white population, the community of "real interest" between the students and the workers is vitiated by the class conflict. However, this community did realize itself in political action on a rather large scale during the May rebellion in France – against the implicit injunction on the part of the Communist Party and the CGT (*Confederation Generale du Travail*), and the common action was initiated by the students, not by the workers. This fact may be indicative of the depth and unity of the opposition underneath and across the class conflicts. With respect to the student movement, a basic trend in the very structure of advanced industrial society

favors the gradual development of such a community of interests. The long-range process which, in large areas of material production, tends to replace heavy physical labor by technical, mental energy, increases the social need for scientifically trained, intelligent workers; a considerable part of the student population is prospective working class – "new working class," not only not expendable, but vital for the growth of the existing society. The student rebellion hits this society at a vulnerable point; accordingly, the reaction is venomous and violent.

The "student movement" – the very term is already ideological and derogatory: it conceals the fact that quite important sections of the older intelligentsia and of the non student population take active part in the movement. It proclaims very different goals and aspirations; the general demands for educational reforms are only the immediate expression of wider and more fundamental aims. The most decisive difference is between the opposition in the socialist and that in the capitalist countries. The former accepts the socialist structure of society but protests against the repressive-authoritarian regime of the state and party bureaucracy; while, in the capitalist countries, the militant and apparently increasing) part of the movement is anti-capitalist: socialist or anarchist. Again, within the capitalist orbit, the rebellion against fascist and military dictatorships (in Spain, in Latin American countries) has a strategy and goals different from the rebellion in the democratic countries. And one should never forget the one student rebellion which was instrumental in perpetrating the most despicable mass murder in the contemporary world: the massacre of hundreds of thousands of "communists" in Indonesia. The crime has not yet been punished; it is the only horrible exception from the libertarian, liberating function of student activism.

In the fascist and semi-fascist countries, the militant students (a minority of the students everywhere) find support among the industrial and agrarian proletariat; in France and Italy, they have been able to obtain precarious (and passing!) aid from powerful leftist parties and unions; in West Germany and in the United States, they meet with the vociferous and often violent hostility of "the people" and of organized labor. Revolutionary

in its theory, in its instincts, and in its ultimate goals, the student movement is not a revolutionary force, perhaps not even an *avant-garde* so long as there are no masses capable and willing to follow, but it is the ferment of hope in the overpowering and stifling capitalist metropoles: it testifies to the truth of the alternative – the real need, and the real possibility of a free society. To be sure, there are the wild ones and the non-committed, the escapists into all kinds of mysticism, the good fools and the bad fools, and those who don't care what happens; there are the authentic and the organized happenings and nonconformities.

Naturally, the market has invaded this rebellion and made it a business, but it is serious business nevertheless. What matters is not the more or less interesting psychology of the participants nor the often bizarre forms of the protest (which quite frequently make the absurd reasonableness of the Establishment, and the anti-heroic, sensuous images of the alternative more transparent than the most serious argument could do), but that against which the protest is directed. The demands for a structural reform of the educational system (urgent enough by themselves; we shall come back to them subsequently) seek to counteract the deceptive neutrality and often plainly apologetic teaching; and to provide the student with the conceptual instruments for a solid and thorough critique of the material and intellectual culture. At the same time, they seek to abolish the class character of education. These changes would lead to an extension and development of consciousness which would remove the ideological and technological veil that hides the terrible features of the affluent society.

The development of a true consciousness is still the professional function of the universities. No wonder then that the student opposition meets with the all but pathological hatred on the part of the so-called "community," including large sections of organized labor. To the degree to which the university becomes dependent on the financial and political goodwill of the community and of the government, the struggle for a free and critical education becomes a vital part in the larger struggle for change.

What appears as extraneous "politicalization" of the university by disrupting radicals is today (as it was so often in the past) the "logical," internal dynamic of education: translation of knowledge into reality, of humanistic values into humane conditions of existence. This dynamic, arrested by the pseudo-neutral features of academia, would, for example, be released by the inclusion into the curriculum of courses giving adequate treatment to the great nonconformist movements in civilization and to the critical analysis of contemporary societies. The groundwork for building the bridge between the "ought" and the "is," between theory and practice, is laid within theory itself. Knowledge is transcendent (toward the object world, toward reality) not only in an epistemological sense – as against repressive forms of life – it is political. Denial of the right to political activity in the university perpetuates the separation between theoretical and practical reason and reduces the effectiveness and the scope of intelligence. The educational demands thus drive the movement beyond the universities, into the streets, the slums, the "community." And the driving force is the refusal to grow up, to mature, to perform efficiently and "normally" in and for a society which compels the vast majority of the population to "earn" their living in stupid, inhuman, and unnecessary jobs, which conducts its booming business on the back of ghettos, slums, and internal and external colonialism, which is infested with violence and repression while demanding obedience and compliance from the victims of violence and repression, which, in order to sustain the profitable productivity on which its hierarchy depends, utilizes its vast resources for waste, destruction, and an ever more methodical creation of conformist needs and satisfactions.

To the degree to which the rebellion is directed against a functioning, prosperous, "democratic" society, it is a moral rebellion, against the hypocritical, aggressive values and goals, against the blasphemous religion of this society, against everything it takes seriously, everything it professes while violating what it professes.

The "unorthodox" character of this opposition, which does not have the traditional class basis, and which is at the same time a political, instinctual, and moral rebellion, shapes the strategy and scope of the rebellion. It extends to the entire organization of the existing

liberal-parliamentary democracy. Among the New Left, a strong revulsion against traditional politics prevails: against that whole network of parties, committees, and pressure groups on all levels; against working within this network and with its methods. This entire sphere and atmosphere, with all its power, is invalidated; nothing that any of these politicians, representatives, or candidates declares is of any relevance to the rebels; they cannot take it seriously although they know very well that it may mean to them getting beaten, going to jail, losing a job. They are not professional martyrs: they prefer not to be beaten, not to go to jail, not to lose their job. But for them, this is not a question of choice; the protest and refusal are parts of their metabolism, and they extend to the power structure as a whole. The democratic process organized by this structure is discredited to such an extent that no part of it can be extracted which is not contaminated. Moreover, using this process would divert energy to snail-paced movements. For example, electioneering with the aim of significantly changing the composition of the U.S. Congress might take a hundred years, judging by the present rate of progress, and assuming that the effort of political radicalization continues unchecked. And the performance of the courts, from the lowest to the highest, does not mitigate the distrust in the given democratic-constitutional setup. Under these circumstances, to work for the improvement of the existing democracy easily appears as indefinitely delaying attainment of the goal of creating a free society.

Thus, in some sectors of the opposition, the radical protest tends to become antinomian, anarchistic, and even nonpolitical. Here is another reason why the rebellion often takes on the weird and clownish forms which get on the nerves of the Establishment. In the face of the gruesomely serious totality of institutionalized politics, satire, irony, and laughing provocation become a necessary dimension of the new politics. The contempt for the deadly *esprit de serieux* which permeates the talkings and doings of the professional and semiprofessional politicians appears as contempt for the values which they profess while destroying them. The rebels revive the desperate laughter and the cynical defiance of the fool as means for demasking the deeds of the serious ones who govern the whole.

This alienation of the radical opposition from the existing democratic process and institutions suggests a thorough reexamination of democracy ("bourgeois" democracy, representative government) and of their role in the transition from capitalism to socialism or, generally, from an unfree to a free society. By and large, Marxian theory has a positive evaluation of the role of bourgeois democracy in this transition – up to the stage of the revolution itself. By virtue of its commitment (however limited in practice) to civil rights and liberties, bourgeois democracy provides the most favorable ground for the development and organization of dissent. This is still true, but the forces which vitiate the "protective" features within the democratic framework itself are gaining momentum. The mass democracy developed by monopoly capitalism has shaped the rights and liberties which it grants in its own image and interest ; the majority of the people is the majority of their masters ; deviations are easily "contained" ; and concentrated power can afford to tolerate (perhaps even defend) radical dissent as long as the latter complies with the established rules and manners (and even a little beyond it). The opposition is thus sucked into the very world which it opposes – and by the very mechanisms which allow its development and organization; the opposition without a mass basis is frustrated in its efforts to obtain such a mass basis. Under these circumstances, working according to the rules and methods of democratic legality appears as surrender to the prevailing power structure. And yet, it would be fatal to abandon the defense of civil rights and liberties within the established framework. But as monopoly capitalism is compelled to extend and fortify its dominion at home and abroad, the democratic struggle will come into increasing conflict with the existing democratic institutions: with its built-in barriers and conservative dynamic.

The semi-democratic process works of necessity against radical change because it produces and sustains a popular majority whose opinion is generated by the dominant interests in the status quo. As long as this condition prevails, it makes sense to say that the general will is always wrong – wrong inasmuch as it objectively counteracts the possible transformation of society into more humane ways of life. To be sure, the method of

persuasion is still open to the minority, but it is fatally reduced by the fact that the leftist minority does not possess the large funds required for equal access to the mass media which speak day and night for the dominant interests – with those wholesome interludes in favor of the opposition that buttress the illusory faith in prevailing equality and fair play. And yet, without the continuous effort of persuasion, of reducing, one by one, the hostile majority, the prospects of the opposition would be still darker than they are.

Dialectics of democracy: if democracy means self-government of free people, with justice for all, then the realization of democracy would presuppose abolition of the existing pseudo-democracy. In the dynamic of corporate capitalism, the fight for democracy thus tends to assume anti-democratic forms, and to the extent to which the democratic decisions are made in "parliaments" on all levels, the opposition will tend to become extra-parliamentary. The movement to extend constitutionally professed rights and liberties to the daily life of the oppressed minorities, even the movement to preserve existing rights and liberties, will become "subversive" to the degree to which it will meet the stiffening resistance of the majority against an "exaggerated" interpretation and application of equality and justice.

An opposition which is directed, not against a particular form of government or against particular conditions within a society, but against a given social system as a whole, cannot remain legal and lawful because it is the established legality and the established law which it opposes. The fact that the democratic process provides for the redress of grievances and for legal and lawful changes does not alter the illegality inherent in an opposition to an institutionalized democracy which halts the process of change at the stage where it would destroy the existing system. By virtue of this built-in stabilizer or "governor," capitalist mass-democracy is perhaps to a higher degree self-perpetuating than any other form of government or society; and the more so the more it rests, not on terror and scarcity, but on efficiency and wealth, and on the majority will of the underlying and administered population. This new situation has direct bearing on the old question as to the right of resistance. Can we say that it is the established system rather than the resistance to it

which is in need of justification? Such seems to be the implication of the social contract theories which consider civil society dissolved when, in its existing form, it no longer fulfills the functions for which it was set up, namely, as a system of socially necessary and productive repression, Theoretically, these functions were determined by the philosophers: the realistically minded defined the "end of government" as the protection of property, trade, and commerce; the idealists spoke of the realization of Reason, Justice, Freedom (without altogether neglecting or even minimizing the more material and economic aspects). In both schools, judgment as to whether a government actually fulfilled these "ends," and the criteria for judging, were usually limited to the particular nation-state (or type of nation-state) which the respective philosopher had in mind: that the security, growth, and freedom of the one nation-state involved the insecurity, destruction, or oppression of another did not invalidate the definition, nor did an established government lose its claim for obedience when the protection of property and the realization of reason left large parts of the population in poverty and servitude.

In the contemporary period, the questions as to the "end of government" have subsided. It seems that the continued functioning of the society is sufficient justification for its legality and its claim for obedience, and "functioning" seems defined rather negatively as absence of civil war, massive disorder, economic collapse. Otherwise anything goes: military dictatorship, plutocracy, government by gangs and rackets. Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity are not effective arguments against a government which protects property, trade, and commerce at home while it perpetrates its destructive policy abroad. And indeed, there is no enforceable law that could deprive such a constitutional government of its legitimacy and legality. But this means that there is no (enforceable) law other than that which serves the status quo, and that those who refuse such service are *eo ipso* outside the realm of law even before they come into actual conflict with the law.

The absurd situation: the established democracy still provides the only legitimate framework for change and must therefore be defended against all attempts on the Right

and the Center to restrict this framework, but at the same time, preservation of the established democracy preserves the status quo and the containment of change. Another aspect of the same ambiguity: radical change depends on a mass basis, but every step in the struggle for radical change isolates the opposition from the masses and provokes intensified repression: mobilization of institutionalized violence against the opposition, thus further diminishing the prospects for radical change. After the electoral triumph of the reaction over the Left in the aftermath of the French student rebellion, *Humanite* wrote (according to The Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1968) : "every barricade, every car burned gave tens of thousands of votes to the Gaullist party." This is perfectly correct – as perfectly correct as the corollary proposition that without the barricades and car burnings the ruling powers would be safer and stronger, and the opposition, absorbed and restricted by the parliamentary game, would further emasculate and pacify the masses on whom the change depends. The conclusion? The radical opposition inevitably faces defeat of its direct, extra-parliamentary action, of uncivil disobedience, and there are situations in which it must take the risk of such defeat – if, in doing so, it can consolidate its strength and expose the destructive character of civil obedience to a reactionary regime.

For it is precisely the objective, historical function of the democratic system of corporate capitalism to use the Law and Order of bourgeois liberalism as a counterrevolutionary force, thus imposing upon the radical opposition the necessity of direct action and uncivil disobedience, while confronting the opposition with its vastly superior strength. Under these circumstances, direct action and uncivil disobedience become for the rebels integral parts of the transformation of the indirect democracy of corporate capitalism into a direct democracy[26] in which elections and representation no longer serve as institutions of domination. As against the latter, direct action becomes a means of democratization, of change even within the established system. All its power could not silence the student opposition (weakest and most diffused of all historical oppositions); and there is good reason to believe that it was, not the

parliamentary and the Gallup poll opinion, but rather the students and the resistance which enforced the change in the attitude of the government toward the war in Vietnam. And it was the uncivil disobedience of the students of Paris which suddenly broke through the memory repression of organized labor and recalled, for a very short moment, the historical power of the general strike and the factory occupation, of the red flag and the International.

The alternative is, not democratic evolution versus radical action, but rationalization of the status quo versus change. As long as a social system reproduces, by indoctrination and integration, a self-perpetuating conservative majority, the majority reproduces the system itself – open to changes within, but not beyond, its institutional framework. Consequently, the struggle for changes beyond the system becomes, by virtue of its own dynamic, undemocratic in the terms of the system, and counter-violence is from the beginning inherent in this dynamic. Thus the radical is guilty – either of surrendering to the power of the status quo, or of violating the Law and Order of the status quo.

But who has the right to set himself up as judge of an established society, who other than the legally constituted agencies or agents, and the majority of the people? Other than these, it could only be a self-appointed elite, or leaders who would arrogate to themselves such judgment. Indeed, if the alternative were between democracy and dictatorship (no matter how "benevolent"), the answer would be non-controversial: democracy is preferable. However, this democracy does not exist, and the government is factually exercised by a network of pressure groups and "machines," vested interests represented by and working on and through the democratic institutions. These are not derived from a sovereign people. The representation is representative of the will shaped by the ruling minorities. Consequently, if the alternative is rule by an elite, it would only mean replacement of the present ruling elite by another; and if this other should be the dreaded intellectual elite, it may not he less qualified and less threatening than the prevailing one. True, such government, initially, would not have the endorsement of the majority "inherited" from the previous government – but once the chain of the past

governments is broken, the majority would be in a state of flux, and, released from the past management, free to judge the new government in terms of the new common interest. To be sure, this has never been the course of a revolution, but it is equally true that never before has a revolution occurred which had at its disposal the present achievements of productivity and technical progress. Of course, they could be effectively used for imposing another set of repressive controls, but our entire discussion was based on the proposition that the revolution would be liberating only if it were carried by the non-repressive forces stirring in the existing society. The proposition is no more – and no less – than a hope. Prior to its realization, it is indeed only the individual, the individuals, who can judge, with no other legitimation than their consciousness and conscience. But these individuals are more and other than private persons with their particular contingent preferences and interests. Their judgment transcends their subjectivity to the degree to which it is based on independent thought and information, on a rational analysis and evaluation of their society. The existence of a majority of individuals capable of such rationality has been the assumption on which democratic theory has been based. If the established majority is not composed of such individuals, it does not think, will, and act as sovereign people.

The old story: right against right – the positive, codified, enforceable right of the existing society against the negative, unwritten, unenforceable right of transcendence which is part of the very existence of man in history: the right to insist on a less compromised, less guilty, less exploited humanity. The two rights must come into violent conflict as long as the established society depends, for its functioning, on exploitation and guilt. The opposition cannot change this state of affairs by the very means which protect and sustain the state of affairs. Beyond it, there are only the ideal and the offense, and those who claim, for their offending action, a right have to answer for their action before the tribunal of the existing society. For neither conscience nor commitment to an ideal can legalize the subversion of an established order which defines order, or even legalize disturbance of the peace which is the peace of the

established order. To the latter alone belongs the lawful right to abrogate peace and to organize the killing and beating. In the established vocabulary, “violence” is a term which one does not apply to the action of the police, the National Guard, the Marshals, the Marines, the bombers. The “bad” words are a priori reserved for the Enemy, and their meaning is defined and validated by the actions of the Enemy regardless of their motivation and goal. No matter how “good” the end, it does not justify the illegal means.[27]

The proposition “the end justifies the means” is indeed, as a general statement, intolerable – but so is, as a general statement, its negation. In radical political practice, the end belongs to a world different from and contrary to the established universe of discourse and behavior. But the means belong to the latter and are judged by the latter, on its own terms, the very terms which the end invalidates. For example, assuming an action aims at stopping crimes against humanity committed in the professed national interest ; and the means to attain this goal are acts of organized civil disobedience. In accord with established law and order not the crimes but the attempt to stop them is condemned and punished as a crime; thus it is judged by the very standards which the action indicts. The existing society defines the transcending action on its, society’s, own terms – a self-validating procedure, entirely legitimate, even necessary for this society: one of the most effective rights of the Sovereign is the right to establish enforceable definitions of words.[28]

Political linguistics: armor of the Establishment. If the radical opposition develops its own language, it protests spontaneously, subconsciously, against one of the most effective “secret weapons” of domination and defamation. The language of the prevailing Law and Order, validated by the courts and by the police, is not only the voice but also the deed of suppression.[29] This language not only defines and condemns the Enemy, it also creates him; and this creation is not the Enemy as he really is but rather

as he must be in order to perform his function for the Establishment. The end now does justify the means: actions cease to be crimes if they serve to preserve and extend the "Free World." Conversely, what the Enemy does, is evil; what he says – propaganda. This a priori linguistic defamation hits first the Enemy abroad: the defense of his own land, his own hut, his own naked life is a crime, the supreme crime which deserves the supreme punishment. Long before the special and not-so-special forces are physically trained to kill, burn, and interrogate, their minds and bodies are already desensitized to see and hear and smell in the Other not a human being but a beast – a beast however, which is subject to all-out punishment. The linguistic pattern constantly repeats itself: In Vietnam, "typical criminal communist violence" is perpetrated against American "strategic operations"; the Reds have the impertinence to "launch a sneak attack" (presumably they are supposed to announce it beforehand and to deploy in the open); they are "evading a death trap" (presumably they should have stayed in). The Viet Cong attack American barracks "in the dead of night" and kill American boys (presumably, Americans only attack in broad daylight, don't disturb the sleep of the enemy, and don't kill Vietnamese boys). The massacre of hundreds of thousands of communists (in Indonesia) is called "impressive" – a comparable "killing rate" suffered by the other side would hardly have been honored with such an adjective. To the Chinese, the presence of American troops in East Asia is a threat to their "ideology," while presumably the presence of Chinese troops in Central or South America would be a real, and not only an ideological, threat to the United States.

This linguistic universe, which incorporates the Enemy (as *Untermensch*) into the routine of everyday speech, can be transcended only in action. For violence is built into the very structure of this society: as the accumulated aggressiveness which drives the business of life in all branches of corporate capitalism, as the legal aggression on the highways, and as the national aggression abroad which seems to become more brutal the more it takes as its victims the wretched of the earth – those who have not yet been civilized by the capital of the Free World. In the mobilization of this aggressiveness,

ancient psychical forces are activated to serve the economic-political needs of the system: the Enemy are those who are unclean, infested; they are animals rather than humans; they are contagious (the domino theory!) and threaten the clean, anesthetized, healthy free world.[30] They must be liquidated, smoked out, and burned out like venom; their infested jungles too must be burned out and cleared for freedom and democracy. The Enemy already has its "fifth column" inside the clean world: the Commies and the Hippies and their like with the long hair and the beards and the dirty pants – those who are promiscuous and take liberties which are denied to the clean and orderly who remain clean and orderly even when they kill and bomb and burn. Never perhaps since the Middle Ages has accumulated repression erupted on such global scale in organized aggression against those outside the repressive system – "outsiders" within and without.

In the face of the scope and intensity of this sanctioned aggression, the traditional distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence becomes questionable. If legitimate violence includes, in the daily routine of "pacification" and "liberation," wholesale burning, poisoning, bombing, the actions of the radical opposition, no matter how illegitimate, can hardly be called by the same name: violence. Can there be any meaningful comparison, in magnitude and criminality, between the unlawful acts committed by the rebels in the ghettos, on the campuses, on the city streets on the one side, and the deeds perpetrated by the forces of order in Vietnam, in Bolivia, in Indonesia, in Guatemala, on the other? Can one meaningfully call it an offense when demonstrators disrupt the business of the university, the draft board, the supermarket, the flow of traffic, to protest against the far more efficient disruption of the business of life of untold numbers of human beings by the armed forces of law and order? Here too, the brute reality requires a redefinition of terms: the established vocabulary discriminates a priori against the opposition it protects the Establishment.

"Law and Order": these words have always had an ominous sound; the entire necessity and the entire horror of legitimate force are condensed, and sanctioned, in this phrase. There can be no human association without law and order, enforceable law and order, but there are degrees of good and evil in human associations – measured in terms of the legitimate, organized violence required to protect the established society against the poor, the oppressed, the insane: the victims of its well-being. Over and above their legitimacy in constitutional terms, the extent to which established law and order can legitimately demand (and command) obedience and compliance largely depends (or ought to depend) on the extent to which this law and this order obey and comply with their own standards and values. These may first be ideological (like the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity advanced by the revolutionary bourgeoisie), but the ideology can become a material political force in the armor of the opposition as these values are betrayed, compromised, denied in the social reality. Then the betrayed promises are, as it were, "taken over" by the opposition, and with them the claim for legitimacy. In this situation, law and order become something to be established as against the established law and order: the existing society has become illegitimate, unlawful: it has invalidated its own law. Such has been the dynamic of the historical revolutions; it is hard to see how it can be arrested indefinitely.

4 – Solidarity

The preceding attempt to analyze the present opposition to the society organized by corporate capitalism was focused on the striking contrast between the radical and total character of the rebellion on the one hand, and the absence of a class basis for this radicalism on the other. This situation gives all efforts to evaluate and even discuss the prospects for radical change in the domain of corporate capitalism their abstract, academic, unreal character. The search for specific historical agents of revolutionary change in the advanced capitalist countries is indeed meaningless. Revolutionary forces emerge in the process of change itself ; the translation of the potential into the actual is the work of political practice. And just as little as critical theory can political practice

orient itself on a concept of revolution which belongs to the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and which is still valid in large areas of the Third World. This concept envisages the "seizure of power" in the course of a mass upheaval, led by a revolutionary party acting as the avant-garde of a revolutionary class and setting up a new central power which would initiate the basic social changes. Even in industrial countries where a strong Marxist party has organized the exploited masses, strategy is no longer guided by this notion – witness the long-range Communist policy of "popular fronts." And the concept is altogether inapplicable to those countries in which the integration of the working class is the result of structural economic-political processes (sustained high productivity; large markets; neo-colonialism; administered democracy) and where the masses themselves are forces of conservatism and stabilization. It is the very power of this society which contains new modes and dimensions of radical change.

The dynamic of this society has long since passed the stage where it could grow on its own resources, its own market, and on normal trade with other areas. It has grown into an imperialist power which, through economic and technical penetration and outright military intervention, has transformed large parts of the Third World into dependencies. Its policy is distinguished from classical imperialism of the preceding period by effective use of economic and technical conquests on the one hand, and by the political-strategic character of intervention on the other: the requirements of the global fight against communism supersede those of profitable investments. In any case, by virtue of the evolution of imperialism, the developments in the Third World pertain to the dynamic of the First World, and the forces of change in the former are not extraneous to the latter; the "external proletariat" is a basic factor of potential change within the dominion of corporate capitalism. Here is the coincidence of the historical factors of revolution: this predominantly agrarian proletariat endures the dual oppression exercised by the indigenous ruling classes and those of the foreign metropoles. A liberal bourgeoisie which would ally itself with the poor and lead their struggle does not exist. Kept in abject material and mental privation, they depend on a militant leadership. Since the

vast majority outside the cities is unable to mount any concerted economic and political action which would threaten the existing society, the struggle for liberation will be a predominantly military one, carried out with the support of the local population, and exploiting the advantages of a terrain which impedes traditional methods of suppression. These circumstances, of necessity, make for guerrilla warfare. It is the great chance, and at the same time the terrible danger, for the forces of liberation. The powers that be will not tolerate a repetition of the Cuban example; they will employ ever more effective means and weapons of suppression, and the indigenous dictatorships will be strengthened with the ever more active aid from the imperialist metropoles. It would be romanticism to underrate the strength of this deadly alliance and its resolution to contain subversion. It seems that not the features of the terrain, nor the unimaginable resistance of the men and women of Vietnam, nor considerations of "world opinion," but fear of the other nuclear powers has so far prevented the use of nuclear or semi-nuclear weapons against a whole people and a whole country.

Under these circumstances, the preconditions for the liberation and development of the Third World must emerge in the advanced capitalist countries. Only the internal weakening of the superpower can finally stop the financing and equipping of suppression in the backward countries. The National Liberation Fronts threaten the life line of imperialism; they are not only a material but also an ideological catalyst of change. The Cuban revolution and the Viet Cong have demonstrated: it can be done ; there is a morality, a humanity, a will, and a faith which can resist and deter the gigantic technical and economic force of capitalist expansion. More than the "socialist humanism" of the early Marx, this violent solidarity in defense, this elemental socialism in action, has given form and substance to the radicalism of the New Left; in this ideological respect too, the external revolution has become an essential part of the opposition within the capitalist metropoles. However, the exemplary force, the ideological power of the external revolution, can come to fruition only if the internal

structure and cohesion of the capitalist system begin to disintegrate. The chain of exploitation must break at its strongest link.

Corporate capitalism is not immune against economic crisis. The huge "defense" sector of the economy not only places an increasingly heavy burden on the taxpayer, it also is largely responsible for the narrowing margin of profit. The growing opposition against the war in Vietnam points up the necessity of a thorough conversion of the economy, risking the danger of rising unemployment, which is a by-product of technical progress in automation. The "peaceful" creation of additional outlets for the productivity of the metropoles would meet with the intensified resistance in the Third World, and with the contesting and competitive strength of the Soviet orbit. The absorption of unemployment and the maintenance of an adequate rate of profit would thus require the stimulation of demand on an ever larger scale, thereby stimulating the rat race of the competitive struggle for existence through the multiplication of waste, planned obsolescence, parasitic and stupid jobs and services. The higher standard of living, propelled by the growing parasitic sector of the economy, would drive wage demands toward capital's point of no return. But the structural tendencies which determine the development of corporate capitalism do not justify the assumption that aggravated class struggles would terminate in a socialist revolution through organized political action. To be sure, even the most advanced capitalist welfare state remains a class society and therefore a state of conflicting class interests. However, prior to the disintegration of the state power, the apparatus and the suppressive force of the system would keep the class struggle within the capitalist framework. The translation of the economic into the radical political struggle would be the consequence rather than the cause of change. The change itself could then occur in a general, unstructured, unorganized, and diffused process of disintegration. This process may be sparked by a crisis of the system which would activate the resistance not only against the political but also against the mental repression imposed by the society. Its insane features, expression of the ever more blatant contradiction between the available resources for liberation and their use for the

perpetuation of servitude, would undermine the daily routine, the repressive conformity, and rationality required for the continued functioning of the society.

The dissolution of social morality may manifest itself in a collapse of work discipline, slowdown, spread of disobedience to rules and regulations, wildcat strikes, boycotts, sabotage, gratuitous acts of noncompliance. The violence built into the system of repression may get out of control, or necessitate ever more totalitarian controls. Even the most totalitarian technocratic-political administration depends, for its functioning, on what is usually called the "moral fiber": a (relatively) "positive" attitude among the underlying population toward the usefulness of their work and toward the necessity of the repressions exacted by the social organization of work. A society depends on the relatively stable and calculable sanity of the people, sanity defined as the regular, socially coordinated functioning of mind and body – especially at work, in the shops and offices, but also at leisure and fun. Moreover, a society also demands to a considerable extent, belief in one's beliefs (which is part of the required sanity); belief in the operative value of society's values. Operationalism is indeed an indispensable supplement to want and fear as forces of cohesion.

Now it is the strength of this moral fiber, of the operational values (quite apart from their ideational validity), which is likely to wear off under the impact of the growing contradictions within the society. The result would be a spread, not only of discontent and mental sickness, but also of inefficiency, resistance to work, refusal to perform, negligence, indifference – factors of dysfunction which would hit a highly centralized and coordinated apparatus, where breakdown at one point may easily affect large sections of the whole. To be sure, these are subjective factors, but they may assume material force in conjunction with the objective economic and political strains to which the system will be exposed on a global scale. Then, and only then, that political climate would prevail which could provide a mass basis for the new forms of organization required for directing the struggle.

We have indicated the tendencies which threaten the stability of the imperialist society and emphasized the extent to which the liberation movements in the Third World affect the prospective development of this society. It is to an even greater extent affected by the dynamic of "peaceful coexistence" with the old socialist societies, the Soviet orbit. In important aspects, this coexistence has contributed to the stabilization of capitalism: "world communism" has been the Enemy who would have to be invented if he did not exist – the Enemy whose strength justified the "defense economy" and the mobilization of the people in the national interest. Moreover, as the common Enemy of all capitalism, communism promoted the organization of a common interest superseding the intercapitalist differences and conflicts. Last but not least, the opposition within the advanced capitalist countries has been seriously weakened by the repressive Stalinist development of socialism, which made socialism not exactly an attractive alternative to capitalism. More recently, the break in the unity of the communist orbit, the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Vietnam, and the "cultural revolution" in China have changed this picture. The possibility of constructing socialism on a truly popular base, without the Stalinist bureaucratization and the danger of a nuclear war as the imperialist answer to the emergence of this kind of socialist power, has led to some sort of common interest between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States on the other.

In a sense, this is indeed the community of interests of the "haves" against the "have-nots," of the Old against the New. The "collaborationist" policy of the Soviet Union necessitates the pursuance of power politics which increasingly reduces the prospect that Soviet society, by virtue of its basic institutions alone (abolition of private ownership and control of the means of production: planned economy) is still capable of making the transition to a free society. And yet, the very dynamic of imperialist expansion places the Soviet Union in the other camp: would the effective resistance in Vietnam, and the protection of Cuba be possible without Soviet aid?

However, while we reject the unqualified convergence thesis, according to which – at least at present – the assimilation of interests prevails upon the conflict between capitalism and Soviet socialism, we cannot minimize the essential difference between the latter and the new historical efforts to construct socialism by developing and creating a genuine solidarity between the leadership and the liberated victims of exploitation. The actual may considerably deviate from the ideal, the fact remains that, for a whole generation, "freedom," "socialism," and "liberation" are inseparable from Fidel and Che and the guerrillas – not because their revolutionary struggle could furnish the model for the struggle in the metropoles, but because they have recaptured the truth of these ideas, in the day-to-day fight of men and women for a life as human beings: for a new life.

What kind of life? We are still confronted with the demand to state the "concrete alternative." The demand is meaningless if it asks for a blueprint of the specific institutions and relationships which would be those of the new society: they cannot be determined a priori; they will develop, in trial and error, as the new society develops. If we could form a concrete concept of the alternative today, it would not be that of an alternative; the possibilities of the new society are sufficiently "abstract," i.e., removed from and incongruous with the established universe to defy any attempt to identify them in terms of this universe. However, the question cannot be brushed aside by saying that what matters today is the destruction of the old, of the powers that be, making way for the emergence of the new. Such an answer neglects the essential fact that the old is not simply bad, that it delivers the goods, and that people have a real stake in it. There can be societies which are much worse – there are such societies today. The system of corporate capitalism has the right to insist that those who work for its replacement justify their action.

But the demand to state the concrete alternatives is justified for yet another reason. Negative thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human condition in the given society, and the "given" possibilities to transcend this

condition, to enlarge the realm of freedom. In this sense, negative thinking is by virtue of its own internal concepts "positive": oriented toward, and comprehending a future which is "contained" in the present. And in this containment (which is an important aspect of the general containment policy pursued by the established societies), the future appears as possible liberation. It is not the only alternative: the advent of a long period of "civilized" barbarism, with or without the nuclear destruction, is equally contained in the present. Negative thinking, and the praxis guided by it, is the positive and positing effort to prevent this utter negativity.

The concept of the primary, initial institutions of liberation is familiar enough and concrete enough: collective ownership, collective control and planning of the means of production and distribution. This is the foundation, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the alternative: it would make possible the usage of all available resources for the abolition of poverty, which is the prerequisite for the turn from quantity into quality: the creation of a reality in accordance with the new sensitivity and the new consciousness. This goal implies rejection of those policies of reconstruction, no matter how revolutionary, which are bound to perpetuate (or to introduce) the pattern of the unfree societies and their needs. Such false policy is perhaps best summed up in the formula "to catch up with, and to overtake the productivity level of the advanced capitalist countries." What is wrong with this formula is not the emphasis on the rapid improvement of the material conditions but on the model guiding their improvement. The model denies the alternative, the qualitative difference. The latter is not, and cannot be, the result of the fastest possible attainment of capitalist productivity, but rather the development of new modes and ends of production – "new" not only (and perhaps not at all) with respect to technical innovations and production relations, but with respect to the different human needs and the different human relationships in working for the satisfaction of these needs. These new relationships would be the result of a "biological" solidarity in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free development – the

exact opposite of the administered and enforced harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?) countries. It is the image of this solidarity as elemental, instinctual, creative force which the young radicals see in Cuba, in the guerrillas, in the Chinese cultural revolution.

Solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating. Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity. Socialist solidarity is autonomy: self-determination begins at home – and that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses. And this end must indeed appear in the means to attain it, that is to say, in the strategy of those who, within the existing society, work for the new one. If the socialist relationships of production are to be a new way of life, a new Form of life, then their existential quality must show forth, anticipated and demonstrated, in the fight for their realization. Exploitation in all its forms must have disappeared from this fight: from the work relationships among the fighters as well as from their individual relationships. Understanding, tenderness toward each other, the instinctual consciousness of that which is evil, false, the heritage of oppression, would then testify to the authenticity of the rebellion. In short, the economic, political, and cultural features of a classless society must have become the basic needs of those who fight for it. This ingression of the future into the present, this depth dimension of the rebellion accounts, in the last analysis, for the incompatibility with the traditional forms of the political struggle. The new radicalism militates against the centralized bureaucratic communist as well as against the semi-democratic liberal organization. There is a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism, in this rebellion, expression of the new sensibility, sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation. Therefore the aversion against pre-established Leaders, apparatchiks of all sorts, politicians no matter how leftist. The initiative shifts to small groups, widely diffused, with a high degree of autonomy, mobility, flexibility.

To be sure, within the repressive society, and against its ubiquitous apparatus, spontaneity by itself cannot possibly be a radical and revolutionary force. It can become

such a force only as the result of enlightenment, education, political practice – in this sense indeed, as a result of organization. The anarchic element is an essential factor in the struggle against domination: preserved but disciplined in the preparatory political action, it will be freed and *aufgehoben* in the goals of the struggle. Released for the construction of the initial revolutionary institutions, the anti-repressive sensibility, allergic to domination, would militate against the prolongation of the "First Phase," that is, the authoritarian bureaucratic development of the productive forces. The new society could then reach relatively fast the level at which poverty could be abolished (this level could be considerably lower than that of advanced capitalist productivity, which is geared to obscene affluence and waste). Then the development could tend toward a sensuous culture, tangibly contrasting with the gray-on-gray culture of the socialist societies of Eastern Europe. Production would be redirected in defiance of all the rationality of the Performance Principle; socially necessary labor would be diverted to the construction of an aesthetic rather than repressive environment, to parks and gardens rather than highways and parking lots, to the creation of areas of withdrawal rather than massive fun and relaxation. Such redistribution of socially necessary labor (time), incompatible with any society governed by the Profit and Performance Principle, would gradually alter society in all its dimensions it would mean the ascent of the Aesthetic Principle as Form of the Reality Principle: a culture of receptivity based on the achievements of industrial civilization and initiating the end of its self-propelling productivity.

Not regression to a previous stage of civilization, but return to an imaginary te*mps perdu* in the real life of mankind: progress to a stage of civilization where man has learned to ask for the sake of whom or of what he organizes his society; the stage where he checks and perhaps even halts his incessant struggle for existence on an enlarged scale, surveys what has been achieved through centuries of misery and hecatombs of victims, and decides that it is enough, and that it is time to enjoy what he has and what can be reproduced and refined with a minimum of alienated labor: not the arrest or

reduction of technical progress, but the elimination of those of its features which perpetuate man's subjection to the apparatus and the intensification of the struggle for existence – to work harder in order to get more of the merchandise that has to be sold. In other words, electrification indeed, and all technical devices which alleviate and protect life, all the mechanization which frees human energy and time, all the standardization which does away with spurious and parasitarian "personalized" services rather than multiplying them and the gadgets and tokens of exploitative affluence. In terms of the latter (and only in terms of the latter), this would certainly be a regression – but freedom from the rule of merchandise over man is a precondition of freedom.

The construction of a free society would create new incentives for work. In the exploitative societies, the so-called work instinct is mainly the (more or less effectively) introjected necessity to perform productively in order to earn a living. But the life instincts themselves strive for the unification and enhancement of life; in non-repressive sublimation they would provide the libidinal energy for work on the development of a reality which no longer demands the exploitative repression of the Pleasure Principle. The "incentives" would then he built into the instinctual structure of men. Their sensibility would register, as biological reactions, the difference between the ugly and the beautiful, between calm and noise, tenderness and brutality, intelligence and stupidity, joy and fun, and it would correlate this distinction with that between freedom and servitude. Freud's last theoretical conception recognizes the erotic instincts as work instincts – work for the creation of a sensuous environment. The social expression of the liberated work instinct is cooperation, which, grounded in solidarity, directs the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the realm of freedom. And there is an answer to the question which troubles the minds of so many men of good will: what are the people in a free society going to do? The answer which, I believe, strikes at the heart of the matter was given by a young black girl. She said: for the first time in our life, we shall be free to think about what we are going to do.

Notes

1. I use the terms “biological” and “biology” not in the sense of the scientific discipline, but in order to designate the process and the dimension in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and aspirations become vital needs which, if not satisfied, would cause dysfunction of the organism. Conversely, socially induced needs and aspirations may result in a more pleasurable organic behavior. If biological needs are defined as those which must be satisfied and for which no adequate substitute can be provided, certain cultural needs can “sink down” into the biology of man. We could then speak, for example, of the biological need of freedom, or of some aesthetic needs as having taken root in the organic structure of man, in his “nature,” or rather “second nature.” This usage of the term “biological” does not imply or assume anything as to the way in which needs are physiologically expressed and transmitted.

2. See pp. 53 f. below for further discussion.

3. For further discussion see pp. 64 f. below.

4. Rene Dubos, Man Adapting (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 313-314.

5. I shall discuss the existence of such a foundation in Chapter 3.

6. The critique of the prevailing scientific establishment as ideological, and the idea of a science which has really come into its own, was expressed in a manifesto issued by the militant students of Paris in May 1968 as follows:

“Refusons aussi la division de la science et de l'idéologie, la plus pernicieuse de toutes puisqu'elle est secretee par nous-mêmes. Nous ne voulons pas plus être gouvernes passivement par les lois de la science que par celle de l'économie ou les impératifs de la technique. La science est un art donc l'originalité est d'avoir des applications possibles hors d'elle-même. “Elle ne peut cependant être normative que pour elle-même. Refusons son impérialisme mystifiant, caution de tous les abus et reculs, y compris en son sein, et remplaeons-le par un choix réel parmi les possibles qu'elle nous offre” (Quelle Université? Quelle Société? Textes réunis par le centre de regroupement des informations universitaires. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968, p. 148).

7. For a far more "utopian" conception see the by now familiar passage in the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen. Oekonomie (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), pp. 596 ff., and p. 49 below.

8. See p. 31 below.

9. Hesiod, Theogony, Norman 0. Brown, translator (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 61.

10. Kant, Handschriftlicher Nachlass (Akademieausgabe), p. 622.

11. Nietzsche, Werke (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1921), vol. IX, p. 185.

12. Ibid., vol. XVI (1911) , p. 230.

13. See esp. Nadja: Voici des rencontres qu'explique mal le simple recours a la coïncidence, et qui, comme les rencontres de Fart, productrices de beauté, engendrent un émoi qui parait bien le signe d'une finalité objective, ou, du moms, la marque d'un sens dont nous ne sommes pas les seuls créateurs. Cette finalité, ce sens, supposent, dans le réel, un ordre qui soit leur source. Quel ordre, distinct de l'ordre de la causalite quotidienne, nous est donc ici signifie?" (Ferdinand Alquie, Philosophie du surrealisme. Paris: Flammarion, 1955, p 141).

14. Here too, Kant's aesthetic theory leads to the most advanced notions: the beautiful as "symbol" of the moral.

15. Benjamin Peret, Le Déshonneur des pâtes (Paris: Pauvert, 1965), p. 65. Written in 1943.

16. The familiar "obscenities" in the language of the black and white radicals must be seen in this context of a methodical subversion of the linguistic universe of the Establishment. "Obscenities" are not officially co-opted and sanctioned by the spoken and written professions of the powers that be; their usage thus breaks the false ideological language and invalidates its definitions. But only in the political context of the Great Refusal do obscenities perform this function. If, for example, the highest executives of the nation or of the state are called, not President X or Governor Y but pig X or pig Y, and if what they say in campaign speeches is rendered as "oink, oink," this offensive designation is used to deprive them of the aura of public servants or leaders who have only the common interest in mind. They are "redefined" as that which they really are in the eyes of the radicals. And if they are addressed as men who have perpetrated

the unspeakable Oedipal crime, they are indicted on the counts of their own morality: the order they enforce with such violence was born in their sense of guilt. They slept with the mother without having slain the father, a deed less reprehensible but more contemptible than that of Oedipus. The methodical use of "obscenities" in the political language of the radicals is the elemental act of giving a new name to men and things, obliterating the false and hypocritical name which the renamed figures proudly bear in and for the system. And if the renaming invokes the sexual sphere, it falls in line with the great design of the desublimation of culture, which, to the radicals, is a vital aspect of liberation.

17. B. Eikhenbaum, in Théorie de la Littérature. Textes des Formalistes Russes, ed. Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), p. 44.

18. V. Chklovski, in ibid., p. 83.

19. Ibid.

20. Franz Marc, "Der Blaue Reiter" (14) , in Manifeste Manifeste 1905-1933 (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1956), p. 56.

21. Raoul Hausmann, "Die Kunst und die Zeit," 1919 (in ibid., p. 1.86) .

22. Ibid., pp. 188 ff.

23. A utopian vision indeed, but realistic enough to animate the militant students of the Ecole des Beaux Arts in their action of May 1968: they called for a development of a consciousness which would guide the "creative activity immanent in every individual," so that the "work of art" and "the artist" become mere "moments in this activity" – moments which are paralyzed in every social "system which makes the work or the man into a monument" (Quelle université? Quelle société?, loc. cit., p, 123).

24. On June 15, 1967, The New York Times published, under the heading "Think Tanks: Applied Research on Not for Profit Basis Is Paying Off Handsomely," an article on the $29 million a year Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute kid One "of the hundreds of engineers" interviewed by the writer is quoted as follows: "There is a tremendous amount of selling in this job. . My real love is minimum weight structures . . . but I'm willing to work on minimum cost structures or how to kill the Russians better because the organization survives by doing research that's saleable." This

statement, priceless in itself and a treasure for language analysis (note the smooth fusion of love, kill, research, and saleable), expresses the consciousness (and the unconscious) of at least one of these "technocrats." Potential revolutionaries?

25. The existence of such groups among the highly qualified technical personnel was demonstrated during the May – June rebellion in France.

26. "Direct democracy": in modern mass society, democracy, no matter in what form, is not conceivable without a system of representation. Direct democracy would assure, on all levels, genuinely free selection and election of candidates, revocability at the discretion of the constituencies, and uncensored education and information. Again, such democracy presupposes equal and universal education for autonomy.

27. A frightful example of the language of counter-sense – destruction not only of the meaning of words but also of the very idea of humanity – is provided by a report in The New York Times (September 5, 1967) which contains the following passages:

County Judge Christ Seraphim sat with his golden retriever, Holly, on the porch of his Spanish-style house on a pleasant East Side street [in Milwaukee] this afternoon and made some acerbic comments on 1,000 civil rights demonstrators who jived and strutted past his front lawn. . . .

"I think they are disturbing the peace, don't you?" he asked, looking at the marchers today. "They are loud and boisterous, are they not? I can't enjoy the peace and tranquillity of my home, a home paid a lot for."

As for the Rev. James E. Croppi, the white Roman Catholic priest who commands the marchers, Judge Seraphim snapped: "He is a criminal, a convicted criminal, convicted twice by a jury for disorderly conduct."

The demonstrators finally moved out of earshot, and Judge Seraphim resumed, with a grateful sigh, his reading of "A History of the Jews" by Abram Leon Sacher, president of Brandeis University, but soon the marchers returned.

"These people," said Judge Seraphim, this time referring to his book, "were baked in ovens. But they maintained their dignity to the end. They didn't do much marching. They are the most law-abiding people in the world."

The epitome of Law and Order: men are law-abiding if they go to the ovens and get baked without “much marching,” while those who march in order to protest and to prevent a possible repetition of the concentration camps are “disturbing the peace” and “criminal” is the priest who leads the protest. And the counter-sense triumphs in the very name of the judge: Christ Seraphim.

28. “Nous contestons une culture qui donne la suprématie au langage parle. Ce langage élabore par la classe bourgeoise est un signe d'appartenance a cette classe. Mais ce langage qui est le fait d'une minorité d'individus s'impose a tous comme le seul mode de communication valable; . . Le langage n'est pas seulement un moyen de communication, c'est aussi et surtout un mode d'appréhension de la réalité, celui tout formel et tout intellectuel que peut se permettre une classe détache par ses privilèges économiques des conflits et des contradictions de la vie sociale”: (Extrait de Alajuscule, organe de liaison de la faculté de Lyon, 29 mai 1968. Quelle universite? Quelle société?, loc. cit., pp. 45-46.)

29. Awareness of this fact and its implications is rarely found in the respectable press. An amazing exception is an article by David S. Broder in The Los Angeles Times of October 1, 1968. It contains the following passages:

The systematic stripping of meaning and substance from words is a form of subversion not covered by statute. Nor are politicians the only guilty parties. A nation that had grown accustomed to hearing reports of heavy fighting in the “demilitarized zone” or of persons being injured in a “non-violent demonstration” was already well on its way to losing a grip on its sanity.

Rhetorical excesses are accepted as part of any campaign, but this year the candidates have been exceptionally profligate in wasting the resources of the language. The words “law” and “order,” and “peace,” for example, are fundamental to the vocabulary of citizens of a free country. Yet the meaning has been drained from these words as higher charges of emotion have been added. . .

But the American experiment in self-government was launched in a society where certain abstract concepts were well-understood. If they had not been part of every man’s vocabulary, the system of self-government could never have been attempted.

Jefferson could expect to be understood when he wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

The concepts in that statement cannot be visualized; they must be defined.

And when words lose their meaning, when the medium overwhelms the message, a system of government like ours may no longer be operable.

30. See "The Americans in Vietnam" (anonymous) in Alternatives, University of California, San Diego, Fall 1966; originally published in German in Das Argument, No. 36, Berlin, 1966; in French in Les Temps Modernes, January 1966.

Socialist Humanism?

Almost twenty years ago, Merleau-Ponty raised the issue of socialist humanism with uncompromising clarity. Is the humanistic, non-terroristic construction of a socialist society in the given historical period a real possibility? He rejected the alternative of humanism and terror: there is no choice between violence and nonviolence, but only between two modes of violence—capitalist and socialist.

> *En U.S.S.R., la violence et la ruse sont officielles, l'humanité est dans la vie quotidienne. Dans les démocraties, au contraire, les principes sont humains, la ruse et la violence se trouvent dans la pratique. A partir de là, la propagande a beau jeu.* [1]
>
> (In the U.S.S.R., violence and deception are official, and humanity is in daily life. In the democracies, on the other hand, the principles are humane, but deception and violence are found in practice. Beyond that, propaganda has a field day.)

The two social systems are locked in a global struggle in which the renunciation of socialist violence is found to strengthen the realm of capitalist exploitation. But socialist violence has the chance of breaking the infernal circle of terror and counterterror as long as it is carried by the supranational solidarity of the only class which, "*selon la*

logique interne de sa condition," is capable of translating humanism from ideology into reality. Merleau-Ponty knew that precisely this condition no longer prevailed, and that the proletariat had ceased to be "the term of reference" in communist thought and policy, but he refused to engage in an ideological rescue of humanism and to reject the actual development in the name of humanistic "values":

> *Opposer ici au marxisme une "morale d'abord,"' test l'ignorer dans ce qu'il dit de plus vrai et qui a fait sa fortune dans le monde, c'est continuer la mystification, c'est passer à côté du problème.* [2]
>
> (To oppose to Marxism the principle "morality first" is to ignore that which is most true in the former and which has made its fortune in the world, is to perpetuate mystification, to bypass the problem.)

The solution:

> *Parler pour l'humanisme sans être pour le "socialisme humaniste" à la manière anglo saxonne, "comprendre" les communistes sans être communiste, c'est apparemment se placer bien haut et en tout cas au dessus de la mêlée. En réalité c'est simplement refuser de s'engager dans la confusion et hors de la vérité. Est ce notre faute si l'humanisme occidental est faussé parce qu'il est aussi une machine de guerre? Et si l'entreprise marxiste n'a pu survivre qu'en changeant de caractère?* [3]

(To speak of humanism without being for "humanistic socialism," in the Anglo-Saxon manner, and to "understand" the communists without being communist, is apparently to place oneself high above, or in any case above, the conflict. In reality, it means refusing to become entangled in confusion and falsehood. Is it our fault if Western humanism is rendered false because it is also an apparatus of war? And if the Marxist enterprise has only been able to survive by changing its character?)

The human reality is an "open" system: no theory, whether Marxist or other, can impose the solution. The contingency of history, which today denies humanism, may also one day deny the denial. Meanwhile there are the enslaved human beings who must accomplish their own liberation. To develop their conscience and consciousness, to make them aware of what is going on, to prepare the precarious ground for the future alternatives—this is our task: "our" not only as Marxists but as intellectuals, and that means all those who are still free and able to think by themselves and against indoctrination, communist as well as anticommunist.

Today, after the destalinization and under conditions of liberation and decentralization in the communist world, the "solution" is no more visible than it was at

the end of the war. The Soviet Union does not seem to become more "humanistic" by making arrangements with the West, nor the West by accepting these arrangements. But the post-war development of the capitalist and communist societies in coexistence suggests that the prospects of socialist humanism should be re-examined with a view to the technical capability and productivity of these societies. This paper offers only a few remarks on the problems.

In the Marxian conception, socialism is humanism in as much as it organizes the social division of labor, the "realm of necessity" so as to enable men to satisfy their social and individual needs without exploitation and with a minimum of toil and sacrifice. Social production, controlled by the "immediate producers," would be deliberately directed toward this goal. With this rational organization of the realm of necessity, man would be free to develop himself as an "all-round individual" beyond the realm of necessity, which would remain a world of want, of labor. But the qualitatively new organization of the realm of necessity, upon which the emergence of truly human relationships depends, in turn depends on the existence of a class for which the revolution of human relationships is a vital need. Socialism is humanism in the extent to which this need and goal pre-exist, i.e., socialism as humanism has its historical a priori *within* capitalist society. Those who constitute the human base of this society have no share in its exploitative interests and satisfactions; their vital needs transcend the inhuman existence of the whole toward the universal human needs which are still to be fulfilled. Because their very existence is the denial of freedom and humanity, they are free for their own liberation and for that of humanity. In this dialectic, the humanist content of socialism emerges, not as value but as need, not as moral goal and justification but as economic and political practice—as part of the basis itself of the material culture.

This much for the Marxian conception. Its historical denominator is obvious. Socialism is "objectively" humanism by virtue of its specific place in the development of industrial society, defined by the existence, interest, and action of the class-conscious proletariat in its supranational solidarity. This historical constellation has been "surpassed" by the actual development of the advanced industrial societies. To the degree to which their inherent contradictions have unfolded themselves, to the same degree have their rising productivity and power succeeded in suppressing the need for resolving the contradictions. As technical progress provides the instrumentalities for a rational organization of the realm of necessity far beyond anything Marx ever envisaged

(the "abolition of labor" does not seem to be the problem of the future, but rather how to avoid the abolition of labor), these instruments are used for perpetuating and even intensifying the struggle for existence, for total mobilization rather than for pacification. The increasing threat of leisure time is utilized by management to defend the status quo of repression. Technological rationality is geared to the requirements of the Cold War, which is waged not only (perhaps not even primarily) against the external enemy, but also against the enemy within the established societies—against a qualitatively new mode of existence which could free man from enslavement by the apparatus which he has built.

In terms of the established industrial societies, nothing is more sensible than the fear of that stage where technical progress would turn into human progress: self-determination of life in developing those needs and faculties which may attenuate the struggle for existence—human beings as ends in themselves. This fear is not only that of technological unemployment, but also that of boredom, of a void which has to be filled and which cannot be filled except by bigger and better management from above and outside. Not only the political but also (and primarily) the technical apparatus and production itself have become systems of domination into which the laboring classes are incorporated and incorporate themselves. The "inner logic of their condition," according to which they were the historical agents of socialist humanism, is no longer *their own*. The objective identity of socialism and humanism is dissolved. It was never an *immediate* identity: it was real to the extent to which the objective condition was seized and transcended in the consciousness of the historical subjects and in their action. This mediation is suppressed by the overwhelming power of technical progress welded into an instrument of totalitarian domination, operating not only through the terrifying concentration of economic and military power, but also through the rising standard of living under the imposed conditions of living. As long as the established *direction of technical progress* prevails (and in the era of coexistence it is bound to prevail), change in the ownership and control of the means of production would be quantitative rather than qualitative change. Prerequisite for the liberation of the humanistic content of socialism would be a fundamental change in the direction of technical progress, a total reconstruction of the technical apparatus. This is the historical idea of humanism today.

Other ideas of humanism belong to the eighteenth and nineteenth century; they retain an image of man which has been surpassed by the development of society. This

classical image still guides Marx's early writings; it finds expression in the notion of the all-round individual, the "personality" which fulfills itself in a realm of freedom. But this notion pertains to a stage where the intellectual culture was still divorced from the material culture, not yet incorporated into mass production and consumption, where the mind and the soul were not yet taken over by scientific management, where time and space were not yet occupied, in their entirety, by organized business and organized relaxation—where there could still be a realm of freedom not correlated with that of necessity. Even so, it is difficult to envisage what Marx's all-round individual would or would not do—simply in terms of occupation or nonoccupation. There is an unfortunate kernel of truth in the malicious denunciation of the vision of free individuals who spend their day in alternating between fishing, hunting, and being creative. If this vision were to become reality tomorrow (and it could far more easily become reality than when Marx wrote!), it would be the very denial of freedom and of humanity.

To be sure, Marx revised his early notions of human freedom by refraining from such positive visions and by examining the conditions of liberation rather than of liberty attained. However, the developed Marxian theory retains an idea of man which now appears as too optimistic and idealistic. Marx underrated the extent of the conquest of nature and of man, of the technological management of freedom and self-realization. He did not foresee the great achievement of technological society: the assimilation of freedom and necessity, of satisfaction and repression, of the aspirations of politics, business, and the individual. In view of these achievements, socialist humanism can no longer be defined in terms of the individual, the all-round personality, and self-determination. If these ideas are supposed to be more than the privilege of a few, if they claim universal validity, they seem dangerously void of meaning and substance. Their realization would call for conditions in which man would fulfill himself in his daily work, in which socially necessary labor would be "attractive labor," a possibility which Marx emphatically denied; "labor cannot become play, as Fourier wants." [4] Short of it, these images of humanism have the repressive connotation of pretechnological "higher culture" which leaves the lower culture on which it is built unaffected. Marx recognized the ideological character of this humanism when he translated the "metaphysical" terms of the early writings into those of political economy. The chance of humanism arises with the abolition of the exchange economy and its institutions; with the rational, socialist organization of labor; then, man may become free to build his own life and to be human with the others. Even then, the true

realm of freedom, the "*menschliche Kraftentwicklung*" which is an end in itself begins only beyond this realm of necessity. But the socialist organization of labor has created free time, and "the free time which is leisure time as well as time for higher activity has naturally [sic!]—transformed man into a different subject (*in ein andres Subjekt verwandelt*) and as this different subject, man also enters into the process of immediate production." [5]

Today, advanced industrial society is creating free time, but the possessor of this free time is not a "different subject"; in the capitalist and communist systems, the subject of free time is subordinated to the same norms and powers that rule the realm of necessity. The mature Marxian conception, too, appears idealistic and optimistic.

With the passing of the objective conditions for the identity of socialism and humanism, socialism cannot be made humanistic by committing socialist policy to the traditional humanistic values. In the situation of coexistence (which must be the framework for any nonideological analysis), such humanization is bound to be ideological and self-defeating. Here, a distinction must be made between capitalist and socialist humanism. In the capitalist world, the fight for the rights of man, for freedom of speech and assembly, for equality before the law, which marked the beginning of the liberal era, is again a desperate concern at its end, when it becomes evident to what extent these liberties have remained restricted and denied. And this fight is hampered to the degree to which it respects, in its own action and suffering, the liberal values and the legality which the adversary meets with unpunished violence. In the communist world, the assertion of individual rights and liberties and of the initiative of the laboring classes would promote (and should promote) radical dissent and opposition to the economic and political repression on which the established regime depends, and which it considers as prerequisite for defense and growth in competitive coexistence. According to this logic, effective dissent and opposition within the communist societies would alter the precarious international balance in favor of capitalism—which would not necessarily brighten the prospects of socialist humanism. For the laboring classes are no longer those to whom the revolution once appealed, and their initiative is not likely to revive international socialist solidarity.

These are the given historical conditions which a discussion of the failures and chances of socialist humanism must face if it does not want to deal with mere ideologies. Advanced industrial society can take care of humanistic values while continuing to pursue its inhuman goals: it promotes culture and personalities together

with toil, injustice, nuclear armament, total indoctrination, self-propelling productivity. The intensity with which the powers that be mobilize the underlying population against their liberation goes hand in hand with the growing capabilities of society to accomplish this liberation. In as much as these capabilities are utilized (or suppressed) in the interest of domination, of the defense of the status quo, they remain technical capabilities, barred from their humanistic realization. As technical capabilities, they define the prospects of socialist humanism. Severance of the fatal link between technical progress and progress in domination and exploitation is the precondition. Humanism must remain ideology as long as society depends on continued poverty, arrested automation, mass media, prevented birth control, and on the creation and re-creation of masses, of noise and pollution, of planned obsolescence and waste, and of mental and physical rearmament. These conditions and institutions are the social controls which sustain and extend the prevailing state of affairs. Consequently, their abrogation on behalf of humanism would be revolutionary subversion, and this subversion would also subvert the very needs and necessities of human existence. What appeared, in the pretotalitarian era, as the precondition of freedom may well turn out to be its substance, its historical content. For the substance of freedom as well as humanism must be defined in terms of the human beings in their society, and in terms of their capabilities. Advanced industrial society is a society in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution has become a totalitarian political apparatus, co-ordinating and managing all dimensions of life, free time as well as working time, negative as well as positive thinking. To the victims, beneficiaries, and heirs of such a society, the realm of freedom has lost its classical content, its qualitative difference from the realm of necessity. It is the work world, the technical world which they must first make their own: the realm of necessity must become the realm of their freedom. The technical apparatus of production, distribution, and consumption must be reconstructed. Technological rationality must be redirected to make the work world a place for human beings who one day may perhaps be willing to live in peace and do away with the masters who guide them to desist from this effort. This means not "humanization" of labor but its mechanization and planned production for the emergence of new needs — those of pacification of the struggle for existence. Some aspects of the new technology can he delineated: the complete rebuilding of cities and towns, the reconstruction of the countryside after the ravages of repressive

industrialization, the institution of truly public services, the care for the sick and the aged. [6]

The failure of humanism seems to be due to over-development rather than backwardness; once the productive apparatus, under repressive direction, has grown into an apparatus of ubiquitous controls, democratic or authoritarian, the chances of a humanistic reconstruction are very poor. This situation accentuates the historical truth of the Marxian conception. The humanistic chance of socialism is objectively grounded neither in the socialization of the means of production nor in their control by the "immediate producers"— although these are necessary prerequisites—but rather in the existence, *prior* to these changes, of social classes whose life is the very negation of humanity, and whose consciousness and practice are determined by the need to abrogate this condition. The totalitarian-technological stage has not altered this truth: no matter how "technical" the basis of socialism has become, no matter how much it is a matter of the redirection and even reversal of technical progress and technological rationality—these are political tasks, involving radical changes in the society as a whole. Technical progress occurs as political progress in domination; thus it is progress in the suppression of the alternatives. The fact that, in the most advanced areas of industrial civilization, this suppression is no longer terroristic but democratic, introjected, productive, and even satisfying does not change this condition. If suppression is compatible with individual autonomy and operates through individual autonomy, then the *Nomos* (norm) which the individual gives himself is that of servitude. This *Nomos*, which is the law of our time, outlaws the pacification of the struggle for existence, national and international, among societies and among individuals. Competition must go on—for profit and power, for work and fun, for the bigger and better deterrent, and it increases the productivity of the whole, which in turn perpetuates this sort of competition and promises the transformation of its victims into its beneficiaries, who will then do their best to make their contribution. And to the degree to which the other societies are forced into the same circle, the qualitative difference between socialism and capitalism is being obliterated by the sweep of a productivity which improves the standard of living through improved exploitation.

Socialist theory has no right to denounce, in the name of other historical possibilities, growing social productivity which allows a better life for more sections of the population. But the question here is not that of future possibilities; it is the present reality which is at stake. In this reality, the denial of humanity spreads through all

achievements: it is in the daily preparedness for annihilation, in the equipment for a subterranean existence, in the ever more ingenious planning of waste, in the inescapable inanities of the Media, in the abolition of privacy, and—perhaps the most effective denial of all—in the helpless awareness of all this, in public acknowledgment and criticism, which are impotent and contribute to the power of the whole, if they are not crushed and silenced by force. Thus the need for liberation exists: it exists as universal need far beyond that of one particular class—but it exists only "in itself," not *for* the individuals in need. Socialism appears again as an abstract idea; loyalty to its idea excludes the fostering of illusions. Its new abstractness does not signify falsification. The proletariat which was to validate the equation of socialism and humanism pertained to a past stage in the development of industrial society. Socialist theory, no matter how true, can neither prescribe nor predict the future agents of a historical transformation which is more than ever before the specter that haunts the established societies. But socialist theory can show that this specter is the image of a vital need; it can develop and protect the consciousness of this need and thus lay the groundwork for the dissolution of the false unity in defense of the status quo.

Notes

1 Merleau Ponty, *Humanisme et Terreur* (Paris, 1947), p. 197.

2 Ibid., p. x f.

3 Ibid., p. 203.

4 Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), p. 599.

5 Ibid.

6 For an elaboration of these propositions, see my *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), esp. Chs. 9 and 10.

The Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of Society

1. The Negation of Philosophy

THE transition from Hegel to Marx is, in all respects, a transition to an essentially different order of truth, not to be interpreted in terms of philosophy. We shall see that all the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic categories, whereas Hegel's social and economic categories are all philosophical concepts. Even Marx's early writings are not philosophical. They express the negation of philosophy, though they still do so in philosophical language. To be sure, several of Hegel's fundamental concepts crop up in the development from Hegel to Feuerbach to Marx, but the approach to Marxian theory cannot be made by showing the metamorphosis of old philosophical categories. Every single concept in the Marxian theory has a materially different foundation, just as the new theory has a new conceptual structure and framework that cannot be derived from preceding theories.

As a first approach to the problem, we may say that in Hegel's system all categories terminate in the existing order, while in Marx's they refer to the negation of this order. They aim at a new form of society even when describing its current form. Essentially they address themselves to a truth to be had only through the abolition of civil society. Marx's theory is a 'critique' in the sense that all concepts are an indictment of the totality of the existing order.

Marx considered Hegel's philosophy to be the most advanced and comprehensive statement of bourgeois principles. The German middle class of Hegel's day had not yet reached the level of economic and political power held by the middle classes of the western European nations. Hegel's system therefore unfolded and completed 'in thought' all those bourgeois principles (completed 'in reality' in other Western nations) that were not yet part of social reality. It made reason the sole universal standard of society; it recognised the role of abstract labor in integrating divergent individual interests into a unified 'system of wants'; it discovered the revolutionary implications of the liberalist ideas of freedom and equality; it described the history of civil society as the history of the irreconcilable antagonisms inherent in this social order.

Marx lays particular stress on the decisive contributions of Hegel's concept of labor. Hegel had said that the division of labor and the general interdependence of individual labor in the system of wants alike determine the system of state and society. Moreover, the process of labor likewise determines the development of consciousness. The 'life and death struggle' between master and servant opens the path to self-conscious freedom.

Furthermore, we must recall that Hegel's philosophy rests upon a specific interpretation of the subject-object relation. The traditional epistemological antagonism between subject (consciousness) and object, Hegel makes into a reflection of a definite historical antagonism. The object first appears as an object of desire, something to be worked up and appropriated in order to satisfy a human want. In the course of the appropriation, the object becomes manifest as 'the otherness' of man. Man is not 'with himself' when he deals with the objects of his desire and labor, but is dependent on an external power. He has to cope with nature, chance, and the interests of other proprietors. Development beyond this point of the relation between consciousness and the objective world is a social process. It leads first to the total 'estrangement' of consciousness; man is overpowered by things he has himself made. The realisation of reason therefore implies the overcoming of this estrangement, the establishment of a condition in which the subject knows and possesses itself in all its objects.

This demonstration of the role of labor, and of the process of reification and its abolition, is, Marx declares, the greatest achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. But the weight of the demonstration is lost. For, Hegel makes the claim that the unity of subject and object has already been consummated and the process of reification overcome. The antagonisms of civil society are set at rest in his monarchic state, and all contradictions are finally reconciled in the realm of thought or the absolute mind.

Did 'the truth' actually coincide with the given social and political order? Had history, then, discharged theory from any need to transcend the given system of life in society? Hegel's affirmative answer rested on the assumption that social and political forms had become adequate to the principles of reason, so that the highest potentialities of man could be developed through a development of existing social forms. His conclusion implied a decisive change in the relation between reality and theory: reality was held to coincide with theory. In the form Hegel finally gave it, theory, the adequate repository of

the truth, seemed to give welcome to the facts as they were and hailed them as conforming to reason.

The truth, Hegel maintained, is a whole that must be present in every single element, so that if one material element or fact cannot be connected with the process of reason, the truth of the whole is destroyed. Marx said there was such an element – the proletariat. The existence of the proletariat contradicts the alleged reality of reason, for it sets before us an entire class that gives proof of the very negation of reason. The lot of the proletariat is no fulfilment of human potentialities, but the reverse. If property constitutes the first endowment of a free person, the proletarian is neither free nor a person, for he possesses no property. If the exercises of the absolute mind, art, religion, and philosophy, constitute man's essence, the proletarian is forever severed from his essence, for his existence permits him no time to indulge in these activities.

Furthermore, the existence of the proletariat vitiates more than just the rational society of Hegel's Philosophy of Right; it vitiates the whole of bourgeois society. The proletariat originates in the labor process and is the actual performer or subject of labor in this society. Labor, however, as Hegel himself showed, determines the essence of man and the social form it takes. If the existence of the proletariat, then, bears witness to 'the complete loss of man', and this loss results from the mode of labor on which civil society is founded, the society is vicious in its entirety and the proletariat expresses a total negativity: 'universal suffering' and 'universal injustice'. The reality of reason, right, and freedom then turns into the reality of falsehood, injustice and bondage.

The existence of the proletariat thus gives living witness to the fact that the truth has not been realised. History and social reality themselves thus 'negate' philosophy. The critique of society cannot be carried through by philosophical doctrine, but becomes the task of socio-historical practice.

Before we outline the development of Marxian theory, we have to distinguish it from the other contemporary forms that were built on 'the negation of philosophy'. The deep surge of conviction that philosophy had come to an end colored the first decades after Hegel's death. The assurance spread that the history of thought had reached a decisive turn and that there was only one medium left in which 'the truth' could be found and put into operation, namely, man's concrete material existence. Philosophical structures had hitherto domiciled 'the truth,' setting it apart from the historical struggle of men, in

the form of a complex of abstract, transcendental principles. Now, however, man's emancipation could become man's own work, the goal of his self-conscious practice. The true-being, reason, and the free subject could now be transformed into historical realities. Hegel's successors accordingly exalted the 'negation of philosophy' as 'the realisation of God' through the deification of man (Feuerbach), as 'the realisation of philosophy' (Feuerbach, Marx), and as the fulfilment of the 'universal essence' of man (Feuerbach, Marx).

2. Kierkegaard

Who and what will fulfil the essence of man? Who will realise philosophy? The different answers to these questions exhaust the trends of post-Hegelian philosophy. Two general types may be distinguished. The first, represented by Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, seizes upon the isolated individual; the second, represented by Marx, penetrates to the origins of the individual in the process of social labor and shows how the latter process is the basis of man's liberation.

Hegel had demonstrated that the fullest existence of the individual is consummated in his social life. Critical employment of the dialectical method tended to disclose that individual freedom presupposes a free society, and that the true liberation of the individual therefore requires the liberation of society. Fixation on the individual alone would thus amount to adopting an abstract approach, such as Hegel himself set aside. Feuerbach's materialism and Kierkegaard's existentialism, though they embody many traits of a deep-rooted social theory, do not get beyond earlier philosophical and religious approaches to the problem. The Marxian theory, on the other hand, focuses down as a critical theory of society and breaks with the traditional formulations and trends.

Kierkegaard's individualistic interpretation of 'the negation of philosophy' inevitably developed a fierce opposition to Western rationalism. Rationalism was essentially universalistic, as we have shown, with reason resident in the thinking ego and in the objective mind. The truth was lodged either in the universal 'pure reason', which was untouched by the circumstances of individual life, or in the universal mind, which could flourish though individuals might suffer and die. Man's material happiness was deserted

in both cases, by the introversion of reason as well as by its premature adequation to the world as it is.

Rationalist philosophy, the individualists contended, was not concerned with man's actual needs and longings. Though it claimed to respond to his true interests, it gave no answer to his simple quest for happiness. It could not help him in the concrete decisions he constantly had to make. If, as the rationalists maintained, the real unique existence of the individual (which could never be reduced to a universal) was not the primary subject matter of philosophy, and the truth could not be found in or related to this unique existence, all philosophical efforts were superfluous, nay, dangerous. ...

The anti-rationalist attack on universals becomes increasingly important in the subsequent development of European thought. The assault upon the universal reason was easily swung to an attack on the positive social implications of this universal. We have already indicated that the concept of reason was connected with advanced ideas, like the essential equality of men, the rule of law, the standard of rationality in state and society, and that Western rationalism was thus definitely linked with the fundamental institutions of liberalist society. In the ideological field, the struggle against this liberalism began with the attack on rationalism. The position called 'existentialism' played an important part in this attack. First, it denied the dignity and reality of the universal. This led to a rejection of any universally valid rational norms for state and society. Later, it was claimed that no bond joins individuals, states, and nations into a whole of mankind, that the particular existential conditions of each cannot be submitted to the general judgment of reason. Laws, it was held, are not based upon any universal qualities of man in whom a reason resides; they rather express the needs of individual people whose lives they regulate in accordance with their existential requirements. This demotion of reason made it possible to exalt certain particularities (such as the race or the folk) to the rank of the highest values.

3. Feuerbach

Feuerbach starts with the fact Kierkegaard had failed to recognize, namely, that in the present age the human content of religion can be preserved only by abandoning the religious, other-worldly form. The realization of religion requires its negation. The doctrine of God (theology) must be changed into the doctrine of man (anthropology).

Everlasting happiness will begin with the transformation of the kingdom of heaven into a republic of earth.

Feuerbach agrees with Hegel that mankind has reached maturity. The earth is ready to be transformed, through the collective and conscious practice of men, into a domain of reason and freedom. He therefore sketches a 'Philosophy of the Future,' which he regards as the logical and historical fulfillment of Hegel's philosophy. 'The new philosophy is the realization of the Hegelian, — moreover, of the entire preceding philosophy.' The negation of religion had begun with Hegel's transformation of theology into logic; it ends with Feuerbach's transformation of logic into anthropology. Anthropology, to Feuerbach, is a philosophy aiming at the concrete emancipation of man, outlining therefore the conditions and qualities of an actually free human existence. Such a philosophy cannot be idealist, for the means are at hand for carrying through a free human existence by liberation in fact. Hegel's great error was that he stuck to idealism at a time when a materialistic solution of the problem was at hand. The new philosophy, then, is a realization of Hegelian philosophy only as its negation.

When he accepted the given state of the world as adequate to the standard of reason, Hegel contradicted his own principles and hitched philosophy to an external content, that given in his day. His critical distinctions are in the end merely distinctions within that given, and his philosophy has a 'critical, but not a genetico-critical significance.' The latter type of philosophy would not simply demonstrate and understand its object, but would investigate its origin and thus question its right to exist. The prevailing state of man is the result of a long historical process in which all transcendental values have been 'secularized' and made the aims of man's empirical life. The happiness he sought in heaven and in pure thought can now be satisfied on earth. Only a 'genetic' analysis will enable philosophy to furnish the ideas that might help man in his real liberation. Hegel, Feuerbach insists, undertook no such analysis. His construction of history presupposed throughout that the prevailing stage of development reached in his time was the immanent end of all preceding stages.

Moreover, genetic analysis is not only a matter of the philosophy of history, but of logic and psychology as well. Here, Hegel failed the more, for thought receives no genetic analysis in his system. Being is conceived as thought from the outset. It enters the system not as the 'fact' of the external world, which is at first simply 'given' and

other than thought, but as notion. And in the elaboration of the system being becomes a derivative mode of thought, or, as Feuerbach says, 'the predicate of thought.' Consequently, nature is derived from the structure and movement of thought — a complete reversal of the true state of affairs.

Feuerbach's genetic analysis of thought starts, per contra, from the obvious fact that nature is the primary and thought the secondary reality. 'The true relation of thought to Being is this; Being is subject, thought is predicate. Thought springs from Being, but Being does not spring from thought.'

Philosophy must thus begin with being, not Hegel's abstract being-as-such, but with being in the concrete, that is, with nature. 'The essence of Being qua Being is the essence of nature.' The new philosophy is not, however, to be a philosophy of nature in the traditional sense. Nature becomes relevant only in so far as it conditions human existence; man is to be the proper content and interest. The liberation of man requires the liberation of nature, of man's natural existence. 'All science must be founded on nature. Theory is a mere hypothesis as long as the natural basis of theory has not been established. This holds especially true for the theory of freedom. The new philosophy will succeed in "naturalizing" freedom, the same that was hitherto merely an anti-natural and supra-natural hypothesis.'

Feuerbach joins the great tradition of materialist philosophers who, taking as the point of departure for their views man's actual state in nature and in society, could see that the idealistic solutions were illusory. The hard fact that man's natural drives were permitted no satisfactory outlet showed freedom and reason to be a myth, as far as social realities were concerned. Hegel had committed the unpardonable offense against the individual of constructing a realm of reason on the foundations of an enslaved humanity. Despite all historical progress, Feuerbach cries out, man is still in need, and the pervasive fact philosophy encounters is 'suffering.' This, and not cognition, is primary in man's relation to the objective world. 'Thought is preceded by suffering.' And no realization of reason is in the offing until that suffering has been eliminated.

We have mentioned that 'the universal suffering' that Marx saw in the existence of the proletariat negated for him the reality of reason. The 'principle of suffering,' Marx held, was rooted in the historical form of society and required social action for its abolition. Feuerbach, per contra, introduces nature as the basis and medium for liberating

mankind. Philosophy is negated and fulfilled by nature. Man's suffering is a 'natural' relation of the living subject to its objective environment, for the subject is opposed and overwhelmed by the object. Nature shapes and determines the ego from without, making it essentially 'passive.' The process of liberation cannot eliminate this Passivity, but can transform it from a source of privation and pain to one of abundance and enjoyment.

Feuerbach's conception of the ego reverses the traditional conception of it, which motivated modern philosophy since Descartes. The ego, according to Feuerbach, is primarily receptive, not spontaneous; determined, not self-determining; the passive subject of perception, not the active subject of thought. 'True objective thought, true objective philosophy arises only out of the negation of thought, out of being determined by the object, out of passion, the source of all pleasure and need.' Feuerbach's naturalism thus maintains that perception, sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit), sensation (Empfindung) are the proper organon of philosophy. 'The object, in its true meaning, is given only by the senses'; 'nothing is unquestionably and immediately certain except the object of the senses, of perception and sensation.'

This is the point at which Marx's critique of Feuerbach begins. Marx upholds Hegel on this point, as against Feuerbach. Hegel had denied that sense-certainty is the final criterion of the truth, on the ground that, first, the truth is a universal that cannot be won in an experience that conveys particulars; and, second, that truth finds fulfillment in a historical process carried forward by the collective practice of men. The latter is basic, with sense-certainty and nature alike drawn into the movement so that they change their content in its course.

Hegel's point was that labor brings sense-certainty and nature into the historical process. Because he conceived human existence in terms of sense, Feuerbach disregarded this material function of labor altogether. 'Not satisfied with abstract thought, Feuerbach appeals to sense-perception [Anschauung]; but he does not understand our sensuous nature as practical, human-sensuous activity.'

Labor transforms the natural conditions of human existence into social ones. By omitting the labor process from his philosophy of freedom, therefore, Feuerbach omitted the decisive factor through which nature might become the medium for freedom. His interpretation of man's free development as a 'natural' development

neglected the historical conditions for liberation and made freedom into an event within the framework of the given order. His ‘perceptual materialism’ perceives only ‘separate individuals in bourgeois society.’

Marx focused his theory on the labor process and by so doing held to and consummated the principle of the Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content (reality) determines the structure of the theory. He made the foundations of civil society the foundations of the theory of civil society. This society operates on the principle of universal labor, with the labor process decisive for the totality of human existence; labor determines the value of all things. Since the society is perpetuated by the, continued universal exchange of the products of labor, — the totality of human relations is governed by the immanent, laws of the economy. The development of the individual and the range of his freedom depend on the extent to which his labor satisfies a social need. All men are free, but the mechanisms of the labor process govern the freedom of them all. The study of the labor process is, in the last analysis, absolutely necessary in order to discover the conditions for realizing reason and freedom in the real sense. A critical analysis of that process thus yields the final theme of philosophy.

4. Marx: Alienated Labour

Marx’s writings between 1844 and 1846 treat the form of labor in modern society as constituting the total ‘alienation’ of man. The employment of this category links Marx’s economic analysis with a basic category of the Hegelian philosophy. The social division of labor, Marx declares, is not carried out with any consideration for the talents of individuals and the interest of the whole, but rather takes place entirely according to the laws of capitalist commodity production. Under these laws, the product of labor, the commodity, seems to determine the nature and end of human activity. In other words, the materials that should serve life come to rule over its content and goal, and the consciousness of man is completely made victim to the relationships of material production.

The materialistic proposition that is the starting point of Marx’s theory thus states, first, an historical fact, exposing the materialistic character of the prevailing social order in which an uncontrolled economy legislates over all human relations. At the same time, Marx’s proposition is a critical one, implying that the prevailing relation between consciousness and social existence is a false one that must be overcome before the true

relation can come to light. The truth of the materialist thesis is thus to be fulfilled in its negation.

Marx emphasizes time and again that his materialistic starting point is forced upon him by the materialistic quality of the society he analyzes. He states that he begins with a 'fact,' an 'economic fact' recognized even by classical political economy. As modern society runs its course, 'the worker becomes the poorer the more wealth he produces and the more his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes a cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. Hand in hand with the exploitation (Verwertung) of the objective world goes, the depreciation of the human world'. Classical political economy (Marx quotes Adam Smith and J. B. Say) admits that even great social wealth means nothing but 'stationary poverty' for the worker. These economists had shown that poverty is not at all the result of adverse external circumstance, but of the prevailing mode of labor itself. 'In the progressing condition of society the destruction and impoverishment of the worker is the product of his own labor and of the wealth he has himself produced. Misery thus springs from the nature of the prevailing mode of labor' and is rooted in the very essence of modern society.

What significance does this mode of labor have as far as the development of man is concerned? With this question, the Marxian theory leaves the plane of political economy. The totality of economic relations, laws, and institutions may not be treated simply as an isolated objective cluster of facts, but as making up a historical form within which men carry on their lives. Freed from the limitations of a specialized science, the economic categories are seen to be determining factors for human existence (Daseinsformen, Existenzbestimmungen), even if they denote objective economic facts (as in the case of commodity, value, ground rent). Far from being a mere economic activity (Erwerbstätigkeit), labor is the 'existential activity' of man, his 'free, conscious activity' — not a means for maintaining his life (Lebensmittel) but for developing his 'universal nature'. The new categories will evaluate the economic reality with a view to what it has made of man, of his faculties, powers, and needs.

Marx summarizes these human qualities when he speaks of the 'universal essence of man'; his examination of the economy is specifically carried on with the question in mind whether that economy realizes man's Gattungswesen (universelles Wesen).

These terms point back to Feuerbach and to Hegel. Man's very nature lies in his universality. His intellectual. and physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist as men, in the developed wealth of their human resources. Man is free only if all men are free and exist as 'universal beings'. When this condition is attained, life will be shaped by the potentialities of the genus, Man, which embraces the potentialities of all the individuals that comprise it. The emphasis on this universality brings nature as well into the self-development of mankind. Man is free if 'nature is his work and his reality,' so that he 'recognizes himself in a world he has himself made'.

All this has an obvious resemblance to Hegel's idea of reason. Marx even goes so far as to describe the self-realization of man in terms of the unity between thought and being. The whole problem is, however, no longer a philosophical one, for the self-realization of man now requires the abolition of the prevailing mode of labor, and philosophy cannot deliver this result. The critique does begin in philosophic terms, because the enslavement of labor and its liberation are alike conditions that go beyond the framework of traditional political economy and affect the very foundations of human existence (which are the proper domain of philosophy), but Marx departs from the philosophical terminology as soon as he has elaborated his own theory. The critical, transcendental character of the economic categories, hitherto expressed by philosophical concepts, later, in his Capital, is demonstrated by the economic categories themselves.

Marx explains the alienation of labor as exemplified in, first, the relation of the worker to the product of his labor and, second, the relation of the worker to his own activity. The worker in capitalist society produces commodities. Large-scale commodity production requires capital, large aggregations of wealth used exclusively to promote commodity production. The commodities are produced by independent private entrepreneurs for purposes of profitable sale. The worker labors for the capitalist, to whom he surrenders, through the wage contract, the product of his labor. Capital is power to dispose over the products of labor. The more the worker produces, the greater the power of capital becomes and the smaller the worker's own means for appropriating his products. Labor thus becomes the victim of a power it has itself created.

Marx summarizes this process as follows: 'The object which labor produces, its product, is encountered as an alien entity, a force that has become independent of its

producer. The realization of labor is its objectification. Under the prevailing economic conditions, this realization of labor appears as its opposite, the negation [Entwirklichung] of the laborer. Objectification appears as loss of and enslavement by the object, and appropriation as alienation and expropriation'. Once turned to the laws of capitalist commodity production, labor is inevitably impoverished. For, 'the more the worker toils, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects he produces to oppose him, and the poorer lie himself becomes ..'. Marx shows this mechanism at work in the movement of wages. The laws of commodity production, without any external aids, maintain wages at the level of stationary poverty.

> [As a result,] the realization of labor appears as negation to such an extent that the worker is negated to the point of starvation. The objectification appears as a loss of the objects to such an extent that the worker is deprived of the most necessary objects of life and labor. Moreover, labor itself becomes an object of which he can make himself master only by the greatest effort and with incalculable interruptions. Appropriation of the object appears as alienation to such an extent that the more objects the worker produces the less he possesses and the more he comes under the sway of his product, of capital.

The worker alienated from his product is at the same time alienated from himself. His labor itself becomes no longer his own, and the fact that it becomes the property of another bespeaks an expropriation that touches the very essence of man. Labor in its true form is a medium for man's true self-fulfillment, for the full development of his potentialities; the conscious utilization of the forces of nature should take place for his satisfaction and enjoyment. In its current form, however, it cripples all human faculties and enjoins satisfaction. The worker 'does not affirm but contradicts his essence'. 'Instead of developing his free physical and mental energies, he mortifies his body and ruins his mind. He therefore first feels he is with himself when he is free from work and apart from himself when he is at work. He is at home when he does not work and not at home when he does. His working is, therefore, not done willingly but under compulsion. It is forced labor. It is, therefore, not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for the satisfaction of wants outside of it'.

In consequence, 'Man [the worker] feels himself acting freely only in his animal functions like eating, drinking and begetting ... whereas in his human functions he is nothing but an animal. The animal becomes the human and the human the animal'. This holds alike for the worker (the expropriated producer), and for him who buys his labor.

The process of alienation affects all strata of society, distorting even the 'natural' functions of man. The senses, the primary sources of freedom and happiness according to Feuerbach, are reduced to one 'sense of possessing'. They view their object only as something that can or cannot be appropriated. Even pleasure and enjoyment change from conditions under which men freely develop their 'universal nature' into modes of 'egoistic' possession and acquisition.

Marx's analysis of labor under capitalism is thus quite deep seated, going further than the structure of economic relationships to the actual human content. Relations such as those between capital and labor, capital and commodity, labor and commodity, and those between commodities are understood as human relations, relations in man's social existence. Even the institution of private property appears as 'the product, result and inevitable consequence of the alienated mode of labor,' and derives from the mechanisms of the social mode of production. The alienation of labor leads to the division of labor so characteristic of all forms of class society: 'Each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape a division that is not overcome when the abstract freedom of the individual is proclaimed in bourgeois society. Labor separated from its object is, in the last analysis, an 'alienation of man from man'; the individuals are isolated from and set against each other. They are linked in the commodities they exchange rather than in their persons. Man's alienation from himself is simultaneously an estrangement from his fellow men.

Marx's early writings are the first explicit statement of the process of reification (Verdinglichung) through which capitalist society makes all personal relations between men take the form of objective relations between things. Marx expounds this process in his Capital as 'the Fetishism of Commodities'. The system of capitalism relates men to each other through the commodities they exchange. The social status of individuals, their standard of living, the satisfaction of their needs, their freedom, and their power are all determined by the value of their commodities. The capacities and needs of the individual have no part in the evaluation. Even man's most human attributes become a function of money, the general substitute for commodities. Individuals participate in the social process as owners of commodities only. Their mutual relations are those of their commodities. Capitalist commodity production has this mystifying result, that it transforms the social relations of individuals into 'qualities of ... things themselves

[commodities] and still more pronouncedly transforms the interrelations of production themselves into a thing [money]'. The mystifying result arises from the specific mode of labor in commodity production, with its separate individuals working independently of each other, and fulfilling their own needs only through those of the market:

> The fetishism of commodities has its origin ... in the peculiar social character of the labor that produces them.
>
> As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of the labor of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each other. The sum-total of the labor of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labor of society [gesellschaftliche Gesamtarbeit]. Since the producers do not come into contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer's labor does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other words, the labor of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labor of society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labor of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons [sachliche Verhältnisse von Personen] and social relations between things.

What does this reification accomplish? It sets forth the actual social relations among men as a totality of objective relations, thereby concealing their origin, their mechanisms of perpetuation, and the possibility of their transformation. Above all, it conceals their human core and content. If wages, as the reification process would indicate, express the value of labor, exploitation is at best a subjective and personal judgment. If capital were nothing other than an aggregate of wealth employed in commodity production, then capital would appear to be the cumulative result of productive skill and diligence. If the creation of profits were the peculiar quality of utilized capital, such profits might represent a reward for the work of the entrepreneur. The relation between capital and labor on this basis would involve neither iniquity nor oppression; it would rather be a purely objective, material relationship, and economic theory would be a specialized science like any other. The laws of supply and demand, the fixing of value and prices, the business cycles, and so on, would be amenable to study as objective laws and facts, regardless of their effect on human existence. The economic process of society would be a natural process, and man, with all his needs and desires,

would play in it the role of an objective mathematical quantum rather than that of a conscious subject.

Marxian theory rejects such a science of economics and sets in its place the interpretation that economic relations existential relations between men. It does this not by virtue of any humanitarian feeling but by virtue of the actual content of the economy itself. Economic relations only seem to be objective because of the character of commodity production. As soon as one delves beneath this mode of production, and analyzes its origin, one can see that its natural objectivity is mere semblance while in reality it is a specific historical form of existence that man has given himself. Moreover, once this content comes to the fore, economic theory would turn into a critical theory. 'When one speaks of private property one thinks he is dealing with something outside of man. When one speaks of labor, one has to do immediately with man himself. The new formulation of the question already involves its solution'. As soon as their mystifying character is uncovered, economic conditions appear as the complete negation of humanity. The mode of labor perverts all human faculties, accumulation of wealth intensifies poverty, and technological progress leads to 'the rule of dead matter over the human world'. Objective facts come alive and enter an indictment of society. Economic realities exhibit their own inherent negativity.

We are here touching upon the origins of the Marxian dialectic. For Marx, as for Hegel, the dialectic takes note of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is 'the moving and creative principle'. The dialectic is the 'dialectic of negativity'. Every fact is more than a mere fact; it is a negation and restriction of real possibilities. Wage labor is a fact, but at the same time it is a restraint on free work that might satisfy human needs. Private property is a fact, but at the same time it is a negation of man's collective appropriation of nature.

Man's social practice embodies the negativity as well as its overcoming. The negativity of capitalist society lies in its alienation of labor the negation of this negativity will come with the abolition of alienated labor. Alienation has taken its most universal form in the institution of private property; amends will be made with the abolition of private property. It is of the utmost importance to note that Marx views the abolition of private property entirely as a means for the abolition of 'alienated labor' and not as an end in itself. The socialization of the means of production is as such merely an economic

fact, just like any other economic institution. Its claim to be the beginning of a new social order depends on what man does with the socialized means of production. If these are not utilized for the development and gratification of the free individual, they will amount simply to a new form for subjugating individuals to a hypostatized universality. The abolition of private property inaugurates an essentially new social system only if free individuals, and not 'the society,' become masters of the socialized means of production. Marx expressly warns against such another 'reification' of society: 'One must above all avoid setting "the society" up again as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social entity [das gesellschaftliche Wesen]. The expression of his entity ... is therefore an expression and verification of the life of society'.

The true history of mankind will be, in the strict sense, the history of free individuals, so that the interest of the whole will be woven into the individual existence of each. In all prior forms of society, the interest of the whole lay in separate social and political institutions, which represented the right of society as against the right of the individual. The abolition of private property will do away with all this once and for all, for it will mark 'man's return from family, religion, state, etc., to his human, that is, social existence'.

It is, then, the free individuals, and not a new system of production, that exemplify the fact that the particular and the common interest have been merged. The individual is the goal. This 'individualistic' trend is fundamental as an interest of the Marxian theory. We have shown the role of the universal in the traditional theories, placing stress on the fact that human fulfillment, what we have called 'the truth' exemplified, could only be conceived in terms of the abstract universal concept so long as society retained the form it had. Shot through with a conflict at every hand among individual interests, the concrete conditions of social life made a mockery of 'the universal essence' of man and nature. And since the prevailing social realities contradicted that essence, and hence contradicted 'the truth,' the latter had no refuge save the mind, where it was hypostatized as an abstract universal.

Marx explains how this state of affairs came about, showing its origin in the division of labor of class society, and particularly in the divorce that was entailed between the intellectual and material forces of production.

> The forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labor implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labor, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals ... The division of labor ... manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labor, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class ... while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves ... It is self-evident that phantoms like 'the Higher Being,' 'Notion' ... are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life, and the form of intercourse coupled with it, move.

Just as materially the reproduction of the social whole was the result of blind forces over which man's conscious powers exercised no guidance, so mentally, the universal came forth as a reality that was independent and creative. The groups governing society were compelled to hide the fact that their interests were private by cloaking them in the 'dignity of the universal'. 'Each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society ... It will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones'. The claim of universality for the ideas of a ruling class is thus part of the mechanisms of class rule, and the critique of class society will also destroy its philosophical claims.

The universal concepts employed are at first those hypostatizing desired forms of human existence — concepts like reason, freedom, justice, and virtue, and also state, society, democracy. All of these envisage that man's universal essence is materialized either within the prevailing social conditions or beyond them in a supra-historical realm. Marx also points to the fact that such concepts become increasingly universal in scope with the advance of the society. The ideas of honor, loyalty, and so on, which characterized medieval times and which were the dominant ideas of the aristocracy, were far more restricted in appeal and applied to fewer persons than the ideas of freedom, equality, and justice, of the bourgeoisie, which reflect the more far-reaching base of that class. The development of dominant ideas thus keeps step with and mirrors an increasing social and economic integration. 'The most general abstractions commonly arise only where there is the highest concrete development, where one

feature seems to be jointly possessed by many, and to be common to all. Then it cannot be thought of any longer in one particular form'. The more society advances, the more do 'abstract ideas hold sway, that is, ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality'.

This process, however, turns into its opposite as soon as classes are abolished and the interest of the whole is fulfilled in the existence of every individual, for then 'It is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or "the general interest" as ruling'. The individual becomes the actual subject of history, in such a way that he is himself the universal and manifests the 'universal essence' of man.

Communism, with its 'positive abolition of private property,' is thus of its very nature a new form of individualism, and not only a new and different economic system, but a different system of life. Communism is 'the real appropriation [Aneignung] of the essence of man by and for man, therefore it is man's complete conscious ... return to himself as a social ' that is, human being'. It is the 'true solution of man's conflict with nature and with man, of the strife between existence and essence, reification and self-determination, liberty and necessity, individual and genus'. The contradictions that lay beneath the philosophy of Hegel and all traditional philosophy will dissolve in this new form of society. For these are historical contradictions rooted in the antagonisms of class society. Philosophical ideas express material historical conditions, which cast off their philosophical form as soon as they are subjected to the scrutiny of critical theory and are seized by conscious social practice.

Hegel's philosophy revolved about the universality of reason; it was a rational system with its every part (the subjective as well as the objective spheres) integrated into a comprehensive whole. Marx shows that capitalist society first put such a universality into practice. Capitalism developed the productive forces for the totality of a uniform social system. Universal commerce, universal competition, and the universal interdependence of labor were made to prevail and transformed men into 'world-historical, empirically universal individuals'.

This universality, however, as we have explained, is a negative one, for the productive forces are used, as are the things man produces with them, in a way that makes them seem the products of an uncontrolled alien power. It is 'an empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activity,

become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them … a power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market'. The distribution of supply under international commodity production is a blind and anarchic universal process, wherein the demand of the individual is satisfied only if he can meet the requirements of exchange. Marx calls this anarchic relation of supply to demand a 'natural' form of social integration, meaning that it seems to have the force of a natural law instead of operating, as it should, under the joint control of all men.

5. The Abolition of Labor

The realization of freedom and reason requires a reversal of this state of affairs. 'Universal dependence, this natural form of the world-historical cooperation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them'.

Moreover, since the state of affairs that has prevailed 'till now' is a universal negativity, affecting all spheres of life everywhere, its transformation requires a universal revolution, that is to say, a revolution that would reverse, first, the totality of prevailing conditions and, secondly, would replace this with a new universal order. The material elements of complete revolution must be present so that the convulsion grips not specific conditions in the existent society, but the very 'production of life' prevailing in it, the 'total activity' on which it has been based. This totalitarian character of the revolution is made necessary by the totalitarian character of the capitalist relations of production. 'Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals … only when controlled by all'.

The revolutionary convulsion that ends the system of capitalist society sets free all the potentialities for general satisfaction that have developed in this system. Marx accordingly calls the communist revolution an act of 'appropriation' [Aneignung], meaning that with the abolition of private property men are to obtain true ownership over all those things that have hitherto remained estranged from them.

Appropriation is determined by the object to be appropriated, that is, by 'the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. From this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a

universal character ..'. The universality that exists in the present state of society will be transposed to the new social order, where, however, it will have a different character. The universal will no longer operate as a blind natural force once men have succeeded in subjecting the available productive forces 'to the power of individuals united'. Man will then for the first time in history consciously treat 'all natural premises as the creatures of men'. His struggle with nature will pursue 'a general plan' formulated by 'freely combined individuals'.

The appropriation is also determined by the persons appropriating. The alienation of labor creates a society split into opposing classes. Any social scheme that effects a division of labor without taking account of the abilities and needs of individuals in assigning them their roles tends to shackle the activity of the individual to external economic forces. The mode of social production (the way in which the life of the whole is maintained) circumscribes the life of the individual and harnesses his entire existence to relations prescribed by the economy, without regard to his subjective abilities or wants. Commodity production under a system of free competition has aggravated this condition. The commodities allotted to the individual for the gratification of his needs were supposed to be the equivalent of his work. Equality seemed to be guaranteed, at least in this respect. The individual could not, however, choose his work. It was prescribed for him by his position in the social process of production, which was in turn forced upon him by the prevailing distribution of power and wealth.

The fact of classes contradicts freedom, or, rather, transforms it into an abstract idea. The class circumscribes the actual range of individual freedom within the general anarchy, the arena of free play still open to the individual. Each is free to the extent that his class is free, and the development of his individuality is confined to the limits of his class: he unfolds himself as a 'class individual'.

The class is the actual social and economic unit, not the individual. It 'achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class, [and] become subsumed under it'. The existent form of society accomplishes a universal order only by negating the individual. The 'personal individual' becomes a 'class individual,' and his constituent properties become universal properties that he shares with all other members of his

class. His existence is not his, but that of his class. We recall Hegel's statement that the individual is the universal, that he acts historically not as a private person but as a citizen of his state. Marx understands this negation of the individual to be the historical product of class society, effectuated not by the state but by the ordering of labor.

The subsumption of individuals under classes is the same phenomenon as their subjection to the division of labor. By division of labor Marx here means the process of separating various economic activities into specialized and delimited fields: first, industry and commerce separated from agriculture; then industry separated from commerce; and finally the latter subdivided into different branches. This entire differentiation takes place under the requirements of commodity production in its capitalistic form, accelerated by the progress of technology. It is a blind and 'natural' process. The totality of labor required to perpetuate society appears as an a priori given body of work that is organized in a definite way. The specific division of labor that prevails seems an unalterable necessity that drags the individuals into its toils. Business becomes an objective entity that gives men a certain standard of living, a set of interests, and a range of possibilities that mark them off from men engaged in other businesses. The conditions of labor mold the individuals into groups or classes, and are class conditions converging upon the fundamental division into capital and wage labor.

The two fundamental classes, however, are not classes in the same sense. The proletariat is distinguished by the fact that, as a class, it signifies the negation of all classes. The interests of all other classes are essentially one-sided; the proletariat's interest is essentially universal. The proletariat has neither property nor profit to defend. Its one concern, the abolition of the prevailing mode of labor, is the concern of society as a whole. This is expressed in the fact that the communist revolution, in contrast to all previous revolutions, can leave no social group in bondage because there is no class below the proletariat.

The universality of the proletariat is, again, a negative universality, indicating that the alienation of labor has intensified to the point of total self-destruction. The labor of the proletarian prevents any self-fulfillment; his work negates his entire existence. This utmost negativity, however, takes a positive turn. The very fact that he is deprived of all assets of the prevailing system sets him beyond this system. He is a member of the class 'which is really rid of all the old world and at the same time stands pitted against it'. The

'universal character' of the proletariat is the final basis for the universal character of the communist revolution.

The proletariat is the negation not only of certain particular human potentialities, but also of man as such. All specific distinguishing marks by which men are differentiated lose their validity. Property, culture, religion, nationality, and so on, all things that might set one man off from another, make no such mark among proletarians. Each lives in society only as the bearer of labor power, land each is thus the equivalent of all others of his class. His concern to exist is not the concern of a given group, class, or nation, but is truly universal and 'world historical'. 'The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically ...' The communist revolution, its movement, is therefore necessarily a world revolution.

The prevailing social relations that the revolution upsets are everywhere negative because they everywhere result from a negative ordering of the labor process that perpetuates them. The labor process itself is the life of the proletariat. Abolition of the negative ordering of labor, alienated labor as Marx terms it, is hence at the same time the abolition of the proletariat.

The abolition of the proletariat also amounts to the abolition of labor as such. Marx makes this an express formulation when he speaks of the achievement of revolution. Classes are to be abolished 'by the abolition of private property and of labor itself'. Elsewhere, Marx says the same thing: 'The communistic revolution is directed against the preceding mode of activity, does away with labor'. And again, 'the question is not the liberation but the abolition of labor'. The question is not the liberation of labor because labor has already been made 'free'; free labor is the achievement of capitalist society. Communism can cure the 'ills' of the bourgeois and the distress of the proletarian only 'by removing their cause, namely, "labor."'

These amazing formulations in Marx's earliest writings all contain the Hegelian term Aufhebung, so that abolition also carries the meaning that a content is restored to its true form. Marx, however, envisioned the future mode of labor to be so different from the prevailing one that he hesitated to use the same term 'labor' to designate alike the material process of capitalist and of communist society. He uses the term 'labor' to mean what capitalism actually understands by it in the last analysis, that activity which creates surplus value in commodity production, or, which 'produces capital'. Other kinds of

activity are not ‘productive labor’ and hence are not labor in the proper sense. Labor thus means that free and universal development is denied the individual who labors, and it is clear that in this state of affairs the liberation of the individual is at once the negation of labor.

An ‘association of free individuals’ to Marx is a society wherein the material process of production no longer determines the entire pattern of human life. Marx’s idea of a rational society implies an order in which it is not the universality of labor but the universal satisfaction of all individual potentialities that constitutes the principle of social organization. He contemplates a society that gives to each not according to his work but his needs Mankind becomes free only when the material perpetuation of life is a function of the abilities and happiness of associated individuals.

We can now see that the Marxian theory has developed a full contradiction to the basic conception of idealist philosophy. The idea of reason has been superseded by the idea of happiness. Historically, the first was interlaced into a society in which the intellectual forces of production were detached from the material ones. Within this framework of social and economic iniquities, the life of reason was a life of higher dignity. It dictated individual sacrifice for the sake of some higher universal independent of the ‘base’ impulses and drives of individuals.

The idea of happiness, on the other hand, roots itself firmly in the demand for a social ordering that would sett aside the class structure of society. Hegel had emphatically denied that the progress of reason would have anything to do with the satisfaction of individual happiness. Even the most advanced concepts of the Hegelian philosophy, as we have shown, preserved and in the last analysis condoned the negativity of the existing social system. Reason could prevail even though the reality shrieked of individual frustration: idealist culture and the technological progress of civil society bear witness of that. Happiness could not. The demand that free individuals attain satisfaction militated against the entire set-up of traditional culture. The Marxian theory consequently rejected even the advanced ideas of the Hegelian scheme. The category of happiness made manifest the positive content of materialism. Historical materialism appeared at first as a denunciation of the materialism prevalent in bourgeois society, and the materialist principle was in this respect a critical instrument of expose directed against a society that enslaved men to the blind mechanisms of material production.

The idea of the free and universal realization of individual happiness, per contra, denoted an affirmative materialism, that is to say, an affirmation of the material satisfaction of man.

We have dwelt rather extensively upon Marx's early writings because they emphasize tendencies that have been attenuated in the post-Marxian development of his critique of society, namely, the elements of communistic individualism, the repudiation of any fetishism concerning the socialization of the means of production or the growth of the productive forces, the subordination of all these factors to the idea of the free realization of the individual. Under all aspects, however, Marx's early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be overemphasized.

6. The Analysis of the Labor Process

Marx rests his theories on the assumption that the labor process determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern. It now remains for him to give the exact analysis of this process. The early writings took labor to be the general form of man's struggle with nature. 'Labor is at first a process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature by his own action '. In this respect labor is basic to all forms of society.

The capitalistic ordering of labor is designated in Marx's early essays as 'alienation', and hence as an 'unnatural', degenerated form of labor. The question arises, how has such a degeneration become possible? And this is more than a quaestio facti, since alienated labor appears as, a fact only in the light of its abolition. The analysis of the prevailing form of labor is simultaneously an analysis of the premises of its abolition.

In other words, Marx views the existing conditions of labor with an eye to their negation in an actually free society. His categories are negative and at the same time positive: they present a negative state of affairs in the light of its positive solution, revealing the true situation in existing society as the prelude to its passing into a new form. All the Marxian concepts extend, as it were, in these two dimensions, the first of which is the complex of given social relationships, and the second, the complex of

elements inherent in the social reality that make for its transformation into a free social order. This twofold content determines Marx's entire analysis of the labor process. We shall now deal with the conclusions he draws.

In the prevailing social system, labor produces commodities. Commodities are use-values to be exchanged on the market. Every product of labor is, as a commodity, exchangeable for every other product of labor. It has an exchange value that equates it with all other commodities. This universal homogeneity, by which all commodities are equated with all others, cannot be ascribed to the use-values of commodities, for, as use-values, they are exchanged only in so far as they are different from one another. Their exchange value, on the other hand, is a 'purely quantitative relation'. 'As exchange value, one kind of use-value is worth as much as another kind, if taken in the right proportion. The exchange value of a palace can be expressed in a certain number of boxes of shoe blacking. Vice versa, London manufacturers of shoe blacking have expressed the exchange value of their many boxes of blacking, in palaces. Thus, entirely apart from their natural forms, and without regard to the specific kind of wants for which they serve as use-values, commodities in certain quantities equal each other, take each other's place in exchange, pass as equivalents, and, in spite of their variegated appearance,' are all of a piece. The reason for this homogeneity must be sought in the nature of labor.

All commodities are products of human labor; they are 'materialized [vergegenständlichte] labor'. As embodiments of social labor, 'all commodities are the crystallization of the same substance'. At first this labor appears to be just as diversified as the use-values produced by it. Labor performed in the production of wheat is quite different from that used in the production of shoes or cannon. 'What in reality appears as a difference in use-values is, in the process of production, a difference in the work creating those use-values'. If, then, the property common to all commodities is labor, it must be labor stripped of all qualitative distinctions. That would leave labor as the quantity of labor-power expended in the production of a good. This quantity is 'indifferent to the form, content, and individuality' of the labor; it is therefore ready for a purely quantitative measurement, equally applicable to all kinds of individual labor. The standard of such measurement is given by time. 'Just as the quantitative existence of motion is time, so the quantitative existence of labor is labor-time'. If all specificity of labor is abstracted, one act of labor is distinguished from another only by its duration.

In this ‘abstract, universal’ form, labor represents the common property of all commodities that becomes constitutive of their exchange value. ‘Labor creating exchange value is … abstract, general labor’.

But even the time-measurement of labor still leaves an individual factor. The amount of labor-time spent by different workers in the production of one and the same kind of commodity varies according to their physical and mental condition and their technical equipment. These individual variations are cancelled in a further step of reduction. The labor-time is computed for the average technical standard prevailing in production, hence, the time that determines exchange value is ‘socially necessary labor time’. The ‘labor time contained in a commodity is the labor-time necessary for its production, i.e. it is the labor-time which is required for the production of another specimen of the same commodity under the same general conditions of production’. Marx thus comes to the fact that the phenomenon of labor covers two entirely different kinds of labor: (1) concrete specific labor, correlative to concrete specific use-values (carpentry, shoemaking, agricultural labor, etc.) and (2) abstract universal labor, as expressed in the respective exchange values of commodities. Every single act of labor in commodity production comprises both abstract and concrete labor — just as any product of social labor represents both exchange value and use-value. The social process of production, however, when it determines the value of commodities, sets aside the variety of concrete labor and retains as the standard of measurement the proportion of necessary abstract labor contained in a commodity.

Marx’s conclusion that the value of commodities is determined by the quantity of abstract labor socially necessary for their reproduction is the fundamental thesis of his labor theory of value. It is introduced not as a theorem, but as the description of a historical process. The reduction of concrete to abstract labor ‘appears to be an abstraction, but it is an abstraction that takes place daily in the social process of production’. Since it is the theoretical conception of a historical process, the labor theory of value cannot be developed in the manner of a pure theory.

It is a well-known fact that Marx considered the discovery of the twofold character of labor to be his original contribution to economic theory, and to be pivotal for a clear comprehension of political economy. His distinction between concrete and abstract labor allows him insights to which the conceptual apparatus of classical political

economy was necessarily blind. The classical economists designated 'labor' as the sole source of all social wealth, and overlooked the fact that it is only abstract, universal labor that creates value in a commodity-producing society, while concrete particular labor merely preserves and transfers already existing values. In the production of cotton spinning, for example, the concrete activity of the individual worker merely transfers the value of the means of production to the product. His concrete activity does not increase the value of the product. The product, however, does appear on the market with a new value in addition to that of the means of production. This new value results from the fact that a certain quantity of abstract labor-power, that is, labor-power irrespective of concrete form, has been added in the process of production to the object of labor. Since the worker does not do double work in the same time, the double result (preservation of value and the creation of new value) can be explained only by the dual character of his labor. 'By the simple addition of a certain quantity of labor, new value is added, and by the quality of this added labor, the original values of the means of production are preserved in the product'.

The process in which labor-power becomes an abstract quantitative unit characterizes a 'specifically social form of labor' to be distinguished from that form which is 'the natural condition of human existence,' namely, labor as productive activity directed to the adaptation of nature. This specifically social form of labor is that prevalent in capitalism.

Under capitalism, labor produces commodities, that is, the products of labor appear as exchange values. But how does this system of universal commodity production, which is not directly oriented to the satisfaction of individual needs, tend to fulfill these needs? How do the independent producers know that they produce actual use-values?

Use-values are means for the gratification of human wants. Since every form of society must satisfy the needs of its members in some degree, in order to maintain their lives, 'the use-value of things remains a prerequisite' to commodity production. Under the commodity system, the individual's need is a fraction of the 'social need' made manifest on the market. The distribution of use-values takes place according to the social distribution of labor. The satisfaction of a demand presupposes that the use-values are available on the market, while the latter will appear on the market only if society is willing to devote a portion of its labor-time to producing them. A certain

amount of production and consumption goods is required to reproduce and maintain society at its prevailing level. 'The social need, that is the use-value on a social scale, appears here as a determining factor for the amount of social labor which is to be supplied by the various particular spheres' of production. A definite quota of labor-time is spent in the production of machines, buildings, roads, textiles, wheat, cannon, perfumes, etc. Marx says that 'society' allots the available labor-time needed for these. Society, however, is not a conscious subject. Capitalist society provides for no complete association or planning. How, then, does it distribute labor-time to various types of production in accordance with social needs?

The individual is 'free'. No authority may tell him how he is to maintain himself; everyone may choose to work at what he pleases. One individual may decide to produce shoes, another books, a third rifles, a fourth golden buttons. But the goods each produces are commodities, that is, use-values not for himself but for other individuals. Each must exchange his products for the other use-values that will satisfy his own needs. In other words, the satisfaction of his own needs presupposes that his own products fill a social need. But he cannot know this in advance. Only when he brings the products of his labor to the market will he learn whether or not he expended social labor-time. The exchange value of his goods will show him whether or not they satisfy a social need. If he can sell them at or above his production cost, society was willing to allot a quantum of its labor-time to their production; otherwise, he wasted or did not spend socially necessary labor-time. The exchange value of his commodities decides his social fate. The 'form in which this proportional distribution of labor operates, in a state of society where the interconnection of social labor is manifested in the private exchange of the individual products of labor, is precisely the exchange value of these products,' and thus determines the proportional fulfillment of the social need.

Marx calls this mechanism by which the commodity producing society distributes the labor-time at its disposal among the different branches of production the law of value. The different branches that have been made independent in the development of modern society are integrated through the market, where the exchange value of the commodities produced yields the measure of the social need they satisfy.

The supplying of society with use-values is thus governed by the law of value, which has superseded the freedom of the individual. He depends, for the gratification of his

needs, on the market, for he buys the means for this gratification in the form of exchange values. And he finds the exchange values of the goods he desires to be a pre-given quantity over which he, as an individual, has no power whatever.

Moreover, the social need that appears on the market is not identical with the real need, but only with 'solvent social need'. The various demands are conditional upon the buying power of the individuals, and therefore, upon 'the mutual relations of the different social classes and their relative economic position'. The individual's desires and wants are shaped and, with the vast majority, restricted by the situation of the class to which he belongs, in such a way that he cannot express his real need. Marx summarizes this state of affairs when he says: 'The need for commodities on the market, the demand, differs quantitatively from the actual social need'.

Even if the market were to manifest the actual social need, the law of value would continue to operate as a blind mechanism outside the conscious control of individuals. It would continue to exert the pressure of a 'natural law' (Naturgesetz), the necessity of which, far from precluding, would rather insure the rule of chance over society. The system of relating independent individuals to one another through the necessary labor-time contained in the commodities they exchange may seem to be one of utmost rationality. In reality, however, this system organizes only waste and disproportion.

Society buys the articles which it demands by devoting to their production a portion of its available labor-time. That means, society buys them by spending a definite quantity of the labor-time over which it disposes. That part of society, to which the division of labor assigns the task of employing its labor in the production of the desired article, must be given an equivalent for it of other social labor, incorporated in articles which it wants. There is, however, no necessary, but only an accidental, connection between the volume of society's demand for a certain article and the volume represented by the production of this article in the total production, or the quantity of social labor spent on this article ... True, every individual article, or every definite quantity of any kind of commodities, contains, perhaps, only the social labor required for its production, and from this point of view the market-value of this entire mass of commodities of a certain kind represents only necessary labor. Nevertheless, if this commodity has been produced in excess of the temporary demand of society for it, so much of the social labor has been wasted, and in that case this mass of commodities

represents a much smaller quantity of labor on the market than is actually incorporated in it.

From the point of view of the individual, the law of value asserts itself only ex post; waste of labor is inevitable. The market provides a correction and a punishment for individual freedom; any deviation from the socially necessary labor-time means defeat in the economic competitive struggle through which men maintain their lives in this social order.

The guiding question of Marx's analysis was, How does capitalist society supply its members with the necessary use-values? And the answer disclosed a process of blind necessity, chance, anarchy and frustration. The introduction of the category of use-value was the introduction of a forgotten factor, forgotten, that is, by the classical political economy which was occupied only with the phenomenon of exchange value. In the Marxian theory, this factor becomes an instrument that cuts through the mystifying reification of the commodity world. For, restoration of the category of use-value to the center of economic analysis means a sharp questioning of the economic process as to whether and how it fills the real needs of individuals. Behind the exchange-relations of capitalism it shows the actual human relations, warped to a 'negative totality' and ordered by uncontrolled economic laws. Marx's analysis showed him the law of value as the general 'form of Reason' in the existent social system. The law of value was the form in which the common interest (the perpetuation of society) asserted itself through individual freedom. That law, though it manifested itself on the market, was seen to originate in the process of production (the socially necessary labor-time that lay at its root was production time). For this reason, it was only an analysis of the process of production that would yield a yes or no answer to the question, Can this society ever fulfill its promise: individual liberty within a rational whole?

Marx's analysis of capitalist production assumes that capitalist society has actually emancipated the individual, that men enter the productive process free and equal, and that the process turns from its own inner rationale. Marx grants the most favorable conditions to civil society, disregards all complicating disturbances. The abstractions that underlie the first volume of Capital (for example, that all commodities are exchanged according to their values, that external trade is excluded, etc.) put the reality so that it 'conforms with its notion'. This methodological procedure is in keeping with

the dialectical conception. The inadequacy between existence and essence belongs to the very core of reality. If the analysis were to confine itself to the forms in which reality appears, it could not grasp the essential structure from which these forms and their inadequacy originate. Unfolding the essence of capitalism requires that provisional abstraction be made from those phenomena that might be attributed to a contingent and imperfect form of capitalism.

From the beginning, Marx's analysis takes capitalist production as a historical totality. The capitalist mode of production is a specifically historical form of commodity production that originated under the conditions of 'primary accumulation,' such as the wholesale expulsion of peasants from their land , the transformation of arable soil into pasture in order to furnish wool for a rising textile industry, the accumulation of large pools of wealth through the plunder of new colonies, the breakdown of the guild system when it met the power of the merchant and industrialist. There arose in the process the modern laborer, freed of all dependence on feudal lords and guild masters, but likewise cut off from the means and instruments through which he might utilize his labor-power for his own ends. He was free to sell his labor-power to those who held these means and instruments, to those who owned the soil, the materials of labor, and the proper means of production. Labor-power and the means for its material realization became commodities possessed by different owners. This process took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and resulted, with the universal expansion of commodity production, in a new stratification of society. Two main classes faced each other: the beneficiaries of primary accumulation and the impoverished masses deprived of their previous means of subsistence.

They were really emancipated. The 'natural' and personal dependencies of the feudal order had been abolished. 'The exchange of commodities of itself implies no other relations of dependence than those which result from its own nature'. Everyone was free to exchange the commodities he owned. The first group exercised this freedom when it used its wealth to appropriate and utilize the means of production, whereas the masses enjoyed the freedom of selling the only good left to them, namely, their labor-power.

The primary conditions of capitalism were herewith at hand: free wage labor and private property in the means of commodity production. From this point on, capitalist production could go its course entirely under its own power. Commodities are

exchanged by the free will of their owners who enter the market free of all external compulsion, in the full joy of knowledge that their commodities will exchange as equivalents, and that perfect justice will prevail. Also, the exchange value of every commodity is determined by the necessary labor-time required for its production; and the measurement of this labor-time is apparently the most impartial social standard. What is more, production starts with a free contract. One party sells his labor-power to the other. The labor-time necessary for the production of this labor-power is the labor-time that goes into making enough commodities to reproduce the worker's existence. The buyer pays the price of this commodity. Nothing interferes with the perfect justice of the labor contract; both parties are treated equally as free commodity owners. They 'deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law'. The labor contract, the basis of capitalist production, is ostensibly the realization of freedom, equality, and justice.

But labor-power is a peculiar kind of commodity. It is the only commodity whose use-value it is to be 'a source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself'. This 'surplus value,' created by the abstract universal labor hidden behind its concrete form, falls to the buyer of labor-power without any equivalent, since it does not appear as an independent commodity. The value of the labor-power sold to the capitalist is replaced in part of the time the laborer actually works; the rest of this time goes unpaid. Marx's statement of the way surplus value arises may be summarized in the following argument: that the production of the commodity, labor-power, requires part of a labor day, whereas the laborer really works a full day. The value paid by the capitalist is part of the actual value of the labor-power in use, while the other part of the latter is appropriated by the capitalist without remuneration. This argument, however, if isolated from Marx's entire conception of labor, retains an accidental element. Actually, Marx's presentation of the production of surplus value is intrinsically connected with his analysis of the twofold character of labor and must be interpreted in the light of this phenomenon.

The capitalist pays the exchange value of the commodity, labor-power, and buys its use-value, namely, labor. 'The value of labor-power, and the value which that labor-power creates in the labor process, are two entirely different magnitudes'. The capitalist puts the labor-power he bought to work at the machinery of production. The

labor process contains both an objective and a subjective factor: the means of production on the one hand and labor-power on the other. The analysis of the twofold character of labor has shown that the objective factor creates no new value — the value of the means of production simply reappears in the product. 'It is otherwise with the subjective factor of the labor process, with labor-power in action. While the laborer, by virtue of his labor being of a specialized kind that has a special object (durch die zweckmassige Form der Arbeit), preserves and transfers to the product the value of the means of production, he at the same time, by the mere act of working, creates each instant an additional or new value'. The quality of preserving value by adding new value is, as it were, a 'natural gift' of labor-power, 'which costs the laborer nothing, but which is very advantageous to the capitalist'. This property possessed by abstract, universal labor, hidden behind its concrete forms, though it is the sole source of new value, itself has no proper value. The labor contract thus necessarily involves exploitation.

The twofold character of labor, then, is the condition that makes surplus value possible. By virtue of the fact that labor has this dual form, the private appropriation of labor-power inevitably leads to exploitation. The result issues from the very nature of labor whenever labor-power becomes a commodity.

For labor-power to become a commodity, however, there must be 'free' labor: the individual must be free to sell his labor-power to him who is free and able to buy it. The labor contract epitomizes this freedom, equality, and justice for civil society. This historical form of freedom, equality, and justice is thus the very condition of exploitation. Marx summarizes the whole in a striking paragraph:

> [The area] within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labor-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labor-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all,

> in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all.

The labor contract, from which Marx derives the essential connection between freedom and exploitation, is the fundamental pattern for all relations in civil society. Labor is the way men develop their abilities and needs in the struggle with nature and history, and the social frame impressed on labor is the historical form of life mankind has bestowed upon itself. The implications of the free labor contract lead Marx to see that labor produces and perpetuates its own exploitation. In other words, in the continuing process of capitalist society, freedom produces and perpetuates its own opposite. The analysis is in this wise an immanent critique of individual freedom as it originates in capitalist society and as it develops pari passu with the development of capitalism. The economic forces of capitalism, left to their devices, create enslavement, poverty, and the intensity of class conflicts. The truth of this form of freedom is thus its negation.

'Living' labor, labor-power, is the only factor that increases the value of the product of labor beyond the value of the means of production. This increase in value transforms the products of labor into components of capital. Labor, therefore, produces not only its own exploitation, but also the means for this exploitation, namely, capital.

Capital, on the other hand, requires that the surplus value be converted anew into capital. If the capitalist were to consume his surplus value instead of reinvesting it in the process of production, the latter would cease to yield him any profit, and the incentive of commodity production would vanish. 'Accumulation resolves itself into the reproduction of capital on a progressively increasing scale,' and this in turn is rendered possible only by a progressively increasing utilization of labor-power for commodity production. Capitalist production on a progressively increasing scale is identical with exploitation developing on the same scale. The accumulation of capital means growing impoverishment of the masses, 'increase of the proletariat'.

With all these negative features, capitalism develops the productive forces at a rapid pace. The inherent requirements of capital demand that surplus value be increased through increase in the productivity of labor (rationalization and intensification). But technological advance diminishes the quantity of living labor (the subjective factor) used

in the productive process, in proportion to the quantity of the means of production (the objective factor). The objective factor increases as the subjective factor decreases. This change in the technical composition of capital is reflected in the change of its 'value-composition': the value of labor-power diminishes as the value of the means of production increases. The net result is an increase in 'the organic composition of capital'. With the progress of production goes an increase in the mass of capital in the hands of individual capitalists. The weaker is expropriated by the stronger in the competitive struggle, and capital becomes centralized in an ever smaller circle of capitalists. Free individual competition of the liberalist stamp is transformed into monopolist competition among giant enterprises. On the other hand, the increasing organic composition of capital tends to decrease the rate of capitalist profit, since the utilization of labor-power, the sole source of surplus value, diminishes in ratio to the means of production employed.

The danger of the falling rate of profit aggravates the competitive struggle as well as the class struggle: political methods of exploitation supplement the economic ones, which slowly reach their limit. The requirement that ,capital be utilized, that there be production for production's sake, leads, even under ideal conditions, to inevitable disproportions between the two spheres of production, that of production goods and that of consumption goods, resulting in constant overproduction. The profitable investment of capital becomes increasingly difficult. The struggle for new markets plants the seed of constant international warfare.

We have just summarized some of the decisive conclusions of Marx's analysis of the laws of capitalism. The picture is that of a social order that progresses through the development of the contradictions inherent in it. Still, it progresses, and these contradictions are the very means through which occur a tremendous growth in the productivity of labor, an all-embracing use and mastery of natural resources, and a loosing of hitherto unknown capacities and needs among men. Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advance in production through restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process begets its determinate negation, and the crisis is the extreme form in which the contradictions are expressed.

The law of value, which governs the social contradictions, has the force of a natural necessity. 'Only as an internal law, and from the point of view of the individual agents as a blind law, does the law of value exert its influence here and maintain the social equilibrium of production in the turmoil of its accidental fluctuations'. The results are of the same blind sort. The falling rate of profit inherent in the capitalist mechanism undermines the very foundations of the system and builds the wall beyond which capitalist production cannot advance. The contrast between the abundant wealth and power of a few and the perpetual poverty of the mass becomes increasingly sharper. The highest development of the productive forces coincides with oppression and misery in full flood. The real possibility of general happiness is negated by the social relationships posited by man himself. The negation of this society and its transformation become the single outlook for liberation.

7. The Marxian Dialectic

We may now attempt to summarize the qualities that distinguish the Marxian from the Hegelian dialectic. We have emphasized that Marx's dialectical conception of reality was originally motivated by the same datum as Hegel's, namely, by the negative character of reality. In the social world, this negativity carried forward the contradictions of class society and thus remained the motor of the social process. Every single fact and condition was drawn into this process so that its significance could be grasped only when seen in this totality to which it belonged. For Marx, as for Hegel, 'the truth' lies only in the whole, the 'negative totality'.

However, the social world becomes a negative totality only in the process of an abstraction, which is imposed upon the dialectical method by the structure of its subject matter, capitalist society. We may even say that the abstraction is capitalism's own work, and that the Marx an method only follows this process. Marx's analysis has shown that capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor. This economy step by step retreats from the concrete of human activity and needs, and achieves the integration of individual activities and needs only through a complex of abstract relations in which individual work counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary labor-time, and in which the relations among men appear as relations of things (commodities). The commodity world is a 'falsified' and 'mystified' world, and its critical analysis must first follow the abstractions

which make up this world, and must then take its departure from these abstract relations in order to arrive at their real content. The second step is thus the abstraction from the abstraction, or the abandonment of a false concreteness, so that the true concreteness might be restored. Accordingly, the Marxian theory elaborates first the abstract relations that determine the commodity world (such as commodity, exchange value, money, wages) and returns from them to the fully developed content of capitalism (the structural tendencies of the capitalist world that lead to its destruction).

We have said that for Marx, as well as for Hegel, the truth lies only in the negative totality. However, the totality in which the Marxian theory moves is other than that of Hegel's philosophy, and this difference indicates the decisive difference between Hegel's and Marx's dialectics. For Hegel, the totality was the totality of reason, a closed ontological system, finally identical with the rational system of history. Hegel's dialectical process was thus a universal ontological one in which history was patterned on the metaphysical process of being. Marx, on the other hand, detached dialectic from this ontological base. In his work, the negativity of reality becomes a historical condition which cannot he hypostatized as a metaphysical state of affairs. In other words, it becomes a social condition, associated with a particular historical form of society. The totality that the Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of class relations. The dialectical totality again includes nature, but only in so far as the latter enters and conditions the historical process of social reproduction. In the progress of class society, this reproduction assumes various forms at the various levels of its development, and these are the framework of all the dialectical concepts.

The dialectical method has thus of its very nature become a historical method. The dialectical principle is not a general principle equally applicable to any subject matter. To be sure, every fact whatever can be subjected to a dialectical analysis, for example, a glass of water, as in Lenin's famous discussion. But all such analyses would lead into the structure of the socio-historical process and show it to be constitutive in the facts under analysis. The dialectic takes facts as elements of a definite, historical totality from which they cannot be isolated his reference to the example of a glass of water, Lenin states that 'the whole of human practice must enter the "definition" of the object'; the independent objectivity of the glass of water is thus dissolved. Every fact can be subjected to

dialectical analysis only in so far as every fact is influenced by the antagonisms of the social process.

The historical character of the Marxian dialectic embraces the prevailing negativity as well as its negation. The given state of affairs is negative and can be rendered positive only by liberating the possibilities immanent in it. This last, the negation of the negation, is accomplished by establishing a new order of things. The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man's historical action. The 'new' state is the truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative state. Truth, in short, is not a realm apart from historical reality, nor a region of eternally valid ideas. To be sure, it transcends the given historical reality, but only in so far as it crosses from one historical stage to another. The negative state as well as its negation is a concrete event within the same totality.

The Marxian dialectic is a historical method in still another sense: it deals with a particular stage of the historical process. Marx criticizes Hegel's dialectic for generalizing the dialectical movement into a movement of all being, of being-as-such, and getting, therefore merely 'the abstract, logical, speculative expression of the movement of history'. Moreover, the movement to which Hegel gave such abstract expression, and which he thought was general, actually characterizes only a particular phase of man's history, namely, 'the history of his maturing' (Entstehungsgeschichte). Marx's distinction between the history of this maturing and the 'actual history' of mankind amounts to a delimitation of the dialectic. The Entstehungsgeschichte of mankind, which Marx calls his prehistory, is the history of class society. Man's actual history will begin when this society has been abolished. The Hegelian dialectic gives the abstract logical form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its real concrete movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase.

The negativity with which Marxian dialectic begins is that characterizing human existence in class society; the antagonisms that intensify this negativity and eventually abolish it are the antagonisms of class society. It is of the very essence of the Marxian dialectic to imply that, with the transition from the pre-history represented by class

society to the history of classless society, the entire structure of historical movement will change. Once mankind has become the conscious subject of its development, its history can no longer be outlined in forms that apply to the prehistorical phase.

Marx's dialectical method still reflects the sway of blind economic forces over the course of society. The dialectical analysis of social reality in terms of its inherent contradictions and their resolution shows this reality to be overpowered by objective mechanisms that operate with the necessity of 'natural' (physical) laws — only thus can the contradiction be the ultimate force that keeps society moving. The movement is dialectical in itself inasmuch as it is not yet piloted by the self-conscious activity of freely associated individuals. The dialectical laws are the developed knowledge of the 'natural' laws of society, and therefore a step towards their annulment, but they are still a knowledge of 'natural' laws. To be sure, the struggle with the 'realm of necessity' will continue with man's passage to the stage of his 'actual history,' and the negativity and the contradiction will not disappear. Nevertheless, when society has become the free subject of this struggle, the latter will be waged in entirely different forms. For this reason, it is not permissible to impose the dialectical structure of pre-history upon the future history of mankind.

The concept that definitely connects Marx's dialectic with the history of class society is the concept of necessity. The dialectical laws are necessary laws; the various forms of class society necessarily perish from their inner contradictions. The laws of capitalism work with 'iron necessity towards inevitable results,' Marx says. This necessity does not, however, apply to the positive transformation of capitalist society. It is true, Marx assumed that the same mechanisms that bring about the concentration and centralization of capital also produce 'the socialization of labor'. 'Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation,' namely, property based 'on cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production'. Nevertheless, it would be a distortion of the entire significance of Marxian theory to argue from the inexorable necessity that governs the development of capitalism to a similar necessity in the matter of transformation to socialism. When capitalism is negated, social processes no longer stand under the rule of blind natural laws. This is precisely what distinguishes the nature of the new from the old. The transition from capitalism's inevitable death to socialism is necessary, but only in the sense that the full development of the individual is necessary. The new social union of

individuals, again, is necessary, but only in the sense that it is necessary to use available productive forces for the general satisfaction of all individuals. It is the realization of freedom and happiness that necessitates the establishment of an order wherein associated individuals will determine the organization of their life. We have already emphasized that the qualities of the future society are reflected in the current forces that are driving towards its realization. There can be no blind necessity in tendencies that terminate in a free and self-conscious society. The negation of capitalism begins within capitalism itself, but even in the phases that precede revolution there is active the rational spontaneity that will animate the post-revolutionary phases. The revolution depends indeed upon a totality of objective conditions: it requires a certain attained level of material and intellectual culture, a self-conscious and organized working class on an international scale, acute class struggle. These become revolutionary conditions, however, only if seized upon and directed by a conscious activity that has in mind the socialist goal. Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism.

Capitalism has itself extended the scope and power of rational practices to a considerable degree. The 'natural laws' that make capitalism work have been counteracted by tendencies of another kind, which have retarded the effect of the necessary processes and thereby protracted the life of the capitalist order. Capitalism has been subjected in certain areas to large-scale political and administrative regulations. Planning, for example, is not an exclusive feature of socialist society. The natural necessity of the social laws Marx expounded implied the possibility of such planning under capitalism, when they referred to an interplay of order and chance, of conscious action and blind mechanisms. The possibility of rational planning under capitalism does not, of course, impair the validity of the fundamental laws that Marx discovered in this system — the system is destined to perish by virtue of these laws. But the process might involve a long period of barbarism. The latter can be prevented only by free action. The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. The realization of freedom an reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it.

Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism. True, historical materialism involves the determinist principle that consciousness is conditioned by social existence. We have attempted to show, however, that the necessary dependence

enunciated by this principle applies to the 'pre-historical' life, namely, to the life of class society. The relations of production that restrict and distort man's potentialities inevitably determine his consciousness, precisely because society is not a free and conscious subject. As long as man is incapable of dominating these relations and using them to gratify the needs and desires of the whole, they will assume the form of an objective, independent entity. Consciousness, caught in and overpowered by these relations, necessarily becomes ideological.

Of course, the consciousness of men will continue to be determined by the material processes that reproduce their society, even when men have come to regulate their social relations in such a way that these contribute best to the free development of all. But when these material processes have been made rational and have become the conscious work of men, the blind dependence of consciousness on social conditions will cease to exist. Reason, when determined by rational social conditions, is determined by itself. Socialist freedom embraces both sides of the relation between consciousness and social existence. The principle of historical materialism leads to its self-negation.

The labor process, which shows forth as fundamental in the Marxian analysis of capitalism and its genesis, is the ground on which the various branches of theory and practice operate in capitalist society. An understanding of the labor process, therefore, is at the same time an understanding of the source for the separation between theory and practice, and of the element that re-establishes their interconnection. Marxian theory is of its very nature an integral and integrating theory of society. The economic process of capitalism exercises a totalitarian influence over all theory and all practice, and an economic analysis that shatters the capitalist camouflage and breaks through its 'reification' will get down to the subsoil common to all theory and practice in this society.

Marxian economics leaves no room for an independent philosophy, psychology, or sociology. 'Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence ... When reality is depicted, philosophy, as an independent branch of activity loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a

summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical development of men'.

With the separation of theory from practice, philosophy became the sanctuary of true theory. Science was either pressed 'into the service of capital' or degraded to the position of a leisurely pastime remote from any concern with the actual struggles of mankind, while philosophy undertook in the medium of abstract thought to guard the solutions to man's problem of needs, fears, and desires. 'Pure Reason,' reason purified of empirical contingencies, became the proper realm of truth.

Towards the conclusion of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant raises the three questions with which human reason is most vitally concerned: How can I know? What shall I do? What may I hope? These questions and the attempts at their solution indeed comprise the very core of philosophy, its concern for the essential potentialities of man amid the deprivations of reality. Hegel had placed this philosophic concern in the historical context of his time, so that it became manifest that Kant's questions led into the actual historical process. Man's knowledge, activity, and hope were referred in the direction of establishing a rational society. Marx set out to demonstrate the concrete forces and tendencies that prevented and those that promoted this goal. The material connection of his theory with a definite historical form of practice negated not only philosophy but sociology as well. The social facts that Marx analyzed (for example, the alienation of labor, the fetishism of the commodity world, surplus value, exploitation) are not akin to sociological facts, such as divorces, crimes, shifts in population, and business cycles. The fundamental relations of the Marxian categories are not within the reach of sociology or of any science that is preoccupied with describing and organizing the objective phenomena of society. They will appear as facts only to a theory that takes them in the preview of their negation. According to Marx, the correct theory is the consciousness of a practice that aims at changing the world.

Marx's concept of truth, however, is far from relativism. There is only one truth and one practice capable of realizing it. Theory has demonstrated the tendencies that make for the attainment of a rational order of life, the conditions for creating this, and the initial steps to be taken. The final aim of the new social practice has been formulated: the abolition of labor, the employment of the socialized means of production for the free development of all individuals. The rest is the task of man's own liberated activity.

Theory accompanies the practice at every moment, analyzing the changing situation and formulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth, not vice versa.

This absolutism of truth completes the philosophical heritage of the Marxian theory and once for all separates dialectical theory from the subsequent forms of positivism and relativism.

Max Horkheimer

The Little Man and the Philosophy of Freedom

In socialism, freedom is to become a reality. But because the present system is called "free" and considered liberal, it is not terribly clear what this may mean. Yet anyone who keeps his eyes open and has a little money in his pocket actually has ample occasion to familiarize himself with this concept. He may, for example, ask an acquaintance for a job in his firm. That has nothing to do with philosophy. But his acquaintance knits his brow and says that that is objectively impossible. Business is bad, he says, and he's even been obliged to let many employees go. The man should not be angry with him, for it is not within his power, his freedom doesn't extend that far.

The businessman is subject to laws which neither he nor anyone else nor any power with such a mandate created with purpose and deliberation. They are laws which the big capitalists and perhaps he himself skillfully make use of but whose existence must be accepted as a fact. Boom, bust, inflation, wars and even the qualities of things and human beings the present society demands are a function of such laws, of the anonymous social reality, just as the rotation of the earth expresses the laws of dead nature. No single individual can do anything about them.

Bourgeois thought views this reality as superhuman. It fetishizes the social process. It speaks of fate and either calls it blind, or attempts a mystical interpretation. It deplores the meaninglessness of the whole, or submits to the inscrutability of God's ways. But in actuality, all those phenomena which arc either experienced as accidental or given a mystical interpretation depend on men and the way they arrange their social existence. They can therefore also be changed. If men consciously took their life in society in hand and replaced the struggle of capitalist enterprises by a classless and planned economy, the effects the process of production has on human beings and their relationships could also be understood and regulated. What today appears as a fact of nature in the private and business dealings of individuals are the effects of social life as a whole.

They are human, not divine, products. Because these effects of life in society are present but not conscious, willed or controlled, and are the results of an equal number of individual wills that grasp neither their dependence nor their power, the limitation on

individual freedom in our time is immeasurably greater than would be necessary, given the available means.

When the businessman whom his acquaintance asks for a job refuses because conditions don't permit it. he thinks he is referring to something purely objective and totally autonomous — reality itself. Since everyone else, including the petitioner, feels the same because the reality they themselves created through their social activity appears as something alien by which they must abide, it follows that there are many agents but no conscious and therefore free subjects of social conditions. Men must submit to conditions they themselves constantly create as to something alien and overwhelmingly powerful.

Insight is not enough, of course, to change this state of affairs. For the error is not that people do not recognize the subject but that the subject does not exist. Everything therefore depends on creating the free subject that consciously shapes social life. And this subject is nothing other than the rationally organized socialist society which regulates its own existence. In the society as it now is, there are many individual subjects whose freedom is severely limited because they are unconscious of what they do, but there is no being that creates reality, no coherent ground. Religion and metaphysics claim that such a ground exists. In so doing, they try to keep men from creating it through their own efforts. Of course, the present lack of freedom does not apply equally to all. An element of freedom exists when the product is consonant with the interest of the producer. All those who work and even those who don't, have a share in the creation of contemporary reality, but the degree of that consonance varies considerably. Those for whom it is high seem responsible for reality in a sense. They speak of "our" reality, as if they were royalty, and rightly so. For although they did not themselves create the world, one cannot but suspect that they would have made it exactly as it is. It suits them perfectly that the production and preservation of reality in our society proceed blindly. They have every reason to approve of the product of this blind process and therefore support all legends concerning its origin. But for the little man who is turned down when he asks for a job because objective conditions make it impossible, it is most important that their origin be brought to the light of day so that they do not continue being unfavorable to him. Not only his own lack of freedom but that of others as well spells his doom. His interest lies in the Marxist clarification of the concept of freedom.

Erich Fromm

Marx’s Concept of Man

1. The Falsification of Marx's Concepts

It is one of the peculiar ironies of history that there are no limits to the misunderstanding and distortion of theories, even in an age when there is unlimited access to the sources; there is no more drastic example of this phenomenon than what has happened to the theory of Karl Marx in the last few decades. There is continuous reference to Marx and to Marxism in the press, in the speeches of politicians, in books and articles written by respectable social scientists and philosophers; yet with few exceptions, it seems that the politicians and newspapermen have never as much as glanced at a line written by Marx, and that the social scientists are satisfied with a minimal knowledge of Marx. Apparently they feel safe in acting as experts in this field, since nobody with power and status in the social-research empire challenges their ignorant statements.[1]

Among all the misunderstandings there is probably none more widespread than the idea of Marx's "materialism." Marx is supposed to have believed that the paramount psychological motive in man is his wish for monetary gain and comfort, and that this striving for maximum profit constitutes the main incentive in his personal life and in the life of the human race. Complementary to this idea is the equally widespread assumption that Marx neglected the importance of the individual; that he had neither respect nor understanding for the spiritual needs of man, and that his "ideal" was the well-fed and wellclad, but "soulless" person. Marx's criticism of religion was held to be identical with the denial of all spiritual values, and this seemed all the more apparent to those who assume that belief in God is the condition for a spiritual orientation.

This view of Marx then goes on to discuss his socialist paradise as one of millions of people who submit to an all-powerful state bureaucracy, people who have surrendered their freedom, even though they might have achieved equality; these materially satisfied "individuals" have lost their individuality and have been successfully transformed into millions of uniform robots and automatons, led by a small elite of better-fed leaders.

Suffice it to say at the outset that this popular picture of Marx's "materialism" -- his anti-spiritual tendency, his wish for uniformity and subordination -- is utterly false. Marx's aim was that of the spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of economic determination, of restituting him in his human wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature. Marx's philosophy was, in secular, nontheistic language, a new and radical step forward in the tradition of prophetic Messianism; it was aimed at the full realization of individualism, the very aim which has guided Western thinking from the Renaissance and the Reformation far into the nineteenth century.

This picture undoubtedly must shock many readers because of its incompatibility with the ideas about Marx to which they have been exposed. But before proceeding to substantiate it, I want to emphasize the irony which lies in the fact that the description given of the aim of Marx and of the content of his vision of socialism, fits almost exactly the reality of present-day Western capitalist society. The majority of people are motivated by a wish for greater material gain, for comfort and gadgets, and this wish is restricted only by the desire for security and the avoidance of risks. They are increasingly satisfied with a life regulated and manipulated, both in the sphere of production and of consumption, by the state and the big corporations and their respective bureaucracies; they have reached a degree of conformity which has wiped out individuality to a remarkable extent. They are, to use Marx's term, impotent "commodity men" serving virile machines. The very picture of midtwentieth century capitalism is hardly distinguishable from the caricature of Marxist socialism as drawn by its opponents.

What is even more surprising is the fact that the people who accuse Marx most bitterly of "materialism" attack socialism for being unrealistic because it does not recognize that the only efficient incentive for man to work lies in his desire for material gain. Man's unbounded capacity for negating blatant contradictions by rationalizations, if it suits him, could hardly be better illustrated. The very same reasons which are said to be proof that Marx's ideas are incompatible with our religious and spiritual tradition and which are used to defend our present system against Marx, are at the same time employed by the same people to prove that capitalism corresponds to human nature and hence is far superior to an "unrealistic" socialism.

I shall try to demonstrate that this interpretation of Marx is completely false; that his theory does not assume that the main motive of man is one of material gain; that, furthermore, the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human; that Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation, the restoration of his capacity to relate himself fully to man and to nature; that Marx's philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in secular language and because of this spiritual quality is opposed to the materialistic practice and thinly disguised materialistic philosophy of our age. Marx's aim, socialism, based on his theory of man, is essentially prophetic Messianism in the language of the nineteenth century.

How can it be, then, that Marx's philosophy is so completely misunderstood and distorted into its opposite? There are several reasons. The first and most obvious one is ignorance. It seems that these are matters which, not being taught at universities and hence not being subjects for examination, are "free" for everybody to think, talk, write about as he pleases, and without any knowledge. There are no properly acknowledged authorities who would insist on respect for the facts, and for truth. Hence everybody feels entitled to talk about Marx without having read him, or at least, without having read enough to get an idea of his very complex, intricate, and subtle system of thought. It did not help matters that Marx Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, his main philosophical work dealing with his concept of man, of alienation, of emancipation, etc., had not until now been translated into English [2], and hence that some of his ideas were unknown to the English-speaking world.

This fact, however, is by no means sufficient to explain the prevailing ignorance, first, because the fact that this work of Marx's had never before been translated into English is in itself as much a symptom as a cause of the ignorance; secondly, because the main trend of Marx's philosophical thought is sufficiently clear in those writings previously published in English to have avoided the falsification which occurred.

Another reason lies in the fact that the Russian Communists appropriated Marx's theory and tried to convince the world that their practice and theory follow his ideas. Although the opposite is true, the West accepted their propagandistic claims and has come to assume that Marx's position corresponds to the Russian view and practice. However, the Russian Communists are not the only ones guilty of misinterpreting Marx.

While the Russians' brutal contempt for individual dignity and humanistic values is, indeed, specific for them, the misinterpretation of Marx as the proponent of an economistic-hedonistic materialism has also been shared by many of the anti-Communist and reformist socialists. The reasons are not difficult to see. While Marx's theory was a critique of capitalism, many of his adherents were so deeply imbued with the spirit of capitalism that they interpreted Marx's thought in the economistic and materialistic categories that are prevalent in contemporary capitalism. Indeed, while the Soviet Communists, as well as the reformist socialists, believed they were the enemies of capitalism, they conceived of communism-or socialism -- in the spirit of capitalism. For them, socialism is not a society humanly different from capitalism, but rather, a form of capitalism in which the working class has achieved a higher status; it is, as Engels once remarked ironically, "the present-day society without its defects."

So far we have dealt with rational and realistic reasons for the distortion of Marx's theories. But, no doubt, there are also irrational reasons which help to produce this distortion. Soviet Russia has been looked upon as the very incarnation of all evil; hence her ideas have assumed the quality of the devilish. Just as in 1917, within a relatively short time, the Kaiser and the "Huns" were looked upon as the embodiment of evil, and even Mozart's music became part of the devil's territory, so the communists have taken the place of the devil, and their doctrines are not examined objectively. The reason usually given for this hate is the terror which the Stalinists practiced for many years. But there is serious reason to doubt the sincerity of this explanation; the same acts of terror and inhumanity, when practiced by the French in Algiers, by Trujillo in Santo Domingo, by Franco in Spain, do not provoke any similar moral indignation; in fact, hardly any indignation at all. Furthermore, the change from Stalin's system of unbridled terror to Khrushchev's reactionary police state has received insufficient attention, although one would think anyone seriously concerned with human freedom would be aware of and happy with a change which, while by no means sufficient, is a great improvement over Stalin's naked terror. All this gives us cause to wonder whether the indignation against Russia is really rooted in moral and humanitarian feelings, or rather in the fact that a system which has no private property is considered inhuman and threatening.

It is hard to say which of the above-mentioned factors is most responsible for the distortion and misunderstandings of Marx's philosophy. They probably vary in

importance with various persons and political groups, and it is unlikely that any one of them is the only responsible factor.

2. Marx's Historical Materialism

The first hurdle to be cleared in order to arrive at a proper understanding of Marx's philosophy is the misunderstanding of the concept of materialism and historical materialism. Those who believe this to be a philosophy claiming that man's material interest, his wish for ever-increasing material gain and comforts, are his main motivation, forget the simple fact that the words "idealism" and "materialism" as used by Marx and all other philosophers have nothing to do with psychic motivations of a higher, spiritual level as against those of a lower and baser kind. In philosophical terminology, "materialism" (or "naturalism") refers to a philosophic view which holds that matter in motion is the fundamental constituent of the universe. In this sense the Greek pre-Socratic philosophers were "materialists," although they were by no means materialists in the abovementioned sense of the word as a value judgment or ethical principle. By idealism, on the contrary, a philosophy is understood in which it is not the everchanging world of the senses that constitutes reality, but incorporeal essences, or ideas. Plato's system is the first philosophical system to which the name of "idealism" was applied. While Marx was, in the philosophical sense a materialist in ontology, he was not even really interested in such questions, and hardly ever dealt with them.

However, there are many kinds of materialist and idealist philosophies, and in order to understand Marx's "materialism" we have to go beyond the general definition just given. Marx actually took a firm position against a philosophical materialism which was current among many of the most progressive thinkers (especially natural scientists) of his time. This materialism claimed that "the" substratum of all mental and spiritual phenomena was to be found in matter and material processes. In its most vulgar and superficial form, this kind of materialism taught that feelings and ideas are sufficiently explained as results of chemical bodily processes, and "thought is to the brain what urine is to the kidneys."

Marx fought this type of mechanical, "bourgeois" materialism "the abstract materialism of natural science, that excludes history and its process," [3] and postulated instead what he called in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts "naturalism or humanism [which] is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the

same time constitutes their unifying truth." [4] In fact, Marx never used the terms "historical materialism" or "dialectic materialism"; he did speak of his own "dialectical method" in contrast with that of Hegel and of its "materialistic basis," by which he simply referred to the fundamental conditions of human existence.

This aspect of "materialism," Marx's "materialist method," which distinguishes his view from that of Hegel, involves the study of the real economic and social life of man and of the influence of man's actual way of life on this thinking and feeling. "In direct contrast to German philosophy," Marx wrote, "which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, or imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process." [5] Or, as he puts it in a slightly different way: "Hegel's philosophy of history is nothing but the philosophical expression of the Christian-Germanic dogma concerning the contradiction between spirit and matter, God and the world.... Hegel's philosophy of history presupposes an abstract or absolute spirit, which develops in such a way that mankind is only a mass which carries this spirit, consciously or unconsciously. Hegel assumes that a speculative, esoterical history precedes and underlies empirical history. The history of mankind is transformed into the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, which transcends the real man." [6]

Marx described his own historical method very succinctly: "The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production." [7]

Marx made the difference between historical materialism and contemporary materialism very clear in his thesis on Feuerbach: "The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, reality, what we apprehend through

our senses, is understood only in the form of the object or contemplation (Anschauung); but not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism -- which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects really distinguished from the objects of thought; but he does not understand human activity itself as objective activity." [8] Marx -- like Hegel -- looks at an object in its movement, in its becoming, and not as a static "object," which can be explained by discovering the physical "cause" of it. In contrast to Hegel, Marx studies man and history by beginning with the real man and the economic and social conditions under which he must live, and not primarily with his ideas. Marx was as far from bourgeois materialism as he was from Hegel's idealism -- hence he could rightly say that his philosophy is neither idealism nor materialism but a synthesis: humanism and naturalism.

It should be clear by now why the popular idea of the nature of historical materialism is erroneous. The popular view assumes that in Marx's opinion the strongest psychological motive in man is to gain money and to have more material comfort; if this is the main force within man, so continues this "interpretation" of historical materialism, the key to the understanding of history is the material desires of men; hence, the key to the explanation of history is man's belly, and his greed for material satisfaction. The fundamental misunderstanding on which this interpretation rests is the assumption that historical materialism is a psychological theory which deals with man's drives and passions. But, in fact, historical materialism is not at all a psychological theory; it claims that the way man produces determines his thinking and his desires, and not that his main desires are those for maximal material gain. Economy in this context refers not to a psychic drive, but to the mode of production; not to a subjective, psychological, but to an objective, economic-sociological factor. The only quasi-psychological premise in the theory lies in the assumption that man needs food, shelter, etc., hence needs to produce; hence that the mode of production, which depends on a number of objective factors, comes first, as it were, and determines the other spheres of his activities. The objectively given conditions which determine the mode of production and hence social organization, determine man, his ideas as well as his interests. In fact, the idea that "institutions form men," as Montesquieu put it, was an old insight; what was new in Marx was his detailed analysis of institutions as being rooted in the mode of production and the productive forces underlying it. Certain economic conditions, like those of capitalism, produce as a chief incentive the desire for

money and property; other economic conditions can produce exactly the opposite desires, like those of asceticism and contempt for earthly riches, as we find them in many Eastern cultures and in the early stages of capitalism. [9] The passion for money and property, according to Marx, is just as much economically conditioned as the opposite passions. [10]

Marx's "materialistic" or "economic" interpretation of history has nothing whatsoever to do with an alleged "materialistic" or "economic" striving as the most fundamental drive in man. It does mean that man, the real and total man, the "real living individuals" -- not the ideas produced by these "individuals" -- are the subject matter of history and of the understanding of its laws. Marx's interpretation of history could be called an anthropological interpretation of history, if one wanted to avoid the ambiguities of the words "materialistic" and "economic"; it is the understanding of history based on the fact that men are "the authors and actors of their history." [11], [12]

In fact, it is one of the great differences between Marx and most writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that he does not consider capitalism to be the outcome of human nature and the motivation of man in capitalism to be the universal motivation within man. The absurdity of the view that Marx thought the drive for maximal profit was the deepest motive in man becomes all the more apparent when one takes into account that Marx made some very direct statements about human drives. He differentiated between constant or "fixed" drives "which exist under all circumstances and which can be changed by social conditions only as far as form and direction are concerned" and "relative" drives which "owe their origin only to a certain type of social organization." Marx assumed sex and hunger to fall under the category of "fixed" drives, but it never occurred to him to consider the drive for maximal economic gain as a constant drive. [13]

But it hardly needs such proof from Marx's psychological ideas to show that the popular assumption about Marx's materialism is utterly wrong. Marx's whole criticism of capitalism is exactly that it has made interest in money and material gain the main motive in man, and his concept of socialism is precisely that of a society in which this material interest would cease to be the dominant one. This will be even clearer later on when we discuss Marx's concept of human emancipation and of freedom in detail.

As I emphasized before, Marx starts out with man, who makes his own history: "The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself -- geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of man. Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life." [14]

It is very important to understand Marx's fundamental idea: man makes his own history; he is his own creator. As he put it many years later in Capital: "And would not such a history be easier to compile since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the latter." [15] Man gives birth to himself in the process of history. The essential factor in this process of self-creation of the human race lies in its relationship to nature. Man, at the beginning of his history, is blindly bound or chained to nature. In the process of evolution he transforms his relationship to nature, and hence himself.

Marx has more to say in Capital about this dependence on nature: "Those ancient social organisms of production are, as compared with bourgeois society, extremely simple and transparent. But they are founded either on the immature development of man individually, who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him with his fellow men in a primitive tribal community, or upon direct relations of subjection. They can arise and exist only when the development of the productive power of labor has not risen beyond a low stage, and when, therefore, the social relations within the sphere of material life, between man and man, and between man and nature, are correspondingly narrow. This narrowness is reflected in the ancient worship of Nature, and in the other elements of the popular religions. The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellow men and to nature. The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production,

does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development." [16]

In this statement Marx speaks of an element which has a central role in his theory: labor. Labor is the factor which meditates between man and nature; labor is man's effort to regulate his metabolism with nature. Labor is the expression of human life and through labor man's relationship to nature is changed, hence through labor man changes himself. More about his concept of labor will be said later on.

I will conclude this section by quoting Marx's most complete formulation of the concept of historical materialism, written in 1859:

> "The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their social being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundations the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, esthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the

> contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production -- antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individual; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close." [17]

It will be useful again to underscore and elaborate on some specific notions in this theory. First of all, Marx's concept of historical change. Change is due to the contradiction between the productive forces (and other objectively given conditions) and the existing social organization. When a mode of production or social organization hampers, rather than furthers, the given productive forces, a society, if it is not to collapse, will choose such forms of production as fit the new set of productive forces and develop them. The evolution of man, in all history, is characterized by man's struggle with nature. At one point of history (and according to Marx in the near future), man will have developed the productive sources of nature to such an extent that the antagonism between man and nature can be eventually solved. At this point "the prehistory of man" will come to a close and truly human history will begin.

3. The Problem of Consciousness, Social Structure and the Use of Force

A problem of the greatest importance is raised in the passage just quoted, that of human consciousness. The crucial statement is: "It is not consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their

consciousness." Marx gave a fuller statement with regard to the problem of consciousness in German Ideology:

> "The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observations must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e., as they are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.
>
> "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct afflux from their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. -real, active men, as they are conditioned by the definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men in their actual lifeprocess. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura,[*] this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical lifeprocess as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process." [18]

In the first place, it should be noted that Marx, like Spinoza and later Freud, believed that most of what men consciously think is "false" consciousness, is ideology and rationalization; that the true mainsprings of man's actions are unconscious to him. According to Freud, they are rooted in man's libidinal strivings; according to Marx, they are rooted in the whole social organization of man which directs his consciousness in certain directions. and blocks him from being aware of certain facts and experiences. [19]

Its is important to recognize that this theory does not pretend that ideas or ideals are not real or not potent. Marx speaks of awareness, not of ideals. It is exactly the blindness of man's conscious thought which prevents him from being aware of his true human

needs, and of ideals which are rooted in them. Only if false consciousness is transformed into true consciousness, that is, only if we are aware of reality, rather than distorting it by rationalizations and fictions, can we also become aware of our real and true human needs.

It should also be noted that for Marx science itself and all powers inherent in man are part of the productive forces which interact with the forces of nature. Even as far as the influence of ideas on human evolution is concerned, Marx was by no means as oblivious to their power as the popular interpretation of his work makes it appear. His argument was not against ideas, but against ideas which were not rooted in the human and social reality, which were not, to use Hegel's term, "a real possibility." Most of all, he never forgot that not only do circumstances make man; man also makes circumstances. The following passage should make clear how erroneous it is to interpret Marx as if he, like many philosophers of the enlightenment and many sociologists of today, gave man a passive role in the historical process, as if he saw him as the passive object of circumstances:

> "The materialistic doctrine [in contrast to Marx's view] concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated. This doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society [as a whole].
>
> "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can only be comprehended and rationally understood as revolutionary practice." [20]

The last concept, that of "revolutionary practice", leads us to one of the most disputed concepts in Marx's philosophy, that of force. First of all, it should be noted how peculiar it is that the Western democracies should feel such indignation about a theory claiming that society can be transformed by the forceful seizure of political power. The idea of political revolution by force is not at all a Marxist idea; it has been the idea of bourgeois society during the last three hundred years. Western democracy is the daughter of the great English, French and American revolutions; the Russian revolution of February, 1917, and the German revolution of 1918 were warmly greeted by the West, despite the fact that they used force. It is clear that indignation against the use of force, as it exists in the Western world today, depends on who uses force, and against whom. Every war is

based on force; even democratic government is based on the principle of force, which permits the majority to use force against a minority, if it is necessary for the continuation of the status quo. Indignation against force is authentic only from a pacifist standpoint, which holds that force is either absolutely wrong, or that aside from the case of the most immediate defense its use never leads to a change for the better.

However, it is not sufficient to show that Marx's idea of forceful revolution (from which he excluded as possibilities England and the United States) was in the middle-class tradition; it must be emphasized that Marx's theory constituted an important improvement over the middle-class view, an improvement rooted in his whole theory of history.

Marx saw that political force cannot produce anything for which there has been no preparation in the social and political process. Hence that force, if at all necessary, can give, so to speak, only the last push to a development which has virtually already taken place, but it can never produce anything truly new. "Force," he said, "is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." [21] It is exactly one of his great insights that Marx transcends the traditional middle-class concept -- he did not believe in the creative power of force, in the idea that political force of itself could create a new social order. For this reason, force, for Marx, could have at most only a transitory significance, never the role of a permanent element in the transformation of society.

4. The Nature of Man

1. The Concept of Human Nature

Marx did not believe, as do many contemporary sociologists and psychologists, that there is no such thing as the nature of man; that man at birth is like a blank sheet of paper, on which the culture writes its text. Quite in contrast to this sociological relativism, Marx started out with the idea that man qua man is a recognizable and ascertainable entity; that man can be defined as man not only biologically, anatomically and physiologically, but also psychologically.

Of course, Marx was never tempted to assume that "human nature" was identical with that particular expression of human nature prevalent in his own society. In arguing against Bentham, Marx said: "To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog

nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch." [22] It must be noted that this concept of human nature is not, for Marx -- as it was not either for Hegel -an abstraction. It is the essence of man -- in contrast to the various forms of his historical existence -- and, as Marx said, "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual." [23] It must also be stated that this sentence from Capital, written by the "old Marx," shows the continuity of the concept of man's essence (Wesen) which the young Marx wrote about in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. He no longer used the term "essence" later on, as being abstract and unhistorical, but he clearly retained the notion of this essence in a more historical version, in the differentiation between "human nature in general" and "human nature as modified" with each historical period.

In line with this distinction between a general human nature and the specific expression of human nature in each culture, Marx distinguishes, as we have already mentioned above, two types of human drives and appetites: the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the "relative" appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature but which "owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication." [24] Marx gives as an example the needs produced by the capitalistic structure of society. "The need for money," he wrote in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "is therefore the real need created by the modern economy, and the only need which it creates.... This is shown subjectively, partly in the fact that the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural, and imaginary appetites." [25]

Man's potential, for Marx, is a given potential; man is, as it were, the human raw material which, as such, cannot be changed, just as the brain structure has remained the same since the dawn of history. Yet, man does change in the course of history; he develops himself; he transforms himself, he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own product. History is the history of man's self-realization; it is nothing but the self-creation of man through the process of his work and his production: "the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human

labor, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins." [26]

2. Man's self-activity

Marx's concept of man is rooted in Hegel's thinking. Hegel begins with the insight that appearance and essence do not coincide. The task of the dialectical thinker is "to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality, and to grasp their relations." [27] Or, to put it differently, it is the problem of the relationship between essence and existence. In the process of existence, the essence is realized, and at the same time, existing means a return to the essence. "The world is an estranged and untrue world so long as man does not destroy its dead objectivity and recognize himself and his own life 'behind' the fixed form of things and laws. When he finally wins this self-consciousness, he is on his way not only to the truth of himself, but also of his world. And with the recognition goes the doing. He will try to put this truth into action, and make the world what it essentially is, namely, the fulfillment of man's self-consciousness." [28] For Hegel, knowledge is not obtained in the position of the subjectobject split, in which the object is grasped as something separated from and opposed to the thinker. In order to know the world, man has to make the world his own. Man and things are in a constant transition from one suchness into another; hence "a thing is for itself only when it has posited (gesetzt) all its determinates and made them moments of its self-realization, and is thus, in all changing conditions, always 'returning to itself'." [29] In this process "entering into itself becomes essence." This essence, the unity of being, the identity throughout change is, according to Hegel, a process in which "everything copes with its inherent contradictions and unfolds itself as a result." "The essence is thus as much historical as ontological. The essential potentialities of things realize themselves in the same comprehensive process that establishes their existence. The essence can 'achieve' its existence when the potentialities of things have ripened in and through the conditions of reality. Hegel describes this process as the transition to actuality." [30] In contrast to positivism, for Hegel "facts are facts only if related to that which is not yet fact and yet manifests itself in the given facts as a real possibility. Or, facts are what they are only as moments in a process that leads beyond them to that which is not yet fulfilled in fact."[31]

The culmination of all of Hegel's thinking is the concept of the potentialities inherent in a thing, of the dialectical process in which they manifest themselves, and the idea that this process is one of active movement of these potentialities. This emphasis on the active process within man is already to be found in the ethical system of Spinoza. For Spinoza, all affects were to be divided into passive affects (passions), through which man suffers and does not have an adequate idea of reality, and into active affects (actions) (generosity and fortitude) in which man is free and productive. Goethe, who like Hegel was influenced by Spinoza in many ways, developed the idea of man's productivity into a central point of his philosophical thinking. For him all decaying cultures are characterized by the tendency for pure subjectivity, while all progressive periods try to grasp the world as it is, by one's own subjectivity, but not separate from it. [32] He gives the example of the poet: "as long as he expresses only these few subjective sentences, he can not yet be called a poet, but as soon as he knows how to appropriate the world for himself, and to express it, he is a poet. Then he is inexhaustible, and can be ever new, while his purely subjective nature has exhausted itself soon and ceases to have anything to say." [33] "Man", says Goethe, "knows himself only inasmuch as he knows the world; he knows the world only within himself and he is aware of himself only within the world. Each new object truly recognized, opens up a new organ within ourselves." [34] Goethe gave the most poetic and powerful expression to the idea of human productivity in his Faust. Neither possession, nor power, nor sensuous satisfaction, Faust teaches, can fulfill man's desire for meaning in his life; he remains in all this separate from the whole, hence unhappy. Only in being productively active can man make sense of his life, and while he thus enjoys life, he is not greedily holding on to it. He has given up the greed for having, and is fulfilled by being; he is filled because he is empty; he is much, because he has little. [35] Hegel gave the most systematic and profound expression to the idea of the productive man, of the individual who is he, inasmuch as he is not passive-receptive, but actively related to the world; who is an individual only in this process of grasping the world productively, and thus making it his own. He expressed the idea quite poetically by saying that the subject wanting to bring a content to realization does so by "translating itself from the night of possibility into the day of actuality." For Hegel the development of all individual powers, capacities and potentialities is possible only by continuous action, never by sheer contemplation or receptivity. For Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel, as well as for Marx, man is alive only inasmuch

as he is productive, inasmuch as he grasps the world outside of himself in the act of expressing his own specific human powers, and of grasping the world with these powers.

Inasmuch as man is not productive, inasmuch as he is receptive and passive, he is nothing, he is dead. In this productive process, man realizes his own essence, he returns to his own essence, which in theological language is nothing other than his return to God.

For Marx man is characterized by the "principle of movement," and it is significant that he quotes the great mystic Jacob Boehme in connection with this point. [36] The principle of movement must not be understood mechanically but as a drive, creative vitality, energy; human passion for Marx "is the essential power of man striving energetically for its object."

The concept of productivity as against that of receptivity can be understood more easily when we read how Marx applied it to the phenomenon of love. "Let us assume man to be man," he wrote, "and his relation to the world to be a human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. If you wish to influence other people you must be a person who really has a stimulating and encouraging effect upon others. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return, i.e., if you are not able, by the manifestation of yourself as a loving person, to make yourself a beloved person, then your love is impotent and a misfortune." [37] Marx expressed also very specifically the central significance of love between man and woman as the immediate relationship of human being to human being. Arguing against a crude communism which proposed the communalization of all sexual relation, Marx wrote: "In the relationship with woman, as the prey and the handmaid of communal lust, is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself; for the secret of this relationship finds its unequivocal, incontestable, open and revealed expression in the relation of man to woman and in the way in which the direct and natural species relationship is conceived. The immediate, natural and necessary relation of human being to human being is also the relation of man to woman. In this natural species relationship man's relation to nature is directly his relation to man, and his relation to man is directly his relation to nature, to his own natural function. Thus, in this relation is sensuously revealed, reduced to an observable fact, the

extent to which human nature has become nature for man and to which nature has become human nature for him. From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed. It follows from the character of this relationship how far man has become, and has understood himself as, a species-being, a human being. The relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It indicates, therefore, how far man's natural behavior has become human, and how far his human essence has become a natural essence for him, how far his human nature has become nature for him. It also shows how far man's needs have become human needs, and consequently how far the other person, as a person, has become one of his needs, and to what extent he is in his individual existence at the same time a social being." [38]

It is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Marx's concept of activity to understand his idea about the relationship between subject and object. Man's senses, as far as they are crude animal senses, have only a restricted meaning. "For a starving man the human form of food does not exist, but only its abstract character as food. It could just as well exist in the most crude form, and it is impossible to say in what way this feeding activity would differ from that of animals. The needy man, burdened with cares, has no appreciation of the most beautiful spectacle." [39] The senses which man has, so to speak, naturally, need to be formed by the objects outside of them. Any object can only be confirmation of one of my own faculties. "For it is not only the five senses but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (desiring, loving, etc.) in brief, human sensibility and the human character of the senses which can only come into being through the existence of its object, through humanized nature."[40] The objects, for Marx, "confirm and realize his [man's] individuality... The manner in which these objects become his own depends upon the nature of the object and the nature of the corresponding faculty;...The distinctive character of each faculty is precisely its characteristic essence and thus also the characteristic mode of its objectification, of its objectively real, living being. It is therefore not only in thought, but through all the senses that man is affirmed in the objective world." [41]

By relating himself to the objective world, through his powers, the world outside becomes real to man, and in fact it is only "love" which makes man truly believe in the reality of the objective world outside himself. [42] Subject and object cannot be separated. "The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a human, social object, created by man and destined for him...They [the senses] relate themselves

to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa. Need and enjoyment have thus lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere utility by the fact that its utilization has become human utilization. (In effect, I can only relate myself in a human way to a thing when the thing is related in a human way to man.)" [43]

For Marx, "Communism is the positive abolition of private property, [44] of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man himself as a social, i.e., really human being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution." [45] This active relationship to the objective world, Marx calls "productive life." "It is life creating life. In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species-character; and free, conscious activity is the species-character of human beings." [46] What Marx means by "species-character" is the essence of man; it is that which is universally human, and which is realized in the process of history by man through his productive activity.

From this concept of human self-realization, Marx arrives at a new concept of wealth and poverty, which is different from wealth and poverty in political economy. "It will be seen from this," says Marx, "how, in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy, we have the wealthy man and the plenitude of human need. The wealthy man is at the same time one who needs a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a need. Not only the wealth but also the poverty of man acquires, in a socialist perspective, a human and thus a social meaning. Poverty is the passive bond which leads man to experience a need for the greatest wealth, the other person. The sway of the objective entity within me; the sensuous outbreak of my life-activity, is the passion which here becomes the activity of my being." [47] The same idea was expressed by Marx some years earlier: "The existence of what I truly love [specifically he refers here to freedom of the press] is felt by me as a necessity, as a need, without which my essence cannot be fulfilled, satisfied, complete." [48]

> "Just as society at its beginnings finds, through the development of private property with its wealth and poverty (both intellectual and material), the materials necessary for this cultural development, so the fully constituted society produces man in all the plenitude of his being, the wealthy man endowed with all the senses, as an enduring reality. It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a purely theoretical problem." [49]

Corresponding to his concept of the wealthy man is Marx's view of the difference between the sense of having and the sense of being. "Private property," he says, "has made us so stupid and partial that an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital or when it is directly eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in short, utilized in some way. Although private property itself only conceives these various forms of possession as means of life, and the life for which they serve as means is the life of private property -- labor and creation of capital. Thus all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of all these senses; the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order to be able to give birth to all his inner wealth." [50]

Marx recognized that the science of capitalistic economy, despite its worldly and pleasure-seeking appearance, "is a truly moral science, the most moral of all sciences. Its principal thesis is the renunciation of life and of human needs. The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house [Br., pub], and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt -- your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being. Everything which the economist takes from you in the way of life and humanity, he restores to you in the form of money and wealth. And everything which you are unable to do, your money can do for you; it can eat, drink, go to the ball and to the theatre. It can acquire art, learning, historical treasures, political power; and it can travel. It can appropriate all these things for you, can purchase everything; it is the true opulence. But

although it can do all this, it only desires to create itself, and to buy itself, for everything else is subservient to it. When one owns the master, one also owns the servant, and one has no need of the master's servant. Thus all passions and activities must be submerged in avarice. The worker must have just what is necessary for him to want to live, and he must want to live only in order to have this." [51]

The aim of society, for Marx, is not the production of useful things as an aim in itself. One easily forgets, he says, "that the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people." [52] The contradictions between prodigality and thrift, luxury and abstinence, wealth and poverty, are only apparent because the truth is that all these antinomies are equivalent. It is particularly important to understand this position of Marx today, when both the Communist, and most of the Socialist parties, with some notable exceptions like the Indian, also Burmese and a number of European and American socialists, have accepted the principle which underlies all capitalist systems, namely, that maximum production and consumption are the unquestionable goals of society. One must of course not confuse the aim of overcoming the abysmal poverty which interferes with a dignified life, with the aim of an ever-increasing consumption, which has become the supreme value for both Capitalism and Krushchevism. Marx's position was quite clearly on the side of the conquest of poverty, and equally against consumption as a supreme end.

Independence and freedom, for Marx, are based on the act of self-creation. "A being does not regard himself as independent unless he is his own master, and he is only his own master when he owes his existence to him self. A man who lives by the favor of another considers himself a dependent being. But I live completely by another person's favor when I owe to him not only the continuance of my life but also its creation; when he is its source. My life has necessarily such a cause outside itself if it is not my own creation." [53] Or, as Marx put it, man is independent only "...if he affirms his individuality as a total man in each of his relations to the world, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, willing, loving -- in short, if he affirms and expresses all organs of his individuality," if he is not only free from but also free to.

For Marx the aim of socialism was the emancipation of man, and the emancipation of man was the same as his self-realization in the process of productive relatedness and oneness with man and nature. The aim of socialism was the development of the

individual personality. What Marx would have thought of a system such as Soviet communism he expressed very clearly in a statement of what he called "crude communism," and which referred to certain communist ideas and practices of his time. This crude communism "appears in a double form; the domination of material property looms so large that it aims to destroy everything which is incapable of being possessed by everyone as private property. It wishes to eliminate talent, etc., by force. Immediate physical possession seems to it the unique goal of life and existence. The role of worker is not abolished but is extended to all men. The relation of private property remains the relation of the community to the world of things. Finally, this tendency to oppose general private property to private property is expressed in an animal form; marriage (which is incontestably a form of exclusive private property) is contrasted with the community of women, [54] in which women become communal and common property. One may say that this idea of the community of women is the open secret of this entirely crude and unreflective communism. Just as women are to pass from marriage to universal prostitution, so the whole world of wealth (i.e., the objective being of man) is to pass to the relation of universal prostitution with the community. This communism, which negates the personality of man in every sphere, is only the logical expression of private property, which is this negation. Universal envy setting itself up as a power is only a camouflaged form of cupidity which reestablishes itself and satisfies itself in a different way. The thoughts of every individual private property are at least directed against any wealthier private property, in the form of envy and the desire to reduce everything to a common level; so that this envy and levelling in fact constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only the culmination of such envy and levelling-down on the basis of a preconceived minimum. How little this abolition of private property represents a genuine appropriation is shown by the abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civilization, and the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless individual who has not only not surpassed private property but has not yet even attained to it. The community is only a community of work and of equality of wages paid out by the communal capital, by the community as universal capitalist. The two sides of the relation are raised to a supposed universality; labor as a condition in which everyone is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of the community." [55]

Marx's whole concept of the self-realization of man can be fully understood only in connection with his concept of work. First of all, it must be noted that labor and capital

were not at all for Marx only economic categories; they were anthropological categories, imbued with a value judgment which is rooted in his humanistic position. Capital, which is that which is accumulated, represents the past; labor, on the other hand is, or ought to be when it is free, the expression of life. "In bourgeois society," says Marx in the Communist Manifesto,"...the past dominates the present. In communist society the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society, capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality." Here again, Marx follows the thought of Hegel, who understood labor as the "act of man's self-creation." Labor, to Marx, is an activity, not a commodity. Marx originally called man's function "self-activity," not labor, and spoke of the "abolition of labor" as the aim of socialism. Later, when he differentiated between free and alienated labor, he used the term "emancipation of labor."

> "Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labor that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labor power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labor was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be." [56]

Labor is the self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and mental powers. In this process of genuine activity man develops himself, becomes himself; work is not only a means to an end -- the product -- but an end in itself, the meaningful expression of human energy; hence work is enjoyable.

Marx's central criticism of capitalism is not the injustice in the distribution of wealth; it is the perversion of labor into forced, alienated, meaningless labor, hence the transformation of man into a "crippled monstrosity." Marx's concept of labor as an expression of man's individuality is succinctly expressed in his vision of the complete abolition of the lifelong submersion of a man in one occupation. Since the aim of human development is that of the development of the total, universal man, man must be emancipated from the crippling influence of specialization. In all previous societies, Marx writes, man has been "a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic." [57]

There is no greater misunderstanding or misrepresentation of Marx than that which is to be found, implicitly or explicitly, in the thought of the Soviet Communists, the reformist socialists, and the capitalist opponents of socialism alike, all of whom assume that Marx wanted only the economic improvement of the working class, and that he wanted to abolish private property so that the worker would own what the capitalist now has. The truth is that for Marx the situation of a worker in a Russian "socialist" factory, a British state-owned factory, or an American factory such as General Motors, would appear essentially the same. This, Marx expresses very clearly in the following:

> "An enforced increase in wages (disregarding the other difficulties, and especially that such an anomaly could only be maintained by force) would be nothing more than a better remuneration of slaves, and would not restore, either to the worker or to the work, their human significance and worth.

> Even the equality of incomes which Proudhon demands would only change the relation of the presentday worker to his work into a relation of all men to work. Society would then be conceived as an abstract capitalist." [58]

The central theme of Marx is the transformation of alienated, meaningless labor into productive, free labor, not the better payment of alienated labor by a private or "abstract" state capitalism.

5. Alienation

The concept of the active, productive man who grasps and embraces the objective world with his own powers cannot be fully understood without the concept of the negation of productivity: alienation. For Marx the history of mankind is a history of the increasing development of man, and at the same time of increasing alienation. His concept of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself, his self-realization.

Alienation (or "estrangement") means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, and he himself) remain alien to him. They stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation. Alienation is essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the object.

The whole concept of alienation found its first expression in Western thought in the Old Testament concept of idolatry.[59] The essence of what the prophets call "idolatry" is not that man worships many gods instead of only one. It is that the idols are the work of man's own hands -- they are things, and man bows down and worships things; worships that which he has created himself. In doing so he transforms himself into a thing. He transfers to the things of his creation the attributes of his own life, and instead of experiencing himself as the creating person, he is in touch with himself only by the worship of the idol. He has become estranged from his own life forces, from the wealth of his own potentialties, and is in touch with himself only in the indirect way of submission to life frozen in the idols. [60] The deadness and emptiness of the idol is expressed in the Old Testament: "Eyes they have and they do not see, ears they have and they do not hear," etc. The more man transfers his own powers to the idols, the poorer he himself becomes, and the more dependent on the idols, so that they permit him to

redeem a small part of what was originally his. The idols can be a godlike figure, the state, the church, a person, possessions. Idolatry changes its objects; it is by no means to be found only in those forms in which the idol has a socalled religious meaning. Idolatry is always the worship of something into which man has put his own creative powers, and to which he now submits, instead of experiencing himself in his creative act. Among the many forms of alienation, the most frequent one is alienation in language. If I express a feeling with a word, let us say, if I say "I love you," the word is meant to be an indication of the reality which exists within myself, the power of my loving. The word "love" is meant to be a symbol of the fact love, but as soon as it is spoken it tends to assume a life of its own, it becomes a reality. I am under the illusion that the saying of the word is the equivalent of the experience, and soon I say the word and feel nothing, except the thought of love which the word expresses. The alienation of language shows the whole complexity of alienation. Language is one of the most precious human achievements; to avoid alienation by not speaking would be foolish -- yet one must be always aware of the danger of the spoken word, that it threatens to substitute itself for the living experience. The same holds true for all other achievements of man; ideas, art, any kind of man-made objects. They are man's creations; they are valuable aids for life, yet each one of them is also a trap, a temptation to confuse life with things, experience with artifacts, feeling with surrender and submission.

The thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries criticized their age for its increasing rigidity, emptiness, and deadness. In Goethe's thinking the very same concept of productivity that is central in Spinoza as well as in Hegel and Marx, was a cornerstone. "The divine," he says, "is effective in that which is alive, but not in that which is dead. It is in that which is becoming and evolving, but not in that which is completed and rigid. That is why reason, in its tendency toward the divine, deals only with that which is becoming, and which is alive, while the intellect deals with that which is completed and rigid, in order to use it." [61]

We find similar criticisms in Schiller and Fichte, and then in Hegel and in Marx, who makes a general criticism that in his time "truth is without passion, and passion is without truth." [62]

Essentially the whole existentialist philosophy, from Kierkegaard on, is, as Paul Tillich puts it, "an over onehundred-years-old movement of rebellion against the

dehumanization of man in industrial society." Actually, the concept of alienation is, in nontheistic language, the equivalent of what in theistic language would be called "sin": man's relinquishment of himself, of God within himself. The thinker who coined the concept of alienation was Hegel. To him the history of man was at the same time the history of man's alienation (Entfremdung). "What the mind really strives for," he wrote in The Philosophy of History, "is the realization of its notion; but in doing so it hides that goal from its own vision and is proud and well satisfied in this alienation from its own essence." [63] For Marx, as for Hegel, the concept of alienation is based on the distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that man's existence is alienated from his essence, that in reality he is not what he potentially is, or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that which he could be.

For Marx the process of alienation is expressed in work and in the division of labor. Work is for him the active relatedness of man to nature, the creation of a new world, including the creation of man himself. (Intellectual activity is of course, for Marx, always work, like manual or artistic activity.) But as private property and the division of labor develop, labor loses its character of being an expression of man's powers; labor and its products assume an existence separate from man, his will and his planning. "The object produced by labor, its product, now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object and turned into a physical thing; this product is an objectification of labor." [64] Labor is alienated because the work has ceased to be a part of the worker's nature and "consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker therefore feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless." [65] Thus, in the act of production the relationship of the worker to his own activity is experienced "as something alien and not belonging to him, activity as suffering (passivity), strength as powerlessness, creation as emasculation." [66] While man thus becomes alienated from himself, the product of labor becomes "an alien object which dominates him. This relationship is at the same time the relationship to the sensuous external world, to natural objects, as an alien and hostile world." [67] Marx stresses two points: 1) in the process of work, and especially of work under the conditions of capitalism, man is estranged from his own creative powers, and 2) the .objects of his own work become alien beings, and eventually rule over him, become powers

independent of the producer. "The laborer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the laborer." [68]

A misunderstanding of Marx on this point is widespread, even among socialists. It is believed that Marx spoke primarily of the economic exploitation of the worker, and the fact that his share of the product was not as large as it should be, or that the product should belong to him, instead of to the capitalist. But as I have shown before, the state as a capitalist, as in the Soviet Union, would not have been any more welcome to Marx than the private capitalist. He is not concerned primarily with the equalization of income. He is concerned with the liberation of man from a kind of work which destroys his individuality, which transforms him into a thing, and which makes him into the slave of things. Just as Kierkegaard was concerned with the salvation of the individual, so Marx was, and his criticism of capitalist society is directed not at its method of distribution of income, but its mode of production, its destruction of individuality and its enslavement of man, not by the capitalist, but the enslavement of man -- worker and capitalist -- by things and circumstances of their own making.

Marx goes still further. In unalienated work man not only realizes himself as an individual, but also as a species-being. For Marx, as for Hegel and many other thinkers of the enlightenment, each individual represented the species, that is to say, humanity as a whole, the universality of man: the development of man leads to the unfolding of his whole humanity. In the process of work he "no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and he sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed. While, therefore, alienated labor takes away the object of production from man, it also takes away his species life, his real objectivity as a species-being, and changes his advantage over animals into a disadvantage in so far as his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him. Just as alienated labor transforms free and self-directed activity into a means, so it transforms the species life of man into a means of physical existence. Consciousness, which man has from his species, is transformed through alienation so that species life becomes only a means for him." [69]

As I indicated before, Marx assumed that the alienation of work, while existing throughout history, reaches its peak in capitalist society, and that the working class is the most alienated one. This assumption was based on the idea that the worker, having

no part in the direction of the work, being "employed" as part of the machines he serves, is transformed into a thing in its dependence on capital. Hence, for Marx, "the emancipation of society from private property, from servitude, takes the political form of the emancipation of the workers; not in the sense that only the latter's emancipation is involved, but because this emancipation includes the emancipation of humanity as a whole. For all human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all types of servitude are only modifications or consequences of this relation." [70]

Again it must be emphasized that Marx's aim is not limited to the emancipation of the working class, but the emancipation of the human being through the restitution of the unalienated and hence free activity of all men, and a society in which man, and not the production of things, is the aim, in which man ceases to be "a crippled monstrosity, and becomes a fully developed human being." [71] Marx's concept of the alienated product of labor is expressed in one of the most fundamental points developed in Capital, in what he calls "the fetishism of commodities." Capitalist production transforms the relations of individuals into qualities of things themselves, and this transformation constitutes the nature of the commodity in capitalist production. "It cannot be otherwise in a mode of production in which the laborer exists to satisfy the need of self-expansion of existing values, instead of on the contrary, material wealth existing to satisfy the needs of development on the part of the laborer.

As in religion man is governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalist production he is governed by the products of his own hands." [72] "Machinery is adapted to the weakness of the human being, in order to turn the weak human being into a machine." [73]

The alienation of work in man's production is much greater than it was when production was by handicraft and manufacture. "In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool; in the factory the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labor proceed from him; here it is the movement of the machines that he must follow. In manufacture, the workmen are parts of a living mechanism; in the factory we have a lifeless mechanism, independent of the workman, who becomes its mere living appendage." [74] It is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Marx to see how the concept of alienation was and remained the focal point in the thinking of the young Marx who wrote the Economic and Philosophical

Manuscripts, and of the "old" Marx who wrote Capital. Aside from the examples already given, the following passages, one from the Manuscripts, the other from Capital, ought to make this continuity quite clear:

> "This fact simply implies that the object produced by labor, its product, now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object and turned into a physical thing; this product is an objectification of labor. The performance of work is at the same time its objectification. The performance of work appears in the sphere of political economy as a vitiation of the worker, objectification as a loss and as servitude to the object, and appropriation as alienation." [75]

This is what Marx wrote in Capital: "Within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labor are brought about at the cost of the individual laborer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the laborer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual potentialities of the labor process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power." [76]

Again the role of private property (of course not as property of objects of use, but as capital which hires labor) was already clearly seen in its alienating functioning by the young Marx: "Private property," he wrote, "is therefore the product, the necessary result, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. Private property is thus derived from the analysis of the concept of alienated labor; that is, alienated man, alienated labor, alienated life, and estranged man." [77]

It is not only that the world of things becomes the ruler of man, but also that the social and political circumstances which he creates become his masters. "This consolidation of what we ourselves produce, which turns into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up to now." [78] The alienated man, who believes that he has become the master of nature, has become the slave of things and of circumstances, the powerless appendage of a world which is at the same time the frozen expression of his own powers.

For Marx, alienation in the process of work, from the product of work and from circumstances, is inseparably connected with alienation from oneself, from one's fellow man and from nature. "A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labor, from his life activity and from his species life is that man is alienated from other men. When man confronts himself, he also confronts other men. What is true of man's relationship to his work, to the product of his work and to himself, is also true of his relationship to other men, to their labor and to the objects of their labor. In general, the statement that man is alienated from his species life means that each man is alienated from others, and that each of the others is likewise alienated from human life." [79] The alienated man is not only alienated from other men; he is alienated from the essence of humanity, from his "species-being," both in his natural and spiritual qualities. This alienation from the human essence leads to an existential egotism, described by Marx as man's human essence becoming "a means for his individual existence. It [alienated labor] alienates from man his own body, external nature, his mental life and his human life." [80]

Marx's concept touches here the Kantian principle that man must always be an end in himself, and never a means to an end. But he amplifies this principle by stating that man's human essence must never become a means for individual existence. The contrast between Marx's view and Communist totalitarianism could hardly be expressed more radically; humanity in man, says Marx, must not even become a means to his individual existence; how much less could it be considered a means for the state, the class, or the nation.

Alienation leads to the perversion of all values. By making economy and its values -- "gain, work, thrift, and sobriety" [81]-- the supreme aim of life, man fails to develop the truly moral values, "the riches of a good conscience, of virtue, etc., but how can I be virtuous if I am not alive, and how can I have a good conscience if I am not aware of anything?" [82]In a state of alienation each sphere of life, the economic and the moral, is independent from the other, "each is concentrated on a specific area of alienated activity and is itself alienated from the other." [83]

Marx recognized what becomes of human needs in an alienated world, and he actually foresaw with amazing clarity the completion of this process as it is visible only today. While in a socialist perspective the main importance should be attributed "to the

wealth of human needs, and consequently also to a new mode of production and to a new object of production," to "a new manifestation of human powers and a new enrichment of the human being," [84] in the alienated world of capitalism needs are not expressions of man's latent powers, that is, they are not human needs; in capitalism "every man speculates upon creating a new need in another in order to force him to a new sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence, and to entice him into a new kind of pleasure and thereby into economic ruin. Everyone tries to establish over others an alien power in order to find there the satisfaction of his own egoistic need. With the mass of objects, therefore, there also increases the realm of alien entities to which man is subjected. Every new product is a new potentiality of mutual deceit and robbery. Man becomes increasingly poor as a man; he has increasing need of money in order to take possession of the hostile being. The power of his money diminishes directly with the growth of the quantity of production, i.e., his need increases with the increasing power of money. The need for money is therefore the real need created by the modern economy, and the only need which it creates. The quantity of money becomes increasingly its only important quality. Just as it reduces every entity to its abstraction, so it reduces itself in its own development to a quantitative entity. Excess and immoderation become its true standard. This is shown subjectively, partly in the fact that the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural, and imaginary appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude need into human need; its idealism is fantasy, caprice and fancy. No eunuch flatters his tyrant more shamefully or seeks by more infamous means to stimulate his jaded appetite, in order to gain some favor, than does the eunuch of industry, the entrepreneur, in order to acquire a few silver coins or to charm the gold from the purse of his dearly beloved neighbor. (Every product is a bait by means of which the individual tries to entice the essence of the other person, his money. Every real or potential need is a weakness which will draw the bird into the lime. Universal exploitation of human communal life. As every imperfection of man is a bond with heaven, a point at which his heart is accessible to the priest, so every want is an opportunity for approaching one's neighbor with an air of friendship, and saying, 'Dear friend, I will give you what you need, but you know the conditio sine qua non. You know what ink you must use in signing yourself over to me. I shall swindle you while providing your enjoyment.') The entrepreneur accedes to the most depraved fancies of his neighbor, plays the role of pander between him and his needs, awakens unhealthy

appetites in him, and watches for every weakness in order, later, to claim the remuneration for this labor of love." [85] The man who has thus become subject to his alienated needs is "a mentally and physically dehumanized being...the self-conscious and self-acting commodity." [86] This commodity-man knows only one way of relating himself to the world outside, by having it and by consuming (using) it. The more alienated he is, the more the sense of having and using constitutes his relationship to the world. "The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being." [87]

There is only one correction which history has made in Marx's concept of alienation; Marx believed that the working class was the most alienated class, hence that the emancipation from alienation would necessarily start with the liberation of the working class. Marx did not foresee the extent to which alienation was to become the fate of the vast majority of people, especially of the ever increasing segment of the population which manipulate symbols and men, rather than machines. If anything, the clerk, the salesman, the executive, are even more alienated today than the skilled manual worker. The latter's functioning still depends on the expression of certain personal qualities like skill, reliability, etc., and he is not forced to sell his "personality," his smile, his opinions in the bargain; the symbol manipulators are hired not only for their skill, but for all those personality qualities which make them "attractive personality packages," easy to handle and to manipulate. They are the true "organization men" -- more so than the skilled laborer-their idol being the corporation. But as far as consumption is concerned, there is no difference between manual workers and the members of the bureaucracy. They all crave for things, new things, to have and to use. They are the passive recipients, the consumers, chained and weakened by the very things which satisfy their synthetic needs. They are not related to the world productively, grasping it in its full reality and in this process becoming one with it; they worship things, the machines which produce the things-and in this alienated world they feel as strangers and quite alone. In spite of Marx's underestimating the role of the bureaucracy, his general description could nevertheless have been written today: "Production does not simply produce man as a commodity, the commodity-man, man in the role of commodity; it produces him in keeping with this role as a spiritually and physically dehumanized being -- [the] immorality, deformity, and hebetation of the workers and the capitalists. Its product is the self-conscious and self-acting commodity...the human commodity." [88]

To what extent things and circumstances of our own making have become our masters, Marx could hardly have foreseen; yet nothing could prove his prophecy more drastically than the fact that the whole human race is today the prisoner of the nuclear weapons it has created, and of the political institutions which are equally of its own making. A frightened mankind waits anxiously to see whether it will be saved from the power of the things it has created, from the blind action of the bureaucracies it has appointed.

6. Marx's Concept Of Socialism

Marx's concept of socialism follows from his concept of man. It should be clear by now that according to this concept, socialism is not a society of regimented, automatized individuals, regardless of whether there is equality of income or not, and regardless of whether they are well fed and well clad. It is not a society in which the individual is subordinated to the state, to the machine, to the bureaucracy. Even if the state as an "abstract capitalist" were the employer, even if "the entire social capital were united in the hands either of a single capitalist or a single capitalist corporation," [89] this would not be socialism. In fact, as Marx says quite clearly in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "communism as such is not the aim of human development." What, then, is the aim?

Quite clearly the aim of socialism is man. It is to create a form of production and an organization of society in which man can overcome alienation from his product, from his work, from his fellow man, from himself and from nature; in which he can return to himself and grasp the world with his own powers, thus becoming one with the world. Socialism for Marx was, as Paul Tillich put it, "a resistance movement against the destruction of love in social reality." [90]

Marx expressed the aim of socialism with great clarity at the end of the third volume of Capital: "In fact, the realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and of external utility is required. In the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of material production in the strict meaning of the term. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature, in order to satisfy his wants, in order to maintain his life and reproduce it, so civilized man has to do it, and he must do it in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production. With his development the realm of natural necessity expands, because his wants increase; but at

the same time the forces of production increase, by which these wants are satisfied. The freedom in this field cannot consist of anything else but of the fact that socialized man, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power; they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis." [91]

Marx expresses here all essential elements of socialism. First, man produces in an associated, not competitive way; he produces rationally and in an unalienated way, which means that he brings production under his control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power. This clearly excludes a concept of socialism in which man is manipulated by a bureaucracy, even if this bureaucracy rules the whole state economy, rather than only a big corporation. It means that the individual participates actively in the planning and in the execution of the plans; it means, in short, the realization of political and industrial democracy. Marx expected that by this new form of an unalienated society man would become independent, stand on his own feet, and would no longer be crippled by the alienated mode of production and consumption; that he would truly be the master and the creator of his life, and hence that he could begin to make living his main business, rather than producing the means for living. Socialism, for Marx, was never as such the fulfillment of life, but the condition for such fulfillment. When man has built a rational, nonalienated form of society, he will have the chance to begin with what is the aim of life: the "development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom." Marx, the man who every year read all the works of Aeschylus and Shakespeare, who brought to life in himself the greatest works of human thought, would never have dreamt that his idea of socialism could be interpreted as having as its aim the well-fed and well-clad "welfare" or "workers' " state. Man, in Marx's view, has created in the course of history a culture which he will be free to make his own when he is freed from the chains, not only of economic poverty, but of the spiritual poverty created by alienation. Marx's vision is based on his faith in man, in the inherent and real potentialities of the essence of man which have developed in history. He looked at socialism as the condition of human freedom and creativity, not as in itself constituting the goal of man's life.

For Marx, socialism (or communism) is not flight or abstraction from, or loss of the objective world which men have created by the objectification of their faculties. It is not an impoverished return to unnatural, primitive simplicity. It is rather the first real emergence, the genuine actualization of man's nature as something real. Socialism, for Marx, is a society which permits the actualization of man's essence, by overcoming his alienation. It is nothing less than creating the conditions for the truly free, rational, active and independent man; it is the fulfillment of the prophetic aim: the destruction of the idols.

That Marx could be regarded as an enemy of freedom was made possible only by the fantastic fraud of Stalin in presuming to talk in the name of Marx, combined with the fantastic ignorance about Marx that exists in the Western world. For Marx, the aim of socialism was freedom, but freedom in a much more radical sense than the existing democracy conceives of it-freedom in the sense of independence, which is based on man's standing on his own feet, using his own powers and relating himself to the world productively. "Freedom," said Marx, "is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realize it.... No man fights freedom; he fights at most the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has therefore always existed, only at one time as a special privilege, another time as a universal right." [92]

Socialism, for Marx, is a society which serves the needs of man. But, many will ask, is not that exactly what modern capitalism does? Are not our big corporations most eager to serve the needs of man? And are the big advertising companies not reconnaissance parties which, by means of great efforts, from surveys to "motivation analysis," try to find out what the needs of man are? Indeed, one can understand the concept of socialism only if one understands Marx's distinction between the true needs of man, and the synthetic, artificially produced needs of man.

As follows from the whole concept of man, his real needs are rooted in his nature; this distinction between real and false needs is possible only on the basis of a picture of the nature of man and the true human needs rooted in his nature. Man's true needs are those whose fulfillment is necessary for the realization of his essence as a human being. As Marx put it: "The existence of what I truly love is felt by me as a necessity, as a need, without which my essence cannot be fulfilled, satisfied, complete." [93] Only on the basis of a specific concept of man's nature can Marx make the difference between true

and false needs of man. Purely subjectively, the false needs are experienced as being as urgent and real as the true needs, and from a purely subjective viewpoint, there could not be a criterion for the distinction. (In modern terminology one might differentiate between neurotic and rational [healthy] needs). [94] Often man is conscious only of his false needs and unconscious of his real ones. The task of the analyst of society is precisely to awaken man so that he can become aware of the illusory false needs and of the reality of his true needs. The principal goal of socialism, for Marx, is the recognition and realization of man's true needs, which will be possible only when production serves man, and capital ceases to create and exploit the false needs of man.

Marx's concept of socialism is a protest, as is all existentialist philosophy, against the alienation of man; if, as Aldous Huxley put it, "our present economic, social and international arrangements are based, in large measure, upon organized lovelessness," [95] then Marx's socialism is a protest against this very lovelessness, against man's exploitation of man, and against his exploitativeness towards nature, the wasting of our natural resources at the expense of the majority of men today, and more so of the generations to come. The unalienated man, who is the goal of socialism as we have shown before, is the man who does not "dominate" nature, but who becomes one with it, who is alive and responsive toward objects, so that objects come to life for him.

Does not all this mean that Marx's socialism is the realization of the deepest religious impulses common to the great humanistic religions of the past? Indeed it does, provided we understand that Marx, like Hegel and like many others, expresses his concern for man's soul, not in theistic, but in philosophical language.

Marx fought against religion exactly because it is alienated, and does not satisfy the true needs of man. Marx's fight against God is, in reality, a fight against the idol that is called God. Already as a young man he wrote as the motto for his dissertation "Not those are godless who have contempt for the gods of the masses but those who attribute the opinions of the masses to the gods." Marx's atheism is the most advanced form of rational mysticism, closer to Meister Eckhart or to Zen Buddhism than are most of those fighters for God and religion who accuse him of "godlessness."

It is hardly possible to talk about Marx's attitude toward religion without mentioning the connection between his philosophy of history, and of socialism, with the Messianic hope of the Old Testament prophets and the spiritual roots of humanism in Greek and

Roman thinking. The Messianic hope is, indeed, a feature unique in Occidental thought. The prophets of the Old Testament are not only, like Lao Tzu or Buddha, spiritual leaders; they are also political leaders. They show man a vision of how he ought to be, and confront him with the alternatives between which he must choose. Most of the Old Testament prophets share the idea that history has a meaning, that man perfects himself in the process of history, and that he will eventually create a social order of peace and justice. But peace and justice for the prophets do not mean the absence of war and the absence of injustice. Peace and justice are concepts which are rooted in the whole of the Old Testament concept of man. Man, before he has consciousness of himself, that is, before he is human, lives in unity with nature (Adam and Eve in Paradise). The first act of Freedom, which is the capacity to say "no," opens his eyes, and he sees himself as a stranger in the world, beset by conflicts with nature, between man and man, between man and woman. The process of history is the process by which man develops his specifically human qualities, his powers of love and understanding; and once he has achieved full humanity he can return to the lost unity between himself and the world. This new unity, however, is different from the preconscious one which existed before history began. It is the at-onement of man with himself, with nature, and with his fellow man, based on the fact that man has given birth to himself in the historical process. In Old Testament thought, God is revealed in history ("the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob"), and in history, not in a state transcending history, lies the salvation of man. This means that man's spiritual aims are inseparably connected with the transformation of society; politics is basically not a realm that can be divorced from that of moral values and of man's self-realization.

Related thoughts arose in Greek (and Hellenistic) and Roman thinking. From Zeno, the founder of Stoic philosophy, to Seneca and Cicero, the concepts of natural law and of the equality of man exercised a powerful influence on the minds of men and, together with the prophetic tradition, are the foundations of Christian thinking.

While Christianity, especially since Paul, tended to transform the historical concept of salvation into an "other-worldly," purely spiritual one, and while the Church became the substitute for the "good society," this transformation was by no means a complete one. The early Church fathers express a radical criticism of the existing state; Christian thought of the late Middle Ages criticizes secular authority and the state from the standpoint of divine and natural law. This viewpoint stresses that society and the state

must not be divorced from the spiritual values rooted in revelation and reason ("intellect" in the scholastic meaning of the word). Beyond this, the Messianic idea was expressed even in more radical forms in the Christian sects before the Reformation, and in the thinking of many Christian groups after the Reformation, down to the Society of Friends of the present time.

The mainstream of Messianic thinking after the Reformation, however, was expressed no longer in religious thought, but in philosophical, historical and social thought. It was expressed somewhat obliquely in the great utopias of the Renaissance, in which the new world is not in a distant future, but in a distant place. It was expressed in the thinking of the philosophers of the enlightenment and of the French and English Revolutions. It found its latest and most complete expression in Marx's concept of socialism. Whatever direct influence Old Testament thinking might have had on him through socialists like Moses Hess, no doubt the prophetic Messianic tradition influenced him indirectly through the thought of the enlightenment philosophers and especially through the thought stemming from Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel. What is common to prophetic, thirteenth-century Christian thought, eighteenth-century enlightenment, [96] and nineteenth-century socialism, is the idea that State (society) and spiritual values cannot be divorced from each other; that politics and moral values are indivisible. This idea was attacked by the secular concepts of the Renaissance (Machiavelli) and again by the secularism of the modern state. It seems that Western man, whenever he was under the influence of gigantic material conquests, gave himself unrestrictedly to the new powers he had acquired and, drunk with these new powers, forgot himself. The elite of these societies became obsessed with the wish for power, luxury, and the manipulation of men, and the masses followed them. This happened in the Renaissance with its new science, the discovery of the globe, the prosperous City States of Northern Italy; it happened again in the explosive development of the first and the present second industrial revolutions.

But this development has been complicated by the presence of another factor. If the state or the society is meant to serve the realization of certain spiritual values, the danger exists that a supreme authority tells man -and forces him -- to think and behave in a certain way. The incorporation of certain objectively valid values into social life tends to produce authoritarianism. The spiritual authority of the Middle Ages was the Catholic Church. Protestantism fought this authority, at first promising greater

independence for the individual, only to make the princely state the undisputed and arbitrary ruler of man's body and soul. The rebellion against princely authority occurred in the name of the nation, and for a while the national state promised to be the representative of freedom. But soon the national state devoted itself to the protection of the material interests of those who owned capital, and could thus exploit the labor of the majority of the population. Certain classes of society protested against this new authoritarianism and insisted on the freedom of the individual from the interference of secular authority. This postulate of liberalism, which tended to protect "freedom from," led, on the other hand, to the insistence that state and society must not attempt to realize "freedom to," that is to say, liberalism had to insist not only on separation from State and Church, but had also to deny that it was the function of the state to help realize certain spiritual and moral values; these values were supposed to be entirely a matter for the individual.

Socialism (in its Marxist and other forms) returned to the idea of the "good society" as the condition for the realization of man's spiritual needs. It was antiauthoritarian, both as far as the Church and the State are concerned, hence it aimed at the eventual disappearance of the state and at the establishment of a society composed of voluntarily cooperating individuals. Its aim was a reconstruction of society in such a way as to make it the basis for man's true return to himself, without the presence of those authoritarian forces which restricted and impoverished man's mind.

Thus, Marxist and other forms of socialism are the heirs of prophetic Messianism, Christian Chiliastic sectarianism, thirteenth-century Thomism, Renaissance Utopianism, and eighteenth-century enlightenment. [97] It is the synthesis of the prophetic-Christian idea of society as the plane of spiritual realization, and of the idea of individual freedom. For this reason, it is opposed to the Church because of its restriction of the mind, and to liberalism because of its separation of society and moral values. It is opposed to Stalinism and Krushchevism, for their authoritarianism as much as their neglect of humanist values.

Socialism is the abolition of human self-alienation, the return of man as a real human being. "It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, be tween objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity,

between individual and species. It is a solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution". [98], [99] For Marx, socialism meant the social order which permits the return of man to himself, the identity between existence and essence, the overcoming of the separateness and antagonism between subject and object, the humanization of nature; it meant a world in which man is no longer a stranger among strangers, but is in his world, where he is at home.

7. The Continuity in Marx's Thought

Our presentation of Marx's concept of human nature, alienation, activity, etc., would be quite one-sided and, in fact, misleading if they were right who claim that the ideas of the "young Marx" contained in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were abandoned by the older and mature Marx as remnants of an idealistic past connected with Hegel's teaching. If those who make this claim were right, one might still prefer the young to the old Marx, and wish to connect socialism with the former rather than with the latter. However, there is fortunately no such need to split Marx into two. The fact is that the basic ideas on man, as Marx expressed them in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and the ideas of the older Marx as expressed in Capital, did not undergo a basic change; that Marx did not renounce his earlier views, as the spokesmen of the above-mentioned thesis claim.

First of all, who are those who claim that the "young Marx" and the "old Marx" have contradictory views on man? This view is presented mainly by the Russian Communists; they can hardly do anything else, since their thinking, as well as their social and political system, is in every way a contradiction of Marx's humanism. In their system, man is the servant of the state and of production, rather than being the supreme aim of all social arrangements. Marx's aim, the development of the individuality of the human personality, is negated in the Soviet system to an even greater extent than in contemporary capitalism. The materialism of the Communists is much closer to the mechanistic materialism of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie that Marx fought against, than to Marx's historical materialism.

The Communist party of the Soviet Union expressed this view by forcing G. Lukacs, who was the first one to revive Marx's humanism, to a "confession" of his errors when Lukacs was in Russia in 1934, after being forced to escape from the Nazis. Similarly, Ernst Bloch, who presents the same emphasis on Marx's humanism in his brilliant book

Das Prinzip Hoffnung (The Principle Hope), [100] suffered severe attacks from Communist party writers, despite the fact that his book contains a number of admiring remarks about Soviet Communism. Aside from the Communist writers, Daniel Bell has recently taken the same position by claiming that the view of Marx's humanism based on the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts "is not the historical Marx." "While one may be sympathetic to such an approach," says Bell, "it is only further myth-making to read this concept back as a central theme of Marx." [101]

It is indeed true that the classic interpreters of Marx, whether they were reformists like Bernstein, or orthodox Marxists like Kautsky, Plechanow, Lenin or Bucharin, did not interpret Marx as being centered around his humanist existentialism. Two facts mainly explain this phenomenon. First, the fact that the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were not published before 1932, and were unknown until then even in manuscript form; and the fact that German Ideology was never published in full until 1932, and for the first time in part only in 1926. [102] Naturally, these facts contributed a great deal to the distorted and one-sided interpretation of Marx's ideas by the above-mentioned writers. But the fact that these writings of Marx were more or less unknown until the early twenties and the thirties, respectively, is by no means a sufficient explanation for the neglect of Marxist humanism in the "classic" interpretation, since Capital and other published writings of Marx, such as the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law (published in 1844) could have given a sufficient basis to visualize Marx's humanism. The more relevant explanation lies in the fact that the philosophical thinking of the time from the death of Marx to the 1920's was dominated by positivistic-mechanistic ideas which influenced thinkers like Lenin and Bucharin. It must also not be forgotten that, like Marx himself, the classic Marxists were allergic to terms which smacked of idealism and religion, since they were well aware that these terms were to a large extent, used to hide basic economic and social realities.

For Marx this allergy to idealistic terminology was all the more understandable, since he was deeply rooted in the spiritual, though nontheistic tradition, which stretches not only from Spinoza and Goethe to Hegel, but which also goes back to Prophetic Messianism. These latter ideas were quite consciously alive in socialists like St. Simon and Moses Hess, and certainly formed a great part of the socialist thinking of the nineteenth-century and even of the thinking of leading socialists up to the First World War (such as Jean Jaurès).

The spiritual-humanistic tradition, in which Marx still lived and which was almost drowned by the mechanistic-materialistic spirit of successful industrialism, experienced a revival, although only on a small scale in individual thinkers, at the end of the First World War, and on a larger scale during and after the Second World War. The dehumanization of man as evidenced in the cruelties of the Stalinist and Hitler regimes, in the brutality of indiscriminate killing during the war, and also the increasing dehumanization brought about by the new gadget-minded consumer and organization man, lead to this new expression of humanistic ideas. In other words, the protest against alienation expressed by Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, then muted by the apparent success of capitalist industrialism, raised its voice again after the human failure of the dominant system, and led to a re-interpretation of Marx, based on the whole Marx and his humanist philosophy. I have mentioned already the Communist writers who are outstanding in this humanist revisionism. I should add here the Yugoslav Communists who, although they have not as far as I know raised the philosophical point of alienation, have emphasized as their main objection to Russian Communism their concern for the individual as against the machinery of the state, and have developed a system of decentralization and individual initiative which is in radical contrast to the Russian ideal of centralization and of complete bureaucratization.

In Poland, East Germany and Hungary, the political opposition to the Russians was closely allied to the representatives of humanist socialism. In France, Germany and to a smaller extent in England, there is lively discussion going on regarding Marx which is based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of his ideas. Of literature in German, I mention only the papers contained in the Marxismusstudien, [103] written largely by Protestant theologians; French literature is even larger, and written by Catholics [104] as well as by Marxists and non-Marxist philosophers. [105]

The revival of Marxist humanism in English-speaking countries has suffered from the fact that the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts had never been translated into English until recently. Nevertheless, men like T. B. Bottomore and others share the ideas on Marxist humanism represented by the aforementioned writers. In the United States, the most important work which has opened up an understanding of Marx's humanism is Herbert Marcuse's Reason and Revolution; [106] Raya Dunayevskaya's Marxism and Freedom, with a preface by H. Marcuse, [107] is also a significant addition to Marxisthumanist thought.

Pointing to the fact that the Russian Communists were forced to postulate the split between the young and the old Marx, and adding the names of a number of profound and serious writers who negate this Russian position does not, however, constitute a proof that the Russians (and D. Bell) are wrong. While it would transcend the limits of this volume to attempt as full a refutation of the Russian position as is desirable, I shall try, nevertheless, to demonstrate to the reader why the Russian position is untenable.

There are some facts which, superficially appraised, might seem to support the Communist position. In German Ideology, Marx and Engels no longer used the terms "species" and "human essence" ("Gattung" and "menschliches Wesen"), which are used in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Furthermore, Marx said later (in the preface to The Critique of Political Economy, 1859) that in German Ideology he and Engels "resolved to work out in common the opposition of our view to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact, to settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience." [108] It has been claimed that this "settling of accounts" with their erstwhile philosophical conscience meant that Marx and Engels had abandoned the basic ideas expressed in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. But even a superficial study of German Ideology reveals that this is not true. While German Ideology does not use certain terms such as "human essence," etc., it nevertheless continues the main trend of thought of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, especially the concept of alienation.

Alienation, in German Ideology, is explained as the result of the division of labor which "implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another." [109] In the same paragraph the concept of alienation is defined, as in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in these words: "man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him." [110] Here, too, we find the definition of alienation with reference to circumstances already quoted above: "This crystallization of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now." [111], [112]

Fourteen years later, in his polemic with Adam Smith (in 1857-8), Marx used the same allegedly "idealistic" arguments which he used in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, arguing that the need to work does not constitute in itself a restriction of freedom (provided it is not alienated work). Marx speaks of the "selfrealization" of the person, "hence [of] true freedom." [113] Eventually, the same idea that the aim of human evolution is the unfolding of man, the creation of the "wealthy" man who has overcome the contradiction between himself and nature and achieved true freedom, is expressed in many passages of Capital, written by the mature and old Marx. As quoted earlier, Marx wrote in the third volume of Capital: "Beyond it [the realm of necessity] begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise." [114]

In other parts of Capital, he speaks of the importance of producing "fully developed human beings," [115] the full development of the human race," [116] and "man's necessity to develop himself," [117] and of the "fragment of a man" as the result of the process of alienation. [118]

Since D. Bell is one of the few American writers interested in Marx's concept of alienation, I want to demonstrate why his position, which is in effect the same as that taken by the Russian Communists, for exactly the opposite motives, is also untenable. Bell's main claim is that to interpret Marx from the standpoint of the humanist writers quoted above is further myth-making. He claims that "Marx had repudiated the idea of alienation, divorced from the economic system, and, by so doing, closed off a road which would have given us a broader, more useful analysis of society and personality than the Marxiam dogmatics which have prevailed."

This statement is both ambiguous and erroneous. It sounds as if Marx, in his late writings, had repudiated the idea of alienation in its human meaning, and transformed it into a "purely economic category," as Bell says later on. Marx never repudiated the idea of alienation in its human sense, but he claimed that it cannot be divorced from the concrete and real life process of the alienated individual. This is something quite different from putting up the straw man of the "old Marx" who repudiates the "young Marx's" concept of human alienation. Bell must make this error because he accepts the whole cliché of the conventional interpretation of Marx. "For Marx the only social reality

is not Man, nor the individual, but economic classes of men. Individuals and their motives count for naught. The only form of consciousness which can be translated into action -- and which can explain history, past, present and future -is class consciousness." In trying to show that Marx was not interested in the individual, but only in the mass, just as he was allegedly no longer interested in human, but only in economic factors, Bell does not see -- or does not mention -- that Marx criticized capitalism precisely because it destroys individual personality (as he criticized "crude communism" for the same reason), and that the statement that history can be explained only by class-consciousness is a statement of fact, as far as previous history is concerned, not an expression of Marx's disregard of the individual.

Unfortunately Bell misquotes a Marx text which is of decisive importance in order to prove his thesis. He says of Marx: "But in saying there is no human nature 'inherent in each separate individual' (as Marx does in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach) but only classes, one introduces a new person, a new abstraction."

What does Marx say in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach? "Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter more deeply into the criticism of this real essence, is therefore forced: 1) to abstract from the process of history and to establish religious temperament as something independent and to postulate an abstract -- isolated -- human individual. 2) The essence of man can therefore be understood only as 'genus,' the inward, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals." [119] Marx does not say, as Bell quotes, that "there is no human nature inherent in each separate individual," but something quite different, namely, that "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual." It is the essential point of Marx's "materialism" against Hegel's idealism. Marx never gave up his concept of man's nature" (as we have shown by quoting the statement from Capital) but this nature is not a purely biological one, and not an abstraction; it is one which can be understood only historically, because it unfolds in history. The nature (essence) of man can be inferred from its many manifestations (and distortions) in history; it cannot be seen as such, as a statistically existing entity "behind" or "above" each separate man, but as that in man which exists as a potentiality and unfolds and changes in the historical process.

In addition to all this Bell has not properly understood the concept of alienation. He defines it as "the radical dissociation into a subject that strives to control his own fate and an object which is manipulated by others." As follows from my own discussion, as well as that of most serious students of the concept of alienation, this is a completely inadequate and misleading definition. In fact, it is just as inadequate as Bell's assertion that Zen Buddhism (like other "modern tribal and communal philosophies" of "reintegration") aims "at losing one's sense of self" and thus is ultimately antihuman because they [the philosophers of reintegration, including Zen] are anti-individual. There is no space to refute this cliché, except to suggest a more careful and less biased reading of Marx and of Zen Buddhist texts.

To sum up this point of the alleged difference between the young and the mature Marx: it is true that Marx (like Engels), in the course of a lifetime, changed some of his ideas and concepts. He became more adverse to the use of terms too close to Hegelian idealism; his language became less enthusiastic and eschatological; probably he was also more discouraged in the later years of his life than he was in 1844. But in spite of certain changes in concepts, in mood, in language, the core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never changed, and it is impossible to understand his concept of socialism, and his criticism of capitalism as developed in his later years, except on the basis of the concept of man which he developed in his early writings.

8. Marx, the Man

The misunderstanding and the misinterpretation of Marx's writings are paralleled only by the misinterpretation of his personality. Just as in the case of his theories, the distortion of his personality also follows a cliché repeated by journalists, politicians, and even social scientists who should know better. He is described as a "lonely" man, isolated from his fellows, aggressive, arrogant, and authoritarian. Anyone who has even a slight knowledge of Marx's life would have great difficulty in accepting this because he would find it difficult to reconcile it with the picture of Marx the husband, the father, and the friend.

There are perhaps few marriages known to the world which were a human fulfillment in such an extraordinary way as was that of Karl and Jenny Marx. He, the son of a Jewish lawyer, fell in love as an adolescent with Jenny von Westphalen, the daughter of a Prussian feudal family, and a descendant of one of the oldest Scottish families. They

married when he was twenty-four years of age, and he survived her death by only a little over a year. This was a marriage in which, despite the differences in background, despite a continual life of material poverty and sickness, there was unwavering love and mutual happiness, possible only in the case of two people with an extraordinary capacity for love, and deeply in love with each other.

His youngest daughter, Eleanor, described the relationship between her parents in a letter referring to a day shortly before her mother's death, and over a year before the death of her father. "Moor" [Marx's nickname], she writes, "got the better of his illness again. Never shall I forget the morning he felt himself strong enough to go into mother's room. When they were together they were young again -- she a young girl and he a loving youth, both on life's threshold, not an old, disease-ridden man and an old, dying woman parting from each other for life." [120]

Marx's relationship to his children was as free from any taint of domination, and as full of productive love, as that to his wife. One needs only to read the description given by his daughter Eleanor of his walks with his children, when he told them tales, tales measured by miles, not chapters. "Tell us another mile," was the cry of the girls. "He read the whole of Homer, the whole Nibelungenlied, Gudrun, Don Quixote, the Arabian Nights, etc. As to Shakespeare, he was the Bible of our house, and seldom out of our hands or mouths. By the time I was six, I knew scene upon scene of Shakespeare by heart." [121]

His friendship with Frederick Engels is perhaps even more unique than his marriage and his relationship to his children. Engels himself was a man of extraordinary human and intellectual qualities. He always recognized and admired Marx's superior talent. He devoted his life to Marx's work, and yet he was never reluctant to make his own contribution, and did not underestimate it. There was hardly ever any friction in the relationship between these two men, no competitiveness, but a sense of comradeship rooted in as deep a love for each other as one ever might find between two men.

Marx was the productive, nonalienated, independent man whom his writings visualized as the man of a new society. Productively related to the whole world, to people, and to ideas, he was what he thought. A man who read Aeschylus and Shakespeare every year in the original languages, and who during his saddest time, that of the illness of his wife, plunged into mathematics and studied calculus, Marx was a

humanist through and through. Nothing was more wonderful to him than man, and he expressed that feeling in a frequently repeated quotation from Hegel: "even the criminal thought of a malefactor has more grandeur and nobility than the wonders of heaven." His answers to the questionnaire made up for him by his daughter Laura reveal a great deal of the man: his idea of misery was submission; the vice he detested most was servility, and his favorite maxims were "nothing human is alien to me" and "one must doubt of everything."

Why was this man supposed to be arrogant, lonely, authoritarian? Aside from the motive of slander, there were some reasons for this misunderstanding. First of all, Marx (like Engels) had a sarcastic style, especially in writing, and was a fighter with a good deal of aggressiveness. But, more importantly, he was a man with a complete inability to tolerate sham and deception, and with an utter seriousness about the problems of human existence. He was incapable of accepting dishonest rationalizations, or fictitious statements about important matters, politely and with a smile. He was incapable of any kind of insincerity, whether it referred to personal relations or to ideas. Since most people prefer to think in fictions rather than in realities, and to deceive themselves and others about the facts underlying individual and social life, they must indeed regard Marx as one who was arrogant or cold, but this judgment says more about them than it does about Marx.

If and when the world returns to the tradition of humanism and overcomes the deterioration of Western culture, both in its Soviet and in its capitalist form, it will see, indeed, that Marx was neither a fanatic nor an opportunist -- that he represented the flowering of Western humanity, that he was a man with an uncompromising sense of truth, penetrating to the very essence of reality, and never taken in by the deceptive surface; that he was of an unquenchable courage and integrity; of a deep concern for man and his future; unselfish, and with little vanity or lust for power; always alive, always stimulating, and bringing to life whatever he touched. He represented the Western tradition in its best features: its faith in reason and in the progress of man. He represented, in fact, the very concept of man which was at the center of his thinking. The man who is much, and has little; the man who is rich because he has need of his fellow man.

Notes

1. It is a sad comment, yet one which cannot be avoided, that this ignorance and distortion of Marx are to be found more in the United States than in any other Western country. It must be mentioned especially that in the last fifteen years there has been an extraordinary renaissance of discussions on Marx in Germany and France, centered especially around the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts published in this volume. In Germany the participants in this discussion are mainly Protestant theologians. I mention first the extraordinary Marxismusstudien, ed. by I. Fetscher, 2 vols. J.C.B. Mohr (Tübingen, 1954 and 1957). Further, the excellent introduction by Landshut to the Kroener edition of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Then, the works of Lukacs, Bloch, Popitz and others, quoted later. In the United States a slowly increasing interest in Marx's work has been observed recently. Unfortunately, it is in some part expressed in a number of biased and falsifying books like Schwarzschild The Red Prussian, or in oversimplified and misleading books like the Overstreets' The Meaning of Communism. In contrast, Joseph A. Schumpeter, in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper & Bros., 1947) offers an excellent presentation of Marxism. Cf. further on the problem of historical naturalism, John C. Bennett Christianity and Communism Today (Association Press, New York). See also the excellent anthologies (and introductions) by Feuer (Anchor Books) and by Bottomore and Rubel, (Watts and Co., London). Specifically, on Marx's view of human nature I want to mention Venable Human Nature: The Marxist View, which, although knowledgeable and objective, suffers severely from the fact that the author could not make use of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Cf. also, for the philosophical basis of Marx's thought, H. Marcuse brilliant and penetrating book, Reason and Revolution (Oxford University Press, New York, 1941), and the same author's discussion of Marx's theories vs. Soviet Marxism in Soviet Marxismk (Columbia University Press, New York, 1958). Cf. also my discussion of Marx in The Sane Society (Rinehart & Co. Inc., New York, 1955) and my earlier discussion of Marx's theory in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Vol. I (Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1932). In France, the discussion has been led partly by Catholic priests and partly by philosophers, most of them socialists. Among the former I refer especially to J. Y. Calvez' La Pensée de Karl Marx, ed. du Seuil, Paris 1956; among the latter, A. Kojcve, Sartre, and especially the various works of H. Lefèbvre.

2. The first English version was published in 1959 in Great Britain by Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., using a recently published translation by the Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow. The translation by T. B. Bottomore included in this volume is the first by any Western scholar.

3. Capital I, K. Marx, Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago 1906, p. 406.

4. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 181.

5. German Ideology, K. Marx and F. Engels, ed. with an introduction by R. Pascal, New York, International Publishers, Inc., 1939, p. 14. [My italics -- E.F.]

6. K. Marx and F. Engels, Die Heilige Familie (The Holy Family), 1845. [My translation -- E.F.]

7. German Ideology, l.c. p. 7.

8. Theses on Feuerbach, German Ideology, 1.c. p. 197.

9. "While the capitalist of the classical type brands individual consumption as a vice against his function, of abstinence from accumulating, the modernized capitalist is capable of looking upon accumulation as abstinence from pleasure." (Capital I, 1.c. p. 650).

10. I have tried to clarify this problem in a paper Über Aufgabe und Methode einer Analytischen Sozialpsychologie (On the Method and Aim of Analytic Social Psychology), Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Vol. I, C.L. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1932, p. 28-54.

11. Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Marx-Engels Verlag, ed. D. Rjazanow, Berlin, 1932. I., 6, p. 179. The abbreviation MEGA will be used in all following references.

12. While revising this manuscript I came across an excellent interpretation of Marx, characterized both by thorough knowledge and genuine penetration, by Leonard Krieger, The Uses of Marx for History in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, 3. "For Marx," Krieger writes, "the common substance of history was the activity of men -- 'men as simultaneously the authors and actors of their own history' -and this activity extended equally to all levels: modes of production, social relations and categories." (p. 362). As to the alleged "materialistic" character of Marx, Krieger writes: "What intrigues

us about Marx is his capacity to find an essentially ethical rationale running within and across the centuries at the very same time that he perceives the diversity and complexity of historical existence." (p. 362) [My italics -- E.F.] Or later (p. 368): "There is no more characteristic feature of Marx's philosophical framework than his categorical reprobation of economic interest as a distortion vis-à-vis the whole moral man."

13. Cf. MEGA V, p. 596.

14. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 7.

15. Capital I, 1.c. p. 406.

16. Capital I, 1.c. p. 91-2.

17. Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx, Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955, p. 362-4.

*. An instrument perfected in the late Middle Ages, to throw, by means of mirrors, an image of a scene on a plane surface. It was widely used by artists to establish the correct proportions of a natural object or scene. The image appeared on the paper inverted, though the later use of a lens corrected this.

18. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 13-4.

19. Cf. my article in Suzuki, Fromm, de Martino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960. Cf. also Marx's statement: "Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well; for language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal has no 'relations' with anything, cannot have any. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious. At the same time it is consciousness of nature, which first appears to men as a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force, with which

men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion)." -- German Ideology, 1.c. p. 19.

20. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 197-8 [My italics -- E.F.] Cf. also Engels' famous letter to Mehring (July 14, 1893) in which he states that Marx and he "had neglected [by emphasizing the formal aspects of the relationship between the socioeconomic structure and ideology to study] the manner and mode of how ideas come into being."

21. Capital I, 1.c., p. 824.

22. Capital I, 1.c., p. 668.

23. German Ideology, 1.c., p. 198.

24. Heilige Familie, MEGA V, p. 359. [My translation -E. F.]

25. E.P. MSS., p. 141.

26. E.P. MSS. p. 139

27. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941, p. 146.

28. Marcuse, 1.c., p. 113.

29. Marcuse, 1.c., p. 142. Cf. Hegel, Science and Logic, Vol. I, p. 404

30. Marcuse, 1.c., p. 149

31. Marcuse, 1.c. p. 152.

32. Cf. Goethe's conversation with Eckermann, January 29, 1826.

33. Goethe, conversation with Eckermann on January 29, 1826. [My italics, and translation -- E.F.]

34. Quoted by K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1941, p. 24. [My translation -E.F.]

35. Cf. the detailed description of the productive character orientation in E. Fromm, Man for Himself, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1947.

36. Cf. H. Popitz, Der entfremdete Mensch" (The Alienated Man) Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, A.G., Basel, p. 119.

37. E.P. MSS., p. 168.

38. E.P. MSS., pp. 126-7.

39. E.P. MSS., p. 134.

40. E.P. MSS., p. 134.

41. E.P. MSS., p. 133.

42. MEGA, Vol. III, p. 191.

43. E.P. MSS., p. 132. This last statement is one which is almost literally the same as has been made in Zen Buddhist thinking, as well as by Goethe. In fact, the thinking of Goethe, Hegel and Marx is closely related to the thinking of Zen. What is common to them is the idea that man overcomes the subject-object split; the object is an object, yet it ceases to be an object, and in this new approach man becomes one with the object, although he and it remain two. Man, in relating himself to the objective world humanly, overcomes self-alienation.

44. By "private property" as used here and in other statements, Marx never refers to the private property of things for use (such as a house, a table, etc.) Marx refers to the property of the "propertied classes," that is, of the capitalist who, because he owns the means of production, can hire the property-less individual to work for him, under conditions the latter is forced to accept. "Private property" in Marx's usage, then, always refers to private property within capitalist class society and thus is a social and historical category; the term does not refer to things for use, as for instance, in a socialist society.

45. E.P. MSS., p. 127.

46. E.P. MSS., p. 101.

47. E.P. MSS., pp. 137-8. This dialectic concept of the wealthy man as being the poor man in need of others is, in many ways, similar to the concept of poverty expressed by Meister Eckhart, in his sermon "Blessed Are the Poor," (Meister Eckhart, transl. by R. B. Blakney, Harper and Bros., New York, 1941)

48. MEGA I, i a p. 184.

49. E.P. MSS., pp. 134-5.

50. E.P. MSS., p. 132.

51. E.P. MSS., pp. 144-5.

52. E.P. MSS., p. 145.

53. E.P. MSS., p. 138.

54. Marx refers here to speculations among certain eccentric communist thinkers of his time who thought that if everything is common property women should be too.

55. E.P. MSS., pp. 124 - 6.

56. Capital I, l.c. p. 197-8.

57. German Ideology, l.c. p. 22.

58. E.P. MSS., p. 107.

59. The connection between alienation and idolatry has also been emphasized by Paul Tillich in Der Mensch im Christentum und im Marxismus, Düsseldorf, 1953, p. 14. Tillich also points out in another lecture, "Protestantische Vision," that the concept of alienation in substance is to be found also in Augustine's thinking. Löwith also has pointed out that what Marx fights against are not the gods, but the idols, [cf. Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, l.c. p. 378].

60. This is, incidentally, also the psychology of the fanatic. He is empty, dead, depressed, but in order to compensate for the state of depression and inner deadness, he chooses an idol, be it the state, a party, an idea, the church, or God. He makes this idol into the absolute, and submits to it in an absolute way. In doing so his life attains

meaning, and he finds excitement in the submission to the chosen idol. His excitement, however, does not stem from joy in productive relatedness; it is intense, yet cold excitement built upon inner deadness or, if one would want to put it symbolically, it is "burning ice."

61. Eckermann's conversation with Goethe, February 18, 1829, published in Leipzig, 1894, page 47. [My translation -- E.F.]

62. 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.

63. The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree, The Colonial Press, New York, 1899.

64. E.P. MSS., p. 95.

65. Capital I, l.c. p. 536.

66. E.P. MSS., p. 98.

67. E.P. MSS., p. 99.

68. E.P. MSS., p. 99.

69. E.P. MSS., pp. 102-3.

70. E.P. MSS., p. 107.

71. Capital I, 1.c. p. 396.

72. Capital I, 1.c. p. 680-1.

73. E.P. MSS., p. 143.

74. Capital I, 1.c. p. 461-2.

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79. E.P. MSS., p. 103

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85. E.P. MSS., pp. 140-2

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103. C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, Vol. I and II, 1954, 1957.

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105. I will mention only the works of H. Lefèbvre, Navill, Goldmann, and of A. Kojève, J.-P. Sartre, M. Merlean-Ponty. Cf. the excellent paper Der Marxismus im Spiegel der FranzLösischen Philosophie by I. Fetscher, in Marxismusstudien, 1.c. Vol. I, p. 173 ff.

106. Oxford University Press, New York, 1941.

107. Bookman Associates, New York, 1958.

108. When outside circumstances made the publication of this work (German Ideology) impossible, "we abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose-selfclarification."

109. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 22.

110. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 22.

111. German Ideology, 1.c. p. 22-3.

112. It is significant that Marx corrected Engel's expression "self-activity" into "activity" when Engels used it with reference to previous history. It shows how important it was for Marx to keep the term "self-activity" for a non-alienated society. See MEGA I, Vol. V, p. 61.

113. Cf. the brilliant article by Th. Ramm, "Die Künftige Gesellschaftsordnung nach der Theorie von Marx und Engels," Marxissmusstudien II, 1.c. p. 77 ff.

114. Cf. Capital III, 1.c. p. 945-6 [My italics -- E.F.]

115. Cf. Capital I, 1.c. p. 529-30.

116. Capital I, p. 554-5.

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118. Capital I, 1.c. p. 708.

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Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man

Some preliminary remarks seem to be in order. Marx's contribution to the knowledge of man or, in a narrower sense, to psychology, is a topic which has found relatively little

attention. Quite unlike Aristotle or Spinoza, whose works on ethics are treatises on psychology, Marx is supposed not to have been much concerned with the individual man, his drives, and his character, but only with the laws of society and its evolution.

This disregard of Marx's contribution to psychology is caused by a number of factors. One, that Marx never put his psychological views in any systematic form, but that they are distributed all over his work and have to be pulled together to display their systematic nature. Second, the vulgar misinterpretation of Marx as having been concerned only with economic phenomena, or the misinterpreted concept of materialism, according to which Marx assumed that man is by nature driven primarily by the wish for economic gain, obscured Marx's real picture of man and his contribution to psychology. Third, Marx's dynamic psychology came too early to find sufficient attention. It was not until Freud that a systematic depth psychology was developed, and Freud's psycho-analysis became the most important dynamic psychological system. Its popularity, to some extent due to its mechanistic materialism, obscured recognition of the core of the humanist depth psychology which is to be found in Marx. On the other hand, the ever more important role of a mechanistically oriented experimental psychology, tended to block the understanding of Marx's psychological concepts.

How could it have been otherwise? Modem academic and experimental psychology is to a large extent a science dealing with alienated man, studied by alienated investigators, with alienated and alienating methods. Marx's psychology, being based on the full awareness of the fact of alienation, was able to transcend this type of psychological approach because it did not take the alienated man for the natural man, for man as such. As a result, however, his psychology was in fact a closed book to those who believe in reflexology and conditioning as the last word in the knowledge of man. Perhaps today there is a better chance for an understanding of Marx's contribution to psychology than ever before, partly because essential findings of Freud's are no longer held to be so inseparably connected with the mechanistic parts of his theory (for instance, the libido theory), and partly because the renaissance of humanist thinking is creating a better basis for the understanding of Marx's humanist psychology.

I am sure it is not necessary to apologize for the fact that given the length of this paper I cannot try more than to give a brief resume of what I consider to be the core of Marx's contribution to psychology. Furthermore, it goes without saying that many

elements of his psychological thinking are to be found in thinkers who preceeded him, of whom Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel, and especially Feuerbach, are only some of the outstanding figures in a sequence of thinkers, East and West.

Marx, speaking of psychology as "a natural science of man", (identical with "a human natural science") starts out with a concept of human nature which runs through his whole work until the last pages of the Capital, where, in the third volume he speaks of working conditions "most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it". While in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Marx speaks of the "essence of man" or the "species life" of man, he qualifies already in the German Ideology the use of "essence" by stating that this essence is "no abstraction", and in the Capital he replaces the concept of "essence" with that of "human nature in general", to be distinguished from "human nature as modified in each historical period". This is, indeed an important refinement of the concept of human nature, but in no way its abandonment.

Does Marx give us a definition of the "essence of human nature", of "man's nature in general"? Indeed he does. In the Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx defines the species character of human beings as "free, conscious activity", in contrast to the nature of the animal which "does not distinguish the activity from itself... and is its activity". While in his later writings, having dropped the concept "species character" he cannot repeat the same formulation, the emphasis remains the same, that of activity as the characteristic of the not crippled, the not fragmented nature of man. In the Capital, Marx defines man as a "social animal", criticizing Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal" as being "quite as characteristic of ancient classical society as Franklin's definition of man as a 'tool-making animal' is characteristic of Yankeedom". Marx's psychology, as well as his philosophy, is one of human activity, and I quite agree with the view that the most fitting way to describe Marx's definition of man is that of a being of "praxis", a point to which I shall return later.

Marx's first step of employing the concept of human nature in one form or another throughout his whole work would have little meaning without the second and most important step which characterizes his psychological theory. I refer to his concept of man's nature as a dynamic, energetic one. He sees man as being driven by passions, or drives, although man is largely unaware of these driving forces. Marx's is a dynamic psychology. This constitutes on the one hand its affinity to Spinoza's psychology, and its

anticipation of Freud's, and on the other, its contradiction to any kind of mechanistic, behavioristic psychology. As I shall try to show later in more detail, Marx's dynamic psychology is based on the primacy of man's relatedness to the world, to man, and to nature, in contrast to Freud's, which is based on the model of an isolated homme machine.

His most general and yet very fruitful concept of drives consists in the differentiation between "constant" or "fixed" drives, and "relative" drives. The constant drives "exist under all circumstances and... can be changed by social conditions only as far as form and direction are concerned"; the relative drives "owe their origin only to a certain type of social organization".

Marx assumed sex and hunger to fall under the category of "fixed drives", while avarice, for instance, would be an example of a relative drive. This distinction is closely related to the distinction between human nature in general and its specific manifestations. At this point I only want to say briefly how extraordinarily fruitful this division between fixed and relative drives is, and that in fact, this concept alone constitutes a most important contribution to the present-day discussion of drives and instincts. Marx clarifies the distinction still further by saying that "relative appetites" (another word for drives) ... "are not an integral part of human nature" but "owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication". Here Marx already linked the relative appetites with social structure and conditions of production, and communication, and thus laid the foundation for a dynamic psychology which understands most human appetites, and that means a large part of human motivation as being determined by the process of production. The concept of "social character" in the dynamic sense in which I have formulated it, is based on this notion of Marx.

Not less important than Marx's distinction between constant and relative drives is his discussion of the animal versus the human quality of constant drives. And it is precisely at this point that we find the decisive difference between Marx's dynamic psychology and that of Freud. Considering those drives which are "constant" and assumed to be of the same quality in man and animals, by psychoanalysts as well as by academic psychologists, Marx states that "eating, drinking, and procreating are, of course, also genuine human functions. But abstractly considered, apart from the environment of

other human activities and turned into final and sole ends they are animal functions". For Freudian psycho-analysis, based on the model of the isolated homme machine, whose drives are fed by inner chemical processes, with the goal of reduction of tension to an optimal threshold, the satisfaction of hunger, thirst, and sexual desire are, indeed, ends in themselves.

We are now prepared for one of Marx's most fundamental statements concerning the nature of drives. "Passion is man's faculties striving to attain their object (Die Leidenschaft, die Passion, ist die nach seinem Gegenstande energisch strebende Wesenskraft des Menschen)." In this statement passion is considered as a concept of relation, or relatedness. It is not as in Freud's concept of instinct or drive an inner, chemically produced striving which needs an object as a means for its satisfaction, but man's faculties themselves, his Wesenskraft, are endowed with the dynamic quality of having to strive for an object they can relate to and unite themselves with. The dynamism of human nature is primarily rooted in this need of man to express his faculties toward the world, rather than in his need to use the world as a means for the satisfaction of his physiological necessities. What Marx is saying is that because I have eyes I have the need to see; because I have ears I have the need to hear; because I have a brain I have the need to think; and because I have a heart I have the need to feel. In short, because I am man, I am in need of man and of the world. In passing it might be useful to note, considering the present-day popularity of the so-called psychoanalytic ego-psychology, that when Marx speaks here of faculties and their expression, he is precisely not speaking of the ego, but of passion, of "natural powers and faculties which exist in man as tendencies and abilities, as drives", of the energy invested in the need of each faculty to be expressed.

There are numerous statements by Marx which are variations of the theme of passion as a category of relatedness of man to himself, to others and to nature, and of the realization of his essential powers. Space permits me to quote only a few. Marx makes very clear what he means by "human faculties" which relate to the world in a passionate way: "his human relations to the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, thinking, observing, feeling, desiring, acting, loving - in short, all the organs of his individuality are the ... active expression (Betätigung) of human reality". Precisely because the object is an expression of human reality, it, itself, becomes human, or as Marx put it, "in practice I can only relate myself in a human way to a thing when the

thing is related in a human way to man". (In passing I should like to call attention to the basic similarity of this concept of Marx with concepts to be found in Goethe, Zen Buddhism, and Christian mysticism).

Man's "drives", then, are an expression of a fundamental and specifically human need, the need to be related to man and nature, and of confirming himself in this relatedness. The aim is to "accomplish the union of man with nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature". The need for self-realization in man is the root of the specifically human dynamism. The wealthy man is at the same time one who needs "a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a need".

Marx saw also clearly the connection between man's relatedness to himself and his relatedness to others. His position in this respect is essentially the same as that of Goethe who said: "Man knows himself only as much as he knows the world. He knows the world only within himself, and he is aware of himself within the world. Each new object truly recognized opens up a new organ within ourselves". From this concept of dynamic relatedness follows that for Marx "the wealthy man is at the same time one who needs a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a need". Hence "poverty is a passive bond which leads man to experience a need for the greatest wealth, the other person".

Is this related man who energetically strives for expression of his faculties, the worker, or the bourgeois of the 19th century? If the answer is no, - and it is "no", - that [what] relevance has Marx's model of human nature for the understanding of man? Is it a man of the golden age of the past, or is it the man of the Messianic vision for the future? The answer is complicated, and leads us directly into one of the most profound and most modern concepts of Marx's psychological system. In contrast to the concept of mental illness which can be defined in relative terms as an illness different and graver than the illness of the average man or, from a different standpoint, as an illness which does not prevent man from producing and procreating, Marx visualized the pathology of normalcy, the crippledness of the - statistically - normal man, the loss to himself, the loss of his human substance, the loss of being what he ought to be because of what he could be. Thus Marx speaks of the possibility that man may "become lost" in the object, provided the object has not become a human object, that is to say, that his relationship

to the object is not that of active relatedness, often called "appropriation". He speaks of man's becoming "mentally and physically dehumanized", or of the "crippled" worker, the "mere fragment of a man" versus the "fully developed individual". If man, so goes Marx's reasoning, does not relate himself actively to others and to nature, then he loses himself, his drives lose their human qualities and assume animal qualities, and so, we might continue, since he is no animal, he is a sick, fragmented, crippled human being. This is precisely the revolutionary and the therapeutic element in Marx's dynamic psychology. Man is potentially not only capable, but in need of relating himself to the world, and in order to be human and to be cured, he needs to restore this potential of a healthy, and not a pathological form of human functioning.

Marx's concept of the crippled versus the fully developed man forms the basis for a new and original concept of neurosis. I am referring to an important statement in the German Ideology: "it is nonsense to believe... one could satisfy one passion separated from all others without satisfying oneself, the whole living individual. If this passion assumes an abstract, separate character, if it confronts him as an alien power, that is,... as the one-sided satisfaction of a single passion - this by no means pertains to consciousness or good will... but to being; not to thought, but to life. It is caused by the empirical development and manifestation of life of the individual... if the circumstances under which this individual lives permit him only the one-sided development of one quality at the expense of all others... the result is that this individual achieves only one-sided, crippled, development". Marx speaks here of alienated passions, of passions which are satisfied as ends in themselves, without satisfying the whole human being, that is to say, which are separated from all other passions and hence oppose the individual as an alien power. In an instinctivistic psychology like Freud's where normalcy and health are the result of the satisfaction, precisely, of one instinct, namely the sexual instinct, such a consideration would have no place. In a humanistic concept of passion, in which the energy is generated by the active striving of all faculties to attain their objects, Marx's statement points to the nature of neurosis or mental illness. It can be defined as absolute dominance, and hence alienation of one passion.

The key concept of the human, that is to say, not alienated or pathological drive, is activity or, as Marx originally said, self-activity. What does Marx mean by "activity"? Obviously he does not have in mind "activity" as it is used in contemporary language, as doing something, being busy, etc. It is also different from the activity of the animal

which constructs "only in accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the appropriate standard to the object. Thus man constructs also in accordance with the laws of beauty". Marx's concept of activity is close to that of Spinoza, a creative and spontaneous act, possible only under the condition of freedom. So he speaks, for instance, of the "spontaneous activity of human fantasy, of the human brain and heart...". This concept of activity becomes particularly clear when Marx speaks in very concrete terms of human passions, particularly that of love. "Let us assume" he writes, "man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artistically cultivated person; if you wish to influence other people you must be a person who really has a stimulating and encouraging effect upon others. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return, i. e., if you are not able, by the manifestation of yourself as a loving person, to make yourself a beloved person, then your love is impotent and a misfortune".

Marx expresses this active quality of love most clearly in what he writes in Die Heilige Familie: "Mr. Edgar transforms love into a goddess and into a cruel goddess by transforming the loving man or the love of man into the man of love, thus making 'love' a being separated from man. By this simple process the transformation of predicate into subject..." man is transformed into no-man. Indeed, love is a human activity, not passivity, (to be in love, rather than to fall in love) and "it is love which teaches man to truly believe in the world of objects outside of him...".

Marx's concept of truly human needs, that is, the need of the other, the need to express and to pour one's faculties into their adequate objects, can be understood fully if one pays attention to Marx's concepts of synthetic, inhuman and enslaving needs. Modem psychology is little concerned with the critical analysis of needs; it accepts the laws of industrial production (maximal production, maximal consumption and minimal human friction) by assuming that the very fact that a person desires something is proof that he has a legitimate need for the desired thing. Freudian psychoanalysis, focusing only on sexual needs, or later on destructive needs, in addition to the needs for survival, had no reason to concern itself with them. Marx, on the other hand, because of the dialectic nature of this psychology, pointed to the ambiguous character of needs very

clearly, and, in fact, used this point as his most severe attack against the science of psychology. "What is to be thought of a science" so he says in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "which... does not feel its own inadequacy, even though this great wealth of human activity means nothing to it except, perhaps, what can be expressed in the single phrase - "need", "common need"? Those "needs" which are not human needs are characterized by Marx very succinctly: "Every man speculates upon creating a new need in another, in order to force him to new sacrifice, to place him in a new dependance, and to entice him to a new kind of pleasure... Everyone tries to establish over others an alien power in order to find there the satisfaction of this own egoistic need. With the mass of objects, therefore, there also increases the realm of alien entities to which man is subjected. Every new product is a new potentiality of mutual deceit and robbery. Man becomes increasingly 'poor' as man... This shows subjectively, partly in the fact that the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural and imaginary appetites".

"As a result,... the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people. Both sides forget that prodigality and thrift, luxury and abstinence, wealth and poverty, are equivalent".

With this distinction between genuine and imaginary human needs, Marx's psychology touches upon one of the most important distinctions to be made in the theory of needs and drives. Neither is an isolated and hypothesized sexual instinct "normal" unless it is part of the totality of man's manifestation of his life; nor is an artificially produced (through advertising) need and desire normal, natural, healthy or human, because it is a subjectively felt desire. The question how to distinguish between human and inhuman, real and imaginary, furthering and poisonous needs is, indeed a fundamental psychological problem which neither psychology nor Freudian psychoanalysis could even begin to investigate, because they made no such distinctions. And how could they make such distinctions when their model of man is the alienated man, when the fact that modern industry creates and satisfies more and more needs is taken as a sign of progress, and when the contemporary concept of freedom, to a large extent, reflects the freedom of the customer to choose between various and virtually identical brands of the same commodity within the reach of his pocketbook - a freedom of the consumer quite different from the freedom of the entrepreneur in the 19th

century? Only a dialectical and revolutionary psychology which sees man and his potentiality beyond the appearance of a crippled man can arrive at this important distinction between two kinds of needs, the study of which may be initiated by those psychologists who do not mistake the appearance for the essence. It should be noted in passing that Marx, once making this difference, must come to the result that poverty and wealth, abstinence and luxury, are not contradictions but are equivalent, resting on the frustration of human needs.

So far we have dealt with Marx's concepts of drives and needs in a general way. Is there anything more specific concerning drives to be found in his psychology? Indeed there is, even though by no means anything as systematic or as complete as we would expect in a work that deals primarily with psychology.

It has already been mentioned that for Marx the concept of love is crucial in describing man's relationship to the outside world. It is crucial also for the process of thinking; one of the main criticisms against "Herr Edgar" in the Heilige Familie is precisely that he tries to get rid of the passion of love in order to find total peace of knowing (Rule des Erkennens). In this context Marx equated love with all "that which is life, all that is immediate, all sensuous experience, all real experience, of which one never knows beforehand whence and whither" (von der man nie vorher weiss woher und wohin). As far as human relations are concerned, Marx believes that "the immediate, relation of man to woman... The relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being".

It is very interesting to compare this concept of Marx with the concept of sexuality in Freud. For Freud, sexuality (and in his later work, destructiveness) is a central passion of man. As I have indicated before, this passion is conceived of as the use of woman by man in order to satisfy his chemically produced sexual hunger. Had Marx known Freud's theory, he would have criticized it as a typical bourgeois theory of use and exploitation. In the center of Marx's concept of human relations we find not sexuality, but Eros, of which sexuality can be one expression. By Eros is meant here the specifically male-female attraction which is a fundamental attraction in all living substance. Freud, in his work up to 1920, could not have had such a concept because for him libido was masculine, and woman was only a sexually crippled man. Only in the

basic revision of his theory after 1920 did Freud speak of Eros, but without giving up his original mechanistic libido theory.

Another basic category in Marx's psychology is that of life as against death. Life and death not in a biological-physiological sense, but in a psychological one. (In many ways this concept touches upon Freud's life and death instinct, but without its alleged biological substratum or more directly, upon what I have called biophilia and necrophilia - love of life and love of death). Perhaps the most decisive question in Marx's psychology is whether a man, class or society are motivated by the affinity to life or to death. His enmity against capitalism, as his love for socialism, as far as the emotional background is concerned, are rooted in this dichotomy. Among the various places where Marx mentioned this distinction, I quote here only the one best known, that in the Communist Manifesto: "In bourgeois society living labor is but a means to increase accumulated labor. In Communist society, accumulated labor is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the laborer. In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past". Or, as he put it elsewhere, the rule of capital is "the domination of living men by dead matter". Eros and love of life are the two central strivings of the unalienated man. They are given in human nature, and manifest themselves under social circumstances which give man the possibility to be what he could be. Among the passions which are produced in, and which govern man in capitalist society, Marx counts in the most general way any kind of greed which is a substitute for the lack of love and aliveness, and more specifically acquisitiveness, avarice and self-indulgence. His analysis of the ascetic, hoarding character of the bourgeois of the 19th century and of the self-indulgent character of those who could afford the luxurious life, is a milestone in the development of a dynamic characterology applied to various classes. Since Marx's whole psychological thinking is dynamic, and not behavioristic-descriptive, those character traits and character concepts have to be understood in the dynamic sense. They are the relatively constant passions and appetites produced by certain economic and social conditions. Marx is related here to the great social-psychological opus of Balzac, who considered the study of character to be the study of those "forces by which man is motivated". The work of Balzac is in many ways the elaboration of Marx's psychological principles. It must be added in passing, that if one reads Marx's letters to Engels, especially in their unabridged German original, one finds a depth-psychological view of individuals which, while not having the artistic qualities of Balzac's descriptions, would

belong among the best psychoanalytic sketches of character in terms of a dialectic humanist psychoanalysis.

To finish this brief resumé of Marx's psychology of drives. I want to mention that rage is also among the passions he mentions, but what is especially interesting is his concept that rage can be turned against oneself, an idea which later on played a very essential part in Freud's psychoanalysis. Marx wrote "shame is a kind of rage which is turned against oneself, and if a whole nation were really ashamed, it would be as were it the lion which crouches before it leaps".

Marx's contribution to humanistic depth psychology could not be fully understood without knowing his attitude toward consciousness and his concept of the function of becoming aware.

His attitude toward consciousness has found its classic expression in the well known statement in the German Ideology: "it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness", and later, in the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique on Political Economy: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence that determines consciousness." What he calls in the first statement "life" he calls in the second statement "social existence". Continuing the tradition of which Spinoza was one of the early outstanding exponents, and which found in Freud, over fifty years later, its culmination, Marx attacks the prevalent opinion that consciousness is the ultimate datum and the quality of all psychic life. Marx saw, and in this respect more deeply than Freud, that consciousness is the product of the particular practice of life which characterizes a given society or class. It is "from the very beginning a social product" and like language, it arises "from the need, the necessity for intercourse with other men. While man thinks he is determined and motivated by his own ideas, he is in reality motivated by forces behind his back and of which he is not aware". While Marx already used the term "repression" (Verdrängung) in relation to the repression of "ordinary natural desires", in the German Ideology, Rosa Luxemburg quite explicitly, and following Marx's thought, spoke of the dichotomy between the "conscious" and the "unconscious". In an interpretative version of Marx's statement about consciousness being determined by social existence, she writes: "The unconscious comes before the conscious. The logic of the historic process comes before the subjective logic of the

human beings who participate in the historic process". In a class society man's consciousness is necessarily false consciousness, ideology, which gives the appearance of the rationality of his actions when due to the contradictions of any class society the true motivations are not rational.

Marx's concept of consciousness and ideology lead to one of the most essential parts of Marx's theory of revolution. In a letter of September, 1843, he speaks of consciousness as "a thing which the world must appropriate, although it does not want to do so. our motto must be then: reform of consciousness not by dogmas but by the analysis of the mythical consciousness unclear to itself be it religious or political". The destruction of illusions and the analysis of consciousness, that is to say, awareness of the reality of which man is not conscious, are the conditions for social change. Marx has expressed it in many splendid formulations, like this one: one must force "the frozen circumstances to dance by singing to them their own melody". Or: "the demand to give up the illusions about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions". Man should become "a disappointed man who has come to his senses in order that he may move around himself and thus around his real sun". Awareness of reality as a key to change is for Marx one of the conditions of social progress and revolution, as it is for Freud the condition for the therapy for mental illness. Marx, not being interested in problem of individual therapy did not speak about awareness as a condition for individual change, but considering his whole psychological system, as I have tried to outline it here, it is by no means a tour de force to make this connection.

I believe that when Marx's central concern, that with man, has been fully recognized, his contribution to psychology will find the recognition which so far has been denied it.

Maximilien Rubel

Reflections on Utopia and Revolution

Two ideas of great importance are to be found at the very core of socialist thinking: Utopia and Revolution. Yet they are seldom examined in their reciprocal relation. It is as if Revolution were held to imply the rejection or exclusion of Utopia, and Utopia to imply the banishment or denial of Revolution. Such appears to be, summarily described, the general approach of nineteenth-century socialist thinkers. In the twentieth century, up to the First World War, the debate—although restricted to the ideological disputes cropping up periodically between Marxists and non-Marxists, or Marxists and anarchists-—was somewhat livelier. But since then there is only silence, as if the turmoil of contemporary history had muted all voices daring to urge a resumption of the debate.

Back to the Sources

Marxism is not the sum total of all socialist ideology. Nor does it embody all socialist thought. Its ethics and theories go back to the industrial revolution which took place in England during the last third of the eighteenth century. From the very start, socialism appears with all the characteristics of a new Gospel—a message of worldly liberation and salvation. However visionary they may have seemed to others, the early socialists or communists of the industrial age did not conceive their ideals as being inconsistent with the practical means of carrying them into effect. For William Godwin, Reason is the means to achieve the desired social transformation; for Gracchus Babeuf, violence—i.e., unreason—is the means. At first declared to be a legal movement, Revolution—due to the closing of the Pantheon Club—becomes the business of a “secret directory” empowered to act “by and for the people." Babeuf’s idea is to seize power in order to “restore it to the people"; but there are obstacles to be overcome. Called to the ballot boxes, the masses were quite capable of restoring tyranny: prior to exercising sovereignty, they had to be taught their lesson.

Irresistibly, once started on the slope of impatience and “provisional” authority, the Babouvists transform social revolution into organized war, with all the rules of the game: hierarchy, discipline, obedience, commandments, specialization, etc. It is Revolution managed from above by a general staff or a committee of experts, until it is

time for the masses to act by themselves—once the enemy has been defeated and power conquered. This ambiguity of Babouvism is to be found also in Auguste Blanqui and his followers: honesty and good intentions are tokens of devotion offered the people—a people still ignorant, reduced to mere inert matter, or more exactly to a main striking force on the battlefield. The essence of Babouvism is outer-directed organized violence. Its humanism is in the intention, the aim, the Utopia: it is not to be found in the means—unless one considers vengeful acts perpetrated by the rebellious masses to be manifestations of their will to achieve freedom. In this case it would be the purpose of violence to "humanize" violence, since it aims at establishing a society devoid of violence. The danger and weakness of such a conception reside in the impossibility of foreseeing and appraising, choosing and evaluating actions in a humanist perspective.

The so-called Utopian socialism goes back to a tradition of humanist rationalism prior to the French Revolution. With Saint-Simon, spiritual heir of the Encyclopaedists, political power plays only an accessory part. The "New Christianity" is the ethical basis of a power which is not political but administrative (managerial). The essence of this socioeconomic Christianity is a science of production. Politics is replaced by industrial organization for human well-being and security, whose only objective is-in the words of Saint-Simon on his deathbed—"to assure to all men the greatest freedom in developing their faculties."

The utopians intend to reform society in the name of reason and science. In the view of Robert Owen, cooperation is the key to solving social problems. Owen has none of Charles Fourier's passion; he has no imagination; his doctrine amounts to a few elementary ideas, the basic one being that man is the product of his environment. Still, that pioneer of co-operative socialism was always ready to advocate spontaneous effort, distrust, and even hostility toward the powerful, the rich, the ruling classes. If socialism means co-operation, then Owen is the first of contemporary socialists; and if in the last analysis Marx's socialism is simply a system or method of co-operative production, then Marx is Owen's disciple.

Karl Marx

Marx did not abolish Utopia. On the contrary, he rejuvenated it and enlarged its scope. With him, Utopia becomes one single movement in two stages: RevolutionCreation. Before Marx the utopians thought and imagined creation

independently from the very men who were supposed to build the New City. Man was Marx's first and foremost concern. “We know that for the new-fangled forces of society to work well, they only need to be mastered by new-fangled men—and such are the workingmen." (Speech at the Anniversary of the “Pe0ple’s Paper,” April 14, 1856.)

Initially Fourier’s and Owen’s disciple, soon deeply involved in political struggle, Marx was never to break the spiritual bonds that linked him to Utopian socialism. It suffices to read on that score a statement which he prepared, two years before his death for the Russian Populists who sought his opinion about the chances and perspectives of the peasants’ communes in the context of the development of capitalism in Russia. Not once, during that lengthy and arduous reflection, does Marx dwell upon political questions properly speaking—such as class structures or party organization. All his thought bears upon the original nature of the archaic institution of the rural commune and its importance as a “regeneratory element in the Russian society, [an] element of superiority over the countries enslaved by capitalist regimes.”

In that apologia for a “localized microcosm,” as Marx calls the Russian commune, it is easy to see a last tribute which he pays to Robert Owen, pioneer of co-operative and communal socialism. Like his utopian predecessor, Marx puts all his confidence in the creative spontaneity of those who produce the wealth of nations without enjoying it themselves. He bestows upon the primitive commune the virtues of a social microcosm. One may recognize in this idealizing of an as yet ill-known institution a projection into the future of a wish-image. Yet, it is no accident that Marx felt a sympathy with Owen’s Utopia. The cooperative commune which Marx imagined meets the equation we mentioned earlier—that of the opposition between the Iacobin (political) concept and the one we shall now call for the sake of clarity the communalist concept of the workers’ movement. In the first, initiative of action and consciousness of purpose are conferred on political avant-gardes heading large and easily maneuverable masses; in the second, the small size of action groups makes it possible to do away with lasting and hence “professional” leaders, and all political elites are deemed superfluous. Here, delegating power does not mean the relinquishment of a right, but the conferring of a temporary and imperative mandate for a strictly circumscribed task.

In a sense Marx is the most utopian of the utopians: caring little about the City to be, bending his mind on destroying the existing order, he elevates Revolution to the level of

an absolute requirement. It is the mechanics of this imaginary and imaginative Revolution that partake of Utopia: it supposes men thoroughly conscious of their "gilded miseries," men capable of thinking the entire gamut of social and socialist reality. In fact, Marx lays down an economic law of pauperization which is more difficult to grasp than plain and naked want. He grafts the Utopia to be onto the actual daily struggle and formulates a dialectical clue to the proletarian revolution: let the workers will and make their revolution, and they shall get socialism in the bargain. In other words, for the workers to become conscious of their alienation (in the deepest meaning Marx ascribes to this Hegelian term) is to become capable both of destroying capitalism and building Utopia—a classless, stateless, moneyless society. Thus Marx's concept contains an odd paradox: it is at the culminating point of their destitution that the workers are

presumed to become conscious of the dire necessity of advancing toward a social rebirth through a total revolution. A strange "materialism" indeed, which envisages such a metamorphosis of the slave who has been turned into a mere cog of a profit-making industrial machine.

According to Marx, "communist consciousness" is supposed to "emanate" from the dispossessed masses, not at all from an intellectual elite (The German Ideology). Bourgeois intellectuals cannot become communists prior to reaching the level of revolutionary consciousness which is that of the enslaved workers. Therein lies the paradox of the workers' movement. Yet Marx makes the distinction between socialist consciousness and socialist science. The latter is both possible and necessary in relation with the double-edged concrete movement of the proletariat: class consciousness and political action. In appointing their own political spokesmen, the workers voice their will to upset the existing order from within -or depending on circumstances—from outside the established institutions. "The proletariat constitutes itself into a class and, consequently, into a political party," states the Communist Manifesto, showing thereby that instead of joining political parties outside their own ranks the workers awake spontaneously and creatively to the consciousness of their selfhood. Whereas interest and profit cement into a unit the bourgeois class, the proletariat's cohesion as a class is hammered out in the daily struggle for bread and the consciousness of pursuing a revolutionary goal. What Marx—and before him, in 1843, Flora Tristan—thus formulated in one single proposition, namely, that "The emancipation of the working

class must be conquered by the working class itself," remains the implicit postulate of all genuine socialist thought.

Unions, parties, councils, and other forms of labor organizations are true to their aims only if they are the conscious and spontaneous creation of the workers themselves. As a class whose very being takes on the form of organized struggle, the workers must not commit their initiative to the hands of a corporate elite that claims to prescribe and guide their social and political action. No other meaning can be ascribed to the formula which Marx and Engels repeated again and again as they censored the bourgeois intelligentsia for professing to educate the working class politically. No doubt, intellectuals do play a part in the workers' movement; but the part they play is adequate and effectual only inasmuch as they bring into the movement "elements of culture" and not readymade theories, philosophies, esoteric doctrines concerning the ends and means of history, a dialectic of revolutionary action, etc. True, as a man of action and a party "leader," Marx did not always himself conform strictly to the principle of the workers' self-emancipation. But at least both he and Engels recognized the fact and found fault with themselves each time they searched their souls.

Marxism Judged by Marx

The real problem is not the opposition Utopia-Marxism, Marxism-Reformism, Marxism-Revisionism, but Jacobinism-Self-Emancipation. The point in question is whether, at the same time as they entrust to chosen and/or elected bodies the representation and defense of their interests, social classes and men as such can retain the autonomy of their consciousness and actions.

There is a dangerous ambiguity looming here: is a social class able to have one consciousness, one will, one action? In other words, is it possible for a social class to think, will, act, except through the instrumentality of "democratically" elected mandataries appointed to represent, i.e., to voice the will and thought of a community? In that case, is not the group's formal or tacit approval regarding their delegate's doings and decisions the sole evidence there is as to the congruency of their will with his comportment? But if, thus formulated, the question carries its own answer, the answer does not exhaust the whole question. Indeed, a further question arises, which demands a rejoinder: what are the most efficient conditions in which a delegation of mandates would result in representing the real interests of those concerned?

Socialist thinking prior to Marx was very much preoccupied with this question. The answer consisted in describing and defining an "ideal" society. Marx inherited and enriched this legacy. 'His challenge is aimed not at the fundamentals but at some of the aberrant aspects of the so-called utopian socialism. Producers' commune, cooperative enterprise, oneness of work and culture—in short Utopia's stateless and moneyless City represents in Marx's view the resurrection, alongside modern technology, of the archaic rural commune and the cradle of primitive communism.

The historical experience of the last sixty years carries a clear, unequivocal lesson: in both its reformist and revolutionary forms, the Jacobin conception of the labor movement has met with failure. When Lenin broke the ties he had kept until the First World War with Karl Kautsky's ideas, he proclaimed the ineffectiveness of the labor movement in the industrially developed countries, whose proletariat had been "betrayed" by an aristocracy which issued from its own ranks. On the other hand, he argued, the material and moral conditions for a revolutionary movement did exist in an industrially underdeveloped and mainly rural country, such as Czarist Russia. It was there-according to the so-called theory of "Permanent Revolution," then common to Trotsky and Lenin—that the socialist revolution could be set in motion, if not carried through.

Actually, in theory and practice Lenin and his party were an elite of bourgeois radical intellectuals artificially grafted onto a stirring social mass whose genuine revolutionary aspirations were readily manipulated by an apparatus of professional revolutionists. The results were soon to be felt. After winning the confidence of the spontaneously formed Soviets who opposed the Kerensky government, the Bolshevik party succeeded in establishing itself as a State power. Just as in the countries of capitalist tradition, a political aristocracy conscious of its interests and objectives had taken the place of the "social microcosm" which—according to Marx's theory and Utopiasurges spontaneously from the soil of every society in a state of historical evolution and transformation.

Marx may have overestimated the political element in the workers' movement; but he never supposed that the working class had to abandon itself to the dialectical wisdom of a party or an elite of political experts. For Marx, the Utopia of the Revolution is an ethic of revolutionary behavior. The workers' destitution is the central motivation of the revolutionary act, as well as the creative force of the new social order. As the direct

subject of this revolutionary transformation, the worker is also its object—- since he abolishes himself as a wage earner.

Conclusion

Utopia and Revolution are the two historical coordinates of the socialist movement. That is to Say, in order to materialize, the socialist movement must regard itself as both Utopia and Revolution. It means also that, to become a socialist, one must be at the same time a utopian and a revolutionary: one must will and desire Revolution and Utopia, will the abolition of our society and desire the creation of the New City.

The ethic of Revolution and Utopia is that of a socialist humanism. Socialism is a historical necessity only inasmuch as it is thought and willed as an ethical necessity. That is what Marx had in mind when he offered the following dilemma: the proletariat is either revolutionary, or it is nothing. To restore its full meaning to the concept of socialist ethics, let us add that socialism is either consciousness of Utopia, or it is nothing.

Ernst Bloch

Karl Marx and Humanity: The Material of Hope

> "It is not true that the shortest line is always the straightest." - LESSING

> "It is not enough to represent things as they are, but it is necessary to think of what is desired and what is possible." - GORKI

> "The great truth of our age (knowledge of this alone is not enough, yet without such knowledge no truth of any significance can be ascertained) is that our earth is sinking into barbarism, because the relations of ownership are being forcibly held down to the means of production." - BRECHT

The Authentic Artisan

No man has been satisfied by desire alone. Wishing is not only ineffectual but enervates if what is wished is not willed, and willed resolutely. It must be accompanied, too, by a keen far-seeing vision which shows the will what can be done. But ultimately all this does not make the mere individual take his so-called personal concerns less seriously, less like the petite bourgeoisie who see no farther than their noses, nor desire to do so. The man who is just so narrow may even feel himself to be a participant in events of common concern so long as and to the degree that they concern him for the time being. But once this is settled, the all too private individual withdraws anew into his own affairs until some later day. He puts the cards of the common good (which he sees as something quite external to him) on the table and calls it a day.

But this type would not be as he is but for his counterpart, the completely busy type—however he may actually oppose the cause, which does not mean only in a bourgeois, despiritualized, and reified form. In this case it is not just that his individual being hides away in a small restricted wigwam, in a Philistine or even snobbish way, and then decays in very privacy; rather, his individual existence dissolves into wholly external relationships, and ends in a merely technical velocity—which may occasionally serve public ends. However, because there is hardly anything personal, humane, or

expressive here, but for the most part only native or factitious nullity, very little that is really useful emerges. For the value of a group is generally no greater than the individuals who go to make it up, and busywork, in which no one is really moving, becomes mere repetition and finally stagnation. Zeros, whether voluntary or coerced, add up to zero; and mud when trodden on just oozes, but does not harden.

The worst situation in this regard exists when half a group has gone red and the other half has stayed petit bourgeois—and this latter half continues to transmit, foster, and develop all the noble values of the bourgeois Philistine. Then not only the love for some tangible kitsch is present but, even more lamentably, the production of human kitsch and the degeneration of human relationships in the very midst of an ascent to the freest and most courageous goals. In such cases the path forward is not blocked, but made difficult and artificially prevented from remaining as fresh as it properly is, and as widely attractive. Therefore the trained, the authentic, artisans of our happiness have to bestir themselves without losing themselves; yet they must carry out their tasks with so much common will and vision that their own achievement does not remain an individual and all too private affair. Then both struggle and assistance will proceed effectively, and there will be no mere restriction or empty achievement. For aid and liberation must have a human face; and a human face must be able to smile.

“To Abrogate All Relationships in which Man Is Degraded Enslaved, Abandoned, and Wretched”

What has brought to the red flag those who did not, in a sense, need it? Perhaps that sympathetic movement of the heart (insofar as it exists at all) before such universal suffering. Perhaps the conscience which this misery awakens in some silent members of the ruling class while their active business partners pocket the profits quite undisturbed. And perhaps the thirst for knowledge also helped by providing in scientific analysis a knife to lop off the branch on which a young man or woman of solid circumstances and expectations had been sitting. Of course, one hardly comes by this sort of knowledge without some previous ethical interest in obtaining it; if knowledge has been arrived at only by contemplation and has remained at this level, one will scarcely draw any actual, revolutionary conclusions. For example, Sombart once said he was highly embarrassed

when people asked him if he was a socialist. The question was quite ambiguous: it could refer either to what was subjectively desirable, or to what was objectively inevitable, in socialism. In the latter case, Sombart, through scientific insight, was (alas!) a socialist; in the former, on the other hand, when the question was put as to his position, being bourgeois he was wholly anti-red. Quod erat demonstrandum—and very definitely shown forth in Sombart.

On the other hand, the above mentioned sentiment, along with conscience and attitude, are not always enough to engender class treason against the well-to-do. Marx himself expressed in a circular letter his opposition to a certain Hermann Kriege, who undertook to combat misery on the basis of love alone, and so ultimately as if out of philanthropic condescension from above. Marx also opposed those who had set Kriege thinking in this way— that is, the "dew of sentiment suffused with love," which he found not only among the "German socialists" but in many humanitarian passages in Ludwig Feuerbach's writings. Feuerbach did indeed remain aloof from the socialist movement, and even from the 1848 revolution, although in his later years he avowed an affiliation with the workers' party.

Hence the least that is required is a collaboration of feeling, conscience, and above all knowledge, in order to present a socialist consciousness in opposition to one's own past social being, with the significant and contrasting result that one's consciousness can no longer be permitted to correspond to the social nature one had possessed for so long. The result in certain areas would be the condition described, and defined objectively, not just psychologically, in the Communist Manifesto: "Finally, in periods when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of the old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands." With this threatened defection of the foremost younger intellectuals from their class, with so peculiar a mixture of a backward glance at the ruins, a look into the future, and humanitarianism, a defensive countermovement begins to develop. The strongest manifestation of this kind was fascism, but long before then there were finer misty adumbrations of it, which then became apparent about it, and have arisen once more in its aftermath. All such countermovements are motivated by an impulse to divert, in a reactionary fashion, any who might be inclined to follow the socialist line.

When it became clear that Marx could not be kept quiet despite every effort, then he had to be greatly fined down, and above all, incredibile dictu, to be de-revolutionized. Hence he has been represented as a poor relation of Kierkegaard or Pascal, in which case a sort of pietist. Accordingly, as a consistent outcome of the furling of the red flag, one Knittermeyer, an existentialist, maintains that it would not be "just" to Marx to saddle him with what today appears under the name of communist ideology. Even Heidegger, in that lucus a non lucendo of his which bears the title A Letter on Humanism, was able to patronize (at least in the period of denazification) an emasculated and decapitated Marx figure, which in spite of—or because of—its lack of correspondence with the real Marx, proved the more acceptable. But this goes to show that the combination of feeling, conscience, and objective insight that so often has caused intellectuals to move to the left makes Marx indispensable. Clearly Marx unadulterated offers a secure paradigm of the red path of the intellect: the model of a humanism that conceives itself in action. This found expression in Marx early on as a distinctive concern with no element of softness. First, this acute and sensitive man was aware of his own humanity; secondly, others with the same human countenance were being treated like dogs. No mercy could be spared for those who treated them in this way; on the contrary, to tolerate the oppressors would really be inhuman in regard to the oppressed and humiliated. The "fake goodness" (as Münzer termed Luther's intervention on behalf of the overlords) which condemns all violence unless exerted by the exploiters is far removed from Marx. Equally remote is that inauthentic pacifism which, since Marx, has been a feature of a gelatinous indiscriminate forgiveness that allows no decisions which might be completely burdensome to a partially conquered master class—as was the case in 1918, and certainly in 1945.

Instead, the humanitarianism of Marx was not general and abstract but personally addressed and directed to those who alone needed it. Like Münzer, Marx took up the whip with which Jesus had driven the money changers from the temple. Therefore, his humanitarianism, precisely because it is concrete depending on the direction in which it faces, simultaneously manifests a pervasive indignation, while calling men to action and seeking, finding and proclaiming their objective redemption.

Even in regard to misery Marx sees more than just misery, unlike all the abstract sympathizers and especially the abstract utopians. For him, the explosive factor in poverty really becomes a dynamic, explosive force, directed against the cause of that

misery, which, once it realizes its causes, itself becomes the lever of revolution. The humanitarianism of Marx, as directed to the least of his brethren, proves itself in his endeavor to understand from their roots the degradation and induced nullity of most of his brethren, in order to attack their very roots. The zero point of the most extreme alienation, as represented by the proletariat, ultimately becomes the point of dialectical reversal. Within the nothingness of this zero point, Marx teaches, we may find our whole world. Consequently, the alienation, dehumanization, and objectification, the transformation of all people and things into commodities, which capitalism increasingly has brought about, comprise for Marx the ancient enemy which in capitalism as capitalism has finally achieved a victory beyond anything in the past. Certainly humanism is the born enemy of this dehumanization. Indeed, since Marxism is essentially only this struggle against the dehumanization which reaches its acme in capitalism (until the latter is utterly transcended), it follows e contrario that true Marxism, in its dynamics of the class struggle, and in its substantive goal, is, and must be, humanism and humanitarianism enhanced. Above all, the various adulterations of and deviations from humanism can be validly criticized or transcended only from within Marxism. For Marxism alone is the heir of whatever was intended by the earlier revolutionary bourgeoisie in respect of human decency. And only Marxism, by reason of its knowledge that class society, especially the capitalist type, is responsible for every variety of self-alienation, has penetrated to its roots, which can be removed. As the eliminative power of the proletariat increases, so the circle of those drawn to Marxist humanitarianism widens, and this real humanism then reaches beyond the radically exploited to all who suffer in common under capitalism. The cardinal humanistic elements in the social revolution will finally remove the darkness of self-alienation from all mankind, or, as Marx says in his Introduction to A Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right: “The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man, and hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, abandoned, and wretched creature…”

This material “categorical imperative” is by no means, as alleged by the bisectors of Marx, confined to the young Marx. No part of it was suppressed when Marx transferred what he had formerly termed “real humanism” into the materialist philosophy of history. Even in 1845, in his Theses on

Feuerbach, the Sixth Thesis had clearly stated: “But the human essence is no abstraction inhering in each particular individual. In fact, it is the totality of social relations.” Even earlier in 1845, the Foreword to The Holy Family had offered a decidedly materialistic formulation of the same essence of human nature: “Real humanism has no more dangerous adversary in Germany than spiritualism or speculative idealism, which sets ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘spirit’ in place of the real human individual.” Admittedly, the term alienation [Entfremdung], the negative pole of the humane [Humanum], recedes somewhat in the later writings of Marx, but this recession is confined only to the term and not the thing itself, oriented to the human ideal. In the later analyses of the proletarian working day and the rest of the totality of social relations as they have developed for the proletariat, the humane remains the guide and standard. Rather than list numerous available examples, let us note one that is particularly late and particularly striking: “The realm of freedom actually begins only when labor, conditioned by need and external necessity, ceases; therefore, in the nature of the case, it lies beyond the sphere of particular material production” (Capital, III).

The “release of the richness of human nature” that will blossom on the ground of conquered necessity does not in the slightest imply the suppression of “real humanism,” but, on the contrary, the establishment for the first time of its proper dignity. Humanitarianism finds a place where democracy has

been made really possible, for true democracy is the first really human domicile. For Marx, the humane, even as a remote goal of the tendency of society, is completely dominant. Marxism properly pursued, effectively unburdening itself, and emancipating itself from evil neighbors, has been since its inception "humanity in action," the human countenance coming to fulfillment. It seeks, strikes out upon, and follows the one objectively real path toward this goal; hence only its future is at one and the same time inevitable and congenial.

Secularization and the Power to Set Things Upright

The humane element must be brought out into fresh and bracing air if it is to advance from mere inwardness, long enough preached in vain. Yet some now maintain (even though their opinions are of suspect origin) that this would be regressive rather than a progress. In this interpretation, whatever is set upon its feet and put into motion undergoes, so to speak, only a process of reduction from horse to mule and then to plebian pedestrian: it is sacrilegiously taken down from its sacred tabernacle and "rendered worldly." In its historical manifestation this process is also called "secularization," with less derogatory connotations. Hence the State transformed ecclesiastical into temporal lands, goods, and rights—in Germany in 1648, and more thoroughly in 1803; in France in 1789, and most recently in 1906. But secularization has become wholly pejorative now that the term is used in a reactionary fashion to refer to Marx—because he did so much setting things on their feet and putting them into action. It is said that Marx deflated man and his spiritual life, which were manifestly higher and more elevated before him; that the blessed life became just a happy one, endowed only with material goods; and that he sold (thus the bank clerks of the Idea) stocks which formerly had a very high quotation at a very reduced price, accessible to far too many, thus making the article so obtained worth just as little. A true connoisseur of such wares need pay no attention (so they say) to a cut-rate merchant like Marx; the expert in the wares of peace can ignore him. The true lover of man and his salvation should return to

the real sources of value which he will find where the "political melody" has not yet sounded at all, or even appears to have sounded wrongly. This is a respectable way to shrug off Marx and remain sensitive to the dawn ahead and the new beginning. In this interpretation, however, the dawn is thought to have glowed in the remotest past, and the new beginning to lie behind a sacred mist instead of the so-called barren "late period" of the present. Marx himself is held to be wholly decadent, or at least an advocate of civilization in the bad sense. Just as once, from a reactionary perspective, poets were distinguished from mere writers, the latter being regarded as comparatively trivial, so the secularizing Marx has come to be regarded as a prophet of an asphalt culture. All because man and the profound implications of the humane were reestablished within the possibilities of their proper stature.

This denigration of one's own age is widespread among the bourgeoisie in other ways, and not restricted to Marx. Of course, the fatigue of a declining class no longer permits much self-confidence in accordance with Spengler's description of this state. We are now in a "late period" [Spätezeit], and there is nothing else; a sterile "waking state" [Wachheit] replaces the once young "culture bearing soul" [kulturträgerische Seele]. Toynbee takes this view much farther when he represents his own "democracy and science" as secularized, and as "an almost meaningless repetition of things which the Greeks and Romans before us had already achieved, and that extraordinarily well" (Civilization on Trial, 1948). Yet this rejection of one's own, already historical, bourgeois values would not fulfill its social mission without a simultaneous rejection of the liberal past, as, above all, the vocation of our time with respect to the future. How comforting it would be if Marxism, too (indeed, especially Marxism), even on purely chronological grounds, in view of its value stance in the general autumn of culture, were in no way noteworthy, or even future sustaining. Yet how dispiriting it would be, especially for young people with a disposition or inclination toward socialism. Then Marx would not only be, as the Nazis put it, the "very depths of the nineteenth century"; even if he were and expressed the twentieth century, he would offer only the past, not the future. And the antiquarian Marx-killers do not stop here: their denigration of their own time would not be complete without idolatry of the magical moonlit nights of the past. "The revolt of the masses," "the rule of the plebs," "the noise of the mob" at the end of all the concerts of culture would not seem so wretched and pitiable but for the fact that its own music might be represented as a mere derivation from better, more spiritual, idealistic, and imaginative times. But without such a sound from the past, the process of corrective

reestablishment would not be complete, and the whole business of secularization would not be destructive at the point that most concerns capitalism. In the Preface to the second edition of Capital, Marx first explained the process of setting upright something from the past, with special reference to the Hegelian dialectic, which was "standing on its head": "It must be turned right side up again if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." Of course, in keeping with the comparatively popular conception of Marxism's indebtedness to German classical philosophy, this process was construed not as "rescue" but equally as regression, that is, into an ostensibly unique classical tradition. Hence the once common "emendations" of Marx via a Marburgian Kant or (much more weakly) a neo-Hegelian Hegel. In this way, Marxism was not yet irrationalized, but idealized, that is, it was forced back, without regard to its unique proletarian-revolutionary source, to still rationalistic though decisively non-materialistic theories.

Subsequently, however, an increasingly irrationalistic tendency developed in late bourgeoisdom, above all in Germany. Marx was now belittled by playing off quite mystical originals against their alleged imitations. The former Kantianization or Hegelianization of Marx was now accompanied by a radical attempt to destroy him by making him out to be a virtual plagiarist. The result was a quite ludicrous variety of source fetishism, tracing a line back from Marx to Joachim of Fiore or Augustine, or ultimately to primeval salvation myths. That great heretic and dreamer of future times, Joachim of Fiore, was acceptable, even though he too was only a sort of Isaiah of the thirteenth century. But Marx, because he was the crucial case, was laid hold of and unmasked as a soi-disant despoiler of churches—in the descrescendo of a secularization reeking of the charnel house of revolution. In this interpretation, humanitarianism was merely a trivialized version of the theme of the Son of man, proletarian solidarity was simply a vulgarized descendant of early Christian agape-communism, and the realm of freedom was simply the kingdom of the children of God—at the level of a godless pseudo-Enlightenment. In other words, the "adventures of ideas" (as Whitehead significantly terms them), whereby ideas are not worth a powder shot—although they may earn one if they cease to be spiritual. Characteristic of this line of interpretation was, for example, Löwith's source hunting for the mythological grandmother, at least a subsidiary purpose of which was to represent the grandson as someone who squanders the ancient temple treasure, in the double sense of the word. Here exploitation becomes "prehistory" or, biblically, the "original sin of this aeon," historical materialism as a

whole becomes “salvation history in the language of political economy,” and the “communist faith a pseudomorphosis of Jewish- Christian messianism” (Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen, 1953). With a Marx so deeply involuted, so relentlessly debunked as a plagiarist, and so magically dissolved, it is no surprise that Löwith could assert: “Compared to Marx, Hegel’s philosophy is realistic.” This is what results when the power to stand something the right way up, and to save the rational kernel, is interpreted exclusively as secularization—as something which is not calculated to gladden the hearts of the devotees and guides of spiritual principalities.

But a society without masters and slaves is clearly the very thing sought for so long—and in vain—under the name of humanization. It is the very thing that a class society has so long opposed or impeded—together with the substance of hope, which is only in the process of formation.

Surely a good content is not weakened if it is corrected, whereas the real plagiarists have before them only stale or flat fare, which was once better or at least fresher. The foremost members of this class of mechanical echoers are those who demand of the giants that they must have parents of stature. They might as well reject pilots as being derivative just because Elijah once rode through the air—and much farther.

But these “secularizers” are themselves epigonal, and genuinely so, for they are all adherents of a partial or completely reactionary romanticism. Mythology as a whole once seemed (to men like Creuzer and even Welcker)to be the original source of all science, and a kind of clairvoyance before the dawn of the day of mere brain power. Indeed, mythology was regarded as being the unachieved totality of knowledge from time immemorial; all subsequent endeavor which provided any knowledge (as, for example, Plato’s theory of ideas) was only an echo thereof, and hence only a secularization. But Marx wrote to Ruge in 1843: “It will be shown … that the world has long possessed in dream form something of which it need only become conscious in order to possess it in actuality. It will then be evident that it is a question not of a great theoretical gap between past and future, but rather of realizing the ideas of the past.” According to the pattern of the “secularizers,” such a statement would be secularized from a romantic original, whereas it represents an absolutely original utterance. Marx’s formulation represents a completely new point of view in respect to the past; or, more precisely, as Marx himself says, entailing an “analysis of the mythical consciousness in

the past which is unclear about itself," and of course, involving no abstract rupture with the past. Hence a good content is actually not weakened when corrected; even more surely, it is not secularized when, having been set right way up, it is made actual.

It is superfluous here to emphasize the completely new elements that Marx, with the proletarian-revolutionary mandate behind him, had to discover in order to be able to realize the good ideas of the past: the crucially new elements in the recognition of surplus value, in the economic-dialectical interpretation of history, in the theory-action (praxis) relationship. If the "secularizers" do not understand these matters, do not wish to do so because of their bourgeois vested interest, or cannot do so because of ignorance, this tells us something about their own reactionary attitude, but nothing about Marxism.

Least of all does this backwardness say anything about the new humanism, activism, and transformation of the world, or the adjusted forward-dreaming in Marxism, which has always remained open. Here there is no ci-devant myth to become cracked and thawed, but a rending of the veil, and a steady shining forth of light. In this connection, and to remain outside the Marxist process of re-establishment, let us glance at morality. Is morality attenuated if it is no longer practiced for the sake of an otherworldly reward? Is it not rather enhanced? And is Christianity itself made less potent (say by a Thomas Münzer) when no longer interpreted quietistically, or in the somewhat tepid other-worldly sense of "feasting on Christ's account"? On the contrary, surely Christianity becomes more genuine and an actual self-fulfillment through involvement in activity, in temporal history, in revolution, and in every other "embodiment of Christ" which had appeared to the Anabaptists, and earlier to the Hussites, as mystical democracy.

And let us look at the history of science which, among the Greeks at any rate, arose when a break with mythology was effected, even though myth was frequently, with varying emphasis, included in the elucidation of the concept. Did philosophy and science become poorer as a consequence? Surely their range of vision and knowledge was extended when Socrates sought to bring them down to earth from heaven. Or when Democritus' ananke by no means secularized the mythical Moira or goddess of fate. Or when Aristotle, with his brace of ontological concepts, dynamis-enteleche, and matter-form, brought to the mythical woman-man hypostases, apart from the

usefulness of these concepts in demythologization, something thoroughly new, responsible, and defensible "in truth." Of course, there is a true intellectual intention within the mythical or mystical shell, something that in humanitarianism and in dialectics (already present in Chinese myth) is seeking orientation to an essential illumination that has yet to shine forth in the future; above all in the messianic lightning flashes of myth. The friend of true enlightenment will hardly withhold his delight at and gratitude for such prefigurations and their instruction. But the activity of the intellect involving the processes of amending, augmenting, and illuminating the world from the basis of the world always starts out from a scientifically achieved awareness that retains a certain given content. But this process can no longer expand and be understood in a society in which, as Edward Spranger has said, only two philosophies are left: one of desperation, which surrenders everything, and one of cobwebs, which seeks to derive ecclesiastical conclusions from medieval scholastic postulates of wisdom derived from a remote past. Only creative Marxism is appropriate to our time, for only Marxism sees it as simultaneously productive, inheriting, and fulfilling. Only in creative Marxism is humanitarianism no longer confined to human hearts or idealistic stimuli (without entailing the expenditure of a penny in the process). Only in creative Marxism may the earth be said to be on the point of penetrating the world and not remaining just a mythical picture of the kind with which the "fictitious riches" of the verbal myth regurgitation of today is satisfied.

A different prospect is allowed the realization of what is correctly known, and known to be correct. It is envisioned in a tendency conceived in Marxist terms, according to the criterion of real possibility and its perspective. This is praxis: secularization indeed—but of the celestial, for it removes everything above, in which man is not apparent. Here, of course, secularization has to be understood in a really new, primarily Marxist, sense, in keeping with the theory-practice concept. Then, with proper irony, the word, made so malicious and derogatory, is redeemed in a manner which the sciolists among the detractors of Marxism could scarcely have conceived. When all the great thinkers before Marx had remained essentially satisfied to develop the world philosophically in a book, Marxist humanism appeared on the horizon to begin an actual incorporation of philosophy into the world, suo modo. Philosophy was set completely on its feet and enabled to stand upright, and thus it showed itself equally called to and adept in the reconstruction of the earth.

All this took place without any diminution of the great ideas of the past; the process was philosophically profound and for this very reason not poor in deeds. In Hölderlin's poem To the German People, the Marxist question is stated thus, after the judgment that the Germans are poor in deeds but rich in ideas: "Or will deeds like light from the clouds shine from thoughts? Will these dry books live?" A task so clearly and decisively manifest is the best possible evidence that hope conceived will be brought to birth.

Dreaming Ahead, Sobriety, Enthusiasm, and Their Unity

No dreaming may stand still, for this bodes no good. But if it becomes a dreaming ahead, then its cause appears quite differently and excitingly alive. The dim and weakening features, which may be characteristic of mere yearning, disappear; and then yearning can show what it really is able to accomplish. It is the way of the world to counsel men to adjust to the world's pressures, and they have learned this lesson; only their wishes and dreams will not hearken to it. In this respect virtually all human beings are futuristic; they transcend their past life, and to the degree that they are dissatisfied, they think they deserve a better life (even though this may be pictured in a banal and egoistic way), and regard the inadequacy of their lot as a barrier, and not just as the way of the world.

To this extent, the most private and ignorant wishful thinking is to be preferred to any mindless goose-stepping; for wishful thinking is capable of revolutionary awareness, and can enter the chariot of history without necessarily abandoning in the process the good content of dreams. The chariot is not so cramped as bleak, miserable, or ignorant ages have pictured it or have found fitting for themselves. Social progress definitely does require, sometimes in a harsh manner, that prejudices, false consciousness, and superstition be discarded and left behind, but for this very reason it never demands that dreams toward the future be abandoned. That which is objectively possible, that to which the dream must attach itself if it is to amount to anything, also holds on to the dream in a pre-ordaining manner.

A daydream about a perfect life that is objectively mediated, and therefore can be retained, thereby overcomes its predisposition to be duped as well as any tendency to dreamlessness itself. The latter, which is associated with standing still or with a realism which only appears to be such, even in a state of resignation, is actually the ruling state of mind of many thinking though unperceptive people in a society without perspectives

(and with an abundance of inaccuracy). All such people are listless or morose about the future and the view ahead, though in various ways and with different expressions of diffidence. Half a measure of Greek humility and half of positivistic caution have been dragooned in order to make an antiMarxist metaphor, so to speak, out of the fact that one cannot see around a corner, the goal of the entire effort being to remain in a state of interested dreamlessness. Yet the simple truth of the fact of not being able to see around a corner becomes nullified as soon as a mirror is used; above all, it is certainly possible to hear around a corner, and so to perceive the trend—the sort of turn that might be taken after the next bend in the road: and it is possible actively to advance this dialectical transition. Furthermore, reason has an acoustic sense of significance.

Yet dreamlessness as destiny imposes a further restriction in that the corner, and even more its non-bourgeois background (which exercises an unpleasant precursory influence), actually appears as eschatological—and accordingly employs Greek humility as a weapon against Christian forwardness. More precisely, the attack is leveled, not against Christianity as the voice of Patmos, but only against the eschatology; and remarkably this is what Marxism is here again held to be: just as though it were a super-world replete with mad frenzy and not what it so impressively is, namely, this very world, but provided with a penetrating analysis of its motivations and a sovereign anticipation of its possible good fruits.

Yet it is precisely this impressive forcefulness, in recognition of its disturbing diagnoses and prophecy, which may appear not only incisive but penetrating. This happens particularly when an abundance of inexactitude and another fullness of obviously macabre superficial brilliance hides the emptiness of one's own evening—or the fullness of another's morning, which as ever comes into being painfully.

Then dreamlessness in regard to the future may appear to be a philosophical defense; yet it is hardly truly philosophic, for it does not anticipate things to come. In this voluntary-involuntary skepticism, therefore, there is fear, not hope; and instead of an understanding of the future as the greater dimension of the present (as Leibniz said), there is only an anticlimax—with the inevitable result of separation, if not of foundering with eyes averted. Fear above all, Sartre says, is the condition that abrogates man; in point of fact, the enlivening opposite is true of hope, both subjectively and—even more so—objectively. If in the building of mere castles in the air there is little concern about

the expense, which results ultimately in false paths and deception, even then, in the long run, hope (with a plan and with a link with the potentially possible) is still the strongest and best thing we have. And even if hope merely overtops the horizon, whereas only knowledge of the real is able by action to move it firmly ahead, it is hope alone which enables the enkindling and comforting understanding of the world (to which it leads) to be attained as the most solid and tendentially concrete form of comprehension of the mundane. Admittedly, the comfort provided by this understanding of the world must be won laboriously. It would have been easier to build Rome in a day than Athens; and what a difficult and often painfully slow road stretches forward to the inauguration of the regnum humanum. "But socialist realism must have a perspective, or else it cannot be socialist"—as Lukács has said of the desired direction. Reason cannot blossom without hope, and hope cannot speak without reason: both must operate in a Marxist unity; no other science has a future, no other future has science.

An upright carriage distinguishes us from the beasts; but we are still without it. As yet it is present only as a wish, as the desire for a life without exploitation and overlords. The daydream, as enduring as it is necessary, has hovered over what has hitherto taken place, and previous failures, and has looked ahead. And occasional seekers of the upright posture have marched on before, in keeping with Ludwig Börne's admonition: "Before an age breaks camp and moves forward, it always sends ahead able and reliable men as scouts for the next site. If these messengers are permitted to go their way, and they are followed and kept in sight, the new way of the epoch is soon recognized. But if the scouts are called agitators, seducers, and enthusiasts, and are forcibly restrained, there will be no such vision. Then time and all its complete baggage moves ahead, and finding nothing arranged and ordered, settles down where it pleases, taking and destroying more than it uses or wants."

This situation has certainly changed since Marx, especially where Marxism has become a power—and the future was billetted. Moreover, the daydream of the regnum humanum is no longer set in the air or the heavens, or merely in works of art, where the paths to it are taken only as roads of escape, and the sort of resignation goes out to them for which beauty blossoms only in song. Opportunity is now given to a gold other than Mammon to precipitate itself out of the traditional utopian-ideology mess. Yet anticipation must blossom and still has its own function, particularly when it occurs in sobriety, rather than in fog and cloud.

Enthusiasm assists sobriety in order to prevent a shortening of the perspective in some abstract-immediate fashion, and to keep it on the planet of concrete possibility. Enthusiasm is imagination in action, and here the acid of sobriety must become the most precious rather than the most common and cheap ingredient.

Nothing is more distant from true Marxist sobriety than common sense, which is not so healthy and not so human, but is more likely to be replete with petit bourgeois prejudices. On the other hand, nothing is closer to genuine sobriety than the quality of bon sens, as found in Marxist enthusiasm. Common sense, typically undialectical, asserts that men will always be men, and (if its possessor has spent his life in Central Africa) that it is absurd to think that water could occur in solid form. Similarly, common sense has maintained that China could never become a republic. On the other hand, bon sens, the sign of truly healthy sobriety, does not exclude any perspective except one that could lead to a situation without good fortune. This is especially characteristic of Marxism as the billeting officer of the future. It overcomes the rigid antithesis of sobriety versus enthusiasm by bringing them both to a new state, and enabling both to work together for precise anticipation and concrete utopia. It is not the function of sobriety merely to remove fantasy; and it is not the function of enthusiasm, precisely as imagination in action, to operate exclusively with absolutes, as though revolutionary romanticism coincided with quixotism. To set the hour hand of a clock one must turn the minute hand; similarly but conversely, the whole of a great vessel embarked on a long journey must be clearly apparent in all the minutiae of revolutionary activity. It is unwise, and alien to Marxism, to underreach reality with sobriety alone or conversely to overreach it with nothing but enthusiasm for it. The reality, especially that of the historical trend, is encountered only through the permanent interplay of both aspects united in a responsibly educated perspective. Hence, on the fourth anniversary of the October revolution, Lenin wrote: “Not on the foundation of enthusiasm pure and simple but with the support of the enthusiasm born of the great revolution, on the basis of personal interest, personal involvement, and the principle of profitability, you must first of all strive to build the sound roads which, in a petit bourgeois country, will lead to socialism via state capitalism. Otherwise you will never achieve communism, otherwise you will never lead myriads of people to communism.” Closely bound up with this cool realism, however, is the objectively committed factor which Lenin referred to in his essay on “‘Left-Wing’ Communism,” as appropriate to the dynamic élan in (and not to the slowing down of) reality: “History generally, and the history of revolutions in

particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively, and 'subtle' than the best parties and the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes imagine. This is understandable, because the best vanguards express the class-consciousness, the will, the passion, the fantasy of tens of thousands, while the revolution is made, at the moment of its climax and of the exertion of all human capabilities, by the class-consciousness, the will, the passion, the imagination of tens of millions."

And the paradigm for the cold shower needed for the sake of this warm current (this latter needing the cold shower of analysis precisely in order to demonstrate its several stages) is obviously to be found in Marx himself, in his empirical prophecy: "Justice can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development conditioned by that structure. In a higher phase of communist society, when the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and with it the antithesis between physical and intellectual labor, has disappeared; when labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime need, when the forces of production have grown with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly: only then will the narrow horizon of bourgeois justice be completely transcended, and society write on its banners: 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'" (A Critique of the Gotha Program).

Only with such an analysis (and even, at times, an analysis ad pessimum, in view of a particularly hazardous channel), and only with such a perspective does that comforting understanding of the world known as Marxism result, which is not contemplation but a directive for action. The incompatibility of the productive forces (which have long since become social) and their private capitalist form of appropriation is a basic persistent contradiction in a developed capitalist society that can be only superficially hidden by hectic economic fluctuations between crises, and by quack theories. Only Marxism, however, both detects and liberates, providing both the theoretical and the practical solution for this so long-standing contradiction. Furthermore, only Marxism has produced the theory and practice of a better world, not in order to abrogate the present one, as in most of the abstract social utopias, but in order to transform this world economically and dialectically. Marxism never renounces its heritage, and least of all the primal intention: the Golden Age. In all its analyses Marxism plays the part of a sober

detective, yet takes the legend seriously, and reacts pragmatically to the dream of the Golden Age. The primary concern has been the debit and credit of real hope. Until now the conditions have not made it possible to enter actively into near-perfect perspectives, and certainly not into the relationships of the perfect society, for it does not actually exist as yet, and in the alienation experienced has been kept especially distant.

The relationship of need to the warmth and enthusiasm in most of the wishful daydreams produced in the past was (beyond contemplation) resignation, or (close to it in this connection) religion. But if the real essence of the contents of hope enters adequately into existence, winning firm ground and stability, then the point of entry, equipped conjointly with prosaic and symbolic value, is the classless society—usque ad finem.

Certainty, Unfinished World, Home

> "There came to him here an image of man's whole life upon the earth. It seemed to him that all man's life was like a tiny spurt of flame that blazed out briefly in an illimitable and terrifying darkness, and that all man's grandeur, tragic dignity, his heroic glory, came from the brevity and smallness of this flame. He knew his life was little and would be extinguished, and that only darkness was immense and everlasting. And he knew that he would die with defiance on his lips, and that the shout of his denial would ring with the last pulsing of his heart into the maw of all engulfing night." - THOMAS WOLFE, You Can't Go Home Again

> "The wish builds and produces something actual. We alone are the gardeners of the most mysterious tree that may grow. The drive to become adequate to oneself draws the soul in. It is the resolution of thought for the perfect crystallization of renewed reality, and of the mind dissolving and yet resolving all creatively. It is strong as a magnet pointing into our future and that of the world, as the future ever gazes after us and alone offers, with equal indecisiveness, to laggard choice, evil as well as good. It revolves about us and does not know where it is going; but we ourselves are still lever and motor; the outer and revealed life are held in check. But finally the new thought does break out into the fullness of adventure, into the open, unfinished, noisy world, so that, in its own strength, fortified with our suffering, and with our daring premonition, with the tremendous force of our human voice, it may pronounce God's name and not rest until our innermost shadows have surrendered, and that empty, seething night is filled around

about which all things, men, and works are still built." - ERNST BLOCH, Spirit of Utopia, 1918

"Three categories of the dialectical process are … central: Front, Novum, and Matter. All three presuppose the most worthy human capacity for comprehension and participation: namely, hope. Front is the foremost segment of time, where what is next is determined. Novum is the real possibility of the not-yet-known, not-yet brought-into-being, with the accent of the good novum (the realm of freedom), when the trend toward it has been activated. Matter is not just mechanical mass, but—in accordance with the implicit meaning of the Aristotelian definition of matter—both that which has being in accordance with possibility, and hence that which in a particular case conditionally determines the capacity of something to become historically manifest, and that-which-exists-in-possibility, and hence the real possibility substrate of the dialectical process. Precisely as being in movement, matter is being that is not yet manifest; it is the ground and substance in which our future—its own future too—is carried out. Hence there are many problems for contemporary philosophy; although they are overdue for consideration by the West today, they are, paradoxically, not ripe enough. Therefore, the old tag ex oriente lux, favored by geographers and Christians alike, is allowed a new truth: light comes from the orient-point of modern man. German philosophy from Hegel to Marx first articulated this truth, and must continue to recognize its responsibility in this regard."- ERNST BLOCH, Philosophy Today, 1950

Rectified wishing, too, does not give up or renounce. It does not vanish, no matter how difficult and costly it turns out to be. It does not cling fast to the given, but finds it fitting, while it can glimpse what is extant and visible, not to believe in it entirely. On the other hand, the subjective hope with which people hope is sure of itself and secure, even when that which it designates,namely, the objective hope in the substance of which hope is placed, can at best be only probable. The subjective hope is spes qua speratur, while the objective is spes quae speratur. The first, the hoping hope, is also really believed in and so has conviction suo modo; whereas if the second, the hope that is hoped, already had full conviction for itself, it would really not be hope. This means that the matter designated in the hope that is hoped, so unbending yet actively enkindling until the last—the objective substance of hope in the world itself—is as yet by no means guaranteed to be secure and certain of itself. Otherwise, the conviction of hoping hope would be simply trivial rather than brave and, as so frequently happens, quite paradoxical. Authentic hope as such—that is, when mediated by an historical trend—stands least of all in an empty space, from which nothing will approach it, and in which

any venture is indeterminate. Precisely because genuine hope within the world proceeds by way of the world and works through the mediation of the world's objective process, it is engaged in a venture together with this process, and they stand in the front line together.

Only when the duly expected and attainable goal of socialist humanization is not obscured by inadequacy and harshly delayed by deviations can the objectively valid laws of dialectical development and their ultimate possibility act as effective guides and be appropriately nurtured. In and by itself, hoping hope may be altogether decisive, yet the outcome itself still has to be determined, in open history as the field of objectively real decision. This is the category of hazard or of objective non warrantability—even of mediated hope, or docta spes. As yet there is no settled absence of problems as with a fixed result. Such security does not yet exist in the dark sense whereby decision making, novum, and objective possibility would be extinguished, and not every lost battle could be more proficiently fought another time.

Nor is there yet any lack of problems in the supremely luminous sense of an existence without alienation, and of unambiguously matured and naturalized value. Consequently, optimism is justified only as militant, never

as confirmed. In the latter form its effect, so far as the misery of the world is concerned, is not only evil but senseless. And really perfect decisiveness exists just as little in any fashion or place in a hypostatized other world, as though the ens perfectissimum of the beyond were some superior ens realissimum enthroned. This kind of perfected "fact" of a higher order, as posited not only by theistic religions but by metaphysical idealisms, represents no more than a pure hypostasis.

It is even worse, even more false, that all previous philosophies, to the extent that they have envisaged such remote celestial areas, have dealt with their god, substance, or absolute, as though it were some unequalled fixed point of orientation, a fixum, a definitum, and even an incomparable realissimum, and as though all process were simply pedagogic guidance toward such a fixed point of orientation or away from it.

Certainly human life is entirely and primarily a process of transcending, stepping beyond the given; but with equal certainty, this sort of transcending, being concretely utopian, involves no transcendence, which would itself be a finished, phantom given. As

surely as the conscience of concrete utopia does not cling positivistically to the fact of direct visibility, even more surely it does not ascend in a vaporous mist of mere fact hypostases of purely mythological invisibility.

Instead, philosophy authenticates itself as expedition with and in the widely ramified and unfinished process, as the courage required for that non warrantability which sets hope squarely at the front. Philosophy does not prove itself by interpreting an unfinished state as fate, nor merely by an infinite process of drawing near a goal, as (symbolically) in Tantalus and (morally) in Kant. For the unfinished world can be brought to an end, and the process pending in it can be brought to a result; and the incognito of the main concern that is actually concealed even to itself can be illuminated. But not by premature hypostases or fixed determinations of essence, which only block the way. The real nature or the essence is not something already found in a finished form, like water, air, or fire, or even an invisible universal idea, or whatever figure may be used to absolutize or hypostatize these real quanta. The real or the essence is that which does not yet exist, which is in quest of itself in the core of things, and which is awaiting its genesis in the trend latency of the process. It is in itself the just-founded, objectively real hope. Moreover, its name ultimately has points of contact with "being-inpossibility" in the Aristotelian sense, and indeed, in a sense that goes far beyond him, with that which is patently most established, namely, matter. All its bearing, conditioning, and becoming would be senseless were everything that might and could emerge from it already extant. Of course, the Not-Yet must not be thought of as though there already existed, say in the atom or in the subatomic "differentials" of matter, everything that would later emerge, already present and encapsulated in miniscule form as inherent "disposition." Such a backward conception of the Not-Yet would really undercut or misconstrue the dialectical leap into the new.

And of course, in the dialectical trend latency of the material process, which is open to the new, there is no pre-ordained and therefore no settled end of the traditional teleological kind, let alone one mythologically deduced from above.

Yet the genuine problem of teleology is not discredited along with this old teleology, reminiscent of "providence": the genuine categories of end, then purpose, then meaning, are not evaded or dogmatically dismissed from the world. All the less since a tendency always implies orientation to a goal, and any progress without such a reference to a

given end can neither be measured nor have any objective reality. All the less since a world without efficient planning with and for it, without operational goals, purposes, and meanings within it, could in no sense be a Marxist one. Therefore, the truth of teleology nowhere consists of ends present in a finished form, but rather of goals which first receive form in the active process, rising therein ever anew, and gaining power for themselves. The nerve of the genuine historical concept is the novum; and the nerve of the authentically philosophical concept is the better novum. Moreover, the utopian tenor in so many, if not most, doctrines of essence is hidden only because the purposive truth of all things was represented as already existing absolutely, and therefore as completely exhibited. This truth, as the appropriateness of things to itself, its exhaustive and fundamental essence, thereupon passes as complete in itself, clear, brought forth, and still veiled only for man's feeble powers of comprehension. From the trial examples, which, so to speak, represent the individual metaphysical titles of the essence, there arises the exemplum itself; from the experiments concerning the real-unique, there results an almost fixed and, at that, highly contemplative ontology. The observational nature of most pre-Marxist philosophers thus consummates an extreme degree of present availability—even though it is still, with much polyphonic light, only in the condition of predictability. With such ontic hypostatization the method becomes purely a way of consummation; the result becomes a palace, somehow complete at the end of the way; and the metaphysics of Hen Kai Pan becomes a finished palace inscription. The net result is not only that matter is unknown, but even where it is known, its most important truth is unknown, namely, that of being matter with a forward trend.

But now not only art but philosophy—and especially the latter—has consciously to bear the responsibility of prefiguration, and the prefiguration at that of an objectively real appearance, of the world of process, of the real world of hope itself. Furthermore, the latter remains uniquely based in matter—in something that is certainly mobile in a polymorphic and not stereotyped manner; in that-which-is-in-accordance-with-possibility, and as such has a duly determinative effect, and in that-which-is-in-possibility, and as such has a substantively opening effect. To perceive this genesis is the function of philosophy. Its new shape is the dialectically aimed, systematically open, vista into matter as it takes tendential form.

The morrow lives in today, and is constantly inquired after. The Countenances that turned in the utopian direction have been different at different times, even as the details

of what they believed they saw there in each particular case. Yet the direction has everywhere been related, and actually, in regard to its still concealed goal, the same. Indeed, it appears to be the only constant in history. Happiness, freedom, non-alienation, the golden age, the land flowing with milk and honey, the eternal feminine, the trumpet call in Fidelio, and the Christ pattern of the resurrection day afterwards—there are so many and diverse witnesses and pictures, yet all have but one focus, which speaks to us eloquently, notwithstanding its silence. The orientation to this evident focus (evident not just logically but materially) must be invariant. This is recognizable wherever hope opens up its account and endeavors to read therein. There is never any doubt that an unilluminated, undirected hope easily leads men astray, for the true horizon does not reach beyond the knowledge of realities. But this very knowledge, when Marxist and not mechanistic, shows reality itself as a horizon reality, and informed hope as congruous with this reality.

The goal in its entirety is and still remains concealed, and so the account of willing and hoping is still untallied; within the functioning of the process of existence, light, of its quiddity, of its essence, of its intended basic content, has not yet shone forth. Yet the nunc stans of the dynamic moment, of the effort filled with its content, stands forth and ahead in a utopianly clear fashion. As the restless Abelard put it: “Terminus est ilia civitas ubi non praevenit rem desiderium nec desiderio minus est praemium.” “The goal is that community where the yearning for the thing does not completely anticipate it, and where the fulfillment is not less than the yearning.”

This is being as hope, quid pro quo, namely, a something and essence such that the intention contained therein may be preserved and transcended because fulfilled. Yet the very human capacity for such an absolute goal concept is the terrible element in an existence where the best remains only a fragment, and where every end again and again becomes only a means to serve the as yet completely invisible, final, and ultimate goal, which is as yet unavailable even in and for itself.

Marx indicates that his ultimate intention is “the development of the wealth of human nature.” This human wealth, like that of nature as a whole, lies exclusively in the trend latency in which the world finds itself vis-à-vis de tout. In this view, therefore, it follows that man everywhere is still living in prehistory, and that all things are still in the stage prior to the just and true creation of the world. The true genesis is not at the

beginning, but at the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical: that is, comprehend their own roots. But the root of history is the working, creating man, who rebuilds and transforms the given circumstances of the world. Once man has comprehended himself and has established his own domain in real democracy, without depersonalization and alienation, something arises in the world which all men have glimpsed in childhood: a place and a state in which no one has yet been. And the name of this something is home or homeland.

Man and Citizen in Marx

It read differently before the meal—how often this statement holds true. When the bourgeoisie had not come to power, it was (or appeared to be) more humane than any previous class. It stood for the free man, the children of the fatherland, and universal humanity. There was a cue for the free man, the national disposition could become nationalistic, the human principle could become ever more universal. But what seemed so pure in inception, and only later abandoned and indeed reversed this orientation, once implemented, continued to shine thus later.

Not everything read differently before the meal—as in the present case. The image of the heritage striven for—the citoyen—replete with illusions and indeed with even greater anticipations, was exploited by the same economic and social trend that later brought forth the emancipated bourgeois. And the essence of the bourgeois, only vastly different and progressive in the wrong sense, to wit, the mere freedom of acquisition, necessarily developed together with the image of the citizen—at least in its main aspects.

Indeed, even in 1791, when human rights were still piously affirmed, in those vernal fantasies which never came to fruition, there was already something of the bourgeois spirit which certainly did flourish later on. At that time it was the bourgeois, the egotistic dynamics of individual production, but not as yet the citizen with actual freedom, equality, and fraternity, that constituted the economic program of the day. Private property was one of the essential components of the four bourgeois human rights of 1791; “propriété” dominates the “sûreté,” the “résistance.” Above all, private property determines the content of freedom, according to the constitution of 1793, Art. 16: “The right of property devolves to every citizen; he may at will [à son gré] enjoy his fortune, his income, and the fruits of his toil and diligent effort, and dispose of them.”

This decline in the stature of the citizen corresponded to the interests of capitalism, even before Thermidor, insofar as the nation had not yet surrendered the ground in which the flowers of true freedom bloom. Or, as Marx says, insofar as the people did not possess the idea of their own real interest when they accepted the idea of the French Revolution. In this way, Marx carefully distinguished the egotistic contents of the droits de l'homme of that time from the then political, still abstract and idealistic, ideal construct of the *citoyen*. The local impetus behind the precision of this differentiation was the arrogant nonsense of Bruno and Edgar Bauer, who had declared that the pure idea of the French Revolution had been corrupted by the "uncritical masses." Instead, Marx and Engels pointed to the complete success of this revolution as the emancipation of the bourgeois, and the profit system then required by the economy—a reference which could not be made without sharp criticism of the ideology of human rights itself.

Yet beyond this particular case, every reception of the socialist heritage must be critical, and none must have a wax figure crowned with laurel. To begin with, bourgeois freedoms are always more bourgeois than they are freedoms. The assessment of the Rights of Man in regard to their ideological content is perfectly understandable; and the first results of such a scrutiny were caution, partial negation, and restriction. Thus Marx declares in On the Jewish Question (1844): "The so-called Rights of Man, the droits de l'homme, in contrast to the droits du citoyen, are nothing more than the rights of the member of civil society, that is, of egotistic man, separated from his fellow men and from the community … Hence man is not liberated from religion, but merely obtains religious freedom. He is not liberated from property, but only obtains the freedom of property. He is not emancipated from the egotism of commerce, but obtains freedom for commerce" (MEGA, I, 1, p. 593). Subsequently, in The Holy Family (1845), he wrote: "Even the slavery of civil society appears to be the greatest freedom, because the apparently accomplished independence of the individual fosters the illusion of the limitless motility of the alienated elements of his life (such as property, industry, and religion, which have been freed of general restrictions and are no longer bound by other people) as personal freedom. In truth, however, this limitless motility is to be interpreted as the individual's complete enslavement and dehumanization … What a colossal deception, to have to recognize and sanction under the aegis of human rights, the modern bourgeois society, the society of industry and of general competition, of private interest, freely pursuing their goals; of anarchy, of alienated natural and spiritual individuality—and at the same time, within this society, to annul the expressions of life

… in particular individuals, while simultaneously intending to fashion the political head of this society to a classical pattern" (MEGA, I, 3, pp. 291 ff.). These are the same self-deceptions which Marx later, at the very beginning of The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852), termed "a conjuring up of the dead of world history."

From this critique there emerged a significant positive element, relating not to human rights in general, but to the "rights of the citoyen." Marx refers at the beginning of the same work to the self-deceptions of Robespierre, and of Cromwell before him, as "those needed by them in order to conceal from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the content of their struggles, and to maintain their passion at the high level of great historical tragedy." It was necessary, therefore, "to glorify the new struggles … to magnify in imagination the given task … to find anew the spirit of revolution." Note: "the spirit of revolution." It was to this that the "rights of the *citoyen*" held fast. And this spirit becomes realized, as Marx finally observes—after all this criticism—in his On the Jewish Question, "only when the real, individual man takes into himself again the abstract citizen of the state … only when man recognizes and organizes his forces propres—his own powers—as social powers, and so no longer separates social power from himself, in the form of political power" (MEGA, I, 1, p. 599). The abstract citizen of the state, wrenched away from the "secular man" albeit contained in him, the "true man" thus brought into relief, this is the citoyen; yet he is this also as the "political power," as the bearer of socialized freedom. In this view, the fellow man no longer represents, as in the egotism of the droits de l'homme, a barrier to freedom, but rather its fulfillment. Nonetheless, the image of the citoyen, when still in the bourgeois womb, so to speak, suffered an injury which has exercised its effects subsequently, because it was not recognized initially. But the whole image of the citoyen, notwith-standing its diverse sources, and even its pernicious stewards, continued—even as a slogan—to exert an effective critical force against its contrary, as it developed; indeed, it always contained within itself, as Hölderlin showed, renewed self-purification.

From this point on, Marx permitted a much warmer light to fall even on the rights of man. With unsurpassed precision, he demonstrated the bourgeois class content in them, yet at the same time their futuristic outlook, which at that time still had no basis. He discovered private property as dominant among the other human rights, and the reason why the others appeared all the more disjointed. When Marx denounces private property as the bourgeois barrier to human rights, he does not reject freedom, the

resistance of the people to oppression, and security, as other rights. But he concentrated on the forward effect of Right, which no private property can impede or ultimately destroy. Marx criticized private property by the standard of the very radiance and humanity of the human right to freedom. Freedom is the viewpoint from which his conclusions follow: not freedom of property but freedom from property; not freedom of industry but from the egotism of industry; not emancipation of the egotistic individual from merely feudal society but the emancipation of all men from every type of class society. In so thorough a fashion, then, liberté rather than propriété ultimately became dominant among the rights of man, and an actual and effective autonomous goal opposed to fascism, and even to dictatorship. Subsequently, the struggle for rights concentrated more on freedom of assembly, freedom of organization, freedom of the press, and the rights of workers to resist exploitation and oppression.

In the program of socialism, however, where the exploitation and oppression of the workers have disappeared, the struggle for rights has gone forward as the quest for the rights of uncompromising objective criticism, followed by pragmatic intervention, in the interests of the goal of socialist construction, within the framework of solidarity. Hence, within the socialist movement solidarity signifies that the "human" in "human rights" shall no longer represent the egotistic but the socialist individual, who, in accordance with Marx's prophecy, has transformed his own powers into socio-political power. The result would be that the citoyen would be pulled back out of the abstract-moralistic transcendental world which he inhabited in the ideology of the French Revolution, into the mundane world appropriate to socialized humanity.

Everywhere, however, it would be the common banner of human rights which would raise up workers in capitalistic lands in their right to resist, and which would lead the way for them in their constructive work in socialist lands through the building of socialism and the right of criticism—and indeed the obligation to do so. Otherwise, authoritarian socialism would prevail—contradictio in adjecto—whereas the International fought for the human right of organized maturity.

And something further shone on the old banner, formerly derided by the bourgeoisie. This was nothing less than the passion to march forward and the wise faith to serve it. Freedom leads the people: this title of a painting by Delacroix unmistakably indicated a path leading forward. It depicts a freedom which, in common progressive action, tears

itself loose from the superannuated and reaches out to new shores, with the night behind it and the day ahead. The reference to "superannuated" is primarily to the relationships of production which have become shackles. That is, the new shores, as of 1791, lay at first in the realm of the emancipated egotistic individual, of free competition, the open market—in short, of the modes of production and exchange that were expanding under capitalism. For this purpose, the bourgeoisie, one of the least heroic of classes, desperately needed heroic illusion in the classical mode. Yet in the illusions contained in the Jacobin faith (those which purported to be able to liberate all the oppressed) there was operative something that was no mere borrowing from antiquity. This was an anticipation, with an aura of progress: anticipation of an immensely improved type of polis; and this first gave the enterprise that moral radiance which the emancipation of the third estate (and none other) lacked. It was this human right which prompted Beethoven to place a bust of Brutus in his room, which produced the music of Fidelio, and the Ninth Symphony for the rescue and the arrival of joy. In the novelty of the contemporary struggle for freedom there lived the ultimate of total liberation. All this Marx was alluding to when he spoke of the "spirit of revolution" which it is necessary to find anew through magnification and imagination, as against the limited "civil content."

Moreover, no matter how much previous revolutions differed in terms of their social mandate, and no matter how specifically the proletarian-socialist revolution, involving the total elimination of class society, differs from every earlier one, they are all pervaded by a unifying typical and cohesive trend. This tendency relates all and every one of its reminiscences to the leap into the domain of freedom. The Jacobin movement manifested at least premonitions of this leap: to such a degree that the French Revolution consistently introduced socialist-humanist concepts of progress that far transcended the maturing emancipation of the entrepreneurs and their class.

The same Marx who so penetratingly analyzed the capitalist factor in the rights of man, proclaimed in The Holy Family what was still implicit in the Jacobins and their followers: "Secure against this opposition, the French Revolution generated ideas which led beyond those of the whole former condition of the world. The revolutionary movement which began in 1789 in the Cercle Social, featured in mid-course Leclerc and Roux as its chief representatives, and finally succumbed momentarily with Babeuf's conspiracy, had advanced the communistic idea, which Babeuf's friend Buonarotti

reintroduced into France after the revolution of 1830. This idea, consistently developed, is the idea of the new condition of the world ... Just as Cartesian materialism runs into natural science proper, so the other direction of French materialism culminates directly in socialism and communism" (MEGA, I, 3, pp. 294 ff.).

Thus even in the old tricolor there was a strong red gleam, announced by the fourth estate—the red of irreducible progress. This was directed against the emasculation of the time, against the alliance with the "primitive forces of life" as seen through the nobility and the church, and against a nihilism of goals in which the Ça ira of the French Revolution completely fades away. As against this, Marx criticized the Ça ira of the natural-rights slogans then current, partly for its abstraction and partly for its immobility, only in order to transcend it definitively by a further process, the socialist one. Man— l'homme—was static as "egotistic man," sundered from other men and the community; the citoyen as a mere borrowed, idealized image in a neoclassical polis, or as an "allegorical moral person," instead of as the bearer of social freedom, was abstract and immobile. The progress which has survived is precisely the political-civic factor: freedom, equality, and fraternity had to enter into the "forces propres" of living men. Indeed, only then, as Marx said, "is human emancipation accomplished." Then one's fellow man will no longer exist, as in the egotism of the droits de l'homme, as a barrier to freedom, but man and his fellows will live together in a community of freedom.

Kevin B. Anderson

Marxist Humanism after Structuralism and Post-structuralism: The Case for Renewal

Prologue: The Emergence of Radical Humanism after World War II

Outrage at the barbarism of Nazism, Stalinism and nuclear weapons sparked a period of radical activism in the post-World War II era. A new peace movement directed against nuclear weapons, national liberation movements against colonialism, and rank-and-file labour struggles against both capital and the labour bureaucracy, as well as an array of newer social movements – of racial and ethnic minorities, women, youth and, later, sexual minorities – emerged rapidly in the post-war era, culminating in the upheavals of the 1960s. To be sure, the East– West rivalry between liberalism/social democracy on the one hand, and Stalinism on the other, continued to dominate political and social discourse, especially during the early years of the Cold War. Nonetheless, new and sometimes revolutionary forms of activism continued to develop during this period, based upon alternative forms of politics that often tried to transcend the Cold War divide.

New radical sensibilities also emerged at the level of philosophy and culture. The post-1945 world saw a renewal of humanist thought, often on a radical, even revolutionary basis. Older forms of progressive humanism like pragmatism, which counterposed science to religion, had been undermined by the ways in which science had been harnessed by capital and the state to perpetuate mass murder. Liberal humanism, which had tolerated and engaged in dialogue with everything, including fascism, had been discredited too, for its failure to stop Hitler during the 1930s.

To take one prominent example, in post-war France, the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre gained a following among the new generation of youth when he attacked the older liberal 'republican humanism, which was taught in the schools' and 'made tolerance the primary virtue' in 'a sort of moral relativism'. Sartre held that this made liberal and republican humanism powerless in the face of the radical 'Evil' of

Nazism, which ‘aimed expressly at destroying’ that very humanism.[1] The older humanism had died, Sartre wrote, replaced by a newer, more radical form of humanism that ‘reaffirmed the human’ in the face of torture and at the same time rediscovered ‘the absolute at the heart of relativity itself ’.[2]

Another strand of newly emergent radical humanism arose, as Barbara Epstein notes in Chapter 1, during the 1940s and 1950s, when Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, with their stress on alienation and humanism, came to the fore as a challenge to an oppressive social order, both East and West. Among those writing in this vein were the former Frankfurt School psychologist Erich Fromm and the erstwhile secretary of Leon Trotsky, Raya Dunayevskaya. The stakes of this new humanism included motifs that went beyond even those of the Hegelian Marxism of the post-World War I era, as exemplified by the writings of Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch, and somewhat later, Herbert Marcuse. The noted philosopher Louis Dupré put his finger on this in terms of Dunayevskaya’s work: ‘Dunayevskaya aims at total liberation of the human person – not only from the ills of capitalist society but also from the equally oppressive State capitalism of established communist governments.’ Dupré contrasted Dunayevskaya not only to orthodox Marxism but also to Hegelian Marxists like Lukács and Korsch, who had limited their critique of capitalism ‘to the social and political order’.[3] The two points underlined by Dupré – (1) the liberation of the human being as a whole, not only from class domination; and (2) an equivalence between statist communism and capitalism – distinguished this specific and self-conscious Marxist humanism, which willbe my principal focus.

Before turning to this, however, I shall examine the implications for the Left of the theoretical exclusion of humanism in the work of Bourdieu, Althusser, Foucault and some of their followers.

The Post-1960s Rejection of Subjectivity and Humanism: Bourdieu’s Attack on Sartre

Since the 1970s, other forms of radicalism have largely displaced existential or Marxist forms of humanism. While radical thought has notfor the most part returned to pre-1945 scientific rationalism, structuralist and post-structuralist theories that attack humanism and subjectivity as well as Hegel have become dominant among critical

philosophers and social theorists. As an illustration of the pervasiveness of these trends, let us consider the 1972 attack on Sartre by the prominent sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, a thinker with only loose affinities to structuralism. Bourdieu's point of attack was a passage in Sartre's Being and Nothingness of 1943, where he had written, in what I consider to be a fine dialectical passage:

> For it is necessary to reverse the common opinion and acknowledge that it is not the harshness of a situation or the sufferings it imposes that lead people to conceive of another state of affairs [état de choses] in which things would be better for everybody; instead, it is from the day that we are able to conceive of another state of affairs, that a new light is cast on our troubles and our suffering and we decide they are unbearable.[4]

Here, Sartre is arguing for the crucial importance of the idea of freedom, and of thinking differently about the 'given' world of capitalism – with its commodity fetishism, notion that there is no alternative, etc. – in order to overcome those conceptual barriers. In this very unusual passage of Being and Nothingness, the rest of which centres almost entirely on the human subject as a hyper-isolated individual, Sartre is writing not so much of the individual subject as of one involving 'people' and 'everybody'. Sartre sees this kind of rethinking as the precondition for a genuinely revolutionary transformation, or even for a movement that is attempting to move in that direction.

Sartre continues, connecting the above directly to working class praxis, in a discussion of the early, pre-Marxian French workers movement:

> The worker of 1830 is able to revolt if his salary is lowered, for he easily conceives of a situation in which his wretched standard of living would not be as low as the one they are trying to impose on him. But he does not view [se representer] his suffering as unbearable; he adapts himself, not due to resignation, but because he lacks the culture and the reflection needed to allow him to conceive of social conditions [état social] under which this suffering would not exist. Consequently he does not act. Having become the masters of Lyon following a riot, the workers at Croix-Rousse do not know what to do with their victory; they return home, and the regular army has no trouble taking them by surprise.[5]

Slightly off in his chronology, Sartre is probably referring to the silk workers riot of 1831, the harbinger of a much larger social movement in 1834 that constituted the first

major French labour uprising, during which the military massacred some 300 workers. He is also somewhat imprecise conceptually, but he appears to be groping towards the notion that without a positive vision of a new, post-capitalist social order, the workers can neither generalise about their social conditions nor develop an effective, sustainable form of resistance to capital: 'Therefore suffering by itself cannot in itself be a motive for his actions. To the contrary, it is after he has created the project of changing the situation that it seems to him intolerable.'[6] What is clear, however, is that for Sartre in this passage, the problem is not solely one of how many workers are participating in the movement, if they are well organised, etc. What is of greater import is what kinds of ideas constitute the workers' intellectual and cultural arsenal in their battle against capital and the state.

Upon a first reading, these passages from Sartre seem to show some remarkable insights, which is surprising for a philosopher who up to then had had little contact with the Left, let alone labour. It is therefore somewhat surprising that in his Outline of a Theory of Practice of 1972, Bourdieu launches his unremittingly harsh attack on Sartre, based upon the first of the passages quoted above.

At a general level, Bourdieu notes – correctly in my view – the problematic nature of Sartre's one-sided and subjectivist concept of 'choice', which often tended to minimise objectivity, whether in philosophy or in society. He also critiques cogently Sartre's notion – elsewhere in Being and Nothingness – of the social as a collection of individuals who are by default separate and isolated. Finally, Bourdieu attacks effectively Sartre's later efforts – in Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) and other writings – to get his readers to 'entrust to the absolute initiative of individual or collective "historical agents" such as the Party' the job of representing the workers' consciousness and forming them into a class rather than a collection of individuals.[7] The last point referred to Sartre's long-time embrace of the Stalinist French Communist Party, and by the time of Bourdieu's writing, of Maoist groups.

But rather than leaving it at that general level, Bourdieu wades into the above-cited passage from Being and Nothingness, a passage where Sartre,

as we have seen, speaks of collective, not individual subjects, and which concentrates not on what is going on in the head of an intellectual, but on the world of French labour activism and working class consciousness. Instead of grappling with these issues,

Bourdieu simply dismisses Sartre's entire discussion of working class subjectivity as a form of idealism 'devoid of objectivity':

> If the world of action is nothing other than this universe of interchangeable possibilities, entirely dependent upon the decrees of the consciousness which creates it, and hence totally devoid of objectivity, if it is moving because the subject chooses to be revolted, then emotions, passions, and actions are merely games of bad faith, sad farces in which one is both bad actor and good audience.[8]

In carrying out this critique, Bourdieu proceeds to cite one of the most deterministic and positivistic texts of sociologist Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method.[9]

Bourdieu extolls Durkheim's book as a prime source for critiquing what he regards as Sartre's complete and utter subjectivism and idealism, citing a passage attacking idealism from Durkheim's book: 'It is because the imaginary offers the mind no resistance that the mind, conscious of no restraint, gives itself up to boundless ambitions and believes it possible to construct, or rather reconstruct the world by virtue of its own strength at the whim of its desires.'[10] Bourdieu refrains from citing the blatantly positivist sentence that precedes Durkheim's attack on idealism, in which he merges the natural and the social sciences, provocatively comparing the 'beginnings of the physical sciences' in 'alchemy' and 'astrology' to the origins of the social sciences in critical idealism.[11] Here and elsewhere, Durkheim rejects the dialectical tradition altogether.[12]

Bourdieu, perhaps sensing elements of an errant subjectivity even in Marx, never declared himself a Marxist, unlike Sartre who by 1957 had written that as long as capitalism exists, philosophy would be living in the 'moment' of Marx.[13] While he would have accepted some of Marx's conclusions, Bourdieu would not have felt very comfortable with Marx's acknowledgement of both the subjective and the objective sides of human social practice. Take, for example, Marx's statement – in the 'Alienated Labour' essay of 1844 – that 'free, conscious activity is the species-characteristic of human beings'.[14]

Nor is it very likely that Bourdieu would have been entirely comfortable even with the Marx of Capital who wrote famously, continuing this theme, albeit in a more precisely worked out form:

> We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the [human] architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.[15]

Here Marx makes clear his view of workers as thinking subjects, who are robbed of their humanity in the capitalist workplace. This is the price paid by the worker as set out more concretely in the chapter on 'Accumulation of Capital': 'They distort the worker into a fragment of a human being [Teilmenschen]; they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine; they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process.'[16]

The latter passage is a concretisation of the commodity fetishism section of chapter 1 of Capital, where human relations become like relations between things because that is what 'they really are'.[17] In turning the workers into variable capital, the system robs them both of the value created by their labour and of their humanity more generally, as the very process is one of deep dehumanisation that cries out for a humanist response. And as Marx sees it, those same workers, yearning for free and associated labour, seek to shake off those shackles, both mental and manual, and to move towards that society of 'freely associated human beings'.[18] But in order to get there they need to clarify their thinking about their concrete situation and about capitalism as a whole. And doing so necessitates thinking theoretically and philosophically, not just strategically. For these reasons, as Marx saw it, they need Marx's Capital, and as later dialectical Marxists added, Hegel as well. The workers also need allies among other social groups, especially revolutionary intellectuals, who can help clarify their thinking while simultaneously clarifying their own thought as intellectuals, for even the most critical intellectuals are themselves necessarily prisoners of commodity fetishism as well.

The Althusserian cul-de-sac: Antihumanist Marxism

Bourdieu left some room in his theorising for human subjectivity, or agency, as he preferred to call it. However, the possibility of subjectivity in the sense of critique, resistance or revolt on the part of the subjugated, is closed off almost completely in the work of the structuralist Marxist Louis Althusser. This stance mars Althusser's celebrated essay on 'Ideological State Apparatuses' (1970), which was indeed a serious attempt to go beyond reductionist arguments concerning ideology's relationship to its material base, and to theorise its place in late twentieth-century capitalist society in terms of institutions outside value production like religion and education. As Althusser sees it, the notion of subjectivity is an illusion that props up the dominant political form developed under modern capitalism: liberal democracy. In short, if one validates the possibility of human creativity and self-movement within – or even in struggle against – existing society, one is at best an idealist dupe, and at worst a propagandist for the capitalist system.

The fact that these apparatuses interact with individual members of society by engaging in 'the interpellation of these "individuals" as subjects' is simply part of these individuals' 'subjection to the Subject' with a capital 'S', i.e. the capitalist system. This interpellation is part of the system's 'rituals' of domination: 'They must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer, that "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself ", etc.'[19] Playing on the ambiguity in the term 'subject', which can refer to either a 'free subject' or a 'subjected being', Althusser forces these two into a single totality, wherein: 'The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e., in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection.'[20]

Althusser confines his discussion largely to individual rather than collective subjectivities, ignoring the varying forms of collective self-consciousness and resultant collective action for self-liberation that emerges again and again on the part of oppressed classes, genders, nations, ethno-racial groups and sexual minorities. This is a most problematic omission indeed for a Marxist. But even if one remains on Althusser's ground, that of the individual subject who is a mere subject of domination, isn't he creating a false totality here? Where is the possibility of contradictions between these individual subjects and their subjugation? Althusser acknowledges that such a situation

may occur, but passes this off as a 'bad' subject who is then dealt with by the openly 'repressive' state apparatus, i.e. police, prisons, etc.[21]

But what about a rebellious individual subject whose rebellion touches off wide support within an entire subjected group? Consider Rosa Parks getting herself arrested for violating the racial segregation laws on that bus in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955, for example. Parks' actions, taken in connection with a large support network, which grew rapidly in the days following her arrest, touched off a decade of radical change today termed the Civil Rights Movement. When such an occurrence comes at the right moment, when historical circumstances are aligned towards liberation, and when the organisation of both emancipatory ideas and the means to implement them are present, we have what Dunayevskaya called a 'subjectivity which has absorbed objectivity, that is to say through its struggle for freedom it gets to know and cope with the objectively real'.[22]

Another problem with Althusser's ideological apparatuses is that they seem to float above the economic structures of society. Here, his surprising, albeit muted, affinity to Maoism is important to note – something that is often missed because Althusser remained a member of the pro-Moscow French Communist Party. Such a focus on culture and ideology as opposed to economic base was also a hallmark of Mao's theory of contradiction, as well as the underpinning for his 'Cultural Revolution' of the late 1960s. That 'revolution' was in reality more of a top-down affair in which Mao used Red Guards recruited from among the student youth – supported by one bureaucracy he did not shake up at this time, the military – in order to dislodge some of his fellow leaders, whom he deemed too close to Russia, among other sins. The Maoist Red Guard attacks on forms of 'Western culture', like classical European music or books, supposedly constituted a challenge to global imperialism, this at the very time when Mao was refusing to give much in the way of material aid to Vietnam in its struggle against US imperialism. The whole process ended, not as Mao's international followers had hoped, in the establishment of a new International to the left of the pro-Moscow Communist parties, but instead with a rapprochement with the United States under Richard Nixon, the butcher of Vietnam.

Another problematic feature of Althusser's apparatuses like religion and education is that they are not new or unique to capitalism. Despite this, Althusser does not analyse

their specifically capitalist character very much. In this sense, his ideological apparatuses lack historical development or grounding. More problematically still, his focus on the cultural and superstructural realm obviates any real discussion of the working class, a human subject that is both subjected to and at the same time, in the form of a revolutionary subject, able to resist or even revolt against capital. Althusser implies that real changes have to begin at the level of superstructure, of ideology. This ignores the fact that real changes in consciousness often result when changes in the economic structure of society wrench people out of their customary modes of existence, plunging them into new forms of production and property relations.

Althusser also famously attacked both Hegelianism and humanism as bourgeois, if not reactionary. This was a departure even from orthodox, Engelsian Marxism. Although Engels had conceptualised idealism and materialism as a general dividing line between progressive and reactionary forms of philosophy, he made an exception for Hegel's idealism, which he regarded as definitely revolutionary. Thus, Engels had always acknowledged Hegel as an important antecedent of Marx's thought.[23] Nor had Engels explicitly repudiated humanism, although he did not make a core category out of it either.

For his part, Althusser, reacting against both Marxist and existentialist humanism, went on the attack, writing of the 'phantom' or 'shade of Hegel'. He called upon Marxists, as if exorcising a vampire, 'to drive this phantom back into the night'.[24] Althusser was to continue this theme unabated throughout his intellectual career, rallying more orthodox Marxists against the threats posed by Hegelian and humanist versions of Marxism. He carried the debate into Lenin's work as well, attempting to deny Hegel's influence on Lenin, despite clear evidence to the contrary in the latter's 1914–15 Hegel notebooks.[25]

Althusser also attracted not a few younger intellectuals to an antihumanist Marxism that, at least on the surface, did not mark a return to the scientistic and quasi-positivist philosophical orientation of many earlier Marxists. This earlier scientistic orientation, attractive in an age when 'progressive' science fought against religion, had been severely undermined during the post-World War II period, when various forms of radical humanism assailed the ravages that had taken place through the use of modern science, most notably the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But by

the time Althusser came on to the scene, in the 1960s, some at least were ripe for an antihumanist counter-attack, a sentiment that only grew larger in the wake of the defeats of the revolutionary movements of the 1960s. This was especially the case in France, where the near revolution of 1968 had first raised and then dashed hopes for a profoundly radical revolution inside an industrially developed capitalist society.

Beginning in the early 1960s, Althusser famously dismissed the writings of the early Marx as pre-Marxist, imbued with what he saw as liberal and Hegelian notions of alienation and humanism. These writings were simply not Marxist, he held, because they were humanist, but he went further, placing antihumanism at the core of Marx's thought despite the lack of textual evidence on this point: 'One can and must speak openly of Marx's theoretical anti-humanism.'[26] The term 'speak openly' may have been intended to imply that 'real' Marxists 'knew' this, but had de-emphasised it in order to gain broader appeal.

The French Hegel scholar Jacques d'Hondt, who, unlike Althusser, was to resign from the French Communist Party in 1968 to protest the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, noted at the time that for generations, Marxists had been at great pains to answer attacks from liberal humanists, who had claimed that Marxism reduced the human being, in dehumanised fashion, to a set of economic categories and forces. Therefore, wrote d'Hondt, the Althusserian attack on humanism amounted to 'a type of provocation' that served to delink Marxism from the democratic and anti-fascist traditions to which it had often been allied. As against Althusser's rejection of the term 'man' or 'human being' as a liberal illusion, d'Hondt noted that Marx had used this term when he wrote that the human being 'makes history'.[27] Moreover, d'Hondt wrote, 'One runs the risk of undermining Marxist methodology if its human basis is ignored.' From a Marxist standpoint, he added, 'the point is [human] liberation'.[28]

Althusser's key Marxological notion, pursued more virulently than others who had only hinted at such a thesis, was that Marx made an 'epistemological break' in 1845 with his earlier writings, especially the 1844 Manuscripts.[29] Initially, Althusser dismissed attempts to tie Capital to Marx's early writings via the psychoanalytic concept of projection: 'The whole, fashionable theory of "reification" depends upon a projection of the theory of alienation found in the early texts, particularly the 1844 Manuscripts, onto the theory of "fetishism" in Capital.'[30] This ignores the fact that it was Lukács who

foregrounded the notion of reification while neglecting the concept of alienation, but also distorts what are often held to be the most important pages in Capital. Ignoring Marx's own language in the fetishism section to the effect that under capitalism, the 'social relation' between human beings takes on 'the fantastic form of a relation between things',[31] Althusser declares peremptorily: 'In Capital the only social relation that is presented in the form of a thing (this piece of metal) is money.'[32] A few years after these were published in For Marx, Althusser asserts in his preface to a widely circulated paperback edition of Capital published in French in 1969, that the entire first part of Capital is marked by 'a method of presentation' imbued with 'Hegelian prejudice'.[33] For these and other reasons, Althusser now advises the reader to 'leave Part I (Commodities and Money) deliberately on one side in a first reading'.[34]

By now, moreover, Althusser had modified his earlier notion of an 1845 'epistemological break' with Hegel on Marx's part. Here in 1969, he laments 'survivals in Marx's language and even in his thought of the influence of Hegel's thought' in Capital itself.[35] Marx, it seems, did not become fully 'Marxist' until nearly a decade after he first published Capital, with 'Critique of the Gotha Program (1875) as well as the Marginal Notes on Wagner' of 1881, texts that were finally free of the supposed taint of Hegel and humanism.[36] In other words, Marx was not really a Marxist until eight years before his death!

Here, Althusser's argument flirted with an open anti-Marxism, and in no small way anticipated the post-structuralist rejection by Foucault and others of Marx tout court, as a Hegelian humanist whose thought was supposedly marked by the concept of a fixed human essence.

Foucault's Anti-Marxist Antihumanism

Michel Foucault's writings had already gained some prominence outside France by the 1960s. For example, Madness and Civilisation appeared with a major US publisher in an abridged edition in 1965. But in the 1980s his international fame skyrocketed, as the most notable representative of post-structuralism. This was the time when neoliberal economics and socially conservative politics came to the fore at a global level, as seen in the ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II. During these years, even dissident and revolutionary movements began to distance themselves from Marxism, if not opposing it outright. Such was the case with Soviet

dissident Alexandr Solzhenitsyn's avowal of an archconservative, moralising form of Christianity. Elsewhere, a rejection of Marxism could be seen in social revolutions and upheavals as disparate as those in Iran and Poland. Tiny Nicaragua was an exception, but its revolution, inspired by Marxism and Theology of Liberation, was eventually strangled by the Reagan administration with the open collusion of the Vatican and the complicity of Western European social democrats.

After having carried out philosophical studies with Althusser in the 1940s and briefly joining the French Communist Party, Foucault had moved away from Marxism altogether by the 1960s. In 1966, a year after Althusser's attacks on Marxist humanism in For Marx, Foucault intoned in The Order of Things that Marxism itself was a hopelessly dated perspective: 'Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else.'[37] This may have been an oblique answer to Sartre's 1957 declaration, cited earlier, that one could not go beyond Marx so long as capitalism existed. In any case, these statements earned Foucault a rebuke from Sartre, who accused him of a 'rejection of history', of being trapped in a structuralist 'succession of immobilities'. Escalating the polemic, Sartre termed Foucault's argument 'the last resort the bourgeoisie can enact against Marx'.[38]

Foucault attacked humanism even more forcefully, mocking its preoccupation with 'man', and with the human being in general. This was because human beings exhibited profound differences from each other that could not be captured within a humanist framework. Instead of Marx, it was Friedrich Nietzsche who anticipated the future, who 'indicated the turning-point' – that of 'the death of man'. In the bleak ending of The Order of Things, Foucault wrote that while the Enlightenment 'made it possible for the figure of man to appear', the era of humanism was 'nearing its end' and by the 1960s 'one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea'.[39]

In Discipline and Punish, published nearly a decade later, Foucault links the oppressive character of the modern apparatuses of surveillance and domination not to antihumanism but to humanism. He writes, for example, that the 'rigorous discipline' of Napoleon's military machine, with its close surveillance over the troops, as the juncture where 'the man of modern humanism was born'.[40]

Some of Foucault's differences with humanism were generational. Sartre's type of humanism led him to write of human beings in general, and he was sometimes leery of the concreteness of race, ethnicity or gender. At one point he told a black audience that blackness was the 'minor term of a dialectical progression' towards the universal of class,[41] for which he received a sharp retort from another revolutionary humanist, the young Frantz Fanon. Two decades later, Sartre found himself alongside Foucault in the French prisoner rights movement of the 1970s, a movement in which Maoists played a prominent part. As Bernard Harcourt notes, Sartre's idea of public solidarity was to hold a press conference of intellectual notables speaking out in support of the prisoners. Instead, as against what was by now perceived as Sartre's intellectual elitism, what prevailed was Foucault's idea of a press conference where ex-prisoners would speak in their own voices, with the intellectual luminaries present only as a supporting cast.[42]

Foucault rightly contested the straightjacket of Althusserian Marxism, although he kept many of Althusser's – and other structuralists' – notions of antihumanism in his work. Although Foucault repeatedly denied he was a structuralist, he can be viewed nonetheless as having operated generally within the structuralist camp. This can be seen in the tense public exchange between Foucault and the structuralist psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, on the one hand, and the Marxist humanist and 'genetic structuralist' Lucien Goldmann, on the other. Their exchange followed Foucault's 1969 presentation to the Société Française de Philosophie of his now canonical text, 'What Is an Author?'[43] Below are brief excerpts from that exchange, which included a sharp retort to Goldmann by Lacan:

> Goldmann: The negation of the subject is today the central idea of a whole group of thinkers, or more precisely, of a whole philosophical current … [This is] the French school of non-genetic structuralism [which] includes notably the names Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Althusser, Derrida, etc. … [In May 1968, a student wrote on the blackboard] 'Structures don't go out into the streets.' This means: it is never the structures who make history, but human beings, even though the actions of the latter always has a structured and significant character. …
>
> Foucault: … I have never, myself, used the word structure. Look for it in The Order of Things; you will never find it. …

> Lacan: I don't think that it was in any way legitimate to have written that structures don't go out into the streets because, if there is one thing demonstrated by the events of May, it is precisely the going out into the streets of structures.[44]

This exchange, in which Goldmann was seen to have been the loser,[45] was a prominent marker in the shift in French intellectual thought towards structuralism and post-structuralism. As Goldmann himself would have noted based upon his other writings, however,[46] this shift away from dialectical humanism came in the wake of the defeat of a revolutionary movement, in 1969 rather than 1968.

Until the mid-1970s, much of Foucault's work stressed the subjugation of the human subject under various institutions of power, developing notions of the decentring of power. In some respects, this decentring of power paralleled Marx's concept of capital, while at the same time diverging sharply from Marx in denying the centrality of the basic forces and relations of production. Like Marx's logic of capital, power for Foucault pervades all social relationships, and these relationships are irreducible to other forms like the economic structure of society. Foucault's world is one where modern forms of power are subtle in similar ways to capital's rule over the worker and society through the commodity fetish rather than the bullwhip or iron chains of old. And as with Althusser, modern power is not primarily repressive, but gentle, often presenting itself in the guise of caring or education. It grows and develops as part of what Foucault terms regimes of truth.

Moreover, as Foucault sees it, modern power brings with it nothing in the way of progress. This is of course at variance with Enlightenment liberalism and even with the Marxian tradition, which articulated, in varying degrees, a dialectical view of what is termed progress, including technological progress. Foucault is particularly interested in critiquing modern apparatuses of power that refer to scientific knowledge and which are marked by the carrying out of scientific research on subject populations: mental institutions and their subject populations, modern penitentiaries with their criminological research projects and rehabilitation systems, and the modern 'science' of sexuality, especially its preoccupation with 'deviance'.

The modern apparatuses of power penetrate the human subject deeply in a capillary fashion, here described by Foucault through an evocation of the Panopticon design for the nineteenth-century prison as developed by the liberal philosopher Jeremy Bentham:

> The Panopticon is a privileged place for experiments on men. … The Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanism of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behaviour; knowledge follows advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces over which power is exercised.[47]

These notions of studying and experimenting upon the subjugated are central to Foucault's notion of modern power, which forms or reforms the human subject, requiring or even inspiring its active participation.

In contrast to both Althusser and Bourdieu, however, there is apparently more scope, especially in Foucault's later writings, for a resistance to power. In 1976, a year after Discipline and Punish, Foucault sketches his notion of resistance at a conceptual level for the first time in his History of Sexuality, volume 1:

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. … Their [power relationships'] very existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance. … Hence there is no single locus of Great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there are specific cases [cas d'espèces] of resistance … They are the other in the relations of power; they inscribe themselves as irreducible in relation to it.[48]

In the above sense, resistance is everywhere, without a fixed point. However, it seems unable to overcome power.

As has been noted by several of his critics, Foucault's notion of resistance has important limitations: both a certain circularity and the lack of a concept of emancipation. In their introduction to Herbert Marcuse's writings on psychology and philosophy, Douglas Kellner, Clayton Pierce and Tyson Lewis offer a philosophical critique: 'With the rise of postmodernism and the discourse of power – in particular Foucault's critique of the Great Refusal – it has become fashionable to replace revolution with the terms resistance – or even with micro-resistance. Resistance is here internal to power, and ultimately produced by power, thus challenging power from the inside.'[49] Similarly, autonomist Marxist John Holloway notes the absence of a concept of 'emancipation' in Foucault's notion of resistance.[50]

At a more empirical level, one can also critique the types of resistance that preoccupied Foucault. He celebrates resistance among prisoners fighting for their rights in France and the US during the early 1970s. Foucault's participation in the French prisoner rights movement forms the background to Discipline and Punish. Here, in what are his finest moments as a thinker-activist, he nonetheless neglects to take up the emancipatory politics that were sometimes present within the Marxist and black liberation frameworks articulated by many of the prisoners at Attica, Soledad and other sites of US prison radicalism in the early 1970s.

More problematically, though, Foucault also supported uncritically the dominant Islamist wing of the Iranian revolution of 1979. He did so without troubling himself very much about the agenda of its clerical leadership, all the while heaping scorn upon liberal and leftist opponents of the regime as incurably Westernised and therefore outdated. Moreover, in his Iran writings, Foucault sees wrathful figures like Khomeini (or earlier, the fifteenth-century Florentine dictator Savonarola) as the very embodiments of revolutionary enthusiasm, which he links in turn to madness. He travelled to Iran twice in 1978, and argued that the Iranian Islamists were expressing the collective will of the Iranian people in a more or less unmediated fashion. Of course, such notions of the sameness of Iranian Muslims illustrated the Orientalist overtones that imbued these writings. Moreover, Foucault extolled the possibilities of a wider Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East in terms of undermining global hegemonies, while also arguing that the secularised West had a lot to learn from Iran's political spirituality. When an Iranian feminist attacked the naïveté of his writings on Iran, he heaped scorn upon her as too Westernised, as hostile to Islam, and therefore unrepresentative of the Iranian people. Foucault's assessment of Iran also came under implicit criticism by France's leading scholar of Islam, the Marxist Maxime Rodinson, who critiqued Foucault's Iran writings as an abstract flight of philosophical fantasy in the pages of Le Monde. In the spring of 1979, after Khomeini came to power and immediately began to repress women, leftists and gay men, Foucault experienced even more intense attack and ridicule in France. He accused his critics of misconstruing his writings, made some perfunctory criticisms of the new regime, and then lapsed into silence over Iran until his death five years later.[51]

Many have regarded Foucault's Iran episode as an aberration. They were stunned to see a radical leftist philosopher, who was also a gay man, support uncritically an

ideology that justified the brutal repression of homosexuality, feminism and democracy more generally. This notion of Foucault's Iran writings as aberrant could be questioned, however, for his Iran writings continue, albeit in exaggerated form, one of his key flaws: a one-sided and too sweeping critique of Western modernity. At least in the Iran writings, Foucault's critique of Western modernity reveals as well a surprising sympathy for what he perceives as a pre-modern social order, bathed in an uncompromising, antihumanist form of religious culture that supposedly helped the popular classes to resist or at least endure a harsh state domination. He showed little awareness that the Khomeinists possessed a modern, quasi-Leninist form of organisation, and that their politics was no mere reiteration of 'traditionalism'.

Were these momentary enthusiasms in the heat of the Iranian revolution, or can one read Foucault backwards, looking at his earlier, 'classic' writings through the lens of these very problematic ones on Iran? In fact, the theme of conservative and antihumanist forms of religious subjectivity as loci of resistance to modern apparatuses of power can already be discerned here and there in Foucault's earlier work. It is present, although not that prominently, nearly two decades earlier in his first major work, the History of Madness (1961), where he gives examples of passionate religious devotion as instances of resistance to the modern apparatus of the asylum. This occurs as part of his critique of the Enlightenment reformer Philippe Pinel, who played a role in the unchaining of French mental patients in the 1790s, under the impact of the revolution.

Foucault calls particular attention to Pinel's hostility towards religion. For Pinel, he writes, 'Religion was not to be a moral substratum of life in the asylum, but purely and simply an object of medicine.'[52] Foucault finds this objectionable, especially Pinel's Enlightenment notion of 'a neutral asylum, purified of all the images and passions that Christianity had brought into existence, and which led the mind to error, illusion, and ultimately delirium and hallucinations'. Thus, it was not only the critique of religion as such that was the problem for Foucault. His more specific target is the Enlightenment effort 'to reduce the imaginary forms' of religion and preserve in a 'Voltairean' manner only the rational, 'moral content of religion'.[53]

In his stance towards religion, Pinel stood on the ground of Enlightenment humanism. This framework was eloquently articulated by his contemporary Mary

Wollstonecraft, who argued against pre-modern strictures on women that were propped up by religious orthodoxy in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). More broadly, Wollstonecraft sought to subject religion to reason, taming its 'wild fanaticism', in order to make room for notions of women's equality and freedom:

> If [religion] be merely the refuge of weakness or wild fanaticism, and not a governing principle of conduct, drawn from self-knowledge, and a rational opinion respecting the attributes of God, what can it be expected to produce? The religion which consists in warming the affections, and exalting the imagination, is only the poetical part, and may afford the individual pleasure without rendering it a more moral being. … Men will not become moral when they only build airy castles in a future world to compensate for the disappointments which they meet with in this; if they turn their thoughts from relative duties to religious reveries.[54]

While it is hard to defend entirely Wollstonecraft's separation of reason from emotion, one can certainly see as laudable her Enlightenment humanist notion that the world's major religions could be seen to possess – and to share – elements of the modern notions of social justice and civic morality, if they could be stripped of their fanatical, irrational and retrograde elements.

But this was exactly the Enlightenment notion of religion that Foucault was attacking in History of Madness, and later, in his Iran writings, with his vindication of 'the images and passions' of religion, which, contra Wollstonecraft and others, he did not wish to see subjected to reason. This was because, to him, the greater danger was Enlightenment reason and the modern apparatuses of domination he saw it as justifying. Here, in counterposing those forms of modern domination to pre-modern religious ones, Foucault revealed, prefiguring his Iran writings, that his critique of modernity did not exclude the validation of extremely reactionary, antihumanist forms of religious subjectivity when they constituted themselves as forms of resistance to modern power.

Tellingly, at the very time of his Iran writings, Foucault had almost nothing to say about another prominent example of spiritual politics, Theology of Liberation in the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979. Was this because the ferment over Theology of Liberation and Marxism at the time in Latin America looked towards the future, towards the progressive features of religious subjectivity – egalitarianism and self-mobilisation of the poor – and because its notion of social justice, although deeply

anti-imperialist, was free of the harsh Puritanical strictures on modern 'Western' culture, especially concerning gender and sexuality, that one found in Khomeinism? Was it simply too Marxist, too humanistic?

Has Today's Philosophical Impasse Created Ground for the Return of Marxist Humanism?

The period 1979–81 was an era when both Michel Foucault and Edward Said refused to criticise the outcome of the Iranian revolution in a fundamental way, and, as we have seen, Foucault even became a quasi-follower of Khomeinism for a period in 1978–9. One cannot find wild gestures like Foucault's enthusiasm for the Iranian ayatollahs in the more careful but less philosophically rich work of Edward Said. Said is also a more ambiguous figure in terms of socialist humanism, as Robert Spencer's somewhat different take on his work in Chapter 3 demonstrates. Still, Said suggests that 'every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric'.[55] This is surely cultural nationalism dressed up in sophisticated postmodernist language. As Aijaz Ahmad writes, 'only the most obscurantist indigenists and cultural nationalists had previously argued … that Europeans were ontologically incapable of producing any true knowledge about non-Europe. But Said was emphatic on this point.'[56]

Said's Orientalism identified a powerful dynamic – indeed, I have relied on it in my own critique of Foucault – but in its absolutist form it has succeeded in driving a wedge between those whose identities are Asian, Middle Eastern and/or Muslim, on the one hand, and Europeans and Euro-Americans on the other. The entire analysis ignores the class position of those who hold these various identities. It has contributed to a form of identity politics for which diversifying the leadership of the dominant institutions is sufficient, a point made forcefully by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire, [57] and the limits of which can be seen with even greater clarity after the Obama presidency.

Hardt and Negri try to go beyond these kinds of identity politics, but they develop instead notions of class that minimise social differences like the hierarchies of race and gender among the world's working people, not to speak of their overly peremptory rejection of the nation-state as a global actor. Empire also falls short because of its

underlying philosophical perspective, an eclectic mix of Deleuze, Foucault, Machiavelli and Spinoza, along with some elements from Marx, particularly the section of the Grundrisse on technology and labour. But the elements of Marxism that are soundly rejected are the Hegelian and humanist underpinnings of Marx's thought.

Thus, whether under the influence of structuralists like Althusser, or post-structuralists like Foucault, the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s saw a turn away from humanism, from Hegel, and from the dialectic more generally. In these milieus, Hegel was characterised as a fundamentally reactionary, even racist thinker, and Marx as a pro-colonialist, Eurocentric one. Frequently, a version of Foucault was presented as the alternative. Meanwhile, humanism in the socialist humanist sense was at best ignored and at worst maligned.

Nonetheless, the various post-structuralisms themselves reached an impasse by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Many began to argue that the work of Said and Foucault had been too closely linked to identity politics, while that of Hardt and Negri was seen as a naïve evocation of a global multitude with no real hope of success in its opposition to the global capitalist order.

Recently, many have returned to Marx and some have even advocated a return to Hegel and the dialectic. Very few, however, are returning to any form of radical humanism. This is unfortunate, for it is the humanist element that has helped to ground, at least philosophically, notions of a real alternative to the existing state of affairs, to the domination of capital and the state over the human being.[58] Moreover, the structuralist and post-structuralist philosophies were, as a whole, markers of the defeat of the Left after the 1960s, especially during the long years of Reagan–Thatcher–John Paul II–Khomeini during the 1980s. In addition, with the collapse during the years 1989–91 of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc it dominated, the death of Marxism was proclaimed loudly nearly everywhere, especially since the dissident forms of socialism, some of them Marxist humanist in orientation, that had predominated in the anti-Stalinist revolts of 1956 and 1968 had by this time largely dissipated. At the same time, the Reagan–Thatcher forms of market fundamentalism and authoritarian politics were continued through the 1990s, albeit in slightly softened form under politicians like Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. But this only served to solidify the era of neoliberal capitalism.

The 1990s also saw other developments that pointed in a different direction. In 1994, the Chiapas revolt broke out, challenging not only the dominant classes of Mexico in terms of indigenous rights, but also the entire system of neoliberal capitalism, and the way its form of globalisation was affecting rural populations. This movement paralleled a certain revival of Marxist thought, at least compared to the 1980s. In 1993, the year before Chiapas, one of the chief representatives of postmodern thought, Jacques Derrida, had given a keynote address at a conference in California that had been intended as yet another dismissal of Marx, this time in favour of postmodernist and post-structuralist forms of critique. Instead, and to the chagrin of some of his hosts, Derrida delivered a ringing endorsement of Marx's Communist Manifesto, in which he declared that he 'knew of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none whose lesson appears more urgent today'.[59]

The twenty-first century began in a radically bifurcated manner, with some evidence of new challenges to neoliberalism, if not capital itself. On the one hand, the beginning of the new century was marked by the 1999 upheaval in Seattle, which placed the new alterglobalisation movement on the world stage. This youthful movement, unlike the more identitarian movements of the 1980s and 1990s, had coalesced around a number of issues, from ecology to labour, but always including an opposition to capitalism, if not in toto, at least in its neoliberal form.

On the other hand, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US by reactionary fundamentalists constituted a totally different sort of marker for the new century. These murderous attacks, by men who carried a misogynist, retrogressive social agenda combined with an opposition to global power networks, gave the green light to another and more powerful set of reactionaries in the Bush administration. The latter proceeded to launch what they called a global war against terrorism, engulfing whole regions in imperial violence. At first, the so-called war on terror between the US and reactionary forms of Islam seemed to crowd out everything else, especially the new openings exemplified by Seattle.

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, however, it was clear that the 'war on terror', in addition to its human toll, constituted one of the most disastrous examples in human history of overreaching by an imperialist power. By 2008, the world economy plunged into the second deepest economic crisis in the history of capitalism, with only

that of 1929 being a worse example. These twin crises resulted in a whole series of upheavals, most notably the Arab revolutions, but also serious unrest in Greece and in a number of other contexts that were directly influenced by the Arab revolutions, most notably the Occupy movement. These events suggested that the spirit of Seattle 1999 had not only persisted, but also deepened. In the midst of despair, it seemed that a new generation of the Left was dawning, something not seen since the post-war years 1945–70.

Perhaps history teaches us something here. As the Marxist humanist Lucien Goldmann once wrote in terms of Hegelianism, Marxism and periods of revolt and revolution:

> Hegelian categories are all recovered in Marxism; and it is no accident that they were reactualised in Europe around, say, the years 1917–23: first by Lenin in the Philosophical Notebooks, secondly by Lukács in History and Class Consciousness, and thirdly, I believe, somewhat later in Gramsci's concretely philosophical analyses. ... And if after 1923 this renaissance of dialectical thought subsequently ended, it was because the revolutionary period was clearly over: we know that with the 1923 defeat in Germany, after 1925–26, there was no longer any trace of this.[60]

One could extend Goldmann's point into a more general one about Hegelianism and revolution, also noting the period 1945–70.

But what about radical humanism, so often the companion of Hegelianism, at least in the second half of the twentieth century? Perhaps what Goldmann said of Hegelianism could also be said of the category of humanism, that it comes to the fore only at times when there is a real hope of positive revolutionary change. In that sense, we may be on the eve of a revival of radical humanism at a time when the hopes and aspirations of a new generation are being articulated in a way that brooks no compromise with an utterly dehumanised global capitalist system that has plunged that whole generation into depths of despair out of which revolutionary challenges are beginning to emerge.

Whether or not that is the case, I would argue that the indifference towards or dismissal of radical humanism weighs down the movements for change and revolution of our era. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be calling for a return – albeit on twenty-first-century ground – not only to Marx's humanism as seen in the 1844 Manuscripts, Grundrisse and Capital – but also to the writings of the post-World War II

socialist humanists in the West, people like Sartre, Erich Fromm and above all Raya Dunayevskaya; Eastern European dissident Marxist humanists like Karel Kosík; and finally, African socialist humanists like Frantz Fanon. I will also be arguing that it was Dunayevskaya who critically appropriated the philosophical contributions of most of these thinkers. In so doing, and in deep – and sometimes very critical – dialogue directly with Marx, Hegel and post-Marx Marxists like Lenin, Trotsky and Luxemburg, Dunayevskaya developed Marxist humanism as a full body of ideas that covered dialectics, changes in capitalism since Marx's death, the emergence of rank-and-file labour and of the Third World revolutions, and the politics and philosophy of women's liberation/feminism, all the while critiquing other forms of radical thought that did not measure up to the times, from Maoism and Trotskyism to structuralism and the Frankfurt School.[61]

But in order to appreciate Dunayevskaya's achievement, we first need to examine the explicitly Marxist humanist tradition in greater detail.

Erich Fromm's Socialist Humanism

Besides Sartre, the best known of the twentieth-century socialist humanist thinkers is Erich Fromm, who is often underestimated today in Left academia as a mere liberal or as a populariser who lacked rigour, in contrast to other members of the Frankfurt School like the melancholy Theodor Adorno. None deny, however, that it was Fromm who first introduced the Frankfurt School to a form of Freudian Marxism that was at the root of all of their subsequent efforts to theorise 'authoritarian personalities'. Drawn frequently from the lower middle classes, these authoritarian personalities combined a masochistic reverence and obedience to higher authority with sadistic urges to dominate the less powerful. The prime point of reference for Fromm and his colleagues was fascism, but their argument could be extended to the guards at Abu Ghraib or those drawn to religious fundamentalist movements, including radical Islamism. Fromm summed up these issues in popular form in Escape from Freedom (1941), a pioneering analysis of the appeal of fascism to those living under the uncertainties and the atomisation of modern capitalist society

By the 1950s, with publications like The Art of Loving (1956), Fromm seemed to be entering the American mainstream, perhaps moving from Marxism towards liberalism as so many others were doing in that period. That was what Marcuse suggested in his

Eros and Civilisation (1955), which led to a sharp exchange with Fromm in the left-liberal journal Dissent. However, a closer look at Fromm's published and unpublished work in this period shows a more complex picture. That same year, in The Sane Society, Fromm began to put forward a humanist interpretation of Marx's thought, extolling Marx's humanism as one of the major 'answers' to the 'decay and dehumanisation behind the glamour and wealth and political power of Western society'.[62] In that book, Fromm criticised Lenin for having helped to lay the ground for Stalinism. In 1958, however, Fromm recalibrated his position on Lenin and Trotsky as well. In an unpublished review of Trotsky's Diary in Exile, issued in 1958 by Harvard University Press, Fromm deplores the 'general habit of considering Stalinism and present-day Communism as identical with, or at least a continuation of revolutionary Marxism', especially the attempt to link 'Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky' to 'the vengeful killer Stalin, and to the opportunistic conservative Khrushchev'. Concerning Lenin and Trotsky, he adds: 'They were men with an uncompromising sense of truth, penetrating to the very essence of reality, and never taken in by the deceptive surface; of an unquenchable courage and integrity; of deep concern and devotion to man and his future; unselfish and with little vanity or lust for power.'[63]

By 1961, in his Marx's Concept of Man, Fromm foregrounded his Marxist humanist position, writing that Marx's 'theory does not assume that the main motive of man is one of material gain; ... furthermore, the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human; that Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation, the restoration of his capacity to relate himself fully to man and to nature.'[64]

Fromm's (and Marx's) notion of human emancipation is markedly different from the Foucaultian notion of resistance. In this respect, Sartrean existential humanism is also lacking, in the sense that an emancipatory moment is largely absent. For Marx, of course, the key is human emancipation, not only resistance to domination. Resistance to capital is predicated on a vision of a new society: not as a distant or imaginary utopia, but as a real possibility that exists as a tendency inside the very structures of capitalist society itself. For the first time since the neolithic revolution subjected labouring populations to unremitting toil in order to achieve a surplus product that helped to create the first class societies, the vast productive apparatus created by capitalism makes possible – for the future – sharply reduced hours of labour alongside material

abundance. This possibility is of course conditioned by the danger that the system might first annihilate humanity in nuclear war or irrevocably damage the global ecological system.

Though Fromm's was not the first effort to launch a discussion of the 1844 Manuscripts in the US, Marx's Concept of Man probably did more than any other publication to introduce them to the English-speaking public, also bringing the notion of socialist humanism to the fore. Marx's Concept of Man consists of a ninety-page introductory essay by Fromm, Tom Bottomore's translation of 110 pages from Marx's 1844 Essays, twenty-three pages from other texts by Marx (primarily The German Ideology and The Critique of Political Economy), and forty pages of reminiscences from Marx's contemporaries.

Despite the widely repeated legend that Fromm expresses in his introduction a preference for the young Marx over the 'mature' Marx of Capital, Fromm makes no such statement anywhere in the book, or later on for that matter. Another critique of Fromm is supported by the facts, however. Unfortunately, in his introduction to Marx's Concept of Man, Fromm sometimes imposes his own more eclectic form of religion-tinged humanism on Marx himself. I am not arguing here for an Enlightenment, let alone a positivistic or Darwinian form of atheism, as I recognise that there have been many progressive and radically humanist forms of religion and politics, from Gandhi's satyagraha, to Martin Luther King's Christian humanism, or to Latin American Theology of Liberation. To be sure, these forms of radical humanist spirituality share many assumptions and goals with Marxist humanism. However, it is a serious distortion of Marx to argue, as some liberals like Schumpeter have done, that Marx's own perspective is ultimately a form of religious subjectivity or prophecy. I would argue that Fromm falls into this kind of excess – albeit in an attempt to make Marx relevant to the 1960s – when he writes in Marx's Concept of Man that 'Marx's philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in secular language' and that Marx's concept of socialism is rooted in 'prophetic Messianism'.[65] He also links it to Zen Buddhism. At the time, some of those on the Left who had chosen the Western camp in the Cold War seized upon these weaknesses to attack not only Fromm, whom they already resented for his critiques of the US nuclear arsenal, but also the whole new view of Marx as a radical humanist that he was presenting. (These critiques were also spurred by the publication the same year of Fromm's searing attack on nuclear weapons, May Man Prevail?)

An interesting and sadly still relevant part of Fromm's own contribution to Marx's Concept of Man is his critique of what he terms 'the falsification of Marx's concepts' in the mass media and even among intellectuals. He adds that 'this ignorance and distortion of Marx are more to be found in the United States than in any other Western country'.[66] The first falsification, Fromm wrote, involved portraying Marx as a crude materialist who 'neglected the importance of the individual'.[67] Fromm refutes this, holding that 'the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human'.[68]

What Fromm saw as a second 'falsification' of Marx, one carried out by both Western intellectuals and Stalinist ideologues, was the forced identification of Marx with the single-party totalitarianism of the Soviet Union and Maoist China. During the Cold War, this led even leftist intellectuals to take sides with either the West (for example, Albert Camus) or Communism (for example, Sartre) as the lesser evil. Fromm would have none of this, as he sharply differentiates 'Marxist humanist socialism', on the one hand, from 'totalitarian socialism', on the other, with the latter in reality 'a system of conservative state capitalism'.[69] Again, this critique on Fromm's part has relevance for today, in light of the many attempts to tie the collapse of the Soviet Union to the 'death' of Marxism.

Fromm followed up Marx's Concept of Man with an edited book, Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium. For several years afterwards, this volume was the only widely circulated book on socialism in the US. It comprised essays by some thirty-five noted intellectuals, among them over a dozen from within Eastern Europe, most of them philosophical dissidents, but also a few who hewed more towards the party line. The more dissident Marxist humanists included several who would become prominent in the upheavals of the 1960s in the Eastern bloc, most notably the Prague Spring of 1968. Among the intellectuals from what was then Czechoslovakia were the Marxist humanists Karel Kosík and Ivan Svitak, while Poland was represented by Bronislaw Baczko as well as the more pro-party Adam Schaff, a personal friend of Fromm. What was then Yugoslavia had a particularly large representation, with a number of figures from the dissident philosophers of the Praxis group, among them Mihailo Markovic, Gajo Petrovic and Rudi Supek. From Western Europe, North America and Australia the volume drew upon Marxist philosophers like Marcuse, Dunayevskaya, Goldmann, Ernst Bloch and Eugene Kamenka.[70] As Fromm himself

acknowledged in his introduction to the volume, it lacked representation from the Third World, although it did contain essays by the left-wing Gandhian Nirmal Kumar Bose and by Leopold Senghor, the president of newly independent Senegal, who espoused a decidedly non-revolutionary form of socialist humanism.

In his introduction to Socialist Humanism, Fromm also spelled out more of his notion of socialist humanism, going to great lengths to show its identity with earlier forms of humanism:

> Humanism has always emerged as a reaction to a threat to mankind: in the Renaissance, to the threat of religious fanaticism; in the Enlightenment, to extreme nationalism and the enslavement of man by the machine and economic interests. The revival of Humanism today is a new reaction to this latter threat in a more intensified form – the fear that man may become the slave of things, the prisoner of circumstances he himself has created – and the wholly new threat to mankind's physical existence posed by nuclear weapons.[71]

But where there was identity there was also difference, and Fromm also stressed the core distinctions between socialist humanism and earlier forms of humanism:

> Although Renaissance Utopians touched upon the need for social changes, the socialist Humanism of Karl Marx was the first to declare that theory cannot be separated from practice, knowledge from action, spiritual aims from the social system. Marx held that free and independent man could exist only in a social and economic system that, by its rationality and abundance, brought to an end the epoch of 'prehistory' and opened the epoch of 'human history', which would make the full development of the individual the condition for the full development of society, and vice versa.[72]

This was not the whole story, however. Marxism also had to be differentiated along a humanist versus crude materialist axis, with the latter not really Marxist in Fromm's eyes:

> Marx was misinterpreted both by those who felt threatened by his program, and by many socialists. The former accused him of caring only for the physical, not the spiritual, needs of man. The latter believed that his goal was exclusively material affluence for all, and that Marxism differed from capitalism only in its methods, which were economically more efficient and could be initiated by the working class. In actuality, Marx's ideal was a man productively related to other men and to nature, who would respond to the world in

> an alive manner, and who would be rich not because he had much but because he was much.[73]

To many, then and especially since, even on the Left, such lofty goals, articulated in such a ringing fashion, were at best utopian and at worst completely outdated or even dangerous.

It was while putting together Marx's Concept of Man in 1959 that Fromm began his twenty-year correspondence with Dunayevskaya, which contains an interesting Marxist humanist discussion of gender. In 1976, while working on her Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, Dunayevskaya wrote to Fromm concerning the 'lack of camaraderie between Luxemburg, Lenin, and Trotsky'. Referring to Luxemburg, she asks: 'Could there have been, if not outright male chauvinism, at least some looking down on her theoretical work, because she was a woman?' Fromm responds: 'I feel that the male Social Democrats never could understand Rosa Luxemburg, nor could she acquire the influence for which she had the potential because she was a woman; and the men could not become full revolutionaries because they did not emancipate themselves from their male, patriarchal, and hence dominating, character structure.'[74]

Still, Fromm's socialist humanism had something of an abstract character, often floating above the real social contradictions of modern capitalist society. This could sometimes lead him towards positions indistinguishable from ordinary liberalism, as when, during the revolutionary year 1968, he devoted most of his political energy to reforming the US Democratic Party by backing anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy. And while he occasionally discussed gender, Fromm gave almost no attention to the searing racial divide that marked the 1960s in the US, as the politics of black liberation came to the fore, espousing a militant revolutionary politics and at times embracing a type of humanism – in Africa and America – that was well to the left of Fromm's. This can be seen in the writings of Frantz Fanon, to be discussed below. It was telling that, although Fromm lamented the lack of African contributors to Socialist Humanism, it did not occur to him to include a piece by Fanon.

Karel Kosík: Capitalism's World of the Pseudoconcrete

Karel Kosík (1926–2003) enjoyed a strange kind of fame during his lifetime. Living inside what was then Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia at the height of his intellectual development, he was an original Marxist humanist thinker, which meant that he was harassed and his work suppressed, and yet at the same time he received great admiration among oppositional intellectuals and youth of that tortured land. In the West, his work was greatly acclaimed by varied figures from the more critical parts of the Left, from Jürgen Habermas to Michael Löwy and from Raya Dunayevskaya to Bertell Ollman, yet it never achieved a very wide readership. In the early 1970s, journals like Telos ran translations of his work, but when his magnum opus, Dialectics of the Concrete, appeared in English in 1978, it seemed almost to end the discussion of Kosík rather than begin it. At the time, much of the intellectual Left was moving towards Adorno's bleak 'negative dialectics', and Foucaultian post-structuralism. In such a context, Kosík's rigorous but nonetheless emancipatory 'dialectics of the concrete' may simply have struck the wrong note, especially since, unlike in 1968, his ideas were no longer connected to a mass movement for socialist humanism inside his own country. At the present juncture, it may be time for another look at Kosík's writings.

Kosík's work is deeply impacted by the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, leading some Western Marxists to see this as the source of his originality. However, one can appreciate his originality very easily by viewing his work in the context of Hegel, Marx, the Frankfurt School and East European Marxist humanism. Kosík's work was the finest flowering of that oppositional form of Marxist philosophy that arose in the 1950s in Eastern Europe, and was associated with the writings of Leszek Kolakowski, Bronislaw Baczko, Mihailo Markovic, Ivan Svitak and others from that region. The Prague Spring of 1968 was the high point, when philosophers united with workers and students in an attempt to forge a socialist humanist society, only to be crushed by Russian tanks. By the time the Eastern European regimes fell in 1989, socialist humanism was more of a memory than an intellectual or political reality. Freed from persecution and censorship and restored to his professorship after two decades, Kosík was soon dismissed again, this time for supposedly economic reasons.

Let me turn to Kosík's greatest work, Dialectics of the Concrete, which originally appeared in Czech in the early 1960s. Its first chapter begins with the famous critique of

the ‘pseudoconcrete’ world of ‘fetishised praxis’. In the world of the pseudoconcrete, i.e. the everyday world of capitalism, we are made to forget that we have the capacity to alter or even create our world, of course within a set of given historical possibilities: ‘Reality can be transformed in a revolutionary way only because, and insofar as, we ourselves transform reality.’ But to do so, we need to strip away the fetishism of the pseudoconcrete:

> The real world, concealed by the pseudoconcrete, and yet manifesting itself in it, is neither a world of real conditions opposed to unreal ones, nor a world of transcendence opposed to a subjective illusion, but a world of human praxis. It is the comprehension of socio-human reality as the unity of production and products, of subject and object, of genesis and structure.

This means that the world of praxis, which is not only practice, but practice connected to a philosophy of liberation, does not exist outside the given world in some transcendental sphere, nor is it merely the ‘real’ as opposed to an illusory world of pseudoconcreteness ‘as in some naturalistic parallel to Plato’s ideas’. [75] Instead, praxis cohabits the world of the pseudoconcrete. Thus, the living negation of the pseudoconcrete exists right inside that pseudoconcrete world of the given social arrangements.

Moreover, the world of the pseudoconcrete cannot be overcome fully with the dominant intellectual Marxist strategies, not even with the concept of totality as developed by Lukács and the early Frankfurt School, whom Kosík critiques without naming them:

> The category of totality has also been well received and broadly recognised in the twentieth century, but it is in constant danger of being grasped one-sidedly, of turning into its very opposite and ceasing to be a dialectical concept. The main modification of the concept of totality has been its reduction to a methodological precept; a methodological rule for investigating reality. This degeneration has resulted in two ultimate trivialities: that everything is connected with everything else, and that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. In materialist philosophy, the category of concrete totality answers first and foremost the question, what is reality. Only secondarily, and only after having materialistically answered the first question, can it be an epistemological principle and a methodological precept.[76]

Kosík goes on to critique pre-Marxian atomist-rationalist and organicist concepts of totality, elaborating a Marxian version that implicitly taxes other Marxian versions with falling, at least in part, back into those pre-Marxian ones.[77] A concept of totality remains abstract if the human being 'is intuited primarily or exclusively as an object in the framework of totality'; conversely, a concept of totality becomes 'concrete' when the 'objective-historical praxis' of human beings is recognised as part of the concept.

Kosík's attack on crude Marxist interpretations comes through when he writes that 'even the totality of the base and superstructure is abstract' when it is forgotten that the human being 'is the real historical subject' and actually forms 'both the base and the superstructure' in the human 'process of production and reproduction'.[78] In short, this is a most rigorous philosophical argument for a humanist position within Marxism.

In Dialectics of the Concrete, these issues of humanism and dialectic undergird the discussion of Marx's Capital that forms the core of the book. Kosík begins by sounding like a Heideggerian, something that has fooled some Western commentators on him, who were perhaps all too willing to be fooled. I would suggest that Heidegger is ultimately a foil, as is seen when his philosophy is termed nothing more than 'an alienated escape from alienation'.[79] Kosík also disputes the notion that Capital lacks a philosophical basis, which must therefore be developed outside Marxism. But his main opponents are versions of Marxism that in his view are not fully dialectical. Here he of course sets his sights on positivist and reductionist readings of Capital that are too economistic.

Perhaps more surprisingly, Kosík also attacks the Frankfurt School, not for idealism or moving into culture, but for something not usually discussed, what he sees as its attempt to abolish philosophy. Here his target above all is Marcuse, especially his magisterial study of Hegel, Reason and Revolution, which includes a brief discussion of Marx under the rubric of 'from philosophy to social theory',[80] summarised by Kosík as follows:

> A different way of abolishing philosophy is to transform it into a 'dialectical theory of society' or dissolve it in social science. This form of abolishing philosophy can be traced in two historical phases: the first time during the genesis of Marxism when Marx, compared to Hegel, is shown to be a 'liquidator' of philosophy and the founder of a

> dialectical theory of society, and the second time in the development of Marx's teachings which his disciples conceive of as social science or sociology.[81]

This is wrong, Kosík maintains, not least because 'the development from Hegel to Marx is not a transition from one philosophical position to another; it does not in any way imply the need to 'abolish philosophy'.[82] In this sense, he highlights the affinities between the Hegelian and the Marxist dialectic.

But the big conclusion comes a few lines later, as the core humanist themes of Dialectics of the Concrete come to the fore once again, here in a critique of established – i.e. Stalinist – Marxism. Marxism, Kosík writes, tends to fall back into a simplistic notion of a sociological totality, one that is not dialectical and certainly not infused with the humanist concept of praxis:

> Abolishing philosophy in dialectical social theory transforms the significance of the seminal 19th century discovery into its very opposite: praxis ceases to be the sphere of humanising man, the process of forming a socio-human reality as well as man's openness toward being and toward the truth of objects; it turns into a closedness: socialness is a cave in which man is walled in.

Some brief allusions to Plato's cave are followed by the statements, 'man is walled in in his socialness' and 'man is a prisoner of socialness'.[83] This poignant image managed to evoke the Berlin Wall, which had gone up just two years before this book was published. What's more, it showed the possibility of a Marxist dialectical vision that did not fall either into the error of totalising, or into that of reductionism to the social or the economic, while at the same time rooting itself in Marx's humanistic materialism.

In another critique, Kosík takes on the notion of theory and practice, so often abused by crude Marxists:

> The only part of the great discovery of materialist philosophy that uncritical reasoning preserved was the idea that praxis is something immensely important and that the unity of theory and practice holds as a supreme postulate. But the original philosophical questioning, in whose light praxis had been discovered, disappeared, and the idea preserved merely the importance of the principle.[84]

Kosík's version of Marxist humanism has a certain lightness of being. Yet it is also firmly materialist, while at the same time a deeply rooted dialectical philosophy that rejects all forms of socio-economic reductionism.

Frantz Fanon: The 'New Humanism' of African Liberation

Let us now move outside the sphere of North America and Europe, to the revolutionary African socialist humanism of Frantz Fanon, who was influenced by Hegel, Sartre, the Négritude School and above all Marx. Note Fanon's use, similar to Sartre, of the term 'decide' – this in a declaration about the future of an independent Africa in his Wretched of the Earth of 1961, the year so many new nations were being born, in many cases with aspirations towards socialist humanism: 'Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.'[85]

While fighting for Algeria's independence from France, Fanon did not dismiss tout court the European humanist tradition. He said that the Europeans had not practiced it – whether under Nazism or in the colonies – but predicted that the emerging Third World would be able to do so: 'This new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others.'[86] This was, to be sure, a humanism drawing from European revolutionary and democratic traditions, but at the same time it was a 'new humanism'. It not only critically appropriated earlier liberal forms of European humanism, but it also went beyond their limitations. As a theoretician of the newly forming Third World, Fanon also distanced himself from the Soviet bloc and its authoritarian and dehumanising form of industrial 'development', not only mentioning the Hungarian revolution of 1956, but also writing of the new Africa: 'The pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or his privacy, to break and kill him.'[87] This was nothing short of a socialist humanist third way, opposed to both Western style capitalism and Eastern statist communism. [88]

The penultimate chapter of Wretched of the Earth contains a burst of dialectical insight. Given his universalising humanist aims, Fanon asked whether nationalism was obsolete. Shouldn't the new African nations drop nationalism entirely in favour of universal brotherhood and sisterhood of peoples across the world? No, he argued, one cannot 'skip the national period', that of 'national consciousness'. Only through the

particular, national consciousness can one get to the universal, humanism: 'The consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension.'[89]

Thus, the new nations of the emergent Third World could not skip over the stage of national self-consciousness, as the road towards universal human emancipation passed of necessity through the particular, provided that that national consciousness did not solidify into a separatist type of narrow nationalism.[90] Nor could the nations of Europe and North America skip over this either. They needed to recognise the fact that they had been complicit in systems of racist colonialism, not in order to wallow in guilt, but in order to make the kind of self-critique needed for a truly global human civilisation. And that global civilisation could be reached in full only by a revolutionary uprooting. Fanon also famously advocated violence, and not

Fanon also famously advocated violence, and not only as a necessary tactic in struggles against intransigent, violently repressive colonial regimes like French-occupied Algeria. He also wrote of violence as personally liberating for oppressed peoples long dominated by a racist system that denied their very humanity. Whether or not this was influenced by Nietzsche, as some have maintained, its liberating force has been questioned by later commentators.[91] More problematically, Fanon's thought was for too long pigeon-holed – both by critics and supporters – as a philosophy celebrating revolutionary violence, in no small part because of the stress on this theme in Sartre's preface to Wretched of the Earth.

Fanon wrote at the dawn of the new Third World, fired with optimism but also deeply concerned about falling back into elitist, one-party rule, as in Nkrumah's Ghana, let alone more openly pro-imperialist regimes like Senghor's Senegal. At the time Fanon died in 1961, these dreams of a new humanism in Africa still seemed very concrete as an immediate and real possibility. To be sure, his socialist humanist vision of Africa's future did not come to pass, although there were for a brief period some interesting experiments, as in the ujamaa philosophy and politics of Julius Nyerere's Tanzania.[92]

I would argue that the failure of the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s to develop new and positive forms of society – whether in Africa or in France in 1968 – came about not only due to imperialist or capitalist machinations, but also because of internal

weaknesses. The latter included philosophical ones: for example, the leftist anti-imperialist tradition that had grown out of opposition to nuclear weapons and wars for empire remains intact today, but increasingly without much of a positive project. This leaves it open to the danger of opportunistically supporting various authoritarian and even reactionary forms of anti-imperialism, from Khomeini's Iran to Assad's Syria. There were some positive exceptions after the 1960s, as in revolutionary Nicaragua and Grenada during the early 1980s, but these were brutally crushed by US imperialism. In the case of Grenada, this was abetted by counter-revolution from within the revolution, as seen in the assassination of Maurice Bishop by the Stalinoid Bernard Coard, which paved the way for Reagan's 1983 invasion. By the 1980s, when Reagan–Thatcher–Pope John Paul II dominated the Western capitalist world, and perspectives as reactionary as Khomeini's radical Islamism came to the fore in the Middle East, this led to a situation aptly described by Raya Dunayevskaya in 1982: 'Without a new vision of revolutions, a new individual, a new universal, a new society, new human relations,' and 'without a philosophy of revolution, activism spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, without ever revealing what it is for.'[93]

By that time – the early 1980s – the vast majority of the global Left came to reject the possibility of a radical transformation of society in which workers would rule through the direct democracy of their councils, women would emancipate themselves and society from millennia of sexism, racial minorities like African Americans would conduct militant struggles that narrowed rather than widened the gap between them and the white workers, and Marxist philosophers would sketch out dialectical humanist visions to help transform the world. No, by the 1980s, and even more so after 1989, the Left got stuck between two very limited alternatives: (1) a sort of liberal left that supported democracy and civil society but no longer really challenged capital (Habermas et al.), and (2) a politics of difference that accepted uncritically even reactionary movements (Iranian Islamism, Farrakhanism) so long as they seemed to challenge imperialism and racism.

Raya Dunayevskaya: Revolutionary Marxist Humanism

Raya Dunayevskaya's Marxist humanism had its roots in Marx and Hegel, but also appropriated critically many of the other strands of socialist humanism discussed above. An emigrant to the US from Russia, she came up through the US anti-Stalinist

left, and then served as Leon Trotsky's Russian Secretary in 1937–8, during his Mexican exile. Without a university education and schooled in the radical movement, Dunayevskaya also had strong ties to the US black, labour and women's movements. Her theoretical career began not long after her break from the Left with Trotsky in 1939, when she opposed the Hitler–Stalin Pact as a Stalinist betrayal, whereas Trotsky defended it as a necessary tactic to preserve what he considered to be a Russian workers' state, albeit with bureaucratic deformations. By 1941, a year after Trotsky's assassination by a Stalinist agent, Dunayevskaya had elaborated a theory different from Trotsky's concerning the nature of the Soviet Union under Stalin, characterising it as a new type of class society, a state-capitalist totalitarianism. Among her earliest theoretical contributions was a debate in 1944–5 in the pages of the American Economic Review, a rarity for a Marxist, over Soviet state capitalism, in which she locked horns with the then Stalinist economists Paul Baran and Oscar Lange.

As Epstein notes [The Rise, Decline and Possible Revival of Socialist Humanism], she joined forces with the Afro-Caribbean philosopher and cultural theorist C. L. R. James in a dissident grouping within Trotskyism widely known as the Johnson– Forest Tendency (JFT) united around the James–Dunayevskaya theory of state capitalism. However, the JFT kept its distance from the specific language of humanism, which it viewed as fundamentally liberal and bourgeois. Within a few years of the breakup of the JFT in 1955, however, Dunayevskaya published Marxism and Freedom (1958), a book that placed humanism at the centre of Marx's thought, a type of vocabulary not found in the texts of the JFT, and in this sense, original to Dunayevskaya. In his preface to Dunayevskaya's book, Marcuse applauded her attempt 'to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: the humanistic philosophy'.[94] Dunayevskaya's translation of two of the key essays in Marx's 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 'Private Property and Communism' and 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic', was appended to the original 1958 edition. In Marxism and Freedom, Dunayevskaya addressed humanism[95] in three contexts: the young Marx, the mature Marx of Capital, and the social movements of the period. In her chapter on the young Marx, Dunayevskaya quotes and then uses as a point of departure the core passages on humanism in the 1844 Manuscripts that had not been addressed by Marcuse in Reason and Revolution, the only previous substantial discussion of these texts in English. In so doing, she wove together in her trademark compressed form a number of issues, among them philosophical analysis of humanism in Marx, critique of the Soviet Union as an

example of ‘vulgar communism’, and present-day humanism in the sense of the striving of human beings to be free of capitalistic alienation. Concerning the young Marx, she wrote:

> He drew the line so sharply between ‘vulgar communism’ and even ‘positive communism’, on the one hand, and his own philosophy of humanism, on the other hand, that it stands to this day as the dividing line between Marxism as the doctrine of liberation, and all who claim the name of ‘Marxism’, ‘socialism’, or ‘communism’ while they pursue an entirely different course, both in thought and in practice, from all that Marx stood for. ‘Not until the transcendence of this mediation (abolition of private property) which is nevertheless a necessary presupposition does there arise positive Humanism beginning from itself ’, said Marx. In a word, another transcendence, after the abolition of private property is needed to achieve a truly new, human society which differs from private property not alone as an ‘economic system’, but as a different way of life altogether. It is as free individuals developing all their natural and acquired talents that we first leap from what Marx called the prehistory of humanity into its true history, the ‘leap from necessity to freedom’.[96]

In this sense, Marx’s humanism was itself the ground for a thoroughgoing critique of both statist communism in the East and formally democratic capitalism in the West.

A second humanist context was seen in the four chapters on Capital that formed the theoretical core of Dunayevskaya’s book, with one of them entitled ‘The Humanism and Dialectic of Capital, Volume I, 1867 to 1883’. She argued that the human being, the worker, remained at the centre of Marx’s exposition and critique of capitalist value production:

> Marxism is wrongly considered to be ‘a new critique of political economy.’ ... By introducing the labourer into political economy, Marx transformed it from a science which deals with things, such as commodities, money, wages, profits, into one which analyzes relations of men at the point of production. ... It is characteristic of Marx, known the world over as the creator of the theory of surplus value, to disclaim the honor because the theory was ‘implicit’ in the classical theory of labour value. What he did that was new, he said, was to make this explicit by showing what type of labour creates values and hence surplus values, and the process by which this is done.[97]

In keeping with this, Dunayevskaya devoted considerable attention to the understudied chapters of Capital on the working day and on machinery, in which the

human condition – and oppositional force – of the working class came to the fore. These chapters were not 'sob story stuff ' to convince the reader of the brutality of capitalist production, but at the core of Marx's analysis.[98]

Dunayevskaya highlighted not only the massive labour movement for a shorter working day, but also the struggle against machinery, towards which, she argued, uncritically pro-technology 'professional Marxists have too sophisticated an attitude'.[99] She also quoted a lesser-known passage from Marx's machinery chapter on this point: 'It would be possible to write quite a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolt of the working class.'[100] As she saw it, however, in Capital each new objective development of this sort not only created an objective transformation in capitalist production, but it also radically restructured the working classes, leading to new forms of consciousness and of revolt.

This type of consideration formed the foundation of a third humanist element of Marxism and Freedom, the discussion – in a chapter entitled 'Automation and the New Humanism' – of a new stage of capitalist production in the 1950s, automation, and the resultant movements of rank-and-file labour and African Americans of the 1950s. Marcuse took exception to this chapter in his preface, writing that he 'disagrees … with the analysis of the contemporary position, structure and consciousness of the labouring classes'.[101] These differences would manifest themselves in Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (1964), where he held that the new forms of production of automated capitalism, accompanied by the relatively high wages and benefits of the Fordist era, had not only transformed the consciousness of the working classes towards a more affirmative stance towards capitalism, but also that automation itself was laying the ground for a liberated future because its reduction in socially necessary labour time was creating the basis for a much shorter working day.

Contra Marcuse, Dunayevskaya held that when one considered the human condition of the worker, the new stage of automated production, far from liberatory, was resulting in both mass unemployment and a deepening alienation on the part of those who still had jobs. Moreover, automated production led to new types of revolt, like the thousands of 'wildcat' strikes that mushroomed from the rank and file, challenging not only capital but also a labour bureaucracy that since 1945 had become a player in the system. She

also took up the mass creativity of the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–6, a struggle by African Americans against racial segregation that persisted for a full year in the face of savage repression by the white power structure. In language that recalled Marx's writings on the Paris Commune, she concluded: 'Clearly, the greatest thing of all in this Montgomery, Alabama, spontaneous organisation was its own working existence.'[102]

Decrying a lack of creative development among Marxist theorists in response to the new forms of subjectivity, as in the wildcat strikes or Montgomery, Dunayevskaya suggested that the traditional relationship of theorist to ordinary people needed to change. She noted the deep thinking that had emerged from inside the working classes and the Civil Rights Movement during these new struggles: 'In truth, while the intellectual void today is so great that the movement from theory to practice has nearly come to a standstill, the movement from practice to theory, and with it, a new unity of manual and mental labour in the worker, are in evidence everywhere.'[103] Among other things, Dunayevskaya was referring to her conversations with striking coal miners, who had questioned not only wages and working conditions, but also the very nature of labour itself, especially the division between 'thinking and doing', which she connected to 'new Humanist impulses from ever deeper strata of the workers'.[104] The book concluded on a ringing humanist note: 'The totality of the crisis demands, and will create, a total solution. It can be nothing short of a new Humanism.'[105]

In the next decade and a half, Dunayevskaya modified her view that radical intellectuals had been entirely lacking in their response to the new forms of revolt of the post-war era. This can be seen in her Philosophy and Revolution (1973), which analysed critically, and drew into her own version of Marxist humanism insights from a number of radical humanist philosophical strains that had appeared since 1945, among them Sartrean existentialism, African socialist humanism and Eastern European Marxist humanism.

At first glance, it would seem that Dunayevskaya's engagement with Sartre was entirely critical, even polemical. For example, she entitled an early version of the Sartre chapter in Philosophy and Revolution 'Sartre's Search for a Method to Undermine Marxism' (1963). But a decade later, although the critique remained very sharp, there was also a measure of acknowledgement of Sartre's having helped to launch the turn by leftist intellectuals in the 1940s towards radical humanism: 'Immediately after World

War II everyone from the theologians to Sartre took issue with Marx while at the same time "discovering" his Humanism.'[106] More importantly, Dunayevskaya critically appropriated Sartre in her elaboration of the most controversial philosophical argument of the book, the notion that Hegel's absolutes – rather than closed totalities that shut out all objectivity as Engels and the empiricists had maintained – needed to be reinterpreted for today as a new departure, as seen in the title of the book's first chapter, 'Absolute Negativity as New Beginning'. In developing this argument, she cited Sartre's critique of liberal relativism and tolerance in the face of Nazism from What Is Literature?, particularly his incorporation of a form of the absolute into his existential humanism: 'He said that what was original with Existentialists was that the War and the Occupation "made us rediscover the Absolute at the heart of relativity itself ".'[107]

In the Sartre chapter of Philosophy and Revolution, subtitled somewhat less polemically as 'Outsider Looking In', Dunayevskaya acknowledges Sartre's search for a philosophy of revolution and his popularisation in the 1940s of the notion, previously restricted to Marxism, that philosophy must become revolutionary. Nonetheless, she took Sartre to task for merging together with Marx's own philosophy too many Stalinist ideological categories – among them a crude materialism and a deterministic theory of history – and then writing that Marxism therefore needed the additive of existentialism in order to address issues like individual subjectivity and choice, and to become a form of humanism. This problem could be seen in the major work in which Sartre declared himself a Marxist, Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). That book was also burdened by elitist attitudes, seen most notably in Sartre's category of the 'practico-inert', a sort of fallback position of passivity and isolation towards which all human relationships tended: 'Sartre may have destroyed as many dogmatisms as he claims. But one unstated yet all-pervading dogmatism continues to be the underlying motif of all Sartre thinks, writes, and does. It is the dogmatism of the backwardness of the masses, now called "practico-inert" and including the individual as well as the masses.'[108]

Dunayevskaya also criticises Sartre's wavering towards Stalinism in the 1950s, as seen especially in his attacks on supporters of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Here, Sartre's very desire to remain revolutionary, all the while imbued with the deep contradictions of his existentialist perspective, led him first towards the French Communist Party, which he uncritically defended during the 1950s, and later into an embrace of Maoism. Along the way, he also supported, sometimes with great courage,

genuinely revolutionary movements, as in the Algerian Revolution against French colonialism, during which military reactionaries tried to assassinate him. In addition, Sartre lent his support to African revolutionaries like Patrice Lumumba and Frantz Fanon, writing a major, albeit flawed preface to the latter's Wretched of the Earth (1961). At the same time, however, he took too many uncritical positions towards various revolutions that had gone sour, especially in China.

To Dunayevskaya, the problem here lay not only in his overall existentialist framework, but also in a problem common to many revolutionary thinkers, 'the consequences of the abstract universal as methodology'.109 The failure of the universal of freedom or humanism adequately to particularise itself meant that Sartre gyrated between individualist subjectivism, on the one hand, and capitulation to alienated forms of collectivity like Maoism, on the other. Concerning Sartre, Dunayevskaya concluded:

> The methodological enemy is the empty abstraction which has helped cover up soured revolutions and failed to disclose new roads to revolution in theory, not to mention in fact ... The philosophy of existence fails 'to merge' with Marxism because it has remained Subjectivity without a Subject, desire for revolution without the 'new forces, new passions' for revolution, and at present escapism into 'world revolution' at the very moment when what is required is the concretisation, the unity of philosophy and revolution on native ground, as the only ground for world revolution.[110]

As discussed below, this problem of an abstract universal was one that Dunayevskaya was also to find even among socialist humanists to whom she felt a greater affinity than Sartre.

In her writings on the African revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, Dunayevskaya, who made a lengthy visit to West Africa in 1962, concentrated on humanist strains within African socialism, which were quite pervasive at the time. While her writings on Africa ranged widely,[111] I will concentrate again here on a chapter of Philosophy and Revolution, 'The African Revolutions and the World Economy', in which Dunayevskaya cited with enthusiasm anticolonialist leader Sékou Touré's call for African unity as a 'new humanism essentially founded on the universal solidarity and cooperation between people, without any racial and cultural antagonism and without narrow egoism and privilege'. It was Fanon, however, who stood out as the most significant theoretician of

African socialist humanism: 'None looked at the African revolutions more concretely and comprehensively than did Frantz Fanon.' [112]

In keeping with her own theme of Hegel's absolute negativity as new beginning, Dunayevskaya cited as well Fanon's characterisation of the African struggle against colonialism as 'the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute'.113 Dunayevskaya also incorporated Fanon's critique of European humanism as an abstract universal as the epigraph to the chapter, part of which read: 'Let us leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men wherever they find them.'[114] As she noted, Fanon remained a dialectical humanist nonetheless, calling for a 'new humanism' based upon revolutionary solidarity for Africa and the world.

These early hopes of the late 1950s and early 1960s went largely unfulfilled, however, as the young African republics and liberation movements faced both the external dangers of neo-colonialism/Cold War politics, and deep internal contradictions between leaders and masses:

> Despite the instant mass mobilisations and the search for new humanist beginnings that would unite philosophy and revolution, theory and practice, which was by no means limited to intellectuals but was a need most urgently felt by the masses themselves, we must soberly face the present bleak reality. For just as these revolutions reshaped the map of Africa in less than a decade, they just as rapidly reached the crossroads. Thus, though the revolutions emerged from deep indigenous roots, without capital of any sort, and by their own force and passion and reason achieved their political emancipation, independent of the 'East' as well as the 'West', after gaining power they did not remain quite so externally 'nonaligned'.[115]

Some, like Touré, sided with the East and gained Russian support. Others, like Senegal's Senghor, who had contributed an essay to Fromm's Socialist Humanism, sided with the West, including the former colonial power, France. Dunayevskaya chalks this up, again, to the dangers of an abstract universal: 'While President Senghor spoke most eloquently about African socialism, the country itself had undergone hardly any fundamental economic changes since gaining political independence. Senegal still follows France too closely, and not only in foreign policy.'[116]

Among the various strands of socialist humanism, with the possible exception of Fanon's version of African socialism, Dunayevskaya seemed to feel the greatest affinity

for the Eastern European Marxist humanist philosophers, many of whom had appeared alongside her in Fromm's Socialist Humanism in 1965. During the period 1953–70, almost all of the uprisings and oppositional movements in Eastern Europe took place in the name of democratic or humanist socialism, as seen most notably in the Hungarian workers' councils during the 1956 revolution, or the 1968 Prague Spring that called itself an experiment in 'socialism with a human face'. The fact that this shifted by the 1980s, when the Solidarność movement in Poland came under the influence of right-wing Catholicism as represented by Pope John Paul II, should not obscure that previous period of socialist humanism. This is not to deny the importance of finally toppling the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe, which had espoused a fundamentally antihumanist ideology that was a caricature of Marxism. In keeping with her state-capitalist theory, Dunayevskaya enthusiastically supported all of the Eastern European uprisings, calling, often vainly, upon the global Left to do so, just as it supported anticolonial and anticapitalist revolutions elsewhere. Already in Marxism and Freedom, she had viewed Hungary 1956 as a harbinger of the demise of the entire totalitarian system of Russia and Eastern Europe. But it was in Philosophy and Revolution that she discussed at greatest length the Marxist humanist philosophers of this region, while also taking up the Prague Spring, the greatest anti-Stalinist revolt of the period.

Among those whom Dunayevskaya saw as the most important thinkers of Marxist humanism was Kosík, who, as she saw it, 'had, in 1963 published an important philosophic work, Dialectics of the Concrete, which raised anew the question of the individual', and also spoken out, 'although in abstract philosophic terms, against the "dogmatic" Communist retrogressionism in life and thought'.[117] Soon after, in a 1974 critique of Adorno's Negative Dialectics, she contrasted the German 'ivory tower' philosopher with Kosík and Fanon, philosophers who had responded – and in her view profoundly so – to the new liberatory impulses within their respective societies.[118] In addition, the Eastern European Marxist humanists pointed to the problem of the individual within Marxist thought, while also rejecting Sartrean existentialism.

Dunayevskaya also singled out another Czechoslovak Marxist humanist, Ivan Svitak, for emphasising the need to overcome the division between mental and manual labour,[119] and the Yugoslav Mihailo Markovic, a founder of the Praxis journal that grouped a number of independent philosophers. Markovic defended a dialectical humanist perspective while also critiquing how the dialectic had been misused by the

Stalinist ideologists. This touched upon a key issue, the question of why, even as Stalin transformed the Russian revolutionary regime into a state-capitalist one, he at the same time hewed publicly to a revolutionary line, rather than the reformism and open betrayal that Trotsky had predicted. As Dunayevskaya writes, 'Markovic calls attention to the fact that, "The use of dialectical phraseology created an illusion of continuity in method," where, in fact, it "has meant little more than a subsequent rationalisation of various past political conceptions and decisions. That is why Stalinism did not reject dialectic as a whole in the way it rejected negation of the negation."'[120] Thus, the Stalinists could justify their twists and turns – anti-fascist in 1936, pact with Hitler in 1939 and anti-fascist again in 1941 after Hitler attacked Russia – on the basis that revolutionary politics did not go on a straight line, but was dialectical. Later on, after Khrushchev revealed publicly some of Stalin's crimes, Soviet ideologues could then say that mistakes were 'of course' made but that progress is necessarily dialectical, i.e. full of contradictions.

At the same time, Markovic, Svitak and even Kosík spoke too often in abstract generalities, about humanity, freedom and the like, while failing to carry out specific Marxist analyses of their own societies, for example as to whether the population was divided by ethnicity, with some groups dominant and the others subordinate. A few years after Dunayevskaya's death, when the Balkan wars broke out in the 1990s, neither Markovic nor Kosík fully met the challenge. Markovic rapidly transformed into an apologist for the most virulent Serbian nationalism, drawing close to the genocidal Slobodan Milosevic, all the while continuing to mouth a universal language of humanism and universalism, and at the same time accusing the Bosnians and the Kosovars of ethno-religious separatism. Kosík avoided that type of deep retrogression. However, when the Kosovo war started in 1999, he issued a denunciation of the US bombing that failed to mention the oppression of the people of Kosovo by the Serbian nationalist regime.

Dunayevskaya's Marxist humanism was deeply Hegelian, relying on her concept of Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings.[121] In this sense, she embraced what Marx referred to in Capital as the needed 'power of abstraction'.[122] At the same time, Dunayevskaya held to what Hegel called the concrete universal, whether in terms of the individual versus state power, or the specificities of race and gender, all the while attempting to avoid the twin dangers of empiricism and identity politics.

Conclusion

This journey has taken us into some of the liberatory, creative aspects of the socialist humanist tradition. At the same time, we have found that some forms of socialist and Marxist humanism remained too often in the realm of the abstract universal. As we have seen, this was true of Fromm, and in a different way of Sartre as well. At a purely philosophical level, of course, Kosík's Dialectics of the Concrete avoided this problem, but the philosopher did not follow through adequately in terms of concretising his dialectics in a way that truly met the challenges of actuality. Only Fanon and Dunayevskaya succeeded in developing forms of socialist humanism that came down to earth and took up issues like race and colonialism in ways that both held on to universalising aspirations and acknowledged difference. Within the broad international discussion in the 1960s of socialist humanism, however, the strains upheld by Dunayevskaya, Fanon and Kosík were marginalised, relatively speaking, in the face of the towering influence of people like Fromm and Sartre. This left the Marxist humanists open to the type of attack the Foucaultians mounted after the 1960s, to the effect that they failed to address specific forms of resistance and were trapped in a generalised view of 'man'.

That process has now run its course as well. It is high time that critical philosophers and activists consider once again a socialist humanism that will give their opposition to global capitalism a type of content that points towards a new, liberated society in which women and men can exercise their self-determination in ways that are both social and individual. Much can be appropriated from the emancipatory universals of Sartre, Fromm and the Eastern European Marxist humanists, provided that we don't fall into the trap of the abstract universal once again. In this regard, we need to look especially closely at those forms of socialist humanism found in Dunayevskaya, Fanon and to a great extent Kosík – forms that allow for the universal to particularise itself. At the same time, we need critically to appropriate into a twenty-first-century Marxist humanism some of the insights from several decades of post-structuralist social critique, whether on language, prisons, the cultural legacies of imperialism, or gender and sexuality.

And yet we seem further off from this than one hundred years ago, when many workers and intellectuals dreamed openly of a socialist future, which they saw as a real possibility. Today, with the collapse of statist socialism in Russia (really state capitalism

in my view123), we are faced with the received notion that there is no alternative to capitalism. The Foucaultian notion of resistance, with its circularity, operates in tandem with this.

Thus, the problem facing us today is deeply philosophical. We are burdened not just by capitalism in general, or by thirty years of neoliberalism, but by ideological apparatuses on the Left as well. Thus, while a critique of the limitations of much of the earlier radical humanism needs to be made, I think that once that operation is carried out, we would be left with some truly visionary perspectives that would help us to solidify and guide in a positive direction the revolutionary, anti-capitalist and democratic movements of today. It would be nothing short of a universalism that is more than merely strategic, rooted instead in the yearnings of human beings for an emancipatory future that would abolish the fetishisms of both capitalism and the state.

Notes

I would like to thank David Alderson, Barbara Epstein, Peter Hudis, Charles Reitz, and Robert Spencer for helpful comments.

1. Jean Paul Sartre, What Is Literature? And Other Essays, trans. Philip Mairet, Brooklyn: Haskell House, 1988 [1948], p. 177.

2. Ibid., p. 180.

3. Louis Dupré, 'Preface to the Morningside Edition', in Raya Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979 [1973], p. xv.

4. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Pocket Books, 1966 [1943], p. 561; L'Etre et le Néant: Essai d'Ontologie phénomenologique, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1970 [1943], p. 489. I have given references to both theEnglish and original French versions because English translator Hazel E. Barnes has garbled this passage. Instead I have used – in slightly modified form – the more precise rendering of Sartre's sentence provided by Richard Nice in his translation of Bourdieu's critique of Sartre (Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1977 [1972], p. 74). In the next block quote, I modify the Barnes translation myself.

5. Ibid., p 561 (English) and p. 489 (French).

6. Ibid., p. 562 (English) and p. 489 (French).

7. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 75.

8. Ibid., p. 74.

9. Arnaud Tomes has argued that these kinds of critiques of Sartre by Bourdieu were not as new as they seemed, and that they bore striking similarities to Stalinist and other orthodox Marxist critiques in the 1940s of Sartre as a petty-bourgeois subjectivist: 'Pour une anthropologie conrète: Sartre Contre Bourdieu', Les Temps Modernes, No. 596 (1997), pp. 32–52.

10. Cited in Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 74.

11. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method, trans. W. D. Halls, New York: Free Press, 1982 [1893], p. 62.

12. Recently, the American sociologist of culture Jeffrey Halley has argued that Bourdieu has ignored 'the ever developing and expanding part of the self as s/he accumulates new experiences. Dispositions are seen, in this optic [contra that of Bourdieu-KA], as less stable and more genetic, holding out the possibility for growth and education' ('Mondo Vino, un art comme les a(o)utres: Rationalisation et résistance dans les usages sociaux du vin', in

Florent Gaudez (ed.), Les Arts Moyens Aujord'hui, vol. 1, Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2008, p. 249).

13. Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel. E. Barnes, New York: Knopf, 1963 [1957], p. 7.

14. Karl Marx, 'Alienated Labour', in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966 [1961], p. 101.

15. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, New York: Vintage, 1976 [1867–75], pp. 283–4.

16. Ibid., p. 799. Here and elsewhere I have sometimes amended the existing Marx translations to render the German term 'Mensch' under its primary meaning of 'human being' rather than 'man' (the German 'Mann' refers specifically to the male human being). For the German original see Karl Marx, Das Kapital, in Marx-Engels Werke, vol. 23, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962 [1867–75], p. 674.

17. Marx, Capital, p. 166.

18. Ibid., p. 173.

19. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 181.

20. Ibid., p. 182.

21. Ibid., p. 181.

22. Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today, Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000 [1958], p. 327.

23. Jacques d'Hondt emphasises this point in his critique of Althusser in De Hegel á Marx, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972.

24. Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans Ben Brewster, New York: Vintage, 1969 [1965], p. 116.

25. On this point, see Kevin Anderson, Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995.

26. Ibid., p. 229.

27. Hondt, De Hegel á Marx, p. 225.

28. Ibid., p. 228.

29. Althusser, For Marx, p. 33.

30. Ibid., p. 230.

31. Marx, Capital, p. 165.

32. Althusser, For Marx, p. 230.

33. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p. 90.

34. Ibid., p. 88.

35. Ibid., p. 93.

36. Ibid., pp. 93–4.

37. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage, 1973 [1966], p. 262.

38. Cited in David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, New York: Vintage, 1993, p. 175.

39. Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 386–7.

40. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Vintage, 1977 [1975], p. 141.

41. Cited in Lou Turner and John Alan, Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought, Chicago: News & Letters, 1986, p. 40.

42. Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt, 'The Louvain Lectures in Context', in Michel Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, trans. Stephen W. Sawyer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014, pp. 277–8.

43. For the full text of the discussion, see Michel Foucault, 'Qu'est-ce qu'unauteur?', Bulletin de la Societé Francaise de Philosophie, Vol. 63, No. 3 (1969), pp. 73–104.

44. Ibid., pp. 97, 100, 104.

45. François Dosse, History of Structuralism, vol. 2, trans. Deborah Glassman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 [1992], p. 122.

46. Lucien Goldmann, 'The Dialectic Today' in Goldmann, Cultural Creation, trans. Bart Grahl, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1976 [1970], pp. 108–22.

47. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 204.

48. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage, 1978 [1976], pp. 95–5.

49. Herbert Marcuse, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 5: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation, ed. Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 63.

50. John Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power, London: Pluto, 2002, p. 40; see also Kevin Anderson, 'Resistance Versus Emancipation: Foucault, Marcuse, Marx, and the Present Moment', Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2013): <http://logosjournal. com/2013/anderson/>.

51. A detailed account of this episode, as well as a translation of Foucault's Iran writings and those of his contemporary critics, can be found in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. For other critiques of Foucault, see especially: Rosemarie Scullion, 'Michel Foucault the Orientalist: On Revolutionary Iran and the "Spirit of Iran"', South Central Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1995), pp. 16–40; and Ian Almond, The New Orientalism: Postmodern Representations Of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard, London: I. B. Tauris, 2007. For a rare defence of Foucault's Iran writings, see Olivier Roy, 'Michel Foucault et l'Iran: Le Philosophe, le People, le Pouvoir et "l'énigme du soulèvment"', Vacarme, No. 29 (2004), pp. 34–8.

52. Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, New York: Routledge, 2006 [1961], p. 491.

53. Ibid., p. 492.

54. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989 [1792], p. 122.

55. Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1978, p. 204.

56. Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures, London: Verso, 1992, pp. 178–9.

57. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

58. Recently, Peter Hudis has illuminated Marx's humanist concept of an alternative to capitalism in Marx's Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, Leiden: Brill, 2012.

59. Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 3.

60. Goldmann, 'The Dialectic Today', pp. 112–13.

61. See, for instance, Kevin Anderson and Russell Rockwell (eds), The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse–Fromm Correspondence, 1954–1978: Dialogues on Hegel, Marx and Critical Theory, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012.

62. Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955, p. 205.

63. Fromm in Kevin Anderson, 'A Recently Discovered Article by Erich Fromm on Trotsky and the Russian Revolution', Science & Society, Vol. 66, No. 22, 2002, p. 271.

64. Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966 [1961], pp. 4–5.

65. Ibid., p. 5.

66. Ibid., p. 1.

67. Ibid., p. 2.

68. Ibid., p. 5.

69. Ibid., pp. vii–viii.

70. Interestingly, Fromm rejected a contribution by Althusser, thus delaying by several years his entrance into the English-speaking world. See Louis Althusser, The

Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, ed. François Matheron, trans. G. M. Goshgarian, London: Verso, 2003.

71. Erich Fromm, 'Introduction', Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium, New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. viii.

72. Ibid., p. viii.

73. Ibid., p. ix.

74. Fromm's letter appears in Dunayevskaya, Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985, p. 242; Dunayevskaya's letters to Fromm from this period appear in Anderson and Rockwell, Dunayevskaya–Marcuse–Fromm Correspondence, pp. 208–10.

75. Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World, trans. Karel Kovanda with James Schmidt, Boston: D. Reidel, 1976 [1963], p. 7.

76. Ibid., p. 8.

77. Ibid., p. 24.

78. Ibid., p. 30.

79. Ibid., p. 42.

80. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 251–9.

81. Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete, p. 104.

82. Ibid., p. 105.

83. Ibid., p. 106.

84. Ibid., p. 134.

85. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, New York: Grove Press, 1963 [1961], p. 313.

86. Ibid., p. 246.

87. Ibid., p. 314.

88. On Fanon's humanism, see Peter Hudis, Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades, London: Pluto, 2015; also Lou Turner and John Alan, Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought.

89. Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 247.

90. Nigel Gibson separates Fanon as well from a form of politics more prominent today than in his own time, radical Islamism, in Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

91. Marnia Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 217–19; see also Irene Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study, New York: Pantheon, 1973, pp. 200–9. Fanon's humanism was also ambivalent concerning the consciousness of the Western working classes: see Wretched of the Earth, p. 314.

92. Raya Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989 [1973], pp. 243–4; see also Kevin Anderson, 'Tanzania's Ujamaa After Twenty Years', Left Court, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1985), pp. 30–44.

93. Raya Dunayevskaya, Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, 2nd edition, Urbana: Illinois University Press,

1991 [1982], p. 194.

94. Herbert Marcuse, 'Preface' to Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, p. Xxi. The intellectually rich dialogues between Marcuse and Dunayevskaya that form the backdrop to this preface can be found in Anderson and Rockwell, Dunayevskaya–Marcuse–Fromm Correspondence.

95. Here and below, I am concentrating on those parts of her work that explicitly address the themes of humanism in Marx or the 'new humanism' she saw in

contemporary social movements and philosophies. This presents a difficulty, as Dunayevskaya referred to her entire body of work after her

1953 'Letters on Hegel's Absolutes' as a form of 'Marxist-Humanism', but as with the other thinkers considered in this chapter, I have concentrated on their engagement – for or against – with humanism. For more general assessments on my part of Dunayevskaya's work, particularly her critical appropriation of Hegel's concept of absolute negativity, see especially Peter Hudis's and my introduction to Raya Dunayevskaya, The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx, Lanham: Lexington, 2002, pp. xv–xlii.

96. Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, p. 58, emphasis in original.

97. Ibid., p. 106.

98. Ibid., p. 116.

99. Ibid., p. 116.

100. Ibid., p. 117.

101. Ibid., p. xxv.

102. Ibid., p. 281.

103. Ibid., p. 276, emphasis in the original.

104. Ibid., p. 285.

105. Ibid., p. 287.

106. Raya Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, p. 79.

107. Ibid., p. 22.

108. Ibid., p. 200.

109. Ibid., p. 208.

110. Ibid., p. 210.

111. See, for example, her call for Western and African Marxist humanists to link up in ‘Socialismes Africains et Problèmes Nègres par Une Militante de l’Humanisme Marxiste’, Présence Africaine: Revue Culturelle du Monde Noir, No. 43 (1963), pp. 49–64.

112. Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, p. 214.

113. Ibid., p. 215.

114. Ibid., p. 213.

115. Ibid., p. 217.

116. Ibid., p. 243.

117. Ibid., p. 219.

118. Raya Dunayevskaya, Power of Negativity, pp. 186–8.

119. Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, p. 261.

120. Ibid., pp. 269–70.

121. See especially Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, chapter 1.

122. Marx, Capital, p. 90.

123. See Kevin Anderson, ‘Raya Dunayevskaya, 1910 to 1987, Marxist Economist and Philosopher’, Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1988), pp. 62–74.