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THE CHICAGO 8 SPEAK OUT!

THE CONSPIRACY

**Abbie Hoffman • Bobby Seale
Rennie Davis • David Dellinger
John Froines • Tom Hayden
Jerry Rubin • Lee Weiner**

Introduction by Noam Chomsky



MEET THE CONSPIRATORS

RENNIE DAVIS. 29. Son of a former White House economic advisor. Graduate of Oberlin College and University of Illinois. One of the early leaders in the student protest and antiwar movements, he is now National Coordinator of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

DAVID DELLINGER. 53. Leader of the American pacifist movement. Ambulance driver for the American Quakers during the Spanish Civil War. Served three years in prison for refusal to register for the draft, although he was studying for the ministry and was eligible for deferment. Editor of the magazine **Liberation** since its founding in 1956. Married and the father of five children.

JOHN R. FROINES. 30. Professor of chemistry at the University of Oregon. Degrees in science from the University of California and Yale University. Post-doctoral research in England under Nobel Prize Laureate G. Porter. Widely published in professional journals. Married; father of one child.

TOM HAYDEN. 29. Graduate of the University of Michigan. Moving spirit behind the creation of Students for a Democratic Society. Active in civil-rights work in both South and North, and in the peace movement. Author of **Rebellion in Newark** and, with Staughton Lynd, **The Other Side.**

(continued overleaf)

ABBOTT (Abbie) HOFFMAN. 31. One of the formulators of the radical-anarchist Yippie movement. Graduate of Brandeis and the University of California. Former psychologist at Worcester State Hospital. Worked with SNCC, CORE, and the Poor People's craft cooperative movement. Author of **Revolution for the Hell of It.**

JERRY RUBIN. 30. Another prominent Yippie. Veteran of the Berkeley Free Speech movement. Organizer of antiwar protests in California and elsewhere. Currently under indictment for participation in recent sit-in demonstrations against the Vietnamese war.

BOBBY SEALE. 32. Co-founder, with Huey Newton, of the Black Panther party, and currently its chairman. During the recent wave of arrests of Black Panther party members, Mr. Seale was indicted for alleged conspiracy to commit murder. At this juncture he has been sentenced to four years in prison for contempt of court in the "Conspiracy" trial.

LEE WEINER. 30. Doctoral candidate and teaching assistant in sociology at Northwestern University. The only native Chicagoan in the Conspiracy. Graduate of the University of Illinois and Loyola University School of Social Work. Married with one child.

**EACH MAN IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
VOICE, TELLS WHAT THE
CONSPIRACY MEANS TO HIM—
AND TO YOU.**

The Conspiracy

ABBIE HOFFMAN • BOBBY SEALE
RENNIE DAVIS • DAVID DELLINGER
JOHN FROINES • TOM HAYDEN
JERRY RUBIN • LEE WEINER

Introduction by **NOAM CHOMSKY**

Preface by **THE CONSPIRACY ATTORNEYS**

Edited by **PETER** and **DEBORAH BABCOX** and **BOB ABEL**

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TYPOGRAPHICAL NOTE

To avoid what they regard as a liberal cliché, the editors have decided to spell blacks with a small "b." And whites with a small "w." Thus is typographical equality created. The same goes for the establishment and the movement. It's the thought, not the conceit, that counts.

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INTRODUCTION

by Noam Chomsky

NOAM CHOMSKY is the Ferrari P. Ward Professor in the Department of Foreign Literatures and Linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In recent years his writings have provided rallying points for the New Left and for the growing opposition to the war in Vietnam, and several of these essays and articles have been gathered in his most recent book, American Power and the New Mandarins.

October 1, 1969. So far, a perfectly normal day. The morning papers have no particular surprises. In *The New York Times*, a background story on the Green Beret case explains that:

The landscape of Vietnam and the border regions are studded with electronic sensors that beep information into the banks of computers. Radar, cameras, infrared detectors and a growing array of more exotic devices contribute to the mass of information. Not long ago reconnaissance planes began carrying television cameras.

The data goes into the Combined Intelligence Center not far from Tansonnhut Air Base at Saigon: "Day and night in its antiseptic interior, a family of blinking, whirring computers devours, digests and spews out a Gargantuan diet of information about the enemy," the better to serve the "conglomerate of allied civil and military organizations that work together to destroy the Vietcong's underground government": namely, the B-52's whose task is to turn a defenseless land into a moonscape; the fighter-bombers and artillery that must ensure that there is no human life in the free firing zones, where any moving object is a legitimate target; the planes that have sprayed an area the size of Massachusetts with herbicides, with what effect, no one knows; the CIA recruits who have been given "the latest equipment and trained . . . in small-unit tactics and the fine art of silent killing."

We can be proud that the technical and intellectual resources of American culture are being employed, with such dedication and skill, to destroy the Vietcong underground government, freely admitted to be the most authentic popular social structure in South Vietnam.

On another page of the *Times*, Robin Moore tells of the Green Beret "assassination schools," where he personally "did one himself." Quoting further: "He said that in addition to teaching techniques of terrorism and assassination to the Vietnamese, the Special Forces also taught them 'to be doctors . . . everything that it takes to run a country in the Far East. You just gotta learn that.'" Clearly the Green Berets *have* learned it. Political assassination is "their business." They are "the ones that got Ché Guevara in Bolivia." And now they are teaching terrorism and assassination to Vietnamese mercenaries, so that they, too, will know how to run a country.

On page one, the *Times* also announces its discovery that in Laos, "the rebel economy and social fabric" are now the main target of the American bombardment, more intensive, other sources indicate, even than the bombardment of North Vietnam, which was more heavily bombed than Korea, which was more heavily bombed than Japan in World War II. The bombing is claimed to be a success:

Refugees from the Plaine des Jarres area say that during recent months most open spaces have been evacuated. Both civilians and soldiers have retreated into the forests or hills and frequently spend most of the daylight hours in caves or tunnels. Refugees said they could only plow their fields at night because they were unsafe during the day. "So long as the U.S. bombing continues at its new level," a European diplomat said here this week, "so-called Communist territory is little but a shooting range." . . . The bombing, by creating refugees, deprives the Communists of their chief source of food and transport. The population of the Pathet Lao zone has been declining for several years and the Pathet Lao find it increasingly difficult to fight a "people's war" with fewer and fewer people.

The world's most advanced society has found the answer to people's war: eliminate the people. As with many fundamental insights, this has a spare elegance. The idea was expressed in its clearest and most persuasive form by the head of the State Department's Southeast Asia advisory group, who is also the chairman of the Government Department at Harvard: ". . . if the 'direct application of mechanical and

conventional power' takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate." In this subtle and ingenious manner we can at last deal with the Vietcong, "a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the constituency continues to exist." In Vietnam, we "stumbled upon" this discovery "in an absent-minded way." Perhaps the method will be applied in Laos with greater success.

It is good that the American press has discovered that the rebel economy and social fabric are the primary target of the American bombardment in Laos. Perhaps we will be spared the pretense that our targets are steel and concrete, or that the bombing is "the most restrained in modern warfare" (McGeorge Bundy, speaking of the bombing of North Vietnam in January, 1967—at the time when the scene described in this book by Rennie Davis was being created).

The discovery has been mysteriously delayed. For example, in July, 1968, the distinguished Southeast Asia expert of *Le Monde*, Jacques Decornoy, published detailed reports of his visit to the liberated areas of Laos: "A world without noise, for the surrounding villages have disappeared, the inhabitants themselves living hidden in the mountains. . . . It is dangerous to lean out at any time of the night or day" because of the ceaseless bombardment which leads to "the scientific destruction of the areas held by the enemy." Further: "The Americans are trying to 'break' the Laotian Left, both psychologically and, if possible, physically." The nature of their relentless attack "can only be explained if the target is the central administration of the Neo Lao Haksat"—the political organization that won handily in the only unrigged election in Laos in 1958, an electoral victory that inspired the American effort at subversion that led to the Laotian crisis of the early sixties, which still persists.

Decornoy describes "the motionless ruins and deserted houses" of the central town of Sam-Neua district:

The first real raid against the population center itself was launched on February 19, 1965. Very serious attacks were made on it quite recently on March 17 and 19, 1968. . . . The two ends of the town were razed to the ground. The old ruins of 1965 have disappeared,

those of March, 1968, were still "smoking" when we visited them. Branches of trees lay all along the length of the river, houses were totally burned out (phosphorus had been used). At the other end of Sam-Neua, the sight was even more painful. Everywhere enormous craters, the church and many houses were demolished. In order to reach the people who might be living there, the Americans dropped their all-too-famous fragmentation bombs. Here lay a "mother bomb" disemboweled, by the side of the road. All around, over a dozen meters, the earth was covered with "daughter bombs," little machines that the Vietnamese know well, unexploded and hiding hundreds of steel splinters. . . . One of the officials of the Sam-Neua district told us that between February, 1965, and March, 1968, 65 villages had been destroyed. A number impossible to verify in a short report, but it is a fact that between Sam-Neua and a place about 30 kilometers away where we stayed, no house in the village and hamlets had been spared. Bridges had been destroyed, fields up to the rivers were holed with bomb craters.

Decornoy reports that "American raids on 'liberated Laos' began in May, 1964, therefore well before the Gulf of Tonkin incident (August, 1964) and the policy of escalation to North Vietnam (spring, 1965). For this reason, Laos has, in some ways, served as a testing ground or experimental site." He describes the amazing persistence of the Laotians in maintaining and advancing the social revolution in the face of this attack, their "virulent nationalism" and refusal to follow foreign models, the schools and factories in caves, the prosperity of the rare villages that have still, for unknown reasons, escaped destruction. Finally he quotes an American diplomat in Vientiane who says: "To make progress in this country, it is necessary to level everything. The inhabitants must go back to zero, lose their traditional culture, for it blocks everything." And Decornoy comments: "The Americans accuse the North Vietnamese of intervening militarily in the country, but it is they who talk of reducing Laos to zero, while the Pathet Lao exalts the national culture and national independence."*

* An English translation has recently appeared in *Peace Press*, 6 Endsleigh St., London, W.C.1, the issue of June, 1969.

No doubt Laos is still serving as a testing ground or experimental site, much as Spain served the German generals thirty years ago when Hitler sent the five-thousand-man Condor Legion to defend the Spanish people from communist internal aggression—scandalizing the civilized world by this shameful act of massive intervention. In particular, it is a testing ground for the next stage of the war in Vietnam. American policy, which has not changed in any fundamental way for twenty years, requires that both Vietnam and the American people be pacified. But the cost in lives and dollars is high and there is much domestic discontent. Therefore, tactics must be adjusted; a new “long-haul low cost” policy must be devised in which the burden of the attack on the people of Vietnam is shifted away from the American infantry, to the B-52’s and the “Vietnamized” internal security forces. We hear that only a token force of two or three hundred thousand American troops will be left in Vietnam, a demonstration of our sincerity in the search for a peaceful solution. Who can complain about the involvement of a mere quarter of a million men along with the Pacific naval and air command—a force that may be compared, let us say, with the Japanese army of 160,000 that attacked North China in 1937, setting the stage for the Pacific phase of World War II? If the American people will only trust their leaders, perhaps there is still a chance to crush the people’s war in South Vietnam in ways that will be concealed as well as the Laotian war has been.

But let us return to October 1, 1969, when *The New York Times* announced its discovery that the rebel economy and social fabric are the primary target of the American bombardment of Laos that has been underway for five and a half years. Of course, the same has been true of Vietnam. Who still reads the occasional news items such as that of September 24, which records an attack on a village northwest of Saigon, where seven hundred soldiers encircled a village, killing twenty-two and arresting fifty-three—the fourth such operation here in fifteen months? As for the villagers: “The Vietcong are everywhere, they say, and will be back when the Americans leave.” An American junior officer, looking at the deserted central market, had this to say: “They say this village is eighty percent VC supporters. By the time we finish this it will be ninety-five percent.” Such reports are hardly more newsworthy than a small item of September 27,

which notes "that United States Army helicopter gunships mistakenly attacked a group of Vietnamese civilians twenty-five miles west of Tamky Tuesday, killing fourteen civilians and wounding seven civilians and two militiamen. . . . United States helicopter gunships killed seven unarmed civilians and wounded seventeen others in a similar incident September 16 in the Mekong delta." It is not easy to avoid such accidents, as we try to ensure that the Vietcong constituency ceases to exist. Against this background, why the furor over a Green Beret assassination?

In this week's issue, *The New Republic's* political commentator TRB informs us that "we are a deeply moral nation (don't let anybody tell you the contrary). . . . Do not ridicule such idealism . . . [as of] . . . Johnson trying to carry the Great Society everywhere, Kennedy seeking to eliminate revolutionary wars." Citing Walter Lippmann, TRB agrees that the rhetoric may be inflated, but the idealism, he insists, is beyond question:

The moral pull for the U.S. to go on rescue missions will always be enormous. There are a dozen such spots today. Our conscience aches for them. But our capacity? It is probably limited. . . .

Our conscience aches to go on rescue missions in Greece, Rhodesia, South Africa, Brazil, Guatemala, Mississippi, wherever human beings are suffering, but our capacity is limited. Imagine, for example, how our consciences would ache were we to read the reports of Swedish anthropologists, now appearing in the European press, concerning the exploits of our Brazilian allies, who are, it appears, attempting to wipe out eight million Indians by napalm bombing and arsenic poisoning of food supplies. And consider our outrage over the intervention by South African troops in Rhodesian counterinsurgency, or the use by Portugal of NATO weapons to control its African colonies, as reported in the current [October] *Foreign Affairs*—where we also read that the dilemmas of counterinsurgency "are practical and as neutral in an ethical sense as the laws of physics" although, to be sure, "idealism has played its part": "Without it, American aid would not have flowed to developing and harassed countries and we would have no policy in Southeast Asia to argue about."

TRB also explains that in Vietnam, where the "moral pull" has led us to overextend ourselves, we now face "an agonizing moral dilemma." What is our primary duty? Is it to "South Vietnamese who might be massacred if we quit? Or to the 150-200 American boys who lose their lives weekly if we stay? I don't think the U.S. has ever before faced such a question."

What of the South Vietnamese who might be massacred if "our Vietnamese" were to win, or those now being massacred by our military actions? They do not figure in our moral dilemma, and are not mentioned by TRB (though he admits that the North Vietnamese victims of American bombing might have "thought they were atrocities, too").

TRB is right not to ridicule the feelings of those who would support virtually any act committed by their government out of a sense of idealism. He is right, as well, to point to the agonizing moral dilemma. It is not without historical precedent. It is, for example, a dilemma that might have been posed by German moralists in 1944, faced with the demand that they withdraw from France. What of the collaborators who might be massacred if we quit—who were, in fact, massacred when France was abandoned by the Wehrmacht? TRB is also right in saying that "people can vote in other ways than at the polling booth—by defending themselves, say, or by dying for their country: that would be evidence that South Vietnam really is a country." And he testifies to the amazing blindness of this deeply moral nation in that he simply cannot perceive that there are those in South Vietnam who have been dying for their country and defending it, with indescribable heroism, against the blows of the idealists who seek to eliminate revolutionary wars everywhere, to carry the Great Society everywhere.

Other commentators are more cynical. Consider Joseph Harsch of the *Christian Science Monitor*. Writing on September 22, he characterizes the Vietnam war as a long-term conflict between Westerners (the French and the U.S.) trying "to impose a Western concept of a solution on a part of Asia" and Asians who are trying to solve the problem of Vietnam in their own way, resisting the effort by Western force to "impose a different solution." His conclusion? If the Vietnamese contenders are "near the end of their resources" and facing collapse, "then the argument is a strong one indeed for keeping up the American effort just a little longer";

we may, in short, still succeed in imposing "a Western concept of a solution upon a part of Asia," whatever the Asians might have had in mind.

Such attitudes as these merit careful attention. They indicate that even the most conventional liberal principles are remote from the consciousness of substantial segments of articulate "liberal" American opinion: for example, the demand that the United States adhere to international law and its obligations under the UN Charter—technically, the supreme law of the land—and refrain from forceful intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. To anyone who accepts this minimal and conventional principle, it must seem absurd that immediate withdrawal of all American troops and matériel is regarded as a "radical" demand. To such a person, much of the current discussion on civil disobedience must seem equally absurd. The same government that has called off the game of "obedience to the law" now claims the right to enforce the rules.

But quite apart from this, one who is seriously opposed to the use of force to control the empire—the "integrated world economy" dominated by American capital, to use the technical euphemism—must pay careful attention to the actual state of American opinion. In some respects, the picture is encouraging. Over the past years, efforts to test public opinion by referendum with regard to unilateral withdrawal have shown substantial support, despite the fact that there has been almost no public figure, no segment of the mass media speaking for this elementary demand or the quite uncontroversial general principle on which it rests. But there are other judgments. Thus a recent study by two social scientists on American public opinion about Vietnam concludes with the authors' speculation "that little reaction to the war is based on humanitarian or moral considerations," that to achieve the goal of ending the war, "most Americans would pursue a more militant policy and ignore resultant atrocities."*

Before accepting the conclusion of these analysts—a conclusion that would place most Americans at the moral level of Nazis—one must consider their own social attitudes and logic. It is curious, for example, to read that medicine is an "object-oriented" profession (along with business and en-

* John Robinson and Solomon Jacobson, in *Vietnam: Issues and alternatives*, W. Isard, ed., Shenkman, Cambridge, 1969.

gineering) rather than a "people-oriented" profession. And confidence does not rise when we read their conclusion that "the common assumption that the college population is the *vocal* anti-war group in the country" is refuted by the finding in a survey that "attitudes toward the war differed little according to educational level" (my italics). Further skepticism about the objectivity of their judgment derives from the fact that the volume in which the study appears is a collection of papers of the Peace Research Society (International), an organization that studies such questions as "how pacification can be achieved in turbulent village societies" and that features speakers who define "modernization and political development" as the establishment of a monopoly of force in a central authority*—an organization whose purposes are explained by the editor of the symposium as follows: to improve the decision-making ability of "good-intentioned leaders and policy makers—as has characterized the foreign policy of the U.S. and many other nations" who are "participants in the game of world domination." Such considerations at least raise some questions about the quality of the quoted

*Ithiel Pool, in a paper at the 1967 conference of the Peace Research Society: "Finally, we might conclude that the only prospect for controlling this proclivity towards continuing village violence is if the organization that exerts the monopoly of force extends well beyond the narrow arena of the village, establishing its legitimacy in the great society, while at the same time having the physical capability to operate efficiently right down to the village level. *These conditions are what we mean by modernization and political development*" [my italics]. By this definition, the most politically advanced and modern society must be South Africa or the Soviet Union, and by working for modernization and political development—surely desirable ends—we may even hope to achieve the levels reached in Nazi Germany, where the "organization that exerted the monopoly of force" had a "physical capability" with few, if any, parallels. Pool also explains here that the Vietcong are "village thugs" lined up with major powers, and that only the "low sophistication among urban scholars" leads them to accept "the cliché that without the support of the local population terrorists and guerrillas cannot operate." He admits that these propositions are "*a priori*" and that "full evidence would require a rather extensive program of studies." Meanwhile, however, we can make use of these *a priori* propositions to achieve pacification. The article is reprinted in the Journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation, *Gandhi Marg* 50, April, 1969. Someone must have a sense of humor.

speculation. But even the Peace Research Society (International) is not monolithic in its commitment to American imperialism, or uniformly committed to mystical beliefs regarding the intentions of policy makers, and the conclusions of the study must be taken seriously by those who are designing actions to influence public opinion or public policy.

Let me return, once again, to the morning papers. They also, of course, deal with the domestic American scene. The *Times* reports Senate approval of a compensation program for victims of pneumoconiosis, so-called "black lung," a disease that "affects an estimated total of 100,000 soft coal miners in the United States." Proponents of the bill were forced to drop the demand for a "black lung" research program. The compensation program will "be financed by taxpayers instead of coal mine operators." Evidently, there are more important topics for research than "black lung" and better uses for corporate profits and government funds, for example, the effort to bring "modernization and political development" to the people of Vietnam and Laos, in the sense defined in Note 3. As to the citizen who now contributes seventy cents of his tax dollar to the financing of past, present, and future wars, he would hardly object to having some of those funds diverted to domestic needs.

James Doyle of the Boston *Globe* reports, this same morning, a speech by Attorney General John Mitchell to the International Association of Police Chiefs, in which he expresses the firm commitment of the administration to the rule of law:

Let me tell you that, as Attorney General, I am first and foremost a law enforcement officer. I believe the Department of Justice is a law enforcement agency. I think that persons who break the law ought to be promptly arrested and tried today. . . . When this administration took office eight months ago, we decided that the time had come to stop talking, to stop offering excuses and start acting now. . . . Indeed, tomorrow may be too late for all of us.

To all of us, that is, except for black children in the South. For, as Doyle observes, at the very same time Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard was explaining to the press that you can't enforce the law at will. Even if the Su-

preme Court were to order immediate integration, "nothing would change." Personally, he would like to see desegregation laws enforced, but this is unrealistic, given the shortage of "personnel and funds." And if reporters "had seen the embattled 2,500 white opponents of desegregation in one Mississippi district they would have understood why the agency reversed itself" and abandoned the idea of enforcing the law (*Monitor*). The realism and pragmatic attitude of the Justice Department has long been familiar to black citizens. And in Chicago—as David Dellinger puts it in his essay: "It came as no surprise to me that the statute under which the government is trying to put us in jail for ten years, for our determined advocacy of peace and racial equality in Chicago, is the Civil Rights Act of 1968."

It was, I believe, Proudhon, who once described the magnificence of the Law in these words:

Laws: we know what they are and what they are worth. They are spider-webs for the rich and mighty, steel chains for the poor and weak, fishing nets in the hands of the Government.

Twenty years ago today the People's Republic of China was founded. Just a few months earlier, Dean Acheson had formed a committee to reassess American policy in Asia, now that China was "lost." The committee was to operate under this instruction: "You will please take it as your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asian area. . . ." Acheson made his thoughts more precise, shortly after, writing on the Soviet threat: "It is not only the threat of direct military attack which must be considered, but also that of conquest by default, by pressure, by persuasion, by subversion, by 'neutralism' . . ." In May, 1950, Acheson announced that "economic aid and military equipment" would be sent to the French in Indochina "in order to assist them in restoring stability." Not long after, the State Department explained our support for French imperialism in Indochina in these terms: ". . . the fall of Indochina . . . would be taken by many as a sign that the force of communism is irresistible and would lead to an attitude of defeatism. . . . Communist forces there

must be decisively conquered down to the last pocket of resistance." The "much-needed rice, rubber, and tin" also justified our support for the French in their ill-fated effort to reconquer their former colony. Upon their failure, we took over management of the enterprise directly.

In 1955 the Communist threat was defined in an extensive study of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association, *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, a study that involved a representative segment of the tiny elite that largely determines foreign policy, whoever is technically in office.* The primary threat of communism is the economic transformation of the Communist powers "in ways which reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the West." Communism, in short, reduces the "willingness and ability" of underdeveloped countries to function in the world capitalist economy in the manner of the Philippines—to take a classic Asian example—where:

Their economy has for nearly half a century been deliberately geared into that of the United States to an extent which caused Mr. McNutt, in testifying as High Commissioner, to say that "our businessmen and our statesmen in past years allowed the Philippines to become a complete economic dependency of the United States to a greater degree than any single State of the Union is economically dependent on the rest of the United States." †

In particular, as has frequently been noted, Vietnamese

* Most of the men who have set the framework of America's national security policy, as I found when I studied the background of the top 400 decision-makers, have come from executive suites and law offices within shouting distance of each other in fifteen city blocks in New York, Washington, Detroit, Chicago and Boston." Richard Barnet, *The Economy of Death*, Atheneum, 1969. For further information and analysis, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, Beacon, 1969. On the origins of American postwar policy, there is nothing to compare with Kolo's *Politics of War*, Random House, 1968.

† Rupert Emerson, in J. C. Vincent, ed., *America's Future in the Pacific*, Rutgers, 1947. Nominal independence has not changed what UN Representative Salvador López refers to as a "colonial economy of the classical type."

communism threatened the new order that we were constructing in Asia, with Japan, as junior partner, linked to Southeast Asia by essentially colonial relationships. More recently, of course, the threat of Vietnamese communism has grown to colossal proportions, as when Richard Nixon wrote in a letter to *The New York Times* in 1965, that "victory for the Vietcong . . . would mean ultimately the destruction of freedom of speech for all men for all time not only in Asia but in the United States as well." Nothing less.

At the turn of the century, a young Chinese nationalist spokesman, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, expressed his concern over the potential dangers posed by rising American power in the Pacific: "Now that the famous expansionist, McKinley, has been elected President, there is no knowing what big things the United States might not do in the twentieth century." As history has shown, these were no idle fears. Whether the last quarter of the century will tell a different story, it is up to us to determine.

NOAM CHOMSKY

Lexington, Massachusetts
October 1, 1969.

PREFACE: THE "CHICAGO EIGHT" PROSECUTION:

A PERVERSION OF LAW

by The Attorneys for the Conspiracy

This Preface has been written by a conspiracy of defense attorneys—William Kunstler, Charles Garry, Len Weingrass, Stu Ball, Gerry Lefcourt, Stan Bass, Irv Birnbaum, Mike Kennedy, Dennis Roberts, Mike Sayer, Mike Tigar, Beth Livesy, and Roger Lowenstein.

We are often told in our introductory Political-Science courses that our government is a government of laws, passed by the legislature, administered and enforced by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary, all under the aegis of a written constitution which secures the integrity of the individual against state-initiated oppression. We are told, too, that the three branches themselves, operating through a delicate but flexible system of checks and balances, makes it less likely that a monolithic government policy can emerge to destroy individual rights. Unless, of course, the government is threatened. Unable to cope with domestic or foreign crises, all three branches of the government are striking out self-consciously at those who would dare to protest. What the whole world is witnessing in Chicago as the Conspiracy trial progresses is the coordinated effort by legislature, executive, and judiciary to jail in one prosecution prominent individuals representing almost every shade of opinion along the spectrum of contemporary political and social dissent. This is the first trial of its kind in the history of the United States. It is a national disgrace.

I. THE LEGISLATIVE ROLE

Six of the eight defendants are being prosecuted under 18 U.S. Code 2101 and 2102, the new federal antiriot act, which makes it a felony to travel in interstate commerce, or to use any facility of interstate commerce, with the intent to incite, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot, and to act upon that intent by committing or attempting to commit any other act in furtherance of a riot. "Riot" is defined in the statute as any assemblage of three or more persons, in which at least one person threatens in-

jury to another person or property, or actually does injure person or property. (The defects in this statute will be discussed later in this chapter.)

The two remaining defendants, Froines and Weiner, are charged with the substantive offense of teaching the "use, application, and making of incendiary devices," contrary to 18 U.S. Code 231(a)1. All eight defendants are charged with a conspiracy among themselves and other (nonindicted) co-conspirators to commit three substantive offenses, including the two already mentioned (the antiriot act and the teaching of the use of incendiary devices), and a third, obstructing firemen and policemen "lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties." 18 U.S. Code 231(a)3. According to the indictment each defendant faces conviction under one substantive charge and one conspiracy charge, amounting to a possible total of ten years in a federal penitentiary and a fine of \$20,000.00.

A. SOME LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The passage of the federal antiriot act is marked by an interesting chronology. On July 17, 1967, the Newark riots came to a bloody conclusion. Two days later H.R. 421 passed the House of Representatives. It was clear from the debate preceding the passage of that bill, which eventually became the federal antiriot act almost one year later, that its supporters were attempting to solve the causes of urban disorders by striking at the "outside agitators" who, they felt, must be behind the outbreak of every civil disturbance. Congressman Thompson of Georgia, who had introduced his own antiriot law, stated during the House debate on H.R. 421:

There is impressive evidence that many of the riots which have been plaguing our cities have been incited by persons who have been traveling from one city to another, deliberately stirring up trouble. We have all heard that in so many instances, preceding a riot, an outside agitator has appeared in the community to harangue an audience concerning their grievances. Sometimes those grievances have been real, sometimes they have not. But real or not, often the speeches of these agitators have been criminally inflammatory, and

often in clear violation of our laws against inciting to riot.

Congressman Reinecke of California echoed Thompson:

These professional troublemakers have come long distances, across state lines to foment strife and discord. They had mailed inflammatory literature into the hands of discontented residents. They had directed civil disobediences by long-distance phone calls. And their sole intent was to reach across state lines to instigate trouble and strife.

And Congressman Colmer of Mississippi got right down to the nitty-gritty as follows:

We have the leaders of SNCC and other similar organizations going around from state to state preaching "black power" and inciting riots. Here we are with one Stokely Carmichael and one Rap Brown, with headquarters down in Atlanta, Georgia, who among others we find traveling from state to state and from city to city, and in their wake comes conflagration, blood-spilling, wholesale pilfering, and the loss of life and property.

Congressman Taylor of North Carolina warned that: "There is evidence that communists are trying to take advantage of the civil-rights movement to stir up people and damage our reputation as an enlightened people in the eyes of the world." Congressman Cramer of Florida quoted J. Edgar Hoover as blaming "subversives and extremists" for "exploiting and aggravating the riots, for example, in Harlem, Watts, Cleveland, and Chicago."

It probably doesn't matter whether the government actually believes the outside-agitator theory of social unrest or not—what matters is that a conviction will vindicate those who propagate the theory. It will vindicate, too, those supporters of the bill interested in obtaining a vehicle for suppressing normally protected dissent. Congressman Roubush of Indiana stated: "These people that these bills will affect are anti-Americans. They oppose our boys in Vietnam. They burn the American flag. They want to help our

enemies. They teach people how to dodge the draft. We can only call them anti-Americans. So a vote for this bill is a vote against these riot instigators." Even more succinct was Congressman Sikes of Florida: "Those who incite to violence should be punished whether or not freedom of speech is impaired."

H.R. 421 died in the Senate. Perhaps the senators were mindful of the words of Congressman Holland of Pennsylvania, who, speaking against H.R. 421, said during the debate in the House of Representatives: "Mr. Chairman, I shall not vote for H.R. 421. I shall not 'forget the First Amendment,' even for the time being, and vote for a bill which, by its vagueness and ambiguity, violates that fundamental law as deeply and lawlessly as any rioter has violated any local ordinance or state law against street violence."

The antiriot act was revived in March of 1968 when, as part of the bargaining over the 1968 Civil Rights Act, Senator Strom Thurmond was able to ram through the antiriot provisions as a rider to that act.

An interesting footnote to the Senate debates is the fact that the bill which passed that house was a more liberal version of what others were suggesting. The Senate conservatives, led by Russell Long of Louisiana, failed by one vote to push through an antiriot act which would omit any mention of interstate travel with specific intent to incite, since such intent is often difficult to prove. The liberals countered by arguing that omitting that specific intent would eliminate any interstate aspect of the act, thereby destroying anything which was purely "federal." Such an omission would unduly intrude, argued the liberals, upon the power of local police authorities to make arrests under local inciting and antidisruption statutes. Liberals arguing for state's rights; conservatives insisting on greater, centralized federal power—all in order to imprison the outside agitator.

Following Senate approval, the 1968 Civil Rights Act went to the House. On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated and a wave of civil disorder spread across the country. Once again in the wake of riots the House of Representatives had the opportunity to pass the antiriot act, which it did on April 10, 1968. President Johnson signed the act into law on April 11. The indictment in this case charges a conspiracy beginning on April 12, 1968, even

though plans for a convention demonstration had been in the works months earlier.

B. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL ANTIRIOT ACT

The Chicago Conspiracy prosecution is basically a "state of mind" prosecution. The gist of the offense is not the participation in a riot or even the instigation of a riot. Rather it is the crossing of a state line or the use of a facility of commerce with "evil intent," and the commission or attempted commission of some overt act for an "illegal purpose." The overt act need not create a clear and present danger or even a tendency toward danger. It may be as innocent as circulating a pamphlet, buying a bus ticket, or making a phone call. If the overt act occurred, any person may be convicted if a jury finds that he had the requisite evil intent. Therefore the crucial issue in any prosecution will be what the defendant was thinking at the time he crossed the state line or used the interstate facilities.

How is the government going to be able to prove the defendant's state of mind? The government's case at the Chicago Conspiracy trial indicates clearly that the bulk of the "proof" concerning the defendants' intent is evidence of activity in Chicago during the convention which is normally protected by the First Amendment—speeches, demonstrations, comments and writings. The indictment recites as proof of the defendants' criminal design the facts that all were present in Chicago at the same time during the demonstrations, that five attended meetings held in the city for the purpose of planning and organizing the demonstrations, and that on at least five separate occasions one or more of the defendants spoke to large gatherings of people. The antiriot act therefore contains a disability beyond that which appears in the act as written, in that in order to prove a case against the defendants the government is permitted to make use of constitutionally protected conduct.

The brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in challenging the antiriot act made the following observation about the impact of the statute:

The burden that such a statute places on interstate

travel for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights is staggering. Any "outside agitator" (who by virtue of being such will have crossed state lines and have committed an overt act) runs the risk that he will be accused of having done so with "evil intent." The college student who helps black sharecroppers in Mississippi to organize may be found to have had the intent to "aid and abet one of them in carrying on a riot." The speaker who urges residents of the slum or ghetto to "do something about their situation" may be found to have had the "evil intent" if some months later those persons "riot"—there is no requirement in the statute that his action has had anything to do with the riot. The person who goes into another state to make a speech against the war and the draft may be found to have had the intent to cause his listeners to seize the Selective Service offices. All of these persons can be found to have committed a violation of the statute if the jury, after probing their thoughts, utterance and beliefs, find that they entered the state with "evil intent" and did an act for one of the "prohibited purposes."

Moreover, the act's definition of riot would include literally scores of punishable "public disturbances" occurring each evening in every major American city. With this statute the government now has the power to select, for any whim or reason, any demonstration or meeting during which a police officer, for example (as the necessary third person), complains of a threat made against him by one person in attendance in order to charge the organizers or principal speakers at the demonstration under the act.

The attorneys for the Chicago Eight believe that a prosecution under the antiriot act threatens the free marketplace of ideas that is essential to the maintenance of an open and democratic society. Indeed it is only through the free interchange of ideas, rather than by punitive and repressive measures, that the violence at which the antiriot act is directed can be avoided. Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the United States Supreme Court has pointed out:

The function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best

serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.

Yet a provocative speech can be exactly the event that triggers the application of the statute. No one can be sure, however. The language of the statute is so vague, and its application depends on so many unknown and unknowable factors, that no person can ever be sure that his activity does not subject him to prosecution. Such uncertainty constitutes the "chilling effect" on free speech and political activity which the First Amendment is supposed to protect.

C. THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY

The history of conspiracy law is as depressing as that of the antiriot law. Its origins are found in the 650-year-old Ordinance of Conspirators, enacted at a time of social unrest in England during the early fourteenth century. It was used by the Star Chamber Court during a time of turmoil preceding the Civil War of the 1640's. It has played an important role in governmental efforts to combat the attempts of laborers to organize themselves into unions. Until the cases of *U.S. v. Spock, et al.* and the Chicago Eight prosecution, conspiracy law has concentrated on secret plotting, not public protest.

The use of conspiracy laws has coincided with times of great social unrest because such laws focus primarily on the defendant's state of mind, one stage prior to the commission of any antisocial act. When conspiracy is coupled to the antiriot act discussed above, defendants are in effect being charged with an *intention to intend* to do something unlawful, thereby moving two stages anterior to an unlawful act. The broad outlines of conspiracy law, when combined with vague substantive laws, permit a dragnet prosecution which lumps together a whole variety of defendants of diverse political views and styles. Evidence introduced against one defendant can become chargeable against all defendants as evidence of their supposed collective intent, making conviction highly probable. The law can be used, as Prof. Benjamin Pollack pointed out:

. . . especially during periods of reaction, to punish, as criminals, associations which for the time being are unpopular or stir up the prejudices of the social class in which the judges (and juries) have, for the most part, been bred.

It is natural, therefore, that the crime of conspiracy should have its origin in a time of social unrest, revolutionary activity, and general insecurity of the powers in control. Such was the case. The development of the law of conspiracy was coextensive with the measures taken by those in power to maintain themselves in the positions which they held and to thwart any possible assaults on the status quo.

Mr. Justice Jackson expressed similar distaste for conspiracy prosecutions:

The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpopular connotations. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state itself. . . . Even when appropriately invoked, the looseness and pliability of the doctrine presents inherent dangers which should be in the background of judicial thought whenever it is sought to extend the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case.

II. THE EXECUTIVE

It is unfortunate but not unexpected that the government's determination to jail the Chicago Eight is evidenced by more than its use of repressive laws. The choice of which eight defendants to charge under the antiriot law was made by the Justice Department in a self-conscious attempt to stifle the leadership of radical dissent. Upon first glance it might seem surprising that a bill aimed at jailing Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown, and other black militants should have white radicals as seven of its eight first victims. But it should be remembered that the antiriot provisions were passed in the wake of ghetto uprisings following the assassination of Martin Luther King. Chicago was particularly hard hit by the April, 1968, riots. The Democratic

National Convention took place in an atmosphere of official fear that any major disturbance might spark a wave of uncontrollable rioting in the black ghettos. This was the threat which the influx of white radicals seems to present to the city officials, who reacted as if they were preparing for Armageddon.

Bobby Seale's surprising indictment as part of the general conspiracy identifies him as the target of an overzealous prosecution in the same way that Congressman Cramer, speaking in favor of the antiriot bill, aimed at Stokely Carmichael as the seminal instigator of urban violence, paid homage to that young black leader:

Carmichael then usually leaves that jurisdiction. In his wake are thousands of Negroes whose blood is simmering—waiting for the instance certain to occur in any large city when a felon is arrested or shot. Charges of police brutality ring out and, like turning up the flame under a caldron of simmering oil, the boiling point is quickly reached. The riot is under way.

The most fascinating example of the lengths the Justice Department is willing to go in order to get a conviction in this case is the controversy surrounding electronic surveillance. In February, 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in *U.S. v. Alderman* case that if a wiretap is ruled illegal, the government must turn over the transcript to defense counsel. No longer is the government permitted to make its own determination as to what the defense can or cannot see. Henceforth a judge is to determine whether a wiretap or electronic eavesdrop has met the procedural requirements set forth in earlier court opinions, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.

On the day following the *Alderman* decision, the Justice Department held an unusual press conference. Deputy Attorney General Will Willson announced that *Alderman* would seriously prejudice a number of pending prosecutions which the Nixon Administration considered crucial. He mentioned *Hoffa*, *Spock*, and *Muhammad Ali*, all of which had already resulted in convictions. He also mentioned the Chicago convention riot prosecution, which was at that time at the grand jury stage. Willson said a de-

termination would have to be made whether to continue to seek indictments in that case, since the government would rather drop prosecution than reveal the nature and extent of its illegal wiretapping activities. Despite this attempt by the Justice Department to rally public opinion against *Alderman*, a petition for a rehearing was nevertheless denied by the Supreme Court.

In March, 1969, the Supreme Court decided the *Giordano* and *Taglionetti* cases—and for the first time mention was made of “international affairs” and “internal security” as possible exceptions to the procedural requirements for government wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. The *Giordano* decision specifically left open the question whether there is such a thing as a “national security” exception, and if so, what its scope is.

On April 9, David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Bobby Seale, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, John Froines, and Lee Weiner were arraigned in Chicago. On May 6 motions were filed by the defense, one of which asked the government to certify whether or not use had been made of wiretap and electronic eavesdropping information. On May 24 the government answered all the defense motions except that one, saying wiretap and electronic surveillance was the subject of a continuing investigation and that the defense must wait until June 13 for an answer.

On June 11 in Newark, N.J., the federal government made an unprecedented disclosure. At the request of a defense attorney, the U.S. Attorney's office turned over twelve volumes of illegally obtained wiretap and electronically eavesdropped conversations of leading Mafia figures. The transcript read like a Mickey Spillane novel, as Mafia figures were heard discussing an assortment of gang killings. On June 12 federal law-enforcement officials held a press conference in Newark and said Supreme Court decisions made it impossible for them to prosecute the Mafia leaders for the crimes admitted in the conversations.

On June 13 in Chicago the government “answered” the Conspiracy defense by sending a news release to the press. The government admitted to having wiretapped or electronically overheard conversations of all but three of the defendants—Froines, Weiner, and Hoffman. The taps were made without prior judicial approval and are therefore, according to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against un-

reasonable searches and seizures, inadmissible as evidence. The government argued, however, that the taps and overheard conversations are nevertheless valid due to an exception concerning conversations affecting the "internal security" of the country. The government therefore refused to hand over the intercepted conversations involving "internal security" in much the same way that President Truman rationalized the seizing of steel mills—that is, an emergency justifies any exercise of executive power. That position was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1952. If that position is now sustained, the government will be able to probe the innermost reaches of people's thoughts and lives, simply by chanting the words "national security."

At a hearing July 17, Judge Hoffman refused to rule on the legality of the controversial conversations. He did not want to define the scope of a national security exception or even to declare that it existed. Instead he said that he would defer the question until after the trial and would only have to rule on the legality point if upon examining the conversations he felt that the trial had been "tainted" by them. The defense attorneys had no idea at the beginning of the government's case what the prosecution intended to produce at trial. The amazing situation is that the government has confessed error in making illegal interceptions of conversations, arguing nevertheless that a new national security rule would exculpate them, with the result that the judge has placed the injured party, the defendants, in the position of going to trial without proper preparation.

The Justice Department was badly stung by the *Alderman* decision and by prior constitutional decisions which made unregulated wiretapping and electronic surveillance illegal. In particular, the Justice Department wanted to preserve at all costs their control, without judicial intervention, over conversations which they felt crucial to key prosecutions. A national security exception to the new rules, if broad enough, would permit the department to bypass *Alderman* and to prevent the defense in the Chicago Eight case from claiming that the entire indictment and trial were tainted by illegal interceptions. The Newark disclosures and the several department press conferences were part of a concerted publicity effort to rally public support behind an eventual Supreme Court definition of "internal security." The more the public is disgusted over lack of Mafia prose-

cutions, the more likely it is that the Supreme Court will sustain a conviction of the Chicago Eight.

III. THE JUDICIARY

The refusal of Judge Hoffman to rule on the wiretap controversy is only one small example of the judicial attitude in the conduct of the Chicago Eight prosecution which more than matches the legislature and the executive in its unfairness. Before the trial was seventy-two hours old the judge issued bench warrants for the arrest of four attorneys of record for their alleged failure to appear in court. Prior to the start of the trial they had notified the judge of their limited participation in the case and later confirmed this by telegram—that they would *not* be present at the trial in person. Three of them had participated in the case solely for the purpose of preparing pretrial motions. The fourth, Gerald Lefcourt, was originally a member of the trial team but was released by the defendants so that he could continue his role as chief trial counsel in the Panther 21 case in New York.

On Thursday, September 25, after the arrest warrants were issued, all four went into the local district court in their respective areas seeking an order to stay Judge Hoffman's warrant. In San Francisco, the court and the district attorney refused to recognize the warrant for Kennedy and Roberts. Judge Albert C. Wollenberg quashed the warrant on the ground that there was absolutely no basis for a finding of summary contempt. In New York the district court stayed the arrest warrant for Lefcourt, pending his appearance in Chicago on Friday. After seeking sanctuary in the Seventh Circuit Court, Lefcourt surrendered to the marshalls in Chicago. Michael Tigar was arrested Thursday after his attempt to have his warrant quashed in Los Angeles failed. He and Lefcourt appeared before Hoffman on Friday morning and were immediately held without bail. Later a withdrawal agreement was reached between the U.S. Attorney and the defense counsel.

It should be pointed out that Charles Garry had been designated by the defendants in this case as chief trial counsel. He is the only attorney representing Bobby Seale. Judge Hoffman refused on several occasions to postpone the trial for a reasonable time until Garry could recover from an

operation. Judge Hoffman refused to accept the withdrawal agreement that had been negotiated between the U.S. Attorney and defense counsel, attempting to coerce Seale to waive his insistence on being represented by Garry by offering to accept the agreement only in exchange for Seale's waiver.

Judge Hoffman ignored all arguments challenging the legality of the bench warrants and set Monday, September 29, as the day for sentencing Tigar and Lefcourt. (The warrant for Kennedy and Roberts had been quashed.) No bail was allowed. Within minutes of this action two circuit court judges (only one was necessary) overruled Judge Hoffman and ordered Tigar and Lefcourt released on their own recognizance pending appeal.

Judge Hoffman has denied every defense motion except two, both of which concerned recessing court a few minutes earlier than usual. The judge, and not the attorneys, interrogated and impaneled the jury. Of forty questions submitted to the judge by the defense in order to better select an impartial jury, all but one were rejected.

Shortly after the jury was impaneled, the youngest and possibly most sympathetic juror was informed by the judge that her family had received a threatening letter allegedly signed by the Black Panthers. The juror had not seen the letter, and did not have to see it, since the family had turned the letter over to the FBI immediately upon receiving it. Over vigorous defense objection the judge instructed the juror to read the letter and then asked her if she could continue to sit impartially. She replied in the negative and was excused.

Judge Hoffman has denied defense counsel the right to have any law clerks or other assistants at the defense table, while allowing an FBI agent free-run of the government's table as, in Judge Hoffman's own words, "a courtesy to the government." Judge Hoffman has repeatedly made derogatory reference to the fact that the defendants' attorneys are from out of town, and has referred to one defense attorney as a "wild man."

Judge Hoffman has rigidly controlled the admission of spectators to the trial, held in a too-small courtroom to begin with, so as to exclude many who would ordinarily be able to witness a public trial. Special persons, friends of the judge, have had ready access to the courtroom.

Judge Hoffman's inflection as he read the indictment to the jury, and his demeanor in front of the jury, has been an obvious attempt to prejudice the defense. One prospective juror, when interviewed on radio after she had stated to the judge that she could not sit impartially in the case, gave as her reason the manner in which the indictment was read to the jury panel.

The attorneys for the defendants, as well as the defendants themselves, do not object to the prosecution because of Judge Hoffman, however. The objection to the prosecution goes much deeper. The following is a quote from a statement prepared by the Ad Hoc Lawyers' Committee to Stop the Trial, sent to Attorney General Mitchell:

As attorneys we must condemn prosecution based upon an "anti-riot" law unconstitutional on its face. As attorneys we must condemn an indictment aimed self-consciously at silencing the leaders of radical dissent in America. As attorneys we must condemn a conspiracy prosecution which tends to make a vague statute even more vague, and which relies for its proof on constitutionally protected, but unpopular, speeches and demonstrations. As attorneys we must condemn this prosecution not only as a protest against the legal travesty being imposed upon the eight defendants, but also because of the intimidation being worked upon untold thousands who would wish to join the defendants in protest and cannot under threat of future prosecution. . . . The undersigned committee of attorneys condemns this political trial, and will condemn all political trials which inherently, like this one, lead to a perversion of justice, to a suppression of unpopular speech. We call upon all attorneys and all concerned persons to join with us in demanding of Attorney General Mitchell that the trial be stopped.

FREEDOM AND LICENSE

by Abbie Hoffman

ABBIE HOFFMAN has been called the "Lenin of the Flower Children," "A Cross between Lenny Bruce, Ché Guevara and Robin Hood," "Biggest Ego-Tripper in the Country," and quite a few epithets. It may all be true: barely over thirty, Hoffman has behind him a decade of civil-rights work, political activism along traditional lines, and a considerable role in forging a new life-style for the young in this country, although he and his friends did fail to lift the Pentagon off its foundations in that famous confrontation in 1967. He is the author of Revolution for the Hell of It. This piece has been rather freely adapted from Hoffman's conversations with an interviewer for the Walker study team, whose federally commissioned report on violence in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, entitled Rights in Conflict, was conducted at the behest of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Abbie Hoffman: If you'd ask me what is going on in this country, I'd say I haven't got the vaguest idea because I don't understand it, you see. The leaders of this country have destroyed it. They've destroyed what I consider to be the destiny of this country and the aims of the founding fathers of the revolution, the American Revolution—I mean I think Thomas Jefferson would vomit over our Vietnam policy.

Interviewer: Do you think we need a revolution every ten years?

Hoffman: I think we should aim toward a free society and I mean really *free*—you don't pay. I think not paying is where it's at. I think this society has the technological capabilities to serve the needs of the people in such a fantastic, unbelievably humanistic way that no one would have to work. The machines would do the work or else we could work steadily toward the goal of full unemployment, not full employment—none of those jerk things that even the NAACP is demanding and the administration demands and the Right demands and everybody demands. We're beyond that. We want full unemployment. We want a society of leisure, a society of creative artists in which we're free to do whatever we want, in which we enjoy what we're doing. If you enjoy it, it's not work. Work is something you do for money, for the kids—you know, for the boss, for the machine. I'm never gonna work again ever. You see, I think in fifty years if the whole thing survives—if we get through nuclear war and everything else, including garbage strikes where the garbage piles up so high that you know the whole civilization is being smothered—if we can get through that, we'd *have* this free society of vision. You know twenty or thirty years ago people worked a sixteen-hour workday; now it's eight, and

pretty soon it'll be down to four. And the question is how is this society going to deal with leisure, how is it going to deal with abundance? Up to now society, the American system—the American capitalist system, to use a dirty word—has worked on the principles of the industrial revolution. That is, it has been based upon a society of scarcity where there is not enough to go around: therefore some people gotta get more and some people gotta get less and some people gotta go out and work for other people so they can get more. I think the cybernetic revolution allows for a society of abundance in which those kinds of questions become meaningless and the whole concept of property becomes meaningless, and that's what my personal revolution is directed toward. There is something wrong with a civilization where you have to pay a dime to take a shit in the subway. I mean, what're pay toilets about? Like what the fuck is that thing about out there called American Society?

Everybody asks us where our goals are and all that and sometimes we say fuck you and sometimes we clown around and sometimes we'll spell it out in great detail, but nobody asks the leaders of this country what are the goals of this country—like, where the hell is it going? What they *say* is that we're for peace and brotherhood. Well, those kinds of words like peace and brotherhood have no meaning to us. Like after Martin Luther King's death, LBJ goes on TV and says that in the memory of King's name we should be nonviolent. What the fuck is he talking about—is he talking about sit-ins in the Mekong Delta? Is he talking about 'We shall overcome' in Vietnam? No, he isn't talking about that—he's telling the oppressed to get the fuck in the cellar, stay there, and get outta the streets. Well, those days are gone. Nobody is listening to them—it's *in* the streets. That's where we're gonna vote. We're gonna vote heavy. People are into this. You see what the whole hippie movement has done is to focus on the possibility that white people in this country, young white kids, can make their own revolution around their own dreams, their own visions, their own needs, their own aspirations.

There is already an edge in the door. We have an underground press. We have underground newsreels. We have underground theater. We have a whole philosophy. We

have a free store around the corner. We give away everything free. We print books; we print poems and we pass them out on the street free. We go around here painting buildings free. We open up communes and have kids live in them free. We're gonna paint the subway stop here free. We're already living in the future—we're living thirty years ahead and, you see, we like it—we like it so much that we're willing to die to defend it and that's where it's at, and that's why we're gonna win.

Interviewer: Who started the Yippies?

Hoffman: It was a myth created by the media, not us. What about if we create a myth, program it into the media so that it's always connected to Chicago and August 25th to 30th—come and do your thing—bullshit—everything and anything you want to say, you can do it. Commitment, engagement, Democrats, pigs—the whole thing. All you gotta do is change the “H” in hippie to a “Y” for Yippie and you got it—a new phenomena on the American scene. Well, that's O K., because the way in which that myth was planned for Chicago, and so for six months you couldn't talk about the Yippies without saying, “Oh yeah—the Yippies are going to Chicago to the Democratic Convention. So by word of mouth and by using the media, that's how it happened.

Interviewer: But didn't you plan it at a Christmas Eve meeting?

Hoffman: So the myth goes. What's a meeting? We've never really had meetings. Three of us sat around and someone said, “Yippie.” That was the meeting. “‘Yippie,’ yeah,” we said, “that's great. Yeah, that's good. You say, ‘Join the Y’—that's good, we'll steal their symbols. Why—that's our question. Our question is ‘Why?’ and our slogan will be ‘Y’” You know, as long as you can make up a story about it that's exciting, full of shit, mystical, you have to accuse us of going to Chicago to perform magic. And that's out of sight, because that's what it's about. We put out a poster, a jigsaw puzzle of the United States, pointing to Chicago, Yippie, the festival of life, August 25th to 30th, Chicago, music, lights, theater, free, magic, and that was enough. *You* can't understand that. You need three hundred pages, you know, beginning with a capital letter and ending with a period. But young kids don't need

that, they don't even want it. Nobody reads books, nobody reads *The New York Times*; we look at movies and watch television.

Interviewer: Well, they read the underground newspaper.

Hoffman: But the underground newspaper has a different concept of, let's say, truth, than the "overground" newspapers. The underground newspaper knows that there's no such thing as truth and therefore can have a whole lot of fun. It can talk in terms of myth.

But the cheapest means of communication on the national scale is the national media. I would say that the Yippies spent under \$5,000 on Chicago, but ABC, NBC, and CBS must have spent \$700,000, you see, so it's like stealing.

We're not very good about money. We had one benefit at a discothèque—at the Electric Circus—one night last February, and we raised about \$3,500, but that was about the only money we ever raised, except for some people being on the street, panhandling—whatever. We had a bank account, but we never used it after a month—we really burned that \$3,500. We had an office—but no lock on the door after a month. People would come in, pick up the phone, and say, "I'm a Yippie leader." And run down on what it was about. But it didn't matter who they talked to or what was said, because when you deal in the area of myth, it doesn't matter. There's no way it can be distorted, because its life blood is distortion. I mean, you can't even tell the truth about the Yippies—you can't! It's a slogan; it has an exclamation point at the end. There are no real Yippies. Nobody is a Yippie—there are no card-carrying Yippies. The press made up the "Youth International Party," *YIP*, so they could relate to the Yippies in a straight, linear way.

Interviewer: The press did that?

Hoffman: Yeah, sure, who the hell talks like that—we don't talk Youth International Party; it's a hoax.

We are very different from the Mobilization. You'll have a lot easier time understanding the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam than you will in understanding the Yippies.

Interviewer: That's for sure.

Hoffman: When the mobilization sits down to negotiate with the administration, they aren't that different. They understand each other. They all wear suits and ties, they

sit down, they talk rationally, they use the same kind of words, the same kind of language, and they want to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Yippie thing is very different from that—we *don't* use the same kind of words, we *don't* use the same kind of language, we *don't* dress the same. We also don't understand what you're talking about, and you don't understand what we're talking about, and we don't mind that one bit.

Interviewer: You don't want to negotiate—would that be included?

Hoffman: We are into revolution and we applied for the permit a long time ago, and that's it. I mean—we are in to win or die.

Interviewer: Revolution by any means necessary?

Hoffman: Any means—any means necessary. That's a phrase of great interest to commissions on violence. . . . We will defend ourselves by "any means necessary"—you can say that in different tones, and one time it'll mean laughing and another time fighting. It's not the words that are important, it's the tone and it's the action, really. You have to examine the action—not the words. That's one thing we play on the American psyche—we know the hang-up on words. You know Rap Brown says everybody ought to get a gun. Well, when I hear that I laugh, because I've worked in ghettos and I've worked in the South and every black already has a gun. So, what's he talking about? They all have guns! For all I know, everybody in this country has a gun. So what does it mean—telling people who already have guns, that they ought to get guns? It's a means of raising their revolutionary consciousness because what he's saying is you ought to think about changing the society in which you live and you ought to think about it to the extent that you're willing to risk your life. That's *what* he's saying. That's raising the revolutionary consciousness. In a revolution, you either win or you die, Ché Guevara said, and that's where it's at. I don't know of any of the so-called movement leaders in the country who are not convinced that they're gonna be killed within three or four years. So we are in it to win or die. That's it. There are no doubts about it. We're going to wreck this fuckin' society. If we don't, this society is going to wreck itself anyway, so we might as well have some fun in doing it.

And that's the thing about the underground press, too—

it doesn't care what it says, it has fun doing it. It can talk in terms of there will be ten million people in Chicago and Bob Dylan will be climbing the trees and we'll be pulling Hubert Humphrey's pants down, you see. *The New York Times* can't joke about that, you know. *The New York Times* is uninvolving, while the underground media is very involving. Just look at the front page of an underground paper—in terms of layout, in terms of the appeal, underground newspapers look like television commercials.

Interviewer: What about organizing?

Hoffman: We operated primarily through the underground press and through our writing and even more in terms of our action. We had to show the people, so we had, for example, a raid on Stony Brook [the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Long Island] after they had the big [drug] raid out there.

So we said, "We're going to have a raid and arrest everybody who's smoking cigarettes and drinkin' booze," and we went out there with rock bands and things in the middle of the morning just like the cops, and went into a whole satirical pun on the way the cops raided that school . . . and that made it . . . got Yippie in the public eye a little.

Then we said, "Well, we need a party!" So on March 21st or 22nd—I guess, the first day of spring, we had a party in Grand Central Station at midnight—we spent \$15.00 and had eight thousand people come to our party for no reason at all. We had all these people, playing with balloons and everything, singing on corners and other people pouring in and everybody getting so excited about having this tremendous sense of community. Wow! Everybody turning out at midnight to a party in Grand Central Station, isn't this exciting?

Well, the police responded to that one with an amazing show of force. I must say that I've been in tremendously violent street demonstrations before, both in the North and in the South, and I would say that Grand Central was the goofiest thing I ever encountered—goofier than Chicago!

Interviewer: Who organized that, you and Paul [Krassner] and Jerry [Rubin] or . . . who got the idea and promoted it and started getting people to— Well, somebody must have thought of it first of all?

Hoffman: Fuck, that's not the way things happen! It just goes, that's all! People get together and somebody says, "Yeah that's a good idea," and lots of people work on it. I would say five guys and a mimeograph machine could bring down any police force in this country. . . . We had eight thousand people in Grand Central. You see, all we're doing is pinpointing certain feelings—we're naming the day. The energy is already there, and it gathers.

After the parading of the wounded from Grand Central Station, the ACLU came into the picture and wanted to defend people and charge the police with brutality and things went back and forth and then articles started appearing. What does it mean to be a Yippie? What is a Yippie? What is this new phenomenon on the American scene? Is the Yippie a "politicalized hippie?" That's generally the phrase the media used. But people also talked about a "psychedelic revolution" or a "psychedelic left" and stuff like that.

Interviewer: Were these articles prepared by you people?

Hoffman: No, they were prepared by *you* people. That was the role of *The New York Times*, and people like that—to analyze what we were about. It was never our role to analyze ourselves. We knew better. We knew we couldn't explain it.

Interviewer: What happened next?

Hoffman: Well, we had meetings with New York City officials who were afraid because we planned a sit-in, in tribute to the memory of Martin Luther King, in the mayor's office. Since they were all mourning his loss, we invited President Johnson, Governor Rockefeller, Archbishop Cooke, and the mayor to join us—adopt King's tactics and have this sit-in—because we were not being allowed to have our Yip-out on Easter Sunday. But the City of New York does it a little differently—you put a little pressure on them and they'll come around on most things.

If the Democratic Convention had been held in New York, I think the city would have given us \$200,000 and gotten the Beatles to come over and play in the park and everything would have been groovy. That's what I told the Chicago officials to do. Give us some money, let us set up the best festival possible in the park, and nothing

will happen. I'd rather dance and listen to music than fight cops in the streets.

Interviewer: Did you put it that way?

Hoffman: We put it in all different ways. We can say anything and do anything because it doesn't matter. They're not about to give us the money; they're not about to do what is right.

Interviewer: But you did have the sit-in [in New York]?

Hoffman: Yes, we had that little sit-in and we tested the city and the city—

Interviewer: How many people were in the sit-in?

Hoffman: We had about thirty. They brought out about eight hundred cops for that event.

Interviewer: Did you see Mayor Lindsay or did you see a representative?

Hoffman: A representative. They had no idea at that point, after the Grand Central Station affair, what the hell it all meant. They picked up a leaflet of ours, you know, and they had no idea whether it would mean ten people or ten thousand, so they would be guarding for ten thousand every time we walked around the city. It was kind of exciting in a way. We'd go there with twenty people with bells and flowers and incense. And there would be eight hundred cops with guns.

Interviewer: Did you get a permit at that time for Central Park?

Hoffman: I don't know if we actually ever did get a permit. I think we did, but it became clear at that point that the mayor's office called the Parks Department and straightened their heads out and we were allowed to have our music festival and we had it on Easter.

Interviewer: Was it staged to promote Chicago?

Hoffman: Anything that had the name Yippie attached to it was to promote Chicago. But it was basically a music festival, just like Grand Central was staged not as a police confrontation event, but as a party.

I'll give you an example of how the media works and how the media is the organizing tool, when you're into myth and organizing through myth. We had two events, two major events before Chicago. We had the Yip-in—which is what we called it—at Grand Central Station, and that was a massacre. They massacred us, no warning,

no nothing, and injured two, three hundred people and arrested sixty. I myself got beaten unconscious, you know. Then we had the Yip-out on Easter in Central Park—maybe we had forty thousand, fifty thousand people, fifteen rock bands, flowers out of the sky, a real joyous kind of event, and the police were instructed by the City of New York, which was kind of cool in dealing with us, to keep the fuck out of the park. This I don't think could have happened in Chicago. It might have, who knows? But for that event they kept the police out on the perimeters. If they *had* police there, they were in costume and they didn't look like police. And there were bonfires and people smoked dope and people fucked on the grass and did whatever they wanted. It was a liberated zone. You could do whatever you wanted and no violence happened.

Interviewer: No?

Hoffman: No. A month after those two events, you see, it was the Grand Central Station thing that stuck in the nation's mind as being what Yippie was about, not the thing in Central Park, even though there were five times as many people and a lot more of what you would call planning and a lot more money spent. You know, we spent maybe \$1,500 on that Central Park thing and \$15.00 on Grand Central Station. It's because the media is attracted by violence; it plays it up and what was gonna happen in Chicago—you see a myth in a sense never lies—so Grand Central Station, not Central Park, was a preview of what was gonna happen to Chicago.

Because violence *does* attract your media, and because this is the idea—to get the media, so that you can get people involved. . . .

Interviewer: Is that why you did it—to provoke violence?

Hoffman: Hell, no—we didn't ask for *that* kind of media attention! Look, we put out one first call for Chicago only to the underground press. I think we maybe had one press conference before Chicago, and this is *another* example of how it doesn't fit. We had a press conference in the Americana Hotel somewhere along about April, I guess. All the top rock singers, Ginsberg and all this lade-da about how this was gonna happen and this was gonna happen in Chicago, and it got no coverage—nothing. It was arranged by one of the top publicists in the country. We had all the major media there, and it got

no coverage. We asked, "*Why*, man—we did everything right, didn't we?" The reason it didn't was because that wasn't what Chicago was gonna be about. That's my conclusion.

And don't forget we had a series of demonstrations here in New York—when Humphrey would come to town, there would be an antiwar demonstration where people were getting clubbed, brutally clubbed—and people started to realize, that is, hippie types, that you couldn't go to a demonstration without expecting violence. There is no such thing anymore in this country—you've got to expect violence. So at that point they had to say, "Well, are we gonna go to a demonstration or not," and they'd say, "No, we're *not* gonna go," and so they went off up to the hills or someplace. But what happened up in the hills, when they went to develop communes—attempted to really in a sense drop out of society—well, they found they were getting the shit kicked out of them anyway. So you get someone like Timothy Leary, a total pacifist drop-out, a rural kind of guy, saying, "Let's go up to Millbrook and forget about protest—forget about it, it's all dead, your protest is as bad as they are." And he goes up to Millbrook and opens up a little community and every week the fucking cops are in there raiding the place. Beating up all the people, arresting them on phony charges. You experience this for a while and then you say, "Hey, we gotta fight, we're fightin' for our lives. We can't just drop out, we gotta fight." So people who drifted off to the hills, eventually, through the course of the summer, started to come back, and they ended up in Chicago. If they didn't, they didn't. It didn't matter. Chicago was, in a way, in your head—there were lots of people involved in Chicago who never even went. You didn't have to go. The community is bigger than the numbers that went to Chicago. In January there was a lot of talk about going to Chicago, and Sheriff Joe Woods comes out with "We're going to put them in subterranean mud tunnels," and Daley comes out with his "Shoot to kill" orders, and all that shit. But Woods came on first with their magic. Their magic was forming white vigilante groups and putting us in subterranean mud tunnels underneath the subway system.

Interviewer: He wasn't talking about you at that time.

Hoffman: Yes, he was. Who was he talkin' about?

Interviewer: Wasn't he talking about the black community?

Hoffman: No, he was talking about us, the ones coming to the convention. There will be no disruption of the Chicago Convention, you see. Daley actually—well, this is a very difficult concept to understand but what they're doing with those kind of things is throwing down the glove, saying, "Come on into battle, we're ready for it." A whole lot of people are going to take up that challenge, see?

Interviewer: This helped stimulate a lot of interest?

Hoffman: Oh, sure, sure. We always talk of Daley as a founder of the Yippies.

Interviewer: Well, how about people in Cleveland and people in Indianapolis, or Madison, Wisconsin? How do they get the news—how did you think you were going to reach them?

Hoffman: The underground is a very Gypsy movement. First of all, you have youth fares in this country, which means that I can get on a plane and fly to Chicago for twenty-three bucks, and get a full meal, too. And there are kids, fifteen-sixteen-year-old runaways, who're off to San Francisco and will be there in three or four days. You know, by hook or by crook, even hitchhiking. So people roaming around the country bring the word around.

Interviewer: Did you have any kind of organization, like offices in other cities or that kind of thing?

Hoffman: No, nothing. But you see, it doesn't have to work that way. For example, if I go into a city, I'll find a long hair and I'll say, "What's happening?" And in five minutes they'll take me to what's happening. They'll take me to a group of people, you know, tell me where the underground press is in the city and where the underground movies are playing, where the pot parties are, where the dances are, where the be-ins are, where I can stay for free, what communes I can crash. And they'll take me to the action. We'll go there and we'll talk and we'll rap, and I'm one of thousands and everybody knows this who's got long hair. When they go to a city they immediately know—it's a symbol, it's a symbol of living in an alternative society and it's highly visible. We have what blacks have, which is a high degree of visibility.

Interviewer: In the underground press, the reports about what was going to happen in Chicago—were those ever cleared through you, or did you expect them to be cleared or anything like this?

Hoffman: No, we have Liberation News Service, which is a link connecting most underground newspapers.

Interviewer: A wire service?

Hoffman: Yeah, it's like AP and UPI—you see, the underground press has no copyright stuff and everything is swapped back and forth and stolen and reprinted and changed and redone in terms of local issues. It's media-organized. It's not organizing in the sense of having meetings and structures—there's a National Mobilization to have that. That's their thing. They always have these meetings and debates about working locally as opposed to nationally. . . . They like meetings, they like these debates. Ideological debates and tactical debates. They had this debate for two days. At the end of the two days, we came in and gave them all a free poster and free Yippie buttons and said, "We'll see you in Chicago, because we know the fuck you're gonna be there—you just want to play out your scenario of having these meetings, undoing your tie and rolling up your sleeves and making it like a fucking business." We never met with them again. And they kept having these meetings and spending this money and flying around the country and doing all this shit. We knew we didn't have to do that, because we knew we had a solid thing. We had the top people in the underground in terms of communication in the country, which meant we had the best people in the country.

Interviewer: When you issued statements in underground papers, you used the figure five hundred thousand—you expected five hundred thousand people in Chicago?

Hoffman: Well, initially, I thought we'd have half a million people on account of LBJ. He was still there and of course he was a focal point. In fact, I had written articles which I had to destroy because the whole myth was perpetuated around LBJ as a symbol of attack, and when he pulled out of it, we were totally fucked and Humphrey came along and then Kennedy, of course. Kennedy nailed us because he had the same kind of charisma, excitement theater-in-the-street thing that we had, and he had the money to buy the whole stage. We had to steal ours, and

when you have to steal it . . . well, he was a very tremendous threat to the Yippie thing. After Kennedy got assassinated there was no doubt in my mind that we were going in, that we were going to Chicago, and we knew a lot of people were going to be there.

We had started negotiations for the park permit about four months before. They had a great deal of contact with us and they said, after those first few meetings, "Well, this is it. The Chicago administration will not give you Grant Park. They say that if you invite people into your home, you don't have them sleep in the living room." That was a direct quote from David Stahl as to why we wouldn't get Grant Park and he in fact suggested Lincoln Park and there were tours taken—they took people on tours of Soldiers Field and to Navy Pier and to the baseball diamond area in Lincoln Park, which we finally used. And, it was very conciliatory, very "Yes, you'll get it—the permit is being processed." The Yippies believed the permit was going to come any day. When anyone called, they'd say, "It's coming next week," and when he'd call again, they'd say, "Oh, it's definitely set—we've just met with this commissioner and that one and they assure us it's coming next week." From *our* experience at the Pentagon, we knew that if we were going to get a permit, it would be a day or two before the festival was scheduled to begin.

Interviewer: You knew that you would get a permit or you thought that you would get a permit—were you very confident of getting a permit?

Hoffman: I thought we would—I didn't think that they would be that dumb as to not give us a permit. I did not suspect that they would drive five thousand people out in the streets of Chicago at eleven o'clock each night. You know, we even talked to columnists—people like Mike Royko—and it was everybody's impression that if we had five thousand people in the park each night, they would leave us alone.

Interviewer: Were any new demands made or new positions?

Hoffman: No. Essentially it was the same permit application. It didn't have to be very complicated because first we had to get permission from the city to occupy the area for those five days. After we got that, we could get into nitty-gritty negotiations, where you talk about

who's gonna provide the toilets and what hours we're gonna be allowed access to the electricity and what's the size of the stage we can build and that kind of stuff. It was ridiculous to start talking about this before we had clearance to use the area.

Interviewer: Were you giving them any different estimate as to the number of people you expected to come at this time or were you still talking about the original figure you gave them?

Hoffman: Which was that?

Interviewer: What was it? Five hundred thousand? One hundred thousand?

Hoffman: I don't know. We just would say that a lot of people were coming even if we were assassinated, people are gonna come—so, like, why don't you just give us a permit. But their threats and everything, their magic, worked very strong to keep the numbers down so that in fact we had coming maybe five thousand, maybe less, not counting Chicago people. But—these are people who are very tough, because you had to go through a lot of mental shit, you know, to wade through those images on TV of barbed wire and troops and guns and Mace and tear-gas demonstrations and all that shit. You had to work through a lot of things in your head before you got on the road and started hitchhiking to Chicago. So the people who came were very ready, very *together*.

But the city administration *had* managed to spook a lot of the Chicago people, and some of the hippies talked about "bad vibes"—bad vibrations—and actually Allen Ginsberg's position at this time was he didn't like it—he didn't like it one damned bit.

Interviewer: Why?

Hoffman: Blood. Bloody visions of the apocalypse. He wouldn't speak out against it, but he wouldn't speak *for* it. All he would say was that he was going to be there and he didn't want us to overpublicize the fact that he was—we could say that he'd be there, but he wasn't going to encourage other people to be there. Allen Ginsberg. He would not go, for example, to poetry readings and say at the end, you know, I'm going to Chicago, let's go. In fact he dropped a lot of bad references to Chicago. But it didn't matter because everytime somebody dropped a reference to Chicago, it became implanted in your stream of con-

sciousness—even if they said it was gonna be a bloody fucking mess because a lot of people like to go to bloody messes, just to see what it's about. People go to accidents and fires all the time. Once a myth is started, it actually grows more when it's attacked than when it's accepted, I think.

For example, the late Don McNeil, one of my very close friends, who got decked real bad in Grand Central Station, was a reporter from the *Village Voice* and he wrote a number of articles attacking Yippie, attacking the way in which it was done and set up and what was gonna happen in Chicago and that we were saying that it was gonna be fun and games when in fact it was gonna be a bloody massacre. My own morality about that is that, number one, I run the same risks as everybody else who's going. I'm not the kind of person who stays in the hotel room while people are out on the streets—that's the kind of leadership that had been in the peace movement up to then. Martin Luther King would come to town with all his assistants and stay in a hotel while everybody got the shit kicked out of them in the streets—now that kind of leadership is gone forever. And good riddance. And the other thing is that it didn't matter what we said. Mayor Daley had so much access to the media and there were so many people predicting blood on the streets and the image of Grand Central Station stuck in people's minds. People pick up the paper and they see cops beating young kids, and maybe the Yippies *are* gonna have a festival of life, but it's the picture of the police beating up young kids that sticks in their mind.

But we were gonna go—I said fun and games—because to me, everything's fun and games, the whole thing, you know. And when I'm shot, I'm gonna laugh like a son of a bitch. And that's why I call the book I wrote *Revolution for the Hell of It*. I realize the word "fun" has a lot of different meanings out there, you know. But I was going with the idea of setting up the Festival of Life—I mean, the schedule was set up that way, and the things that I rounded up in Chicago, stages, mobile stages, sound equipment, were for that purpose, and we intended to set up a free store right in the park.

Interviewer: This was within the couple of weeks prior

to the convention that you finally came to Chicago, and were rounding up this equipment?

Hoffman: The hippies and the rock groups were committed to the point where if we got a permit, they would come. Now our line to them was that you had to keep saying you're coming because that was the only way we could get a permit. We couldn't just walk in and say, "We want a permit for five days to use Lincoln Park" or Grant Park or whatever it was. They'd say, "Well that's nice, you know, come back in ten years." You had to convince them that you *were* coming, whether you had a permit or not. Then you would get a permit.

The question of the permit became central to the rock groups because they couldn't bring all their equipment, they didn't want to risk \$10,000 worth of equipment, as well as their asses, without a permit. My feeling was that it didn't matter whether we had a permit anyway because if the police were into smashing our skulls, the fucking permit wasn't gonna matter.

If Chicago had issued the permit a day or so before, it would've taken a lot of the morality out of our effort, but to deny it totally was strategically wrong. If they'd issued it way in advance, *that* might have been a mistake as it would have increased the number of people coming to Chicago—it would have increased the bands and *that* would have increased the numbers of people. But then, on the other hand, maybe if there were more people, it wouldn't have happened the way it did. Maybe it would have been a much more peaceful event. There's no way of really predicting all these things, but I think I could say from experience that the amount of violence is inverse to the number of people. If Mayor Daley had not laid down the glove, if it had been a different situation, you would have attracted many more older people, many more straight-line groups, like the Communist party.

More of *those* kinds would have been attracted had the threat of violence on Mayor Daley's part not been so great. Mayor Daley's a shoot-to-kill guy and people who are gonna take up that challenge are the kind of people who are willing to pay a very heavy price for what they believe in. But at that point I honestly believed that nothing was going to happen in Lincoln Park—that people who stayed in Lincoln Park would be relatively safe. It

was inconceivable to me, up until that Sunday night at six o'clock, when the police first charged into the park, that they were not going to let us sleep in the park that night. It was inconceivable that they would be that fucking dumb. I mean, to drive five thousand people out into the streets with no place to go, is to me, ah, I don't know—can you explain it? You explain that to me, and maybe I'll understand a little bit more about what happened in Chicago. I've been to a lot of demonstrations and worked on a lot of them and I would never have expected that, never. I expected that kind of thing on Wednesday; I expected that sure as hell on Wednesday it would take place at the barbed-wire fences at the amphitheater because I—

Interviewer: Did you support that march to the amphitheater?

Hoffman: I did not support it publicly, but I did not disavow it publicly. I told them, "Do what you want."

Interviewer: Did you plan to go there yourself?

Hoffman: I planned to pull Hubert Humphrey's pants down right up on the podium—that's what I planned to do, but, so what, I failed. But in a way I didn't because his pants are down pretty far, they're down around his ankles right about now.

Interviewer: Well, you say after Grand Central, Chicago was bound to be violent?

Hoffman: I went out two days before all the shit hit the fan, and I saw the way Mayor Daley lived, the fact that he had that huge police station across from his house and his little bungalow out there and I said, "This guy is a tough Irish cop. He wants to show the world that. He wants to show that he doesn't want to budge an inch." And in a way, I kinda suspected—after seeing the way he lived—I had a hunch Chicago was just another dumb Southern town. . . . But it was—I will tell you how naïve I am—it was inconceivable, even after the whole experience in Lincoln Park, that they weren't gonna let us sleep in the park and everything, and I was sure they would allow some kind of token march on the amphitheater out of Grant Park. It was inconceivable to me that they would wade into a crowd of ten thousand people, because somebody lowered a flag, and start smashing the shit out of people.

Anyway, our plan was to start with music—we would

start with what we considered to be the least act of provocation, which would be the music festival—and there were very strategic reasons for starting with that on Sunday night. We would be able to draw a lot of the McCarthy kids and, in fact, delegates' kids, and straight kids from Chicago and then we would encourage them at that point to stay beyond eleven o'clock. I mean, our plans were that the music festival would just keep going until forever—who knows? We had no idea how many bands were gonna show up, but we definitely had very strategic reasons for starting with the music festival. If they weren't going to allow a music festival, they weren't going to allow a fuck-in—that was for sure—so our plan was to start with the thing that would be the least provocative, and then get on to workshops in the afternoon, and beach parties at night which might develop into naked swims and things, stuff like that. And—the olympics and rallies for the pig—it was unclear when exactly we were gonna release the pig or make him public and, in fact, which pig it was gonna be. You know, the pig that we had been using up to that point was somewhere in New Mexico stoned at some Yippie gathering with the Pueblo Indians.

Interviewer: A Yippie gathering with the Pueblo Indians?

Hoffman: Well, Hugh Romney and Ken Kesey and the Pranksters—I don't know what they call themselves now—but they had some kind of love-in outside of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and they were holing up there with the pig, awaiting word as to whether or not we had received a permit . . . to decide whether they were going to come to Chicago or not. At that point, we still felt we'd get a permit a day or two before the convention happened. It would be just like the Pentagon: "No, no, you can't come," and then they would go from a policy of trying to scare people away to a policy of containment. We felt that that would be the procedure that the Chicago administration would follow—try to scare us away and then the last day say, "Well, we know they're coming—we might as well have them all up in Lincoln Park, where we can keep an eye on them." That's what we told people—that was our feeling.

Yippie's plans after the music festival were undecided, that's all. We were planning an action, but we had a variety

of alternatives. We had plans for a scavenger hunt in Chicago with getting things like tails of Playboy Bunnies and tablecloths from the Millionaires Club in Chicago and matchbooks from the various hotels where the delegates were staying and—I mean, we had some idea but there has always been this kind of philosophy of Do Your Thing and not try to program events for other people. We were not about to tell everybody there was *one* thing planned and this was it and this is what you *had* to do. You know that's a heavy measure of responsibility and leadership that nobody is ready to assume and nobody even wants to assume or feel they have the right to do so—there are all kinds of philosophical reasons as well as artistic and political ones for just saying that there would be an action. In fact, I remember in the original schedule, I wrote, "Wednesday—Police Riot," and that spooked them; these people were kids, you know, and they did not have the experience that we had and they were not as tough. When they asked me what my personal predictions were for that day, I got into twenty or thirty killed, you know, six thousand arrests and about two or three thousand beatings—based on fifty thousand people showing up. What I made clear was that I felt that if people stayed in Lincoln Park and did not go on the march, then they wouldn't be touched at all; in fact I felt that they would be held up as "model niggers," that the city would say, "Look, we allowed freedom of speech—here it is. We let ya even sleep in the park and fuck on the ground. We tolerated a great number of things, but you went too far when you marched on the Ampitheater."

That's what I thought would happen, but some of the Chicago people, I guess, were more sophisticated than we were because they said that was bullshit and that the cops had no respect for that and they were gonna attack Lincoln Park, no matter what happened that day. If there was a march on the amphitheater they would attack and it would be an open field-day on anybody who had long hair or anybody who was young. I didn't believe that, and I don't think any of the people from New York did, so in that respect I guess the Chicago people were more realistic than we were. But anyway they got kind of spooked and there were all-night meetings about arrangements with local hospitals and clinics and churches and clergy groups

and all that . . . so then there were articles which appeared saying Yippie is a put-on but underneath they are dead serious revolutionists . . . and then articles started to appear in Chicago newspapers urging, really urging, the police and city administration to give us Lincoln Park. I can think of no article, even in the most hostile newspapers in Chicago, in which the police or the city administration was urged not to give us a permit. They were all urging the city to give us a permit to let us stay in Lincoln Park, where we'd be isolated—after all, it's *ten miles away from the convention*—and let us carry on and then fold our tents and fade into the night. So there was every indication, I felt, that that was what they were gonna do.

Interviewer: Now was there anything else that spooked, as you put it, the Chicago people—any particular thing that you said or anyone else that really got them nervous?

Hoffman: Well, we said things like We're gonna have ten thousand naked bodies walking the waters of Lake Michigan and that kind of had a rather a frightening effect on them, that spectacle—somehow the Chicago city administration thought that was possible. But mostly we felt we had absolutely to convince them that there would be thousands of people coming to Chicago, that they would have what we often call a "very dangerous social condition" on their hands unless they gave us a permit for Lincoln Park.

A meeting was scheduled, which was to be the definitive meeting on the permit, at which there would be large numbers of people from various municipal departments, corporations-council lawyers, parks-department officials, you know, the kinds of people who could pass on the acceptability of our permit application and our request. They [the Chicago Yippies] had been placing great faith in this meeting.

Interviewer: Did you go to that meeting?

Hoffman: No, we flew out before that, but as soon as that meeting was over, they were to call us immediately because we were still telling people in New York there *would* be a permit. If the answer was yes, the plan was to immediately talk to every rock group in the country, and tell them we now had a permit and—do you want to come?

But our Chicago people came out of that meeting

with a very different attitude—they told us that at this meeting the city administrators said, “You want to sleep in the park? We didn’t know that.” And that was the clue that they had paid no attention to what we had been saying for the past four months. At that point, our Chicago people got very nervous. I’m sure it was repeatedly pointed out to them at this meeting that they were gonna have to live in this city—that we could come in and go out—and that there were very subtle pressures placed on them to do everything they could to keep the thing down, to either attack it or withdraw, get the hell out. . . . They had to issue a new kind of statement and they felt the only way they could do this effectively was to pull out their permit application. They called us up and said, “We’ve decided to pull out our permit application,” and we said, “Why?” and “That’s bullshit,” and “Look, if you stay in Lincoln Park, it’s gonna be O.K. and what the hell’s the difference—you’re only causing us to zip in and do it again anyway.” But they were still gonna issue a statement saying, to the press, that they had been misled.

Interviewer: Is that why they wanted to pull out, do you think?

Hoffman: Well, the image they had been projecting up to that point of what was gonna happen in Chicago was misleading. They had been led to believe by the city administration that they would get a permit and now they believed that they would not, and they felt that they had to get out a new message—that you were risking a lot in coming to Chicago and that it was going to be bloody, it was going to be up against “the man” and “up against the wall” and up against Hubert. And that *wasn’t* their scene and they didn’t dig it and the only effective way they could get out that message was to withdraw their permit application.

Interviewer: Why did you want to keep going?

Hoffman: Why not? What’s the difference? First of all, we weren’t frightened—because we expected that all along and we didn’t expect that we’d get a permit until a day or two before, at best, and that whether we got a permit or not, we were pledged to go and that our image of what would be relevant in Chicago was that anything would be relevant and it didn’t have to be a music festival, a five-day music festival. It had to be what it had to be, and

the forces and events inside Chicago during that week would mold the kind of activity that would happen, and we had much more respect for the people who were coming because they would spontaneously create the situation. So, we were against their [the Chicago people] putting out this kind of position paper, this statement, because we were against anybody saying "Don't come." Or that it wasn't gonna happen because, in fact, it was—we were working on it, so it was gonna happen.

[Editor's Note: At this point in his testimony, Hoffman detailed how he and other Yippie leaders gathered in Chicago that night to talk with local city officials and try and explain to them that large numbers of concerned young people would be coming to Chicago, park permit or not, and so it was imperative that the permit be issued as soon as possible in order to ensure—Hoffman's term—"a very peaceful scene" during the convention.]

Hoffman: [Meeting with them] our feeling was that they would like to just kind of close their eyes, hoping it would all go away. They didn't know what to do because they had no power. They were essentially liberals and they'd say, "Yes, yes, of course you have a right to do this," and "Yes, we realize young people are getting shafted."

It was not a Daley's—you know—"Fuck you," but they had to work within an administration and try to be rational in an administration whose leader was essentially irrational. So they had themselves more of a problem than we did, or Daley did. I guess it was in Daley's mind to just kick the shit out of us—right from the beginning. And they convinced us that we had to start talking about violence in Chicago and that it was gonna happen and that people oughta prepare for it and we oughta get a little more serious in our statements and eliminate a lot of the bullshit.

Interviewer: Why is that?

Hoffman: Because we felt that the time was getting close and the kind of information that we had to get out and the kind of work that we had to do, had to be of a very concrete nature. We had to start setting up medical centers and we had to be prepared to evacuate wounded from certain areas; we had to start telling kids about vaseline, and about self-defense measures. We had to start working real hard on self-defense classes in the park

and start building them up. We had to prepare for war. That requires a little different approach than preparing for a festival of life.

Interviewer: What was the objective of this new line of talking about measures?

Hoffman: The objective was to prepare people who were already coming to Chicago, including ourselves, to be ready—to be ready for anything.

Interviewer: Was it thought that this new line would influence the city to settle in any way—was that part of the purpose of taking this new line?

Hoffman: Well, we had sort of run out of new ideas as how to influence the city, and it was up to them to make their own decision. We had done everything we could to convince them that there were people coming and it would be a very dangerous social problem unless we got a permit.

Interviewer: All this time, what about the other groups? What sort of things were you discussing—joint participation and activities in Chicago during the convention week?

Hoffman: Well, there was really no talk about joint efforts—it was recognized that we were *all* gonna be there and we were interested in things like how many lawyers they had lined up, how many doctors and what kind of medical facilities, and they were interested in similar information about what we had prepared. And how we could keep from stepping on each other's toes.

Interviewer: What did you have prepared as far as medical personnel and lawyers?

Hoffman: We had made arrangements with certain hospitals and clinics in the area and with certain medical groups, including the Medical Committee on Human Rights, and there would be certain mobile, medical facilities in the park. We had a hospital set up in the park and one fairly close by, about ten blocks away in a church, and then the one in the park was moved to the free theater across the street off Lincoln Street, after the police made it clear that we weren't going to be able to have medical facilities in the park. After, of course, it started—you see, after that Sunday we became a mobile army, so that you knew what to do—it was just reports as to where medical people were needed and they would go where they were needed.

Interviewer: There is a very significant amount of interest in the relationship between the hippie types and Yippie

people who came to Chicago and the black community. Now I think that earlier along the way you mentioned that this was supported by black groups in the early stages and just recently you mentioned that you went into the black community to talk to certain people. . . . Did you make the contact with them or did they try to get in touch with you to see what you were doing?

Hoffman: No, we made the contact—we tried to find them.

Interviewer: What was your purpose in talking with them?

Hoffman: We wanted to find out what they were gonna do, that's all—whether they were gonna come in, what their attitude was toward what was gonna happen, what they would like to see happen, how we could relate what we were doing to the black community in Chicago, make it relevant to the issues that affected their lives.

Interviewer: Who was at those meetings—Mobilization people, did they go?

Hoffman: No, no.

Interviewer: Just you?

Hoffman: When I talk of meetings, there may be three or four people, or just me.

Interviewer: How many of these contacts did you make with the black community?

Hoffman: We talked with maybe fifteen to twenty people who said that they represented various black groups or, mostly, the Blackstone Rangers. That was the one group that we were chiefly concerned with, and concerned with talking to. But it's very difficult, you see, in terms of these meetings, and especially when you don't know the people well, you don't know how full of shit they are or who they are. These kind of meetings are relatively unimportant. . . . You don't know what's gonna happen until the action and I think the position of the black community was that they wanted to see what we were gonna do before they decided what they were gonna do, and I think that's entirely reasonable.

Interviewer: Did they give you any indication of what their plans were?

Hoffman: Yes, but not until during the week—well, I'd say about Monday or Tuesday morning, Tuesday afternoon, I met with some people from the Blackstone Rang-

ers who said that they liked what we're doing and that they were gonna join us and I said, "That's nice." I didn't know what that meant.

Interviewer: Join you in Lincoln Park?

Hoffman: I said, "What do ya need?" They said, "Nothing." I said, "Great." That's the kind of joining I like. There was a rally scheduled at which Bobby Seale was to speak, a Black Panther rally, and they were interested in that, but I actually never attended that rally, so I don't know how many blacks were there, or Blackstone Rangers, but there were blacks involved in the park and I think color became a very irrelevant issue once you were in the park—we were all niggers.

Interviewer: What did they think about the march to the amphitheater?

Hoffman: I don't know.

Interviewer: Did you hear more rumors?

Hoffman: The stuff that happened is the stuff that's relevant.

Interviewer: Did you hear any other rumors of this kind?

Hoffman: I heard ten rumors a minute about everything.

Interviewer: Coming out of the black community about the action they were going to take?

Hoffman: Well, you don't know where they come from; you don't know if they're coming from white expectations or from blacks. . . . All I know is what I saw and touched.

Interviewer: Any other significant communications that you had with the black community?

Hoffman: The only significant communication that I could say that I had was when Tuesday morning I met a guy who, because of his manner and the way in which he talked and presented himself, I was convinced that he was a high official within the Blackstone Rangers. And he said that he was gonna bring a lot of people out that night.

Interviewer: Did they?

Hoffman: I don't know—how would I know a Blackstone Ranger from a member of the NAACP?

Interviewer: Tuesday night—are you talking about at the Coliseum or—

Hoffman: They were gonna bring people to Lincoln Park that night and help us fight for our right to have a party.

Interviewer: Was anything said to you about blacks *not* wishing to get involved, at any of these meetings that you had with them?

Hoffman: I think that the reason that most didn't is that they're so alienated from the political process of this country, especially on a national level, that when it gets into things like Democratic conventions and things that relate to Washington—the politics of Washington—that it's just not in their sphere of reference. That's part of the white world right off—and that's ours—and they're more interested in local issues and local control and control over their lives and the destiny of their lives as it applies to their local community.

Interviewer: You mentioned earlier that this thing *was* supported by certain black groups and I wondered who you were referring to?

Hoffman: Well, like I said, in the contact that I mostly had with blacks in Chicago, their attitude was that Lincoln Park is not in the black area, that's in a white area and you're white and that's your business, we don't care what you do. If it's gonna help us, more power to you. And that was their attitude.

Interviewer: Did they express any attitude at all about the march to the amphitheater?

Hoffman: No. No. That never came up . . . it was my idea that on Thursday we should have a rally in the black community on the South Side—that we would say that's the only place we felt safe in Chicago—and I attempted to get in touch with black groups, but it never came about.

Interviewer: Getting in touch with them never came about? Or the rally?

Hoffman: Yeah, the rally.

Interviewer: Getting back to the blacks—have we talked thoroughly?

Hoffman: There were blacks involved, there were blacks. I wouldn't call them Blackstone Rangers, I would, say, call them Yippies if I would call them anything. They're not mutually exclusive.

Interviewer: Have we exhausted pretty well what information you can give about your contacts with the blacks and what your ideas are concerning their plans?

Hoffman: If I think of anything else, I'll send you a letter.

Interviewer: Now I want to get back to the chronology. You were saying that you had meetings with various people—Rennie Davis, the black community—who else were you having contacts with?

Hoffman: Well, that's not a town to run after money. I only contacted people we thought would be interested in what we were doing and interested in putting up some money. The way in which it worked out was that eventually—I don't like raising money and I don't like using it as a means of organizing—I would just tell these people that the festival was gonna be as big as it was gonna be and we needed everything and that they should come up to Lincoln Park and look around and figure out what they wanted to see happen and then go out and do it. So I'd just invite them on tours of Lincoln Park and we had maps and things and we'd point out where the stage and the free stores were gonna be, and talk a bit about our philosophy of a free society and what we were doing in contrast to what the Democrats were doing on the other side of town, and that this was going to be the program that was going to save the country.

Interviewer: All right, what happened next?

Hoffman: Let me see, we'll take it to a week before it happened, which was that Sunday. As you remember, we had these music festivals scheduled every Sunday to sort of loosen up the vibrations and get people used to the fact that we . . . that there were long hairs assembling in this area and that there was music.

Interviewer: What was the purpose of these small, weekly festivals and parties?

Hoffman: Well, they had two purposes. The first was to get the local residents around Lincoln Park and the particular people that used the park used to the fact—used to long-haired people. There was no use in having a festival there . . . well, one of our great fears, and right up till the fact, this was what most of the training was about—we feared that we were going to be attacked by white groups, the lower-class white groups from Cicero and from other kinds of working-class communities. So a good deal of the training in Lincoln Park, the self-defense training and formation of groups to protect the park, was designed to protect us against these kinds of invading groups and . . . actually there were two minor incidents on Sunday night of groups

coming into the park, but after that, after the police made their charge, and after it became clear that the police were so much against us, we never had problems from any of the citizens of Chicago. Anybody who came to the park who wasn't dressed in blue, or without a helmet and club in his hand, joined us. Anyway that Sunday we had a rally. There might have been two thousand people there and we talked about people coming in and the local Chicago people had to take initiative and how we needed posters and banners and people had to get into bringing medical supplies, and that it could be a very hectic bad scene and they ought to be prepared for that. And that negotiations were going on with the city, the permit request was still in and we were developing a lawsuit, to sue the city and that sort of stuff and that we had no word on this yet. Actually later we withdrew the suit. After we found out what happened with the Mobe, we felt that they [the courts] were into a policy of nailing people that signed the lawsuit, as conspirators, saying that they had urged people to come and sleep in the park or march when they didn't have a permit. And also we felt it fell in line with our political stance, that the judicial system was as corrupt as the political system in this country. So when it came our turn to apply our lawsuit, we just stood up in court and said we'd withdraw—we had as little faith in the judicial system as we did in the political. Besides we made a statement about Judge Lynch being Mayor Daley's ex-law partner, so we didn't feel it was gonna serve any purpose for us to attempt to sue the city.

Interviewer: Why did you wait so long to take legal action? Why did you wait until the eleventh hour?

Hoffman: To begin to file this lawsuit? Well, because if we had filed it previously, the city would just turn around and say, "Well, it's being processed. Permit application's being processed"—how could you sue them for something that they hadn't done? But when you've got four or five days before the convention and you still do not have a permit, then you have a case for them giving us one. We didn't have a case three months before the fact.

Interviewer: Why did you seek out a young hippie-type lawyer instead of a very—

Hoffman: None of the others would handle it.

Interviewer: A skilled constitutional lawyer?

Hoffman: They would not handle it. They were not interested. It was very— Look, Chicago's a very close city, and they didn't want to buck the administration.

Interviewer: Did you make any attempts to get other lawyers?

Hoffman: Yes, we made a number of attempts to talk to lawyers and we talked to some. The Mob had a better legal staff setup than we did and we talked to them and their lawyers and again it was told to us that there were very few lawyers in Chicago who would be willing to even get involved in this, never mind for nothing—don't forget, we don't pay anybody.

Interviewer: All right, have we skipped anything that's significant in the chronological development between the time you filed the lawsuit and the weekend before the convention?

Hoffman: No, just that the rapid influx of people, and once that Sunday rally started a week before, it was that . . . yeah, two major things went on that week that ought to be discussed. One was that people started filtering into Chicago wanting to work on the whole project, coming early for the whole thing. Our chief concern was to find housing for these people, to discourage people from sleeping in Lincoln Park during that first week because our feeling was that, say, three or four nights before the convention there would be a massive roundup of everybody sleeping in the park and arrests, just to scare other people around the country from coming—you know, frighten them off. So we would patrol around the park around eleven o'clock and tell people not to stay there, but of course we were working both ends because we would send parties of ten, fifteen kids deliberately into the park to sleep, and they would be allowed to sleep. And the police were very friendly, very cooperative up to that point and during that whole week. I would say before Sunday, *the police were overfriendly*. I remember one night we were having a meeting with some bikers and some people who were supposed to have money to give us—we were just sitting around talking in Lincoln Park and some of us were on the roadway and the police came by and said, "Would you mind getting off the roadway

and sitting up on the grass," and "Well, you're the Yippies, welcome"—and that very friendly kind of attitude.

Then the training classes started, of course, on that Tuesday and it was off and running as far as that goes.

Interviewer: What was the purpose of the training classes?

Hoffman: The training classes were to prepare—I don't know exactly what you'd call it, I don't like the name marshals—but to prepare people to defend themselves and to encourage their sense of community and unity and solidarity. There were classes in snake-dancing—we felt that we were boxed-in, in Lincoln Park, and totally surrounded, then we would have to bust out. There were classes on how to defend yourself if you were hit and what to do if you were tear-gassed or Maced or . . . instruction along that line. And I'd say most of it was just another form of theater, to give the Army Intelligence, the CIA, the Secret Service of Chicago, the Red Squad, FBI, who knows who else, a chance to come in and take pictures and waste a lot of film and arrest a few . . . you know, the Chicago Red Squad would arrest the Army Intelligence and all that, and this stuff would go on and we giggled. There was an attempt to—all those things that went on beforehand, the training classes and music festivals that went on on Sundays—were *an attempt to test the limits of what we could do*. In this situation we had absolutely no idea what the City of Chicago was gonna do, so the only way we could find out was to go ahead and do something and then find out what they were gonna do.

Interviewer: Prior to Sunday, were there any statements that you made that could possibly have been misinterpreted by the police authorities?

Hoffman: I frankly don't even recall talking to the press during that week immediately preceding the convention. I don't recall talking to the press at all. There were no formal announcements to the press. If it was, it was a reporter who just sort of came up in the park and said, "What are ya gonna do tomorrow?" And you'd say, "You know." And he'd say, "Do you expect violence?" And I'd say, "I'm in America, I always expect violence."

Interviewer: Do you know of anyone that participated in activities in one way or another in Chicago during con-

vention week who espouses the violent overthrow of the government?

Hoffman: Me.

Interviewer: Anyone else?

Hoffman: I don't care about anybody else. I espoused the overthrow by any means necessary. I'd like to see it be done with bubble gum, but I'm having some doubts.

Interviewer: Anyone else?

Hoffman: Yes. Lester Maddox. He was in town and making some pretty violent statements.

Interviewer: Would you say that a significant group of the people who participated in demonstrations during convention week felt this way?

Hoffman: I think what characterized the people that came to Chicago was their intense frustration about the state of the country. They recognized that the present system is totally inoperable, totally irrelevant to the needs of the people in the country, that its foreign policy is fantastically brutal and inhumane and that they want to see a better life and that they want to see a better kind of society and that they also recognize that we live in the most advanced, the richest country in the world—in the history of the world—and we have the capabilities and the technology for relieving a great deal of human suffering in the world and we don't use these technologies, and that makes us pissed. You see, it is not only the attitude that we're living under a state of repression but also the fact that we have a vision that *could* be achieved, that could realistically be achieved and that there are blundering old menopausal dinosaurs who control the power in this country, and are not allowing that. And I think that's what characterized the young people who came to Chicago. I mean, we have, for example, marihuana, which a lot of the people are into—I'd say the majority of the young people that came to Chicago—you have people smoking a flower that people have been using for two thousand years and you can do life imprisonment in some states in this country for that. I don't believe in what's generally called confrontation politics. I believe in politics of being, the politics of ecstasy. Look, somebody told me there were 2,700,000 laws in this country, counting federal, state, and local statutes. How are you gonna figure out what's legal

and what's illegal? It would take years, and besides, it's not done that way, it's only done in terms of power, and our legal system is only there to have people in power to keep their power. I was arrested outside of HUAC with a shirt that looked like an American flag, right? Three days later I watch TV and I see Phyllis Diller in a miniskirt made out of the American flag; now I'm a lot prettier than Phyllis Diller, right—why isn't she arrested? Why isn't every drum majorette in the country arrested? They're criminals, those drum majorettes, and those guys that pose as Uncle Sam walking around the country—they're criminals. I am being held on that charge, you see, and I'm under bail and I've spent the night in jail and I have to go back to trial November 20. Now I've constantly been faced with this. I was arrested in a Southern town for going through a red light, but there was no red light in the town. I was arrested at Columbia and at the time the policeman *said* they arrested me, I was on a radio station forty blocks away. I have tapes to prove it; I mean, I told you I had twenty-three arrests and no convictions.

Interviewer: Are there any specific things that may not have been publicized, that may be within your special knowledge or information about events that took place during convention week in Chicago?

Hoffman: Well, it was just the \$10,000 loan that we got from Spiro Agnew—that didn't receive much publicity.

Interviewer: Could you tell us about that?

Hoffman: Well, it was on August 17th; I met with him on 7th street and Avenue B at 4:30 A.M. and he gave us a brown paper bag with \$10,000 worth of small bills.

Interviewer: Well, before we close this, I did want to ask if you, from your place in all this, could give some estimate about how many people came who were responsive to the Yippie thing or responsive to Mobilization—both of them? Where had they come from—what sections of the country?

Hoffman: Well, I would say that those that responded to the Mobilization numbered about ten thousand and those that responded to the Yippies were three or four.

Interviewer: Where did those that responded to Yippie come from—do you have any idea approximately how many came from—

Hoffman: Butte, Montana—those three or four came from Butte, Montana.

Interviewer: How many came from New York?

Hoffman: And a couple dropped out.

Interviewer: How many came from New York?

Hoffman: One, two, three, four, and five.

Interviewer: Are we at the—

Hoffman: The thing that fucks up a movement right off is the thing that the press and the establishment try to do, which is to constantly focus on leaders, create leaders, because if you get leaders, then you get a thing like SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference], which is go and bump off the leader and the whole thing falls apart. We're never gonna—that situation is never gonna arise—partly because the people who are considered leaders don't want to be leaders anyway and partly because nobody else would let them be who was involved in the movement anyway. Everybody feels that they are creative and they have something to offer and they're gonna offer it even if somebody whom they respect tells them not to—they're gonna do it anyway. So everybody's getting to accept that fact more and more and it's becoming a more populist movement rather than a movement from the top down, which is good.

Now it gets to the point where if they isolate some of the leadership and harass them, like, you know, shoot them or something, that would only tend to light the fires more. Either way, I can tell you all this because I feel so strongly that what we're doing is gonna win the future—there's nothing that can stop it. Whether the government comes in with a massive show of repression and wants to use all the concentration camps they got, and all the heavy artillery and weaponry and try to crush us and try to stomp out the underground press and the media, that would only increase the will to fight and the commitment on the part of young people.

POWER TO THE IMAGINATION!

by John Froines

While doing postdoctoral research in England, on a National Institutes of Health fellowship, John Froines signaled his sense of deep belief in the necessary connection between radical activism and the academic community by becoming a founding member and signer of the New Left Manifesto. In this country, he has been a community organizer for poverty programs, a fund raiser for SNCC and CORE, and a member of the steering committee of the New Mobilization. His professional concern with problems of ecological breakdown and the technological society are reflected in his cofounding, along with Dr. Allen Steinbach, of the Radical Science Information Service in 1968. On the eminently professional side of the ledger, he is a member of the American Chemical Society, American Association for the Advancement of Science, The Royal Institution, and Sigma Xi.

A conspirator who is also a "professional"—a physical chemist—I find I confront with a new clarity issues that were already producing a divided man. The division, like the issues, is greatly sharpened by the federal indictments. In the coming months I will have to live in this intellectual schizophrenia unless the two parts of myself can be merged into a tentative, fragile whole; or until I find that I simply must make a choice.

The division imposed by events reflects a division in the audience for these remarks, which will be brief of necessity. Some things must be said to the academic community, especially to those who have social concerns, who would identify themselves as left liberals. Other remarks will be directed to the movement as a whole.

To the academic community I would like to say simply that my moral values and political ideals are in conflict with my vocational and institutional interests. There are a number of "professional" people who feel this way; most of them don't say much about it, I suspect, because the tensions can become almost intolerable. You might say that this dichotomy is an essential feature of American society. Our mouths shape the words: equality, participation, and freedom. Yet we are employed by institutions that are instruments of the ruling elites, designed to perform tasks for the corporations, the government, and the military—the only groups or institutions that can afford to subsidize the expensive business called research in our major universities.

My feelings about scientific research are strong. Since I was an undergraduate I have worked on a series of problems that I set myself. An attachment to research is almost childlike; what keeps one going is the process of innovation and discovery. Working with small groups of gradu-

ate and undergraduate students on the same process increases satisfaction. But I cannot look forward to any degree of control over the use made of my research. We sometimes argue that our scientific research is directed toward humanitarian ends. But it is precisely our lack of control over the uses of our work that prevents this from being true. We must recognize that our scientific research is not directed to serve the people and, for those of us concerned about our relationship to the greater society, our research simply becomes alien to us.

Myths about the universities cling to their walls more closely than ivy. This is true for the academic community in spite of "Who Rules Columbia," in spite of the realization of the kind of life-destroying information the Stanford Research Institute has provided to the government, and in spite of the realization that the new Title V in the California Education Code gives extraordinary powers of control over student activities to the state board of trustees, as evidenced by the struggle at San Francisco State.

These myths can be grouped into a short list: (1) the university is a free and open marketplace of ideas; (2) whatever work is carried on in the universities is subject only to "professional" criteria and is therefore objective and resistant to pressures outside the universities; (3) universities exist primarily to educate the nation's youth; and (4) the universities are the source of humanistic ideals and instigators of social change.

What is labeled "student unrest" and "campus violence" has gone a long way to dispel some of these myths by exposing, in many cases, the true nature of the university. Here I can cite only brief arguments to demonstrate that these myths about the university bear little relation to reality.

(1) The "free and open marketplace of ideas" is only now beginning to include studies relevant for the people of color in the United States. There is a class bias in the knowledge our universities impart just as there are classes in our society—a society of, by, and for middle-class, white Americans. Currently only a very few sociologists probe the class structure of society. University curricula give scant attention to the work of Karl Marx, C. Wright Mills, and T. B. Bottomore. Mills was ostracized in the American university system during his lifetime, and the ideas of

Marx have routinely been excluded from curricula even to the extent of ignoring his historical importance.

The struggle at San Francisco State is a fine example of the class nature of the universities. Until the experimental college was set up, the curriculum for black, Mexican, and Chinese Americans was designed by white middle-class Americans. As the students' voice grew stronger through the experimental college and other student-controlled programs, the class that rules the university—the trustees and state college administrators in California all the way up to Reagan—opposed what was happening. They tried to regain control of the college through Title V, a revision of the California Education Code designed to give college presidents the power to review all student budgets and ensure that all programs were in line with "trustee policy."

Black Panther George Murray, an instructor at San Francisco State, was dealing with "subversive" ideas that undermined the ideology of the dominant elite. He attacked the American system as imperialist in relation to the Third World and toward black people in the United States. His firing led to the strike and to the fifteen demands of the Third World Liberation Front, calling upon the college to consider the class interests of the Third World peoples in all crucial decisions. Thus, the outcome suggests that the only ideas open to students at San Francisco State are those defined by Reagan, Hayakawa, and the state board of trustees.

At Berkeley, staffed with the largest number of Nobel laureates in the world, a similar case occurred when Eldridge Cleaver was refused the opportunity to lecture. The open marketplace turns out to be racist.

(2) A look at the sources of research money and the kind of research they finance dispels the myth of objectivity and resistance to outside pressures. Political scientists in departments across the country who develop and support pluralist theories of government have close relationships with powerful foundations like Rockefeller and Carnegie. Accepting the present social and economic fabric as the basis of analysis, and noting down only "observable" behavior—voting patterns, membership in organizations, and the like—the pluralists have found that no particular group or class has more than its share of political power. But the fact is that six percent of the population owns more

than fifty percent of the wealth, and a small minority dominates the major institutions in the society. Pluralism does not explain this.

Why is it that the behavior of the masses is investigated, but rarely the behavior of the elites—that is, the corporations, banks, and governmental institutions with the major influence in our society? Recent articles in *Ramparts* track down the answers: earlier in the century the foundations, particularly the Rockefellers, were the main agents in creating and promoting social-science research in the universities. This in effect excluded research that would pinpoint these same wealthy men as members of a governing elite. The foundation funds are concentrated in a dozen universities and the faculty in these universities are dominant in their field and professional associations. Through a careful selection of faculty at the major universities the perpetuation of these mainstream ideas is assured.

The relationship of the university departments of natural sciences to the corporations and the government can also be clearly traced. The most obvious are the classified and unclassified research contracts executed by academic researchers for the Department of Defense. In chemistry and physics a high percentage of students expect to work in industry. Science faculties frequently reap substantial benefits from consulting contracts with industrial firms. For many these benefits are overriding; while a thousand gallons of oil leak daily from wells off Santa Barbara, the state has trouble obtaining testimony concerning the effects of the leak from university scientists who fear the loss of industry grants and consulting arrangements. The relationships are very close, and a substantial part of the work of science and engineering departments in major universities is cultivating contacts in industry.

This is not surprising, nor is the relationship, in theory, evil. The argument that a university should exist without these relations makes nonsense, for clearly a university is a "knowledge" factory in any society and must do more than prepare another generation of academics. The problem is with the kind of knowledge the university produces and the nature of the system it serves.

For the scientist who does basic research, as I do, the conflict between my work and my commitment to social revolution seems to have no solution. Even though my

research is of a basic and theoretical nature and seems to have no immediate application of an unpleasant sort, conceptual developments in chemistry, physics, or biology can always turn out to be the missing part of the puzzle posed in the production of a faster fighter plane, a more efficient weapon system, a virulent new bacteria.

It is impossible to get around the fact that only those institutions which have the necessary resources at their command—the corporations and the military—can use the developments of basic scientific research. One cannot conceive of scientific research that can be used by people directly, as one can conceive of a radical or people's sociology or history to counter the dominant trends in those areas.

(3) Does the university exist for the nation's youth? Increasingly, it would seem, the students are deciding that the university is designed not to answer their questions but only to train them for preestablished niches in society. Granted, many students are looking only for career preparation and look neither right nor left as they progress through their required subjects. This in itself is the result of a faulty educational system, which does not provide them with the means during their youth to indulge in more free-wheeling inquiry. Now a minority, disillusioned with what society has in store for them upon graduation, is demanding the chance to open up the university to formerly unpopular or unapproved ideas, to new experimental programs, to disadvantaged youth. The earlier demand for "student power" has been supplanted by a movement which reveals a radical awareness of the class nature of the society. The students are demanding that the university, if it is to serve the society, involve itself in poverty work, social planning, and the ending of militarism on campus. This also implies that the university open itself up to the community. They are not only demanding participation in decisions about the way the university is to be run, but are also raising the more fundamental question of who is to control the university, and for what purpose it should exist. In sum, they are rejecting with frantic, positive activity the implications of a statement by Mario Savio in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement sit-in in 1964: "I beg you to consider: if this is a firm, and if the Board of Regents is the Board of Directors . . . then . . . the faculty are a bunch of employees and we're the raw material."

The university processes its raw material into members of a technical elite, highly specialized but incapable of broad understanding of the society and their place in it. The technicians go off to Dow, Boeing, or Fort Dietrick without questioning the relation of their work to the war machine. They go to corporations where their specialties are used to increase the glut of nonessential goods filling our supermarkets and department stores. They help these same corporations spend millions for advertising to create "needs" for these products.

After four to eight years in the university a graduate counts on being integrated into the corporate structure. He cannot easily conceive of doing another kind of work, one for which he is unprepared; thus he is psychologically dependent on getting *that* job with its material benefits just as the student has depended on getting *that* grade in *that* course.

This conditioning is startlingly evident in the response of a group of academics to a question about the factors they considered important in their professions. They rated, in order of importance, the volume of their publications, the school at which their doctorates were acquired, right connections, ability to get research support . . . and finally, tenth and last, teaching ability.

(4) And what of the myth that the universities are the primary source of humanistic ideals and the forces of social change? In the decade of the sixties it was not the academics or intellectuals who inspired the civil-rights movement, demanded a rigorous examination of poverty in America, or organized widespread opposition to the Vietnam war and U.S. foreign policy in general. (It is true that people who also happen to be academics work actively in peace groups, but this does not mean that they are able to use the university as a vehicle of social change.)

The analysis tying the universities to the war machine, to institutionalized racism, to corporate servitude has been done primarily by students. The development of new programs for the universities has been promoted by students, not by administrators or faculty. The reaction of universities to demands for substantive change has either been tokenism, a grudging movement toward ameliorative programs designed to co-opt campus activism, or violent repression by law-enforcement authorities. The opening up

of the university to Third World peoples has come from student struggle, often in opposition to administrators and faculty, and, in fact, it has only been through struggle of all forms that universities have moved even hesitatingly toward change. Thus, in Berkeley the university administration has acted since 1964 to co-opt student demands, but when the demands become too great, when they concern the disposition of property, the military is called in to restore the People's Park to the Regents. When the domestic Alliance for Progress fails as the overseas alliance has failed, counterinsurgency forces are required to maintain the status quo.

Now that student demands are striking at the question of control and function of the university, it turns out that the so-called liberal faculties are the most repressive. At Harvard a faculty committee expelled the leaders of the anti-ROTC demonstrations; at Cornell, president James Perkins negotiates with the black students and is forced to resign due to faculty pressure. At Columbia, Dartmouth, and the University of Chicago it is the faculty which has called for the harshest punishment for student activists. The elite universities train the elites of the society and when "revolutionary elements" begin to raise questions about that role, the faculty moves quickly to restore the privileged quality of the schools.

The role of direct action in releasing energies for evaluation and change is examined in an article by Staughton Lynd on the students' response to the firing of Mrs. Marlene Dixon from the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago. The occupation of the administration building was seen by faculty members as an "intolerable act of coercion," a substitution for "the way of the mind." However, the students, as a result of their own powerlessness, saw the sit-in not only as a form of petition for redress of grievances but as a method of establishing their own kind of power and raising the question of control of the university. As the president of the student government said: "To think that mere discussion would have been enough to make the campus community examine itself is naïve. Sit-in demonstrations don't cut off discussion. Sit-in demonstrations make real discussion possible." The faculty replied that this is "blackmail." Staughton's own experience demonstrates that when radical professors face discrimination

because of their politics, their only recourse is some kind of direct-action protest. And, as he points out, it is precisely the procedure followed by "other working people when one of their members is fired for union organization, and all walk off the job until the grievance is settled. If the University of Chicago professors consider themselves superior to working men, so much the worse for the professors. If these professors suppose that their power over students and junior faculty is less arbitrary than that of management over workers, they are simply wrong. Until recently their power has been unquestioned and they have mistaken acquiescence for free consent."

The traditional academic approach to the concept of "reason" does not appear to touch our feelings of common humanity. To reason means to think logically. To think logically often means to channel one's thoughts into already prescribed forms, and one's actions into methods that have worked before or have been laid down by the proper authorities. One example will have to suffice: a man from the community describing himself as a "poor person," in alliance with some students, erects several cardboard and tarpaper shacks on the University of Oregon campus in front of the student union. They are unsightly. They are meant to dramatize the fact that the university ignores the poverty that exists within a few miles of the campus. A number of reasonable men (faculty) criticized the presence of the shacks as *unreasonable* and harmful to rational discourse. There are agencies in the community designed to deal with poverty, said the critics, and that is where the grievances should be laid.

But the presence of the shacks generated a debate on how students could become involved in community projects designed to fight poverty, and gain community power, and whether the university itself has any responsibility to confront pressing social and economic problems. The shacks clarified this issue as no written or spoken appeals could have, because the shacks pierced people's defenses to an emotional core where feelings about poverty are buried.

Implicit in this analysis of universities is the belief that the university has some choice or even free will in its relation to the other institutions in society, but the research on universities done over the past few years demonstrates that they are in fact an integral part of the corporate complex.

Therefore, the universities can only be transformed finally with a real transformation in the society. From this the students and young faculty must understand that they are not to be the elements of a revolution and recognize their limitations.

However, it would be ludicrous to abandon the university as a place of struggle for social revolution. We should not attempt to transfer the responsibility for developing the struggle and vision for change to others, such as Third World peoples or the workers. We shall all be part of that change and we only become confused when, through the guilt stemming from the limitations of our movement, we deny our very own worth and existence. Rather we must still continue to make examinations of university priorities, to shape programs which will be relevant to students and nonstudents, to struggle to open up, decentralize, diversify, and expand into new areas on the outside. We must attempt to create the vision of a university and its community which we want to be involved in after a revolution and, as with the People's Park, we should struggle to implement that vision.

Those who feel that the universities are long overdue for reforms but disagree with this analysis are urged to commit themselves to reform, to changes which ultimately will not simply ameliorate but strike at the basis of the issues. My guess is you will end up fighting a larger struggle than you envisioned.

Although I have always worked in universities, I have related to the movement primarily as an activist, not as an intellectual source. That is, my work in New Haven was divided between science and organizing in a community organization and in the antiwar movement. Most debates about the role of radicals on campuses involve radicals in the social sciences or history, men whose professional work can contribute directly to the understanding and ideology of the movement. Some of them, too, want to work more directly with the movement and so attempt to organize while remaining teachers.

One of the avowedly radical faculty groups is the New University Conference, with chapters on a number of campuses. Most of these groups describe their task as organizing a radical faculty constituency and as providing, within the university, a sort of counterculture for profes-

sors emotionally and intellectually sympathetic to the movement. The first task stems from their political beliefs, the second from need. They are more likely to succeed in the second than in the first.

A small radical faculty group, organizing around issues of university reform as well as the wider issues of poverty, racism, and war, may frequently find itself caught between student activism and faculty conservatism. Except for a small percentage of young, new faculty, professors are not a potentially radical constituency. They are loyal to the universities as they are because of the pleasant living and working conditions. In a sense they are the "wrong class" in the university. Their attitudes are sharply polarized, and they are driven to the right by student activism, which seems to them irresponsible and violent. As Staughton Lynd said: "Most faculty think of the university as a free zone; students are beginning to see that it is a battle zone, like the other major institutions in our society." NUC groups tend to flourish where the student movement is weak or non-militant. Where it is strong and active, the NUC, whose strategy has necessarily been different, will in effect be challenged to join with the students. The role of mediator or support group will not differentiate the NUC much from those faculty who quietly mind their own business.

On the other hand, NUC groups, or at least those people who are associated with the national newsletter out of Chicago, because of their radical analysis of universities as institutions run by those who oppose social revolution, do have a realistic appraisal of their chances of professional success. Their chances are slight. And here is the problem: to define your constituency as students and young faculty in a place where you can expect no permanence. There is simply no way around this. Clearly, however, it makes no sense to abandon the teaching role to the uncommitted, the apolitical, the apologists for the status quo.

The New University Conference confronts another important question of constituency. It attempts to provide a politics for those in universities who have, in effect, graduated from the student movement or from community work (primarily in northern ghettos or in the South). These are people who formerly did not model their work after the active leadership and cannot do that now. Their schooling has prepared them for jobs as teachers, lawyers, social workers,

workers in the health professions. By organizing on the job and forming NUC chapters or Movement for a Democratic Society chapters, these people are attempting to commit their adult, working lives to the movement for social change. The groundwork laid by these efforts is very important, if only to prevent the movement from becoming entirely a generational phenomenon. For any one student the campus struggle cannot last longer than four to six years. We are approaching the fifth anniversary of the Berkeley FSM.

Another alternative is to see teaching in higher education as a way to earn a living, but concentrate one's energies in a counterinstitution, like a free school. Free schools are designed to encourage a kind of learning that is impossible within most university programs. History and sociology are taught with a radical class analysis, courses deal more intimately with political practice, courses in the arts have an expressive rather than receptive orientation. Teachers and students who would not normally qualify for university positions can be brought into a free school. When they are seen not as ends in themselves—liberated territory at last—but as providing meaningful experience and training for the movement (for example, through skills building, political education, and outside organizing) or as contributing to the struggle to change the existing educational system, free schools are an exciting possibility for radicals who want to leave the campuses.

A third alternative is to teach in a college or university and work with an independent political movement in the outside community, conducting a host of activities which revolve around the demand for community control of schools, urban renewal, community control of police, health and welfare programs. The American Independent Movement in New Haven, which grew out of Bob Cook's antiwar congressional campaign in 1966, seems to be one of the most viable community groups with some of the members, including Cook, an assistant professor of sociology, connected with Yale University. Their primary allegiance is to the community group. (Bob Cook's university department recognized this, rejected the notion of a sociology of *action*, and decided not to renew his contract.)

Each of these alternatives is informed by a vision of a new society. The strong impulse to create counterinstitu-

tions stems from the depression we all feel about not having decent alternatives, where different parts of our vision can be put into practice. Counterinstitutions also serve—and this is important—as organic blueprints for institutions in the new society we envisage. Blueprints are necessary if we are to go beyond mere criticism. And blueprints begin to emerge from every effort of various sorts of workers—doctors, teachers, auto workers, lawyers, electrical workers—to examine and revise that part of the society they know best. One point should be clear, however; any plans should not be developed by skilled workers alone, since specialization of function reinforces dependency on a technological system. The recipients of medical care, for example, ought to participate in the planning of medical-care programs.

Criticism of and opposition to the present system are so demanding and may temporarily be so frustrating that the emerging blueprint often becomes indistinct and even fades away. We must try to capture it, get it down on paper, and make it a prominent part of our program. We do not know what effect such a series of revolutionary blueprints would have on the neutral and cautious people who are only hesitatingly committed to radical change. Thus far we have provided them with no real alternatives.

My own perspective on working in a university differs somewhat from each of these three alternatives, although I have not reached a final definition of my role. The history of campus activity in the past year is important. At Columbia, Berkeley, and San Francisco State, to name the most prominent examples, the old campus-oriented issues were not raised. That is, the question of student power gave way to the broader issues of racism and community control versus corporate planning. The war in Vietnam becomes an example of the most brutal aspects of an imperialist system in which the universities play an active part. The reaction to the university authorities to the building of the People's Park in Berkeley reveals a bankrupt system that can only respond to a people's movement with military force. The issues which crystallized were corporate capitalism, militarism, even facism. It is no longer enough for Stanford University, for example, to divest itself of its defense interests by separating from the Stanford Research Institute. Rather, control in SRI must be maintained and its function changed. The thrust of the move-

ment must be to make the universities serve the people.

A faculty member need not have a special relationship with the student movement if one realizes that a radical analysis and revolutionary commitment unites all people in the same movement. It is simply a cop-out to vote in faculty meetings to support the People's Park; a radical teacher should be out helping to build the park. A radical teachers' strike at San Francisco State would make the demands of the Third World Liberation Front *their* demands.

If there is any difference between students and faculty in terms of the movement, it is that faculty have more permanence in the community. A radical teacher, therefore, can play an important role in transforming the campus movement into a broader movement embracing the entire community.

This view of things is based in part on my first year's experience teaching in a university, and involves breaking down the traditional barriers—age and education—that largely prevent students and faculty from working on common concerns. My aim is not to attack these barriers in the university community but to redefine my role, recognizing that for me these barriers don't exist. The distinctions of age and academic credentials have little to do with education as we are now beginning to perceive it. (Of course I know more physical chemistry than my students and when I teach I simply impart my experience to them. But academic credentials contribute nothing to the understanding of critical issues of freedom and control of the university community and of society as a whole.)

There are two important aspects of this kind of relationship with students. First, I am not interested in "evaluating the students' performance," which is presently the most crucial thing a teacher does with or for his students. Nor am I interested in having them evaluate my performance. Learning does not arise from a situation where I deliver, they receive; I am the actor, they are the audience. Instead, I am interested in exploring cooperatively areas and methods not presently structured into the process we call higher education. If we must evaluate something, let us evaluate what's happening around us. To these ends, groups of students together with some of us employed by the university have the opportunity to create new programs in areas we want to examine. For example, along with social scientists,

I would like to develop a course examining techniques in our society and the influence of technological growth on the social order. We would be concerned with far more than machine technology. We would examine the role of "technique," meaning a complex of standardized procedures to attain a predetermined result, where efficiency of means becomes more important than the value of the ends. We would explore how the elites rule through a standardized culture administered by technicians—scientists, managers, lawyers, welfare administrators, and the like—who acquiesce in the "logic and order" of the technological society.

A course like this might include for the students a period of work in an assembly plant or a large office for firsthand experience in the effects of a standardized, automated system on their lives. A realistic alliance of youth of different social classes might grow from a joint examination of the effects of assembly-line speed-up, for example, on the overall working conditions. Potential scientists should be involved in such a course to counteract their increasing specialization and to promote clearer analysis of the general system of knowledge into which they fit.

To some extent this approach assumes that university departments are open to real initiation and achievement from below—from the students and untenured faculty. It suffices to say that our earlier analysis speaks to that assumption, and, in fact, to the extent that we find we are unable to exercise control over our education, to that extent the universities are not "reformable."

The second assumption is that we do not see ourselves as critical catalysts in the existing student movement. We may be part of the struggle but we don't inspire it. It is the conflict of personal values with societal values and the feeling of powerlessness that inspire students to organize for change. Our role is to participate in the development of a consciousness leading to identification with and commitment to a radical movement, a commitment we ourselves also embrace.

Influencing my relation to the movement is a personal perception of our technology. It is ironic to live in the most advanced, technological society with the greatest wealth, and to find oneself envying the societies and peoples of small, developing, revolutionary countries such as Cuba

and Vietnam. It is an irony that must be appreciated, not ignored, because we cannot deny our technology, or realistically reject it. It is and will remain an integral part of our culture.

In America there is no reason to do without cars, electronic music, radio communication, films, refrigeration, photocopiers, and the like. We do not deny these things: it therefore makes no sense to deny the knowledge that produced them. (Certain products we can and should deny; for they have no place in a humane society.) What we want to do in this country is create both a democracy of the people and a people's technology; we want to separate the knowledge we have from the dehumanized, corporate structure that now controls knowledge and the uses to which it is put.

Just as it took some time for the movement to recognize that it needed to develop its own permanent media, underground papers, news services, newsreel, local radio stations, it will take us some time to understand and appreciate how we can utilize other aspects of our technology. There is already at least one group of computer scientists and technologists that has attempted to make computer techniques available to the movement for social change. Often it seems frivolous to think of such developments when the issues of poverty and oppression, the class nature of the society, are so overwhelming. At the same time I feel that we must keep aware of all developments, including scientific ones, and that we must not isolate certain skills from our movement, however limited their usefulness presently seems. There is a tendency in the left that would have us all be ideologues or organizers on the street and in the factory. The more practical skills like carpentry, plumbing, mechanics, nutrition, and nursing already have a demonstrable use in the communities where we live or work. The same skills could be made available to the poor, the unemployed, and to the people of the street. Let us not talk continually about the class structure of the society in our free universities. Instead, recognizing that structure, let us establish some "free" technical schools.

If we are ever going to create in America a technology of the people, then we are going to need some of the people with special skills on our side; or to say it another way, some of us who are committed to social revolution must be

able to "teach and demonstrate" the principles of physics and chemistry, mechanics, electronics, computer techniques, architecture, and engineering, agriculture, nutrition, and medicine.

With the development of a highly complex, conglomerated, and technological corporate structure it is evident that men at all levels have become further alienated by it. Any individual understands only single parts of the machine and, except for the corporate managers, has little perception of how this immense structure operates. Thus people who have had little sense of power heretofore are further estranged from the process of decision making and control. It becomes crucial for the movement to understand this problem—if we are talking about a new America where the control of its institutions will depend on the will of the people, then it is implicit that the people must have some understanding of society if only in order to believe that their lives can be different in relation to it in the future. More important, the workers (and by that I mean at all levels) must be able to understand the nature of their technology if they are to become master over it rather than being victimized by it.

One way I see of building links between the anti-imperialist movement and young scientists is through a Radical Science Information Service. Largely through the efforts of one person in New York, such a service has begun; now we need to involve more people. Movement people often distrust science, sometimes for the wrong reasons. RSIS aims to replace simple distrust with critical knowledge. A good number of young scientists are truly concerned about the misuse of science and technology, but they don't know what to do. Simply renouncing science doesn't seem to them a possible alternative.

The RSIS urges science students and scientists to scan the literature for items to pass on to the movement news services about air pollution, drugs, medicine, weapons research, nutrition, and so on. These are items of interest to people concerned about progressive, humane scientific research. All of us should begin to think about these issues. Students could then begin to collaborate on more extensive research into the misuse of scientific and technological developments, and perhaps generate their entire scientific career from this research. For example, we are

now being warned of the possibility of an irreversible destruction of the ecological balance. More and more green things are dying, there is less and less oxygen in the air to breathe. It is possible that problems like these can't wait until we have a new social order.

The movement's part is to examine the relationship of politics to science and technology; to point out to young technologists and scientists that a humane science exists only in a humane society; a deformed society necessarily deforms the uses to which its scientific knowledge is put.

Power to the Imagination!

All Power to the People!

**FROM ATLANTIC CITY TO CHICAGO:
THE MAKING OF A "CONSPIRACY"**

by David Dellinger

DAVID DELLINGER has been described as one of the few direct links between the new radicalism of the sixties in America and the small but virile tradition of revolutionary pacifism in America. An ambulance driver for the Quakers during the Spanish Civil War, Dellinger later attended Yale, where, as a result of his academic brilliance, he was awarded a Henry Fellowship to study at Oxford. He was a student at Union Theological Seminary when World War II began, and despite his eligibility for deferment as a seminarian, he served two prison terms for his refusal to register for the draft. A founder, along with the late A. J. Muste, of Liberation, and its editor ever since, Dellinger has been intimately connected with not only the civil-rights movement but has organized practically every major peace demonstration in this country since late 1966. This essay, perhaps the definitive chronicle to date on the growing protest movement in America, will be included in a subsequent hardcover collection of Dellinger's work.

Someone who has enjoyed . . . a reprieve, however brief, from the inhibition on love and trust this society enforces—is never the same again.

—Susan Sontag, *Trip to Hanoi*

Effective power, as Eisenhower once said, belongs to the “military-industrial complex.” The monopoly of decision making and of information lies with the bureaucracies of the leading corporations and of the State. Modern capitalism has thus evolved a system of domination in which people have no democratic control over their political parties, their elected assemblies, or their labor unions; in which “democracy” is but a method of manipulating the atomized masses into accepting decisions they do not share in making, of preventing citizens from organizing themselves, from shaping, expressing, and exerting their will collectively.

—Andre Gorz, *Strategy for Labor*

I

The battle of Chicago was an episode in a continuing war between people who take seriously the ideals on which this country was supposed to have been founded, but never was (equality, justice, solidarity, love) and a government which fears and distrusts any movement which tries to organize itself outside the controls of electoral politics.

For some people, what happened in Chicago began in the South six, eight, or ten years earlier, and the Atlantic City Democratic Convention of 1964 was a way station. At Atlantic City, Hubert Humphrey secured appointment to the Vice-Presidential nomination by helping arrange a disastrous shotgun marriage between the leaders of the civil-rights movement and the Democratic officeholders

and politicians. The preliminary procuring took place a year earlier, under President Kennedy, during preparations for the 1963 Civil Rights March on Washington. At Chicago the scenario was different but the objective of the people who run the country was the same—to get rid of a protest movement which was not beholden to either major party, had more faith in street demonstrations and nonviolent direct action than in lobbying or balloting, and was developing an independent body of experience and counterculture known as “the movement.” As we shall see, the threat of such a movement consists only partly in its disruption of the so-called “orderly society,” a state of surface tranquillity which ensures the perpetuation of the status quo (no matter how unjust). It also consists in the creation of a whole new ethos and attitude among its members, as a result of their experiences in the confrontations, in jails, and in their day-to-day relationships.

Years ago Ignazio Silone wrote of the terror created in the heart of a fascist government when a single opponent dared to scrawl “NO” in the dark of night on a city wall. There are periods in the life of a totalitarian government when any slight hole in the dike of conformity could all too easily lead to a flood, sweeping away the oppressive government. By contrast, capitalist democracy thrives on the existence of writers, speakers, candidates, and parties that say “NO.” Their existence encourages the illusion that there is freedom of choice, though the actual choices are kept within narrow limits by the power of great wealth to dominate the normative institutions of the Free Society—the press, the job market, the allocation of capital resources, the universities, the political parties, the police, and the government.

The Free World allows bitter infighting between rival elites, for political power or financial gain. The conflict between two schools of government—the liberals who would be kind to the people and the right-wingers who would rely on the stick more than the carrot—spills over into the public press and the political campaigns (though often the differences are more in style and rhetoric than in substance). What the present system will not tolerate is the continued functioning and growth of a protest movement which relies not on speeches and articles, not on candidates and legislation, but on direct confrontation either between

the oppressed and their oppressors or between an aroused and disillusioned people and the government. Beyond the problems created by the conflict and pressures of the confrontations is the danger of the human solidarity, the faith in oneself and one's fellows, the sharing of resources and raising of social vision that the protestors develop if they act together over a period of time and become a movement. A society based on cynicism and selfishness, on technology and money, on the kind of power that grows out of the barrel of a gun, cannot tolerate the growth in its midst of such a counterculture.

Whether such a movement should be co-opted or crushed—to be more precise, how far the government should go in trying to co-opt it before deciding to crush it—sometimes becomes a burning issue of partisan politics. But in general there is a bipartisan realization that one way or another it must be eliminated. Capitalism cannot survive unless it succeeds, as Andre Gorz has pointed out, in “preventing [its] citizens from organizing themselves, from shaping, expressing and exerting their will collectively.” They must be kept atomized so that they can be manipulated “into accepting decisions they do not share in making.”

In 1963 Birmingham, Alabama's, police chief and Democratic National Committeeman, Bull Connor, complained of the press coverage when police dogs were shown biting little children during nonviolent civil-rights demonstrations. He said that when northern cities were faced with similar situations they would respond in the same way. Richard Daley fulfilled Bull Connor's prophecy, at the Democratic Convention, but he did so not primarily in his role as mayor of Chicago but rather as agent of the party in power in Washington. He, in turn, complained of the press coverage and said that any other city in which the convention might have taken place would have acted in the same way.

Was there a “police riot” in Chicago, as claimed by the federal government's Walker Commission? Yes, if by that you mean hundreds of policemen charging, gassing, and clubbing demonstrators, bystanders, clergymen, and medics. But it was not a police riot if you mean that what happened was caused by poor police training or by the police acting on their own initiative. Nor if you mean that

they were merely giving vent to the personal antagonisms of police officials or the private politics of Mayor Daley.

To blame either the police or Mayor Daley for the events in Chicago is like blaming the GIs or the Pentagon for the war against Vietnam. Yes, it would be better for the police and the GIs to resign or revolt. Yes, Mayor Daley and the generals in the Pentagon are particularly unlovely representatives of American reality who wield great power harshly. But wars and police assaults do not take place in a vacuum. They reflect the policies, written and unwritten, of the society. As a matter of fact, Chicago demonstrators got but a very small taste of the ugly violence that black people, Vietnamese, and Latin Americans have experienced for years from the same society. "These were our children," gasped *The New York Times'* Tom Wicker in disbelief.

It is true that many Americans (though by no means all) were outraged by the police brutality, as revealed on television. Mayor Daley has become a dirty word in liberal circles, where it is seldom mentioned that he was John F. Kennedy's best friend in the 1960 elections or that he was busy trying to engineer a draft for Edward Kennedy in Chicago at the same time the police were bashing in demonstrators' heads. Few people like to think that "their" city would have accorded the demonstrators the same treatment. But Americans are also outraged when they see pictures of napalm strikes on Vietnamese villages, the torture of prisoners, or the broken bodies of little children, yet the war has continued for years after the first widespread public revulsion, because capitalist democracy has many devices to soothe and distract public indignation. The gap between public concern and government policy is not quickly or easily bridged when government policy is carrying out the long-run objectives of the military-industrial complex.

Mayor Daley was hoist with his own petard in Chicago not because he acted contrary to the wishes and plans of the Democratic administration or the bipartisan forces which finance and dominate both parties, but because feelings against the war, against the continued racist reality (twelve years after the Montgomery bus boycott, three years after Watts), against the rigged conventions and the joyless consumer culture ran so deep that a hard core of

eight to ten thousand demonstrators showed up at Chicago determined to voice their protests and to affirm an alternate type of human relationship, no matter what happened to them. The mayors of some other cities might have brought things off a little better, from the point of view of style and public relations. Just as JFK clearly outclassed LBJ in carrying out the same basic policies. But given the determination of the demonstrators to be seen and heard, the reality would not have been much different wherever the convention might have taken place.

There are times when capitalist democracy can no longer tolerate the repeated presence of large numbers of protestors in the streets, even if they are nonviolent. One of those times is when they both reflect and stimulate widespread public uneasiness and "alienation," and thus they are growing sufficiently in numbers and militancy to raise thoughts of a "clear and present danger" to the status quo. The danger may remain in the future, but if its outlines become clear enough to excite people and to arouse hope, the time has come to divert or destroy the movement. Let the people register, vote, run hopeless candidacies, even elect a symbolic figure or two (who can easily be brought to his senses by the realities of campaign financing and governmental procedure). But *keep them out of the streets!* Especially outside the political conventions that are supposed to fulfill the people's democratic needs and provide them with acceptable channels for the redress of grievances.

With the advent of national television, the nominating conventions have become a weak point in the public facade of democracy. It is here that the deals are made, that naked power comes into play when it proves necessary, that one way or another the candidates who require curbing are either brought under control or dropped. Even the delegates, most of whom are appointed by party bosses and only a handful of whom can be claimed to represent the people, are alternately cajoled and bullied, outmaneuvered and overpowered.

Only a small part of this is portrayed on television, but enough comes through to suggest that the conventions are hardly models of democracy or a genuine reflection of the popular will. They never have been, and for years anyone who has taken the trouble to follow them closely was aware of cynical deals, crude power plays, and minority control.

But today's pictures on TV in twenty or thirty million homes have a potentially more unsettling public impact than generations of news accounts and political analyses. If the public comes to realize emotionally what it now half suspects intellectually—that the candidates are not democratically chosen and enter the campaign indebted to sinister figures like Strom Thurmond, Charles Engelhard, and Richard Daley—then it may conclude that the elections, the very hallmark of democracy, are a fraud and that there is no democracy.

Thus the political establishment is presented with a serious crisis in public relations at convention time. In 1968 the crisis was intensified by the clear contradiction between public will and government policy (Vietnam) and by public concern over a number of volcanic problems (the ghettos, youth alienation, rising inequitable taxation) for which the government had no solution. That is why it felt that on top of everything else it could not tolerate the presence outside the convention of thousands of protesters who voiced extremely popular demands, rejected the convention process, and offered the seductive alternative of a nonelectoral movement in which joy and camaraderie, love and sharing, were intertwined with action in the streets.

In order to understand the forces that came into conflict in Chicago, let us take a brief look at some of their early encounters in the southern-based civil-rights movement and at the Atlantic City convention of 1964. On the one hand, the movement that mounted the Chicago demonstrations grew out of and was profoundly influenced by the civil-rights movement, both by virtue of the direct experience of many of its participants in the earlier movement and because its history forms an important part of the folklore of the New Left. On the other hand, the power structure that resisted and co-opted the civil-rights movement without yielding any major ground is the same power structure that has both resisted and tried to defuse and divert the antiwar movement without abandoning its aggression in Vietnam or yielding any major changes in foreign policy.

History rarely repeats itself in identical ways, so there are certain obvious differences between what happened at Atlantic City and Chicago. It is useful to study the parallels and contrasts in order to probe the reasons for them and

consider what they portend for the future. After a brief interpretation of the decline and fall of the civil-rights movement and the role of the federal government in helping to destroy it (Section II), let us look at some of the changes in the movement that resulted from these defeats and from the war in Vietnam, with a side excursion into President Johnson's attempt to get off the hook in Vietnam by working out a deal with Russia, and the blow that was dealt this plan by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia five days before the convention (Section III). Finally, let us consider the events of Chicago and a few post-Chicago developments (Section IV). In looking at Chicago and comparing it with Atlantic City, I will focus on three major areas in which the similarities and differences of approach (either by the establishment or the movement) are instructive in preparing for the future. They are: (1) the differing role and treatment of antiwar demonstrators; (2) the pressures to get the demonstrators out of the streets and into conventional politics; and (3) the attempts of the federal government to pass itself off as being above partisan politics and interested only in freedom and justice under an impartially administered system of law and order. Throughout the whole essay I am concerned with the complex and unresolved problem of the uses of violence and nonviolence as instruments of social change.

II

One of the first lessons the civil-rights movement learned in the South was that none of the local governments onto whose turf it ventured could be trusted politically. It was not so much that they were biased in favor of our enemies and therefore could not be won over to our side by presentations of the facts or appeals to democratic enlightenment, but rather that they *were* the enemy. Individuals in Birmingham or Atlanta or Washington could have their eyes opened or their consciences quickened, but if so, their new enlightenment came into conflict with the overall context of governmental policy and practice, within which they had either to operate or to resign. To use the example of the war in Vietnam again, individual GIs may have the friendliest attitude toward the Vietnamese or be disillusioned with U.S. foreign policy, but so long as they continue to

operate in Vietnam as loyal members of the U.S. armed forces they are enemies of the Vietnamese liberation movement. The U.S. Army may boast that "Peace is our Profession," and the federal government may endorse racial equality and pass laws that are entitled Civil Rights Acts, but anyone in the front lines of the struggle for peace or racial equality knows better. It came as no surprise to me that the statute under which the government is trying to put us in jail for ten years, for our determined advocacy of peace and racial equality in Chicago, is the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

At the height of the civil-rights movement, Northern supporters often complained that southern officials violated the impartiality of the law or that the police departed from good police practice by lapsing into brutality. Why did they allow the mob to attack demonstrators? Why did the courts convict those who were exercising their democratic rights—and acquit murderers? People on the spot, whose lives and freedom were at stake, quickly learned what black people had known all along: these public officials made up a "mob" of their own. Sometimes they merged with or used the mob in the streets; later on, they increasingly repudiated it, in the interests of less troubled public relations in the era of television and national press coverage. But the judge's robes and the policeman's uniform provided more effective cover for violence than the Klansman's hood. We were safer in the streets than in the courtroom or jail.

Most of the residents of Niggertown did not need to get hit over the head or taken for a ride to experience the violence of society. It came to them in the form of being restricted to menial work at starvation wages and having to live in miserable shacks without electricity, paved roads, street lights, or plumbing. The overt terror of cattle prods, clubs, and prison was mainly a way of ensuring continuation of the daily violence that is built into the economy. Its purpose was preservation of the status quo by preventing black citizens from organizing themselves.

Liberal mythology and government rhetoric aside, the federal government also turned out to be the enemy. It gave some temporary protection to distinguished visitors-for-a-day (the clergymen, union officials, and other concerned liberals who flew down for symbolic national events).

Occasionally it tossed the restless blacks a bone, but the bone was pretty well cleaned of meat, and the purpose was to keep them away from the feast at the table. President Kennedy appointed racist judges, and the FBI worked hand-in-glove with state and local police. It did so not just because it depended on the cooperation of local authorities in its other work, but because that was its politics. After the lengthy demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, in November and December 1961, which were met with mass arrests and brutality, the Justice Department secured indictments not of the guilty authorities but of the leaders of the non-violent Albany movement. In a characteristic pretense at preserving the "impartiality" of government procedures from partisan pressures, Justice indicted them for picketing a grocer who had served on a federal jury.

The federal government was willing to tamper here and there with southern culture in order to avoid gross national and international scandal and in order to stabilize the status quo by updating it ever so slightly. But stabilization, not justice, was the goal. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred discrimination in public accommodations. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 was a voting-rights bill. As everyone knows, Washington is dedicated to the preservation of capitalist democracy, in the South as well as in Vietnam and Venezuela. And capitalist democracy unashamedly divides people into classes: rich and poor, owners and employers, managers and workers, people who select the candidates and people who mark X on the ballot, a minority of decision makers (only a few of them elected, and none of them subject to any but the most remote, periodic controls) and a majority who lack control over their own lives. The government could not openly oppose the slogan "Freedom Now" in the South, any more than it could come out against the ideas of land reform and self-determination for Vietnam and Venezuela. But it was bound to oppose the growth of any movement which took these ideas seriously enough to become a threat to established power relationships and profitable private enterprise. The government saw the similarity between SNCC and the NLF before most of the movement did.

More frightening than the specific demands and program of the movement (which tended to remain minimal and reformist) was the growth of a body of aroused blacks and

supportive whites who began to develop a sense of their own dignity and worth and their own power as a movement. As the southern-based civil-rights movement gathered momentum and self-confidence and began to involve larger and larger sections of the black population while winning increasing sympathy from the general public, Washington reacted to it with the same distrust it felt toward the NLF in Vietnam and the Fidelistas in Latin America. The tactics of suppression had to be different against this internal colony, particularly because the movement was nonviolent and therefore provided few if any credible pretexts for the federal government to crush it militarily, but the objective was the same. If the movement could not be crushed physically, it must be co-opted and contained within the prescribed limits of the existing hierarchical society—representative rather than participatory democracy; lobbying, voting, and court challenges rather than confrontation politics. As Joanne Grant points out in *Black Protest: History, Documents and Analyses*, "Much of the flurry of activity by the federal government was aimed, in the words of President Kennedy, at getting the demonstrators out of the streets and into the courts."

Sections of the movement that resisted domestication and continued to organize grass-roots, militant actions were subject to federal legal measures, such as being drafted or being prosecuted (in the case of the SNCC leadership) and found they were receiving reduced protection against state and local authorities. In addition, they found themselves deprived of funds for court costs and organizing. The convenience (for the capitalists) of capitalist economic realities—given the financial power of the foundations, wealthy private donors, and organizations like the AFL-CIO and the National Council of Churches—is that the process of strangling the unacceptable left can take place informally, without any new laws or unpopular state interventions. The tendency of liberals to look upon the government not as the enemy but as an ambivalent ally, through whom all realistic social change will ultimately take place, makes them particularly susceptible to governmental influence. Thus the present chairman of the National Council of Churches is Arthur Fleming, a former cabinet officer under Eisenhower. An organization that considers such leadership a feather in its cap and hardly notices the price

it pays in reduced vision and militancy will naturally tend to subsidize civil-rights organizations that are playing an "effective" role, as indicated by their access to the White House, rather than organizations—like SNCC—which are on bad terms with the decision makers. This is exactly what happened in 1963 and 1964, the watershed years.

In the spring of 1963 President Kennedy himself, alarmed by the continued strength and independence of the civil-rights movement, arranged for the tractable organizations to get huge grants from the Taconic Foundation and other groups to which both his family and the CIA contributed funds. In return, these organizations concentrated on voter-registration campaigns and abandoned the tactics of across-the-board demands, backed by populations in the street, that had come to the fore in Birmingham. As part of the betrothal arrangement, the Civil Rights Leadership Conference, which had gone to Kennedy to get his assistance for the forthcoming Civil Rights March on Washington, made clear that it would not tolerate sit-ins and the tactics of disruption in Washington. The original idea behind the march had been to bring southern tactics to Washington, in recognition of the fact that organizers in the field had discovered that the federal government was indeed the enemy. By the time the march itself rolled around, not even free speech was permitted. A few hours before the event, John Lewis, chairman of SNCC, was pressured by the march's coordinator, Bayard Rustin, to change his speech, under the threat that if he did not do so, Archbishop Boyle (a Kennedy contribution), Walter Reuther, and other speakers or co-sponsors would drop out. Among other changes, the statement "In good conscience, we cannot support the Administration's civil-rights bill," was altered to say: "True, we support the Administration's civil-rights bill but this bill will not protect young children and old women from police dogs and fire hoses."

For blacks, fulfillment was now to be postponed until that distant day when new voters would elect new officials, and the demands could then be filtered through established procedures and safeguards, including the inevitable indebtedness of the new officials to their financial backers and other establishment allies. For blacks and radical whites, the growth of a self-aware and self-reliant movement, with dynamics of its own beyond the easy control of the govern-

ment, was to be halted by the elimination of street demonstrations and direct confrontations between the oppressed and their oppressors.

In the next twelve months the process of domesticating the movement continued. Bayard Rustin pleaded for the new realism in an influential article entitled "From Protest to Politics" (*Commentary*, February, 1964). Shortly before the Atlantic City nominating convention, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights announced a moratorium on all demonstrations at the convention and during the Presidential campaign. The agreement was signed by, among others, Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, Dorothy Haight, James Farmer, and John Lewis, although Lewis repudiated it the next day. Its purpose was to "prevent a white backlash." As if any dynamic movement for social change will not provoke a reaction, and in cases like the American colonies in 1776 and Cuba today, an exodus of those who cling to their selfish privileges. The answer, of course, is to build a movement strong enough to overcome the reactionaries, while at the same time paying careful attention to building bridges of communication to the ambivalent middle, rather than to become so inoffensive that the reactionaries know that they have nothing to fear. But instead of placing their faith in the movement, the signers were anxious to guarantee the election of Lyndon Baines Johnson, successor to John F. Kennedy as the Negro's best friend, and first President in history to intone "We shall overcome" on national television.

The result of the moratorium was to weaken seriously the more radical wing of the movement, including COFO (that summer's Confederation of Federated Organizations, organizers of the Mississippi Summer) and its ally, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. COFO had been advocating militant demonstrations at Atlantic City, including sit-ins, sit-downs, or whatever tactics from the South could be adapted to the convention. Such actions had the potential of attracting thousands of black and white participants from the heavily populated eastern seaboard, with additional supporters pouring in within a matter of hours in response to dramatic confrontations. Hundreds of college students had already experienced the realities of Mississippi justice and federal complicity at first hand. Further-

more, the brutal murders of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner (together with the discovery of numerous mutilated black bodies in the search for the three missing COFO volunteers) had shocked the country and could have provided the emotional undergirding and moral support for militant actions at Atlantic City. A dramatic confrontation could have electrified the country, revived the sagging civil-rights movement, and materially altered the power relationships between the government and the movement. Instead of dutifully herding a passive electorate into polling booths to cast their vote for the "lesser evils" of Johnson and Humphrey, the movement could have gotten onto an independent course, building its own strength and not relying on unreliable friends in high places.

But at Atlantic City, Hubert Humphrey, Walter Reuther, King, Rustin, Wilkins, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. (Washington attorney for Americans for Democratic Action, who argued the MFDP's case before the credentials committee) pushed the strictly "legal challenge" to the credentials committee, supplemented by a mild public vigil outside, in the manner of petitioners loyally waiting outside for the monarch's decision. And the decision that did come down on the first day of the convention was engineered by Humphrey (working closely with the others named) in order to keep the convention untainted by protest demonstrations. It granted the MFDP two token (at-large) seats at the convention and promised to seat an integrated delegation in 1968. The MFDP rejected the compromise but was itself badly divided and disillusioned, and abandoned further protest. Humphrey was rewarded with the Vice-Presidential nomination.

Atlantic City marked the end of an era. The movement had been turned over by its nonviolent, moderate leadership and prestigious liberal friends to its enemies, the "statesmen" and politicians. Of course some demonstrations did take place, both during the campaign and afterward, but the insurgents had lost the initiative and the movement as a whole suffered an incalculable loss in morale and growing power. It had surrendered its most valuable weapon, the one that had aroused the politicians' fear and interest

in the first place: the energizing and radicalizing dynamics of masses in motion in direct confrontation with their enemies.

Not surprisingly, the resulting disillusionment and frustration in black communities contributed significantly to the eruption of politically unfocused and largely self-defeating explosions in Watts, Newark, Detroit, and other cities. These rebellions were hailed by some white radicals as the beginning of the black man's liberation through armed struggle. But most of the black residents of the cities where riots took place knew better. Joanne Grant sums up the opinion of ordinary black citizens and movement organizers as follows: "The other mode of protest in Negro ghettos—riots—provided a fleeting emotional outlet but little else." (*Black Protest*, Part VI, "The Birth of a Movement.")

It is true that by 1966 most segments of the black movement were disillusioned with nonviolence, because the non-violent expression of the last decade had ended in frustration and failure. The drama of nonviolent confrontation and direct action had been turned into accommodation and compromise at the negotiating table, and self-defeating alliances with the enemy. To make the pill more bitter, King, the last major spokesman for nonviolence, had defended the use of police power to suppress the riots. (Did he think that the police and National Guard were non-violent?)

Thus when blacks rejected the idea of "nonviolence," they also spat out moderation, compromise, and reliance on national leaders who hobnobbed with the mighty but failed to produce adequate results. At the same time, they were rejecting the nonviolent tactic of refusing to defend themselves against violent attack. And there was a logic to these simultaneous rejections. After all, failure to defend oneself and one's friends (except by such devices as coiling up in a ball or interposing one's own body between an attacker and his intended victim) calls for extreme self-discipline and group discipline. For most people such discipline is possible only in a period of upsurge and hope, a period when they can see some direct connection between accepting abuse nonviolently and gaining their objectives.

For that matter, the necessity most people have to see a clear relationship between nonviolent defense and the attainment of urgent political goals is clearly demonstrated

by the failure of the conventional pacifist movement, which includes the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, and the Quakers, to win over—even for a short time—the numbers that adopted nonviolence in India under Gandhi or in the South under SNCC and Martin Luther King. The pacifist movement, partly because of its religious and moralistic preoccupations and partly because it has been a movement ahead of its time (with its early advocacy of racial equality and its pre-nuclear-bomb opposition to all war), offered rewards that tended to be symbolic and religious (moral witness and personal ennoblement) rather than directly political. And very few people are interested in undergoing imprisonment or physical punishment in order to gain symbolic victories.

The southern civil-rights movement thrived on nonviolence so long as its objectives were urgent and peripheral (desegregating buses, restaurants, and other public accommodations) and therefore at least partially attainable. So long as the movement was new and young and filled with naïve expectations that these peripheral advances would cause the walls of Jericho to come tumbling down, it displayed tremendous discipline in facing violence without striking or shooting back. But even during this most optimistic period, armed guards were commonplace in situations where it was hard for people to see any tactical purpose in nonviolence—for instance, at those homes where civil-rights workers congregated or held meetings. King himself had an armed patrol to guard his home during the Montgomery bus boycott, until one night when a guard came within a second or so of shooting a shadowy figure who turned out to be a Western Union boy delivering a telegram. Then King decided that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.

Nonviolent tactics also lost their appeal when the people taking the head-whippings and seeing their ranks thinned by murder came to realize how truly entrenched and institutionalized were the evils they fought. After a period of declining morale and losing battles, after a series of bloody events in which the national leadership either compromised the movement's objectives behind closed doors or else trafficked unsuccessfully with Washington, there were few people who still retained their enthusiasm for absorbing the physical punishment associated with strictly nonviolent de-

fense. (If nonviolence is to make a comeback, as I tend to think that it will, it will be in a new period of rising morale and movement solidarity. It will also be after militants have experienced some of the disadvantages of the recourse to fist-fights and guns. Such disadvantages include the tendency, already evident, of those militants who rely on these methods to turn their fists and guns on one another. Then, too, there's the greater ease with which the police can claim justification for their own violence, when their opponents are armed or violent.)

However, despite the alarms of the establishment and the wish fantasies of romantic white antiracists, whose isolation, impotence, and genuine sense of urgency contributed to their infatuation with black violence, no city where there had been a major riot ever went up a second time. Here and there, shootouts might take place, either in self-defense or in response to unbearable provocation, and perhaps they did provide a kind of fulfillment for some blacks who had reached the breaking point after years of humiliation and brutality. If so, all too often they provided it at the price of death or long years of imprisonment. (Still, what white person has the right or experience to judge the necessity or long-range effects of such acts or to measure the degrees of revenge, warning, or simple heroic assertion of personal dignity involved?) But most serious black revolutionists tried to avoid shootouts, riots, and street fighting, since they were disastrously outarmed. They might use violence in situations where the encounters were brief and clear-cut, such as forcing a barricade or ousting a scab or hostile administrator. They might greatly speed up the process of arming and training themselves for self-defense—psychologically this helped to recapture a sense of their stolen manhood and politically it helped to develop some needed protection against police harassment and abuse in the cities and against night riders and vigilantes in rural areas. But however militant the rhetoric and determined the self-defense forces, the black community remained vastly uncertain about the possibilities of liberating itself through armed struggle. It did not set about the task of seriously preparing itself for armed warfare. Like its counterparts in the white antiwar and anti-imperialist movements, it found it easier to see the limitations of traditional methods and leadership than to develop a consistent, viable alternative.

Undoubtedly some of the leaders were pushed both by community desperation and by their own recognition of the failures of yesterday into an uneasy acceptance of forms of action—violent ones—that they were not fully committed to or prepared to pursue indefinitely. If so, there was a certain ironic parallel with what had happened to Martin Luther King ten years earlier. In Montgomery and elsewhere he allowed himself to be pushed, by the new militancy and his own recognition that something more drastic than sermons and court action was required, into forms of activity that he was never fully at home with.

King once told me that bringing people into the streets was a dangerous act that initially horrified all public officials and most of his liberal supporters. But he added that it was necessary in order to raise the level of public debate and to have any impact on public policy. It was clear that mass confrontations made him pretty nervous. (I confess that they make me nervous, too, but not so much as the evils they attack or the reliance on the slippery electoral method for which they substitute.) Even after his espousal of such a tactic, he remained more at home preaching at mass meetings (whether in churches or at the Lincoln Memorial), leading a march whose limits had been carefully worked out in advance, or personally confronting the White House with his own sense of moral imperatives. It was his SNCC-trained lieutenants and the SNCC regulars who revealed a gift for creative improvisation and non-violent leadership in unpredictable encounters with the white establishment and the police. The more famous King became, the more he relied on static situations and prestigious supporters, curbing his lieutenants and SNCC. He usually called people in from confrontations before they had achieved their maximum impact or developed a full sense of their own power and creativity.

The result was that he tended to use demonstrators as counters to increase his and other leaders' bargaining power with local, state, or federal authorities, rather than to encourage their development and fusion into a continuing, independent, and self-reliant force. Writing in *The New York Times Magazine* in June, 1967, he said: "We must develop, from strength, a situation in which the government finds it wise and prudent to collaborate with us." As it turned out, collaboration between the government and the

movement proved wiser and more prudent for the government than the movement.

When the black community finally rejected this unproductive political collaboration, it was to a great extent rejecting not only the leaders who had presided over it, but an important part of its own past. When King fell into the trap of White House politics, he was acting out one of the persistent fantasies of the black community of that period—that there had to be a benevolent power at some higher level than that of their daily experience, a power who actually believed in the noble sentiments that dignify the country's public utterances. As with the Communists of the thirties, who had deep psychological needs to believe in the transcendent virtue of Moscow, even after the evidence had piled up to the contrary, so running through the black community was a deep need to believe that sooner or later—with the aid of a little prodding and explaining and proper voting—the White House would turn out to be occupied by a President who would lift their burdens and ease their way into the panacea of American democracy. In the 1960 elections, 77.7 percent of the vote in Harlem was for Kennedy. It was eighty percent in the black wards of Chicago, eighty-two percent in Philadelphia.

Since most liberals shared the same illusion, and controlled the only potentially sympathetic press and the only large sources of money that would conceivably be made available to the movement, it is not surprising that the movement ended up half-pushing and half-following King into this trap. For all the movement's heroism in the field, and all the lessons it was gradually learning about the interconnectedness of the power structure and the domination of the federal government by the very forces the movement itself was fighting, it ranks pretty close to a historical necessity that the civil-rights movement had to end by being diverted in this way. Given the moral and political underdevelopment of the country and the power of entrenched privilege, there was no way the movement could change the racist institutions of the country in ten short years or suddenly lift itself—that is, its own consciousness and political sophistication—to a new plateau of power. As a result, much was tragically lost, and some of the unsung heroes drifted away. But they left more than a heritage of failure. They had shattered the complacency and quickened

the consciences of millions of people. They had routed the fears and false formulations of the McCarthy period. They had swept away student apathy and conformism. They had set up a living contrast in values between human relationships derived from commerce, property, race, and fear and those based on love, sharing, dignity, and courage.

Martin Luther King was a man of deep personal integrity and moral courage. If he had been otherwise, he never would have gotten involved in leading a movement for which he was in many ways unsuited temperamentally and unprepared politically. This meant that although his political position was weakened in the black community by *its* growing alienation from nonviolence and reliance on the White House, he continued to be held in respect and viewed with affection by sections of the community that were going through the growing pains of trying to forge a more realistic combination of tactics. It also meant that although he could be trapped temporarily by White House politics, he could not be permanently contained by them. In the long run he could tell a con-man and liar from an honest friend, an aggressor against Vietnam from a man of peace.

During the last year and a half of his life, King began to move, painfully and despite the pressure put upon him by some of his liberal financiers, toward reliance on the power of the people as an independent force more conscientious and trustworthy than the politicians in Washington. He did this first via his active support of the National Mobilization Committee and the Concerned Clergy and Laymen in their demonstrations against the war in Vietnam. Then he went a step further in his visualization and preliminary organization of a Poor People's Campaign. Finally, he interrupted his other activities to go to Memphis to take part in the protests of the striking sanitation workers.

There is no telling what role King might have played in helping reconstitute a more independent, more aggressive, yet nonviolent movement if he had lived. There is no doubt that his disillusionment with the enervating alliance with the White House and the shock of the explosions in Watts and in other cities had caused him to rethink many questions of tactics and strategy, although he remained wedded to nonviolence. During the last months of his life he was responding not only to these events themselves but also to

the changes in mood and consciousness which they had crystallized in the black community. For if the elitist betrayals and subsequent withering away of the civil-rights movement, followed by the crushing defeats at Watts, Newark, and Detroit, had put an end to two early thrusts toward black liberation, paradoxically they had strengthened and sophisticated the sense of urgency and alienation from the white society, from which other thrusts were being prepared. As Joanne Grant observed in 1968:

Today the situation for the majority of Negroes has not changed, except in this all-important aspect: a major aim of the current movement, with all of its changes and floundering and periods of inactivity during which direction and goals seem to have been lost sight of, has been fulfilled. The masses of Negroes have been stirred, there is a widespread will to fight, a new-found ability to organize and a substantial decrease in fear.

Today black-white confrontations are springing up piecemeal around demands for community control of the schools and colleges, community curbing and control of the police and courts, welfare rights, job opportunities, adequate housing and other issues. The government and the liberal wing of the power elite are trying to parry these thrusts by making money available for black capitalism—as earlier they made funds available for voter registration; as even earlier they cultivated house slaves to oversee and control the field slaves. They are continuing their efforts to persuade black people to focus on legislation, courts, candidates, and elections as substitutes for direct confrontations. This time around, however, the black community is backing black candidates but by no means turning the entire struggle over to them. Undoubtedly black capitalists and black mayors will succeed in diverting some of the energies of the black community away from confrontation politics and the dream of liberation for the entire community. But the patience of that community is thinner and its political sophistication far greater than in 1964.

Since 1965 the attitude of black groups toward national antiwar demonstrations has been cautious but friendly.

Those groups and individuals who on occasion have worked, formally and informally, with the shifting antiwar coalitions (the Mobilization Committee, the Conspiracy, and regional coalitions such as New York's Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee) have rather consistently advocated a combination of revolutionary demands and analysis with tactical nonviolence. On the one hand, they have no illusions about the good intentions of the Democratic party or the Nixon Administration or the ability of white, racist capitalism to reform itself at home and abroad. Nor do they have any illusions about the "impartiality" of the police. On the other hand, they have no desire to get involved in losing physical battles on enemy terrain and against superior military force. They have consistently opposed police-baiting, street fighting, and physical assaults on government buildings.

At the Pentagon demonstrations in October, 1967, about half the black participants dropped out at the termination of the activities at the Lincoln Memorial, before the main body of demonstrators headed for the Pentagon. As one of the black leaders expressed it beforehand, "We do not want to be slaughtered playing Indian outside the White Man's fort." Those who did go to the Pentagon avoided the supermilitant charge of the tiny Committee to Aid the NLF, with its barehanded assault on the individual troops assigned to guard the military brain center. Instead they joined the teach-in for the troops, a tactic which they had helped devise in last-minute planning sessions a few hours earlier. It was a technique which anticipated and threw the movement's weight behind the growing opposition to the war within the armed forces. They also took part in the nonviolent resistance to attempts to dislodge the protestors.

At Chicago the black participants played a similar role. Ahead of time they helped formulate and consistently supported the nonviolent, nondisruptive tactics around which the coalition activities were organized. Only the police infiltrators and a handful of romantic adventurers who lacked the realistic experience of the black cadres ever urged anything different. When the police attacked the demonstrators, many blacks provided valuable on-the-spot assistance in the arts of physical survival without surrender.

III

The distance from Atlantic City to Chicago is only 750 miles, and the interval on the calendar between the two nominating conventions was only four years, but the changes that had taken place in the attitudes of the American people were out of all proportion to these statistics. The foreign policy remained the same; the economic and political systems still operated on the same basic principles; but it is doubtful if even the massive Depression of the thirties had produced such a deep-seated alienation of so many people from these governing principles. Criticism of concrete policies (the war, racism, poverty, urban blight, the impacted political processes) had grown from a whisper to a shout, while the most active sections of the movement had gone from criticism of specific evils to condemnation of the entire system of government and values which had produced them. They no longer looked on the war as a mistake, or racial injustice and the continued poverty of thirty million Americans as carry-overs from the past that were in the process of being rectified. More and more they identified these offenses with the drive for selfish power and profits that forms the mainspring of the American system of free enterprise. They argued with increasing passion and logic that the evils could not be eliminated until the system was changed. From being antiwar, virtually the entire movement had become anti-imperialist and was rapidly becoming anticapitalist. From demanding integration into the existing society, black spokesmen were increasingly asking "out," demanding separation or the building of a totally new society, or both. Unless something could be done to reverse the trend, there was no telling what troubles lay ahead for the power elite and the system of capitalist democracy which served as its figleaf.

A prime source of the growing disaffection was the incredible failure of the society to respond to fourteen years of black upsurge and militance with any significant alteration in the pattern of racist institutions and practices. The 1963 and 1964 alliances of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with the civil-rights movement had bought the government a little time. But now they were being used, along with the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, the Peace

Corps, and the Anti-Poverty Program, as proof that even the gaudiest plans and promises were a decoy to camouflage the establishment's lack of desire or ability (it didn't matter which) to solve the problems.

After roughly ten years of civil-rights demonstrations and sacrifices, after four years marked by riots and insurgencies in hundreds of cities and the explosive development of black power; after fourteen years of promises, court decisions, Presidential commissions, foundation grants, church resolutions, and civil-rights legislation, the conditions of black people were if anything worse than before it all began with the Montgomery bus boycott, the student sit-ins, and the Freedom Rides. To quote the devil to prove scripture, Bayard Rustin (who had helped engineer the disastrous political coalition with the Democrats and had drafted the moratorium on demonstrations) wrote in the fall of 1966:

Negroes today are in worse economic shape, live in worse slums, and attend more highly segregated schools than in 1954. [Emphasis in original.] Thus—to recite the appalling and appallingly familiar statistical litany once again—more Negroes are unemployed today than in 1954; the gap between the wages of the Negro worker and the white worker is wider; while the unemployment rate among white youths is decreasing, the rate among Negro youths has increased to 32 percent. . . . Even the one gain which has been registered, a decrease in the unemployment rate among Negro adults, is deceptive. . . . To put all this in the simplest and most concrete terms: the day-to-day lot of the ghetto Negro has not been improved by the various judicial and legislative measures of the past decade. [Commentary, "Black Power and Coalition Politics," September, 1966.]

Not surprisingly, an increasing number of persons who were familiar with this appalling litany were not about to put their faith in convention platforms or in the campaign pledges of anyone who could get the party bosses to nominate him.

A second source of disaffection that threatened the rulers gathered in Chicago was the disillusionment of millions of young people not only with the "failures" of capitalism but

with its "successes." They looked at the fabled material accomplishments and found them stifling. Some of society's technological accomplishments, such as television (but not the programs), computers (but not the uses to which they are put), and air travel, they admired and considered the rightful property of all human beings.* But in general the proliferation of consumer goods for which they were supposed to surrender their initiative, their daily freedoms and their human solidarity, they considered a bore. Those that were not adulterated or schmaltzy were inferior to rock, grass, sex, sleeping on the ground, be-ins, love-ins, the fabulous world of inner consciousness and human relatedness. They dropped out of the plastic society and developed a youth culture of their own.

But the straight world would not let them alone. There were marihuana busts, obscenity arrests, vagrancy busts when hitchhiking, panhandling or just walking down the street, enforced haircuts in the schools and jails, suppressions of the underground press, police and vigilante attacks, and of course the universal intrusion of the draft. For their part, whereas they rejected the values and routines, the customs and clothes, the hypocrisies and regimentations of established society, many of them were not content to leave society alone, either. They marched and rallied against the war, burned money at the stock exchange and draft cards at antiwar demonstrations, put on guerrilla theater at public events, and entertained or rapped at coffee houses set up in army towns by the antiwar movement. They tried to levitate the Pentagon and called a Yippie Festival of Life in Chicago to exorcise the Democrat's Convention of Death. They announced that they would nominate a pig for President, as the only fit companion to the other candidates. As Abbie Hoffman, Yippie product of the idealism and failure

*"While people today simply watch television as a surrogate for the lives they have ceased to live, in the new society they will use it as a means of widening their experience, of mastering the environment and of keeping in touch with the real lives of other people. If television programs were to be put on for their social value and not solely because they induce the maximum hypnosis on the greatest numbers, they would enable us to extend the real democracy to the entire population." (Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism: The Left Wing Alternative.*)

of the civil-rights movement, explained it, "We're dancing on the grave of the dying American Empire."

Originally a largely middle-class phenomenon, one restricted to a minority of college students and college drop-outs, the youth revolt proved contagious. The evils it pilloried were real; the love and freedom and expanded consciousness it offered (but did not always succeed in attaining) appealed to many people of all ages and classes. Like the student antiwar movement, the cultural revolt spread to the sons and daughters of generals, senators, Wall Street financiers, and corporation executives. Between the political rebels and the hippies, and with the considerable amount of cross-fertilization that was taking place between the two, the ruling class was faced with an inheritance crisis. It could no longer count on its own sons and daughters to carry on the family's or the nation's capitalist traditions. The youth revolt moved into the high schools, then into the grade schools, into the armed forces (of all places), and finally began to reach the sons and daughters of the working class. The movement might not be in a position to overpower the establishment, but with the aid of the Yippies it was threatening to undermine its legitimacy by exposing its pretentiousness and fratricidal tendencies to ridicule.

The catalyst that accelerated these changes in mood and attitude was the war against Vietnam. The antiwar movement began as a simple, humanitarian response to the horror of napalm, torture, concentration camps, pellet (fragmentation) bombs, corruption and dictatorship in Saigon, and the official lies that caused the credibility gap. It grew into an awareness which became far more threatening to the continued stability of the status quo. The government's insistence on continuing the war long after it had lost all semblance of political justification or popular support told us something about the absence of democratic decision making in the country, despite the existence of an elaborate facade of democracy. It also suggested how much of a stake someone pretty powerful had in continuing the war. It pinpointed both the power and the contempt for human life of the military-industrial complex, with its secret drives that flow from the profit system and its stranglehold on decision making that results from its private ownership of the accumulated productive capital of society.

The type of lesson we learned can be summed up in the following analysis by Andre Gorz:

The people do not have the choice between two (or several) fundamentally distinct sets of policies or programs [in the present case, whether to continue or stop the aggression against Vietnam]; their choice is only to have one of several sets of politicians apply policies which, except for some marginal differences, are basically the same. How has this situation arisen? It springs from the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of private corporations whose decisions have a national and even an international scope. No government can afford to antagonize Big Business. . . . It must keep Big Business prosperous or the whole nation will suffer from the corporation's ill will, and so will the government's popularity. The prosperity of Big Business depends on constant intervention to keep the profit rates attractive and investment booming. In the guise of bringing corporate interest into line with the general interest, the general interest, conversely, must be brought into line with the interest of Big Business.

This constant mutual adjustment of business and governmental policies explains the strengthening of the power wielded by the State, and the weakening of the influence held by representative assemblies. Such "serious matters" as the military budget, the rate and the taxation of profits, the volume and location of new investments, diplomatic or military intervention abroad, must not be discussed by "irresponsible" delegates of the people, since these might question rather than understand and cooperate with the leading corporations' aims.

Or, making the connection from the opposite direction, Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden wrote in a Mobilization position paper in preparation for the Chicago convention demonstrations:

We can accelerate the breakdown of confidence in the government and military by stressing that the decisions which led to the Vietnam war were rigged in

the same way and by the same people who are rigging the conventions and the elections in 1968.

Ordinarily much of this knowledge of how capitalist democracy actually works is half-recognized but repressed. After all, American capitalism has produced the highest standard of living and the most freedom from governmental control anywhere in the world. Or so we were continually told and half-believed, given the repressive nature of the Soviet regime—which we had been led by capitalists and Communists alike to believe was the only conceivable alternative to what we had. Besides, what can ordinary citizens do to replace the present system with anything better? You can't fight City Hall or General Motors. But, then, in the present instance, in addition to the obvious horrors in both Vietnam and the ghetto that flowed from the monopoly of the military-industrial complex on decision making, plus the outrage people felt at the war's undemocratic prolongation, there was the invigorating factor of the successful David vs. Goliath role of the Vietnamese. Coming on the heels of Cuba's resistance, which had placed a role in stimulating the idealism and faith of the civil-rights movement, Vietnam's heroic and increasingly successful resistance began to give people faith in human beings again. Perhaps man *could* stand up to the monster after all. Perhaps love and decency and human solidarity were not mere romantic indulgences condemned to exist around the edges of society and doomed to be crushed whenever they challenged the awesome power and cynical prerogatives of corporate capitalism.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit writes of the influence of Cuba and Vietnam in creating the psychological climate that made possible the May-June (1968) student revolts in France:

In Vietnam, a small peasant country was withstanding the aggression of the greatest military power on earth. . . . Though there was much to criticize in the National Liberation Front and in the regime of North Vietnam and, for that matter, in Castro's Cuba, the defiant and unshakable resistance of ordinary Vietnamese and Cubans alike had proved that a super-organized and super-armed capitalist society is not invincible. [D. and G. Cohn-Bendit, *op. cit.*]

Susan Sontag writes of the same phenomenon in her *Trip to Hanoi*:

For the anger an American is likely to direct toward the emblems of his country's imperial dominance isn't founded simply upon their inherent repulsiveness, which permits no reaction other than aversion, but rather upon the despairing conviction that American power in its present form and guided by its present purposes is *invincible*. But this may not be, probably isn't, the case. The Vietnamese, for one, don't think so. And their wilder judgments do, by this time, have a claim to be taken seriously. After all, who—except the Vietnamese themselves—would have predicted on February 7, 1965, that this small, poor nation could hold out against the awesome cruelty and thoroughness of American military force? But they have.

For those who still found it difficult to believe that American power would not prove invincible in the end, it was nonetheless hard not to be prodded and inspired by Vietnamese courage and suffering into making at least minimal gestures against the war. If Vietnam's example encouraged the French students to unanticipated levels of commitment and action, its effect had to be at least as great on Americans who felt the direct shame of American responsibility and faced the impact in their own lives of the draft, taxes, casualty lists, and so forth. From 1965 to early 1968 the sharp contrast between the movement's communal élan and the sterile official response carried people step by step into new kinds of individual and social awareness. (Beginning in 1968, or thereabouts, the movement's rhetoric and analyses became more revolutionary, but growing factionalism and a new harshness of spirit began to undermine the movement's actual revolutionizing effect on its participants.)

The revolutionary implications of Vietnam's example suggest another reason why the United States has felt it necessary to continue the war long after it has been discredited in the eyes of decent people everywhere. More important at this point than confirming its virtue—a difficult task in any event—the United States finds it necessary to confirm its power. It must prove its capitalist will. It must

convince the underdeveloped peoples of the world that genuine independence will not be tolerated; that any attempts to build a noncapitalist society will either be crushed or, if that proves impossible, subject to such ghastly reprisals that the attempt is not worthwhile; that the United States will indeed persevere in the punishment ("honor its commitments") long after it has lost all immediate hope of crushing the rebels—as in the economic blockade and other harassments of Cuba, as in the devastating bombing and punitive military sweeps in the unconquerable liberated zones of South Vietnam. The United States can afford to write off its economic losses in Cuba and Vietnam, but it cannot tolerate the political losses. It cannot afford to let the idea get around that freedom is possible or that societies that escape its hegemony will be allowed to flourish.

Clearly some of the same considerations apply domestically. The failure to make any but the paltriest gestures to appease public dissatisfaction, the failure to run even a mildly antiwar, but pro-establishment, candidate in the 1968 elections, the government-sanctioned "police riot" at the convention and the subsequent indictments of demonstration leaders—none of these strategies may be quite as shortsighted as they appear at first. In the divisions within the establishment between the liberals and the hard-liners, the hard-liners won hands down at both Miami and Chicago—and therefore inevitably in the election. As Carl Oglesby has pointed out, Chicago proved that "liberalism has no power in this country. . . . This country, in the current situation, is absolutely impotent before the threat of what Fulbright has lately called 'elective fascism.'" ("Notes on a Decade Ready for the Dustbin," *Liberation*, August–September, 1969.) There is a logic, however gruesome, to the winning position. Not only in the underdeveloped world, but in the United States, people must be taught that in the "real" world there are practical limits to both democracy and decency. Rather than encourage Americans to believe that they can indeed rein in their government when its policies offend their humane and humanitarian impulses, they must be brought back to what Susan Sontag calls "the despairing conviction that American power in its present form and guided by its present purposes is invincible." Given the dangerous psychic changes first generated in the civil-rights movement and lately reappearing in the new

youth culture and in the antiwar resistance, the movement must be shown that any ideas it may have about the possibility of a society based on individual dignity and communal solidarity rather than on property, profit, and power are doomed to disappointment.

Lest this interpretation seem too fanciful, let me quote from Susan Sontag again. In the following two passages, she discusses the impact on her own psyche of a trip she took to Hanoi in May, 1968, and compares it to the feelings engendered in French acquaintances by their experiences in the May-June revolts:

I came back from Hanoi considerably chastened. Life here looks both uglier and more promising. To describe what is promising, it's perhaps imprudent to invoke the promiscuous ideal of revolution. Still it would be a mistake to underestimate the amount of diffuse yearning for radical change pulsing through this society. Increasing numbers of people do realize that we must have a more generous, more humane way of dealing with each other; and great, probably convulsive, social changes are needed to create these psychic changes. To prepare intelligently for radical change requires . . . getting more perspective on the human type that gradually became ascendent in the West from the time of the Reformation to the industrial revolution to modern post-industrial society. Almost everyone would agree that this isn't the only way human beings could have evolved, but very few people in Europe and America really *believe* that there is any other way for a person to be or can *imagine* what they might be like [emphases in original]. . . .

I recognized a limited analogy to my present state in Paris in early July when, talking to acquaintances who had been on the barricades in May, I discovered they don't really accept the failure of their revolution. The reason for their lack of "realism," I think, is that they're still possessed by the new feelings revealed to them during those weeks—those precious weeks in which vast numbers of ordinarily suspicious, cynical urban people, workers and students, behaved with an unprecedented generosity and warmth and spontaneity toward each other. . . . Someone who has enjoyed new

feelings of that kind—a reprieve, however brief, from the inhibitions on love and trust this society enforces—is never the same again. In him, the revolution has just started, and it continues.

Numerous participants in the civil-rights movement and in the less cut-and-dried antiwar demonstrations (such as the August, 1965, Assembly of Unrepresentative People, the activities of the Resistance, the demonstrations at the Pentagon in the fall of 1967 and at the Chicago convention, the Oakland Stop the Draft Week, and the struggle over the People's Park in Berkeley) have reported experiencing something of the same liberating dynamics. It is sometimes difficult for people who have these experiences to hold on to their conviction that they are the key to the building of a new society, given the pressures from both the right and sections of the left to think that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun. But they are what gives hope and distinction to the movement.

Obviously there is a gap between a movement whose revolutionary character is nourished by experiences and feelings of this type and the old FBI—yellow press stereotype of blind partisans on the Soviet side of the Cold War. Vietnam's resistance might be reminiscent of the heroic struggle of the Russian peasants and workers in 1917, as it is of the struggle for independence by the American colonies in 1776. But the realities of Soviet bureaucracy, its Stalinist past and its post-Stalin suppression of our counterparts in Russia and Eastern Europe, have been too well documented for too long for the movement to consider it an ally or to be swayed by its brand of "revolutionary realism."*

Rather it is the controlling sectors of the military-industrial complex who bank their hopes for "peace" on the

* There is a section of the movement (Progressive Labor) that slavishly follows its own oversimplified version of Maoism. And for most of us what is going on in China is much more exciting and attractive than Russia's revisionist state capitalism and bureaucratic sludge, but information about China is scanty and unreliable, the idolatry of Mao repulsive, the history of the American Communist party's subservience to the imperatives of Soviet foreign policy too frightening, and our own firsthand experience too real for most of the movement to subordinate its indigenous quality to China worship.

maturity and reasonableness of the Soviet Union, which will permit the Super Powers to divide up the raw materials and human resources of the world in gigantic "spheres of influence." Of course, there is very little honor among thieves (and not all the thieves in either country are agreed on the desirability of such a division), so tension and conflict persist, particularly in borderline areas and trouble spots like Vietnam and the Middle East, where one or the other of the two countries sees an opportunity to bleed its rival or gain an advantage. But Lyndon Johnson's great hope for getting off the hook in Vietnam was to work out a major settlement with the Russians, whereby in return for American concessions in other areas the Russians would force the Vietnamese to abandon their struggle for self-determination.

This was a difficult initiative to bring off, particularly in view of the Sino-Soviet split, which weakened the Soviet Union's ability to ride herd on the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese, who had been victimized by similar big-power pressures in 1954 into accepting temporary partition of their country, were anything but tractable. As I discovered when I visited Hanoi in 1966 and 1967 (and as most other Western visitors have reported as well), they are almost as wary of their big-power friends as of their enemies. Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister, told me that if either the Soviet Union or China stopped supplying them with arms, they would go back to fighting with sticks and snares—and, of course, the considerable quantities of American arms they get either through capture or the black market. "But we are extremely grateful to our Soviet and Chinese friends for their considerable assistance," he said with a smile, "and we do not think they will stop helping us."

Despite the difficulties in any U.S. attempt to resolve the Vietnam dilemma through an accommodation with the Russians, the attempt had to be made. Military defeat, loss of political prestige, and domestic disintegration were staring the United States in the face. The secret of the attempted deal was not too well kept, and I was made aware of it sometime in July, a month before the Democratic Convention, through contacts at the United Nations and elsewhere. But let me quote Theodore White, cautious traditionalist, trusted friend and confidant of presidents and diplomats:

For weeks before the convention, an unwritten and unpublished script had governed the high diplomacy of America, a script which Lyndon Johnson hoped would end his Presidency with an outburst of doves, a flourish of trumpets, an end to war in Vietnam and peace on earth. All through July and August, American diplomats had been preparing for a summit conference of their President with Premier Kosygin of Russia. . . . By Tuesday, August 20th, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy had finished drafting a secret diplomatic note to be sent to all America's major allies abroad informing them of the approaching summit and its purpose: George Christian, the President's press secretary, was on stand-by to inform the nation . . . for Lyndon Johnson it meant the most dramatically conceivable demonstration of his good will and, if lucky, of his world achievement. From a successful summit in Europe, a quick flight would bring him home as a peacemaker to a cheering convention in Chicago—and then, who could guess what might happen? [*The Making of the President—1968.*]

Unfortunately for President Johnson and Premier Kosygin, a new mood of disaffection and alienation from the stifling cynicism of the super-states, together with the creation of a counterculture of subversive warmth and generosity and spontaneity, were proceeding at a rapid rate not only in France and the United States but in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries as well. Kosygin had his own "Vietnam" to deal with. On August 22 the armies of the Soviet Union and five satellite countries invaded Czechoslovakia.

McCarthy, Humphrey, and Johnson were all caught off balance. McCarthy dismissed the Soviet invasion as a minor episode, hardly constituting "a major world crisis." "The White House staff . . . were quoted as saying that Hubert's been destroyed by the Czechoslovakian thing," according to White. And Johnson was forced to abandon his trip to Moscow—and the grandiloquent plans that went with it. A handful of Old Left ideologues, spending most of their time trying to collar delegates, but also looking in on the demonstrators, were embarrassed and chagrined, yet tried to defend the invasion. But the Mobilization Committee and

most of the demonstrators unhesitatingly condemned the Soviet aggression, comparing it in principle if not in intensity with the American aggression against Vietnam. We organized protests at the Polish Travel Agency, the only office in Chicago that represented one of the invading countries. We called Chicago the Prague of the American Midwest, comparing the presence of the six thousand National Guardsmen, the six thousand army troops, the twelve thousand Chicago police, and the tons of Mace, and other armaments, with the presence of Soviet troops, tanks, and guns in Prague.

We had no doubts that the CIA and numerous other U.S. organizations in the service of imperialism had done their best to stir up trouble in Czechoslovakia, just as Moscow had hailed the American antiwar movement. We also realized that the United States would now try to interpret the growth of an indigenous Czechoslovakian liberation movement as pro-American and pro-capitalist rather than pro-life and pro-man. But we knew that Moscow had no influence on our movement, and we doubted how much influence the United States had in setting the goals or affecting the quality of life experience of the movement in Czechoslovakia or other Soviet-bloc countries. This was not all reasoning by analogy. Movement representatives had exchanged experiences and life views with students and intellectuals of Czechoslovakia in the wine cellars of Prague, Brno, and Bratislava. (I myself had visited Czechoslovakia in 1964, 1967, and 1968.)

No matter how offended the government pretended to be (and of course many individuals actually were) by the Soviet-led invasion, the "realists" undoubtedly recognized—and approved—the facts as we had presented them in drawing a parallel between Soviet intervention to protect its power interests in Czechoslovakia and American intervention in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. In any event, they continued their effort to come to terms with the Soviet Union in order to get a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the interests of the American power elite. The fanfare of the public trip had to be abandoned, but behind-the-scenes negotiations continued throughout September and October. Once again it is useful to quote Theodore White. He writes of a secret meeting in New York, on

October 7, 1968, between a "key Russian diplomat" and "an influential American political figure":

... the Russian made known to the American that Russia had deep problems of its own, both domestically and in foreign affairs with China; despite the rupture of the summer summit by the Czechoslovakian invasion, Russia still sought rapprochement with America. *On the matter of the war in Asia, Russia wanted it to come to an end. Russia, he said, now finally held the upper hand in Hanoi's Communist government over the pro-Chinese Communist elements [emphasis added].* If America stopped the bombing of the North, Russia could guarantee that a positive response from Hanoi would be forthcoming.

Despite the persistent speculation by most American politicians and establishment analysts about the struggle in Hanoi between the pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions, the Vietnamese are in reality, of course, not very importantly either pro-Russian or pro-Chinese. They welcome aid from all their "socialist brothers," stay magnificently aloof from the Sino-Soviet conflict, and have the closest relationship of all with tiny Cuba, a love affair which does them little good materially, but can cause them even less harm. Whatever their heritage of factional conflict from the past (in 1946 internecine warfare was quite virulent and apparently led to the shameful physical liquidation of the leading Trotskyists, though Ho and the Lao Dang party attributed it to bandits), fifteen years of nationalist struggle have made them all supremely pro-Vietnamese. What other sentiments could have enabled them to survive all that time, locked in mortal conflict first with France and then the United States? In the war against the French, the United States paid eighty percent of the French costs, but during most of that period the Vietnamese received no aid from either the Russians or the Chinese.

Not knowing how to deal with honest men (finding it hard even to believe in their existence) and therefore reduced in bafflement to dealing with Russia instead of Vietnam, the United States apparently accepted these misguided assurances from their Russian counterparts as rationale for

instituting the badly needed bombing halt in the North a few days before the election. It just barely failed to turn the tide in favor of the Democrats. Quite properly the Vietnamese continued to insist on complete withdrawal of all American troops and self-determination for Vietnam. Meanwhile, they continued to press their military and political campaign against the occupying American troops and against the "leftover Colonial officers" whom the United States was backing in Saigon. The bombing of the North had been militarily unproductive as well as politically unpopular, so although the United States tried to make political capital out of its claim that the Vietnamese had gone back on the agreement (an agreement which apparently had been made with the Russians but not the Vietnamese) it did not resume the bombing.

Undoubtedly Nixon is now continuing the attempt to solve the war in Vietnam not by listening to the Vietnamese, who insist on complete withdrawal, but by talking with the Russians. It is the only hope the United States can see of ending the war (a military and political necessity) without losing "face."

These last paragraphs carry us well beyond the setting at convention time, but they help underline, retrospectively, the seriousness of the bind in which the power elite found itself as the convention approached. They reveal its characteristic determination to handle the problem through the cynical maneuvers of secret diplomacy and big-power politics, with the Russians, rather than by paying heed to the sentiments and demands of the American people. To carry through with this plan, it desperately needed to have the Administration's foreign policy ratified at a rigged convention in a city purged of all public protest.

The Administration had squeaked through at Atlantic City, four years earlier, when the explosive issue had been civil rights and the movement was relatively inexperienced. But between Atlantic City and Chicago great changes had taken place. The amount of public disaffection and alienation had grown immeasurably. The organized movement was far stronger and had grown in political and tactical sophistication. This time there was a resolute core of protestors who would not go away. And the attempts to deal with them became an international scandal.

IV

Now let us examine three key areas of comparison and contrast between Atlantic City and Chicago.

1. *The differing role and treatment of antiwar demonstrators.* The crisis at the Atlantic City convention was precipitated by a predominantly black movement, interspersed with whites; the crisis in Chicago by an essentially white movement, interspersed with blacks. The burning issue at Atlantic City was racism, although a separate group of about two hundred antiwar demonstrators, organized by the Committee for Nonviolent Action, was present. Many of the antiwar demonstrators periodically joined the MFDP vigil, but even after the debacle of the Atlantic City compromise and the abandonment of the civil-rights protest, few if any of the civil-rights demonstrators joined the antiwar protest. The psychology of the civil-rights movement of the time was to avoid endangering public sympathy by criticizing the war. Not until January 6, 1966, did a major civil-rights organization (SNCC) condemn the war.* If today some sections of the antiwar and black liberation movements seem to go out of their way to alienate public sympathy and offend potential supporters by excoriating everyone who disagrees with them, even on seemingly minor matters, it is worth remembering the heritage of public-relations opportunism they are working off.

* Six months earlier and roughly a year after the Atlantic City convention, movement organizers in McComb, Mississippi, circulated a leaflet giving "five reasons why Negroes should not be in any war fighting for America." This was the first civil-rights protest against the war. It was stimulated by the death in Vietnam of John D. Shaw, twenty-three, of McComb, who had participated in the McComb civil-rights demonstrations in 1961. Three days after the leaflet was printed in the McComb newsletter of the MFDP, Lawrence Guyot, chairman of the MFDP's executive committee, issued a statement saying that it did not represent the position of MFDP, but also saying: "it is very easy to understand why Negro citizens of McComb, themselves the victims of bombings, Klan-inspired terrorism and harassment arrests, should resent the death of a citizen of McComb while fighting in Vietnam for 'freedom' not enjoyed by the Negro community of McComb."

The unifying issue at Chicago was opposition to the war, although signs, speeches, and chants continually called for an end to racism. One reason for the greater focus on Vietnam was that for all its generalized opposition to racism, the white movement had been unsettled by the emergence of black power, midway between the Atlantic City and Chicago conventions. The proposed solution in Vietnam was simple and unifying—to stop the bombing, withdraw the troops, and permit self-determination for the Vietnamese. The specific programs for ending racism were both more complex and divisive; the black community itself was divided over them. Indeed, some of the rhetoric and programs threatened the privileges or challenged the assumptions of many of the antiwar constituents.

In 1964 the tide of public sentiment had not turned yet against the war, so the antiwar demonstrators did not represent a serious threat at the convention. There was no immediate danger of their crystallizing widespread disenchantment with the convention hypocrisies, the candidates, or program. So although matters were a little touchy, the demonstrators were allowed to stand with their placards and chants *in the very shadow of the convention amphitheater*. By 1968, though, the antiwar demonstrators represented millions of people, with a resulting change in the attitude of the authorities that is exactly the reverse of what one would expect in a genuine democracy: the authorities tried to keep the demonstrators out of sight. The attempt could have succeeded only if the protestors had cooperated in their own disappearance. When they refused, the attempt to have them disappear backfired and multiplied their visibility many times over. Demonstrators were forbidden to come within approximately six miles of the convention amphitheater, a ban that was enforced in a manner that turned the stomachs of television viewers all over the country.

The contrast between the treatment of antiwar demonstrators at Atlantic City and Chicago is a perfect example of how the United States tolerates dissent (as a sign of the freedom under which we live) so long as it is ineffectual, but smashes it when it threatens to become popular or powerful.

2. *The attempt to get demonstrators out of the streets, out of genuine resistance activities, and into the McCarthy*

campaign—followed at a later date by the last-minute bombing halt and the attempt to pass off Humphrey as the movement's best friend or lesser evil (whichever of the two would lead the movement to stop its protest activities and vote).

The most obvious parallel between the establishment's approach to the civil-rights movement in the period leading up to and including the 1964 convention and its approach to the antiwar movement in 1968 is presented by the McCarthy campaign. In the earlier period, as we have already noted, much of the flurry of activity by the federal government was aimed, in the words of President Kennedy, at getting the demonstrators out of the streets and into the courts. This was followed by the diversion of movement energies into the voter-registration campaign. Senator McCarthy, with equal candor, announced that the aim of his campaign for the Democratic nomination was to get the antiwar movement out of the streets and into conventional politics. Although some of his supporters hoped to supplement (or even crown) their street or resistance activities by campaigning for McCarthy, McCarthy himself was intent on getting them to give up street demonstrations and resistance altogether. One interesting sidelight, from my own personal experience in the National Mobilization Committee, is how many of his supporters—unable to renounce demonstrations, yet still clinging to the electoral illusion—never quite heard his repeated words along these lines.

In the original announcement of his candidacy, McCarthy said that he "wanted to provide an alternative for those who 'become cynical and make threats of support for third parties or fourth parties or *other irregular political movements.*'" (Quoted from "An Open Letter to McCarthy Supporters," Carl Oglesby in *The Ramparts Wall Poster*; emphasis added.)

In a speech at the University of Denver, McCarthy said: "For years you had dissented from the way and you obtained no tangible results. You got results only when you directed the fire and spirit of your resistance movement into the processes of democratic government." (Quoted in the *Boston Globe*, April 7, 1968.)

Of course one must make allowances for "campaign oratory" and in-group morale building, but it is tempting

to ask what *tangible results* they got. Surely nothing more substantial than primary victories that were soon to be overruled by the party bosses. So undemocratic is the nominating procedure that even if McCarthy had entered and won every primary, this still would not have gotten him enough delegates to secure the nomination. According to Arthur Miller, writing in *The New York Times Magazine* after the convention: "Of 7.5 million Democrats who voted in the primaries, 80 percent preferred McCarthy and/or Robert Kennedy's Vietnam position. The violence in the hall, let alone on the streets, was the result of this mockery of a vast majority who had so little representation. . . ." To get the nomination, McCarthy would have had to bind himself over to the invisible government that has the power to veto any candidate it cannot control. So even if the "results" had been McCarthy's nomination and election, this still would have left open the question of what tangible changes in policy would have followed, once he was in the White House.

One clear contrast between 1964 and 1968 was that in 1968 the attempt to hook and reel in the movement was carried out not by the incumbent or his heir-apparent but by a relative outsider providing bait which could be passed off as antiestablishment. In part this was inevitable—in 1964 Johnson and Humphrey could disclaim responsibility for "southern" racism, whereas in 1968 they could not so easily divest themselves of responsibility for the continued aggression in Vietnam. But the crux of the matter was that the section of the movement which in 1964 was not susceptible to the type of self-deception involved in the moratorium and alliance with the Democrats had grown and matured in the intervening years. It was strengthened not only by its own bitter experience but by the widespread youth revolt against the values and institutions of capitalist culture, and by the emergence of the Black Panthers and the general radicalization of the black community. Perhaps Bobby Kennedy, no outsider, could ultimately have succeeded in seducing large sections of the movement, if he had not been murdered, but even he was finding it difficult, because such a wide gap had opened up between the movement's politics and the most enlightened politics tolerated by the liberal wing of the establishment. The positions taken by both Kennedy and McCarthy in their

TV debate shortly before Kennedy's assassination "turned off" the movement. In addition, Kennedy got a late and unpopular start, due to the fact that his computers, polls, and analysts had underestimated the unprecedented movement of the country leftward.

The heightened crisis and growing public support for the movement had intensified the internal contradictions within the ruling class, widening the rift between those who thought that the best thing was to seduce the movement (the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns; concessions in Vietnam) and those who were itching to crush it. From one point of view, the smart thing to do would have been to undercut the opposition by giving the convention nod to McCarthy (once Bobby Kennedy was gone), just as it would have been smart to withdraw from Vietnam before failure to do so had disillusioned or radicalized millions of Americans. But as in the dying days of every empire, the ingrained prejudices of the ruling elite would not permit such a realistic act. The alternative type of "realism" that they adopted was based on other considerations and included the decision to scrap part of the facade of democracy rather than to encourage movement illusions of relevance to the real world.

It was bad enough that Lyndon was fuming in the wings, worried that the effect of angry demonstrators on the delegates and the public would make it difficult—perhaps impossible—for him to come to Chicago and seize the nomination by acclamation. If worse came to worst, it would be better to try to pull it off with Hubert, especially since the Republicans had nominated Nixon, whom nobody could pretend was against the aggression in Vietnam or opposed to current racist institutions and practices. Those sections of the movement that had any sense would have no alternative but to vote for Johnson or Humphrey, whichever it turned out to be, particularly if the government announced a bombing halt before election day. The rest deserved to be crushed anyway, through a strict application of "law and order" in the courts and in the streets.

So a federal grand jury was convened in Chicago before the convention even opened, in order to prepare indictments of any demonstration leaders who insisted on going through with their plans. The Chicago police and the National Guard had been given their battle plans even ear-

lier. Beginning in January, representatives of the Police Department, Secret Service, Military Intelligence and "other governmental agencies . . . met every two weeks through May, and weekly thereafter until mid-August." (The Walker Report, p.95.)

Given the alienation and militancy of large sections of the movement and the unwillingness of the power elite to go with McCarthy, the objective that had been foisted on the movement in 1964 through the self-imposed moratorium on demonstrations could best be accomplished in 1968 by serving unmistakable notice that from now on militant demonstrations would not be tolerated. Ideally, if the notice were served drastically enough (the "police riot"), it would intensify the splits that already existed within the movement, weaken or destroy the antiwar coalition, and drastically reduce the numbers who would respond to future calls for action. At the very least, a sufficiently tough policy in Chicago would turn the clock back to those happier days before the 1967 Pentagon demonstrations, when militant demonstrations were small, and massive demonstrations docile. If this happened, it might even be possible to tolerate some demonstrations again, as befits a Free Society.

Long before this drastic solution was imposed on the demonstrators, a rather typical symbiotic relationship had been developing between the rival schools of thought within the establishment. They could not come together in their choice of candidates or their programs for Vietnam, but they were agreed that the convention should be freed from the blot of demonstrations. For months Mayor Daley, Sheriff Woods, and other members of the "get-tough" school issued warnings and threats, while Senator McCarthy made clear his conviction that demonstrations were an intrusion on the democratic process and that he expected his followers to stay away.

After the disturbances in the ghetto that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King on April 4, Daley criticized the Chicago police for not being tough enough, and made his famous order that in future disturbances the police should "shoot to kill arsonists and shoot to maim looters." Neither arson nor looting had ever been contemplated by the demonstrators, but the message to expect the worst was unmistakable. Other threats and intimidations followed,

including police harassment of known militants, a raid on a Chicago Yippie meeting on April 25 (at which twenty-one were arrested), savage attacks and mass arrests at a peaceful antiwar parade on April 27, and a raid on a Yippie benefit at Chicago's Electric Theatre, at which thirty more were arrested.

The April 27 antiwar parade had been organized by the Chicago Peace Council and the National Mobilization Committee as part of nationwide April Actions against the war, and was widely considered on both sides as a dry run for convention protests. After six weeks of careful investigation, the impartial Sparling Commission, made up of prestigious citizens,* none of whom had been part of the antiwar movement, condemned "the ostentatious brutality" of the police: "This brutality, of which the Commission has more than adequate proof, was inexcusable. The circumstances of this brutality indicate police ineptitude as well as hostility."

The report concludes:

Yet to place primary blame on the police would, in our view, be inappropriate. The April 27 stage had been prepared by the Mayor's designated officials weeks before. Administrative actions concerning the April 27 parade [and in preparation for August] were designed by city officials to communicate that "these people have no right to demonstrate or express their views. . . ."

On Friday, August 23, two days before the convention and four days before the intended mass demonstrations out-

* The members of the commission were Dr. Edward J. Sparling, president emeritus of Roosevelt College, chairman; Warren Cabon, vice-president of Inland Steel Corporation and member of the Chicago Board of Education; Dr. Edgar H. Chandler, executive director of the Church Federation of Greater Chicago; Earl B. Dickerson, president of the Supreme Life Insurance Company of America and former alderman of the city of Chicago; Monsignor John J. Egan, pastor of Presentation Church; Dr. Joseph P. Evans, professor of neurological surgery at the University of Chicago; Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., University of Chicago Law School; Rev. E. Spencer Parsons, dean of Rockefeller Chapel; and Rabbi Edgar E. Siskin, president of the Chicago Board of Rabbis and North Shore Congregation Israel.

side the amphitheater, Brigadier General Richard T. Dunn, commander of the six thousand Illinois National Guard troops assigned to the convention, translated Daley's earlier statement into a last-minute attempt to keep away potential demonstrators and to intimidate those already on hand. He announced that "his men would 'shoot to kill' . . . if there is no other way of preventing the commission of a forcible felony during the convention. . . . We use .30 caliber ball ammunition. This kind of ammunition is made to kill." (*Chicago Daily News*, August 25.)

Significantly, the Walker Report* fails to quote this statement by General Dunn, although it quotes extensively from the most extreme put-ons by the Yippies, from "unidentified document(s) in police intelligence files," and the wildest imaginings of police informers. After pointing out that such material "could not all be taken seriously," it offers a convenient rationale for the official overkill (denial of permits, stockpiling of Mace, gas, troops, etc.) by declaring: "But since their responsibility takes in the protection of the entire public, they could not take the risk of underestimating any intelligence, however absurd it might seem to a private citizen." (Page 98.)

These repeated threats and acts of intimidation did, of course, have a chilling effect on potential demonstrators. Thousands who had been planning to come stayed away. For example, I recall a phone conversation I had with a father of a family of four, shortly after the Dunn statement. He explained that although his kids were unhappy with the decision, he and his wife had decided that it would be irresponsible to risk the family's safety by coming.

Throughout all the threatening statements and denials of permits, Senator McCarthy had nothing to say about the obvious creation of a police-state atmosphere. But on August 12 he once again urged his followers to stay out of Chi-

* The Walker Report is a typical liberal document, with its troubled conscience over police "excesses," its obvious attempts to probe honestly what was going on in the minds of the demonstrators, but also with its inability to pin responsibility where it belongs or to understand that when suppression is the order of the day, "excesses" are apt to accompany it. (See points 3 and 4, below, on governmental "impartiality" and on "the erroneous tendency to blame oppressive governmental policy on the mistakes or bad politics of individual villains.")

cago during convention week, warning against the possibility of "unintended violence." As the Walker Commission rather delicately puts it, "it was reported that Senator McCarthy had been in contact with Mayor Daley," before issuing the statement. After meeting with Daley, the Report continues, "He urged [his supporters] to conduct rallies in their own communities rather than contribute to tensions in Chicago. In addition, telegrams were sent to each of the many campaign headquarters around the country to reinforce the request. . . . The co-chairman of the Pennsylvania Coalition for an Open Convention, for example, announced that his group would comply with Senator McCarthy's request and that they had cancelled plans to take 2,000 persons to Chicago for the mass rally on August 25." (Page 54.)

Allard Lowenstein took a similar tack, according to the Report: "Allard Lowenstein announced a cancellation of the program [for a massive rally in Chicago on Sunday] after Senator McCarthy's public statement urging his followers to avoid Chicago and after an unsuccessful bid to obtain a permit for the use of Soldier Field." (Page 53.)

The issue was joined. As at Atlantic City, the liberals had yielded to pressure, had canceled planned protests, and were using their influence to keep demonstrators away. But the Mobilization and the Yippies refused to withdraw. The Mobilization announced that to yield to such threats was to allow the creation of a police state by default.

The stakes were now higher, the risks greater. The smaller the number of demonstrators, the easier it would be for the forces ostensibly assigned to "protect" the public to crack down on them. Police provocateurs and infiltrators would be more effective in their attempts to provoke violence. It would be easier for Mayor Daley to argue, as he had all along, that we were "nothing but a small group of troublemakers and terrorists."

But now more than ever it was also important to hold firm. The forces committed to the war in Vietnam and continued control by the military-industrial complex wanted to pretend that the limits of citizenly protest were defined by the electoral process—in which they patently hold a stacked deck. An absence of protestors during the convention would encourage that illusion. It would also imply that the problems were not so deep-seated and

pressing as we knew they were. If in the end we were allowed to protest, we were confident that we would be speaking both for and to millions of troubled Americans. If the government persisted in its efforts to stop us, it would have to bring out into the open, on a sensitive occasion, the brute force on which it always relies, in the ghetto, in Vietnam, wherever people are determined to gain control over their own lives and to live in forms of fraternity that are impossible under capitalism.

3. *The attempts of the federal government to pass itself off as being above partisan conflict and interested only in freedom and justice under an impartially administered system of law and order.* The myth of the government as impartial referee dies slowly. And the more repressive the society becomes, the more useful the actual decision makers find it to keep the myth alive. Today it is reflected in virtually all Presidential messages and other official utterances.

According to the myth, the norm by which all American administrations are judged is their faithfulness in sitting disinterestedly above the battle, regulating the various conflicts of interest in society without favoritism, with sensitivity to everyone's rights, and in the service of the public. Human nature being what it is, and with the tendency of changes in technology and public taste to open up various "loopholes," things get out of balance occasionally. Sometimes there is even corruption in high places. But under the American system of freedom, there are compensatory pressures from other groups—the much-mentioned Free Press, the rival party, periodic elections, and the famous checks and balances between the courts, the legislature, and the executive—to keep deviations from getting out of hand. There may be disagreements about policy, but clearly the basic *function* of the government is to balance out all the factors and make any necessary adjustments in behalf of all the people.

Karl Marx knew better. He referred to the government as "the executive committee of the ruling class." If we bear in mind that few executive committees (and no ruling classes) are monolithic, it's an accurate description of how things are in the United States. It's also worth remembering the role of caucuses (formal and informal, visible and invisible) in bringing pressure on executive committees.

We have already noted the failure of American govern-

ments (both local and federal) to live up to their claimed function of impartiality in their relations with the civil-rights movement. Commenting on the attitude of the French government in the May-June, 1968, insurgency, the Cohn-Bendits sum up its role in words that apply to all capitalist governments: ". . . the government was still trying to present itself as the supreme arbiter of all the various interests in society, while trying to keep private property, and the means of production, in the hands of the bourgeoisie."

At Chicago the threat to the continuation of private property and the means of production in the hands of the bourgeoisie was perhaps not obvious to the casual observer. (The existence of such a threat seems so *far-fetched* in the United States, despite the restiveness of important sections of the population and the increasingly anticapitalist rhetoric of the movement.) But the government was quite correctly aware that such a threat was implicit in popular attempts to divest the government and the power elite of their power to continue the war in Vietnam and the prevailing racial and economic injustice. Stripped of decision-making power, private ownership does not amount to much—merely ponder the supposed ownership of Bell Telephone Company and certain other huge corporations by thousands of small shareholders.

Max Frankel of *The New York Times*, who, let it be said, was appalled by the crudity of police violence in Chicago, writes in his introduction to the Bantam edition of the Walker Report: ". . . for there in Chicago two fundamental rights in conflict had posed an essential question about our current violence: how can we assure both a people's right to dissent and a community's right to protect its citizens and property."

One does not know whether to congratulate him for being so close to the truth or to chastise him for having, in the end, missed the point altogether. To bring his comment into touch with reality, it is necessary to point out that the *community's* right to protect its citizens and property specifically meant the *government's* right to protect its fictitious citizens, the huge corporations, and their private control of public property, a control which brings with it *de facto* domination of political conventions and democratic decision making. Then one can see which of the "rights in conflict" is deserving of support. But I fear that he had some-

thing much more prosaic and less real in mind. Something similar to what the authors of the Walker Report themselves were thinking of when they wrote euphemistically of the government's responsibility for "the protection of the entire public."

At the December, 1968, hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities to probe the Chicago disorders, Congressman Albert Watson (South Carolina) sought at one point to reduce the problem to a question of whether it was not true that the marching of antiwar demonstrators "eight abreast down the sidewalk" would interfere with "the right of people to traverse the streets and sidewalks of Chicago in a normal fashion": "They can't traverse the streets when you are marching eight abreast. What do they do? Do they lose their rights or do they run over you?" But to the best of my knowledge, Chicago has never found it necessary to ban a Chicago Bears football game or to gas, club, and Mace the spectators heading for a World Series baseball game in order to protect the interests of those who are inevitably victimized by the traffic jams that accompany these events.

Still and all, the most ironic example of the government's pretensions of impartiality was its indictment of eight policemen, along with eight demonstrators, under various sections of the civil-rights law. By this act it tried, much too mechanistically, to create the appearance of a tie-game, an interim score which it no doubt hoped would give the impression that the government has no vested reason for suppressing the demonstrators' political rights. Who can suspect the umpire when, after a donnybrook breaks out, he throws an equal number of players on both sides out of the game?

By such creaky contrivances do the country's psychological warriors go about their tasks. No wonder American psychological warfare and pacification techniques have been so unsuccessful in Vietnam. Lest this seem an unwarranted extrapolation from the Justice Department's Chicago follies, when I was in North Vietnam people in some of the villages that I visited told me that sometimes American planes would come with bombs and destruction, and then a few hours later would return, dropping transistor radios and toys for the children, with propaganda leaflets attached telling how much better life was with the Ameri-

cans. One for death and one for life. One for the generals and one for the humanitarians. What could be fairer than that in this most evenly balanced of all democratic societies?

Leave aside the American Civil Liberties Union's complaint that the government indicted eight "leaders" on our side and eight rank-and-file policemen on theirs. Or that the penalties are far severer for our charges than theirs—ten years against one. These are peripheral matters. Our role as leaders was minimal. And the movement will not help build an egalitarian future, with grass-roots initiative and responsibility, unless it cherishes these qualities now, by rotating its leaders and not relying unduly on any of them. The demonstrators knew why they came to Chicago, and it wasn't to play Follow the Leader. If the government thinks it can cut off a few heads and kill the body, it is in for a shock.

Clearly police brutality was not limited to the eight chosen scapegoats. Hundreds of charging policemen, acting in close formations, succumbed collectively, officers and men alike, to the occupational sickness of their trade. Hundreds of them exceeded the public's approved limits for "game," when the authorities decided to turn the streets of Chicago into a hunting preserve. But there is no way the government, in its pretended impartiality, could even consider indicting them all. For if the government is the executive committee of the ruling class, the police are the government's enforcers. It doesn't pay to bite the hand that protects you. Like J. Edgar Hoover, the police remain in some important respects above the law, even when they offend normal proprieties. So the grand jury (which is invariably dominated by the U.S. Attorney's office) didn't even bother to look at the film clips of what had taken place. (This information was revealed privately by a confidential source high in Chicago's official hierarchy.)

Undoubtedly there would be temporary public advantages in following the ACLU's suggestion of indicting the highest Chicago officials, if it could be accomplished politically. But clearly the responsibility for what happened does not stop in Chicago. Nor is the key question whether or not the police could have carried out their assignment with more delicacy and discrimination—for example, clubbing only demonstrators and not newsmen, or only demon-

strators and newsmen and not medics and passersby. The excesses which first engage the consciences of the general public (whether in Chicago, in the South during the civil-rights demonstrations, or in Vietnam) seem at first glance to be the arbitrary acts of individuals or to result from inadequate training or command. But closer examination usually reveals that they are not quite so arbitrary and flow almost inevitably from the general nature of the struggle that is being waged and the official objectives in that struggle. It is important to combat and expose such "excesses," but it is not realistic to try to eradicate them without at the same time exposing the institutional context in which they take place. Otherwise one fights on the level of Ladybird Johnson's campaign to beautify America. Not only does he fight in a minor skirmish, he is bound to lose.

There are two key questions that must be answered before one can understand the central issues that led to the "police riot" in Chicago, issues which remain unresolved and have already led to other police riots in other cities. Firstly, why did the demonstrators have to go to Chicago in the first place, and why did top government officials believe that it was necessary to ban demonstrations and to make an example of those who refused to heed the ban?

Most of what I have already written is an attempt to throw light on these two questions. In the present context, it is enough to point out that the demonstrators did not go to Chicago to protest the policies of its police department or the propensities to violence of individual policemen (though naturally they are concerned with both matters all over the country). It was the policies and practices of the federal government that made it necessary for the demonstrators to go to Chicago. They went because of the war against Vietnam, the continued racist oppression, the subservience to the military-industrial complex. And the federal government could not be the umpire. It was the enemy.

For its part, the government's major concern was not that the demonstrators might cause inconvenience to pedestrians, shout obscenities, burn trash cans in the street, or even smash a window or two. All these improprieties and worse are regular occurrences at conventions of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the AFL-CIO. Every President goes out of his way to solicit and accept invitations to address such conventions.

If the government has any sense at all (and I must admit that sometimes it is hard to believe that it does), it could not possibly have believed that we would try to invade the convention, though that was the pretext on which the city claimed that we must be kept six miles away. Besides our clear-cut decision against such a tactic and our repeated announcements to that effect, the federal government's extensive use of bugging, wire-taps, and spies must have confirmed that we had no such intentions. Certainly they are wasting a lot of the people's money if they did not know. Finally, if there had been any group foolish enough to make the attempt, the government had many times more than enough troops, bayonets, barbed wire, Mace, gas, tanks, helicopters, and guns to frustrate it. Thus, realizing that if it waited for such an attack to take place, it would never happen, the government decided to launch a "search-and-destroy" mission.

The government was not afraid that we might trample on the rights of others. It was afraid that we might encourage others to assert their rights. It was not our potential misdeeds, real or imagined, that put the city and federal authorities uptight. It was our politics. It was our views and our attempts to advance them outside the snares of electoral politics. It was the threat of sit-ins and demonstrations at draft boards, induction centers, offices of corporations engaged in war work—at a time when the convention was pretending to provide an adequate opportunity for the redress of grievances. It was the combination of our political demands and our style as a movement. For all these reasons, we were the enemy.

If any additional proof was required to show the government's lack of impartiality, the government itself supplied it when it indicted Bobby Seale, acting national chairman of the Black Panther party. Everyone on both sides knows that the Panthers were not involved at any stage in the organization or planning of the Chicago protests.

Bobby came to Chicago on the second day of the convention (the fourth day of protests), long after the pattern of police brutality and movement response had been well established. He came at the invitation of the Peace and Freedom party, as a last-minute replacement for Eldridge Cleaver, Peace and Freedom nominee for President. He spoke at a Peace and Freedom party rally at Lincoln Park,

and again the next morning at a second rally they put on in Grant Park, across from the Hilton. Then he went home. I did not see him during the few hours he spent in Chicago and did not have the pleasure of meeting him until after we had been indicted as co-conspirators. Six of his "co-conspirators" had never met him before Chicago, the seventh only casually in a crowd.

Where there is a crime, there is generally a motive. It's not hard to discover two possible motives for the government's decision to indict Bobby—one of them clearly established by the pattern of government behavior, the other more speculative. The conjectural one derives from the government's knowledge that the Black Panthers advocate armed self-defense and sometimes speak emotionally on the need for everyone to get a gun.

I do not want to take anything away from the Panthers' militancy, which has been tested in the line of fire and is heroic. But some of their speeches, which breathe fire and brimstone, are not a literal guide to their program. This is not an unusual political phenomenon, and is one reason the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court make a distinction between speech and acts. To use an extreme example from the other side of the spectrum, when President Kennedy made his famous speech in West Berlin, he sounded as if the United States was about to seize East Germany by force, though his actual policy at the time was to try to cool the Cold War in Europe. When he spoke in Miami shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, he virtually promised the Cuban counterrevolutionaries that the United States would invade Cuba, although from everything we can determine he had just made a deal with Khrushchev which included a commitment not to do so.

By indicting Bobby Seale, the government has put itself in the position of being able to quote, in court, excerpts from his Chicago speeches in which according to reports he called for people to get guns. If it leaves out his long-run purpose of encouraging the development and training of self-defense forces against unlawful police harassments and arrests (and if the press minimizes or ridicules defense attempts to put the speeches in perspective), it may be able to blur the public's image of unarmed demonstrators being brutally attacked by the police.

The government is anxious to set a psychological climate

for the trial, and the battle of public opinion that will surround it, similar to the climate it tried, with some success, to create for the convention hostilities. At that time, it leaked fantastic charges that were never substantiated or borne out by the course of events. One of them was that "An organization was reportedly organized to secure weapons and explosives and to plan a revolution to coincide with the convention." (Walker Report, page 97.) Mayor Daley announced that the city had secret information about plots to assassinate leading political figures. This produced the intended result of lurid headlines and public apprehension. To this day he has never produced a shred of evidence, although it would have been to his political advantage to have done so. Even if there had been such a plot, it would not have implicated the demonstrators or justified the police violence, but a climate of fear tends to make the public less critical of police brutality—and encourages guilty verdicts.

Not speculative at all is the fact that the convention indictment of Seale coincides with a nationwide effort of big-city police and the federal government to smash the Black Panther party. Since the Panthers captured the imagination of large sections of the black community, police have killed or wounded dozens of them in shootouts initiated by the police on thinly veiled pretexts or in one-sided attacks. Little Bobby Hutton was shot with his hands in the air in the attack in which the police wounded Eldridge Cleaver, an attack which was subsequently used as a pretext to accuse Cleaver of parole violation. In all, more than twenty Panthers have been killed in the last three years, most of them by the police.

In a number of cities the police have shot up Panther headquarters, smashing mimeograph machines, typewriters, and files, destroying literature and food for the group's mostly unrecognized free-breakfast program for children. All of these things took place in a raid on the Illinois Panther headquarters in Chicago, on the night of July 30, 1969, shortly after I had been there. When I got news of the raid, I returned and saw the wanton destruction at first hand. The police claimed that they had attacked because someone had shot at them from a window, but four of us from the New Mobilization Committee, who had been meeting with the Panthers, find this unbelievable. The

Panthers were clearly impressed by the fact that the police were in an ugly mood—there had been a raid the previous month, followed by repeated harassments and arrests—and they were determined not to give the police any excuse for further crackdowns. CBS television reported it this way: “The police say the Panthers shot first; the Panthers say the police shot first. Civilian witnesses tend to agree with the Panthers.” (Liberation News Service, August 2.) But whatever the police may claim about how the shootout started, there could be no conceivable excuse for the thoroughness with which the police vandalized the headquarters and its contents. After a similar raid on the Panthers’ San Francisco headquarters, reporters and public officials were scandalized by the destruction.

The cases are too numerous to itemize, but one woman I know in New York had her door broken down, her apartment torn apart, and her small children terrorized—all this at three A.M. In the absence of any incriminating material, she was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon, her bread knife.

One of the government’s techniques is to infiltrate black militant groups, and then to arrest a number of persons for allegedly plotting crimes that have been proposed by the infiltrators. The famous “plot” to blow up the Statue of Liberty is an example of the successful use of this technique. (The public didn’t seem to care who had planned the event, so long as *someone* had.) I predict that this will be the essence of the government’s case against the twenty-one New York Panthers accused of plotting to blow up the Botanical Gardens (someone in the government may have a sense of humor after all), five department stores, railroad yards, and lots more.

Sabotage is a classical technique all over the world of people who have been struggling for their freedom for a few years—let alone three hundred. In this country we have the hallowed precedent of the Boston Tea Party, and as Dr. Spock has pointed out, the injustices imposed on the colonists by the mother country were considerably less than those suffered then and now by black people at the hands of the white society. It would not be surprising if some black liberation forces experimented with some efforts of this general type. If so, the fact that they did should not lead us to side with the police. But the government’s

charges against the Panthers are so sweeping and heavy-handed as to be ludicrous. I was with Bobby Seale in Oakland when he received a phone call from New York telling the details of the charges. His spontaneous reaction was, "Why, that's stupid! Man, we'd be out of our minds to blow up department stores. That's where the people are, and we want to liberate the people."

As nearly as uninformed citizens who are not in on government secrets can ascertain, the purpose of these attacks and wild charges is not simply to destroy the Black Panther party. From the public statements of top officials, one may deduce that an additional purpose is to manufacture an atmosphere in which a drastic general crackdown would seem justified. By discrediting the Panthers and then establishing their conspiratorial ties with the antiwar movement and the Yippies, the government would be able to move significantly in the direction of political suppression of insurgent groups. Apparently it believes that such a move is necessary in order to continue the present unpopular foreign policy (with or without withdrawal from Vietnam) and to keep blacks, students, and other rebels in line.

On the ideological side, there have been a number of trial balloons sent up by the present administration to test the readiness of the country to accept such a repression. (Or were they simply indiscreet revelations of the way some of its leading officials think?) Let me present some samples from a single department, the Justice Department. Attorney General John N. Mitchell has proposed controlling "crime" in the District of Columbia by using federal troops and has urged "preventive detention" of suspected criminals who the government thinks might commit crimes if they were free. He has also proposed making "a distinction between 'demonstrators' and 'activists' and also spoke of distinguishing between them in order to prevent the latter from being granted permits to protest." (These examples from an article by Elizabeth Drew in *The Atlantic*, May, 1969.) "He has significantly loosened the restrictions under which the FBI and other federal law-enforcement agencies may tap wires. Although he denies being arbitrary . . . he has certainly broken new legal ground by bringing to court the argument that the Government can tap the wires of domestic political organizations if it deems their objectives to be

subversive." (*The New York Times Magazine*, August 10, 1969.) Naturally it is the government which decides which organizations are subversive, and courts, whose judges have been appointed by the government, which rule on any protests the victims may make.

Mitchell has said that, "There's a difference between my philosophy and Ramsey Clark's. I think this is an institution for law enforcement, not social improvement." Significantly, *The New York Times* notes that, "It is John Mitchell's observation that he is the Cabinet member to whom President Nixon pays the most heed—a contention that the men closest to the President rather readily confirm."

For his part, Assistant Attorney General Will Willson has this to offer: "I don't believe in permissive law enforcement. . . . Clark's trouble was that he was philosophically concerned with the rights of the individual. Our concern is more an orderly society through law enforcement." (*The New York Times Magazine*.) "As for student unrest, I think if you could get all of them in the penitentiary, you'd stop it. The ringleaders I'm talking about." (*The Atlantic*.)

On student unrest, Mitchell has also made his views clear: "When you get nihilists on campus, the thing to do is to get them into court." (*The New York Times Magazine*.)

Willson has more to say about free speech and public order: "In the area of balancing the right of dissent against public order, my heavy leaning would be on the side of public order. On the question of where does free speech move towards public disturbance, my answer would be 'pretty soon.' . . . I'd call something a riot sooner than maybe other people might. Don't you think that's the attitude generally of this administration?" (*The Atlantic*.)

Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst has called the student dissenter a "modern ideological criminal." In the same statement he affirms that the United States enjoys "the most nearly perfect government which civilization has produced," an observation which must be of great comfort to blacks, GIs dying in Vietnam, and the Vietnamese, as I am sure it will be to the people who are rounded up and put in the detention camps he has proposed: "If people demonstrated in a manner that interfered with the rights of others, they should be rounded up and put in a detention camp."

It was the considered opinion of both the Democratic Administration and the incoming Nixon Administration that the ten thousand demonstrators in Chicago tried to demonstrate in a manner that interfered with the rights of others. We have already noted the confusion of the Walker Commission and *New York Times* veteran Max Frankel on this subject. From such clarity on the right and equivocations on the center, concentration camps will be born.

Almost every day brings other revelations of where the government is heading, though it will require time and public complicity to get all the way there. The prosecutions already under way, combined with these little gems of philosophy from the Justice Department, should be enough to remove any lingering doubts we might have. But in fact most of us still find it hard to realize the fate that is being prepared for us. For one thing, in real life such statements are mixed in with reassurances of the government's devotion to democracy and the people's welfare. It is only a handful of terrorists like the Panthers, nihilists like SDS, dope addicts like the Yippies, subversives like the Mobilization Committee, who have anything to fear. Most Americans are safe—just as most Jews were assured of their safety in Germany in the early years of Hitler (as I learned in 1936 when I spent several months there); just as most Czechs are told that they are safe today. But not that safe for that long, and not safe at all without paying a terrible price in subservience and silence, as their former comrades disappear.

I realize that it will be offensive to most Americans to hear even the slightest comparison between anything that is happening in the United States and anything that happened at any point in Nazi Germany. But, spurred by Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst's remarks about "ideological criminals" and "detention camps," I have already succumbed to hinting at such a comparison, almost against my will and certainly against my better judgment. So let me point out a strange parallel that is surely a simple matter of historical coincidence, but even so is quite fascinating—dare I say foreboding?

On March 20, 1969, the federal government indicted eight of us, including Bobby Seale, for conspiracy to organize a riot. There is no real question that in practice either the federal government sponsored the riot and the

Chicago police carried it out (as we tend to believe) or that the Chicago police carried out a riot on their own (as the government's own Walker Report affirms), and the government is now trying to pin it on us. A few days later the government accused Bobby Seale's organization of conspiring to terrorize the American people by blowing up various public buildings, museums, railroad yards, and so forth.

On February 27, 1933, the Hitler government accused four Communists of having set fire to the German Reichstag (parliament). There is no real question that, in practice, either the German government sponsored the act, which was carried out by the anti-Communist Van Der Lubbe and associates (as most historians believe) or that the fire was set by the anti-Communist Van Der Lubbe and associates on their own and that the German government then tried to pin it on its political opponents, the Communists. On the very next day, the government announced that it had "discovered instructions for the carrying through of a Communist terror. . . . According to these instructions, government buildings, palaces, museums, and essential undertakings were to be set on fire." (Bulletin of the German AP, the German Press Agency, the *Amtliche Preussische Presse Dienst*, February 28, 1933; quoted in *The Reichstag Fire Trial*, John Lane, the Bodley Head, London, 1934.)

According to the U.S. Attorney's office, "bombs and bomb parts, books and plans on how to make bombs and firearms" were found in the roundup of Panthers. According to an interview with Hitler published in New York on August 6, 1933, "Fuses, cotton-waste soaked in petrol and explosives were found ready." (*The Reichstag Fire Trial*.)

Although I am serious when I say that the near exactitude between these two double-barreled attempts to discredit the opposition is coincidental, there are certain general considerations that we ignore at our peril. One is that similar historical conditions produce similar human reactions. The Reichstag Fire Trial and the "discovery" of elaborate plans to set fire to public places took place in the shadowy period of German history when the surrender of Germans to the temptations of fascism had just begun. Hitler and the Nazis, ugly as they were, had not yet consolidated their power and had been constrained by public opinion

to launch only a small part of the terror that, during the course of the next few years, was to become their trademark. It was not clear yet whether the right or the center would triumph—or how far the right would go if it did triumph. That was one of the purposes of the trial and the discovery of the damning evidence—to inflame public opinion against the left and create an atmosphere in which a general crackdown would be tolerated.

In case anyone doubts this, the trial of the four Communists accused of having set fire to the Reichstag ended in acquittal. The "Not Guilty" verdict came after a trial of four months in Leipzig. I only hope that we shall be as successful in Chicago. Even more, I hope that the American people will be more successful in resisting the encroachments of the "orderly society" than the Germans were.

The government's persistence in continuing the war, the terror already visited on the Black Panthers, and the attitudes of the top officials in the government, as revealed in some of their more candid statements, all make it unwise for us to be complacent. The surest way for us to lose the life-or-death struggle now going on is to underestimate either the determination of the military-industrial complex to maintain its system of private power, profit, and decision making or—in Susan Sontag's words—"the amount of diffuse yearning for radical change pulsing through this society"—the yearning to "have a more generous, more humane way of dealing with each other."

THE BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL

by Tom Hayden

THOMAS EMMET HAYDEN is Tom Hayden. He was born in Michigan in 1940, but in some ways it all began in 1962, when he drafted the now-famous "Port Huron Statement," which was to be the founding cry for Students for a Democratic Society. The statement, which is as unequivocal as Hayden is in its demands for social justice in America, has not mellowed, yet has grown sweeter with time: "We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to a world we inherit. . . . We regard men as infinitely precious, possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, love. . . . We see little reason why men cannot meet with increasing skill the complexities and responsibilities of their situation, if society is organized not from minority participation but from majority participation in decision making." This piece is adapted from a speech Hayden made at UCLA in May, 1969.

There's some word about us in a recent *U.S. News & World Report*. The editors have been continually unhappy about the state of things in the nation, about the "degeneration" of the nation's youth, about the collapse of loyalty in the military, about the questioning on the part of students. But now things have taken a turn for the better; things are looking up, according to *U.S. News & World Report*. They find:

Suddenly amidst all the problems, all the uncertainties, you're beginning to see new signs of change. Specifically, on the campuses, rioters are about at the end of their road. The boom is to be lowered on them. They're in for more arrests and expulsions. Public opinion clearly has swung against anarchism. Genuine improvement in education is one thing; terror is another.

Glad to hear them say that. That's what *we've* been saying: genuine education is one thing; terror is another.

Congress has had enough. It's hard to find a good word for the troublemakers in any publication. Authorities are getting the message. Movement is underway from President Nixon on down.

Correct so far, but then comes their conclusion:

So universities should turn quieter soon.

Incorrect. Universities are *not* going to turn quiet!
Now I don't want to repeat what Dave Dellinger has already said about Chicago, but there is one major point that should be made clear about Chicago: that Chicago was a

turning point for the whole country perhaps in a way that the Oakland induction-center demonstrations were a turning point in California the year before. A turning point, at which time the officials decided that it was no longer simply necessary to kill and repress black people, Vietnamese people, but that it was becoming necessary to conduct the same policies of intimidation and terror against students and against young white people. So it's important to see there was a straight line from those Oakland demonstrations to the Chicago demonstrations, a straight line of development in the thinking about repression initiated by the people responsible for managing and pacifying California, a straight line from Oakland to Chicago, where that thinking became national policy.

What happened in Chicago was not irrational, not accidental, not a unilateral freak-out by Mayor Daley, not a "police riot," as certain people would have you believe. Mayor Daley is not the "Bull Connor of the North." The blame for the so-called "excesses" of the police—the blame as so many liberals place it—is put on Mayor Daley's head or on those of individual policemen so as to cover up the larger reality that Dave Dellinger talked about, which is that even Mayor Daley takes orders. Chicago policemen take orders. You know if you watched on television that this was true. If you turned off the sound and did not listen to the propaganda but simply looked at what was happening on the screen, you did not see individual policemen going berserk. Now and then you *might* have—I'm sure that no one gave the order for the individual policeman to throw that girl in the Lincoln Park lagoon at midnight. But on the whole you saw policemen acting in a very rational manner. You saw policemen conducting themselves according to the highest professional standards; you saw policemen moving in an organized way, according to a pattern, so it had to be your conclusion that they were taking orders.

Orders from whom? Orders from Mayor Daley? In one sense, of course, but not really. You don't really believe that the government of the United States, planning to have a convention in Chicago, would leave all the local arrangements to the local mayor. You don't believe the United States government allows its local police chiefs or officials on any political or military battlefield to determine what the national policy is going to be. Mayor Daley, I think, is less important

in the picture than Dave Dellinger might have implied when he described him as a power broker. Power broker he is, but it's the Clark Cliffords, the Cyrus Vances, the Abe Fortases, who were the real power brokers, the people who made the real decisions regarding Chicago. They had to have a plan. These people have not been running the country for the last twenty-five years irrationally, according to the way they feel when they get up in the morning, these people—the institutions and the families they come from—operate according to plans, according to worked-out policies. That's why we say that *they're* the conspiracy, and we mean it in a literal sense.

So what was their conspiracy? Well, on the political level, we can say they checked out Chairman Mao and decided that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. They decided that if that was true for Chairman Mao, maybe it could be true for the counterrevolution also. Counterrevolutionaries always think they can borrow the methods of revolutionaries; counterrevolutionaries think they can decide how to defeat the revolution by reading what revolutionaries say. So we can imagine Clark Clifford up in the Department of Defense scratching his smooth silver hair and reading Mao on political power. And that's how they decided to keep political power—making it grow from the barrel of a gun in Chicago. They said to themselves: "We'll show George Wallace and Richard Nixon and the American people that when it comes to imposing law and order, nobody can one-up the Democratic party."

That's what they said politically, and that's what they carried out. They heard that there were going to be a quarter of a million people in Chicago, a lot of them disenchanting Democrats, and they decided they could not stand for that in an election year. They decided they would have to get rid of everybody, discourage everybody from coming to Chicago who had jobs or who had children, by threatening them with the idea that they would go home widows or widowers or jobless if they came to Chicago for a week—because it was going to be a rough scene. They decided to get rid of these respectable people, who for too long had been providing cover for the hard-core radical militants, and clear the way for an open showdown between the government and the freaks who had become a key political issue in the campaign and who would now give a frustrated country a

lightning rod, give a frustrated country an outlet for its violence, and thereby undermine the "law and order" campaigns of Wallace and Nixon. Wallace was only talking! Hubert Humphrey was doing! George Wallace was only talking about running us over if we lay down in front of his car. Humphrey, Johnson, Clifford, and Fortas saw to it that we would be run over in Chicago if we lay down in front of cars. They had something called "Daley dozers." Counter-insurgency language has come home: in Vietnam they have a machine that shoots thousands of rounds a second which they call "Puff the Magic Dragon," and in Chicago they had this "Daley dozer," a little Jeep with barbed wire attached to the front which could sweep the streets or, if necessary, make a little mobile strategic hamlet or a little mobile concentration camp.

But there's a deeper reason, deeper than the strategy of electoral politics, for what the government did. The Democratic party was defeated in its electoral strategy because we gave Humphrey a karate chop that he did not recover from in time to win the election. That's one of the things we've been indicted for—teaching people karate kicks. A federal offense. What the fools do not know is that the essence of karate is more important than the specifics, and the essence is to get your opponent off balance and let him destroy himself. So we gave them a political karate chop from which they could not recover, even with millions of dollars being kicked in during the last few weeks from frightened liberal businessmen.

So they failed in terms of their election strategy, but where they have succeeded so far is in their overall strategy—which Richard Nixon is now carrying out. A very interesting cartoon I saw recently shows Lyndon Johnson in the hospital, complaining, as he's undergoing an operation, about the way he'd been treated and talking about the way in which the ruling class operates when one of its personalities has been harmed. In this cartoon Johnson's talking about the different ways to deal with the people when the people unmask their emperor and try to get rid of him, and suddenly he takes the sheet off his face at the end of the operation and he has Richard Nixon's face. That's the truth; that's the nature of the system, and it's not simply a straight line between Johnson and Nixon. It's a straight line between Eugene McCarthy and Richard Nixon, between Robert Ken-

nedy and Richard Nixon. Richard Nixon is trying to carry out their programs, too, the programs of both the dovish and the hawkish wings of the establishment. They make verbal concessions to protest while preparing its repression. What's the reason for this? The reason is not hard to find—the reason for the emphasis on law and order, for the emphasis on repression, is because these policies are mandatory, a requirement, for a government, a ruling class, in a time when it does not intend in the least to change its fundamental direction and therefore has to shift public attention away from its goals and toward the question of disorder at home.

What *could* they say? They're so bankrupt they cannot conceivably justify what they're doing any longer, not even to significant numbers of people in this country. What would they say? That we should prolong racism after four hundred years because it suits the white people, because black and brown people have smaller brains? What can they say? They are indicted by their own laws, by their own commission reports calling America a white racist society; they're indicted by their own language and proclamations, because they are committed, supposedly, to dealing with racism, but they have no intention to do so, and cannot explain that to the people. So they have to turn to the methods of the black militants, the revolutionaries, the Black Panthers.

And what can they say about Vietnam? That whatever happens in Southeast Asia, the United States must stay there because it is the white man's burden, because strategically we have to control the resources and the political and economic development of that area, because the United States has a mission to police the world? No! They cannot say these things any longer, they have nothing left to say, so they have to adopt the rhetoric of the peace movement. They talk about peace in Vietnam, about self-determination, about letting the Vietnamese decide for themselves, blah, blah, blah, and then they say that the Vietcong are the chief force preventing such a solution! They even give in to the demands of last year's peace movement—that is, they decided to get rid of the peace moderates in this country by giving in to their demands rhetorically.

What were those demands? To stop the bombing of North Vietnam. Done. Talk with the National Liberation Front. Done. De-escalate the war. Done. Begin to withdraw troops . . . all those things are done or in the works, but

that does not alter the fundamental imperialist strategy of maintaining domination in South Vietnam. All they have done is to look at history and say—as did the Nazis when they got rid of the “good Germans” by scaring them on the one hand and appearing to meet their reasonable demands on the other—we can get rid of the “good Americans,” the “good Germans” of our time, by showing them they’ll be killed if they get out of control and, at the same time, comforting them by pretending to give in to their demands. That’s what they’re doing, and that requires that they turn against the militant peace movement, against the draft resisters, turn against the people who see through this vicious plan in Vietnam.

And on the campuses it’s the same thing. Even Richard Nixon is now for “student power,” educational reform, black studies. *Time* Magazine editorializes for the “right” kind of black studies, Nixon says he’s for student decision-making power! What are they saying? Richard Nixon is the number-one empty-headed conformist of modern times! He could not conceivably be for reform, much less revolution; he would not know what it is; he has been running against communism since he was a little boy. He didn’t even switch like Ronald Reagan! He’s never had a doubt about it in his life. His kind of mind is not subject to the constraint of thought. So we know that something is being put over on us, when we hear Richard Nixon saying:

We can be thankful today that we do have a younger generation which is, as I have often said, with all of the faults that we may see in it, the best-educated younger generation that we have ever had, more deeply motivated than any we’ve ever had, one that deeply cares about America, about our system, about our educational system. We may not agree with them, but they do care. We welcome and we encourage, provided dissent is the peaceful kind of dissent within the rules of the institution, we welcome dissent.

Well, we can dismiss that and get right to the point. This fool simply had that written for him by someone a little more skilled in the arts of propaganda than Nixon. But here we come to the point of Richard Nixon’s program: sure, we agree with your goals, we share your concern, but *first*

we have to reestablish law and order before we can have progress. That's all their program is. Richard Nixon says that while we should have more decision-making power for the students on the campuses, first we have to throw out the students who raised the question in the first place. Richard Nixon and Hayakawa and Mitchell are only saying that we have to throw out the protestors before we can deal with protest. They're saying the chief impediment to reform is the reformer! They're saying there should be or even *is* a black-studies program at San Francisco State, and it could get under way if only Nathan Hare would leave! If Hare, and Varnardo, and Alvarado, and George Murray could be removed, they would go ahead with Third World studies. That's what they're saying, that's the part they're going to emphasize.

For that matter, they're even starting to drop the emphasis on the educational reform because they're starting to slobber so much as they look at the prospects of putting us all away. They can barely control themselves. Mitchell can't control himself. Look what Mitchell says, the Attorney General, who is described as being, next to Finch, Nixon's closest friend in the cabinet. He says:

We have substantial information confirming the widely accepted belief that several major university disturbances have been incited by members of a small core of professional militants who make it their tragic occupation to convert peaceable student dissatisfaction into violence and confrontation. These circumstances can only lead to the conclusion that this hard-core is bent on the destruction of our universities and not on their improvement. You can be assured that these violence-prone militants will be prosecuted to the full extent of our federal laws because the first precept for any academic community must be to outlaw terror.

Mitchell's assistant, Kleindienst, the Assistant Attorney General, could not contain himself and *he* slobbered to the *Atlantic Monthly* that the solution was just to throw us all in detention camps. And what is our crime, according to Herr Kleindienst? We are "ideological criminals!" Ideological criminals—that's very important to understand. Because that's exactly my view—our crime *is* our ideology, our poli-

tics; our crime is what we *believe* and the great appeal it has to young people in this country.

Our crime hardly is in what we *do*. What violence? If they think we're violent, they have seen nothing yet. Our violence is not yet the equivalent of the three-minute violence of a B-52 raid in South Vietnam! Our violence is not yet quite at the level of even the women's suffrage movement. When we look at American history, we see the country was built on the murder of the Mexicans and Indians. The country was built on the most brutal system of chattel slavery in the whole Western Hemisphere, and Mark Hopkins could have taught Joseph Stalin a thing or two about forced industrialization when he built the railroads to the West. The very workers whom Agnew thinks he represents occupied more factories in Flint and Detroit than any black students at Cornell in their wildest dreams have begun to covet university plants. We know that it's not *our* violence, it's not our methods they are worried about. Our crime is our existence. Our crime is the challenge that we present to the country. Our crime is that we might be effective.

We see that the universities are not open citadels of freedom, that people do not go around exchanging ideas on the campuses. How many ideas have you heard exchanged at universities? What's exchanged is money: a lot of contracts get exchanged. The universities are nothing more than the brain centers of world imperialism. This is where they do the research for the bombs, where they do the research on how to destroy revolutionary movements, and, above all, this is where they condition the minds, where they convince young people that they're free so that as slaves they can go forth without being guarded—they can go forth and live in the suburbs. Once they've been ideologically conditioned, once they've been brainwashed, taught to conform, taught there are no alternatives, taught there is nothing and never has been anything but the American way of life—then they're free to leave. Those are the functions of the university as brain center of this system, and we should shoot out that brain. It's *not* a great center of freedom.

They have business-administration schools on the campuses where hundreds of people are conditioned, where hundreds of people do research for the corporations, but where is the anti-imperialist and the anti-business research institute? If our universities are free centers of exchange, where's the

liberation school? Where's the Department of Revolutionary Studies? At best, they'll take one Crazy New Left Intellectual Jew as a token in the sociology department, and even he won't be able to last!

So let's make it absolutely clear to Ronald Reagan and his counterpart around the land. He hasn't got an idea about a university in his head. He might once have had one when he was an adolescent, and that could explain why he thinks rebellion is a teen-age hang-up, but he hasn't had one since, although he's had plenty of hang-ups. He wants to turn these schools—even more than they are—into purely technical centers to produce personnel for the corporations and the military. We have to stop that. Closing down the universities through a strike, stopping their deadly functions, is *not* the end of dialogue, it is the beginning!

Universities are not only the international brain centers, but they are part of the international class structure. You don't go to whatever school you want to—you go to the school that's within your range. And your range is most often determined by what your daddy does and what color he is, not by your genius, your personal skills, your individuality, as Richard Nixon—and especially Patricia Nixon—like to claim. Good ole Tricia claims that Richard Nixon is a case study in the American Dream, a young man rising from rags to riches. (I say he's a case study in the American Nightmare, the American air-conditioned nightmare.) And Ronald Reagan claims the same thing; in fact some nin-compoops in New York last spring gave Ronald the Horatio Alger Award, so now he can strut around with that, telling everyone how a poor fellow made good, but no one should be fooled. The way these people get ahead is through performing a lobotomy on themselves and then kissing ass for twenty-five years so as to become, quote, powerful. But these pore-boy Nixons and Reagans do not have the potential power of the young people on even one campus. That's the main thing you have to understand.

They want to scare you, and the first step in lifting the veil of fear they're attempting to pull down, is for all of us to realize that when they go for their guns, it's a sign of weakness, not of strength. Because this system, if it was functioning smoothly and perfectly, would not need guns to control the people. If this system was functioning well, you

would be contented slaves and you would be allowed to go freely through the university halls, through the classrooms, it would be perfectly all right to expose you to some ideas because you would be inoculated already, and you would simply be put out to the suburbs and that would be it. There would be a perfectly manipulated and perfectly controlled population. When the system needs barbed wire and Mace, when the system needs troops, not simply in foreign countries, but when troops are needed for the campuses, to protect the fragile brain, the computer brain of the plastic imperialist machine, then the system is in a state of decay and weakness. When the system has to take its own progeny, the sons and daughters that came from its own sperm, and line them up against the wall and kick them out of schools and shoot them down in the streets, then the system is facing an Inheritance Crisis. A crisis of legitimacy, in which the future rulers are turning unreliable. When students at Harvard and Stanford have questions, when the children of the ruling class have questions, when the cracks are appearing at the top—*then* you know something is about to explode at the bottom. The rulers know this and their children know this, both sides know it all too well.

But we have been conditioned to believe that revolution is not possible in America, that at best only reform is possible, that therefore you have to go from a bad leader, to a slightly better leader, to a much better leader, to a good leader. The theory of step-by-step progress has been drilled into us. So we think that things are getting worse when our leaders become more corrupt, and we're conditioned to believe that things are terrible when our leaders become more maniacal, and when they lose their cool and begin operating like degenerate madmen presiding over the collapse of an empire, we are liable to fear that they are wild beasts coming after us.

Now I do not want to say that before things get better they have to get worse. Even Chairman Mao recognizes that paper tigers are real tigers on the tactical level. By that he recognizes that Chairmen Nixon and Mitchell and Reagan have the power to send the troops onto the campuses and arrest everyone, that they have the power to round the young up for Vietnam, the power to gas American cities. They have that machinery of power. But they are losing their authority. And power without authority cannot stand. Power

needs authority, needs respect, needs the consent of the people, and more and more that consent is coming to be questioned and is being withdrawn. That's why they have to accuse us of violence, so they can use violence against us.

For a period of time we are going to fight a survival battle and a lot of people are going to be afraid of this situation. They're going to think back to the happy years of protest when you would petition the emperor and get a hearing or a jug of coffee, or something that would let them believe they had a chance. But we're not in those times anymore, we're in times of resistance, where enough people have found out that the emperor has a deaf ear, and where the emperor himself has seen that he's no longer fooling people. That combination of an awakening among the people along with a loss of confidence on the part of the rulers can only mean that we're going to have to fight for survival. They are going to come after us seriously. They're going to round people up, kick people out of school, even kill people. They'll do it in measured doses, just as the Vietnam escalation was done in measured doses, and a lot of people will want to back away from this confrontation and let the threat of fascism force submission. This includes people on our faculties, people in intellectual circles, people who oppose the war moderately, people who believe that if we were less extreme, the situation would cool itself somehow. There are "concerned liberals" who agree with the right wing that the New Left is the cause of disorder in the United States. As if we make policemen behave like pigs by calling them pigs! Anybody who says that we make pigs act like pigs is also saying that the Vietnamese are making the Americans genocidal because the Vietnamese insist on fighting for their independence. That's madness, but a lot of people will be saying that because they are afraid. And because they're confused. So as we begin to fight a battle for survival, we will have to look less to the idea of bringing middle-class moderates around, look less to the idea of radicalizing older liberals, and look more to the idea of revolutionizing youth. People do not necessarily have to go through stages from conservative to liberal to radical. They don't have to. A young person who grows up today and sees it's a normal thing to march on Washington is quite different from people of my generation who thought that it was far-out to speak in public. So these younger people are in a position to move faster.

There definitely will be confrontations because this system will not fall because minds are changed or blown—this system will fall during a series of sharp and dangerous conflicts, life and death conflicts. All we can do is pick the terms of confrontation so that we both survive and expand our base. When they bring the troops against us we have to show a fighting spirit in the streets, but we also have to recognize their superior force for a long time to come. And as much as possible, the confrontations should be based on positive issues on which the establishment has little to say, so that we come out of each confrontation with more active political support than before. The People's Park issue in Berkeley is a beautiful example of what I mean, because here you have a whole community engaged in doing something creative and constructive against an establishment which is always claiming we are purely negative. When the police move against us, we will be in the strongest possible political position; we will gain from the confrontations and they will lose.

As part of our survival battle, we also have to convince the working people of this country that we are not their enemy, as the ruling class insists. We have to shed our middle-class student sense of privilege; we have to make demands and talk in terms that the average person can see as being in his interest, and we have to press forward with organizing among soldiers, factory workers, and young working people who identify with our cultural revolution. We will fool no one by turning conservative in order to reach out for more support. No one will respect us in this country unless we stand strongly for what we believe. But we must overcome our fear that we are a tiny, alien minority, and we must act with the confidence and flexibility of a movement that eventually will have tremendous domestic and international support.

If we can also internationalize our struggle so that everybody in the world knows that the United States is beginning to take political prisoners, if we link up with the people in Europe, Japan, and the Third World, we can begin to encircle the American power structure on a global basis, which is the only proper way to deal with it. We need not be afraid; we have to understand that America's affluence and technology are producing new generations of people who have needs that puritan capitalism cannot fulfill, that the stifling corporate world cannot fulfill, that these new gener-

ations, together with people of color, make up the overwhelming majority of struggling humanity. We have to understand that the present situation of those in power is worse and more frightening than ours, trying as they are to protect a fantastic sense of inequality; they are without real plans for the future. It is we who are the emerging force, the only force capable of making—and living—a peaceful future with the people of the world who are presently hungry and enraged and desperate. We are the future—if there is to be a future—and these rulers are the fossils.

BEHIND ENEMY LINES

by Rennie Davis

RENNIE DAVIS was one of the early student activists of the sixties. Today he looms as one of the leading, most engagé political activists of the seventies. He has visited North Vietnam and he has lived in America. During his summer, 1969, trip to North Vietnam, with which this piece is concerned, he was instrumental in gaining the release of three downed American pilots. He says he hopes to do the same for the American people.

The Conspiracy
28 E. Jackson St.
Chicago, Illinois

Judge Julius J. Hoffman
U.S. District Court
Federal Building
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Judge Hoffman:

Since my arraignment before you last April on charges of crossing state lines with an unlawful frame of mind, I, like the other seven "conspirators," have been required to make regular reports on my movements and whereabouts to the U.S. Attorney, Tom Foran. In the case of my recent trip to North Vietnam, I think it is in order to make my report directly to you. You, sir, played a brief but important role in the events that led to that trip—a role that revealed the enormous chasm between the court's political and moral assumptions and the values of the eight men whom you are being asked to convict.

You will recall, Judge, that I stood before you on the morning of July 15, 1969, with a fistful of legal papers requesting permission to leave the jurisdiction of the Northern District of Illinois to fly to Hanoi for the purpose of escorting home three American prisoners of war who were to be released by the North Vietnamese. Only three weeks earlier you had begrudgingly permitted David Dellinger to fly to Paris to negotiate this release. I mistakenly thought you might recognize the humanitarian nature of the mission, and would grant similar permission to me. But that was not to be.

Referring to a secret memorandum in which the Justice Department had confided to you its unconstitutional wire-

tapping and surveillance activities in our case, Judge announced that you considered us “. . . defendants, if you please, whose activities in an affidavit filed personally by the Attorney General of the United States, are open to some question, considering the allegations concerning their conduct contained in that affidavit.” Thereupon, you denied “the defendant, Rennard C. Davis,” permission to travel to “an enemy country, North Vietnam.”

I remember thinking to myself: Here is a judge who sees Vietnam as an enemy country, a man who is to sit in judgment on eight men who have been indicted for their opposition to the view that the enemy is a tiny nation ten thousand miles away, indicted for the threat they pose to the real enemy—the enemy within—the military and corporate powers whose war machine is turning that inoffensive nation into a moonscape.

My mission to Vietnam was not frustrated, however; Judge Otto Kerner of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned your ruling, and I dashed to O'Hare Airport with only the narrowest margin of time to catch a flight that would get me to New York's Kennedy Airport before the departure of the Air France flight for Paris and Bangkok. And so for the second time in two years I was on my way to a country with which my generation has decided to establish its own relations, because we are not at war with the people of Vietnam. (I had first visited Vietnam in the fall of 1967.)

The seven of us who scrambled aboard that Air France jet were more or less typical of others who have taken themselves and their State Department passports into range of U.S. gunsights in Vietnam: Jim Johnson, a black army veteran who was recently released from U.S. military prison after twenty-eight months' confinement for refusing to fight in Vietnam; Grace Paley, a well-known writer, mother, and college teacher who is active in a national Resistance organization for the support of men who refuse induction; Linda Evans, a twenty-two-year-old militant leader of SDS; and John Douglas, Norm Fruchter, and Bob Kramer, three professional film makers who make their talents available to the radical movement in the United States. We formed the third antiwar delegation to assist American prisoners of war out of Hanoi. As we flew out of New York's Kennedy Airport, we had no idea that we also would be the first Americans to

glimpse the outline of a possible future, should life on the earth's surface become untenable.

I dimly remembered a story that I had heard in 1967 that suggested a novel journey I wanted to take once we were in Vietnam. A significant moment is often triggered by a few insignificant words (like the time Tom Hayden said, "Let's go to the Democratic convention"), and this idea for a trip to Vietnam's underground came from a vague but intriguing story I had heard in Hanoi on my first trip there.

I was returning to Hanoi from a trip to a city of 100,000 called Nam Dinh. Sixty percent of the city had been obliterated by American air raids, and for miles in all directions, the residents had scattered, bringing their institutions and social organizations with them. Students and teachers had moved schools into bamboo hamlets far from the city's center. Hospitals had gone underground, so that surgery could go on uninterrupted during the frequent air attacks. People and institutions were being dispersed as part of a national evacuation policy for survival.

On the way back, a Vietnamese friend and translator, Hieu, asked if I could imagine life in the Vietcong-controlled areas of South Vietnam, or the panhandle region of North Vietnam, after seeing a *lesser* example of America's ferocious bombardment. I said, "Probably not," and he then told me about the beleaguered people living at the edge of the DMZ in a Vietnamese district he called Vinh Linh. "At the DMZ, survival has meant going totally underground," he said. "There is no way for people simply to disperse into the countryside, since every meter is a target. The people of Vinh Linh are facing difficulties new to civilization. For example, we have a skin disease that results from being without sunlight for hundreds of days."

Hieu also showed me a Vietnamese newspaper article from Vinh Linh about the "new society" where life functions were put below the surface and "normalized": children were born, schools and hospitals operated, local political institutions and markets functioned under rock and earth. People walked the surface only to hoe the nitrogen-enriched soil around the rims of bomb craters or to shoot at American planes. "If you can understand Vinh Linh"—Hieu smiled—"you can understand why Vietnam will win!"

Hieu's account of subterranean life around Vinh Linh

was barely believable. My comprehension had already been strained by the devastation I had seen at Nam Dinh, and I don't recall even mentioning the story of Vinh Linh to anyone after I came home from that first trip to Vietnam. But this past summer, somehow the sound of the plane's tires touching down in the Hanoi Airport jolted the memory out of some far corner of my mind. I stepped off the plane in Hanoi determined to go to Vinh Linh.

Tran Troung Quat did not seem enthused by our proposal when the seven of us announced that we wanted to go to the edge of the war. (Quat was secretary of our host organization, the Vietnamese Committee for Solidarity with the American People.) In fact, his response was both direct and negative: "Impossible!"

"No American has ever gone into the area," Quat added. "Very few even from socialist countries have gone there. *I* have not gone there. The shelling of Vinh Linh has created many difficulties, and it continues today."

We persisted. Quat tried to dissuade us with practical considerations—bad roads, no electricity, insufficient food, heavy rains, hot winds from Laos, no toilets or running water, personal danger. "Every locality through which you would pass must first be consulted before any decision can be made," he said finally. But so far as I was concerned, Quat had enumerated enough reasons to excite anyone about going.

A message came from the Vietnamese army that the formal ceremony that would release the three American prisoners of war was ten days off, giving us plenty of time for an extended trip through North Vietnam. So, as the staff of the Vietnamese host committee proceeded to call province after province to consult about our proposed itinerary, we waited anxiously, hoping the answer would be yes.

Like other Americans concerned about Vietnam, we knew certain salient facts about the air war: that this tiny Asian country had absorbed more tons of explosives than the combined European, African, and Asian theaters of World War II; that the bombardment had had little military impact, but had destroyed most cities and towns; that weapons like magnesium, toxic chemicals, and cluster bombs—which were considered to be criminal and outlawed by international agreement—had been used in massive quantities on civilian

targets; and that the bombs had contributed mostly to the unification of the people of Vietnam.

I had seen evidence of much of this, north of the twentieth parallel, but of that region in Vietnam in which the bombing had been concentrated, the narrow strip of land between the twentieth and seventeenth parallels—where it is estimated twenty-five percent of North Vietnam's seventeen million people live—I knew almost nothing. No American, as Quat had said, had seen the panhandle since President Johnson conferred upon it the distinction of being the most intensively bombarded piece of land in the world.

On March 31, 1968, Johnson had announced that the United States was "limiting" the bombing of the North to "essential military targets." Washington insists that the choice of the date was accidental, but even as Johnson spoke it was already April Fools' Day in Vietnam, and the Vietnamese were learning what "essential military targets" were. The bombing was "limited" only in area—to a smaller but more densely populated part of the panhandle. I could imagine what a 250-mile strip of the northeastern corner of the United States would look like under equivalent air strikes—probably fifty million people dead. What I found hard to imagine was that anyone could survive in that area of North Vietnam. But we were to see it for ourselves, Quat had arranged it.

We left Hanoi on July 24—seven Americans and twenty-seven Vietnamese (including jeep drivers, reporters, a doctor, an English student, translators and Quat, who had decided to see for himself) crowded into seven jeeps, with seven hundred miles of rocky North Vietnamese highways ahead of us.

We took Highway 1 south from Hanoi into the panhandle and toward the DMZ. In 1967 American newspapers had told us that Highway 1 no longer existed, having been repeatedly torn up for two years by Thunderchiefs, Phantoms and B-52s. The Vietnamese thought it a great joke to invite the foreigners for a ride on "the road that doesn't exist." And it was traveling down this same narrow blacktop road in 1967 that I had first understood what was meant by "a people's war." At night the North Vietnamese countryside exploded in a frenzy of activity that transformed the face of the country. Targets photographed from the air by day would

be shifted in a kind of nightly waltz involving a vast mobilization of young and old, men and women. Hamlets, bridges, roads, communication lines, and dikes that had been blasted by day were rebuilt by night.

Now I was back, twenty months later, seeing the same countryside and the same villages. What was left? How bad had the damage been? Where was the "people's war" now that the pressure of the air attacks had been lifted from this area?

The city of Phu Ly had been leveled in 1967, but now we passed it, the first day out of Hanoi, and found it resting on a new site and built of bamboo. In fact, most of the reconstruction of bombed-out cities and villages was complete but temporary—bamboo had been substituted for brick. Similarly, throngs of Vietnamese crowded the roads as they had twenty months earlier, transporting rock, rice, and other supplies—but this time they were busy by day instead of by night. More trucks than before crowded through the bicycles, honking at the basket-laden people. We often saw trains, carrying both freight and passengers. Bomb craters that had scarred acre upon acre of the countryside had been filled in and were again under cultivation. The fragile wood poles that had once propped up electric lines had been replaced by cement towers. Steel-framed bridges had replaced many of the temporary pontoon bridges that had kept rivers open to heavy trucks even during the height of the bombing.

Yet there was a curious unevenness in the reconstruction. It was a nation constructing cement electric towers rather than cement homes and raising steel bridges beside bamboo hamlets. While American journalists were speculating that a peacetime lull was now gripping North Vietnam, the country I revisited looked like a Vietnam rebuilding and mobilizing for war; and so, speeding down that highway, my thoughts kept going back to Ho Chi Minh. He had chosen the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Convention to issue a special nationwide appeal to Vietnam. Pham Van Dong, the Premier, read what was to be Ho's last written public statement, in which the Vietnamese were asked to prepare for "total victory." It was treated as a routine memorandum in the American press, yet less than a week after the appeal, the slogan—"Total Victory"—was splashed across the country, hand-painted on bridges and walls and on steel beams awaiting transport along the road. Were these the signs of a Viet-

nam preparing for a massive new push for victory, after its survival of America's attempt at mass extermination? Well, Pham Van Dong would tell us, at the end of these travels, that the slogan "Total Victory" was not empty rhetoric, defining victory as total unconditional withdrawal of American troops and the formation of a broad government to govern, rebuild, and heal the war wounds of South Vietnam. "While Nixon thinks time is on his side and that we are running out of breath," Pham told us, "he is making the same mistakes as the French. Time is working to the advantage of the Vietnamese and not for Nixon . . . If necessary, we will fight for many, many years. We will win whatever the hardship. We will fight along with the American people until the Nixon Administration is compelled to end this war."

Near the twentieth parallel, the road took a sharp right turn, and we came upon a spectacle of startling magnitude. A mountain in the distance had been split and pulled apart about a third of the way down, causing massive rock slides into the valley below. The valley was a sea of craters—thousands of inverted cones punched out of the clay running about a mile in both directions—and was spanned by a steel-framed bridge, its cement pillars delicately balanced on the edges of deep craters, its frame torn and twisted as if attacked by millions of steel-eating locusts. The bridge had two narrow lanes for trucks and bicycles and a single railroad track down its center.

"We call this bridge Ham Rong," one of our Vietnamese translators said. (One of the American pilots later released to us called it "Devil Bridge.") "Three thousand tons of bombs have been dropped at the base of Ham Rong," the translator continued, "but there has never been a direct hit, and the U.S. Air Force has lost ninety-nine planes trying to destroy this single bridge. After the first attack, we prepared six alternate routes across the valley, but we never had to use any of them. The more flak we put into the sky, the more convinced the American generals became that there was something here to defend. And the more planes they sent, the more we shot down. You might say it was the perfect trap. It just shows the madness of the Pentagon, dropping three bombs for every square meter and yet missing a bridge that was strategically unimportant in the first place."

I asked the translator if one day the craters would be filled in and the damaged bridge repaired or replaced. The answer

was no—the entire valley would be preserved as a museum so that “our children and grandchildren will know something of the cost of their freedom and independence.” As we slowly crossed that tortured but proud bridge, the translator concluded his story of the bridge: “Here you see the result of two stubborn nations who have never lost a war in all their history. The difference is that our history is longer and our fight is just. We won this battle, just as we shall win the war.”

The mountains around Han Rong were only the first that we saw blistered from air attacks. Beyond the twentieth parallel we saw the aftermath of a string of battles between planes and mountains. One mountaintop had been ripped apart by pilots who had tried unsuccessfully to destroy its insides, where a cave had been carved out of the mountain to make room for a factory that had been moved out of Thang Hoi. Our convoy stopped there, and we were greeted by an eager reception committee of Vietnamese workers waiting at the cave’s mouth. We then were led through a stone passageway into a 60-by-100-foot room filled with humming machines. Grinders, polishers, machine drills, and metal lathes lined the walls. Casings of truck generators were stacked in one corner, awaiting repair. A giant generator provided a back-up source of power for various Russian- and Vietnamese-made electric tools.

“We’ve had no casualties during the air war,” the factory official who conducted us from machine to machine announced. Inside this stone fortress, the light was dim, but adequate, and breathing was easy. Indeed, this basement factory was considerably cooler than the hot air outside. “We think the advantages of mountain factories are considerable enough for them to become permanent postwar operations,” the director continued, after leading us into a second rock room. We had taken chairs around a long table decorated with a linen cloth. Bananas, candy, and tea had been set out for a meeting. As the factory director made a general report, about twenty-five men and women from the factory pressed around him, a bit apprehensive, it seemed, lest he talk too long. Stopping short, the official said simply: “One of the slogans of this workshop is ‘Let the sounds of song overwhelm the sounds of bombs.’” Someone began to play, and the rock room resounded with singing Vietnamese voices. Translators tried to pass on the gist of the words to us—there were songs about the ordeals of the American attacks,

the importance of machines to the revolution, the beauty of the mountain range under which these people worked, and a long poem about a policeman in green uniform who stood in the DMZ to keep watch over a nationwide hope for a reunified Vietnam. As I listened, I wondered if this was the Stone Age that Curtis LeMay had once promised to bring to North Vietnam.

The first city south of the nineteenth parallel is Vinh, where eighty thousand Vietnamese once lived. We arrived in the middle of a sunrise to confront a nightmare of devastation and ruin. The buildings must have been pounded over and over again. It was not enough that a church be gutted—military satisfaction had demanded pulverization. Vinh was one hundred percent destroyed. And Vinh was only our introduction to the Panhandle.

Mile after mile, in town after town, it was the same story: total destruction. The road itself was gutted and broken, and where the blacktop was still intact it never ran for more than fifty feet continuously. Deep craters ringed every bridge, no matter how small. In one area there were about four hundred of these craters, each about twenty feet deep and fifty feet wide. The target for these costly air attacks was a bridge constructed of twenty wooden planks, easily repaired. I wondered how many American pilots had given their lives in exchange for a thirty-minute road delay.

Between the nineteenth and seventeenth parallels, I did not see one single brick, cement, or stucco building. By our second day on the road we were passing towns and landmarks that had not been seen for several years by the Vietnamese guides who accompanied us and both the survivors and the ruins of Uang Phu, Cu Ba, and countless other communities were leaving a deep impression on even these veterans of the Vietnam struggle.

One of the reporters, who represented North Vietnam's radio station, The Voice of Vietnam, walked silently through the former city of Dong Hoi, where the homes of thirteen thousand people had been flattened. He turned away, saying, "I have been calling this a war of genocide, but only now do I understand the full meaning of the word."

"These people are the real heroes of Vietnam," Quat said movingly as we crossed into the southernmost province of

North Vietnam. "The men and women of Puang Binh hold every honor our country can bestow. Of course, some of the distinctions have been bestowed by Lyndon Johnson."

Puang Binh, a province that borders Laos, the Gulf of Tonkin, and Vinh Linh, has the dubious distinction of leading the country in B-52 raids, in air attacks (one every thirteen minutes in 1968), and in destruction (out of 100,000 homes, 82,000 have been leveled). However, what we saw with our own eyes was more sobering than the official account. Puang Binh officials were proud that half a million bomb craters had been filled in since the air war ended in late 1968. But it seemed to me that millions of craters remained. There was no mistaking the intent of the U.S. military here: burn all, kill all, destroy all.

We stayed three nights in this province, touring Vinh Linh, the DMZ, and numerous villages, co-ops, and seaside hamlets in what became, remarkably enough, a constant search for Vietnam's "secret weapon." We simply could not understand why the U.S. military objective had so clearly failed, for, frankly, most of the people in this province looked like they had literally missed the war. The signs of massive military assault were everywhere on the physical environment, but the people showed no signs of it. We expected a population inflicted with napalm scars, steel-pellet wounds, amputated arms and legs, broken spirits. Instead, the roads were thronged with Vietnamese carrying rock for roads, wood for bridges, manure for fields, and food for markets. Schoolchildren who lined the roads on their way home for summer vacation held hands, sang songs, or skipped together. Fifty women on a road- or bridge-building team, taking time to rest in a field, could be heard singing as we passed.

We finally decided that if there were a "secret weapon" protecting the people living closest to South Vietnam, it must be the highly advanced "tunnel technology" developed after the first air attacks in 1965. The people of the province claim to have dug sixteen hundred miles of underground tunnels and shelters—roughly the distance from Hanoi to Saigon—and person after person said he had lived underground for years. Perhaps this remarkable achievement explained the contradiction between human survival and total physical destruction of the earth's surface. While a village

might be raided "only" four times a day, driving people underground for periods of about sixty minutes for each attack, eight hours of a long day could be spent farming above ground. So schools, hospitals, markets, and living quarters were established underground, and the people who lived this way seemed in no way to regard themselves as victims of entrapment in underground dungeons.

Along the rim of the DMZ, we made forays into villages, searching for more information. In Thanh Tich, where a network of twenty-two hamlets made up a village of about forty-six hundred people, a typical tour began with a visit to a one-room building called "The House of Tradition." Spread across the four walls of this village museum were the relics of a century of war. A sharpened bamboo pole in one corner of the room bore this legend: "This spear helped capture two rifles from the French colonialists—Thanh Tich Village." Another display showed pieces of an American plane, one of three said to have been shot down by local self-defense units. A wall chart proclaimed that out of 850 houses in the village, 1,700 had burned down. "Each house had burned twice," I was told.

Still another chart cataloged the types of bombs dropped on these forty-six hundred people. I began to copy down the figures: "1,383—napalm; 267—time-delay bombs; 6,998—explosive bombs (two hundred pounds or more); 2,213 steel-pellet bombs." I got the idea without completing the list.

That these museum records were not the result of some bureaucrat's imagination, tacked to a public wall for everyone to see in a small village where any adult would surely know the truth, seemed obvious. Yet one set of charts gave a rather unbelievable account of progress during the four hard years of war. Placards comparing the years 1964 and 1968 in production, education, health, and cultural activities pointed to remarkable advances for a village under heavy aerial attack. Only one statistic revealed a setback. In 1964, thirty-two percent of the village buildings were brick. In 1968 there were none.

But this was the lone setback. While the village was losing overground facilities, its people were building underground institutions. According to these wall charts, the number of kindergartens had tripled and the number of children attending school had increased from 790 to 1,127; medical cadres

had doubled, and cultural groups had tripled; five libraries were built. From smallest details of improving cultivation by the use of nitrates deposited in the soil from American bombs to the fundamental questions of community survival, the underground facilities had been organized to deal with every imaginable difficulty, resulting in a proliferation of fire brigades, first-aid teams, self-defense units, road- and bridge-building teams, mobile cultural groups, reading teams, guiding teams, rescue teams, and so on.

People seemed to find strength through collective struggle, looking to the community organization for personal support. A young woman I talked with said she had been counseled to marry only after she and her fiancé had completed a "proper" underground shelter. Another man described how he had been buried alive in a collapsed tunnel, but had survived by forming an air pocket over his mouth with his helmet, a technique he had learned in a class conducted by the hamlet rescue team. A youthful woman army officer with only five years of schooling spoke of her difficulties in mastering logarithms, knowledge she needed in operating a large land cannon. So the hamlet reading team assigned a man to devote hours to reading a math text to her.

In Thanh Tich, twenty-six reading teams traveled from shelter to shelter reading papers, books, periodicals, and poetry to anyone wanting to listen. I met teen-agers—participants in "mobile cultural groups"—who said they often put on three-hour-long theater performances for underground audiences of five to eight people. Public markets were held three times a week in bunkers below tons of rock and earth. A system of distribution was maintained to prevent a family from hoarding or purchasing more than was required, and this apparently kept prices stable. (Meanwhile, inflation and black-market conditions were spinning out of control in Saigon.)

Teams of guides assisted people out of hamlets under concentrated air attacks through complex networks of tunnels and trenches, and first-aid teams helped the wounded to one of several hospitals built at the edge of Thanh Tich, also below ground level. We visited some of these hospital facilities—a maternity ward, a general hospital, a ward which specialized in women's diseases, and an operating room. Each was draped with a fine linen white cloth. "We thank Johnson for the American parachutes," a beautiful Vietnam-

ese nurse said. She then spread out several pieces of hand-made equipment, including a clamp used to hold open a wound during surgery. "From the wing of an F-105," she laughed.

The last leg of our journey took us into Vinh Linh, bordering on the DMZ. Here the sounds of war split the air every few minutes as shells and bombs exploded along the upper rim of South Vietnam. We were attending a small meeting with Vinh Linh representatives when we were told that conditions for a trip into the DMZ were favorable and that we could go if we wanted. The jeeps had been camouflaged with branches and leaves, and we rode off to the war's front in what looked like a large mobile bush.

"Any idea how many bombs dropped in Vinh Linh?" I asked their vice-chairman as we approached South Vietnam. "Thirteen tons of bombs for every person. And they keep coming. Over one hundred air attacks have occurred since the bombing 'ended.'"

The jeep drivers inched along a narrow, battered road, keeping their vehicles close to a line of trees planted beside the road. They were tense. Ahead, American jets streaked across the tip of South Vietnam, belching out death on "targets" below. In the distance I could see a large military fort. "Con Tien," a Vietnamese said. "Death can come in a matter of seconds in this sector," he said.

Three miles into the DMZ, we came upon five water buffaloes watched by a small boy. Farmers were cultivating around the edge of several monstrous bomb craters, seemingly unaware that they had wandered into "no-man's-land." "Isn't it suicide in those fields?" I asked. "How come they're here?"

"Maybe you should talk with them and convince them to leave," the Vinh Linh official joked. "We've urged them to evacuate, but they insist that this is their land. They say, 'If we move, who will defend our village?'"

The words stayed with me. "Who will defend our village?" A handful of people, bent over hoes, harboring the insane proposition that against the firepower of the American government, they will defend their tortured land, they will take their stand here, for the sake of their ancestors and children. A picture of madness. But it is a madness that infects a whole population: from Hanoi to the DMZ, young and old, men

and women, have been gripped with an insanity that the Americans can be defeated in "backward" Vietnam. It is an insanity that contains in it the most profound lesson of the twentieth century—that against the machine, ordinary people can win.

Just beyond the DMZ village with its people living off the fruits of bomb craters, we approached the Ben Hai River, which divides the DMZ and North Vietnam. A towering pole flies the flag of North Vietnam, for anyone south of the seventeenth parallel who might venture forward to see. The flag is twelve by eighteen yards. Hovering over the tower was an American reconnaissance plane, apparently photographing the hundreds of craters that circle the flag. Nervously, we waited until the plane left. Then our feet were on the ground and we were walking swiftly but cautiously toward the river. A loudspeaker, lodged in a tree that has been reached by a five-mile cord, blared its message into the South. A mangled bridge hangs across the river. "The cleanest bridge in the world," one of the Vietnamese said. "It's never used."

A green-uniformed policeman—the one cited in the poem we heard in the mountain factory—stepped out of a sentry post, an AK-1797 in his hand. I asked if I could speak with him. He questioned me about the moon shot. "A brilliant achievement," he called it. "But look how Nixon is also misusing your science," and he pointed to South Vietnam. As I scouted the river for a small souvenir, the policeman said, "Thank the American people for me. I know many of you stand here with me in the DMZ. I wish you success in bringing this war to an end."

Suddenly that picture-taking, flying machine was directly overhead, photographing us near the Communist flagpole. I was reminded of demonstrations back in the States, getting my picture taken by government agents. There's no escaping the camera. The Vietnamese yelled to us, and we jumped into our jeeps. Minutes later, as we left, the shelling began behind us. "Where is it hitting?" I asked. Quat shook his head in disbelief. "The flagpole," he said. "They even want to murder you."

As this was happening, Judge Hoffman, you were probably preparing for your special part in the new Nixon melodrama. I understand that the White House script calls for a major

scene to be acted out in American courtrooms where some of the more notorious critics of America's imperial venture in Vietnam will be gagged and hauled off to the darkened wings, as lead-man Nixon plays phony peacemaker, his lantern-jawed sincerity straining to deflate antiwar sentiment at home with phantom troop withdrawals and press announcements of a "de-escalation" of the war.

The two-act play of domestic repression and empty "peace" gestures is the crude government theater for hanging on to the corrupt puppet regime in Saigon, and reducing America's social problems to the work of a handful of "outside agitators."

I caution you that we are going to present a national drama that will teach every teen-ager from Brooklyn to Berkeley that American justice is a blatant alliance between judge and club-swinging cop or paid informer to smash the young and oppressed. But today's audience is not the same as it was in the fifties. This time around, the people whose lives are invested in service to the military and the privileged are going to turn their audience against them.

You see, when you denied my trip to Vietnam, I knew you would help us win. If that is confusing to you, please reread this report. It is an honest account of those people Nixon once called "rag-tag guerrillas," who are also winning even against the most advanced military power in history.

The Vietnamese *do* have a secret weapon against American technology. It is their ability to organize and to unite millions of people to resist even when resistance has meant the frightful devastation that U.S. technology has wreaked upon their country.

And the Conspiracy that sits at the defendants' table in your courtroom represents that secret weapon—the determination to resist—behind our own enemy lines. I believe the Conspiracy will also win.

Your defendant,
RENNARD C. DAVIS

THE POLITICAL TRIAL OF A PEOPLE'S INSURRECTION

by Lee Weiner

LEE WEINER is a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant in sociology at Northwestern University. He graduated from the University of Illinois, later studied political philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and then earned a master's degree from Loyola University's School of Social Work in Chicago. His essay here is very serious, but he seems rather a free-spirit: "I never wanted to be a doctor, but after a while I accumulated a bunch of university degrees, and now I'm going to get another that will mean terrorized freshmen will call me 'Doctor' on their bad days. It makes my mother happy. . . . During all of that time I talked, listened, hallucinated, and harangued at different places at different times. Some of it anybody would consider political. Now I'm thirty, have a beard, a wife, a two-year-old son who scares me sometimes, a color TV, and a tattoo on my forehead that says 'Government Certified Radical.' If I stay in touch with myself and continue to act free, the government has promised to additionally tattoo 'Bomb Maker and Evil Man.' It makes me happy."

August, 1968, in Chicago was not a summer festival. It will be remembered as the historic site of the open resistance of thousands of Americans against a repressive civil authority. Short-lived and uneven, but nevertheless very real, what happened in the streets of Chicago was a people's insurrection against a government we had been told was our own. And Chicago was neither the first such event in recent American history nor even the most extreme, measured either in terms of its violence, destructiveness, or the numbers involved. The riots in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and other racially divided American cities were both bloodier and costlier to the establishment in material terms, but Chicago symbolized open insurrection in political terms. And so something had to be done.

Historically, a number of factors can motivate the representatives of state power to attempt the direct repression of its political opponents. The day-to-day tactics of police control may prove inadequate to keep potentially hostile groups politically isolated. That is, when despite all the apparent and not-so-apparent control mechanisms—from police control to collective bargaining contracts—people raising political questions still seem to be getting out of hand, a policy of more formal repression may be initiated. Some form of repressive action may also follow specific events—say, demonstrations—which in themselves seem to threaten persons, organizations, or myths that the state authorities consider essential to their efforts to retain political control.

Chicago in August of 1968 represented all those possibilities. People “got out of hand”—and it was clear that everyday levels of police violence weren't going to be adequate to contain or redirect a public rage that was directed against an alien civil authority and the political issue of the war in Vietnam. After Chicago, people have

maintained that rage and continued to get out of hand. Worse, in its public breakdown, the otherwise quiet, stylized control and isolation of political dissent almost became official. The American myth of eventual consensus among all shades of political opposition rests on covert state violence and control, and any event which threatens to expose the reality of state violence against its own citizens must be dealt with in a manner that protects the integrity of a critically important political myth.

Insurrection in the streets—and the threatened political redefinition of what is real in people's lives—is generally enough to move any state toward a formal policy of repressing its political opponents. Chicago has evoked that repressive response. The actual style of repression can vary, but in nominally constitutional regimes, resort to the courts and political trials is common. And it was to the courts and the law as political weapons that the U.S. government turned in its efforts to control dissent in America, culminating in our indictment in September, 1968. A political trial clearly sets judicial machinery into motion in order to attain political objectives. And most often, it's an attempt, with prearranged rules, to eliminate political opponents of the regime.

In political trials, court action may be initiated to influence the distribution of political power or to affirm the public order or, more drastic a move, to upset or destroy individuals or movements which threaten the state. Yet the decision to enlist the court in behalf of the political goals of men in power may not be a matter of necessity, but rather one of choice or mere convenience.

Certain political acts, such as assassination, of course must be tried in the courts, if the government is to remain intact and continue to function within a legal framework. Whether the Chicago insurrection had to be tried in court seems open to question. Although events in Chicago were considered by the state to be reprehensible politically as well as dangerous to public order, as a specific event that insurrection was so complex and technically elusive as to defy prosecution under the law. In fact, when the decision to prosecute had been made, a substitute for insurrection—the verbalization of intent, a "conspiracy"—had to be charged against the defendants.

The difficulty in even physically describing the events of

Chicago so that someone could be tried for them strongly suggests that the initiation of court action in this case is more a matter of choice than necessity for the government. Something *besides* the event itself had to be found if the law was to be used as a weapon against political opponents identified with the Chicago insurrection. Now it should be made clear that the political consequences of *not* finding some "crime" to prosecute might have been so damaging to public confidence that no other choice but to prosecute could realistically have been made. However, the more significant point is that, faced with increasingly coherent political opposition, a government *does* have a number of choices. It can genuinely tolerate the growth of dissent. It can engage in activity that is something less than toleration, but not repressive. Or it can resort to partial or total repression. The decision *against* toleration and the legal implementation of a variety of repressive measures is what the U.S. government has chosen.

Choosing to use the courts for political ends is also something of a convenience for a regime. It allows it to engage in a sanctified style of political warfare which sets restraints on its enemies and yet confirms the state's method of repression. The aura of legitimacy and fairness that is retained by even the most corrupt court can be used by the government to attack the character of political opponents, hamper their activities, and assert the correctness of the state's official interpretation of events.

According to theory, any trial isolates for impartial judgment some specific act of past performance without regard for either the past or the future. A political trial also separates a particular event from its historical context and attempts an intense examination of that event. But in a political trial it is difficult to separate an event from the past and the future. When this is achieved, with varying degrees of success, viewing the event in an impartial light is usually only given token recognition. More often, even this formality is discarded, as a political trial deliberately reconstructs the past for the sake of the future. The reinterpreted past then becomes a weapon in the battle for political power in the future. It is, alas, that simple.

The techniques of the political trial may vary. One technique is to carefully focus on a limited action, seeking retribution for that "crime." This method will usually

produce a damaging picture of an opponent to be presented to a public that both the government and its political adversary want to influence. Alternatively, the prosecution can try to concoct a complex interpretation of a large-scale happening, one designed to shape the images and responses of the public to a historically important event. And that is what the Chicago trial is about.

Attempts to create images and social interpretations of reality favorable to one or another dissenting political movement, or to an established regime, are common and continuous, and recently much noted. However, the image-creating power of a public political trial can be enormous, reducing history into *either/or* propositions which convey a rather simplistic understanding of history. Using the artificial, state-controlled rules of the court, the U.S. government's prosecutors and judge will attempt to interpret the people's insurrection in Chicago as the private and deliberate manipulation of eight evil men. The government will be desperate to play down the independent action of thousands of people who openly resisted illegitimate political and police power. The trial, therefore, must blur and soften the contours of what actually happened, and instead focus upon and magnify the roles of these eight men in particular. The alternative image—one of a popular insurrection rooted in the experience and desires of people that was put down by the deliberate exercise of state-controlled violence—too clearly focuses public attention on what America is all about. The government effort is intended to punish and frighten a growing, insurgent mass movement of both the young and concerned adults, and to protect the official myths of political reality in America.

The perverted frigidity of American politics and its isolation from life, long enforced by old men of power acting out of their own fears, has provided the social context of our lives. Those old men will now try to use their courts to confirm their belief that people are always manipulated, that politics is a private and necessarily dirty game, that Americans must accept without question the separation and brutalization of politics and personal life-styles that the old men suffer gladly. The defendants in Chicago must fight, instead, for a public definition and appraisal of last August that allows people to hold on to and build upon what they learned about America in the streets of Chicago.

Our fight must and *will* be conducted in the court—which is theirs—and in the streets—which are ours.

As with the defendants in any political trial, we, too, recognize that the battle in the courtroom is not just about some specific activity of certain men or women. To appeal exclusively to our civil libertarian rights in the courtroom, or to simply deny our actions had wrongful consequences, would be to accept the political myths and definitions under which the old and sterile men now rule. Instead we must move as best we can to clarify a new political reality.

What we must fight to achieve in the court and in the streets is the evocation and maintenance of a vision and a reality which legitimizes a new form of struggle that links, and finally integrates, an alternative cultural life-style with the systematic restructuring of political and social institutions in America. The lesson of Chicago then and now is not that the political and cultural opponents of a regime will be repressed. That certainly may be true. What is more important is that people must learn and feel, and then act, on the belief that any artificial separation of emergent new life-styles and radical politics is wrong. America is a changing nation and must have its own form of revolutionary struggle. And the form of that ongoing struggle was projected in the streets of Chicago last August.

OUR STRONGEST WEAPON IS ALL OF US

by Bobby Seale

It has been said that the Black Panther movement represents the vanguard of revolution in America. BOBBY SEALE, who co-founded the organization along with Huey Newton and is currently the party's chairman, came to Chicago in the late summer of 1968 to speak at a rally, but, as David Dellinger points out, "six of his 'co-conspirators' had never met him before." If he is guilty of a conspiracy, it would make quite a good case for telepathy, if nothing else. Similarly, the performance of the media with regard to the Panthers is something less than estimable. For instance, the movement's militant stance has been widely reported, but by any objective reckoning the group's most notable activity to date has been an extensive program for providing breakfast to ghetto children who would otherwise go to school hungry. Suffer little children—but suffer the media at the same time: the Panthers aren't pretending to be pussy cats, but it much behooves America to comprehend who and what they very much intend to be—free and equal citizens of this country.

I'd like to speak to some of the people who are involved, maybe just emotionally and maybe in other respects, in what has become a drastic situation in the developing revolution in this country. That revolution—in this country at this time—is simply a matter of the people coming forth to demand freedom. And that revolution at this time, as part of the message that the Black Panther party is putting forth, is as directly connected with gathering guns as it is with gathering political force. We must recognize that we go forth as human beings not only to remove the “pigs,” the “hogs” in the power structure who are murdering and brutalizing people here in the confines of a racist, decadent America, but also those who are murdering and brutalizing oppressed people all over the world. And when we go forth to deal with them, we must also understand that they always send their racist, scurvy “pigs” to occupy the community—just as they had Lincoln Park in Chicago occupied.

There's a lesson the Black Panther's Minister of Defense, Huey P. Newton, tries to teach, and this is that whenever the people disagree with the political decisions that have been laid upon their heads—*whenever* the people disagree with those decisions—the racist power structure sends in guns and force to see that the people “accept” these political decisions.

Well, we are gathering as revolutionaries to let them know that we refuse to accept these political decisions that maintain oppression of our black people.

Now we are dealing with a couple of things. You recall that the Black Panther's Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, who had been nominated to run for President on the Peace and Freedom party in 1968, always said: “All

power to the people." And, "Black Power to black people." Now you must understand what "power" is. As Huey Newton defines it, and sends the message out not only to the members of the Black Panther party but also to the black people of the world and to others who wish to be revolutionaries, "power" is the ability to understand phenomena and make them act in a desired manner.

What phenomena are we talking about? We're talking about the *special* phenomena that are happening to black brothers. We're talking about the brutal, racist murders of black people. We're talking about lynchings that have been going on for four hundred years. We're talking about the occupation: troops in Chicago occupying the black community and troops in Lincoln Park, occupying a park where the people have come forth. That's what we're talking about when we speak of the ability to define *phenomena*. For instance, we have too many "hogs" in every facet of government in this country. And we can *define* that.

But we said the ability to define social phenomena is also the ability to make it act in a desired manner. And how do we make this happen? I believe my black brothers and sisters are well aware of how to make it happen. If a "pig" comes up to them and they sit down and start talking about "praying-in," and "swimming-in," and "sliding-in" and "rolling-in" and "jumping-in" and "bugalooing-in," and then singing "We Shall Overcome," like a lot of these Toms want us to do—we *are jivin'*. But if a "pig" comes up to you and starts swinging a billy club, you got to down that "pig" and defend yourself. When the "pig" is on the ground, this "pig" is then acting in the desired manner.

Many individuals and many groups will run into situations where the "pigs" are going to attack—the "pigs" getting orders from the "top hog" in the power structure to attack the people. Now, listen here: if we are going to get down to nitty-gritty, brothers and people—and we don't *intend* to miss no nits and no grits—we've *got* to have some functional organizations to make not only one or another "pig" act in the desired manner, but to make this whole racist decadent power structure act in a desired manner.

In California there has been a coalition between the Peace and Freedom party, a predominately white group, and the Black Panther party, a black organization and a revo-

lutionary organization. This coalition was based, in part at least, on the fact that the white people said they were concerned that the racist power structure in Oakland was going to try to railroad Huey Newton into the gas chamber. But this coalition has developed into a more functional thing: the general party exists, with the Black Panthers working in the black community and the Peace and Freedom people in the white community. They are working to eradicate racism because they have realized that racism comes from their community, and we are trying to convince black people that they've got to defend themselves and liberate themselves from the oppressive conditions that are caused by racism. This coalition has gone forth, and we think it's a very functional coalition.

Not only do we have to defend ourselves against the "pigs" but we also have to defend our people—on a massive scale—against the government. So we run political candidates, such as Eldridge Cleaver and Huey Newton, who ran for Congress from the Seventh Congressional District while in jail, to build a real revolutionary movement. And the brothers and sisters out there dig it because they want a righteous black revolutionary candidate to represent black people in the black community.

So it's very important we understand the need for organization. Because that's what we deal with—power and organization. We're not here to be dealing and jiving. We're not here to be sitting around a jive table vacillating and bull-jiving ourselves. Too many times in the past—*too many* times—our people have sat down at tables. When they sit down at these tables, they get to arguing about whether the white racist wall that black people are chained to is *real* or not. They want to debate the *molecular* structure of that wall. And the molecular structure of that wall is really ninety percent space—so is that white racist wall we're talking about *really* real or not? You're damned right it's real! We're saying it's *here*. Because *we're* chained to it, and you—white folk—get all shook up when black people start popping a few of the spikes that hold them, that hold the chains around their arms. That is, when black rebellions started tearing up around the country.

And so we say this here and now: don't be out there jiving yourselves wondering whether the wall is real or not. Make sure that if you want to coalesce, work together,

organize functionally, that you pick up a crowbar. Pick up a gun. And pull that spike out from the wall.

Now there are many kinds of guns. Many, many kinds of guns. But the strongest weapon that we have, the strongest weapon that we all and individually have, *is* all of us. Unity in opposition—unite with revolutionary principles. Unite in coalitions that function to go forth and rid ourselves of the Democrats and the Republicans. We have, as Eldridge Cleaver says, to send the jackass back to the farm and the elephant back to the zoo. And to do that, it is very necessary that we stand in opposition against *all* forms of brutality and murder that the racist "Pig Power Structure" perpetrates upon the people's heads, especially black people's heads. Because many times they'll just beat white people, but they kill black people many times. Wherever there is a large community of black people across the nation, the power structure is stepping up its activities and doubling and tripling and quadrupling its police departments. So it's very important for *us* to understand the need for functional organizations. It's very important for *us*—especially black brothers—to have revolutionary principles by which to guide ourselves. Because if we just go out in a jive gang, running around in big groups, armed with rocks and bottles, we're not going to do nothing against violent "pigs" with shotguns and point-three-five-seven Magnums.

Get every man in the black community to have a shotgun in his house and a three-five-seven Magnum and a forty-five if he can get it and an M-1 if he can get it and anything else if he can get it. And on the streets, stop running in large groups. Large groups are wrong. We should run in groups of fours and fives—spread ourselves—spread it out everywhere. That way "the man" can't shoot down forty of us, and wound a hundred and put three thousand warriors in jail. We cannot continue to use these tactics where we lose three thousand arrested or we lose one or two hundred dead. Small groups—small groups using revolutionary tactics. So we can drive out these "pigs" who occupy our community—who occupy our community like foreign troops.

Huey Newton says *this* in relation to these principles: the racist dog policeman must withdraw from the black community or face the wrath of all black people. So I want to say *this* to all white revolutionaries: Do you re-

call how, over the last two years or so, and especially in northern cities, white people have wondered whether that "police brutality" the black people are always talking about is real or not? Well, at the Oakland Induction Center a lot of them found out. And in Chicago a lot of them found out. These "pigs" will brutalize and kill *anyone* who opposes their racism.

The seven or eight thousand troops who were sent to Chicago were there to put the masses of people—those people who were duped by the Democratic party and the Republican party—into the kind of frame of mind where they have to accept a war machine. So the thing we have to understand is that the "Pig Power Structure" is using every tactic it can to survive. And *we* are tired—sick and tired—and tired of being sick and tired.

Black people, we seem to be lost, lost in a world of white racist America, and I'm saying that we have a right to defend ourselves as human beings. And if some "pig" comes up to us and treats us unjustly, then we have to bring our "pieces" and start barbecuing some of that pork.

So—Power to the People! Power to all the People! Black Power—Black Power to Black People! Panther Power! Even some Peace and Freedom Power! Power—and Free Huey!

DO IT!

by Jerry Rubin

JERRY RUBIN is the creator of the non-book DO IT! Scenarios of the Revolution. Introduction by Eldridge Cleaver and designed by Quentin Fiore. Rubin is also a non-leader of 800,000 Yippies. Jerry Rubin is, well, Jerry Rubin. His actions speak for himself as well as for themselves. He has helped to found the Yippies and the Off-Broadway branch of the House Un-American Affairs Activities, known to its friends as HUAC—Off-Broadway. According to a Washington, D.C., newspaper reporter, who is purported to have taken a close look, Rubin's "dialectic" is that "people are really good; it is only the institutions which make them do evil; all this will change when the youth culture of love and freedom prevails." His piece here is adapted from several speeches he delivered while on a visit to Cincinnati, where he was born in a log cabin.

The last time I went to my home town of Cincinnati—and made some speeches—the newspaper primarily counted the number of times I said “fuck” in town. I believe their count reached something like twenty, and on a news broadcast they gave a little sermon about it, and bleeped out all those words. Great. Because a blank word is so much more informative than any other word. You can see, all over the city people were looking, listening, and saying, “I wonder what that word was?” So I was supposed to be on WEBM. . . . I said to them that I would not say “fuck.” I’m housebroken, I’ve been on radio before, and I know that you can say “napalm”—you can say “bomb,” “kill,” “destroy”—but you can’t say something that has anything to do with love, with the act that brought us all here. It’s weird, but that’s true.

But they said, no, we don’t like your ideas and we don’t want you on. That’s bad; they’re still afraid of certain things, certain ideas. It’s hard to get through to people like that. I remember the first time I got subpoenaed to HUAC in 1966. (Remember in the fifties when everybody was afraid of being subpoenaed by the government? Now we think it’s great, everybody wants to get subpoenas; in Berkeley we call it “subpoenas envy”!) Anyway, we were trying to stop the war, stopping troop trains, etc., and I decided the best thing to do would be to try to affect them through my dress, because I didn’t think I could get through with language. So I decided to come in the language of the American Revolution. And it was like perfect. Because they didn’t know how to deal with it, the communications gap. I was the only one appropriately dressed, when you come right down to it.

And they called me again two years later, and I had a big conflict about what to wear. I finally decided to come

as a composite international guerrilla—a Black Panther beret, a painted face, and Vietcong pajamas that a friend gave me . . . and I had bells all over, so that every time I moved throughout Congress, it was like an orchestra. Then I had a bandolier of real bullets and an M-16 toy rifle like the Vietcong use, having taken them from the manufacturer, the U.S.A. But the thing that pissed HUAC off most was the painted tits. About two weeks later I read in the papers that they were thinking of proposing a new law making it a crime to insult Congress through dress or other means. That's *my* law—I got my own law! That should be everybody's goal—to break the law in a peculiar enough way so that they've got to pass a new law. They don't have enough laws to deal with us. They want to arrest us because of our very existence, and they got to figure out some way to do it.

The guy who started the Decency Rally said "decency" is obeying your government, no matter what it does! I'm very indecent! I proclaim this an Indecency Rally, because we'll decide for ourselves who we obey. . . . I really dig this Fred Whitmore, though. It came out that he cheated, that he forged a signature to get into some class or something, and I respect that! The reason I respect that is he's honest! This system has survived by people cheating, hustling, conning, cutting corners, and so forth . . . everybody tries to find out How do I get through? How do I get the credits? How do I get a diploma? It's all based on some kind of manipulation, like the society at large—like, How do I get bread? How do I cheat on my taxes? The whole system thrives on that kind of manipulation, so here's a guy, and he knows that to survive in the system you gotta go by the system's rules, which amount to cheating, so he does it. It's like Teddy Kennedy, remember? Somebody came in and took his Latin exam at Harvard for him—he cheated as a student—and it was a big issue when he ran for Congress a few years ago.

But that's the way school is, as I remember. If you can get away with it, do it.

These Decency Rallies are white racist rallies . . . you saw what happened in Baltimore . . . the black kids came, a racial remark made, fight, riot, injuries, but that's normal

in America today. As the police chief said: Just a bunch of rotten kids.

How many cops here today—how many undercover men, FBI agents? Stand up! You serve the people, you're our employees! We want to see what you're doing! If you're *not* here, we gotta give hell to the FBI! They're doing a lousy job, they ought to be here.

It's like when the last HUAC subpoenas came down, and everybody was getting subpoenas but me. I was afraid I was gonna get left out—free trip to Washington, subpoenas envy, and all—so I called the local Red Squad. (They're the guys who watch after commies, guys who commit sex crimes, things like that.) The guy there didn't know—he had to call Washington, call J. Edgar Hoover, I guess. Is J. Edgar Hoover living? I guess he's dead, I've never seen him. Anyhow, he came back to the phone and said, "Yes, they're looking for you in New York."

"Looking for me in New York?" I said. "I've been in Berkeley for ten days! You guys are not doing a good job! You're not going to save this fucking country if you don't sharpen up!"

I know you cops work eight-hour days—that's the difference between you and us, we work twenty-four hour days. In Chicago they had eight cops following a number of us all the time. But they worked eight hours, you know, a shift—you saw them change. I go in my house at night, there'd be one set of cops. I come out, there would be a new set. That's it—they're employees and we're life-actors. We're in it for our survival, and they're in it for pay. I'm happy. And I'm willing to take any consequences from Chicago or anywhere else that come my way, because I know we're winning. I feel sorry for people who're not involved. If you haven't been arrested, you're not doing anything. The way you find out you're effective is that they come after you, they start attacking you.

Huey Newton says that "power" is the ability to define things for yourself and act on it. Only action counts. I don't care whether you like me, hate me, disagree or agree with me. I'm talking about what I'm doing, and saying we got to do it together, for our survival. It doesn't make a damn bit of difference if you agree, and if they send me off to jail, you say "That's terrible"—that opinion doesn't

help me at all. Because they don't care about your opinions—it's when you act that it counts.

And we *can* define things for ourselves. All of a sudden a generation has grown up that sees television, sees reality in the streets, and says, "I'm going to define my own reality." That's why the school thing is so big—the class struggle begins in class. High school, college, elementary school even, is learning reality as the past sees it, reality as people who have power have seen it. That's what we learn, that's the reality we get in school, and what we have to do is get out of school and take over the schools, and we gotta create our own reality, define it for ourselves.

Because when they control the words, they control everything, and they got the words controlled. They got "war" meaning "peace"; they got "fuck" being a bad word; they got "napalm" being a good word—they got "decency" that to me is indecent. The whole thing is like backwards, and we gotta turn it around. School is indoctrination. It's learning the vocabulary and the meanings and the methods by which society thinks—so they can pass the older culture on to us.

We got to liberate the classrooms. We got to. In Berkeley we couldn't understand how all these kids with such energy and beauty and excitement could go into class, sit down, open up their books, pull out their pen, and take down every word some joker said, writing it down like machines. So we went into this class, a psychology class on thinking—a big lecture hall. There were four of us, and we sat in the middle, smoking, getting high—the whole place smelled like a pot party. Meanwhile everybody's taking it all down . . . He says "Good morning." "Good Morning." "May ask this on the exam . . . that on the exam." Take it all down, can't take chances, it may be asked. So finally the guys with us took off their shirts, and we started heavy kissing right in the middle of it all. It went on for five or ten minutes. Everybody is so plasticized into the classroom environment that the Vietcong could attack, China could drop a bomb, and everybody would still be taking notes.

Finally some girl got up and said, "Will the people in the middle stop making a disturbance?" And I leaped up and said, "Thinking! This is a class on thinking, and we're

thinking!" And the teacher spoke up and said, "In *my* class, I do the teaching."

Teachers are tyrants. School is the conditioning of your reflexes. You gotta raise your hand to go to the bathroom. Education is toilet-training, deluxe toilet-training! Telling you when to shit, when to pee, when to raise your hand, what to do when the bell rings . . . remember when Abbie stood up in the middle of that very solemn HUAC hearing (I'm sitting there half-naked, ringing my bells, chewing gum, blowing big bubbles . . . it was really an acid trip!) and he said, "May I go to the bathroom?"

That was in every newspaper across the country. Because we all experienced that having to ask to go to the bathroom . . . but as I recall, bathrooms are the freest places in the schools—only place you can get high. That's why marihuana is so great—it weakens the conditioned reflexes—the bells ring, you just sit there. Marihuana is the glue of the new culture . . . I do not have a civil liberties position about marihuana—I do not say, "If you want to take it, okay." I *advocate* it! Marihuana is not harmful! What they say about marihuana, they used to say about masturbation, remember? It wasn't true about masturbation, we all knew that, and it isn't true about marihuana. But thirty thousand people are locked up right now for smoking it—thirty thousand of our brothers in jail because they smoke a flower. Thirty thousand people in jail in the U.S.A. because they smoke flowers!

The entire school system is a crime against young people, and I don't approach this from an anti-intellectual bag at all. Like take a baby—a baby is totally curious, wants to touch everything, feel everything, be everywhere. The society has got to take that baby's curiosity and turn it into a machine that works for pieces of paper—grades, money, external things. The solution in America is first you indoctrinate people, teach them the boundaries of behavior, and control their dreams. That's how the society works . . . when you're young it tells you, "People are bad," and "Only work for profit," so you never imagine an alternative, and if an alternative ever comes into your head, you'll say something like, "But that's not human nature!" But then you know that the things you like to do, you never want money for. If you like it, you do it because it ful-

fills something in you, some need. And if you have to get paid for it, something's wrong. They say I haven't worked in six years. I work fucking hard! What's work? Work is play. Play is work. I don't know these divisions. Working is living, playing . . . of course if the entire society is based on people getting money for something, then you gotta cheat to survive.

Now we are a revolution coming out of the middle class, which is really amazing. "They" have this idea that revolution only comes out of poverty. Because money's the only thing they think about, but it's not true at all. And they say, Well, there's never been a revolution in an advanced country. Well, *nothing's* ever happened until it happens! We came out of our affluent homes, out of the suburbs, looked at the scene, and said, It's boring, it's hypocritical, it doesn't meet my needs. We said, I don't like your rat race, I don't like your money games. I don't like your bureaucracy, your eight-hour day, your wars, or your authority bullshit. I don't like you telling me who you are or who I am, I'm gonna decide for myself. I think the voting age should be lowered to fourteen—or lower . . . all children and teen-agers should vote. Because they're going to live in the world the next twenty, thirty, forty years, not the old people. The Yippies is a youth movement, all right, a movement aimed at the six-year-olds. We know who's gonna be here in twenty years, we're aiming at the kids. Dope, sex, community, love, your own thing, and you can create your own life. Young kids know what's happening, they ask the right questions . . . and it makes people afraid and guilty, because they know they're going to lose their kids, and they are. I mean even the Pentagon generals, their kids are smoking pot, looking at TV, and identifying with the long-hairs, everywhere.

And long hair still gets them uptight more than ideology, because long hair is communication, is like television. (Hey, I'm a walking TV commercial for the revolution!) And young kids identify short hair with authority, discipline, boredom, unhappiness, rigidity, hatred of life . . . and long hair with letting go, letting your hair down, being free, being open. A lot of people are trying to grow their hair long to make it in the scene, sure. I don't bother with them. A lot of people are traitors to their hair, but we've created a new culture. Our new culture has a language, a

new religion, a new authority figure—a fifteen-year-old high-school dropout, right? We should run him for President—yeah, Bob Dylan for President! He's someone who's saying something that meets our needs. And the professors aren't, the politicians aren't—there's not one politician in this country who's talking to us. McCarthy? He said he wanted to run to take the energy and disruption that's in the street and housebreak it and bring it back into the Democratic party. Two days he ran for President, and then he announced, "People who work for me got to cut their hair." You know what he's saying? He's saying that if you work for him you gotta deny what you think and feel, deny your culture, deny who you are and fit yourself into a mold. Well, as far as I'm concerned, when McCarthy made that statement, I knew where he was at. I knew as soon as he lost the nomination he'd go somewhere quiet, at the last minute he'd support Humphrey, he'd forget about the war—that'd be it. Because he's a politician.

That kind of politician is irrelevant. The church has become irrelevant, the media've become irrelevant, school's become irrelevant. That's how we're gonna change this country—the institutions that exist all of a sudden are not going to respond to the needs of the people. And that's what's happening on the campuses; you can sum it up in one sentence; people are shouting out: "YOUR SYSTEM DOES NOT MEET MY NEEDS!"

I don't want anybody to think I'm giving a rap against education—I'm not, I believe in education. I learned more in one hour in Chicago than I learned in ten years of sitting on my ass, hearing words go into my ear, out through my brain, into my pencil. Into my head for a few weeks, can't hold it much longer, HELP!—the exam, thank you, and forget it. It's like taking a good shit. All those ideas I heard in school only took shape when I got outside and saw action in the streets. Let's get this straight: Chicago is no different from any other American city . . . people get beat up, arrested . . . I've been arrested twenty times. The only difference about Chicago was that now people know about it, people heard about it. What we did was force them to share our experience, which is the experience of living in a police state. . . .

We were indicted in Chicago for crossing state lines to have a pig roast. We came there to nominate our own

presidential candidate . . . the idea is that whenever the society's having a party, like the Democratic convention, we're having one, too. LBJ invited everybody to Chicago in August, and we said, Yeah, we'll come too. And we'll bring our own candidate—Pigasus! We brought him into Civic Center Park, and the cops arrested eight people and the candidate. Before he could speak or anything! And then they threw us all into the same paddy wagon, with the pig. And when we were booked, a cop said we were being sent to jail for the rest of our lives because the pig "squealed on us." (One clever cop in the world!)

After they arrested Pigasus we announced we were running a lion for President, so they put cops at the zoo. . . . I sent a telegram to Daley saying we would put LSD into the drinking water—that really scared them—and they had cops at every water main that week! (You can't do it, though it's a great idea, and we've got Yippie technicians working on it.) And at eleven o'clock every night, out came the tear gas to drive us into the street, so we wouldn't sleep in Lincoln Park—very subversive, sleeping. But you should have seen—they brought missiles, gas, helmets, dogs, guns, to fight us! But what they didn't bank on was that people weren't going to run away, they were going to fight back and defend themselves. And that's what happened—look at the casualty lists for Chicago. And you know they indicted a few cops too, which is bullshit. Because you can't single out any six or eight cops—the whole damn society is responsible for the shit that went down that week, the whole damn society, Humphrey, every one of them! The cops, even the people with power, aren't individually evil men with horns. They think they're doing the right thing. The problem is the fucking structure has put them in a situation where they have to act like pigs. We gotta focus on the structure, we gotta liberate the people who got power! And as far as I'm concerned, we're winning, arrests or not, because we're stealing their children. The kids know where we're at: we all have things in common. The schools try to turn us into a replaceable part, so one person can be replaced by another, so if one gets out of the way or dies, he can be replaced by another. We're all trained in this big machine. We come in different, alive, swinging . . . and then it's Let's get all the rough edges nicely trimmed, shut up here, don't do that, this kid's a little wild, I don't think

he's very . . . watch him, watch him. And then we all come out ready for middle-class suburbia—come in different, go out attuned.

But the movement says, Come in different, go out different. We're not the same, but we're not enemies. We have things in common, and we won't let the police and the society make divisions in our communities. But we have differences. People ask, "What is the difference between Yippies and SDS? I hope there are differences—there have to be. There're differences between the Yippies. We had a big battle among the Yippies; it almost split us. When we were running the pig for President, some of us said we should kill the pig and have a big pig roast. And we should say to the world that in America, at a national convention, the politician is nominated and he eats the people. But at the Yippie convention the candidate is nominated and the people eat him. And we all become the candidate, we all want to be President—every man for President! Vote for me! (That's the most revolutionary slogan there is.)

Now, if there was one issue that could split the Yippies, it was Vegetarianism! Some people are vegetarians—Ed Sanders, Allen Ginsberg . . . beautiful people! And they said they really could not remain in the Yippies if we were going to kill the pig, and I understood that. And we really didn't want to. So there *are* differences, and we have to resist the conforming thing of making us replaceable parts. We're one family, but society tries to divide us. How? Well, remember how high school and college encourages competition. Okay, fine, everybody competes in his own way. But this is the kind of thing where you're happy if you do better than the guy next to you and you're hoping for his downfall, because there's only one place for the two of you to go into, and you both want to ass-kiss, brown-nose, the teacher so he likes you. It's one big sack race to the end. That's not education, that's mob rule! That's anarchy. The country says we're anarchists, but words can be used in any direction, and I say they're anarchistic, too, and we want to return the country to a saner anarchy. Try to find out who makes decisions in this country. . . . He does, no, *he* does; up there—*he* does. They have yet to learn the Eichmann lesson. They have not learned that when a large population is working and justifying what it does by saying, "So what? It's my job," it's got in it the seeds of genocide.

We've got to get control over decisions that affect us, over our lives. In America a revolutionary issue is the First Amendment. Students don't decide who speaks in their schools—principals do. We're sitting in sterile plastic classrooms that we don't control. The principals, the deans, the presidents make the decisions for us because they've got the idea that we're children, and so we're being trained for the outside world in all kinds of ways. We're being psychologically trained, most profoundly, to separate our emotions from facts, so that we can be a good American. A good American walks down the street, opens his newspaper, and sees, "One thousand people dead in Vietnam," and he says, "That's a fact," and turns the page. It doesn't affect him emotionally: he doesn't see the people, he doesn't relate to them, he doesn't picture himself there. He says, "That's a fact." We're taught disinterested knowledge—in other words, knowledge doesn't count. That's what we learn in school, that knowledge doesn't count. Do what you're told. Work, fight, die, for what we tell you. The whole thing about Vietnam is that it's sending the young people to die for the mistakes of the old, which I don't dig at all. I think a person has got the right to look the way he wants to look, smoke whatever he wants to smoke, fuck whoever he wants to fuck, and die for whatever he wants to die for.

If Richard Nixon likes war so much, why doesn't he go over on the front lines? In 1961, when we heard that the Cuban people were rising against Castro, and actually it was only a few people *we* paid to go there, Castro got in a tank and went right to the front line. If anybody was going to die, it was going to be him. He wasn't sending out teen-agers or college kids to die for him. Same with Che Guevara—he believed in something, and he didn't sit in an air-conditioned office giving out orders for young men to fight here and here . . . defend this and that . . . he went right to Bolivia and put his life on the line. That's the kind of revolution we're involved in, one that concerns our lives, our survival. I'm not talking about someone else's revolution, I'm talking about my own freedom. The only way you can support anybody else's revolution is by making your own. We'll die for something we believe in, all right, and what we believe in is control over our own existence, which is right here. And it isn't just leaders telling

us what to do, what to think. You know, in this country you always have the myth of the infiltrator, the dupes, the organizer . . . they're trying to locate it on a few people, eliminate them, destroy them, and everything will be fine. The rest of the people—the young people, or whoever—will be fine. Now, I think that's a lot of crap. The Vietcong would still be there without Ho Chi Minh, and as far as I'm concerned, all I'm doing right here and now is telling you what I think. And if it doesn't touch anything in you, then it will have been an attempt at communication which went a certain way. If, on the other hand, it *does* touch something in you, that thing was already there to be touched. Nobody can start a riot; Huey P. Newton did not invent exploitation of the black community.

We're now fighting, and *we* can be *anybody*. So far as age goes, age is how you act, and not necessarily connected to how long you've been on the earth. As I see it, you're born twice. Once is when you're really born, and the second time is when you find out who you really are and how you want to live your life. So I was born in Berkeley in 1964, when we seized a building and brought down the biggest university in the country, and brought down the state and created a total myth that went across the world, a myth that says being a student doesn't mean you only work, get grades, etc., but it means that you are a person, an actor, who can decide and determine your own environment—you have power. So I'm four years old; I have twenty-six more years before I'm over thirty! If people come up to me and say "I'm forty, I'm fifty, I can't be part of the Yippies because of my age," I say that's a cop-out, it's all in what you do, how you live your life. The only time you find out anything about a university, about the people at a university, is when the cops come on campus, when it's an issue, and all of a sudden people have to take a stand as human beings, not standing up there at their little lectern and saying, "In 1912 this happened, in 1924 that happened," but saying, when history knocks on the door: "What's happening?" Age doesn't necessarily have anything to do with it. You can be any age you want. Universities are not democratic. Dig it. Every university is controlled by the rich people in society, calling themselves the Board of Trustees. They control the whole fucking thing.

America is a democratic country, right? It nominates its Presidents through the will of the people. There are primaries, and then there are conventions. I read all about it in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century . . . it sounds great, just great. But all of a sudden I look around me, and the world is nothing like that, nothing like that at all! In history classes we've been learning the history of the rich people, not our history. We don't have to go into the classrooms any more and learn old, distorted versions of history. We're making history, every act we do is historical revolution. We're through with lying and stealing, because that's what it is—capitalism is theft, by definition. You read the history of this country and you read that we went to Africa and stole people and brought them back here, forced labor. Stealing! And I hear a guy saying, "I'm tired of supporting the blacks. . . ." Where does he get this? In school? It's all backward. The rich steal from the poor, that's the way it is. The economic structure is based on dishonesty. Capitalism has killed more people than any other "ism" you can think of, and for all we know, more blacks died on slave ships coming to America than Jews died in Germany. Capitalism is based on stealing.

We went to this place called the New York Stock Exchange, our pockets stuffed with dollar bills. Newsmen would come up to us and ask, "Where'd you get your money?" We'd say, "Did you ever ask Rockefeller where he got his money? Let's go over to Rockefeller right now and say 'Where'd you get your money?' Ask Kennedy where he got his money. They're asking me where I got my money . . . a hundred dollars I got, and they're asking me. How come they don't ask you guys? You're immune from those questions? Always ask poor people where they got their money, never ask the rich." Property is theft. If it's there, it was stolen.

We went to the stock exchange to burn this money—we consider burning a dollar bill a political act. It says something—the country burns money! Rich men burn money! The country burns money in Vietnam! We're putting more money right now into Vietnam than we're putting into the black communities in America, into anything in *any* community in America. Why don't all these high-school administrators who are so afraid to have me speak because of "the vote on the school levy" stand up like men and

say to the fucking government: "Get out of the war in Vietnam and put the money into the schools!" That'll do it; there's the money. Let's put "acid" in Nixon's water—he might freak out and bring our boys back. And when I say, "bring our boys back," I mean from Canada. We got about forty thousand now, fleeing the country in Canada. You know, people say, Communism's terrible, look at all the people that flee. . . . More people are leaving this country today for political reasons than any country in the world! Pretty soon they'll have to build a wall around it to keep people in. The country's falling apart, nothing works. Everything's all screwed up—that's why we said we were going to Chicago to fuck in the streets. Because it's all a sexual thing when you come right down to it. Everybody is so uptight about sex, about the human body.

I just came from Iowa . . . where a *Playboy* representative came to give a little talk. Eight people came who didn't like the way *Playboy* sells sex, so in the middle of the guy's talk they took off all their clothes—really stopped his talk cold! And a month later they were indicted for indecent exposure! Indecent! How can the body be indecent?

As you can see, I have a sexual interpretation of history, and money and grades equal shit. And we're trained to work for it anally, to hold in, it's all connected. That's why the new culture has a new psychology, a psychology that says, "We're not working for external rewards, we're working for our experience today, for this moment right now, and when it's gone you can't relive it." What's indecent is to give up *today*, to give up control of our lives. We want control, we believe in the democratic principle that things should be controlled from below . . . that students should make decisions at universities, not some president appointed by the richest people in the country.

THE PEOPLE AT THE BOTTOM WANT CONTROL! I really dig this, and I hope this isn't really just words in the air. But I'm not on an academic trip, I'm not saying I want to convince you of a point of view, to accept *this* interpretation of America—you've got a test next week on what I said here, remember everything, true or false. I'm not saying that at all. What I'm saying is that *I'm* in it with everything. And they've honored me with a federal indictment, and I hope you get honors like that someday, too.

Because it's our survival that's at stake, our life they're talking about, and it's us who're going to jail, us being clubbed . . . and it's only when we get together and realize that the purpose of living is community, and is *family* in a new sense, and the only way we're going to get together is in struggle. I've known love and community among large groups of people when there was a struggle—in Berkeley, in Chicago—when there's a crisis and people need one another, and don't look at one another like paranoids and say "Who's he?" "What's he want?" "Oh, I better watch out for him—and him." People all of a sudden realize that everybody's gotta take a bite out of the same sandwich and live together. We're all in the same rowboat. When that comes, all of a sudden everything you learned just gets wiped away and you realize it's a new world, and a new day, and we're new men, and we're gonna make it.

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"THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL TRIAL IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES"

—Jay Miller, Executive Director,
Illinois Branch, American Civil Liberties Union

In early fall of 1969, a trial began in Chicago. The eight defendants ranged widely in age, politics and social philosophy. But they all came to Chicago at the time of the Democratic convention to protest poverty, racism and the Vietnam war. All were indicted for violating a new Federal law that makes it a crime to cross a state line merely *with intent* to cause a riot.

For the first time this law is being tested. The defendants—uniting under the consciously ironic title of "The Conspiracy"—are making that test.

This important book documents the crisis of our times. These eight men speak out to you—the American public—with candor and courage. Hear them—for in the balance may hang the rights of travel and free speech in the United States.

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