

PREFACE.

Tedo (Fedor) Gaonti is one of the oldest and most prominent members of the Georgian Socialist-Federalist Party. This purely Georgian party existed and exists only in Georgia, and very little is known about it in Russia. Although T. Gloiti was the author of several books written in Russian, these books were published in Tiflis and did not reach Russian readers. It is not surprising that the name T. Glonti is little known in Russia, and for the Russian reader to appreciate the significance of Glonti's brochure, they should be acquainted with the author and his party.

The Georgian Socialist-Federalist Party was formed in 1903. It was a purely intellectual group with a very vague program. Characteristic of the party was its nationalist bias, as the name itself shows; the party demanded great political independence for Georgia. It was in favor of the federal principle, desiring Russia to become a federative state in which Georgia would be one of the full members. The party's literary organ was the journal "Sakharvelo" ("Georgia").

Tedo Glonti joined the party in 1906. He worked mainly in the field of economic issues.

The program was vague. The composition of the party was also uncertain. Subsequently, when it became necessary to concretize the program and policy of the party in the process of revolutionary struggle, the party underwent a series of splits. It was divided into the so-called Georgian Ezherians and the National Democrats (a party of a distinctly bourgeois-nationalist character; essentially, the Georgian Cadets).

Frictions and disagreements also began to arise and grow within the councils of the remaining Socialist-Federalist Party. These culminated in the official and final split of the party in the summer of 1922 (June 5) into two factions - right-wing and left-wing Socialist-Federalists. Tedo Glonti is the leader of the left wing. The current organ of this party is the newspaper "Tribuna."

The essence of the disagreement between the right and left wings of the Socialist-Federalists was that the left wing opposed the Constituent Assembly and supported the Russian orientation of Georgian policy.

At the end of summer 1920, during the domination of the Mensheviks in Georgia, Glonti published a book titled "The Asiatic Policy of the Bolsheviks." In this book, he wrote, polemicizing with the famous Georgian Menshevik Tsereteli:

"No other force, given the present balance of forces in Russia, except the Bolsheviks, can hold on to power. The expulsion of Bolshevism from Russia is now possible only through the armed force of the Entente, a system of intervention, and the triumph of black reaction.

"The fall of Bolshevism now in Russia will be marked by the murder of hundreds and thousands of the living forces of the revolution, the reign of white terror, the burning of villages and towns: the horrifying events of the triumph of reaction in Russia will cover with their cruelty and blood all those scenes painted in the blood of the tormented masses during the triumph of reaction in July 1831, in June 1848, and during the Commune in 1871.

"The fall of Bolshevism and the accession of even Guchkov or Milyukov will drive the now self-determining peoples of Russia to despair, ruin, and self-destruction.

"The fall of Bolshevism in Russia will reduce Russia to a colonial state, to the enslavement of the people by the Entente imperialists, thereby strengthening the foundations of financial capital and imperialist capitalism for several decades."

From this quote, it is clear that despite his nationalism, Tedo Glonti, as early as the summer of 1920, clearly saw the ephemerality and groundlessness of the false democratism of the Georgian Mensheviks and the destructiveness of the policy of these Mensheviks, who were oriented towards Western European imperialism. Already in 1920 (and earlier), Tedo Glonti saw that the policy of Soviet Russia in Transcaucasia and Asia posed no danger to Georgia, which was striving to secure its national rights.

After the victory of the proletarian revolution in Georgia, Tedo Glonti sincerely embarked on the path of working hand in hand with Soviet power. He is currently the chairman of the main committee of the Left Socialist-Federalist Party. This party, which is weak among the lower strata of the Georgian people, still represents a fairly significant force among the Georgian intelligentsia. In the elections to the Georgian Constituent Assembly in 1918, the Socialist-Federalists gathered up to 45,000 votes, although these elections took place under the severe pressure and terror of the Menshevik government. As is well known, the Georgian Mensheviks were the first to develop the tactics of crushing revolutionary workers' and opposition organizations that did not please them, which their Fascist disciples are now using with such success in Italy. Tedo Glonti has some interesting photographs of such crackdowns, which an inexperienced reader might mistake for the work of Fascists. It must be confessed that future historians will rightly reproach the Communists for not having studied the Georgian Mensheviks as representatives of fascism.

At present, in the Tiflis City Council, which has about 150 members (not counting representatives of the Red Army units), the Socialist-Federalists have 16 representatives. In the executive committee of the Congress of Councils of Georgia, they have 4 members. Tedo Glonti is a member of this executive committee and a member of the presidium of the Tiflis City Council.

I repeat, Tedo Glonti has never been a communist; moreover, he has always been a nationalist. This makes his testimony even more significant when he points to the enormous merits of the Georgian communists and the Soviet power in Georgia. Such testimonies, supported by figures and facts, abound in Glonti's small booklet. I will cite some of them.

"...With the communists, Georgia gained peace, which is the greatest benefit for the country and the people. But in addition to this, the communists brought to Georgia something that no other regime has ever brought—the national pacification of Georgia... Only under the communists was there no trace of chauvinistic harassment, and during almost two years of communist rule, there was not a single nationalist uprising in Georgia.

"Only a Russian orientation and Communist policies could open a wide road for Georgia's national-economic revival in the deepest sense of the word, given the prevailing global conditions. And indeed, Georgia has never seen such great positive work as that being done by the Communists now."

"...For eight years we have had no respite from war and civil strife; everything was destroyed, ruined, and collapsed. And now, in one year of Soviet power, we have become so revitalized and strong that with an open heart, looking directly into the eyes of the workers, we can triumphantly say to our dear freedom fighters: Rejoice, comrades! Your long-term patience and hardships are bearing great fruit: the prosperity of the working class, its dominant position, and cultural advancement in life."

The tight framework of the preface prevents me from citing a long series of similar acknowledgments from the brochure. I will only add that T. Glonti knows the Georgian economy well and supports his conclusions with numerous figures and eloquent facts.

In conclusion, a few words about Braunthal, with whom T. Glonti polemicizes.

Braunthal is a very little-known employee of a Viennese Social-Democratic newspaper. In the spring of 1922, he visited Georgia, and upon his return, he printed a number of articles full of lies, slander, and malice against the Soviet power and the Communists. L. Martov, of course, could not miss such an opportunity and used these articles in his Menshevik newspaper.

Glonti's brochure provides numerous figures, facts, and conclusions from an impartial, non-communist, prominent Georgian public figure. It demolishes all the lies so carefully concocted by Braunthal, and additionally offers a number of interesting facts about the economic life of Georgia in recent years, a subject almost completely unreported in Russia.

N. Meshcheryakov.

FROM THE AUTHOR.

I had intended to respond to Mr. Braunthal in a newspaper article, but no matter how brief I tried to be, the work went beyond the scope of a newspaper article and had to be published as a brochure. In the course of the work, I had the idea of giving a fuller account of the activities of the Soviet authorities in Georgia.

The Georgia of the Menshevik “kingdom” showed by example the utter bankruptcy of the policy of vacillating “between imperialism and revolution.” The same Georgia under the Soviet system demonstrates in practice the viability of Soviet policy and provides an example of the correct resolution of issues related to national, cultural, and economic problems.

For the West as a whole, and especially for the awakening East, the history of “Soviet” Georgia is of great significance.

The End of the Braunthal Saga.

In Vienna, Adler's pince-nez barely noticed Braunthal. In Georgia itself, no one had heard of him. A mediocre employee of the little-circulated "Vienna Workers' Gazette," he became almost a hero of the day only after he had given Lev Martov "excellent" material for all sorts of fabrications about the devastation that resulted from the "seizure" of Georgia by the "red imperialists and officials of Moscow."

Braunthal placed 12 bulky feuilletons in the above-mentioned newspaper, and with this, he made a great move for his career. After all, Georgia became a historical country in its own way. If Germany is considered the cradle of Menshevik theory and party organization of social democracy, then, according to Kautsky, Günsman, Shaw, and MacDonald, Georgia was the embodiment of Menshevik state practice. Kautsky's "Eine sozialdemokratische Bauernrepublik" is a full-throated praise of Menshevik Georgia, and how could the Moscow Communists not lose their temper when they utterly trashed this creation of Menshevik practice, as well as the whole Menshevik theory?

Braunthal had to demonstrate before his statesmen a picture of the defeat of Menshevik state practice and to share with the Amsterdamers (Braunthal was an Amsterdammer by trade organization) his information about the destruction of Menshevik Georgia by the Communists.

Allow me, as someone personally acquainted with Braunthal, to say a few words about his method of conscientious study of historical events, the objectivity of the facts he presents, and his neutrality in the dispute between the Mensheviks and the Communists.

In an interview with me in the editorial office of the newspaper "Tribuna" (published by the Left Federalists in Tiflis), Braunthal expressed his attitude, as an independentist of the type of Adler and Hilferding, to the creation of a united front by the independents and the Scheidemannian Mensheviks in Germany in roughly the same way that Franz Mehring wrote about the proposal of Adolf Braun of Nuremberg in 1917: "One would have to be extremely shameless to dare now to suggest that they (the independents) should cease to exist as an independent workers' party and unite with a party whose future depends solely on the mercy of the government.

Although the Nuremberg meeting crowned Braun's "exceptional shamelessness" with laurels, we did not suspect that the representatives of even the Amsterdam Yellow International could cross the extreme line of shamelessness and speak of the violence committed by Soviet workers in Georgia without the slightest foundation. When I first read Braunteil's outpourings, I felt sorry for these gentlemen: representatives of the Mensheviks and independents, who do not hesitate to slander or lie in order to achieve

one thing: to disgrace the Soviet regime and to score points with the working class of Europe.

As an old worker in Tiflis, I promised Braunteil all sorts of statistical information about Georgia and the general state of affairs, gave him information and data, which he wrote down in his notebook; but later it turned out that the information I gave him served only as material for his vicious scolding against the Communists and for Martov's speeches against me in his "Socialist Herald".

Of course, that's up to the individual. Everyone can be distrustful of all kinds of information. A critical attitude to data is the duty of every impartial and serious thinker, but to see by all means a stinking swamp in the place of a building under construction, not to distinguish light from darkness, deed from illusion, is a crime which does no honor to a representative of the working class, even if he be of the type of Erzberger, the German Christian demagogue.

Braunteil had a full opportunity to get quite accurate information about Georgia and should have trusted it: strange as it may seem, the Central Statistical Office in Georgia (CSO) is not run by a communist, the financial and accounting records of the capital of Georgia are also managed by non-communists, the head of the city statistical department is a former responsible Menshevik, and the manager of the Tiflis City Council is non-partisan. Literally the same can be said about the institutions of the Central Executive Committee of Georgia, about the departments of railroads, customs, banks, etc. The Amsterdam hero could have obtained the most accurate information from all these institutions, but he, as a man of "science" and "impartiality"...Observer, he turned all his attention to the proclamation of Catholicos Ambrose and the black clergy, to the cries of the Mensheviks and the traitorous SRs, resulting in his poem about the downfall of the first Menshevik republic in the world.

Without noticing the largest and most important phenomena in the center of Georgia, Braunteil notes the bloody riots in Svaneti, of which he has no idea, because he could not get there. Mountainous Svaneti is not Vendée at all: it is a mountainous, backward region that never thought of any kind of action against the Communists for the simple reason that Svaneti knew about the existence of Communists only by hearsay. In the full sense of the word, a misunderstanding occurred in Svaneti, which was resolved by Comrade Dumbadze without a single shot or even an arrest.

We can give Braunteil a better example of the works of Chelokaevites in Khevsureti, whose "uprisings" are more akin to Vendée, with the only difference being that the Vendéans knew very well what they were doing, while the peasants of Khevsureti, several thousand people, upon meeting representatives of the Soviet authorities, naively asked - are there communists in Tiflis? No matter how unfortunate and offensive all this

is for us, Soviet workers, we have to admit that there are inaccessible mountainous corners in the Caucasus, whose inhabitants are completely politically undeveloped and do not understand the most elementary issues. A lot of labor and effort should be made to enlighten such regions. Adventurers like Prince Chelokaev, who, with a handful of people deceived by him, found a welcome among the backward Mtiulians, take advantage of the political underdevelopment of the highlanders. Would you call the brigandage of the Chelokaev gang a Menshevik uprising, Mr. Braunteil? Qualify it as you wish, but nothing will come of it, and the conscious proletariat will learn once again what brings joy and satisfaction to the likes of Braunteil.

There was no question of any other uprisings in Georgia. It is even astonishing that in Tiflis, this alleged center of the Menshevik Party, the cradle of the Jugeli Guards, where Ramishvili supposedly had an army of 30,000 Menshevik workers, there was not a single workers' demonstration, not a single suspension of work even for an hour in any of the institutions or enterprises, despite the furious cries and appeals of Menshevik proclamations. The same must be said of Kutaisi, Batumi, Sukhumi, Poti, Telavi, and other cities of Georgia. What does this prove, Mr. Braunteil?

Braunteil claims that the Communists 'strangle their opponents.' But under the nightmarish Menshevik regime, we witnessed armed demonstrations of workers in Alexandrovsky Garden, in the military school, and in all corners of Georgia, including Guria, Imereti, Mingrelia, Ossetia, etc. Were the Mensheviks so afraid of bayonets that they did not express their hatred for Soviet power through a single demonstration or protest? All these facts were probably known to Braunteil, but if they were, he prudently kept silent about them.

You are truly an impartial scholar, citizen Braunteil! We need more historians like you for the Mensheviks!

Braunteil claims to know in detail all the most remote corners of Georgia, and at the same time, he does not mention with a single sound the most important historical fact that the Communists brought with them for the benefit of the population. I am talking about peace, both internal and external.

Georgia's historical misfortune lies in its geographical position. By occupying trade routes and access to the sea, Georgia could dominate over the countries that send their goods from Europe to Persia, to all of West Asia (via Batum) and keep Armenia and Azerbaijan in a constant state of tension. Under the given conditions, a powerful country, populated and powerful in all aspects, could become the mistress of the situation, but Georgia is physically weak, poorly populated, and economically has not yet reached the stage of the first initial usurious capitalism. That is why it has always been a bone of contention between all Asian and European states for thousands of years

of its existence and that is why its 4 million population was reduced to 800 thousand souls in the last years of the XVIII century. The Georgian kings, from Vakhtang to the last king George XIII, by adopting Russian orientation did the greatest historical deed in political and national terms and gave the Georgian people an opportunity to calm down, strengthen, and develop. The twentieth century was a century of rest, increased population growth, economic, and cultural revival for Georgia. The twentieth century returned to Georgia its historical possessions - Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Ardagan, Batum, and Poti, occupied by the Turks by right of war.

When, after the October Revolution, Georgia separated from Russia, the old times revived: in the self-proclaimed Menshevik Georgia, external wars persisted, internal peace remained elusive, and consequently, no internal development could take place.

With the Communists, Georgia gained peace, which is the greatest benefit for the country and its people. But beyond that, the Communists brought something to Georgia that no other orientation, under any regime, had ever achieved - national pacification. Up to 35% of Georgia's population consists of ethnic minorities. Armenians, Turks, Russians, Ossetians, Jews, and others have historically exemplified national hatred and discord. The bloody governments of Romanov, Golitsyn, and Dashkov skillfully fueled national discord, encouraging Armenian-Tatar massacres, Georgian-Jewish pogroms, and other atrocities.

Only under the Communists was there no trace of this ethnic tension left, and during almost two years of Communist rule, there was not a single nationalist outburst in Georgia.

This phenomenon holds immense national, cultural, and economic significance for both Georgia and the entire Caucasus region. Its importance undermines not only Braunteil's arguments but also the proclamations and cries of Kautsky, MacDonald, and others.

Under the prevailing global conditions, only Russian orientation and Communist policies could pave the way for Georgia's economic development on a national scale. In fact, Georgia has never seen such significant positive progress as that which is currently being accomplished by the Communists, yet the 'objective researcher' Braunteil fails to mention it in a single word in his disgraceful feuilletons.

Let us turn now to the work of the Communists in Georgia.

Strange as it may seem, the Mensheviks, who had always been on friendly terms with Wardrop, Kress, Milne, and other representatives of the enlightened Entente, while in power, often experienced desperate food difficulties and had to feed the population with all sorts of surrogates, which caused general resentment among the people. There are times when food issues for the population are of paramount importance. The years 1920

and 1921 were such moments. The population, torn from the land by endless wars and national strife, was literally languishing under the weight of the food crisis. It was only under communist rule that Georgia breathed more freely and soon forgot about food needs.

The period of communist rule was marked by the appearance of bread all over Georgia. Never (I mean the last 4 years) has so much food cargo been imported into Georgia from abroad as under the communists, and never has there been such a lively communication with Europe as under the Soviet system. This happened for the simple reason that the gates of Batumi and Poti opened for the whole of Transcaucasia, and Russian gold appeared on the Constantinople stock exchange, causing increased imports of all kinds of goods into Georgia.

For a more accurate and clear picture of the circulation of goods, we will cite statistical data. We consider Tiflis to be the main goods receiving point. There were imported in poods:

	В 1915 г.		В 1919 г.		В 1920 г.	
	Из разн. местн. Грузии.	Из заграничн.	Из разн. местн. Грузии.	Из заграничн.	Из разн. местн. Грузии.	Из заграничн.
1. Прод. предм.	1.064.753	9.552.639	2.890.967	1.857.993	1.588.360	1.059.078
2. Сырье . . .	5.058.376	3.942.074	3.377.513	2.184.752	1.807.827	507.815
3. Фабрикаты.	121.443	98.276	128.378	116.848	277.158	95.561
4. Скот. . . .	198 гол.	179 гол.	7.843 гол.	1.553 гол.	11 гол.	60 г.
Итого . . .	6.244.770	13.593.168	6.405.858	4.159.593	3.673.356	1.662.454

Следовательно, общий ввоз выражается в пудах:

	Из разн. местн. Грузии.	Из заграничн.
В 1915 году . . .	6.244.770	13.593.168
" 1919 " . . .	6.405.858	4.159.593
" 1920 " . . .	3.673.356	1.662.454

What do these remarkable figures tell us, of which Mr. Brown-Tayle has not the slightest idea? The figures tell us of a systematic and steady decline in both the foreign and domestic trade of the Georgians, i.e., of the complete collapse of the Georgian economy under Menshevik domination.

Whoever wants to have a true understanding of Georgia and sincerely wishes prosperity for the Georgian people should delve into this information, study it thoroughly, and only then propose to the working people a way out of the difficult economic situation. At the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, Jordania stated that he adheres to European orientation, but as we can see from the figures, it was during the time of the Mensheviks that Georgia drifted away from Europe. Menshevism was the embodiment of the collapse of economic life in Georgia; even though it was clothed in state form and

inspired by the generals of the 2nd International, it still fell, showing its complete failure and economic bankruptcy.

What is happening now under Communist domination, seemingly distancing itself from Europe? Under the Soviet system, we see quite the opposite phenomenon: planning of the general economy takes place, in all spheres of life instead of decomposition there is rise and development. Here is information about the import of products to Georgia for four months in January, February, March, and April 1922. During these four months, the following amounts were imported in poods:

	Из разн. мест. Грузии.	Из заграницы.
1. Продовольств.	618,120	765,247
2. Сырье	769,454	350,098
3. Фабрикаты	43,311	86,239
4. Скот	576	—
5. Разные товары	103,328	16,336
	<u>1,534,789</u>	<u>1,217,980</u>

If we consider the total import figures for these 4 months as the standard, then, by increasing the data threefold, we obtain the total import in poods for the entire year:

	Из разн. мест. Грузии.	Из заграницы.
Во время меньшевиков (1920 г.) . . .	3,673,356	1,662,454
„ коммунистов (1922 г.)	4,904,367	3,653,940

Total import:

при меньшевиках	5,335,870 пуд.
„ коммунистах	8,558,307 „

The three years of the Menshevik reign in Georgia were years of decline and economic decay, while the one year of Soviet rule in Georgia was a year of uplift and revival.

So far, we have exclusively discussed the importation of goods. This issue and this information are of such serious importance for the general public that even the Mensheviks themselves need to contemplate them. We will provide data on the new exportation of goods. They were exported in poods:

	1915 г.		1919 г.		1920 г.	
	В разн. мест. Грузии.	За гран.	В разн. мест. Грузии.	За гран.	В разн. мест. Грузии.	За гран.
1. Прод. предм.	673,953	1,446,027	645,276	456,288	784,836	141,204
2. Сырье	120,464	485,474	904,739	169,739	592,555	186,975
3. Фабрикаты	116,660	378,949	217,972	47,463	385,170	43,878
4. Скот	7,563 г.	44,606 г.	1,236 г.	279 г.	1,614 г.	502 г.
Итого	920,077	2,310,450	1,767,987	672,490	1,762,561	372,057

Or the total amount exported in poods:

	В разн. мест. Груз.	За границу.
В 1915 году	920,077	2,310,450
" 1919 "	1,767,987	672,490
" 1920 "	1,762,561	372,057

The picture of exports, especially to foreign countries, illustrates how the Mensheviks gradually withdrew from Europe and, without reaching Asian shores, remained within the glittering halls of the Vorontsov Palace, systematically engaged only in praising Menshevik wisdom.

Now, let's present information about the export of goods in 1922. Under the Soviet system, only 723,147 poods were exported in the first four months of 1922, including 295,081 abroad. If these export figures for a third of the year are taken as the norm, then for the whole year, we shall see the following. It was exported abroad:

✓ Во время меньшевиков (1920 г.)	372,057 пуд.
✓ " " коммунистов (1922 г.)	885,243 "

Let this information open the eyes of Citizen Braunteil and all the Menshevik slanderers who trumpet it all over Europe, relying on the ignorance of the masses and the lack of information about Georgia, claiming that the Soviet system brought destruction and ruin to the country.

Let us go further and reveal the true picture of internal economic construction in Soviet Georgia.

There was not a single instance during the entire period of Menshevik rule in Georgia where the government of Zhordania provided even one pood of grain to assist the population in fertilizing the fields and increasing the profitability of the land, which was almost the sole source of the people's welfare under the Mensheviks. In 1922, for the entire Transcaucasia, the Soviet government granted one and a half poods of grain to the population.

In 1922, the Soviet government provided the entire Transcaucasia with one and a half million rubles in gold for the purchase of seeds from abroad, and from this fund, Georgia alone received up to four hundred thousand poods of Australian and Bulgarian grain for spring sowing, which were used to seed peasant lands.

Without delving into the details of statistical studies, I will point to the Georgian ruble as a true reflection of the overall state of the national economy. From February 1932 to October 20 of the same year, when these lines are being written, the Georgian ruble did not experience the slightest fluctuation, whereas under the Mensheviks, it continuously lost its purchasing power.

Let us provide some information about the movement of prices for various products in Georgia up to the February coup d'état, i.e., before the Communists took over the government.

Taking the index prices in 1918 as a hundred, we obtain the following picture of the movement of market prices for all kinds of products:

В 1913 году	100
" 1916 "	141
" 1918 "	2,940
" 1920 "	176,152
" 1921 "	8,038,874

We will talk about the situation of the working class in this connection below. However, for now, we consider it necessary to note that only in 1922, under the Soviet regime and the New Economic Policy system, we observe a stabilization of prices for products and an improvement in the value of the Georgian ruble day by day. The prices of the most basic products for the working class were in gold rubles in 1922:

	Март.	Апрель.	Май.	Июнь.
1. Хлеб	13 коп.	11 коп.	9 коп.	7 коп.
2. Говядина	32 "	30 "	22 "	21 "
3. Сахарный песок	21 "	18 "	16 "	16 "
4. Топленое масло	116 "	94 "	86 "	53 "
5. Соль	2 "	2 "	2 "	2 "
6. Картофель	5 "	5 "	6 "	4 "

From this, it is abundantly clear to any impartial observer that with the overall revival of the country's economic conditions, prices for food products, which are indicative of the economy's pulse, gradually decline, approaching normal and stable levels.

This phenomenon is of immense significance for the further economic development of Georgia and, especially, for the improvement of the living standards of the working class.

Certainly, economic revival is also reflected in the regulation and improvement of the country's financial management. However, in this regard, much more work will need to be done, including seeking new sources of income, maximizing revenues from existing taxable objects, and minimizing all non-productive expenses. In short, it is necessary to create a solid budget, strictly adhering to budgetary constraints.

But the overall contours of financial management are undoubtedly shaping up very positively for Georgia.

Georgia's financial management is a product of the New Economic Policy (NEP), a new economic policy introduced in the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) since November 1921. The NEP had a significant importance for Georgia and its financial management. The remaining rates from the Mensheviks' indirect taxes, mainly from excise duties, for January-September 1921, yielded the Georgian treasury only 712.3 million rubles. However, for October alone of the same year, during which half of the month was affected by Decree No. 75, which rationally regulated excise rates, the state received 623.3 million rubles. In the subsequent months, revenues from indirect taxes amounted to:

В ноябре	1.455,4	млн. руб.
„ декабре	2.251,0	„ „
„ январе	2.760,7	„ „
„ феврале	2.807,5	„ „

The era of legislative creativity commenced as the Revolutionary Committees gave way to local and central elected Executive Committees. New decrees such as No. 95 in February, and No. 6 in May, among others, were enacted, further invigorating Georgia's financial apparatus. The advantages of these innovations, coupled with the stability of the Georgian ruble, were subsequently reflected in the following figures:

В марте месяце	7.858,1	млн. руб.
„ апреле „	8.396,7	„ „
„ мае „	8.625,6	„ „
„ июне „	12.204,0	„ „
„ июле „	18.353,6	„ „
„ августе „	20.050,2	„ „

The total indirect tax revenues as of September 1, 1922, amounted to 91.5 billion rubles. There has been a significant increase and improvement observed in the direct taxation department. By the very nature of direct taxation, the accounting of receipts from direct

taxes can only be made after a certain period of time. Therefore, accurate information about the commercial and industrial revitalization due to direct taxes will be obtained only after the end of the current year. The current figures for direct tax revenues highlight their importance for the state budget of Georgia. According to preliminary calculations in 1921, it was expected to receive 52 billion rubles from trade taxation, but in reality, 59.2 billion rubles were collected. As of October 1, 1922, a total of 96.7 billion rubles were collected from all kinds of direct taxation. In total, both direct and indirect taxes contributed 188,184,061,827 rubles to the state treasury over 8-9 months. For now, let's confine ourselves to these details, but it must be acknowledged that these tax revenues have provided invaluable assistance to the Georgian printing press and enabled all commissariats to expand their activities. Despite reducing staff by 25-30% in all commissariats, the development of their activities is evidenced by the subsidies received from the state treasury on a monthly basis. The commissariats received these subsidies in 1922:

В январе	22,9	млн. руб.
„ феврале	21,7	„ „
„ марте	29,8	„ „
„ апреле	23,8	„ „
„ мае	56,7	„ „
„ июне	59,3	„ „
„ июле	66,1	„ „
„ августе	82,4	„ „
„ сентябре	102,8	„ „
Итого	465,5	млн. руб.

42% of the total distribution to the commissariats was provided by tax revenues. Here, we have surpassed the revenues from product taxes as of October 1, which exceeded last year's revenues by 10 times. In 1922, we have received approximately 50 billion rubles from the product tax so far. In addition to all this, we have not taken into account the production and all kinds of receipts from the economic and administrative commissariats, such as the Commissariats of Agriculture, Protection, the Supreme Council of National Economy, Justice, Internal Affairs, etc.

The further development of the NEP system, as well as the implementation of the economic principle in all departments, indicates that in the near future, Georgia will have a deficit-free state budget and will be able to sustain itself independently without resorting to the services of the printing press.

All this information, all these considerations, are of no importance to the “scientist” non-sequitur Brauntaile. But we ask, whom was Mr. Brauntaile counting on in the end? Who did he want to feed with his fables? We believe that with Brauntaile's information, one cannot get far in cultured Europe, with its conscious working class.

Brauntaile knows nothing about very important and large state enterprises, but perhaps the fair historian Brauntaile knows something “objectively” about other more vivid phenomena. Let's see.

We mentioned that Georgia is predominantly an agricultural country. The first task of any government is to improve this economy and create conditions for the sustained existence of the people. Therefore, the main condition for the development of agricultural culture in Georgia is, first of all, the fulfillment of irrigation and reclamation works, without which it is unthinkable to approach the economy of Georgia.

Let us note the first thing. The Communists solved the agrarian issue in a radical way: all the land was taken away from the non-labor population and given to the agricultural population of Georgia. Anyone who had even a small idea of the need for land in Georgia (there are 11.2 tithes per capita in western Georgia and 4-5 tithes in eastern Georgia) must agree with us that there can be no other solution to the question but the Communist one. By the Communist resolution of the agrarian question, the area under cultivation increased one and a half times, which had a significant production effect in the current year of 1922.

But the communist resolution of the agrarian issue in Georgia holds another significant importance, as it also addresses the pressing territorial question: the unrestricted sale of land has been prohibited, and according to the law passed by the recent session of the Georgian Central Executive Committee in October of this year, priority in land allocation must be given to the native inhabitants of Georgia. This historic measure lays to rest the avarice of Georgian nobles and landowners who sold land to various speculators.

Gathering all the decrees issued by the National Council, Parliament, and Constituent Assembly of Georgia – essentially, the collective wisdom of the Menshevik rulers from May 26, 1918, to February 25, 1921, which the Mensheviks and their supporters, the right-wing federalists and national democrats, consider a significant relic of Georgia's national identity – and comparing them to just one decision on the agrarian issue, implemented by the communists, I assert emphatically: Georgia has never experienced an act more remarkable and of greater national, cultural, and economic significance for the livelihood of its working people than the resolution of the agrarian question by the Communists.

Now, let's address the second matter. I was referring to the irrigation and reclamation works undertaken by the Communists in Georgia. Since the era of the great queen Tamar, the golden age of Georgia in the 11th century, Georgia has not embarked on such extensive irrigation and reclamation projects as those currently being undertaken by the

Communists. In 1921 and 1922, the Hydrostroy under the All-Union Council of National Economy carried out and continues to carry out the following irrigation projects:

1. Matkhodzh Canal. Originating from the Tskhenis-Pkhali River, it spans 11 versts in length, irrigating an area of 2,000 desyatins. Opened on May 15th for the irrigation of 1,200 desyatins.
2. Kulashi-Ganiri Canal. Originating from the Tskhenis-Tskhali River, the canal is diverted and reconstructed to irrigate an area of up to 5,000 desyatins (increased by 2,500), with a canal length of 28 versts. Basic works completed.
3. Drainage of Samtredia District. Several sluices, bridges, and channels have been constructed, including the clearance of channels and the Lochoba River, irrigating 2,500 desyatins.
4. Major repair of Adjame Canal. Irrigation area of 2,500 desyatins.
5. Irrigation of Kvitiri-Maglaki-Partskhanakapevi near Kutaisi. Originating from the Rioni River (within Kutaisi), irrigating an area of 12,000 desyatins, with a canal length of 5 main and 10 branch channels totaling 160 versts.
6. Irrigation of Geguti-Opshiqviri Sakulia. Originating from the Rioni River, irrigating an area of 10,000 desyatins, with a canal length of 80 versts.
7. Irrigation of Vani-Tobanneri-Amagleba. Originating from the Rioni River, with a canal length of 28 versts and irrigating an area of 6,000 desyatins.
8. Irrigation of Dimi-Rakiti villages near Bagladi. Canal originates from the Tskheni-Tskhali River, with a canal length of 20 versts and irrigating an area of 2,000 desyatins.
9. Irrigation of "Ulevela" lands near Svir. Canal starts from the Kviriulki River, with a canal length of 17 versts and irrigating an area of 2,500 desyatins.
10. Irrigation of Khokhoulie-Chalebi lands near Kviriul. Originating from the Kviriulki River, with a canal length of 18 versts and irrigating an area of 2,500 desyatins. The canal was opened on July 28th.
11. Irrigation of Dogdauris-Veli near Mikhaylovo and Gomi stations. The canal starts from the Kura River, with a length of 36 verstas, irrigating an area of 3,000 dessiatinas. Near Mikhaylovo station, the canal generates an excess capacity of over 600 horsepower.
12. Doesi-Grakal canal. Originating from the Kura River, the canal is 18 verstas long, irrigating an area of 2,500 dessiatinas. Near Uplie-Tsikhe on the canal, there is a tunnel 80 sazhen long. The canal was opened by the Extraordinary Commission on May 18 this year.
13. Skra-Karelsky canal. Starting from the Kura River, the canal is 22 verstas long, irrigating an area of 3,000 dessiatinas. The canal was opened by the Extraordinary Commission on May 17 this year for the irrigation of 1,800 dessiatinas.

14. Irrigation of Lami Misaktsieli Tsilkani. The canal starts from the Aragvi River, with a length of 21 verstas, irrigating an area of 3,000 dessiatinas. The canal was opened on April 19 this year, irrigating 2,000 dessiatinas.
15. Works in the Borchalin district. Irrigation on the Mashaporki River, covering 2,000 dessiatinas.

Investigations and tracing of canals are being carried out for:

16. Irrigation of the Samgor Plain. Originating from the Iori River, the canal is 56 verstas long, irrigating an area of 30,000 dessiatinas.
17. Irrigation of s.s. Bandza-Abasha and others in the Novosanak district, covering an area of 15,000 dessiatinas.
18. Irrigation of lands in the Khovli-Gori district, covering an area of 1,500 dessiatinas.
19. Irrigation of lands in Kaspi, covering an area of 1,000 dessiatinas.

Всего исполнено:	
а) земляных работ по устройству каналов	47000 кв.
б) про nivelировано каналов	2600 вер.
в) протассировано каналов	480 "
г) орошение устраивается на площади	112800 д.
д) проведено каналов главных	20 кан.
е) общая длина этих каналов	120 вер.
ж) общая стоимость их золотом	280000 руб.
з) израсходовано на технический персонал, раз'езды, канцел. и хозяйств. расходы золотом	17000 руб.
и) орошение устроено на площади	18000 дес.
Работы по укреплению берегов р. Цхенис-Цхали и Ингура:	

along the Tskhepie-Tskhali River:

1. The sealing of breaches in Maydansky and Gezatsky was performed by a stone-faced clay dam, 420 arshins long, with a volume of up to 1,500 cubic sazhen. Earthworks for excavating riverbeds amounted to 3,000 cubic sazhen.

along the Inguri River:

1. A dam with a capacity of 100 horsepower, with a volume of 500 cubic meters of stone and brushwood masonry, and excavation of the channel totaling 500 cubic meters, was constructed.

And what did the Georgian Mensheviks achieve during their three years in power? The answer is very simple: nothing.

Citizen Brauntaille, in his research, remains silent about all these works and is busy only collecting stunning facts about the atrocities of the Communists in the Menshevik commissariats.

Engaging in the collection of data on the smaller projects that revitalize the country and fill the hearts of the working masses with joy and vigor, I think, was very boring for Citizen Brauntaille.

But such facts do exist in Georgia.

In the city of Poti, a palace has been built especially for the workers. Will this instill hatred and anger towards Soviet workers in the minds of the working masses? Now in the city of Lanchkhuti, right next to the villa of Zhordania, the head of the Menshevik government, a peasant people's theater is being built. Will this enrage the peasants of Lanchkhuti against Soviet power? For thirty years, the old bureaucratic and Menshevik demagogues have been trumpeting the construction of an 18-verst railroad between Notanebi and Ozurgeti. None of the old bureaucratic and Menshevik demagogues had lifted a finger in this endeavor. By the hands of Communists and Gurian peasants, this railroad is being built now, which is of great economic importance for Georgia. Will this stir up distrust among the peasants towards the new rulers of Georgia? Major works are being carried out in Borchala county, and by next month, the Chatakh copper smelting plant is expected to be put into operation. Isn't this positive work, Citizen Brauntaille? All the equipment for the textile factory has been delivered from Moscow to Tiflis for the development of local raw materials. Is this not a sign of the collapse of Georgian economic life?

Citizen Brauntheil lived mainly in Tiflis. He may not have been able to study the provinces of Georgia, except for the highland Svaneti, but he has studied the life of mountainous Tiflis in great detail.

Tiflis is much more important for Georgia than Moscow for Russia, Berlin for Germany, and London for England. Tiflis is home to one-sixth of the entire Georgian population and is Georgia's only major commercial, industrial, and cultural center.

What is currently happening in Tiflis? Is the city being destroyed or rebuilt?

The budget, in general, is the best indicator of the nature of any economy, so allow me to present a small comparative table of the budgets of the city of Tiflis under autocracy, the Mensheviks, and the Communists.

According to the budgets of 1914, 1919, and 1922, the expenditure items were distributed as follows:

	1914 г.	1919 г.	1922 г.
1. Отдел Управления	27,8 %	18,4 %	3,6 %
2. Наробраз	12,2 "	7,6 "	11,7 "
3. Гораздрав	13,3 "	11,3 "	6,4 "
4. Коммунхоз	34,0 "	51,5 "	77,5 "
5. Уплата долгов	10,3 "	07,7 "	—
6. Разные расходы	2,4 "	3,5 "	0,8 "

This shows that the Communist budget was the most progressive, productive, and economical: in it, public utilities accounted for 77.5%, compared to 51.50% for the Mensheviks and 34.0% for the Nicholas.

But it's much more interesting to unfold the picture of Soviet construction and the prospects of Soviet activity. It should be noted that Tiflis is a basin surrounded by mountains on the side of St. David and the Kodjor highway. During rains, streams flow from these mountains and fill streets, cellars, apartments with water, and all kinds of mud. The only way to make the city healthier is to afforest these mountains, which has been a dream of the city's rulers for 50 years, but no one has taken any practical step until now. Only now, under the Soviet regime, the Tiflis City Executive Committee decided to move the matter forward by allocating 500 million Georgian rubles for the initial works. According to preliminary calculations, this major undertaking will cost the city at least 10 billion.

Along with this, it is necessary to mention the role of the Tiflis City Executive Committee in the realization of the Somgori constructions. By irrigating all slopes of Kukin with the Jordan basin, turning the 200-300 sazhen salt lake under Tiflis into an 8-verst living lake, the city executive committee opened up a wide field for horticulture and gardening around Tiflis. Neither the Mensheviks nor the Nikolaev administration did literally anything to boost the economy and improve the health of the city.

Nowadays, the electrification of the country is the primary focus of attention for the entire republic and the city. In the past, there were only tiresome and annoying words on this issue.

Only now, under the Soviet regime, this historical endeavor of the greatest national, cultural, and economic importance has been set in motion. At the moment these lines are being written, the construction of the first hydroelectric power station not only in Georgia but also in the entire Caucasus, according to the project of engineer Melik-Pashayev in Zemo-Avchelakh, 17 versts away from the city of Tiflis, is underway. This station is intended to replace all 35 functioning power stations in Tiflis and provide the city with three times more electric energy. It represents the inaugural utilization of the republic's water power in the electrification process. The construction of this station will cost 3 million rubles in gold and is expected to reduce the cost of energy by 8 times. Considering that Tiflis, aside from the railroad, consumes 70% of all oil consumed by

Georgia, and that Tiflis will be completely freed from the need to purchase Azerbaijani oil, the colossal comprehensive significance of this station for the entire country is evident to any unbiased observer.

Only citizen Brauntheil remains unaware of this.

Should I discuss other smaller projects? I'll just mention that the Communists inherited the city in a state of ruin, with all the enterprises dilapidated and disorganized, lacking even the most basic amenities. In Tiflis, there is a "European" slaughterhouse, as per the Mensheviks' favored term. The Communists had to completely replace the roof of this slaughterhouse, and only now have they installed a water line to the slaughterhouse near the Kura River, although it lacks water. All of this may seem insignificant, but the Brauntheil Mensheviks paid no attention to such details, and the Amsterdam figure detected no odor from the Menshevik stench at the booth.

Currently, Tiflis is connected to the Navtlug station and to the fight with us by a special tram line, making communication between the Navtlug and Avlabar districts and the city center easier, and reducing the cost of meat products. Major repairs were carried out on all Tiflis baths, water lines, electric stations, trams, and other enterprises, which had not seen any repairs for a whole decade.

I am not saying anything about the drainage and restoration of Saburtalo, the continuous repaving of Tiflis streets: printed materials, reports, diagrams, cartograms, lantern slides, cinematographic pictures were available to review all these and other major agricultural works, but, unfortunately, citizen Brauntheil did not notice any of these things in Tiflis, although they were all demonstrated during his stay in Tiflis.

Brauntheil pays the most serious attention to the situation of the workers. It was to be expected, for he is an Amsterdammer, an admirer of Henderson, Gompers, Kautsky, Adler, a pure-blooded trade unionist, and, in addition, co-editor of a workers' newspaper in Vienna; could he not pay attention to the workers?

Slavery of workers, lack of freedom of elections to unions and Soviets, violence of Soviet gendarmes, poverty, dirt, stupidity, etc. - this is the state of affairs among the workers of Tiflis, according to him.

Did the Amsterdam trade unionist visit the professional organizations in Tiflis? Of course, yes. But in his now historic notebook, Brauntheil wrote lies instead of truth and hypocrisy instead of sincerity.

Now let's consider the situation of the working class in our country under the Soviet system.

Let us begin with the question of the budget of the working class. As I qualified in time the first budget for 1922, drawn up by the Executive Committee of the city of Tiflis, this budget has historical significance for the working class, for never before has Tiflis and Georgia seen such a budget with a decisive implementation in it of the principles of the class policy of the labor proletariat.

In studying the material situation of the working class, it is necessary to present the main components of the entire workers' budget. According to Engels, the workers' budget is broken down into the following expenditure items:

1. Пища	62 %
2. Одежда	16 "
3. Квартира	12 "
4. Отопление и освещение	5 "
5. Просвещение	2 "
6. Налоги	1 "
7. Медицинская помощь	1 "
8. Разные расходы	1 "
Итого	100 %

In order to understand these percentages even better, let us present the real wages of workers representing mainly physical labor. These are tramway workers, who are typical of urban industrial enterprises.

The determination of workers' wages is based on the subsistence minimum. In any fluctuation of prices for goods, the following norms of products are adopted:

Хлеба	50	фун.
Картофелю	30	"
Рыбы	5	"
Капусты	12	"
Мяса	5	"
Постн. масла	1	"
Сливочн. масла	1	"
Сахарного песку	2 ¹ / ₂	"
Соли	2 ¹ / ₂	"

The price of these products is determined by the Council of Trade Unions together with the People's Commissariat of Labor, and this should constitute 70% of the salary. Taking into account the qualifications of workers according to the 17-grade scale, workers of the first category, with an 8-hour working day, will receive 1,941,000 rubles per month, and on average, a worker will receive 3,105,000 rubles for the sixth category. Considering the average overtime work consistently for the last three years, we will see that workers engaged in physical labor will receive around 4,958,000 rubles in the nerve belt area of Georgia and particularly in Tiflis. That is, about 45 rubles and 10 kopecks in gold. The price of the gold ruble, in turn, fell by 40%. Thus, workers engaged in physical labor receive 37 rubles and 6 kopecks in pre-war rubles. In fact, this is a 100% approximation to workers' wages. But that's not all.

We have stated that the general city and state budgets have a character clearly reflecting a class-based and proletarian nature. How is this expressed? It's expressed as follows: workers in Soviet Georgia are exempt from all forms of direct taxes, as well as from any special or targeted levies. Moreover, workers are provided with medical and sanitary assistance, covered by the enterprise, which accounted for only 4% of the workers' budget. Before the war, rent accounted for 12% of the workers' budget. However, the Soviet system has set a fixed rent norm of 1 ruble per square arshin. This means that, on average, workers will pay only 60 kopecks per month for the two best rooms in the finest city and central houses, as opposed to the 24 kopecks they paid in remote parts of the city. Moreover, Soviet workers receive 5% of their wages for work attire and 2% for cultural activities. When you tally it all up, citizen Brauntheil, you'll see that the condition of the working class hasn't just improved during one year of Soviet rule—it has surpassed the old pre-war period.

What else is being done for the workers?

The proletarian revolution has completely transformed life in Tiflis. The Tiflis city executive committee has acquired 400 of the best and healthiest houses in the capital's center, along with 38 gardens and a considerable amount of movable property. Specifically, 76 of the best houses have been reserved for workers. The Professional Associations are the sole owners of these houses, while 19 of the gardens have been allocated to workers' organizations, 3 to workers' cooperatives, and 152 to various labor collectives. Furthermore, the entire Housing Department in the city is overseen by a special board composed solely of responsible workers delegated by the Central Council of Trade Unions of Georgia. This board controls 25% of the city's entire apartment space, prioritizing allocation to workers.

I do not mention here anything about workers' kindergartens, community centers, or housing, nor do I mention anything about the workers' settlements of great importance for the workers, for which purpose a special municipal mortgage bank has been established. But Brauntheil, who forgets all this, would like to ask: where and in which states, apart from the Soviet republics, have these principles of life been introduced, which are of great educational, spiritual, and economic importance for these yesterday's pariahs, slaves, the downtrodden, the oppressed? In what country is the whole order of social life directed towards the endless and systematic improvement of the life of the workers, as is the case in the Soviet republics?

According to the reports drawn up by the Mensheviks in the Soviet service, we can see that in absolute figures, the wages were spent during the first half of 1924 and are being spent according to estimates for the second half of the current year:

	В пер. пол. 22 г.	Во вт. пол. 22 г.
1. По предприятиям *)	25,480 мил. руб.	37,017 мил. руб.
2. Стросантех	1.215 " "	3.922 " "
3. Земотдел	550 " "	1.800 " "
4. Наробраз	7.874 " "	25.482 " "
5. Горздрав	6.376 " "	14.160 " "

No matter how these figures deviated in the second half of 1923 in the process of fulfilling the estimated predestinations, it is clear that the working class has left behind the nightmarishly hard days of disaster and moved onto the broad road of joy and liberation. Under the socio-economic conditions created in Georgia now, no worker will turn from the Soviet path, unless they are true traitors of the working class, unless they are members of the bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks.

For eight years, we have not rested from war and internecine strife; everything perished, crumbled, collapsed, and now, within one year of Soviet power, we have risen and strengthened so much that with an open mind, looking directly into the eyes of the workers, we can triumphantly say to our dear freedom fighters: rejoice, comrades. Your long-term patience and hardship are bearing great fruit - the prosperity of the working class, its dominant position, and cultural prosperity in life.

And you, citizen Brauntheil, slander as much as you want; we know that the workers you have deceived will not ignore your criminal aims of disgracing the workers of the republics and the Soviet workers.

Up to now, we have been talking exclusively about workers of physical labor with average qualifications. We shall now reveal a broader picture of the entire commercial and industrial Tiflis.

We will present the data compiled by the City Statistical Department over several years to provide insight into the workers' situation from a historical perspective. The fluctuations in market prices and the correlation between wages and these fluctuations are depicted in the following illustration. We set the year 1918 as the base year with a value of 100 for both prices and wages, considering it to be relatively normal. Thus, the following changes have occurred since 1918:

	в 1913 г.	в 1916 г.	в 1918 г.	в 1920 г.	в 1921 г.
Рыночн. цены на продукты	100	141	2.940	176.152	803.877
Заработная плата	100	119	1.428	34.000	970.580

It is evident from this that the Menshevik period for the workers was a period of unprecedented economic oppression of the workers in Georgia; inflation caused unheard-of leaps, while wages moved at a snail's pace.

These disastrous living conditions for the workers changed for the better only with the consolidation of Soviet power in Georgia, especially in recent times in 1922.

In connection with the improvement in food supplies on one hand, and the stability of prices for goods on the other, according to the conclusion of collective agreements, we see that in relation to the index of commodity prices in 1922, which was 19.972.652 (1918 being 100), the wage index is approaching, showing a figure of 16,665,000. For clarity, let us show the ratio of real wages to these price indices for a series of years in units.

В 1913 году	1:1
» 1918 «	1:2
» 1920 «	1:5
» 1921 «	1:8
» 1922 «	1:1,8

These relations reveal the following: The years 1915-1921 were the most challenging for the working class; this marks the illustrious Menshevik era of the "free" democratic republic. Under the Communists in 1923, workers would receive nearly three times as much as they did under the Mensheviks in 1920. A significant turning point occurred under the Soviet regime in 1922, when we reached the standard of 1916, surpassing the pre-war conditions.

The improvement in the working class's material position brings about a profound change in the entire economy. During the Menshevik rule, absenteeism, vacation days, and sick leave were as low as 30-3800 working hours; now they have been reduced to nearly normal levels of 6-80%. To illustrate this, I'll provide a random example from the tobacco industry in Georgia. The total number of missed man-hours in factories doesn't exceed 80% of the worked man-hours, and labor intensity is maximized. So, in 1914, a worker produced 6400 cigarettes a day; in 1922:

В июне	9320	штук	папирос
» июля	9607	»	»
» августе	11665	штук	папирос.

The best example of the overall revival of the national economy is Tiflis, where citizen Brauntheil stayed, without noticing any revitalization in life. And how could one not notice the following picture of 1922:

	Поступления от предприятий	Поступления финансовые
В январе	3,5 млрд. руб.	5,9 млрд. руб.
„ феврале	5,3 „ „	4,3 „ „
„ марте	7,8 „ „	8,1 „ „
„ апреле	11,6 „ „	6,8 „ „
„ мае	15,9 „ „	9,8 „ „
„ июне	12,6 „ „	13,3 „ „
„ июле	13,4 „ „	14,8 „ „
„ августе	16,5 „ „	15,8 „ „
„ сентябре	17,6 „ „	17,5 „ „

These remarkable figures demonstrate the unprecedented progress of Tiflis's industrial organizations, showcasing the economic development of both its population and the city. Within just nine months, production income increased fivefold, and financial income tripled. Throughout its history, the city has never sustained itself with its own resources, its own production, or its own economy; it has always relied on French and Belgian capital, autocracy, or the lesser Shevist printing press. Only under the Soviet system did Tiflis become self-sufficient, managing its own economy and enriching its life using its own resources.

Can we envision production prosperity amidst worker impoverishment and death? Our sociology has not yet reached the level of sophistication required to explain social phenomena to Brauntheil. Let's wait; perhaps the International and the Amsterdam Union will introduce a new doctrine of political economy in the near future.

We've addressed the economic question for Braintail.

Now, it's essential to address the national question in Georgia, which Braunthavel ponders over and simplifies in a Zordanian and Cretelian manner.

Brauntailli's key points are as follows: Russians oppress Georgians, Tiflis has become a Russian city in Georgia, Armenians and Russians have formed a bloc against Georgia, Georgian culture is dissipating, and so forth.

How should we respond to this Brauntailian nonsense? We're familiar with this political demagogy not only from Brauntailli's lips. P. Milyukov also claims that Moscow Communists have betrayed Russian national interests. Does the freedom of Taras Shevchenko's language in Ukraine and the abolishment of the Jewish population's residency line imply national oppression? It's well-known that Menshevism didn't address the issue of national minorities in Georgia, and these minorities vehemently opposed Menshevik state power in Georgia. For us, one thing is essential: national minorities must be respected. They must be given concessions and opportunities for

development. The dominant nation must relinquish its ultranationalist desires; we must silence zoology in the national question and adopt the principles of socialist federalism.

Communism stifled pan-Russian politics in Great Russia. It also put an end to pan-Georgian nationalism in Georgia, pan-Armenian in Armenia, and pan-Turkic in Azerbaijan.

To some, this represents a threat to national interests. For others, including ourselves, it signifies the correct resolution of the issue. It embodies the freedom of self-determination and is a prerequisite for the development of every nation.

The Menshevik resolution of the national question led to inter-ethnic conflicts in Georgia.

Cadet Russian nationalism triggered Jewish pogroms in Russia. This was what the right-wing elements, the offspring of the dark reaction in Georgia and Russia, desired and yearned for.

The communist solution to the national question pacified the smaller nations, eradicating national unrest and pogroms at their core. Massacres and pogroms have been forgotten everywhere, as brothers of diverse ethnicities work together for the common cultural prosperity of the entire working class.

This is not what the rightists desire, but it is the aspiration of the workers and peasants. No power can sustain itself in Transcaucasia without quelling pan-Georgian nationalism in Georgia, pan-Armenian chauvinism in Armenia, and the pan-Turkic zoological instincts in Azerbaijan.

Anyone seeking to practically address the state question in Transcaucasia should be aware of this.

We are surprised by the following circumstance: Brauntaill observed the oppression of the Georgian people by the Communists, but why does he call for the Entente to come to Georgia when the British and Germans were oppressing Georgians in the most unceremonious way? Does Brauntaill know that the Entente forces established so-called "neutral zones" all over Georgia, populated by various ethnic groups, where Georgia was not dominant but rather aliens from the Entente countries? Borchalo, Djenaqkheti, Meskhetia, Abkhazia, the Dariali direction—wherever the hand of Menshevik power was directed by the Entente!

Why does citizen Brauntaill remain silent about all this?

The Mensheviks tolerated European domination in Georgia, and they themselves dominated and enjoyed banquets. The Mensheviks would have tolerated Entente domination even if the neutral zones had expanded indefinitely, as long as at least Khevsureti was left to the lesser Viks for the dominance of their party and its narrow interests. The Mensheviks ceded Argalani and Meskhethia to the Turks in order to retain control over the rest of Georgia; they offered Batumi to Kamel Pasha and brought 500 askers to Batumi for this purpose as well.

During their three-year rule in Georgia, the Mensheviks never took into account the true national interests of Georgia, and on the most desperate but outwardly solemn day of May 26th, 1918, the Mensheviks announced and wrote in the newspaper "Droba": Georgian independence is not a goal for us, Mensheviks, but a tactical move. Devdanani stated that with the expansion of Menshevik influence, the Social Democrats would move away from Georgian independence.

For the Mensheviks, Georgia was merely a geographical point, an outpost in their fight against the communism they abhorred, yet they failed to retain control of these outposts, just as they failed to hold on to Batum in 1918 and Artaan in 1921.

Their only strength lay in international law and the favor of the Entente, but international law, unsupported by real power, holds little significance.

If the Mensheviks, once disciples of Lassalle, have forgotten the fundamentals of Marxism, then let them at least study the works of Keynes to understand how the Entente disregards the norms of international law whenever convenient.

Under the Menshevik rule, the English general Kukkolpe established a republic in Gruani in the east, Armenia approached the very walls of Tiflis, Turks seized Batum and Akhaltsikhe, Azerbaijan fought for Zakatali and Karavy, while Dobrovoye pressed on Sukhum.

In the history of Georgia and its national existence, the era of Menshevism was marked by internecine strife, war, famine, decline, and the exhaustion of the country.

For Georgia, communism heralded the beginning of regathering strength, increased population growth, energy accumulation, and cultural development.

Braunheil cares about the Georgian language. The issue of language is very interesting in Georgia. One cannot but agree, citizens of Braunteil, that the Russian language has taken deep roots among the Georgian intelligentsia. At the height of nationalism in Georgia, the Russian language has not ceased to be the language of communication. Russian is the language of the greatest nation in the world - Russians. "Happy is the intellectual," wrote Kautsky in 'Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism', "who belongs to a

large nation and especially to one whose language has become a world language.” Not without reason, Karl Marx, at the end of his life, studied the Russian language with special zeal. For a whole century, Russian has been a cultural language for Georgia. The territorial neighborhood and cultural influence of Russia have left a deep trace in our life. Literally all Georgian figures of all political parties are products of the Russian school. Whether Georgia wants it or not, it will not do without the Russian language, just as Flemish cannot do without the French language, just as in Austria every Magyar, Czech, Slovak, Russian, Ruthenian, and Russin needs German as a language of life, just as in Silesin and on the Rhine every Pole and Frenchman needs to know German. This in no way implies that no attention should be paid to the development of national languages. The cultural development of world languages does not mean that the languages of small nations are dying. The Georgian language developed under the Vostorgovs, Chudetskys, Golitsyns, during the expulsion of the Georgian language from all schools, even primary schools. Under the Soviet regime, in all schools, in society, in Executive Committees, in the press, the Georgian language is universal and nationwide in Gruzni. The Soviet constitution considers the Georgian language as the state language. Freedom of language is the alphabet of communism.

The Menshevik rule threatened to destroy the Georgian language. The detachment of Akhaltsikha and Artaania from Georgia under Mensheviks expelled the Georgian language from these historical Georgian lands, and Georgians who remained there adopted the Islamic religion and adopted the Turkic language. The 20th century was the century of gathering of Georgian territory, the century of spreading of the Georgian language with terrible oppression of the Georgian language by the autocratic government. It is unimaginable to imagine that under the best economic conditions of freedom of the nation and language, Georgian speech and writing would have perished.

In the Soviet system, we see not only the economic revival of the country but also the development of national-cultural Adorian principles. This is why we, the left federalists of Georgia, have always supported the Communists.

A few more words about the coalitions of public forces in Georgia.

So far, the political relationship among social forces in Georgia has not been adequately highlighted. The February coup and the Soviet system brought about significant changes in the socio-political structure of Georgia. According to Braunthal, the communists in Georgia are not only a foreign force, but they also lack support in the existing political parties in Georgia. In this regard, as in all other matters, Braunthal deviates from truth and reality.

With the Soviet system, we have two major coalitions: the first coalition led by the Mensheviks along with the Right Federalists, Right SRs, and National Democrats; the

second coalition is led by the Communists with the Left Federalists and Left SRs. The fusion of the Mensheviks and National Democrats - these Georgian counterparts of Markov and Purishkevich - was formed in the Constituent Assembly. The party of the petty nobility and urban kulaks, the party of Catholicos Amvrosy and the feudal lords, has been engaged in joint organizational work with the Mensheviks for three years now in the so-called 'Inter-Party Committee.' What could there possibly be in common between this reactionary force and the Georgian working class?

Indeed, the most criminal and shameful connection of the Mensheviks with the entire right wing of Georgian society has discredited the Menshevik Party to such an extent that for the general mass of workers, the mere name 'Menshevik' evokes indignation. This word is now considered the most obscene, the most insulting.

Not a single issue of any Georgian newspaper is published without an announcement that a Menshevik, a right-wing federalist, or a right-wing SR, disavowing their past, is leaving the right-wing circles and joining the corresponding party of the left-wing coalition. This is the result of the Menshevik party's agony, its final decomposition, its demise.

All those who genuinely stand for the workers and peasants in Georgia constitute a united socialist coalition led by the Communists. All opportunists and traitors, black-hundred and counter-revolutionary elements from white clergy to black clergy, from princes to moneylenders, form a united front with the Mensheviks.

The two-year existence of Soviet power in Georgia has proven to everyone that under the banner of peaceful coexistence of peoples, the greatest construction work is now being carried out in all regions of Georgia.

We call upon all those who have been misled and stunned by Braunthal and Menshevik gossip:

Go and strengthen the ranks of Soviet workers in Georgia. Do you want the prosperity of your homeland and the development of national culture?

Georgia has that.

You want peace among nations and creative work on the economic front?

Georgia has that. Only two things are missing in Georgia:

1. There is no bullying of the Georgian people under the guise of patronage and protectorate, as in Persia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, India, where Lloyd George's England dominates. There is no trampling of workers' rights as in Syria, Algeria,

and the newly enslaved areas of Saarland, Alsace, etc., where French imperialism is rampant.

2. There is no trace of the facts that Braunteil hastened to inform Europe about. With his speech, he only strengthens the self-consciousness of the working class and its resistance to European bourgeoisie and imperialism. Tedo Glonti."

Tedo Glonti