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

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“Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.”

Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels

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PITY, MANIFESTOS, AND THE LEFT

R.M. ROGERS

The left is dead; it died of pity for itself. Questions of where the 'radical' non-liberal left is going, of where it needs to go, of where it could go if (only any given line of programmatic measures were applied), all are the staples of any properly rounded left-academic polemic which may appear in the spectacular of today. One might think that after decades of reiteration, that this endlessly predictable ideological parade of elementary neo-Kautskyite commentary might have lost the perception of its initial historical vigor, but, in line with the demands of ideology, the presentation has remained rapid enough in its evolution to stay afloat- so long as the need remains for the castration of radical theory, this will remain an unquestionable trend of our times. The continued overdevelopment of what today passes as modern 'production' has persisted in preparing heightened numbers of would-be discontents with the materials demanded of false negation, however, and the demands for the mass party, for the united left, for the sale of the paper, all have found new life in a society dependent upon the preservation of the old.

Like any worthless consumer product, the left has been built up with promises in every presumable field of falsely dreamed desire, promising to fulfill every modern dream of the modern consumer that capitalism has simply failed to imbue all with, promising capitalism without capital, consumption without work, a final synthesis of reality with its fraudulent depiction of commodity-induced utopia. With its aging, it has only become more diverse, more diffuse, with numerous additions in flavoring, coloring, and packaging having been

tacked onto the same tired ideological currents upon which the commodity has always been founded upon. The opiate of leftist revolution has lost some of its high, and its proprietors are no less than aware of this reality. Technical considerations of capitalism aside, the ability of every leftist to head his own virtual splitter party aside, the same alienation of militancy persists in asserting past the veneer of endless innovation.

Inevitably, these considerations are not absent from this pseudo-debate either, making the coup of the left all the more convincing. A discourse that has what appears to be a good and proper oppositional force in the swelling markets of the intellectual, the racket has done well enough internally in the preservation of its own paltry, yet still potentially discernible, position as the overseer of the anti-capitalist struggle. In true postmodern fashion, it has indeed become the case that the left is more self aware than ever, but this self awareness has not encouraged anything beyond a static pity. Envious of the past, ignorant of the future, and concerned primary with the preservation of what decaying mass of prestige is still allotted to the left, the modern militant of reform masquerading as revolution has become sentient in all the most detestable regards. This cadre knows that the conditions of 1917 are long past, that revolution will take on an appearance separate from those which they know, but this is a reality not fully quantifiable in the language of alienation upon which the dedication of their life has been founded.

Every imaginable left party bureaucracy, the skeletal corpses of every blend of Leninism, all are clamoring in rapid opposition to any article for left unity and to any outfit making a pass at the phrase; these debates are not anything new to the history of the ideology, they wrote the battle plan well over a century ago and are quite fully capable of conducting themselves both defensively and offensively in this still entirely

predictable organizational dichotomy. They detest left unity, they know it to be worthless, but their reasons are purely self-reflexive in the most classical sense, they fail to escape the mentality of the 'radical' organization as anything but an organization built along the static framework of a positive dialectic designed never to be founded. All the arguments are still well known, each party cannot have unity because it is the only true party of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, etc., but the arguments are listing, only the fool insists on buying the face value of such historiography today. As far back as the organizational split in the question of inclusivity vs exclusivity that split the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the more self-conscious bureaucrats of the left have realized that a strong correlation exists between group size and ease of maintenance, with regards to their own power. Not averse to such self-serving sentiments themselves, the careerists of the opposite camp of traditional mass leftist organizing, the lingering vestige of Kautsky's SPD, have since proven themselves entirely capable of making a spectacle of the mystical call to unity in party organization in an époque which has long since killed the mass party. The debate may have been livelier at the time, with more true believers occupying the ranks, but the illusion of the appearance was all the same. It's a useful ordering of the question for both sides, however, as it is a question which allows some molecular decorum of legitimacy. The 'tactical' arguments which occur over the divide of what should or should not be scarified for the sake of the mass party are known as irrelevant to most, even if as much amounts to a reality spoken rarely, but this is a reality which lends brilliance to the structure of such a fight- all sides are fully aware that the leverage they may be allotted on a useless question is infinitely greater than that which they may have on questions applicable.

The Democrats depend on the Republican menace for negative self definition, vice versa, so follows the ordering of modern leftist ideology. No one is quite sure these days of the differences present between the 50 or so leading Trotskyite parties competing for the title of America's next top vanguard except the leading members of said groups, a milieu which remains questionably informed. Such is beneficial; it gives them all something terribly important to kill time with. As with any good boss, the militant remains in an adherent to the language of dead time and its material application, the logic of labor. And, in the ranks of a recomposed modernist ideology, an ideology still thoroughly beholden to the myth of labors' naturally imbued positivity, this is a factor not to be scoffed at for its purposes of delusion.

Regardless of whether or not they consider revolution to be a spectacle created at the behest of a few, or they consider it to require a mass 'proletarian' party of sorts, the end results all exist within close ideological proximity. The more hardened neo-Bolsheviks of today may consider the process on a sliding scale, with more leverage towards rapid transformation towards the myth of their respective rise to dictatorial power, while the holders of the mass line consider these efforts to require more overtures towards the political of today, but the aim is yet a complete realization of a centralized spectacle continually perfected. The baggage maintained by most that inner party democracy will keep a mass political grouping in line isn't of much note in this process towards a more thoroughly controlled state management of capitalist production, the notion of critiquing the image of modern democracy with the corollary of a mystified 'economic democracy' exists only to provide the worker with yet another brand of illusive poverty. Yes, the left of today will employ all with fair wages, provide all with centralized healthcare, furnish our department stores with

the 'fairly' produced commodity, all the while eliminating the tyranny of the integrated diffuse with a return to a more modern and equitable tyranny of rationally planned alienation. Militant reformism remains reformism in the society of the spectacle, citations of Lenin and Marx aside.

It's a shame, surely, to think of the casualties suffered in wasted ink on this question since shown to be productive only to aims counter to those of revolt, but, once again, it's a shame which does not at the same time stimulate surprise. The left of today replicates all the pseudo-debates and false inquiry as the left of yesterday, with repetition serving as the primary model for self-justification. Neo-liberalism is one of the favored enemies of the left today; every article must cite it for legitimacy, so that our enemy may be recognizes as such. Liberalism, in all its varied forms, is in power, it must temper its promises in action- whereas the left is the shadow government of liberal thought, free of such constraints in its speech and thus prepared with the allowance to generate what false divisions between itself and liberalism proper that it may please. Just as Trotsky could speak freely of the deformities of his former Soviet state, purely from a position of envy against its preferred cult image of power, so to may the 'revolutionary' left say as it pleases. When SYRIZA is out of power, it will take dramatic anti-capitalist stances as it pleases, in the latest manifestation of the psychosis of the left, though it is well known by most any honest observer that they will cooperate perfectly well with all the norms of modern statesmanship. Neo-liberalism, like the innumerable other ideologically dreamed enemies of the left, serves to remind all that differences exist between the radical left and the liberal left, that radical leftist organizing still yet has a justification for its continued existence to the spectacle, that their lives are somehow defensible, somehow beyond the alienation

understood to grip all else. The highest form of alienation, leftism has done the finest work for the continuity of class power today.

Once it could be said that the struggle of organized labor, and its hoards of leftist collaborators, was one of some historical salience, when it occupied something of a discernible relation to then popular conceptions of class struggle, but these lessons of revolt have remained entirely static in an époque of class dominance marked by fluidity. The pendulum of capital versus labor has become so thoroughly recuperated into the discourse of the spectacle that today most any argument hinged on the premise automatically finds itself a victim of unconscious self-castration. Use value no longer exists, production no longer exists in relation to organic social demand, all the production that appears today does so simply for the ends of expansion in the field of production. Modernist ideology has run amuck with the creation of increasingly intricate desires and their correlative commodities, this is the reality of what passes as the mystic 'neoliberal' adversary. Questions of revolution today are not questions of how to create an ecofriendly capitalism under the guise of socialism, of designs for communal living to be applied today, but rather questions of how to do away with this complete totality. Not only are the conditions for revolution ripe, but they are rotting, a rot which the left has not escaped.

The affairs of organizational trifle are now to be viewed as they are, the marginalized fringes will now be given critical inquiry into the cause of their marginalization, revolution demands nothing short of such action. Around the inventors of new values the world revolves. The question of negating the image of revolution by party is certainly not one of original qualities, the history of anarchism is laden with appearances to just such conflict, but their fetishistic love of negation without

negation is yet another ideological barrier to the end of a revolution made for the total destruction of the society of spectacle. “Ideology is the falsehood of language and radical theory its truth.” spoke Vaneigem in his Revolution of Everyday Life, in a phrase yet relevant to the struggle for truly revolutionary organization today, which is to say, in the struggle for negative revolutionary organization, or, a fully expressed style of negation.

What is demanded of ones understanding of revolution is thus not a strong ecoconsciousness, not a reiteration of blissfully rendered Russian history, not another manifesto on repackaged reform, but rather, an acceptance that *we know nothing of modern revolt*. The knowledge of revolution will come with the creation of revolution, until that time, our efforts as revolutionists can only lie in the aim of detonating just such a process. Radical separation from the world of separation, such is the only act one can turn to as fertile ground for the discovery of such detonations, as embodied in this model of critique is a critique of the totality. This critique does not entail physical isolation from the centers of modern production, such an illusion has crippled far too many self-assumed anarchist ideologues, but rather an integrated comment against the integrated. A detournement of all that is at once presented within the field of capital's vision necessary must be predicated on the presence of some model of engagement, rarely are battles won with dated tactics, with plans decided for battles since passed.

He who has knowledge walks among the left today as among animals. Dead are all ideologies, now we want to live...let this be our last will.

A CRITICAL HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT

REMI DOBBS

Authors note: This paper began as a critique of Morgan Witzel's A History Of Management Thought, a book which was assigned for a graduate course on Organizational & Management Theory. The work, which claims to be a summary of management thought from the beginning of civilization to the modern day, had a large number of apparent flaws and 'holes' in its historical structure, but during my critique I swiftly found that the issue was not the text itself, it was the flawed and ideological history that Management has built up around itself. As this realization dawned on me this paper moved from an attempt to 'plug the holes' of Witzel's work--to present a discussion on the power structures of early capitalism which he glosses over--into a critique of modern management thought in general. Throughout this paper I attempted, to what degree I could, to present these ideas and my critique sans jargon and in a self explanatory way. I hope you enjoy.

> *"How would you arrive at the factor of safety in a man?" Wilson asked*
> *"By a process analogous to that by which we arrive at the same factor in a machine," he replied.*
> *"Who is to determine this for a man?" asked A.J. Cole, a union representative.*
> *"Specialists," replied Stimson.*
> (Kanigel 2005 460)

When a political proposition is made, its political nature is seen, critiqued, its power structures discussed. But if that proposition survives, if it lasts a century or for centuries, it is no longer a proposition. It becomes a social system, a system we are brought up in, a system we are taught within, a system we have a hard time thinking outside of. This is especially true of management thinking.

A hundred years after the Congressional hearing on Frederick W. Taylor's methods, and after decades of depoliticization, management has come to be seen as a science, a fact of life. In the meanwhile, management academics try desperately to fix the *disorganizing* effects of management thinking (Addleson 2011 1). What both the layman and the academic miss is that management thought is political and serves to hide and justify the power relationships which occur within the workplace. Within this essay I will discuss the political dimension of management thought through a critique of Morgan Witzel's *A History of Management*.

Morgan Witzel's *A History of Management Thought* is a task of amazing scope--an attempt to provide a survey of all management thought from the very beginning of civilization, showing that "since the birth of civilization, people have been writing and thinking about problems in management and how to solve them" (Witzel 2011, 2). Despite Witzel's goal there are significant holes in his narrative--several times he says with surprise that this or that major civilization "did not produce much in the way of notable work on business…[or] administration" (ibid 26). Such a finding is without a doubt 'strange, even perverse' (ibid 25), but such major holes suggest a mistake, not so much in archival work as in historical perspective.

HISTORY IS MORE THAN LOOKING BACK

In R.G. Collingwood's *The Idea of History*, he warns against thinking that the past is merely a backwards extension of the present, or thinking of writing history as a merely archival endeavor. Cut-and-paste history, as he calls it, is a school of thinking which attempts to understand the peoples and practices of the past without understanding the thinking of the past, and he calls it a critical misunderstanding of history--a method which turns the study of history into a series of

technical problems: “a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian” (Collingwood 1946, 132).

He argues, instead, that thinking historically requires putting any event or reading within the context of the time, and attempting to put oneself in the shoes of those one writes about (ibid 172-173). This requires understanding the way a different culture or time functions, and appreciating the way that the context of the modern day presses itself on the study of history.

How does this relate to Witzel? Witzel writes very much in the context of his time, where even military or governmental organizations use the language of business and see themselves as businesses. He writes in an age where business and management is explicitly written about in hundreds of journals and self help books, where the development of business is seen as a positive phenomenon.

Our context is very different from even the immediate past. There was little explicit thought on the subjects of business and management until 18th and 19th centuries respectively. Much of the thinking about management and business before this was 'embedded' within society, ie people thought about management or organizations via analogies to other things which were more familiar to them. Without accepting the embedded nature of management thinking--which would recast management thought as an Ideology rather than as a discipline--accessing the past's implicit thinking about management would be difficult if not impossible. This explains the major gaps in Witzel's work before Taylor.

It also leads to a far more interesting question than why one university professor chose to write a history text in a certain way. That is, what happened to change management thinking into an explicit discipline? Throughout history people were able to manage massive organizations and projects without the help of management literature, and even as late as the 20th century there were many people who insisted that

management could not be taught or explained to any satisfactory level. What led to the change?

This question--what events led to the emergence of management thought as a discipline rather than as a series of societal beliefs, is the key question of this essay. To answer it, I will examine Witzel's text--as *A History of Management Thought* is above all else a perfect example of the Whig History management has of itself--while constructing an alternate explanation for the creation of management.

This essay will be organized in three sections corresponding to three eras of management thinking. Through the first section, which will follow the time when management was an implicit mode of thinking, I will discuss three civilizations which Witzel says 'did not have much to say' about management (Rome, Ancien Regime France, and Ming China) as well as others to attempt to explain the hole in his narrative. With the knowledge gained there, the second section--following the 19th century and the evolution of an explicit field of management--will explain the reasons for management's shift into the public light. And in the third section (going over the 20th and 21st centuries), I will will return to discussing the holes in Witzel's narrative and how the origins of management still affect it today.

NOBLESSE OBLIGE: ARISTOCRATIC MANAGEMENT

Witzel's choice to begin his discussion of management thinking at the very beginnings of human civilization is both a highly innovative choice and one that leaves open much space for problematic writing. Many traditional histories of management have started with Frederick Taylor's work or immediately earlier (Witzel 2012 1), and in doing so are able to talk about management thought that occurs in a society relatively similar to ours rather than the massively different

societies of the Classical, Medieval, or Enlightenment eras not to mention the management thinking of the rest of the world.

Witzel expresses shock throughout his earlier chapters that this or that major civilization (the Romans, the Chinese) either did not have much to say about management or did not produce anything in the realm of management thought (ibid 26). This seems to be wrong on its face--how could the Chinese or Romans administer massive empires without thinking about the subject of management? Why is it that even as firms did business on a global scale, management thinking existed in an intellectual squalor, only being mentioned on occasion and in passing, which Witzel notes ("most earlier authors did not set out to write works on management" [Witzel 2012 2]) but does not seem to appreciate. This leads to the question: why did management thought not emerge until the dawning of the 20th century? Or more specifically, *what* changed to necessitate the creation of management thought?

Pre-industrial management thinking was constrained in two ways: the anti-commercial underpinnings of aristocratic society, and the belief in the other-worldly superiority of the aristocrat. These beliefs reinforced each other, leading to a society that did not need and did not want a concentrated literature on business management.

Nearly every pre-industrial society afforded a special rank at the lowest positions in society for the merchant class. Whether via bans on usury as in the West or through the legal-social construction of merchants as a low social class as in India, China, and Japan, business was widely seen as a 'low' activity across societies. The only legitimate form of wealth accumulation, from Republican Rome to Ancien Regime France to Ming China, was through land ownership and rents--that is, forms of wealth gained without the exertion of labor (Ranum 1979 197-199; Brooks 1999 278-279). The sons of successful merchants would often give up their business as a way to gain entry into the aristocratic elite, a tendency which could be seen

in societies as disparate as 18th century Paris (Ranum 1979 197-199) and 14th century China (Brooks 1999 278-279).

This anti-business viewpoint came from two combined viewpoints--the importance of otherworldly goods and the subsequent distaste for those straining for worldly goods. These otherworldly goods (karma, familial prestige, *gentilesse*) had in common that they could not be established within one lifetime but instead were gained over multiple generations and lifetimes. But more importantly, these otherworldly goods were thought to provide far greater skill than anything which could be taught: thus even as markets developed in Europe and China they remained something dominated by aristocrats.

This leads to the belief in the inherent superiority of the aristocracy. This belief impeded the development of management thought in two key ways. The first was the idea that aristocrats had inborn abilities which meant that there was little to no need for teaching or even thinking about management. The second was a widescale belief that the poor were subhuman or otherwise incapable of agency, an idea which meant that there was no need to develop a set of ideas based around managing other individuals. These two intellectual products of the feudal economy combined with an allegorical view towards businesses made the development of management thinking unnecessary. It took not one but three revolutions to shake this framework.

That aristocrats had inborn abilities was commonsensical to the people of the pre-Industrial era. Many of the patrician families of Rome claimed to be descended from Gods (Holland 2004 21-22), and both Ming China and Ancien Regime France had a concept of gentlemanliness (in French, *gentilhomme* and in Chinese *junzi*), an inborn concept which placed one irrevocably above his peers. *Gentillesse* was a characteristic that could only be provided through the blood: "the King might create a noble, but not even he could make a gentleman…[*gentillesse* could only be created] by deeds, heroic deeds, and by time. Two generations usually sufficed" (Ranum

1979 135-136). The *gentilhomme* was a larger than life character, capable of more destructiveness and more greatness than any mortal could possibly grasp.

The *junzi* was a remarkably similar character, a person beneath only the sage (a saint like figure) in societal placement. The *junzi* was literally translated to 'lords son', which keeps with the inherited nature of nobility. The *junzi,* moreover, was defined by his ability to see what the everyman could not: his virtue and knowledge of the classics led to transcendent accomplishments inconceivable to the 'small minded' (Wilson 2009 xviii).

The gentleman was an anti-business person, explicitly defined in noneconomic terms. The French *gentilhomme* was a martial and artistic figure while the *junzi* was at heart an academic living isolated from the world (Brooks 1999 2). In both cases these figures exist without any discussion into the origins of their wealth. But the conception of in-born gentlemanliness challenged management from another front. Witzel notes that as late as the 20th century British business schools would not teach management, believing management to be an "aristocratic x-factor" (Witzel 2012 131), something which could not be taught. This gets to the heart of the problem--why think about management if the ability to lead was simply in the blood? Why not think about, instead, the blood? Pre-industrial societies shared widespread horrors at the possibility of miscegenation, and the societal punishments involved in a *gentilhomme* family marrying a non-noble one were so strong that no such combination has been found (Ranum 1979 135). Love between the Indian castes was viewed with similar anxiety (Fukuyama 2011 167). This anxiety, and the complicated categories of nobility and peasanthood constructed over the centuries in nearly all societies, lead to a society where inborn abilities were seen as as powerful that "certain physical characteristics exemplifying nobility were intentionally sought out and bred" (Ranum 1979 136).

This belief in the inborn abilities of the nobleman had another side to it: a disbelief in the ability of the poor to think or act for themselves. The Fronde, a civil war in 17th century France, began because the crown considered the nobility as responsible for the revolts of their peasants who were "considered to be something like leashed animals, and when they revolted, the king, the bishops, and the nobility frequently blamed the nobles…for not keeping the peasantry in hand" (Ranum 1979 200). Because the peasants were considered to be 'childlike' and obviously followed their superior masters, revolts along the Seine valley were considered to be aristocratic plots rather than a reaction by individual actors.

A similar example of individuality being viewed as either an aberration or as the purposeful malice of the master can be seen in the American south. During the 19th century, a pseudo-science was built around understanding the origins of slave revolts and runaways. The idea of Drapetomania, that is, the irrational want to run away from one's masters, was prescribed as a reaction slaves had to masters "attempting to raise him to a level with himself" (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h3106t.html). That the position of the African slave is given as "the Deity's will" (ibid) is a common trend which occurs in readings from all over the world in the preindustrial era.

The belief in a hierarchy ordained by a divine being (or by the laws of science) permeated nearly all pre-Industrial cultures, manifesting in different ways in different societies. In India it manifested as literal castes (Fukuyama 2011 164-167), in China in the 'Nine Ranks' (ibid 146), in Europe as the Gentilesse/Noblesse/bourgeoisie/peasant distinction. This hierarchy created an interlocking set of beliefs which destroyed the need for management thinking. These beliefs--in the supernatural and inborn powers of the nobility, in the lack of agency of the lower classes, in the unimportance of business--combined into a feudal ideology which devalued the idea of

social mobility, devalued the individual excepting the aristocratic individual, denied the agency of the lower classes and devalued the unheroic task of running a business. Combined, they formed a social system which allowed very little room outside of it. If nobility is inborn and nobility is only gained through 'heroic' acts, why care about running a business? If the peasants had little to no agency, why think about managing them? If social mobility is de facto impossible except through the state and the nobility, why invest one's time in a business when a title is clearly so much more important?

This set of questions explains Wiztel's surprise in finding little to no development ion management thinking in Chinese, French, or Roman cultures--they thought about management analogically, through metaphors to leadership (which they considered inborn) and the family. The workplace--the prime focus of management--was seen as merely another, inferior, aspect within society. Furthermore, management rests on an a priori assumption of a relatively equal relationship between the boss and the worker--the worker could be fired, the worker could work poorly, the worker could leave but in management the worker is assumed to have agency--which did not (intellectually) exist within the latifunda workplace. The general examples that Witzel finds of proto-management in the pre-Enlightenment era occurred in exceptional cases where upheaval destroyed the idea of inborn ability (Machiavelli's *Il Principe* was written to the victor in an assumed coup, an event which occurred often in Italian city states), or in the case of something considered more important (warfare). This intersecting set of ideas was so strong that it took centuries before it started to fall apart.

THE REPUBLIC IN THE WORKSHOP — MANAGEMENT AS REACTION

The general notion of history is as a march to the present. It is the mistake of every society to think that the

zeitgeist of the present day came about as the result of a series of won compromises and that we are living in "the best of all possible worlds". The general history of America takes this viewpoint. The Founding Fathers are not seen as revolutionaries in their time--promoting a radically different system than what had came before--but as conservative figures in our time, promoting the current system that we have. Each step in American history is seen as a step towards the present that could only have gone one way when in reality each event had an infinite number of possible conclusions. From the perspective of the contemporaries of Washington, Jackson, or Lincoln, it was not so obvious where the events of their lifetime would lead.

I say this because Witzel's history of management is written in a similar line--management is depicted as a problem solving methodology (Witzel 2011 81), which would have emerged in roughly the same form regardless of the thinking of Tyler or of the events of the 19th century. Management was simply an answer to the organizational problem of factory life, which came contextless into the world. I will argue in this section that once management is put in its political context it becomes far less innocuous.

While the feudal ideology I described in the last section was collapsing in Europe over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, it was only with the events of the late 18th century--the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution--that finally broke the back of the aristocratic notion of inequality among the classes. It was the notion of equality, first conceived by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and then given form by the republican governments of France, the United States, and Britain, which attacked both the notion of inborn ability by allowing any man to stand for office and the idea that the poor had no agency by allowing the poor to vote.

These movements were thought to have occurred naturally--that the abolition of slavery or the extention of the

franchise were a natural outgrowth of the birth of capitalist democracy. Hierarchical structures like slavery, the caste system, and noble privileges were economically "inefficient", and thus their dissolution was inevitable (Fukuyama 2011 164-165). Such a construction ignores that these orders were as ideologically rooted and that the deconstruction of these orders was revolutionary in its time. And even if we accept that slavery's dissolution was inevitable, the *way* in which an event occurs and *what* exactly replaces it is just as important as the event of dissolution itself.

Similarly, even if we take the eventual development of a field of scientifically minded management as a given, the *kind* of management thought that developed was just as important as the fact that a form of management thought emerged. Multiple strands of management thought grew at once in the late 19th century and despite much of Taylor's work being based on forgeries (New Yorker 2009 "Not so fast") scientific management dominated all other forms of management in the early 20th century. This is because scientific management was about more than merely solving problems: it was an ideological response to the threat of socialist and democratic movements who sought to bring the logics of republicanism into the workplace.

Manifestations of this tension appeared throughout the Western world during the early 19th century. Recent scholarship has found that Marx was influenced a great deal by the American workmans parties and the Knights of Labor, who advocated the redistribution of property. Their reasoning had its roots in juxtaposition of liberty in the voting booth combined with autocracy in the working floor: "the consequence [of capitalistic relations] now is, that while the government is republican, society in its general features, is as regal as it is in England" (The Jacobin 2012 "Wage Slavery and Republican Liberty"). The Workies pamphlets also featured a discussion of the similarities between chattel and wage slavery: "For he, in all countries is a slave, who must work more for another than that

other must work for him…whether the sword of victory hew down the liberty of the captive…or whether the sword of want extort our consent, as it were, to a voluntary slavery, through a denial to us of the materials of nature…" (ibid). From this point to the Civil War, it was not entirely clear whether the abolition would stop at the emancipation of chattel slaves, and Union officials used emancipatory rhetoric through the 19th and early 20th centuries (Beaty 2008 "The Rome of the Railroads").

Similar events occurred in France. After the 1830 July Revolution, French workers waited "for the introduction of the republic in the workshop". The "applied republic", that is a democracy which was replicated within the workplace, was a common call during the July Monarchy and the Second Republic . It was in France during the election of 1848 that the first divergence emerged between "a social republicanism, seeking direct application of republican principles in the economic sphere, and a republicanism that sought to restrict these principles to the political sphere" (Politicsinspires.com 2013 "Revolutionary France and the social republic that never was"), with the republicans winning.

Despite the victories of capitalistic republicanism in the early 19th century, social democratic parties and movements continued to gain strength, with the German Social Democratic party becoming the largest single party in the country (Anderson 2000 273). The French created a word, *sinistrisme*, to describe the situation of the 3rd Republic wherein the leftist parties of one generation would become the right of the next as increasingly socialistic parties appeared and took their place (http://dictionary.sensagent.com/sinistrisme/en-en/). The reason for the continued decay of the 19th century rightist parties was their tendency to use traditionalistic (that is, reliant on the feudal ideology I explained in the last section) justifications for the injustices of society, and the reason that Taylorism was so successful was that it finally presented a new and comprehensive argument against republicanism in the

workplace: by creating "one best way" for all workers the manager is able to make everyone better off.

This argument (if the workers were only to sublimate their desire for agency gained via social movements and their relationships with each other into a desire for agency gained via the piece-rate system and their contract with their manager then everyone would be better off) was able to convince such social justice advocates as Louis Brandeis (New Yorker 2009 "Not so fast"), and leads Witzel to see anti-capitalist critiques as merely desires for better management (Witzel 2011 80).

This shows the degree to which Tayloristic thinking has survived within management: the problem of workers asking for representation is changed into the problem of workers needing better managers. That is, a problem involving class conflict is turned into merely a problem of insufficiently skilled elites: it is notable that the union movement has no part to play in Witzel's history. By viewing the problem of worker's dissent as a technical problem, Witzel is able to argue that the answer was "to make management more efficient and to restore harmony with the workers" (ibid 83). In effect, Witzel was able to erase the ideological aspect of both scientific management and the workers movements and to present a movement which disempowered workers as the restoration of harmony.

Taylor's process--to watch a laborer at work, design a better way to do that job, and then to require each and every worker to work at that pace--disempowered workers in several ways. Firstly, it deskilled the job of craftsman, turning autonomous workers into pseudo-automated machines without knowledge of their subject which could be used without the manager's assent (The Jacobin, "The rise of the machines"). Secondly, it applied the division of labor hierarchically--all thinking to be done about the nature of the job and the task was to be done by management and the consultant (a division shown by consistent comparison of the manager to the 'brain' in organic metaphors of management and organizations (Witzel 2011 190). Thirdly, by arguing that most firms were inefficient

and that the “scientific" methods applied by experts were superior to rule of thumb methods, Taylor was implicitly denying the worker’s own experience and knowledge. Lastly, it applied those two processes not under the old arguments that managers were simply born as leaders, metaphors which were clearly unpopular as seen in France where old-rightist parties died out within two generations. Rather, these processes were applied under a new argument: that it was more efficient to deskill, mechanize, and autocratize the workplace, and that to argue against this process was to hurt the whole.

In a time when democratic ideals were increasingly becoming the norm and were spilling out into the factory floor, Taylor was able to create an ideology which denied democracy to the workplace which was not founded on aristocratic ideas of an otherworldly hierarchical order. This allowed one to be simultaneously a democrat in general while being an autocrat in the workplace. The contradiction of capitalistic republicanism, while not resolved, was now obfuscated.

THE ABYSMAL SCIENCE AND THE PATHOLOGIES OF MANAGEMENT

If economics is the dismal science because it the needs of 'science’ requires a perfect seeming model which rests on many of assumptions, then management is the abysmal science because even after expressing all of its arguments through algebraic notation and even after constructing highly complicated models meant to create computer simulations (Bardach 1993), it is still deals entirely with the most difficult of variables: unabstracted, individual, human beings, and under a highly mutable criterion: efficiency.

The first issue of management is that any problem involving the interaction of human beings in the social sphere is a *wicked problem*, which is a problem as much of interpretation and meaning construction as it is a real problem of ‘objective’ interests. Wicked problems are highly contextual

which interacts badly with scientific management's claim of 'one best way's and universalism.

The second problem of any scientific management is with the idea of efficiency. Deborah Stone, in her work *Policy Paradox*, notes that efficiency is an almost completely subjective measure, that is what is efficient for one actor may be inefficient for another (Stone 2002 61). It is also comparative: something is only efficient in comparison to something that is inefficient. Management has simultaneously constructed efficiency as the manager's efficiency, erasing the perspectives of the infinite other actors who's lives could be 'more efficient' at the sacrifice of the manager.

It is fully possible to create a rigorous field of study under these conditions: psychology, philosophy, and history all deal with these problems. However, management has not responded to the problems of unclear criterion and mutable variables by embracing critical methods. Instead, management has structured and presented itself more and more as if it were a hard science dealing with the interactions of protons and electrons rather than the interactions of people (Witzel 2012 184). Efficiency has been discussed as if it were an objective physically extant variable rather than a construction that was then reconstructed in a specific way. Over and over again the vacuous baubles of the org chart and process chart have been embraced, leading to expensive reorganizations which do nothing but redraw the chart. Indeed management's continued embrace of scientistic discussion has led to an overfocus on the organization (which, like efficiency, is treated like an objective physically extant object rather than a construction) leading to a management thought which does not have much to say about work and people--supposedly the two subjects of the discipline (Addelson 2012 22). And despite all of this faux-scientism, management has become inundated by pseudo-academic gurus who pump out books that tell people that they can take charge in the workplace in X easy steps by the hundreds (ibid 232).

All of these trends emerge from management's original sin: that it was not created as way to create knowledge. Instead it emerged in response to two needs: firstly, as I have said, the need to create a coherent justification for authoritarianism in the workplace, and secondly, the anxiety of managers who want easy answers to their immensely difficult problems. Management, rather than evolving from its origins, has remained an ideology: a field of explicit knowledge based on implicit and unquestioned views. Because management stands on (largely up until recently) unquestioned notions, the discipline has found itself riven with pathologies of its own making, that is management is finding itself breaking apart even within its own rules.

The pseudo-scientific methods of the gurus are an example of this. While they are decried by management scholars their methods are actually highly similar to Taylor's *The Principles of Scientific Management*. During one of Taylor's consultations, he asked 12 of the strongest men in a factory to simply 'work harder', guessed that under this level of work these men could haul 72 tons of steel (which he rounded to 75) instead of 42, and then set 75 tons of steel as the minimum amount of steel one could haul per day. This is not the seed of a rigorous field of knowledge (New Yorker 2009 "Not So Fast")1.

While scientific management has not succeeded in providing answers to the problems of the manager, it has succeeded in building a highly resilient ideology around itself, an ideology that has been based on the aping of scientific methods. The result has been the successful depoliticization of Taylor's ideological assertion of authoritarianism in the workplace and the continuation of the 'gospel of efficiency' to the degree that people now talk of efficiency as if it were an objective measure. However, the trends which have emerged from management's original sin have started to become highly problematic, not only for those on the outside of the discipline but for the discipline's practitioners.

Disciplinization and the 'silo effect' is one of the pathologies which has emerged from management's attempts to don scientific garb. While the splitting up of management into different sub-disciplines has as much to do with the m-form organization (a way of organizing firms wherein each task would have its own department/division, an organizational method which had its roots in the divisional structure of armed forces (Witzel 2012 163) as it does with the academy, the silo effect, which is the complete separation of the management sub-disciplines into their own self contained worlds academically and creating fiefdoms within organizations, is one of management's major pathologies. This phenomena has two aspects--the academic aspect (the silo effect which occurs in the academy) and the practical aspect (the silo effect that occurs in the workplace). I will explain each in turn.

The academic aspect of the silo effect emerges straight from management's origins. The belief in the need for experts and the simultaneous disbelief in the importance of the lived experience of the workers creates a need for a highly specialized expert class with knowledge which is independent of the workplace--that is a managerial class with a "view from the top" rather than a view from the workplace (Addleson 2011 15). And at the same time, scientific management and its successors have little to say about power relationships within the workplace. This dual absence--the absence of work and power from management--has exerted a centrifugal force on the management discipline, leading to disparate sub-disciplines.

A look at an example of good organizing, the Valve company, shows why such a sub-disciplinary trend is necessary from a control mindset. In the Valve company, there are no formal control structures, everyone is allowed to move around, and because of this, everyone, from the accountants to the lawyers to the managerial executives, is asked to gain a degree of knowledge in programming, which is the company's specialty (Valve 2012 39-40). Without a rigid command structure originating from an invented concept, Valve requires everyone

to have a common language and thus asks for T-shaped people (that is, generalists who also have a specific capability), because commonly held knowledge allows for easier collaboration (ibid 42). This syncretic, 'liberal arts' viewpoint of management is exactly the opposite of mainstream management teaching and thinking, because management is not concerned with work.

Instead management takes as its focused the invented concept of the organization, and how to best rule that invented concept. From this highly sterilized viewpoint, hierarchies become so necessary that they are rarely thought about--the authoritarianism in the workplace which was so problematic in the 19th century has been reconstructed as a battle between efficiency and equality, a battle which goes unquestioned (Stone 2002 80). Furthermore syncretic knowledge is unnecessary because tasks are split into their component parts, allowing each part to be done by a specialist (a phenomenon which would not be unfamiliar to Taylor or Ford) (Witzel 2012 191). This factory viewpoint leads to necessary overspecialization by academics and management students, because cooperation between the highly disparate parts is assumed.

Yet when management students come to the workplace they find that cooperation is rarely forthcoming. Because management has historically seen all of the things which grease the wheels of cooperation--talking and building social relationships within one's job--as unnecessary and wasteful (Addleson 2011 22). Furthermore, *when* cooperation is modeled by management thinkers, it often looks little like what we would think of when we think of cooperation. Works like Bardach's *Developmental Dynamics: Interagency Collaboration as an Emergent Phenomenon* places 'acceptance of leadership' as one of the key steps/goals of collaboration while simultaneously complaining of agencies which worry about "imperialistically minded agencies [which] might steal a march on them" (Bardach 2001 153, 157).

This fear of collaboration leading to annexation emerges from management's lack of focus on the work and on

management's competitive mindset. Because 'the work' is seen as comparatively unimportant compared to the need for control, collaboration must be done for some other goal besides merely getting things done. And because competition is seen as more important than cooperation, management often transforms cooperation into a competitive act--for instance the imperialistic theories which Bardach uses wherein each step is a step towards control. In such an environment there is little reason to cooperate, leading to the silo effect within the workplace.

But what is tragic about management is that despite the pathologies and its inability to provide technical solutions to wicked problems, its logic has become massively powerful within our body politic. The growing influence of management thinking over politics will be the focus of the next section.

MANAGING SOCIETY, OR "I KNOW THE SYSTEM WORKS, I ALSO KNOW THAT NOT EVERYONE FOLLOWS THE SYSTEM"

While modern day management has failed in many respects, its promise of technical solutions to wicked problems has made it hugely successful as an intellectual lens. We can see this because even while management academics try to find a new form of management, they wring their hands about loss of control and the chaos brought by equality. Even Valve, a model of new management, asks "So if every employee is autonomously making his or her own decisions, how is that not chaos?" (Valve 2012 23).

Management thinking, despite its flaws and pathologies has moved out of the workplace to become a part of the contemporary zeitgeist. This has produced two strange juxtapositions--firstly, while the pre-Industrial world saw business only via analogies to more important institutions, in the modern day business has become the sole operating lens through which other institutions are viewed. We see

government, the arts, non-profits and even families as analogous to businesses and thus reduce them to a specific kind of economic lens.

Secondly, due to this domination, management, which was once used to defend authoritarianism in the workplace, has now become a way to argue for authoritarianism in the body politic. In our modern system we are such advocates for democratic systems that we are willing to go to war to establish it in other countries, while being unwilling to establish democracy in the workplace. We believe that man is worthy enough to weight in on matters of national security, the country's economic system, and even how one's schools should be run, yet we do not believe that man can be trusted to have a say in the events that go on in their workplace. The paradox of democratic capitalism which produced management has now been wholly obfuscated by it.

A perfect example of this is the discussion of the role of the president in our political system. A massive series of worried articles have come out in the last 4 years saying that the job of the president "is to somehow get this dunderheaded Congress, which is mind-bendingly awful, to do the stuff he wants them to do. It's called leadership" (New York Times 2012 "No Bully in the Pulpit"). As Ezra Klein notes, this concept "is not quite clear enough to rise to the level of wrong…it's impossible to argue with these columns because they never actually say what they're about. If Noonan or Dowd explained what the president should actually do, we could have a discussion. But they don't, presumably because they can't." (Washington Post 2012 "Politics is not here to please you"). These vague requests emerge from the powerful yet meaningless demands of management thought and the way that they have mapped onto our politics. Just as management is absolutely sure of the need for an authoritarian manager while having vague answers for what a manager should do in any situation, in politics we know we need an authoritarian president so he can do *something* instead of listen to

parliamentarians bicker over what to do, we just do not have an idea of what exactly we need that authoritarian president to do.

Similarly, so many policy arguments in the public sphere have been reduced to great man-ist arguments. The "Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics", also known as the "Confidence Fairy Theory"--the idea that "the only thing limiting us [in foreign policy] is a lack of willpower" (Nyhan 2009 "The Green Lantern Theory of the Presidency") has been used by conservatives and liberals alike to attack non-managerial approaches to policy. Practically, the idea of 'willpower' and 'confidence' is so vacuous that the idea that it is used in foreign policy talks seriously is almost laughable. But the 'willpower' argument is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in public policy just as scientific management is used to argue for an authoritarian figure in the workplace. In fact, things have devolved--we are so entranced by the power of authoritarian figures that our arguments are reminiscent of the faux psychologists who diagnosed slaves with drapetomania: the confidence argument has been used practically to argue that merely treating foreign rulers with respect--for instance, bowing to a foreign king (Washington Post 2011 "Obama 'bowing to foreign dictators' — and his golf game") weakens the confidence other countries have in our power and our will to use that power.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the supposed total victory of democracy over all the tyrants of the world, a new earning for autocrats is being expressed everywhere, from the fringes of the left to mainstream neoconservativism to libertarianism. This autocratic argument is new: it is not the old feudalistic argument for a person who represents the father of the whole nation. It is instead expressed in the language of Taylor, and the desire to transform our messy and muddled political arguments into the idealized hierarchy envisioned by management. Phrases like "It is for the experts to present the situation in its complexity, and it is for the Master to simplify it to a point of decision" appear even

from leftist sources (The New Statesman 2013, "The Simple Courage of Decision"). The idea that if only we were more courageous, willful, and authoritarian that we would be able to make the hard decisions easy, that within each wicked problem is a technical answer which we could find if only we had an authoritarian figure with enough willpower steps from the faith we still have to the system of scientific management. We believe that, like fairies, the manager will only be able to provide us with the easy answers if we believe in the system enough.

These emerging trends, which came out of scientific management to become far larger than the factory workplace it originated in, are hugely problematic: the belief in society of simply and rational answers is so enmeshed that any of its failures are attributed to the failures of individuals. This belief is larger than management and the schisms within the management field: just as positivism is based on a very particular and superficial notion of the hard sciences (Collingwood 1943 126), our current management norms are based on a very superficial idea of modern management thinking.

The line of thinking which I have been discussing is not directly connected to 'the work' (Addleson 2012 22) but rather to an idealized view of the way that workplaces should work. This is because this line of thinking has always been about control rather than results, and due to this the changes that have occurred within management academia have had little effect on management as it is practiced. In Witzel's last chapter he does bemoan the disconnect between management and management academia, saying that "management thinking is now the province of the academic" (Witzel 2012 238). This is not, strictly speaking, true: management fads and gurus have in many ways a broader audience than management academia. This is even more problematic than the possibility Witzel (rightly) presents, that management may be obsoleting itself by closing itself to the nonacademic world (ibid): because

management academia has a far better ability to turn management into a truly intellectually rigorous field--in which both the theories and assumptions of management are questioned with the goal of creating more knowledge rather than upholding an ideological framework based on control--than the guru cottage industry is, management academia's willingness to specialize and ostracize itself into obscurity is highly worrisome.

This gap desperately need to be breached if management is to become less problematic. But that is not enough. Larger participation by different parts of society, including workers, in management needs to occur both at the practical and academic levels in order to get organizations focused back on work and interpersonal relations. The larger problematic attitudes of society towards management need to be deconstructed at every level--simply attacking them in the academy will not be enough. To some degree, the goal is obvious--a more inclusive and democratic view of management is necessary. It is necessary both because it 'works' but also because an affirmation of human value in the workplace has long been necessary. But while being simple, the task is immensely difficult. We will need to rebuild our labor organizations, to fight with management, to attack the very ideology of the current age. To some it may seem impossible.

But democracy in the workplace is a worthy ideal. It will help restore the agency of the worker, help create a more fulfilling workplace, and it will allow us to better utilize the people's intelligence. Enough of this century long derailment, it is now time--as Peter Drucker put it--to declare management dead, and forge a new path into a more democratic future.

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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LATE MODERNITY

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A number of noted scholars in the fields of criminology and criminal justice including Zygmut Bauman, David Garland, Pat O'Malley, John Lea, Jonathan Simon, and Jock Young have tried in recent years to develop coherent theories which might explain recent trends in crime, incarceration rates, citizens' fear of crime and shifts in criminal justice system policies by suggesting that these sometimes dramatic changes are part of macro-social changes occurring in late modern society. The suggestion is that seemingly incoherent and often draconian changes in criminal justice policy are simply reactions and adaptation to social conditions emanating in late modernity.

Pre-modernity was a period that was characterized by clan-based agricultural or hunter-gatherer societies. These societies were often dominated by strong religious belief systems or systems of understanding mixing nature and religion, such as early Pagan societies. They usually had strong, centralized, autocratic governments, frequently monarchies and made use of the most rudimentary technologies (Lea, 2002).

Modernity was a period of human history embracing the ideas of the enlightenment, which effectively ended the Dark Ages in human evolution. Social relations were based on rationality and reason (Young, 1981). Social progress was tied to the scientific method and empiricism in explaining the natural world. A complex division of labor and advanced technology tied to production ushered in the economic era of mercantilism and capitalism. Government was a social contract which provided security for its citizens, looked after the mechanics of social welfare so vital to the development of an

educated and healthy workforce required by capitalist production, and provided "public order" so that business and production could proceed and profits could be made. Modernity extended human rights, expanded democracy, advanced science, and provided at least enough social welfare to keep the wheels of production turning (Lea, 2002).

Late modernity is, of course, our current era of human existence. What it is, how it developed and what its impacts are make up the substance of late modern theorizing. It is clear that these questions are still awaiting adequate answers.

ACTUARIAL JUSTICE

The defining characteristic of social control in late modernity is actuaralism (Simon, 1987; Feeley and Simon, 1992; 1994). Actuarial justice drastically changes the nature of the criminal justice system. No longer is there a concern with criminal justice as a system of crime prevention, victim protection or the defense of the community against criminal acts. The causes of crime and deviance are seen as irrelevant to crime policy and of little interest in dealing with the problem of crime. Actuarial justice is primarily concerned with statistical probabilities. It seeks to calculate risk, minimize the harm from criminal acts, and limit the damage from crime, rather than eliminating it. It is the ultimate anti-utopia where the best we can do is to create defended safe zones and gated communities. The outside world is seen as hopelessly hostile. The only crime control policy is seen as one where we keep the barbarians outside the gates in fortress-like defensive zones where the well-off might live and commerce might be conducted.

This hostile world of criminal actors and evil doers is all around us. The risk of crime and its attendant harms to individuals and social institutions is pervasive and omnipresent. Crime has become a social fact, a normal part of everyday life. Criminals roam the streets and rule the ghettoes.

But they also occupy political offices, corporate suites and the agencies of the criminal justice system itself. Every stranger is a potential predator. Nannies, teachers, daycare workers, those charged with the duties of caring for the elderly, family members, youth group leaders, hitchhikers and vagrants all pose threats to our safety. Risk is everywhere and we have no idea of its causes. The best we can do is predict risk and safety by the magic of statistical probability, or as Jock Young calls it, "voodoo criminology" (Young, 1999).

The law itself becomes confusing because the rules change so often. In actuarial justice we have different rules for different people, as evidenced by laws related to crack and cocaine hydrochloride, or the laws requiring the registration of sex offenders for behaviors engaged in by the majority of the population. The rules change. Gambling is illegal and then legal. Loansharking is a crime, but not when it is engaged in by a check cashing agency. Drugs are illegal but dangerous drugs are prescribed by doctors and required for unruly children in schools. Concepts of right and wrong play no role in actuarial justice. Individual responsibility for criminal acts is of little consequence. The question becomes what is the probability of victimization and the probability that laws will be violated, and more importantly by whom. It matters little if the offender is a victim of blocked opportunities, insane, or simply carrying out his or her required corporate duties. Concepts of free will and social determinism are irrelevant. Avoiding trouble and minimizing risk takes precedence over understanding or even condemning criminal behavior.

Actuarial justice is a symptom of what Zygmut Bauman calls adiaphorization. Adiaphorization is "the stripping of human relationships of their moral significance, exempting them from moral evaluation, rendering them 'morally irrelevant'" (Bauman, 1995: 133; Simon, 1987; 1988). Adiaphorization not only addresses issues of risk and safety but also the diversity of late modern life. Actuarialism is a matter of calculating risk and avoiding trouble. Multiculturalism is the

late modern response to difference. An increasingly diverse world threatens the personal sense of self and the security of knowing who and what we are. In late modern society we surrender to that threat by celebrating diversity and then arguing that diversity is not a matter of choice (if it were everyone would be like us) but a predetermined outcome of culture. People define themselves as Irish, African, Jewish, Arab, gay, straight, male, female, Christian, Moslem, Jewish, conservative, liberal etc We define ourselves by where we came from and the daily rituals we engage in rather than by who we really are.

NEO-LIBERAL AND NEO-CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

Neo-liberal political philosophy is constructed on a view of society that presupposes open markets and free trade as the rational means to attain economic prosperity by allowing for the expansion of capitalist markets and by reducing labor costs through the globalization of production. Inherent in this philosophy is the idea that the welfare state, which provided educated and healthy industrial workers is no longer needed and is both a drain on capital through taxation and a crutch which prevents neo-social Darwinism from eliminating the unfit and elevating those with ambition and potential for work. Neo-liberalism also takes a very contradictory view of the state, regarding it as an interference with market because of over-regulation, but also demanding that it be strengthened to maintain domestic order and protect against external threats, such as terrorism. Neo-liberals seek to protect the consumption society by extending markets, protecting private enterprise, and rewarding the "worthy" in the work force. Personal security is more and more seen as an individual responsibility. Making the right choices about behavior will protect individuals from crime. Utilizing private security services will augment the police and the criminal justice system. In a very real sense neo-

liberalism represents a return to classical criminology in its view of crime and criminal justice. Crime policy is seen as a mosaic of punishment which fits the crime, surveillance and corrects choices about individual behavior and responsibility (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

Neo-conservative political philosophy embraces a view of humans as animals in need of control. The argument is that human beings possess both an instinctual and a social aspect to their existence. The problem is, according to neo-conservatives that our animalistic, atavistic natures are continually threatening to break through and destroy the veneer of civilization which society has socialized us to display. Humans therefore must be restrained in some manner. The lower and most base urges of the human beast can only be controlled by an ideology of sacrifice, discipline and submission to authority (Young, 1981).

Jock Young postulates that neo-conservatism is actually a delayed reaction to the French Revolution (Young, 1981). Neo-conservatism stresses the organic nature of society and defends tradition against both individualism and rationalism. In order to hold society together it is necessary to subordinate self-interest to the overall good of society (in this case a capitalist society). Young points to the neo-conservative view of the family as an example of this commitment to traditionalism and social "good." In neo-conservative theory the unity of the family and its patriarchal structure is a long-term social and moral good. No matter what changing circumstances or attitudes impinge on family structure and life, neo-conservative theory insists that self-sacrifice and order, embodied in the family, should never be reduced to utilitarian calculations of individual pleasure and pain, effort and reward. Translating this into crime control it is fair to say that for neo-conservatives order always takes precedence over justice. To quote van den Haag: "order is indispensable to justice because justice can only be achieved by means of social and legal order" (van den Haag, 1975: 35). Van den Haag goes on to say: "objections to

inequality of condition are objections as to the system of distributive justice, unless they are objections to God" (1975: 46). Simply put, coercion is an inevitable part of the system, and its focus must of necessity be on those most tempted by crime, namely the poor.

For neo-conservatives the notion that it is those activities which threaten order that should be criminalized is paramount. This includes acts that offend neo-conservative morality as well as those which endanger person or property. Attacks on tradition and respect for authority are a seen a major threat to an orderly society.

Neo-conservatives see criminal behavior is seen as an individually rational endeavor - if the potential criminal feels that the likelihood of being caught and punished is greater than the benefit that will derive from the criminal act then a criminal act will not take place. The social policy implications of this are clear. First, the police should focus their efforts not on law enforcement (catching people after a crime has been committed), but upon the maintenance of social order. The role of the police is "pro-active" involving functions such as (Lea, 2002):

- Maintaining a strong presence "on the ground".
- Keeping in close touch and working with "local people" to prevent crime.
- Keeping the streets clear of "potential criminals" (youths, drug abusers, beggars, prostitutes and so forth).

Neo-conservatives focus on the "conformity" aspect of control theory. They see informal social controls as being most effective in preventing crime from taking place. The role of the police is an active one of preventing the breakdown of community life by making it safe for the "law-abiding" citizen. If the police are successful in protecting the law-abiding

members of a community then "informal social controls" can be more effective and efficient, ultimately reducing levels of crime (Young, 1981).

For neo-conservatives the causes of crime lie in the pursuit of individual gratification (usually incommensurate with effort), the undermining of traditional loyalties and the unwillingness of the individual to accept discipline. The weakening of the social ties has been undermined by a lack of recognition of the necessity for coercion in the preservation of order.

CONTRADICTION AND INCOHERENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY

Theorists focusing on late modernity postulate that the rapid changes in society at large have produced confusion and doubt about personal biographies, rules of conduct and the identification of self. This same confusion, it is said, has spread to the criminal justice system. The formal governmental system of crime control has grown rapaciously, but so has the private security sector. Crime prevention is juxtaposed to punitiveness and extremes of punishment. The police become both militarized and community-oriented. Theorists explain this incoherence in several ways. The inability to control crime has called the efficacy and legitimacy of the criminal justice system into doubt according to Garland. Feeley and Simon, on the other hand suggest that actuarial justice itself is responsible for the contradictions in the system. None of these explanations are sufficient to explain the problem. The breakdown of rational crime control policies is far more complex and requires a return to more basic social concepts to be understood.

THE DECLINE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Garland points out that crime control efforts have become dispersed in late modernity with government agencies, community organizations, and private sector security services all playing a key role. The state cannot control, or for that matter even influence crime. The response is to redistribute authority and responsibility to non-state actors. It replaces substantive policies will symbolic and rhetorical references to law and order. He points to Foucault's concept of governance as a key consideration in this diffusion of state power. That concept is indeed key to understanding everything that impacts crime control and criminal justice in late modernity.

THE SOCIALLY EXCLUSIVE SOCIETY

The exclusive society is defined by the rejection of the underclass. The unemployed are stigmatized and the underclass is stereotyped as criminogenic. Deviance is defined by racialization, as with the demonization of drug users. In an exclusive society the unworthy and dangerous are not just excluded from economic opportunities or political and civil rights, they are denied the basic status of citizens in civil society (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

A socially exclusive society is multi-dimensional. It involves political, economic and spatial exclusion. But it also involves exclusion from decent housing, effective policing, medical services, and resources through which one can attain information. Exclusion entails all aspects of civil society (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

Exclusion is not based on deviance, or marginality, or the identification of a few dysfunctional individuals. Social exclusion is collective. It is directed at an underclass, or a

dangerous class rather than specific acts or life conditions (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

Exclusion is not rooted in localized conditions, it is globalized. The decline of manufacturing industries, the creation of an underpaid and insecure service industry, and the normalization of structural unemployment are all problems of a global economy. The causes are global, but the outcomes are local (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

Economic changes in patterns of production and mass consumption increase public disorder, and at least the perception of crime, if not actual instances of victimization itself. Formal laws and informal rules of conduct are continually questioned and violated with ever greater regularity. Society becomes more and more segmented and divided. People become more suspicious and fearful of other people because of what Young refers to as "ontological insecurity" (living in a society marked by pluralism where individual attributes are less important and certain than in the past) (Young, 1999). There is great economic uncertainty and material insecurity. A combination of the questioning of the rules and the rise of actuarial justice leads to increasing incivility, a sense of disorder, and intransigent pockets of crime. The capitalist market is by definition "exclusive," handing out the greatest the rewards to small number of people and excluding the majority from those rewards. As the mass consumption market grows and intensifies that exclusion becomes ever more pervasive.

The market itself is driven by the diversity of late modern society. In fact, the capitalist market consumers, digests and reproduces that diversity as products offered for sale, magazines, television shows, movies, and music. In late modernity diversity and difference is absorbed, marketed and sanitized. But in late modernity there is no tolerance for people with difficult problems who cannot be absorbed and marketed. Just like the early days of capitalist development in the 19th

century, late modern society of the 21st century simply cannot abide the dangerous classes (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

In the exclusive society our personal insecurity is mirrored by a fear of an "inferior" and dangerous social "other." Our inability to address structural problems in late modernity and late capitalism leads to scapegoating, projecting all of our problems onto to others. Those others are demonized and criminalized. The constant nagging of material and economic insecurity lead us to seek out some "other" person or some "other" group to blame (Bauman, 1995). Exclusion becomes economic, cultural, racial, anthropological, religious and political. Assimilation ends with those "others" who must be excluded, punished, and contained if we are to have any feeling of security at all.

THEORETICAL DYSFUNCTION

Each of these five main areas of theorizing about late modernity reflects a basic truth about contemporary society. The problem is that they are micro-truths, only tenuously connected and never satisfactorily understood. The big questions are never answered and only occasionally speculated upon. How did this happen? Where did actuarial justice come from? How did a risk society evolve? Why did a society based upon exclusion spring from a society struggling with the ideals of inclusion? Where did the powerful state of the cold war era go and why has it become so ineffective and confused? When and how did incoherence become the descriptor of crime control policy? These things do not just happen. They do not fall from the sky. People don't simply wake up with pervasive social insecurity. Something has changed and changed drastically. The very concept "late modernity" implies a process at play, a progression from pre- to modern to late to post. That evolution, that progression in social life does not happen

outside of the basic structures of society. Late modern theorists see the trees but not the forest.

As we exited the 20th Century and entered the 21st Century two things became painfully clear. First, the new era of playful experimentation which would tap the roots of our human diversity and usher in a new era of both prosperity and human enlightenment has not been realized. Instead, we have seen widespread and particularly cruel and vicious wars, extreme and pervasive inequality, cultural exclusion, and a pervasive xenophobia that harkens back to the Dark Ages. Second, it is also clear that the new millennium is characterized by unprecedented levels of social and political conflict, instability, and economic deprivation and plunder, which actually threatens the continued existence of human life on this planet (Bauman, 1998).

Our concern here is with chaos and plunder, or as we have come to know it, crime. In the 20th Century we understood crime as a social force that disrupted social, political and economic life. Crime was a waste product of a capitalist system which produced worldwide misery and violence. But, today it is increasingly clear that crime is no longer a disruptive aspect of social life. Crime has become the fuel for the engines of 21st Century capitalism. Crime is no longer a waste product; it is an integral part of the machinery of the state and the economy (Bauman, 2000; Lea, 2002; Simon, 1997; Young, 1999). As Bill Chambliss (1988) noted three decades ago, crime is the perfect lubricant for capitalism's engine.

Traditional criminology has viewed crime as a product of the relationship between an offender and the state. But, crime can only be understood when we analyze the actions and reactions of communities, the criminal justice system, offenders and victims. These relationships have both a contemporary and historical focus to them. Crime control is not merely a process of interaction. It is conditioned by historical circumstances and by historical conditions. Crime control is a process of power,

communication and interaction through which social conflicts come to regarded as "crime" (Lea, 2002).

The social relations of crime control are reflections of the social division of labor in modern capitalist societies (Lea, 2002). The ways that people and communities are linked to the state are clearly power relationships. The state is clearly more powerful that offender, victims and communities. In addition, the social relations of crime control are characterized by marginalization and exclusion (Young, 1999). Offenders are feared, shunned, and segregated by other members of the public and the community at large. The community and its constituent populations legitimize the criminal justice system and idealize and support the victims of crime.

Crime does not exist and cannot exist, apart from the institutions which are charged with defining and controlling it. We have crime only because we have criminal justice system. We have crime because there is a set of historically constituted social relations which form the foundations of that system and makes it possible for the criminal justice system to act (Lea, 2002).

Foucault (1977; 1991) saw modernity as a period of history involving the transition in the form of state power from sovereignty to government. Sovereignty was a form of state power that derived from the will of the Sovereign (kings, czars, etc.) and subsequent obedience to that will by the populace. Government involves the regulation of a complex society. When a Sovereign rules the state simply concerns itself with the issue of obedience that particular point in time. But, when the state governs it concerns itself primarily with the issue of how society reproduces itself. A state that governs must concern itself with public health, social stability, workplace discipline, and conditions of employment. Crime is an issue not because it insults the will of a Sovereign but because it is disruptive to the orderly functions of social and economic processes. Crime is inherently inefficient. So the process of governing extends well beyond the state itself to involve the family, corporations,

schools religions, charities, etc. in maintaining a system of crime control (Lea, 2002). Crime control is a form of governance. It is a set of processes which regulate social conflicts by handing those conflicts over to the state and the criminal justice system (Lea, 2002). These processes also create socially constructed definitions and languages which define crime. The key question for scholars studying the criminal justice system in late modernity is why are those processes breaking down and why is crime control failing?

Late modernity is characterized by social fragmentation and polarization. The social cohesion promised by the neo-liberals as "democratic" forms of capitalism expanded markets across the world is a myth. The "trickle-down" spreading of wealth promised by the neo-conservatives as new markets opened and industrial production spread to the third world never happened. Instead economic inequality grew more pronounced and poverty exploded, not just in the third world, but in the industrial democracies as well. Instead of global assimilation into "democratic" capitalism growing awareness of and concerns about "differences" dominate late modernity. Increasing inequality, relative deprivation and environmental degradation were the major products of the expansion of capitalist markets (Lea, 2002; Young, 1999).

Karl Marx pointed out that in order to survive capitalism needs to constantly expand its sources of profitability. As we entered late modernity, that basic need of the economic system had become a frenzy to accumulate more and more capital. Good-paying industrial jobs were shipped from the industrial democracies to the third world, where labor was cheaper, work rules were lax, and states were easily compromised. The export of industrial production jobs meant that there was no longer a need to invest in education, health, housing, and the general welfare of workers, after all they were no longer producing and had been shunted off to the service sector of the economy. The welfare state was just another cost which could be cut to maximize profits. The impact of this change in labor relations is

profound for local communities and for the legitimacy of the state. As long as capitalism promised life-time jobs, good retirements, health care, and the like, workers could be induced to share the basic values of the economic system. With the basic social contract broken those consensual values disappear (Lea, 2002).

In addition, the export of capital and jobs to the "not yet industrialized" world seriously weakened national economies. This is important for two reasons. First, a weak, recession-prone economy increases misery, economic desperation and a sense of relative deprivation. Second, the strong state of modernity was totally dependent on a strong economy to finance its military, police and the welfare system. The system of political compromises that kept the state strong and provided for security and public health and welfare collapses into strident ideological warfare as the state weakens (Lea, 2002).

As capitalism consumes itself in its lust for profits three things begin to happen with relation to crime, the criminal justice system and crime control policies. First, the system becomes criminogenic. Crime is normalized. Second, the state begins to give up its role its governance and retreats to sovereign rule. And, third, crime is integrated into local communities as an income-producing mechanism and as a source of social welfare, taking over the functions of governance (Lea, 2002).

In late modernity crime has become normalized. It is no longer seen as something which disrupts the political-economic system, but it is part of that system. The rich have become internationalized; they no longer need a strong social infrastructure, a system of political compromise and accommodation or a stable working class. Transnational corporations make deals with the most brutal and corrupt of regimes, engage in constant searches for new tax havens, adopt illegal accounting practices and enter into a worldwide alliance with organized crime to move their cigarettes, weapons, and chemicals, while disposing of their toxic wastes. At the other

end of the economic spectrum the state reduces expenditures on education, health care, social security, and aid to children. In a state characterized by social exclusion crime becomes a form of survival for the poor. Legitimate and illicit economies merge at the top and the bottom of society (Lea, 2002).

The strong state which had been concerned with governance through social planning and social regulation now finds itself depleted of recourses. Welfare, health care and education are privatized for profit. The state retreats from governance and focuses on one central concern, security. Crime control is reduced to marginalizing and neutralizing troublesome populations. The state devolves into a debilitated, under-funded authoritarian regime which constantly seeks to augment its police powers to manage the dangerous classes. At the same time, real risk management is privatized to gated communities, private security and the extension of property rights defined in such a way as to exclude the undesirable "others" from even basic human services. Those undesirable others are same people they have always been, those at low end of the social class scale. Transnational corporations and the wealthy are beyond the control of the state having fled across international borders. The best the sovereign state can do is to engage in tactical warfare against inner city communities through zero tolerance policing, sweeps and crackdowns (Lea, 2002).

But the new sovereign state has the same problems as the old sovereign monarchies. Kings could never control all of their lands. Some communities were simply outside state paper, as in the Robin Hood legend. In late modernity ever larger geographic areas around the world are outside of state control. In these regions criminal organizations and illicit economies are tolerated by the marginalized and poor. All the weakened state of late modernity can do is to engage in episodic and virtually useless incursions, but it can never exercise control. Normalized crime comes to dominate neighborhoods, cities, regions and even entire countries. At the other end of the

economic spectrum, transnational finance and commerce, acting in concert with its allies in organized crime, are virtually immune from even the most powerful states. In much of the world the state exercises sovereignty, but criminals engage in governance. The concept of a national state becomes virtually irrelevant (Lea, 2002).

In late modernity capitalism is returning to its past. The deep state of crisis in capitalist economies is roughly akin to the crisis of the early development of the capitalist economy. Socially excluded and marginalized populations now dominate the social structure, particularly in urban areas. Just as they were in the early years of capitalism these groups become the targets of the law and the police (Young, 1999). Urban areas are segregated into secure, protected "gated" locations and "wild zones," areas beyond the capacity of the state to control or regulate. The reintegration of criminality into the economy and into normal everyday life looks much more like the 1850s rather than the 21st Century. A frenzied war on its own population becomes the last gasp of a dying system of state sovereignty. The desperate foraging for short term profit and capital become the last gasps of an economic system that can no expand, no longer produce, and must therefore consume itself as its only source of wealth (lea, 2002, Young, 1999).

Jock Young suggests that late modernity is a period of "cannibalism and bulimia" (Young, 1999). Capitalism consumes itself in a desperate foraging for easy profits and new sources of capital while vomiting out the underclass, the mentally ill, the physically infirm and those "others" who simply do not fit. John Lea (2002) argues that capitalism in late modernity has entered an era of "destructive self-reproduction" where it eats itself to sustain its failing life. In late modernity crises and dislocations in capitalism have become permanent features of the system, rather than episodic crises like the Great Depression. These crises are "spread out, both in a temporal sense and with regard to their structural location. What we have now is a depressed continuum,

exhibiting the characteristics of a cumulative, endemic, more or less permanent and chronic crisis, with the ultimate perspectives of an ever deepening structural crisis" (Meszaros, 1995: 597-598). Bauman says that he is unsure of how this will all turn out, but he suggests that "mixophobia" (fear of the mythical "other") has the upper hand. Late modernity reads like a Hunter Thompson book full of "fear and loathing." But as Jock Young and John Lea suggest, maybe, just maybe, Karl Marx has already written the climax. And maybe, just maybe, that might be the forest made up of all those trees.

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OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN LEFT

CAMPAIGN FOR A UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY

To the American Left,

Talking about Occupy Wall Street is like beating a dead horse at this point, but it's a dead horse that haunts everything we do, making it seem small and laughable in comparison. So we begin where Occupy left off: it's painfully old news that Occupy Wall Street, perhaps the largest protest against wealth inequality in US history, has lost its mass character. Its remnants may object that Occupy is not "dead," but it has certainly lost the numeric force that made it so critically important. And yet it truly signaled a change in the US political landscape, a change that is still with us, but a change which most of the (admittedly tiny) organized leftist forces have not even come close to fully utilizing in advancing our message and our cause. So the dead horse is still with us, though far more important than its corpse is its disembodied spirit. It seems to be looking for a *new* body…

According to a November 2012 Gallup poll, 39% of the US thinks positively of socialism (Newport, 2012). This should be rocking our worlds. That is over 120 million people. Make no mistake: it is the basis for a new mass party, one which the Green Party, whether you like them or not, will simply never unleash or capture, since their branding and demographics are inherently based more on the progressive activist milieu than the instinctual class anger of millions.

Now what do these 120 million people mean by socialism? Who knows? It could be anything from Sweden to

guillotines, or both; they've only recently entertained the word. But more importantly, who cares what they mean, or if their idea is imprecise? Shouldn't these 120 million people be consolidated into a struggle-and-electoral party, where they can find strength from each other, instead of being left to drift and scream in isolated futility at their reactionary televisions? Even better, by getting ourselves into one place, we who have more defined ideas could finally link up with the masses the way we've always wanted to.

It's true that such attempts have been made in the past: Solidarity, Socialist Party USA. They are certainly worth something, and should be part of the new process. However, declaring a new inclusive group (which everyone else is supposed dissolve into) at any random historical moment is a bit different from a persisting effort for an electoral-activist front (requiring no dissolution) in an unmistakable era of global revolution and rage against capitalism. In this context, such a unity effort could signal to the tens of millions of socialists waiting in the wings that the left is *finally* getting its act together, and it's time to get involved.

We in the "Campaign for a United Socialist Party" (CUSP), a self-acknowledged tiny particle in the political storm consisting of members from different groups or none, are *not* declaring one more new group to add to the alphabet soup of recruitment competition. Instead we are encouraging the existing groups to try harder in fostering a comradely, collaborative identity with each other – we are on the same side – and to make sincere socialist incursion attempts into electoral politics.

For now, we want to get people thinking and talking. However, we are also concretely proposing regional unity conferences of the independent socialist left. The purpose of such conferences would be to discuss new unconventional tactics for collaboration. For example, is it really necessary to have six different socialist meetings in the same city about the same topic whenever a major story hits the news? Wouldn't it

be better to avoid splitting our advertising efforts, our audience – to really act like socialists, and pool our resources? These regional conferences would also be a chance to have the hard-headed discussions about what kind of effort, resources, and planning a socialist electoral campaign in your locality would *really* require. It could be a chance to prioritize learning the skill sets required during elections, which are woefully absent among too many protest-oriented socialists. Finally it could help iron out the precise contours of how cross-group collaboration would realistically happen where you are, with hopefully some of the old lines melting and the old feuds forgiven.

These regional conferences could serve as a step toward an eventual national congress. That national congress, which could result in anything or nothing, might serve in turn the launch of a self-labeled socialist party, an electoral front of the existing socialist forces and beacon for the unorganized millions, which seriously seeks to contend against the Republicans and Democrats. Or perhaps the congress would just be a start of improved collaboration, itself certainly a step forward.

If this was sent to you, you are invited, and apologies to anyone we overlooked. Anyone sympathetic to the idea should begin making practical/logistical preparations for regional unity conferences, between one and two years from now.

It is sometimes shocking how much of the left has a knee-jerk reaction against unity. People of such disparate ideas are united on this point that it's almost like they should be in the same group! We ask that you suspend any instant dismissal and ask yourself a few strategic questions:

- Are issue-based coalitions really enough to fill the space between the Democrats and the well-defined radicals? Or does that demographic need political representation broader than the existing socialist groups can provide, given that they have specific stances on many issues?

- To what extent have social movements alone actually been effective in reversing or even halting the ruling-class offensive of the last five years, in terms of the workplace and the public budget?
- Shouldn't purity of program or method come second to actually establishing a mass socialist party that can pick up where Occupy left off, recruit the Millennial generation, and attract millions with a message of class anger? Or if they can't be compromised, does it really bar you from partaking in such an effort?
- Which was more successful in getting millions of people into the streets in the last five years: single-issue movements, or a broad social vision? Or both?

Let's get doing what we've all always wanted to do, and give the system a big new problem that won't go away.

Sincerely,

CUSP coordinators

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A Marxist Perspective on Taxation

Jacob Pointon

With the phrase thrown around so often, Marxism often is nothing more than a hollow label. It can be hard to decipher what Marxism stands for in the context of contemporary politics and economics. Often used as an insult by conservatives to stigmatize attempts at liberal reforms and tax increases, a quick look at Marxist theory can dispel the notion that Marxism is a far-left liberalism and provide insight into one of today's ideological battlegrounds: taxation.

Marxism is Anti-Liberalism

A more comprehensive analysis of liberalism and its relation to Marxism will be explored soon, but for now a concise analysis will do. To begin, let us be reminded of liberalism's main function: as an ideology of the ruling class. After all, the principles of liberalism were born from and guided bourgeois revolutions throughout the world — revolutions which ultimately bequeathed to us the world we see today. Contemporary liberalism seems to give us a compelling ethical critique of the world's socio-economic ills, offering a vast array of solutions to problems. However, liberalism puts forth imaginary treatments of concrete problems; it ignores the material conditions of our society.

One of the greatest contributions to social theory that Marxism has generated is the 'materialist conception of history'. This theory regards the material conditions (prevailing way in which society furnishes its material needs) i.e., economic

organization, as endowing society with a definite development. During feudalism's slow transition to capitalism, the dominating ideas of the time — such as Monarchism — became barriers to the further development of the capitalist productive forces. As Marx wrote in The German Ideology, "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas." A philosophy which reflected the emerging capitalist mode of production would need to take root: classical liberalism. Liberalism proclaims that all individuals are subject to law (including monarchs) and entitled to the right of life, liberty, and property. Central to these 'natural rights' are the concept of a social contract, the proponents of which — such as Rousseau — professed individuals gain these realized natural rights within society by accepting the obligation to respect the rights of others, even if this means giving up some freedoms. These ideals reflected in the emerging bourgeois legal systems gave capitalism the proper socio-legal basis on which to flourish and provided the ground on which our current mainstream ideological battles would be fought.

These tenets of liberal philosophy are irreconcilable with Marxism; such is the reason why the social-democrats are no more 'Marxist' than the conservatives. A fundamental area where Marxism differs is the fact that liberalism sees individuals as abstract beings outside of concrete socio-economic relations by assigning individuals with these 'natural rights.' However, these 'rights' cannot be natural per se because they are merely naturalized conditioned modes of socio-economic relations (i.e., the reflected material conditions as explained above). The significance of this conclusion is simply that capitalism is only a stage of development within the arena of human history; the socio-economic conditions which ultimately birthed bourgeois philosophy differed in the past, and can change again. Now that it has been shown why Marxism is anti-liberal — and why liberalism is inseparable

from capitalism — the question posed in the title will be examined.

IS THE WORKING CLASS 'TAXED' TWICE?

Central to the Marxist theory of economics is the concept of the labor theory of value (LTV). To put it simply, the labor theory of value explains how capitalists extract profits from the working class. Because labor (besides nature) is the sole producer of wealth, a commodity's value is directly proportionate to the amount of labor expended during production. The majority of a commodity's value, which again is created by the hands of the laborer, is extracted via the commodity circulation/exchange process and taken by the capitalist. This appropriation of value constitutes the invisible 'working-class tax' hidden within the capitalist mode of production.

To put it directly, this extraction of value from the working-class laborer is the core of the Marxist theory of exploitation. Now, if Marxism is opposed to the appropriation of value by a capitalist — value that is rightfully the workers — how can Marxism support the appropriation of value from the collective working class by the State? It cannot be on the grounds that the State is a mediator on behalf of all in society, for the current socio-legal relations are based upon classical liberalism which only affirms capitalist class society. Undoubtedly some of this tax would be used to fund programs that gives back to the working class, but this is besides the point. The capitalist class lives by the exploitation of the working class and is taxed once, while the working class that must live by their own means is collectively exploited by capitalists and the State. Through legislation, the State taxes the working class AND legally protects the right of the capitalist to extract value from them (i.e., exploit them). As long as production exists on the basis of individual ownership of the

means of production, the burden of tax, which allows for the existence of State and its functions — including its function to secure economic development/capital accumulation — belongs to the capitalists.

EXPROPRIATION OF THE EXPROPRIATORS

The question will be raised, "Why isn't taxing the capitalist class, or in the end, expropriating the means of production theft?" An important feature of the class struggle is the collective re-appropriation of property from the capitalist class, often referred to in Marxist theory as the "expropriation of expropriators." Full expropriation marks the threshold between capitalism and socialism, while 'expropriation' through taxes only takes place in a capitalist economy via the bourgeois State. So, why is this not theft? When a company (think along the lines of BP and the oil spill) pollutes the coastline (one of the biggest sources of revenue for Louisiana), corporate taxes only represent taking what has already been taken from the working class. Taxes assume the responsibility of re-appropriating the stolen tourism and fishing revenue. Even in the case of a business that has not polluted, damaged other industry, etc., the business' value still rests upon the collective labor of the working class and the value that was appropriated from them. I would argue that *the taxation of the working class is theft in a capitalist economy*, where the means of production are under non-democratic control. If socialism is constructed and the working class genuinely controls the means of production, taxes in the contemporary sense of the word will cease to exist.

With this in mind, it becomes evident why socialism is mutually exclusive from liberal reformism. Socialism represents an explicit break from liberal philosophy. Whereas liberalism seeks economic justice in the form of progressive taxation — a form of symptomatic 'treatment' — socialism seeks to address

the issue directly: through structural economic change. As Marx explained in *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, to strive for liberal tax reforms as a solution to the limitations of capitalist distribution is simply to retrogress after the real relations have been made clear. With the collective ownership and cooperative management of the means of production, the working class will be able to appropriate and control the full value of their labor.

On Communism and Markets: A Reply to Seth Ackerman

Matthijs Krul

In his recent essay on Jacobin[1], Seth Ackerman makes a number of common arguments in favor of some form of market socialism over and against central planning as well as other designs for non-market, non-capitalist economies. The essay contains much that most socialists could agree with. He rightly cites the failure of the neoclassical argument for general equilibrium to apply in real-world situations under the devastating theoretical impact of the Cambridge capital critique and the so-called 'theory of the second-best', and the lack of statistical evidence proving the superior efficiency of market capitalist societies over those of the former Soviet bloc. The historical record of capitalism to achieve general efficiency, equity, and democracy is, in short, atrocious, and neoclassical economics always serves first and foremost as apologetics for this system – we probably need not go into this further.

Also understandable is Ackerman's negative response to models of a post-capitalist economy along the lines of some form of direct democracy, such as Albert and Hahnel's "Parecon" approach. For Albert and Hahnel, democratic councils would gather data from individuals regarding their preferences, debate these according to socialist and ecological norms, and process them into a planning system, which would regularly update its information according to the same political processes; all this in order to regulate production for human need. Ackerman is justifiably skeptical of the workability of this proposal, as it would require millions of political debates about millions of input-output processes from wildly divergent

sources and for wildly divergent ends. If every aspect of the planning system would have to be truly democratic – in the sense of being up for immediate political input 'from below' – any system with more than a rudimentary division of labor would quickly come to a shuddering halt.

For Ackerman, this is proof of the validity of the so-called calculation problem, an old argument from liberal critics of Marxism (in particular the Austrian school of economics), alleging that it is a priori impossible for centrally planned economies of any kind to operate: only prices, the argument runs, are accurately able to convey the necessary decentralized and distributed information that makes up the relative exchange value of goods. Therefore, in any system seeking to replace prices (and by implication, profits) with some form of central management, there necessarily follows a shortage of information in the decision-making process in production and exchange, with the familiar results of shortages, gluts, famines, and failures of supply.

For the liberal critics, and especially the Austrian school, this argument against central planning has often been generalized against any attempt to interfere with the market process: after all, if this argument holds, any interference at all will prevent 'getting the prices right', and thereby move the economy away from optimal allocation of goods and services. However, even the mainstream economic literature abounds with debate as to the accuracy of this proposition, with much of the debate revolving around the significance and extent of the presence of externalities, that is, costs not internalized into the price system but nonetheless real from a social or ecological viewpoint. But even taking the pervasiveness of externalities for granted, the critique of government intervention allows the left little substantial political room for maneouvre – at most mere management of market failures. This does not satisfy Ackerman, who is committed to superseding capitalism as a social system, and therefore he is faced with a plausible economic answer to this critique.

Ackerman's solution is to propose a market socialist alternative, which would have prices (and thereby evade the calculation problem), but not profits – a handy solution if ever there was one, having one's cake and eating it too. In this, he follows some of the market socialist critics from Eastern Europe, who responded to what they saw as the political-economic failures of their countries under Soviet-oriented rule by formulating a happy middle between a planned economy and the 'anarchy' of market capitalism. This proposal boils down to leaving intact the free market in the sphere of production and exchange, with autonomy of firms and competition between them, but by socializing the commanding heights of the economy in the sphere of finance and credit, in particular the banks: "A constellation of autonomous firms, financed by a multiplicity of autonomous banks or investment funds, all competing and interacting in a market — yet all nevertheless socially owned."

Of course, if one has this, but permits profits to be pocketed by the capitalist class, one would simply have a kind of social-democratic capitalism with nationalized banks – perhaps radical, but not necessarily anything novel. Ackerman realizes this and confronts the problem of profit under market socialism with admirable clarity. His proposal is a compulsory purchase of all private financial assets – stocks, bonds, investments, and so forth – and to deposit them into a "multiplicity of socialized banks and investment funds owning and allocating capital among the means of production". Any surplus firms would generate would then (presumably as dividend) be allocated towards this socialized fund, and thereby the capitalist class would be eliminated from the social division of labour – the euthanasia of the rentier interest, at least, as Ackerman notes. Now, this would still leave the tremendous inequalities generated by the buying, rather than expropriating, of the capitalists' financial assets. But here Ackerman has a simple solution as well, a classic left social-democratic measure: one simply caps the total assets an individual (or family) may have. Socialism in two steps!

Is it really so easy? I would argue it is not. It falls to me to defend the currently very unfashionable proposition that a socialist mode of production, recognizable to the Marxist tradition as well as to non-Marxist opponents of capitalism, actually requires a system of central planning and cannot permit any kind of market socialism to exist in the scale and manner Ackerman suggests. To do so, I must also analyze the significance of the central planning efforts of the Soviet Union, seen by friend and foe alike in these debates as the prototype of such a system, and access to what extent it really did 'fail' (as Ackerman takes as decisively proven), and what this might imply. It is no small task, and I will necessarily have to be somewhat summary in my arguments, but the significance of this debate makes it essential to get this right. I do not wish to make a virtue of orthodoxy, but market socialist critiques such as those of Seth Ackerman have been a dime a dozen in the history of the communist movement, and they have never been convincing nor been able to make themselves practical within actual anti-capitalist revolutionary movements. I would argue this is no coincidence, for they contain a number of fundamental flaws that Marx and his immediate successors already identified. In this reply to Ackerman, I will argue two things. Firstly, that market socialism cannot overcome the limitations of capitalism, and secondly, that the failure of Soviet central planning does not condemn the idea of central planning. In fact, I will argue that the flaws in Ackerman's design and the Soviet model of central planning are remarkably similar: both are rooted in the failure to overcome capitalist production, as opposed to distribution.

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The most significant shortcoming of almost all market socialisms, including that of Ackerman, is that they share with neoclassical economics and the liberal tradition generally the

exclusive focus on the process of exchange. This stands in stark contrast to Marx's primary interest, the process of production. It is not for nothing that Marx considered the classical economists' emphasis on exchange to be a powerful ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie. As long as distribution and exchange are the central categories of social relations, the market will seem to be the natural, self-evident form in which one-off exchange between individuals takes place, at least in societies with an advanced division of labor. But, for Marx, it is precisely this fetishism of commodities, this exclusive focus on the sphere of exchange and distribution, that hides the essential nature of capitalist society. In Capital, after discussing exchange value, he then famously writes: "Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face – 'No admittance except on business.' Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit making."

This secret, the core of capitalist social relations that must be overcome to overcome capitalist society altogether, is the process of capitalist production. It is there that capitalist social relations are reproduced on an ever-expanding scale through the repeated separation of workers from the means of production, and the generation of surplus value that results from this separation. Whatever value is produced in capitalist society can only be distributed within the market, but is never generated in it: whatever you gain in exchange, I lose. Marx for this reason distinguished between the labor in capitalist society that immediately produces surplus value, and the manifold kinds of labor that are involved in exchange, transport, marketing, and so forth. The latter do not reproduce capitalist social relations, and therefore fall in the sphere of distribution. This is not to say distribution in this sense is not important: indeed, it forms by far the largest part of the everyday

experience of capitalism in contemporary Western societies. But this is exactly what leads to mistaking all the economic activities of the market for the reproduction of capitalism itself. This is why Marx considered it a form of fetishism. The process of production under capitalist conditions is what reproduces capitalist society – the actual application of labor and technology that allows modern-day society and its accumulative drive to exist. The everyday significance of the sphere of distribution – with its apparent equality of buyer and seller and the smooth machinery of the price system – give rise to the appearance that this is what capitalism is all about, not what happens behind the doors of the factories, sweatshops, and mines. If market socialism does not address the sphere of production, it does not address the fundamental conditions of capitalist society, and therefore does not succeed in overcoming it.

So it's no surprise that in Ackerman's example, nothing at all is said about the production process itself. In his concern to evade the calculation debate's critique of central planning, he permits the central conditions of capitalism to perpetuate themselves: the separation of workers from the means of production, which are not the banks and other distributional institutions, but the factories, mines, sewing machines, and tractors. If nationalizing banks and investment itself had the power to create socialist conditions by themselves, the Royal Bank of Scotland would now be in the vanguard of socialism – which is sadly not the case. Even if all banks were nationalized, and a good deal else besides, as was de facto the case under total war conditions in various capitalist societies during WWII, there would still be a capitalist mode of production. Private appropriation of surplus is not the central feature of capitalism, although this permits a capitalist class to exist independently in political terms. Rather, its central feature is coercing working people to work on means of production not held in common, means that are used for the purposes of accumulation for its own sake. Even if one were to have a 100% tax on profit, and nationalization of banks, hedge funds, and pension funds, as

Ackerman's proposals seem to reduce to, this would be a left social-democratic version of capitalism, perhaps a radically egalitarian capitalism: but a capitalism nonetheless. It would be nothing to sneeze at, but not achieve his aim of an actually socialist society; with capitalist production left intact, so is exploitation, the alienation of working people, and the politics of growth for its own sake.

The reason for this is that, as Marx pointed out, the root of exploitation under capitalism is not insufficient wages per se, or the depredations of finance, but the theft of alien labor time. Not only is labor under capitalism alienated from the means of production and is the worker alienated from society's general interests, but more importantly, the process of exploitation under capitalism necessarily implies that for accumulation to take place on one end, the worker must be paid less than the value of her labor-time on the other. The more capitalist production expands, the less time the worker has for herself. This is why so much of the history of socialist activism does not revolve around higher taxes on the wealthy or the nationalization of the commanding heights, but about reducing the share of their total lifetime workers are forced to produce for the reproduction and expansion of capitalist society – for example through pensions and social security, or overtime laws.

The struggle over exploitation is fundamentally the question of whether the worker has the time to fully develop her intellectual, social, and creative powers, or must devote this time instead to the reproduction of a hostile, alien, and benumbing society, with no time to call her own. Here central planning comes back into view. The aim of central planning, what Marx calls "the society of associated producers", is therefore not just to socialize the process of exchange and distribution of goods – though as Ackerman rightly notes, this is a 'bread and butter' question in its own right – but to develop the productive forces to the degree that the necessary labor-time for all workers can be reduced to a minimum. This leaves maximum time for playing, singing, socializing, sports, art,

music, writing, debating, and all those things that have been considered the good things in life and the birthright of humanity since the classical age.

There is no known process of the market that can achieve this aim, for the logic of the market is blind to the process of production, and concerns itself exclusively with private accumulation and consumption. Just as we do not care, in practice, about the appalling conditions under which our clothing and our food is made, in Ackerman's market socialism the condition and work of the producers is of no significance. Their alienation is not abolished by the mere phrase 'socializing finance'; as long as they are subject to the coercive pressure of competition and accumulation, each other's eternal counterparts, they cannot fully realize their talents and potential as individuals and can therefore society is a hostile force for them.

Ackerman's society, in short, would socialize capital, but not abolish it. It would socialize exploitation, but not abolish it. It would not work towards the fullest development of the creative, intellectual, and social capacities of the majority, and would not apply technology, the embodiment of reduction of necessary labor-time, to this end. As Marx wrote: "economy of time, to this all economy ultimately reduces itself." This applies to market socialism as much as any society, and Ackerman's proposal keeps at arm's length "the very possibility of defetishizing economic life", to borrow from David McNally's critique of market socialism, Against the Market. "To reject this possibility is to embrace the inevitability of alienated labor, of exploitation, and the unplanned and anarchic drive towards competitive accumulation".[2]

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Seth Ackerman also confronts us with a new problem, however – a historical one. Doesn't the Eastern European

experience under 'really existing socialism' disprove the possibility of central planning? Is central planning really necessary to overcome the limitations of market socialism outlined above? The Soviet (and Soviet-dependent) experience plays a central role in Ackerman's argument against the very possibility of a centrally planned society. For Ackerman, Soviet-type central planning was simply too radical; by ignoring the centrality of the market it represented a kind of bureaucratic utopianism whose only result was a shortage of toilet paper at crucial moments. Ackerman only barely acknowledges the very real accomplishments of Soviet society: "when Communism came to poor, rural countries like Bulgaria or Romania they were able to industrialize quickly, wipe out illiteracy, raise education levels, modernize gender roles, and eventually ensure that most people had basic housing and health care". But this is not enough for him. Central planning seems to be unable to go beyond the point of the achievement of mere basic provisions. It can achieve no more than a mid-table economy in GDP per capita terms, with shoddy cars and insufficient toothpaste. This will not do, for the aim of socialism cannot be universal equal poverty, but the possibility of abundance for the widest possible share of society. If central planning cannot achieve this, then we must reject it. But is that true?

I argue that the conventional narrative of central planning's failure must be radically revisited. Ackerman himself already notes that the central planning system performed not much less efficiently than most actually existing capitalisms of today. The Soviet strategy was based on a classic model of high investment rates, financed by the artificial repression of living standards and the (forcible) distribution of the surplus population unproductive in agriculture into the cities as an industrial working class, generating an enormous increase in the productivity of labor. The idea is that such productivity gains are then reinvested into heavy industry, further generating productive capacity, and so forth. This model was followed not just by the USSR, but in a different way also by China, Japan, South Korea, and other nations.

Using mainstream productivity and growth models, the liberal economic historian Robert C. Allen compared the central planning and collectivization of the Stalin period to various alternative approaches. In his book Farm to Factory, Allen astounded orthodox economic historians by finding that the 'Stalinist' approach (albeit credited to Preobrazhensky) was the best possible result among the alternatives.[3] But, the narrative goes, Soviet planning could undertake labor-intensive industry well, but not capital-intensive industry. While the USSR could compete in sheer quantities of steel and coal and cars produced, as their propaganda often boasted, it couldn't compete in spheres of production requiring substantial R&D and rapid technological upgrading of goods. Robert Allen's account, for example, uses this as the explanation of Soviet failure. However, I believe evidence points to a very different conclusion.

William Easterly and Stanley Fischer's World Bank study of the 'Soviet climacteric' argues that Soviet R&D on civilian production actually increased substantially between 1959 and 1984, rejecting the common notion that the Soviet arms race combined with the inflexibility of Soviet production caused the consumer economy to come to a standstill.[4] Moreover, Brendan Beare's correction of the Easterly and Fischer paper has demonstrated that due to statistical mistakes in the reconstruction of the data, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the Soviet economy was much higher than is commonly believed.[5] In other words: previous scholars claimed that when the Soviet surplus population ran out, the USSR was unable to efficiently replace labor with machinery, leading to an inability to make the leap from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production. But Beare's data show that the ratio of this replacement of labor by capital may not have been as bad as previously thought, but in fact may have been quite high, as it was in Japan, which did not experience such stagnation. Nor did investment itself falter: even as late as 1989 the Soviet investment share of GDP was a staggering 35%. In

short, Soviet central planning did not fail due to its inability to develop or implement labor-saving technology.

Why do I mention all these technicalities? Simply to make the important point that the traditional narrative, in which the Soviet central planning model collapsed due to the inherent flaws in such a system's ability to expand and deliver the goods, is untrue. The failure of Soviet and Eastern European planning is no less real than it was before, but it must be understood as a contingent, political failure, located not in the concept of central planning itself, but in the limitations of the Soviet version. By most statistical measures, even those of outright foes of the Soviet Union, their central planning system was an overwhelming success in terms of growth, increases in productivity, and raising the potential living standards. It is not a coincidence that the USSR was the only state ever to make the American ruling class tremble – no mean achievement. Contrary to Ackerman however, I would argue its ultimate failure rested not so much in these categories. It failed for reasons not dissimilar to the flaws of Ackerman's market socialism. The Soviet Union failed not because it was too socialist, but because it was not socialist enough.

The one weakness of the Soviet model was that it was still a form of the 20th century 'developmental state', that is, part of the general push of the past century of poor and underdeveloped countries to develop the productive forces (as Marxists would say) and to modernize at all costs. In so doing, it achieved tremendous things, but it was still subject to the logic of accumulation characteristic of all the negative aspects of capitalism. The workers of the USSR never saw the 'switch' from the development of heavy industry to the point in which the enormous productive capacities so generated would actually be used in their favour: when production would no longer be for exchange or reinvestment, but for general use. Their working days were long and intense, and as illustrated by the propaganda of Stakhanovism, they were ever exhorted to work harder and longer for the accumulation of a socialized surplus.

This brings me to the similarities between the failure of the Soviet model and the problems with Ackerman's plan. Since the USSR arguably lacked a capitalist class, the surplus so accumulated was socialized, but not used for the purpose of general needs. The technology developed was socialized, but applied to further generate surplus, not to reduce the necessary labor-time to a minimum. Finally, the ultimate yardstick of the USSR was its military-industrial competition with the USA, not the fullest development of all. In short, just like Ackerman's market socialism, Soviet society fell short of true socialism. Soviet society, and the Eastern European states dependent on them, asked its working class to postpone the move to a recognizably socialist form of production as long as the country, isolated and surrounded, needed to develop. Investment, the distribution of goods, housing and healthcare: all these were socialized, but there was no 'society of the associated producers' sought by Marx. The result was that competitive production would lead to the preservation of exploitation. This is exactly the same flaw I outlined in Ackerman's plan: a failure to overcome capitalist production means a failure to overcome capitalism itself. In this sense, the Soviet economy is actually closer to Ackerman's ideal than he realizes.

I would argue then, contrary to Ackerman, that the failure of actually existing central planning is not one of its potential, but historically one of its politics. The drive for accumulation for its own sake makes sense, when productivity in poor countries must be developed so that socialism can mean general abundance, not general poverty. I completely agree with Ackerman when he points to the importance of whether the supermarkets are full or empty. But there can be no market-based socialism, because capitalism ultimately does not reproduce itself in the market, but in production. Soviet central planning is in this respect a step up from that, as it socializes not only all spheres of distribution and surplus, but also consciously aims for developing productivity so that ultimately the 'switch' can be made towards a general needs-based society. However, it failed this test. The working class resisted this

accumulation, as it represented the perpetual postponement of their personal development in the name of the general interest. This resistance took the form of a resistance to work, since this and this only was the remaining locus of capitalist logic in the Soviet system: hence the endless thefts from the workplace, the low quality of production, the shoddiness of the finished goods, the sullen, passive noncompliance with the state apparatus and its designs, and finally the fruitless attempts by the Soviet state to remedy these by draconian measures and moral exhortations. The problem with Soviet-type central planning was therefore a political, not a technical one.

Central planning is simply not the problem Ackerman makes it out to be. In fact, we see it at work even in 'normal' capitalism all the time. As soon as push comes to shove, and the liberal-democratic societies are threatened by total war, they approximate central planning in their production methods as closely as their political systems allow. Capitalist firms rely on high-level central planning all the time in the modern economy. Just-in-time distribution, Amazon's on-demand system, modern supermarket provisioning, international cargo shipping, air traffic coordination: all these are examples of sophisticated and accurate central planning in the contemporary world. Our computing techniques and capacity have improved by several factors since the Cuban Missile Crisis: there is nothing technical stopping us from applying this technology in the benefit of socialist humanity rather than a small elite of owners and investors. But if we do not want to repeat the mistakes of market socialism and of Soviet planning both, we must put the conditions of production at the forefront of our transition to socialism. Let us learn all we can about logistics, about organizational theory, about planning models. Let us take the enormous technological capacities and productivity of capitalist society, "which has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals", and use it to reduce to a minimum the work expected from everyone; especially dirty, unpleasant, and degrading work. Our unprecedented expansion of free time will

see not just a flourishing of culture and the intellect, but also of many more ideas to perfect the process of production and distribution to the benefit of all. Then the realm of freedom will truly begin, and with it a new, socialist, history of humanity.

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Notes

1) Ackerman, Seth. "The Red and the Black." Jacobin. 2013: n. page. Web. 8 Oct. 2013. <http://jacobinmag.com/2012/12/the-red-and-the-black/>.
2) David McNally, Against the Market (London/New York, NY 1993), p. 184.
3) Robert C. Allen, Farm to Factory (Princeton, NJ 2009).
4) Easterly, William and Stanley Fischer. 1995. "The Soviet Economic Decline", in:World Bank Economic Review vol. 9, p. 341-371.
5) Beare, Brendan K. 2008. "The Soviet Economic Decline Revisited". Econ Journal Watch 5:2 (May 2008), p. 135-144.

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Theodor W. Adorno


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

#3

#1,2,3 — R.M. Rogers

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